fix(auth): reject unsigned x-amz-* headers to close CopyObject confused-deputy

A presigned or signed PUT authorized for a single object could be turned
into a server-side copy of any object the signing key can read by adding
an unsigned x-amz-copy-source header, executed as the signer. SigV4
verification only walked the signed-headers list, never the headers that
actually arrived; the meta-header check matched only X-Amz-Meta- and ran
only on the presigned path, so an unsigned x-amz-* header outside the
list was never seen while the router still dispatched the PUT to
CopyObjectHandler.

Reject any x-amz-* request header not covered by the signed headers, on
both the presigned (doesPresignedSignatureMatch) and Authorization-header
(doesSignatureMatch) paths, matching AWS S3. The check tests membership
in the signed set rather than value equality, so a header whose first
value is empty (e.g. {"", "/src/secret"}) cannot slip through.
X-Amz-Content-Sha256 is exempt (payload hash: read from the query for
presigned requests and bound into the string-to-sign for signed ones, so
it is self-protected) and X-Amz-Signature-Age is exempt (an internal
scratch header written after verification, so repeated verification of
the same request stays idempotent). The synthesized X-Amz-Tagging header
in PutObjectTagging is now injected after signature verification.

Tests that previously added x-amz-copy-source and friends after signing
(relying on the vulnerable behavior) now re-sign, mirroring real S3
clients. Adds checkUnsignedHeaders unit cases and TestPresignedVerifyIdempotent.

Reported by Oren Yomtov. Inherited unchanged from upstream minio/minio.
Tracked as SN-2026-011.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
This commit is contained in:
Feng Ruohang
2026-09-10 09:57:01 +08:00
parent 8a2fe9b7a0
commit 1233254309
12 changed files with 231 additions and 24 deletions
+6 -3
View File
@@ -3658,9 +3658,6 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
}
tagsStr := tags.String()
// Set this such that authorization policies can be applied on the object tags.
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzObjectTagging, tagsStr)
logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
@@ -3668,6 +3665,12 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
return
}
// Set this such that authorization policies can be applied on the object
// tags. This is derived from the request body, so it must be injected only
// after signature verification: the SigV4 verifier now rejects unsigned
// x-amz-* request headers, and this synthesized header is never signed.
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzObjectTagging, tagsStr)
opts, err := getOpts(ctx, r, bucket, object)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)