Remove the per-username LDAP STS throttle bucket and keep the limiter keyed only by source IP. A username bucket is shared across all clients and lets one source keep a known account's bucket drained with bad-password attempts, locking the legitimate user out before LDAP bind.
For trusted proxies, stop trusting the left-most forwarded address. Resolve X-Forwarded-For right-to-left, skip trusted proxy hops, reject catch-all trusted-proxy CIDRs, and intentionally ignore RFC 7239 Forwarded for this security-sensitive bucket. Document that X-Real-IP is trusted verbatim and must be overwritten by the trusted proxy, not passed through from clients.
Update focused limiter, source-IP, trusted-proxy, and LDAP config tests to cover source-only buckets, spoofed appended XFF, multi-hop trusted proxies, Forwarded fallback, catch-all rejection, and the X-Real-IP deployment contract.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Prevent LDAP STS reservation cancel paths from over-crediting rate-limit buckets by capping refill and refund capacity against in-flight reservations.
Add an explicit trusted-proxy allowlist for LDAP STS source bucketing, prefer clean X-Real-IP values on trusted peers, and extend tests/docs for the new behavior.
Prevent username enumeration in AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity by returning the same external STS error for unknown users and invalid passwords, while preserving LDAP infrastructure failures as upstream errors so they continue to surface as 500s and remain visible in server logs.
Add a small in-memory rate limiter for LDAP STS login attempts, keyed by source IP and normalized username, and add regression coverage for auth failure classification, throttling, and Docker-backed LDAP end-to-end flows.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Feng Ruohang