The test and verification scripts invoked ./minio and pulled their tooling from
upstream infrastructure with no integrity check. Every `curl | tar` of a client
or an old server binary was an unverified execution path in a script that
regularly runs as a privileged user, and several fetched a floating "latest".
Two installers replace all of it:
- install-mcli.sh resolves a pinned pgsty/mc release, downloads the archive and
its checksum manifest, requires exactly one valid manifest entry for the
asset, verifies it, and installs. MCLI_BIN with a mandatory MCLI_SHA256 lets
an offline or air-gapped run supply its own binary, still checksum-checked.
- install-verified-fixture.sh takes source, expected SHA-256 and target, and
refuses anything that does not match. Sources may be a URL or a local file.
Every script that previously downloaded mc now calls install-mcli.sh. The three
places that genuinely need an upstream artifact - the old MinIO server binary
for the LDAP IAM upgrade-import test, the 2021 mc for the three-site
replication test, and the functional-tests.sh fixture - go through
install-verified-fixture.sh with the digest recorded inline. Those dl.min.io
URLs remain on purpose: they are historical upstream artifacts needed to prove
upgrade compatibility, and they are now pinned and verified rather than
trusted.
The scripts otherwise switch to ./silo, silo.service, the silo container and
compose service names, and SILO_CONFIG_DIR. run-multi-site-minio-idp.sh is
renamed to run-multi-site-silo-idp.sh with the Makefile target following.
buildscripts/minio-upgrade.sh keeps its name and its `minio server` argv - it
exists to test the MinIO-to-Silo upgrade, so the old side must stay old - but
it is now pinned to an image digest rather than a tag, and its `docker system
prune` and `docker volume prune` calls are removed. Those ran unfiltered
against the developer's whole Docker installation; the resiliency tests had the
same problem and lose their prune and `docker ps -q` sweeps too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A bucket policy that allows s3:DeleteObject only when s3:versionid is null
-- Condition {"Null": {"s3:versionid": "true"}}, the idiom for "let clients
delete current objects but not roll back versions" -- denied every delete,
including the version-less ones it was meant to permit (upstream issue
minio/minio#21735).
getConditionValues wrote "versionid": {""} unconditionally. The condition
engine decides Null by slice length (nullfunc.evaluate), so a present-but-
empty value reads as "key present": Null:true never matched and Null:false
always did. Absent and empty were indistinguishable.
Writing the key only when the request names a version fixes the reported
case but, alone, opens a worse one. DeleteObjects carries each object's
version in the XML body, which getConditionValues -- reading only r.Form --
never sees. A body version would then vanish from the map, read as null,
and a policy meant to protect old versions would authorize deleting a
specific one. So authorization also rebinds versionid to the effective,
server-resolved reqInfo.VersionID for DeleteObjectAction: the per-entry
body value that checkRequestAuthTypeWithVID already sets in the
DeleteObjects loop, deleting the key when that value is empty. A
query-level ?versionId on a DeleteObjects POST no longer leaks into any
entry's decision.
Finally, trim the version the condition builder reads. newContext and
getOpts both TrimSpace it before the object layer acts, so an untrimmed
value here let a padded ?versionId=V%20 present a different s3:versionid
than the version actually operated on, sidestepping a Deny keyed on
StringEquals s3:versionid. DeleteObjectAction was already immune via the
trimmed reqInfo value; this covers GetObject, tagging, retention, and the
copy-source read.
Tests: an end-to-end DeleteObjects against a Null:{s3:versionid:true}
policy over versioned objects (with a decoy query versionId proving the
per-entry body value wins), and a unit test asserting key presence,
trimming, and the copy-source fallback.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
without atomic load() it is possible that for
a slow receiver we would get into a hot-loop, when
logCh is full and there are many incoming callers.
to avoid this as a workaround enable BATCH_SIZE
greater than 100 to ensure that your slow receiver
receives data in bulk to avoid being throttled in
some manner.
this PR however fixes the unprotected access to
the current workers value.
The `Token` parameter is a sensitive value that should not be output in the Audit log for STS AssumeRoleWithCustomToken API.
Bonus: Add a simple tool that echoes audit logs to the console.
- Adds an STS API `AssumeRoleWithCustomToken` that can be used to
authenticate via the Id. Mgmt. Plugin.
- Adds a sample identity manager plugin implementation
- Add doc for plugin and STS API
- Add an example program using go SDK for AssumeRoleWithCustomToken
- This change renames the OPA integration as Access Management Plugin - there is
nothing specific to OPA in the integration, it is just a webhook.
- OPA configuration is automatically migrated to Access Management Plugin and
OPA specific configuration is marked as deprecated.
- OPA doc is updated and moved.
Feng Ruohang