The address MinIO attributes a request to is read from X-Forwarded-For,
X-Real-IP or RFC 7239 Forwarded, and never from the connection unless all
three are absent. It becomes aws:SourceIp and the audit remotehost field,
so any client that can reach the API port chooses the value an IpAddress
condition is evaluated against and the address every logged action is
attributed to.
MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES now selects who may make that claim:
unset the historical behaviour, unchanged
none no forwarded header is believed; the TCP peer wins
<CIDRs> believed only from listed peers, chains read right-to-left
Reading right-to-left is what makes an appending proxy safe: each hop
appends the peer it actually saw, so an entry a client injected can only
sit to the left of one a proxy wrote. The stock nginx recipe
$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for appends, which leaves the client's entry
left-most - exactly where the untrusted path reads - so a deployment with
no direct route to the API port was forgeable too.
_MINIO_API_XFF_HEADER is deliberately untouched, in semantics and in read
timing. Widening it to mean "trust nothing" was implemented and reverted:
it is the only part of this change that could alter a deployed
configuration, and the new variable expresses the same guarantee at no
compatibility cost. Upstream's TestXFFDisabled is retained verbatim.
Notes on the allow-list mode, all covered by tests:
- it must name proxies, not the subnet they sit in; listed entries are
skipped while walking, so a range covering clients lets them forge
- a cluster must list its own nodes, because MinIO forwards between
them and a client can force a hop via the ListObjectsV2 token
- loopback is trusted as a peer, not as a chain entry, so FTP and SFTP
keep attributing their sessions
- the node-to-node forwarder drops X-Real-IP and Forwarded from a peer
not entitled to have set them
- the walk scans the header in place and stops after 100 hops, so a
long chain costs neither allocation nor unbounded work
No behaviour change for any deployment that does not set the new
variable: the untrusted path is a verbatim copy of the previous function
body, differentially verified against it over ~5.1M header combinations.
The LDAP STS allow-list now shares the list parser as pure code motion,
verified identical across every combination of 37 allow-list values and
21 peer addresses.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
A bucket policy that allows s3:DeleteObject only when s3:versionid is null
-- Condition {"Null": {"s3:versionid": "true"}}, the idiom for "let clients
delete current objects but not roll back versions" -- denied every delete,
including the version-less ones it was meant to permit (upstream issue
minio/minio#21735).
getConditionValues wrote "versionid": {""} unconditionally. The condition
engine decides Null by slice length (nullfunc.evaluate), so a present-but-
empty value reads as "key present": Null:true never matched and Null:false
always did. Absent and empty were indistinguishable.
Writing the key only when the request names a version fixes the reported
case but, alone, opens a worse one. DeleteObjects carries each object's
version in the XML body, which getConditionValues -- reading only r.Form --
never sees. A body version would then vanish from the map, read as null,
and a policy meant to protect old versions would authorize deleting a
specific one. So authorization also rebinds versionid to the effective,
server-resolved reqInfo.VersionID for DeleteObjectAction: the per-entry
body value that checkRequestAuthTypeWithVID already sets in the
DeleteObjects loop, deleting the key when that value is empty. A
query-level ?versionId on a DeleteObjects POST no longer leaks into any
entry's decision.
Finally, trim the version the condition builder reads. newContext and
getOpts both TrimSpace it before the object layer acts, so an untrimmed
value here let a padded ?versionId=V%20 present a different s3:versionid
than the version actually operated on, sidestepping a Deny keyed on
StringEquals s3:versionid. DeleteObjectAction was already immune via the
trimmed reqInfo value; this covers GetObject, tagging, retention, and the
copy-source read.
Tests: an end-to-end DeleteObjects against a Null:{s3:versionid:true}
policy over versioned objects (with a decoy query versionId proving the
per-entry body value wins), and a unit test asserting key presence,
trimming, and the copy-source fallback.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Require Go 1.26.5, gRPC 1.82.1, and x/text 0.39.0 while retaining the dependency graph's existing pins wherever MVS permits. Restore the blocking govulncheck job and correct the documented security advisories.
Replace upstream docs.min.io references with the SILO documentation domain and remove the upstream community path prefix.
Co-authored-by: waterkip <6317502+waterkip@users.noreply.github.com>
Update the module Go directive and release Docker build images from Go 1.26.2 to Go 1.26.4 so local, CI, hotfix, and release builds use the same patched toolchain.
Keep ordinary Go module requirements and replacements unchanged; this intentionally avoids a third-party dependency refresh while allowing container system packages to refresh through the newer golang Alpine base image and existing apk resolution.
Update the security advisory index to record the Go 1.26.4 toolchain bump alongside the earlier Go 1.26.2 security update.
Verified with go build ./..., go vet ./cmd/, and focused cmd tests. go mod tidy -diff was attempted as a read-only dependency drift check but could not complete because proxy.golang.org timed out while fetching uncached transitive test modules.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Remove the per-username LDAP STS throttle bucket and keep the limiter keyed only by source IP. A username bucket is shared across all clients and lets one source keep a known account's bucket drained with bad-password attempts, locking the legitimate user out before LDAP bind.
For trusted proxies, stop trusting the left-most forwarded address. Resolve X-Forwarded-For right-to-left, skip trusted proxy hops, reject catch-all trusted-proxy CIDRs, and intentionally ignore RFC 7239 Forwarded for this security-sensitive bucket. Document that X-Real-IP is trusted verbatim and must be overwritten by the trusted proxy, not passed through from clients.
Update focused limiter, source-IP, trusted-proxy, and LDAP config tests to cover source-only buckets, spoofed appended XFF, multi-hop trusted proxies, Forwarded fallback, catch-all rejection, and the X-Real-IP deployment contract.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Update the STS, security, select, and Docker documentation to reflect the recent hardening work, including LDAP STS throttling details, OIDC JWT verification changes, and the new pgsty-specific security policy and advisory index.
Rewrite repository and raw-document links that still pointed at minio/minio so the docs consistently reference pgsty/minio instead.
The core idea is to keep the documentation aligned with the fork's actual security behavior, ownership, and upgrade guidance without mixing in unrelated code changes.
Prevent LDAP STS reservation cancel paths from over-crediting rate-limit buckets by capping refill and refund capacity against in-flight reservations.
Add an explicit trusted-proxy allowlist for LDAP STS source bucketing, prefer clean X-Real-IP values on trusted peers, and extend tests/docs for the new behavior.
- Revert console dependency from stripped v1.7.7-pre to v1.7.6,
restoring the full embedded management console
- Rewrite README disclaimer with proper trademark attribution and
nominative fair use language for AGPL compliance
- Update documentation links and Go module paths to this repository
- Restore docs removed upstream (hotfixes.md, metrics/v3.md)
- Restore feature request issue template
- Update Go version to 1.26.0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`go run golang.org/x/tools/gopls/internal/analysis/modernize/cmd/modernize@latest -fix -test ./...` executed.
`go generate ./...` ran afterwards to keep generated.
There is prefix in json, but not in the equivalent command line. Although the role of prefix has been explained in the previous example, I think it should be supplemented.
Allow multiple private keys and extract all files from streams.
Place files in the folder with `.enc` removed.
Do basic checks so streams cannot traverse outside of the folder.
Before https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/20575, files could pick up indices
from unrelated files if no index was added.
This would result in these files not being consistent across a set.
When loading, search for the compression indicators and check if they
are within the problematic date range, and clean up any parts that have
an index but shouldn't.
The test validates that the signature matches the one in files stored without an index.
Bumps xlMetaVersion, so this check doesn't have to be made for future versions.
Feng Ruohang