Fix path traversal attack in -proto-out-dir (#573)

* Fix path traversal in `-proto-out-dir`

A malicious file descriptor name (e.g. from an untrusted protoset or
server reflection) could escape the output directory through ../
sequences, writing attacker-controlled content to arbitrary paths.

Confine all writes to an `os.Root` opened on the output directory.

* assert

* refactor

---------

Co-authored-by: Scott Blum <dragonsinth@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bram
2026-07-27 15:30:28 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 353acfef45
commit 6be36ba632
2 changed files with 67 additions and 8 deletions
+20 -7
View File
@@ -309,24 +309,37 @@ func WriteProtoFiles(outProtoDirPath string, descSource DescriptorSource, symbol
for _, filename := range filenames {
allFileDescriptors = addFilesToFileDescriptorList(allFileDescriptors, expandedFiles, fds[filename])
}
return writeProtoFiles(outProtoDirPath, allFileDescriptors)
}
func writeProtoFiles(outProtoDirPath string, allFileDescriptors []*desc.FileDescriptor) error {
if err := os.MkdirAll(outProtoDirPath, 0755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create output directory %q: %w", outProtoDirPath, err)
}
root, err := os.OpenRoot(outProtoDirPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to open output directory %q: %w", outProtoDirPath, err)
}
defer root.Close()
pr := protoprint.Printer{}
// now we can serialize to files
for i := range allFileDescriptors {
if err := writeProtoFile(outProtoDirPath, allFileDescriptors[i], &pr); err != nil {
if err := writeProtoFile(root, allFileDescriptors[i], &pr); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func writeProtoFile(outProtoDirPath string, fd *desc.FileDescriptor, pr *protoprint.Printer) error {
outFile := filepath.Join(outProtoDirPath, fd.GetFullyQualifiedName())
outDir := filepath.Dir(outFile)
if err := os.MkdirAll(outDir, 0777); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory %q: %w", outDir, err)
func writeProtoFile(root *os.Root, fd *desc.FileDescriptor, pr *protoprint.Printer) error {
// root confines all path operations to the output directory, so a
// malicious file name (e.g. "../escape.proto") cannot write outside it
outFile := fd.GetFullyQualifiedName()
if err := root.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(outFile), 0755); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create directory for %q: %w", outFile, err)
}
f, err := os.Create(outFile)
f, err := root.Create(outFile)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create proto file %q: %w", outFile, err)
}