fix: harden CORS and replication request trust

Keep pre-authentication CORS lookups resident-only so attacker-controlled path segments cannot trigger metadata I/O or grow the metadata cache. Preserve fail-closed behavior for startup, load failures, invalid metadata, and the internal namespace.

Centralize replication request trust after authentication, distinguish general replication from replica-only privileges, and gate SSE-C ciphertext handling, source metadata, object-lock bypasses, event suppression, delete semantics, and replica status on the appropriate permission. Add least-privilege, multipart, PostPolicy, CORS amplification, and compatibility regressions.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
This commit is contained in:
Feng Ruohang
2026-09-01 20:50:08 +08:00
parent d5e763b072
commit 938603458d
15 changed files with 1377 additions and 164 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ func DecryptObjectInfo(info *ObjectInfo, r *http.Request) (encrypted bool, err e
if encrypted {
if crypto.SSEC.IsEncrypted(info.UserDefined) {
if !crypto.SSEC.IsRequested(headers) && !crypto.SSECopy.IsRequested(headers) {
if r.Header.Get(xhttp.MinIOSourceReplicationRequest) != "true" {
if !isReplicaTrusted(r.Context()) {
return encrypted, errEncryptedObject
}
}