GetObjectAttributes lets a replication peer read SSE-C attributes without
presenting the customer key. That carve-out was keyed on the
X-Minio-Source-Replication-Request header alone, which any client can set,
so a caller holding only s3:GetObject could read an SSE-C object's ETag,
plaintext size, part list, and checksums without the key -- the response was
byte-identical to one made with the correct key.
Gate the carve-out on s3:ReplicateObject for the target object, mirroring
CopyObjectHandler's existing replication check.
The pre-existing test asserted the carve-out with root credentials, which
hold every action and therefore cannot tell a gated check apart from an
ungated one. Add least-privilege cases that do: a reader without
s3:ReplicateObject is now refused, a caller that holds it keeps the
carve-out, and the ordinary key-bearing path is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Unseal the supplied customer key after request preconditions before returning object size, ETag, checksum, or part attributes. Cover zero-byte and non-empty objects with correct, wrong, and missing keys.\n\nRefs #84.
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
A key rotation rewraps the object key held in metadata; it never re-encrypts
the stored bytes. CopyObjectHandler took that shortcut whenever the request
looked like a same-object SSE-C rotation, on the assumption that the object
layer would then leave the stored bytes alone. That is the same assumption
copyRewritesObjectData() was added to stop making.
When the source is a null version on a bucket that gained versioning after the
object was written, the object layer cannot reference that version and falls
back to PutObject. The reader at that point holds plaintext decrypted with the
old key and no EncryptFn is set, so the destination ends up storing plaintext
under metadata that claims the object is SSE-C encrypted. A subsequent GET
failed with "sio: unsupported version".
Gate the rotation shortcut on the same prediction the compression metadata
already uses. When the object layer stores new object data the rotation falls
through to the regular re-encrypting copy, which decrypts with the old key and
re-encrypts with the new one. The source version selection moves next to the
gate because both decisions need it.
That fallback authenticates the source key through the source decryptor, which
GetObjectNInfo does not build for a zero byte object. Check the key explicitly
before the destination is written, so the gate cannot turn a rotation that the
shortcut rejected with AccessDenied into one that succeeds. The re-encrypting
copy regenerates the encrypted ETag, unlike an in-place rotation; the test
records that difference.
The other three object layer CopyObject callers that set metadataOnly -
PostRestoreObjectHandler, updateRestoreMetadata and batchKeyRotate - address
the same version on both sides and never set Versioned, so they only reach the
two in-place cases already covered by the copyRewritesObjectData table.
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Fk3PAD7DHCYzcyegYWqAmt
CopyObjectHandler recorded the source compression metadata whenever the copy
was metadata-only, on the assumption that the object layer would then leave
the stored bytes alone. That assumption does not hold. Both
erasureServerPools.CopyObject and erasureSets.CopyObject only skip a data
rewrite in three cases, and otherwise fall back to a full PutObject.
The reachable gap is a copy whose source is a null version on a bucket that
gained versioning after the object was written. Neither version ID is set, so
the self-referential version branch is skipped, the data is rewritten as
plaintext, and the preserved compression metadata then described bytes that
no longer exist. A subsequent GET failed with "s2: corrupt input".
Mirror the object layer's decision in copyRewritesObjectData and record the
compression metadata from it, so the metadata always describes whichever
bytes are finally stored. The source version selection that lets a versioned
metadata-only copy add a self-referential version moves next to the same
decision, since both depend on the effective metadata-only value.
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The legacy etcd federation branch of CopyObjectPartHandler forwards copied
bytes with minio-go Core.PutObjectPart, which can only recover a checksum
from response headers. After the server-side part checksum work, the remote
computes and persists the checksum, but an AWS-compatible UploadPart response
correctly omits a checksum the request did not supply, so the proxy had
nothing to put in CopyPartResult.
The destination now returns the non-empty checksum fields of the PartInfo
produced by that exact write, but only when the request carries the
minio-federated application token that getRemoteInstanceClient already
attaches. Ordinary UploadPart responses are unchanged, and the checksum type
is deliberately not returned because UploadPart does not carry it. The
User-Agent is a response-shape hint only: it never gates authorization,
visibility or validation, and it can expose nothing beyond the checksum of
the body the caller just uploaded.
Reading the checksum from the same PartInfo that produced the response ETag
also keeps the pair bound to one write, so a concurrent overwrite of the same
part number cannot publish another writer's checksum.
Tests cover the application token gating matrix including lookalike tokens,
the real minio-go response parser, concurrent overwrites of one part number,
and an in-process two-deployment probe that drives the federation branch
through the real getRemoteInstanceClient into a real PutObjectPartHandler for
both FULL_OBJECT and COMPOSITE uploads.
Fixes#64
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Policy evaluation mixed server-derived identity and transport values with raw headers and query parameters. A client could therefore shadow internal condition keys, synthesize LDAP or JWT resource variables, substitute request tags for stored tags, or make a condition observe a value different from the one the handler actually used.
Partition condition sources, reserve internal names, adopt exact-name lookup from silo-pkg, and bind authorization to the effective request state. Preserve compatible query forms for storage class and upload tags with explicit header precedence, while restricting signature age and existing-object tags to authenticated or server-resolved values.
Tests sweep every supported key across header and query routes and exercise LDAP/OIDC variables, object-lock spelling, STS tags, metadata extraction, and end-to-end policy decisions.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Track issue #28 / GHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237 as fake CVE-2026-40028. Close the Snowball auto-extract auth gap in PutObjectExtractHandler by treating authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer the same as ordinary PUTs: honor X-Amz-Decoded-Content-Length, initialize newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader(), and verify the SigV4 request before any tar bytes reach untar(). This removes the forged-signature write primitive that let a single request fan out into arbitrary extracted object creation.
Add regression coverage for forged-signature Snowball unsigned-trailer writes, anonymous Snowball requests against non-public buckets, and legitimate signed Snowball extraction with trailing CRC32 trailers. Validate the new tests against the vulnerable parent and patched tree, and confirm with containerized before/after smoke runs that the exploit succeeds pre-fix, fails post-fix, and normal signed Snowball uploads still extract correctly.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Track issue #27 / GHSA-hv4r-mvr4-25vw as fake CVE-2026-40027. Close the unsigned-trailer trust flaw that let query-string credentials skip signature verification in PutObject and PutObjectPart by moving presigned rejection and SigV4 verification into newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader(), so authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer can no longer silently downgrade query auth into an anonymous body read.
Add focused regression coverage for forged query-string-only unsigned-trailer PUTs and multipart uploads, mixed header/query auth rejection, and anonymous unsigned-trailer writes that remain allowed only when bucket policy explicitly permits them. Validate the new tests against the vulnerable parent and confirm with before/after live-server runs that presigned unsigned-trailer attacks are rejected while legitimate header-authenticated and policy-driven flows still work.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Close the replication-header trust flaw that allowed ordinary PutObject and CopyObject requests to smuggle X-Minio-Replication-* headers into X-Minio-Internal-* SSE metadata and write objects into an unreadable state. Stop accepting replication-only metadata in the default extraction path, restore it only after a trusted replication write has passed ReplicateObjectAction, and tighten CopyObject by sanitizing replication-only request headers before metadata, precondition, and SSE-C source handling consume them. Also gate replica status writes on the same trusted replication path and restore replication SSE metadata in multipart and snowball upload flows so legitimate replication continues to work.
Add focused regression coverage for untrusted PUT and COPY header poisoning at the handler layer, plus helper tests for trusted vs untrusted metadata extraction and CopyObject header sanitization. Validate the new tests against both the patched tree and the vulnerable HEAD baseline, and confirm with live server before/after runs that malicious PUT/COPY requests no longer turn objects unreadable.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
`go run golang.org/x/tools/gopls/internal/analysis/modernize/cmd/modernize@latest -fix -test ./...` executed.
`go generate ./...` ran afterwards to keep generated.
This is a security incident fix, it would seem like since
the implementation of unsigned payload trailer on PUTs,
we do not validate the signature of the incoming request.
The signature can be invalid and is totally being ignored,
this in-turn allows any arbitrary secret to upload objects
given the user has "WRITE" permissions on the bucket, since
acces-key is a public information in general exposes these
potential users with WRITE on the bucket to be used by any
arbitrary client to make a fake request to MinIO the signature
under Authorization: header is totally ignored.
A test has been added to cover this scenario and fail
appropriately.
- Move VersionPurgeStatus into replication package
- ilm: Evaluate policy w/ obj retention/replication
- lifecycle: Use Evaluator to enforce ILM in scanner
- Unit tests covering ILM, replication and retention
- Simplify NewEvaluator constructor
* Add the policy name to the audit log tags when doing policy-based API calls
* Audit log the retention settings requested in the API call
* Audit log of retention on PutObjectRetention API path too
When the encryption and compression are both enabled, the
the server will avoid compressing the data for no apparent reason
This commit will enable it and update unit tests.
Services are unfrozen before `initBackgroundReplication` is finished. This means that
the globalReplicationStats write is racy. Switch to an atomic pointer.
Provide the `ReplicationPool` with the stats, so it doesn't have to be grabbed
from the atomic pointer on every use.
All other loads and checks are nil, and calls return empty values when stats
still haven't been initialized.
* Multipart SSEC checksums were not transferred.
* Remove key mismatch logging. This key is user-controlled with SSEC.
* If the source is SSEC and the destination reports ErrSSEEncryptedObject,
assume replication is good.
precondition check was being honored before, validating
if anonymous access is allowed on the metadata of an
object, leading to metadata disclosure of the following
headers.
```
Last-Modified
Etag
x-amz-version-id
Expires:
Cache-Control:
```
although the information presented is minimal in nature,
and of opaque nature. It still simply discloses that an
object by a specific name exists or not without even having
enough permissions.
This change uses the updated ldap library in minio/pkg (bumped
up to v3). A new config parameter is added for LDAP configuration to
specify extra user attributes to load from the LDAP server and to store
them as additional claims for the user.
A test is added in sts_handlers.go that shows how to access the LDAP
attributes as a claim.
This is in preparation for adding SSH pubkey authentication to MinIO's SFTP
integration.
```
==================
WARNING: DATA RACE
Read at 0x0000082be990 by goroutine 205:
github.com/minio/minio/cmd.setCommonHeaders()
Previous write at 0x0000082be990 by main goroutine:
github.com/minio/minio/cmd.lookupConfigs()
```
Recent Veeam is very picky about storage class names. Add `_MINIO_VEEAM_FORCE_SC` env var.
It will override the storage class returned by the storage backend if it is non-standard
and we detect a Veeam client by checking the User Agent.
Applies to HeadObject/GetObject/ListObject*
This PR makes a feasible approach to handle all the scenarios
that we must face to avoid returning "panic."
Instead, we must return "errServerNotInitialized" when a
bucketMetadataSys.Get() is called, allowing the caller to
retry their operation and wait.
Bonus fix the way data-usage-cache stores the object.
Instead of storing usage-cache.bin with the bucket as
`.minio.sys/buckets`, the `buckets` must be relative
to the bucket `.minio.sys` as part of the object name.
Otherwise, there is no way to decommission entries at
`.minio.sys/buckets` and their final erasure set positions.
A bucket must never have a `/` in it. Adds code to read()
from existing data-usage.bin upon upgrade.
Feng Ruohang