README, README_ZH, SECURITY, COMPLIANCE, CONTRIBUTING, NOTICE,
code_of_conduct, the vulnerability and PR-etiquette documents, the GitHub issue
and pull request templates, and the docs/ tree all present Silo as the product.
The Grafana dashboards under docs/metrics/prometheus/grafana/ have their panel
titles and descriptions rebranded while every minio_* query, label and
expression is left alone, so existing alerts and recording rules keep matching.
The distinction the review demanded is applied per hit rather than by
search-and-replace:
- Product and command text becomes Silo and silo: install and run instructions,
systemd examples, compose services, download links, badges.
- Protocol and interface text keeps MinIO: MINIO_* variables, minio_* metrics,
x-minio-* headers, /minio/* routes, .minio.sys, arn:minio, and API field and
error names.
- Attribution keeps MinIO and gains the fork's own: the AGPL obligations,
original copyright, CREDITS and NOTICE stay, with the modification notice
added alongside rather than replacing them.
- Historical and third-party references are left as facts, not rewritten for
brand tidiness.
README and README_ZH each carry an explicit non-affiliation notice, document
the side-by-side package migration including the
/etc/systemd/system/silo.service.d/10-legacy-user.conf drop-in for keeping a
legacy UID/GID, and state that recursive chown is never performed. The trademark
attribution uses the policy's approved "based on MinIO technology" wording, not
the shortened form the policy rejects.
github.com/pgsty/minio links are left in place and labelled transitional. The
repository has not been renamed, and rewriting them now would produce documented
URLs that 404 until the cutover; they change in the cutover commit together with
the goreleaser release target, the OCI source label and the raw-content branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Algorithms are comma separated.
Note that valid values does not in all cases represent default values.
`--sftp=pub-key-algos=...` specifies the supported client public key
authentication algorithms. Note that this doesn't include certificate types
since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the client if
it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant.
Valid values
```
ssh-ed25519
sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.comsk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
rsa-sha2-256
rsa-sha2-512
ssh-rsa
ssh-dss
```
`--sftp=kex-algos=...` specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in preference order.
Valid values:
```
curve25519-sha256
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
```
`--sftp=cipher-algos=...` specifies the allowed cipher algorithms.
If unspecified then a sensible default is used.
Valid values:
```
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.comaes256-gcm@openssh.comchacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
arcfour256
arcfour128
arcfour
aes128-cbc
3des-cbc
```
`--sftp=mac-algos=...` specifies a default set of MAC algorithms in preference order.
This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed because they have
reached the end of their useful life.
Valid values:
```
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.comhmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-256
hmac-sha2-512
hmac-sha1
hmac-sha1-96
```
Feng Ruohang