The address MinIO attributes a request to is read from X-Forwarded-For,
X-Real-IP or RFC 7239 Forwarded, and never from the connection unless all
three are absent. It becomes aws:SourceIp and the audit remotehost field,
so any client that can reach the API port chooses the value an IpAddress
condition is evaluated against and the address every logged action is
attributed to.
MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES now selects who may make that claim:
unset the historical behaviour, unchanged
none no forwarded header is believed; the TCP peer wins
<CIDRs> believed only from listed peers, chains read right-to-left
Reading right-to-left is what makes an appending proxy safe: each hop
appends the peer it actually saw, so an entry a client injected can only
sit to the left of one a proxy wrote. The stock nginx recipe
$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for appends, which leaves the client's entry
left-most - exactly where the untrusted path reads - so a deployment with
no direct route to the API port was forgeable too.
_MINIO_API_XFF_HEADER is deliberately untouched, in semantics and in read
timing. Widening it to mean "trust nothing" was implemented and reverted:
it is the only part of this change that could alter a deployed
configuration, and the new variable expresses the same guarantee at no
compatibility cost. Upstream's TestXFFDisabled is retained verbatim.
Notes on the allow-list mode, all covered by tests:
- it must name proxies, not the subnet they sit in; listed entries are
skipped while walking, so a range covering clients lets them forge
- a cluster must list its own nodes, because MinIO forwards between
them and a client can force a hop via the ListObjectsV2 token
- loopback is trusted as a peer, not as a chain entry, so FTP and SFTP
keep attributing their sessions
- the node-to-node forwarder drops X-Real-IP and Forwarded from a peer
not entitled to have set them
- the walk scans the header in place and stops after 100 hops, so a
long chain costs neither allocation nor unbounded work
No behaviour change for any deployment that does not set the new
variable: the untrusted path is a verbatim copy of the previous function
body, differentially verified against it over ~5.1M header combinations.
The LDAP STS allow-list now shares the list parser as pure code motion,
verified identical across every combination of 37 allow-list values and
21 peer addresses.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update the STS, security, select, and Docker documentation to reflect the recent hardening work, including LDAP STS throttling details, OIDC JWT verification changes, and the new pgsty-specific security policy and advisory index.
Rewrite repository and raw-document links that still pointed at minio/minio so the docs consistently reference pgsty/minio instead.
The core idea is to keep the documentation aligned with the fork's actual security behavior, ownership, and upgrade guidance without mixing in unrelated code changes.
This commit removes the SSE-S3 key rotation functionality
from CopyObject since there will be a dedicated Admin-API
for this purpose.
Also update the security documentation to link to mc and
the admin documentation.
This commit adds some documentation about the design of the
SSE-C and SSE-S3 implementation. It describes how the Minio server
encrypt objects and manages keys.
Feng Ruohang