70914759e refused an edit whose stored record no longer matched the
caller's view, but left the stale copy in the serving server's cache in
two cases: a service-account edit bound to a parent whose account was
deleted and created again for another parent, and a replicated edit older
than what is stored, which site replication acknowledges. That server
kept authenticating the old credential until a notification or the
periodic load.
Both refusals now drop the cache entry of the addressed kind, as a
refusal for an absent or deleted identity does: the service-account
closure reports such a record as gone (callers still get
errNoSuchServiceAccount), and editStoredIdentity also drops the entry on
errIAMStaleUpdate. The LDAP group refresh again treats a stale update as
a refusal that writes nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
UpdateServiceAccount, SetUserStatus and UpdateUserSecretKey read the
identity from the serving server's cache, changed it and wrote it back
whole. On a server that missed a notification, an ordinary edit (a
description, a status, a secret) undid a rotation made through another
server and brought back a user or service account deleted meanwhile, with
its old secret.
Edits now go through iamIdentityEdit, inside the identity's cross-node
revision lock: the stored record is loaded and normalized as the loaders
do (access key from the path, claims from the token, a deprecated comment
for an empty description), the edit applies to it, and an absent or
deleted identity is refused and dropped from the cache of the server
that tried. The LDAP group refresh of a0de92fcb uses the same mechanism.
- The admin handler binds a service-account edit to the parent it
authorized: an account deleted and created again for another parent
meanwhile is not edited (parentUser in updateServiceAccountOpts;
replication does not set it).
- A replicated edit older than a deletion this site applied is answered
as stale, so site replication acknowledges it instead of retrying.
- SetUserStatus refuses a service or temporary credential as before, and
a refused edit drops only a cache entry of the addressed kind.
- A session-policy edit stores the claims of the token it signs; the
token is signed once.
- UpdateUserSecretKey addressed to a service-account key finds no user
instead of writing the account to the regular-user path.
Tests use a second IAM store over the same storage whose cache missed the
change: rotation, deletion, status and secret edits of users, parent
binding, legacy records, replicated edits around a deletion, and status
calls on a service account. Against the cache-based writers every case
fails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Feng Ruohang