ci(release): unset synthetic RELEASE_TAG for Helm check in test-release

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>

.github/workflows/dco.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 name: DCO
 
 on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
   pull_request:
     branches:
       - main
@@ -17,18 +20,29 @@ jobs:
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
 
-      # Every non-merge commit in the pull request must carry a Signed-off-by
+      # Every non-merge commit in the pull request or push must carry a Signed-off-by
       # trailer matching the commit author's email, certifying the Developer
       # Certificate of Origin 1.1 (https://developercertificate.org/).
       # Only commits authored from a GitHub-issued bot address are exempt; a
       # display name is attacker-controlled and must never grant the exemption.
       - name: Check Signed-off-by trailers
         env:
-          BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
-          HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
+          PR_BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
+          PR_HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
+          PUSH_BEFORE_SHA: ${{ github.event.before }}
+          PUSH_AFTER_SHA: ${{ github.sha }}
         run: |
+          if [ "${EVENT_NAME}" = "pull_request" ]; then
+            rev_range="${PR_BASE_SHA}..${PR_HEAD_SHA}"
+          elif [ -n "${PUSH_BEFORE_SHA}" ] && [ "${PUSH_BEFORE_SHA}" != "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ] && git cat-file -e "${PUSH_BEFORE_SHA}^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then
+            rev_range="${PUSH_BEFORE_SHA}..${PUSH_AFTER_SHA}"
+          else
+            rev_range="${PUSH_AFTER_SHA}^..${PUSH_AFTER_SHA}"
+          fi
           fail=0
           while read -r sha; do
+            [ -n "${sha}" ] || continue
             author_name="$(git log -1 --format='%an' "${sha}")"
             author_email="$(git log -1 --format='%ae' "${sha}")"
             case "${author_email}" in
@@ -39,5 +53,5 @@ jobs:
               echo "::error::commit ${sha} by ${author_name} <${author_email}> lacks a matching Signed-off-by trailer; sign with 'git commit -s', repair with 'git rebase --signoff'"
               fail=1
             fi
-          done < <(git rev-list --no-merges "${BASE_SHA}..${HEAD_SHA}")
+          done < <(git rev-list --no-merges "${rev_range}")
           exit "${fail}"

.github/workflows/go.yml

@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ jobs:
       - name: Check gofmt
         run: |
           mapfile -t unformatted < <(gofmt -l main.go cmd internal \
-            buildscripts/rebrand-guard buildscripts/helm-migration-guard)
+            buildscripts/rebrand-guard buildscripts/helm-migration-guard \
+            buildscripts/release-dependency-guard)
           if [ "${#unformatted[@]}" -ne 0 ]; then
             echo "The following files are not gofmt-formatted:"
             printf '%s\n' "${unformatted[@]}"
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ jobs:
   race-s3select:
     name: Race, S3 Select
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
+    timeout-minutes: 25
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v7
 
@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Run lifecycle expiry and native restore tests under race detector
         env:
           MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
-        run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(PoolsLifecycle|PoolsMigrationLifecycle|ExpireRestored|NativeRestore)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
+        run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(PoolsLifecycle|PoolsMigrationLifecycle|ExpireRestored|NativeRestore)' -count=1 -timeout=10m
 
       - name: Run multipart listing, cancellation and cleanup tests under race detector
         env:
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Run Object Lock authorization and overwrite tests under race detector
         env:
           MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
-        run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
+        run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|ReplicaDeleteObjectLock|PoolsReplicaDeleteObjectLock|BulkDeleteDirectoryObjectLock|BulkDeleteObjectLock|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
 
       - name: Run maintenance storage timeout and compatibility tests under race detector
         env:

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ permissions:
   id-token: write
   attestations: write
   artifact-metadata: write
+  actions: read
 
 concurrency:
   group: release-${{ github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && inputs.tag || github.ref_name }}
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Gate release on Object Lock authorization and overwrite tests under race detector
         env:
           MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
-        run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
+        run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|ReplicaDeleteObjectLock|PoolsReplicaDeleteObjectLock|BulkDeleteDirectoryObjectLock|BulkDeleteObjectLock|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
 
       - name: Compute release variables
         env:
@@ -102,6 +103,12 @@ jobs:
             echo "Release tag ${TAG} resolves to ${TAG_COMMIT}, checkout is ${HEAD_COMMIT}" >&2
             exit 1
           fi
+          CHART_APP_VERSION="$(sed -n 's/^appVersion: *//p' helm/silo/Chart.yaml)"
+          CHART_IMAGE_TAG="$(sed -n '/^image:/,/^[^ ]/s/^  tag: *//p' helm/silo/values.yaml)"
+          if [ "${CHART_APP_VERSION}" != "${TAG}" ] || [ "${CHART_IMAGE_TAG}" != "${TAG}" ]; then
+            echo "helm/silo Chart.yaml appVersion (${CHART_APP_VERSION}) and values.yaml image.tag (${CHART_IMAGE_TAG}) must match release tag ${TAG}" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
           VERSION_HYPHEN="${TAG#RELEASE.}"
           PKG_VERSION="$(echo "${VERSION_HYPHEN}" | sed -E 's/^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})T([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})Z$/\1\2\3\4\5\6.0.0/')"
           VERSION_COLON="$(echo "${VERSION_HYPHEN}" | sed -E 's/T([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})Z$/T\1:\2:\3Z/')"
@@ -109,14 +116,29 @@ jobs:
 
           {
             echo "RELEASE_TAG=${TAG}"
+            echo "RELEASE_COMMIT=${HEAD_COMMIT}"
             echo "PKG_VERSION=${PKG_VERSION}"
             echo "LDFLAGS=${LDFLAGS}"
           } >> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
 
           echo "Release tag: ${TAG}"
+          echo "Release commit: ${HEAD_COMMIT}"
           echo "Package version: ${PKG_VERSION}"
           echo "LDFLAGS: ${LDFLAGS}"
 
+      - name: Check release commit is the tip of main with green CI
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          buildscripts/check-release-commit.sh "${RELEASE_COMMIT}"
+
+      - name: Verify coordinated release dependencies
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          GOWORK: "off"
+        run: go run ./buildscripts/release-dependency-guard
+
       - name: Check existing release state
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -140,7 +162,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build Draft release with GoReleaser
         uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
         with:
-          version: v2.18.3
+          version: v2.20.1
           args: release --clean --skip=validate --config .github/goreleaser.yml
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

.github/workflows/test-release.yml

@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ on:
       - "buildscripts/minio-upgrade.sh"
       - "buildscripts/sign-release-rpms.sh"
       - "buildscripts/verify-build-provenance.sh"
+      - "buildscripts/check-release-commit.sh"
+      - "buildscripts/check-release-commit_test.sh"
+      - "buildscripts/release-dependency-guard/**"
       - "buildscripts/check-release-state.sh"
       - "buildscripts/check-release-state_test.sh"
       - "buildscripts/verify-rebrand.sh"
@@ -97,10 +100,14 @@ jobs:
       - name: GoReleaser config check
         uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
         with:
-          version: v2.18.3
+          version: v2.20.1
           args: check --config .github/goreleaser.yml
 
       - name: Validate Helm chart and legacy upgrade identity
+        env:
+          # Compute test variables sets a synthetic GoReleaser fixture tag;
+          # real tag equality is enforced in release.yml.
+          RELEASE_TAG: ""
         run: buildscripts/verify-helm-migration.sh
 
       - name: Install Syft
@@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build snapshot artifacts
         uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
         with:
-          version: v2.18.3
+          version: v2.20.1
           # A pull-request snapshot has no trusted release identity. Exercise
           # the SBOM/checksum pipeline here, and reserve keyless signing for
           # the tag-triggered release workflow with GitHub OIDC.
@@ -537,6 +544,8 @@ jobs:
           bash -n buildscripts/minio-upgrade.sh
           bash -n buildscripts/sign-release-rpms.sh
           bash -n buildscripts/verify-build-provenance.sh
+          bash -n buildscripts/check-release-commit.sh
+          bash -n buildscripts/check-release-commit_test.sh
           bash -n buildscripts/check-release-state.sh
           bash -n buildscripts/check-release-state_test.sh
           bash -n buildscripts/verify-rebrand.sh
@@ -553,6 +562,8 @@ jobs:
           test -x buildscripts/package-release.sh
           test -x buildscripts/sign-release-rpms.sh
           test -x buildscripts/verify-build-provenance.sh
+          test -x buildscripts/check-release-commit.sh
+          test -x buildscripts/check-release-commit_test.sh
           test -x buildscripts/check-release-state.sh
           test -x buildscripts/check-release-state_test.sh
           test -x buildscripts/verify-rebrand.sh
@@ -561,4 +572,6 @@ jobs:
           test -x buildscripts/package/preremove.sh
           test -x buildscripts/package/lifecycle_test.sh
           test -x dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh
+          buildscripts/check-release-commit_test.sh
+          GOWORK=off go test ./buildscripts/release-dependency-guard
           buildscripts/check-release-state_test.sh

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,357 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z
+
+Package version: `20261112000000.0.0`. Publication status and artifacts are
+listed in [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases). This
+section covers the changes after the published 20261109 source `d998292387cc`,
+adopting Go `1.27.4`, `silo-pkg v3.16.1`, embedded Console `v2.7.2`, and
+bundled `mcli 20261112`. See the
+[server compatibility notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/server/)
+for behavior and upgrade boundaries.
+
+- Release checks verify the selected pkg and embedded Console versions and
+  match the bundled mcli release to its source module, independently of local
+  workspaces, before building release artifacts. Deploy SILO and mcli
+  `RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z` by default from Helm chart `7.0.5`.
+- Replica writes and copies use the destination version's retention, legal
+  hold and tags under its mutation lock, verify staged replica content and
+  SSE-C/compressed metadata against stored locked versions before committing,
+  and prevent newer peer timestamps from weakening unexpired COMPLIANCE
+  retention. Cross-pool reconciliation preserves COMPLIANCE protection
+  regardless of pool order, while authorized changes to GOVERNANCE retention
+  and legal hold remain possible. Local lock revisions advance past stored
+  revisions, unaddressed deletes under versioning suspension or excluded
+  prefixes enforce Object Lock across single-pool and multi-pool deployments
+  and fail closed when versioning or Object Lock metadata cannot be read,
+  bucket metadata imports require versioning across prefix exclusions as well
+  as suspension, and peer replication-trust headers must be signed with
+  header-based SigV4 ([#336](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/336)).
+- Tagging proxies (`GET`, `PUT` and `DELETE`) authenticate and authorize every
+  present replica, including its stored tags, fail closed on unreadable targets,
+  and skip missing replicas caused by replication lag unless all targets are
+  absent; active-active `GET` and `HEAD` proxies enforce `s3:ExistingObjectTag`
+  and `s3:versionid` before returning peer responses, forward
+  `X-Amz-Tagging-Directive: ACCESS` on `HEAD`, gate proxied
+  `x-amz-tagging-count` and `X-Amz-Tagging` headers on tag-read authorization
+  without emitting duplicate headers, and filter canonical-case peer
+  `X-Amz-Object-Lock-*` headers when `s3:GetObjectRetention` or
+  `s3:GetObjectLegalHold` is denied. Authenticated unsigned-trailer
+  uploads enforce the request time window and header signatures, SigV4 header,
+  presigned, streaming and POST policy verifiers bind the credential-scope date
+  to the signed request timestamp, streaming trailer readers bound trailer memory
+  and surface non-EOF stream errors without hanging on negative
+  `X-Amz-Decoded-Content-Length`, and bucket metadata cache loads no longer
+  overwrite fresher concurrent updates
+  ([#337](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/337),
+  [#338](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/338)).
+- Object tag and version authorization now applies consistently across read,
+  copy, list and archive endpoints: `GetObject`, `HeadObject` and
+  `SelectObjectContent` evaluate `s3:ExistingObjectTag` and `s3:versionid`
+  (preserving retryable `5xx` server errors for callers authorized by tag
+  conditions when storage is unreadable, resolving the 20261109 limitation in
+  [#293](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/293) via
+  [PR #294](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/294)); `CopyObject` and
+  `UploadPartCopy` authorize source `s3:ExistingObjectTag` and `s3:versionid`
+  as well as destination `s3:RequestObjectTag` on copied tags; both
+  `x-amz-tagging-count` and `X-Amz-Tagging` (`X-Amz-Tagging-Directive: ACCESS`)
+  are omitted on `GET`/`HEAD` (including versioned reads, STS sessions,
+  presigned/anonymous requests and replication proxies) unless
+  `s3:GetObjectTagging` / `s3:GetObjectVersionTagging` (with no explicit `Deny`)
+  or signed `s3:ReplicateTags` permits; `ListObjectsV2` / `ListObjectVersions` with `metadata=true` evaluate
+  current-object and per-version metadata permissions respectively, using stored tags; and `GetObjectAttributes`,
+  tagging handlers (`GET`/`PUT`/`DELETE`) and ZIP `GET`/`HEAD`/member listings
+  authorize stored tags and version actions without mutating unindexed archives
+  ([#342](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/342)).
+- Policy parsing rejects unknown JSON fields, trailing tokens and malformed
+  principals across admin IAM policy/user/service-account endpoints, STS
+  session policies, IAM imports/replication, bucket policies and bucket metadata
+  imports instead of silently accepting empty or wildcard fallbacks. Validate
+  the complete imported policy file before applying entries; retain supported
+  historical snapshot semantics and explicit null bucket-policy replication
+  tombstones. New session policies retain strict resource validation.
+- Every explicit version removal in S3 `DeleteObjects`, including in buckets
+  without Object Lock, now uses the sequential single-object path to check
+  metadata, retention and replication under the mutation lock. Large version
+  purges can take longer. Unaddressed deletes that can replace a locked null
+  version also use the single-object path; other unaddressed deletes retain
+  bulk execution.
+- Decommission rescans keys hidden below another key only while source
+  versions are actually removed, resolving the 20261109 limitation recorded
+  in [#334](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/334)
+  ([PR #335](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/335)). Decommission and rebalance
+  clean up successfully migrated sibling versions after concurrent deletion
+  of another version. Source-removal and final empty verification check every
+  online drive and tolerate offline drives within the erasure set's read quorum,
+  while rejecting online metadata remnants, corrupt metadata, directory errors
+  and drive outages beyond parity. Cancellation returns an error, and a scan
+  without physical progress stops. Free-version tier ownership and the final
+  physical-empty check remain protected
+  ([#340](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/340)). See the
+  [decommission procedure](https://silo.pgsty.com/operations/deployments/baremetal-decommission-server-pool/).
+- Site-replication bucket healing, metadata healing, status collection and
+  replication hooks snapshot site topology and release the state read lock
+  before storage I/O and peer RPCs, avoiding deadlocks and state-map races
+  when a configuration writer is waiting
+  ([#341](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/341)). IAM import preserves
+  disabled service accounts and groups, reports group failures, and excludes
+  derived session-policy claims from exported and replicated credentials
+  ([#345](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/345)).
+- Lifecycle history revision counting treats old and healed `xl.meta` headers
+  for the same version as one revision ([#332](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/332)),
+  and restore expiry no longer turns a time-derived data-directory flag into a
+  different version revision; mixed healed headers can reach quorum and expired
+  local restore data can be cleaned up ([#344](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/344)).
+  Historical-version self-copy plans its destination pool and data rewrite
+  before encryption or compression, preserving multi-block compression seek
+  indexes so a source version in another pool creates a readable new version.
+  In-place metadata updates locate the exact requested version and preserve
+  authoritative content on moving pools, while copies that require encryption
+  or checksum recomputation select an active pool
+  ([#343](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/343)). Indexed `Range` reads into
+  compressed, server-side encrypted (`SSE-S3`, `SSE-KMS`, `SSE-C`) objects also
+  succeed when the target compressed block starts inside the first 64 KiB
+  encrypted frame (`decryptSkip > 0`), without rewriting stored objects.
+- Batch KMS rotation decodes and validates the configured encryption context
+  as strict UTF-8 JSON before changing an object key and without adding
+  validation-probe fields to object metadata, supports `SSE-S3` to `SSE-KMS`
+  key migration and multipart metadata preservation, and rewrites legacy `XLV1`
+  objects onto `XLv2` streams instead of failing in-place metadata updates
+  ([#346](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/346)). Incoming HTTP
+  `X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption-Context` headers on `PutObject`, `CopyObject`,
+  `CreateMultipartUpload` and browser `POST` uploads reject empty values,
+  malformed Base64/UTF-8/JSON, trailing tokens and non-string/non-`null` member
+  values with `400 InvalidArgument` instead of `500 InternalError`. Batch variable
+  preflight follows the pinned policy evaluator's literal and substitution
+  rules, including BinaryEquals, while retaining refusal of unavailable
+  request context. This does not add AWS special-variable escape semantics
+  ([#347](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/347)).
+- Service-account and access-key create/edit normalize a missing policy Version
+  to `2012-10-17`, reject malformed or unknown policy fields, and distinguish an
+  omitted or `null` policy (preserve existing inline policy) from an explicit
+  empty policy document such as `{}` or `{"Statement":[]}` (reset to parent
+  inheritance), while keeping historical deny-all accounts carrying an empty
+  embedded policy restricted until explicitly reset
+  ([#339](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/339),
+  [Console #89](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console/issues/89),
+  [mcli #78](https://github.com/pgsty/mc/issues/78)). Previously,
+  `mcli admin user svcacct disable`, `enable` and `edit` without `--policy`,
+  the matching `admin accesskey` and `idp ldap/openid accesskey` commands, and
+  any other `update-service-account` request without `newPolicy` removed the
+  inline policy on the receiving site and on site-replication peers for
+  non-root parent users. In the matching Console (`v2.7.2`), turn off **Restrict
+  beyond user policy** or enter `{}` to remove an inline policy; clearing the
+  editor while restriction is enabled prevents saving, save errors render inside
+  the edit modal, and HTTP-to-HTTPS browser redirects preserve the request host
+  or `CONSOLE_SECURE_TLS_HOST` when bound to `--host 0.0.0.0`
+  (`unrolled/secure v1.18.0`). Freeze service-account edits on un-upgraded
+  `20261109` nodes during rollout; after upgrading every site, review accounts
+  that `svcacct info` reports with `Policy: implied` and re-apply restrictions
+  where needed.
+
+- S3 `DeleteObjects` on a single pool stops at an entry whose name fails the
+  object name check: the entry returns `XMinioInvalidObjectName` and is not
+  locked or sent to a drive, as with a single-object DELETE and with more than
+  one pool. Until now such an entry still reached the drives of the node, where
+  a name with a `..` segment was joined to the request bucket. A caller allowed
+  to delete in one bucket could remove a version in another bucket, including
+  one under Object Lock retention, and from a versioned bucket could put a
+  delete marker on an object of another bucket or on stored system metadata
+  such as a bucket's configuration. The other entries of a request are deleted
+  as before.
+
+- Site replication sends a service account or access key as the record its
+  site has stored, whole: for a create, for every edit, at the first sync of a
+  new site and when healing. IAM export writes that record too. Until now an
+  edit was sent as the fields it changed. A peer that an earlier edit had not
+  reached, or reached late, kept the old secret key, status or inline policy
+  under the revision of the later edit, and healing took the sites for equal:
+  a key that was rotated, disabled or restricted on one site stayed as it was
+  on the other. Sync, heal and export took the claims and the inline policy, and
+  heal the secret key and status as well, from the cache of the server that ran
+  them, which can predate an edit made through another server of the site, and
+  sent them under the revision of the stored record. A service account created
+  for a user that had been deleted and created again did not reach the peers
+  before healing. Peers on 20261109 and 20261026 apply the new items as they
+  apply a healed account, and an edit that names no policy no longer removes the
+  inline policy on such a peer; a site that is not upgraded still sends its own
+  edits the old way. An edit now gives every site the whole account of the site
+  that took it, so accounts that already differ between sites are not repaired
+  by the upgrade, but by the next edit: after upgrading every site, review such
+  accounts and edit each one at a site that has it right.
+
+## RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z
+
+Package version: `20261109000000.0.0`; published from source `d998292387cc`.
+Artifacts are listed in the [GitHub release](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z).
+The coordinated [English release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261109/)
+and [Chinese release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261109/)
+cover all components, upgrade guidance, and validation scope since the
+published 20261026 source `c3ad836aed0d`. Most fixes come from reports and
+patches by [@botdeniska](https://github.com/botdeniska); see [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md).
+
+Lifecycle, multi-pool and tiering:
+
+- Decide an ILM expiry under the object lock against the versions of the key
+  in all pools, and refuse one that does not hold for the whole object or whose
+  history or lock protection lacks an authoritative quorum. Decommission and
+  rebalance move such versions instead of dropping them, and an approved
+  version expiry deletes every copy ([#278](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/278)).
+- Expire the restored copy of a current version instead of the object
+  ([#281](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/281)). Keep lifecycle delete-all
+  (`ExpiredObjectAllVersions`, `DelMarkerExpiration`, batch expiration with
+  `retainVersions: 0`) on the expired key instead of the keys below it; a key
+  with a tiered or Object Lock protected version is refused
+  ([#297](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/297)).
+- Exclude the internal free-version marker of a deleted tiered version from
+  visible version history and lifecycle decisions
+  ([#263](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/263)), apply rules whose only
+  action is `DelMarkerExpiration` ([#268](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/268)),
+  and report and account only the removals that happened
+  ([#305](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/305)).
+- Keep remote tier data that another pool still references after a version
+  expiry or tier cleanup ([#306](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/306),
+  [#308](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/308)). Heal versions whose queued
+  expiry is refused ([#303](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/303)), and read
+  a key's history once in migration prechecks ([#304](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/304)).
+- Decommission and rebalance: move objects whose copies have two erasure
+  layouts ([#261](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/261)) and ILM-expired
+  current versions ([#265](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/265)), continue
+  with later buckets when one cannot finish and keep cancellation
+  ([#307](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/307)), and do not panic when a
+  rebalance stop finds no metadata ([#270](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/270)).
+- Do not replicate the delete markers and version purges that lifecycle
+  creates, as in S3. [PR #240](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/240) remains
+  open as a proposal.
+
+Native restore:
+
+- Restore in two phases, without holding the object write lock during the tier
+  download ([#284](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/284)). Restores with more
+  than one pool no longer hang, stay in progress or change the restored version
+  ([#289](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/289)), and a failed ordinary
+  multipart completion stays usable ([#327](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/327)).
+  A failed or canceled restore returns at once and clears its marker in the
+  background, instead of waiting up to a minute for the object lock.
+
+Locking, conditional writes and storage:
+
+- Lock every write and delete of a single pool in the object's own erasure set
+  ([#298](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/298)). Fix CopyObject waiting on
+  its own lock for normalized aliases ([#299](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/299))
+  and starving its destination while waiting for the source
+  ([#300](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/300)); delete the set groups of a
+  bulk delete concurrently ([#301](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/301)).
+- Evaluate `If-Match` and `If-None-Match` of a multi-pool CreateMultipartUpload
+  against the current object ([#291](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/291),
+  [PR #292](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/292)).
+- Answer a retryable `503` instead of `NoSuchKey` when a node sees only some
+  drives of an existing object ([#302](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/302)), remove the empty object
+  directory of a failed write ([#285](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/285),
+  [PR #286](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/286)), classify `xl.meta`
+  checksum failures for healing ([#309](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/309)),
+  and keep a heal dry run from deleting data
+  ([PR #280](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/280), thanks to
+  [@dihmandrake](https://github.com/dihmandrake)).
+
+Object Lock, IAM and batch jobs:
+
+- Keep the target's legal hold and retention on a replicated delete; a source
+  purge that bypassed GOVERNANCE retention is refused by a target copy that
+  still carries it, and the source retries. Check a directory object's lock
+  before a bulk delete removes its null version. S3 `DeleteObjects` checks
+  physical version removals under the mutation lock and merges protection
+  across pools, including concurrent legal-hold and retention updates. These
+  removals in Object Lock buckets use the single-object path sequentially;
+  large version-purge batches can take longer. Marker creation and ordinary
+  buckets retain the bulk path.
+- Batch jobs enforce the submitter's data permissions throughout execution and
+  leave Object Lock protected versions alone ([#310](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/310),
+  [#311](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/311)). Key rotation keeps other
+  pool copies readable ([#312](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/312)).
+  Transient failures pause work instead of ending it, saved jobs are found
+  after a failed startup scan, and running replication resumes
+  ([#313](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/313), [#314](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/314),
+  [#324](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/324)). A completed expiration job
+  stays completed after a restart ([#315](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/315)).
+  Authorization skips deleted policies a mapping still names, refuses a job
+  only for a Deny that needs request context, and survives metadata edits and
+  LDAP refreshes that keep the credential
+  ([#318](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/318)–[#320](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/320)).
+  Live metrics keep pause reasons and skipped or refused counts
+  ([#325](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/325)), and `make check-gen`
+  leaves the runtime policy snapshot alone ([#326](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/326)).
+- IAM refuses incomplete policy loads, keeps cached authentication available
+  during lazy loads, and applies edits, LDAP group refreshes and service-account
+  creation to the stored record, so a stale node cannot restore old credentials
+  or resurrect deleted identities ([#316](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/316),
+  [#317](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/317), [#321](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/321)–[#323](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/323)).
+- Log in LDAP users with long DNs on erasure sets, and root to the embedded
+  Console with LDAP enabled ([#271](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/271),
+  [#272](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/272)). Keep audit and logger
+  webhook targets running on every server after a configuration reload
+  ([#259](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/259), reported by
+  [@haf](https://github.com/haf)).
+
+Components and packaging:
+
+- Embed the published Console v2.7.0 source `4e91ae506e70`, including its
+  ten-language UI, rebuilt frontend assets, Swagger array-validation fixes,
+  Redoc routing, plain-HTTP folder-size and key-copy actions, usage-worker TLS
+  roots and scan budgets, and malformed-multipart rejection. Select the
+  published mcli 20261109 source `e1d4cc5abfe0` and silo-pkg v3.16.0 directly
+  in the maintained dependency graph.
+- Adopt go-jose/v4 v4.1.9, cpuid/v2 v2.4.2, YAML v3.0.6 and gjson v1.20.1,
+  plus Console's runtime/server-middleware v0.33.4. Preserve Go 1.27.3, the
+  verified upstream minio-go commit, networking/crypto security floors and
+  terminal-width/NetBSD compatibility selections.
+- Update NATS credentials to jwt/v2 v2.8.3 and nkeys v0.4.17, including
+  rejection of identity-point and small-order public keys. Use nats-server
+  v2.15.2 for notification integration tests.
+- Update Google Cloud auth to v0.24.3 and oauth2adapt to v0.3.1 for REST
+  request validation and AWS FIPS endpoint signing fixes.
+- Bundle verified mcli 20261109 archives in source container builds and use
+  that release by default in the integration-test client installer.
+- Prevent replication worker metrics from panicking when the replication
+  pool is absent, while retaining historical averages and peak counts.
+- Give the distroless image the same CA roots as the standard image, and ship
+  mcli's license files in both ([#295](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/295)).
+- Deploy SILO and mcli `RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z` by default from Helm
+  chart 7.0.4; the server image tag was left at 20260916 before
+  ([#296](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/296)).
+
+Upgrade notes:
+
+- A single pool whose erasure sets do not all use the same hosts (with the
+  automatic layout, 18 or more hosts) needs a drained restart, not a rolling
+  upgrade: old and new nodes lock deletes and copies in different sets and do
+  not exclude each other. Stop every old process before a new one serves.
+- During a rolling upgrade, upgraded nodes answer `POST ?restore` with `503`
+  while any peer is old or unreachable. Pause new restores until every node is
+  upgraded. Multi-pool lifecycle protection is complete only after a full
+  upgrade.
+- Stop batch submissions and drain or cancel unfinished jobs before changing
+  versions. Unfinished legacy jobs require resubmission after all nodes upgrade;
+  completed jobs stay completed. Submitter-bound manifests and progress reports
+  use a new format that 20261026 cannot execute or resume. Do not downgrade
+  with pending or paused new jobs. An old node can still execute old-format
+  jobs, so mixed-version execution is not protected by the new authorization
+  rules. Preserve job definitions and reconcile completed work before resubmitting.
+- `healthcheck ready` remains a process/dependency probe and can succeed before
+  storage or IAM load. `cluster` reports quorum, which can precede a restarted
+  node reconnecting its remote drives. Before resuming applications, run bounded
+  signed write/read checks through every node; neither HTTP probe alone proves
+  data-path readiness. Preserve peer discovery during bootstrap.
+- `helm upgrade --reuse-values` keeps the previously stored `image.tag`; set it
+  explicitly when upgrading such a release.
+
+Known issues: `ListMultipartUploads` prefix and paging
+([#79](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/79)), multi-site delete-marker purge
+([#217](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/217)), replayed bucket creation
+under site replication ([PR #241](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/241)), and
+`403` instead of the server error for reads allowed only by object tags while
+the object is unreadable ([PR #294](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/294)).
+
 ## RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
 
 Package version: `20261026000000.0.0`; published from source `c3ad836aed0d`.

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -165,8 +165,11 @@ license grant to SILO or upstream MinIO maintainers is required.
 
 ### How does Silo manage dependencies?
 
-Silo uses Go modules. Preserve the compatibility module and import paths in
+Silo uses Go modules. Shared packages in `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3` are
-`go.mod`; downstream forks are selected with explicit `replace` directives.
+required and imported directly under their own module path, upstream
+`github.com/minio/minio-go/v7` is pinned to a verified commit, and Console
+(`github.com/minio/console`) and MC (`github.com/minio/mc`) are selected with
+explicit `replace` directives in `go.mod`.
 
 - Run `go get foo/bar` in the source folder to add the dependency to `go.mod` file.
 

Dockerfile.distroless

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ RUN mkdir -p /prep/data && chmod 0777 /prep/data
 # Debian's bundle in distroless still trusts the roots the classic image
 # blocklists. Build the same bundle as Dockerfile.goreleaser so both variants
 # trust the same roots; it is architecture-neutral, so build it natively.
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:16e9e43d99e181463513cc84a514859b1abb9460f1c4d9e208da4b4e51cd5cc3 AS certs
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:8b212f75a0e5a156ac28b1c5c030d2e8a07715254e19d522286118279399af81 AS certs
 # Native root blocklist mitigation: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012
 RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
     if [ -d /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist ]; then \

Dockerfile.goreleaser

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:d530cf60723abf1ffae0cd16bb546b379ec0550d2f3815e5b16ed69dbc00fba4 AS curl-build
+FROM golang:1.27.4-alpine@sha256:0a5f7fe796599ff487605987432e7619ae45beeb2fba4c2ce0b907879932aebf AS curl-build
 ARG TARGETARCH
 COPY dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh /build/build-static-curl
 RUN /bin/sh /build/build-static-curl
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ COPY --from=curl-build /go/bin/curl /curl
 COPY --from=curl-build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
 ENTRYPOINT ["/curl"]
 
-FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:d530cf60723abf1ffae0cd16bb546b379ec0550d2f3815e5b16ed69dbc00fba4 AS build
+FROM golang:1.27.4-alpine@sha256:0a5f7fe796599ff487605987432e7619ae45beeb2fba4c2ce0b907879932aebf AS build
 
 ARG TARGETARCH
 
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ ENV GOPATH=/go
 ENV CGO_ENABLED=0
 
 ARG MC_REPO=pgsty/mc
-ARG MC_VERSION=RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
+ARG MC_VERSION=RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z
-ARG MC_AMD64_SHA256=e86295bb11ed59369c0560f030d59abd42fb64a376b1d7e9799ec2e8596ebf64
+ARG MC_AMD64_SHA256=68875c7fdd06a76af12b74753506df65226d1bec65a405d2617d76448c229ba2
-ARG MC_ARM64_SHA256=47b1a558f766f26bef5beeedd5300e082bcdec07a5e7d4a16f5f9d168f5275d1
+ARG MC_ARM64_SHA256=4ea59d2f278c96b25e380289fd2ee9bc49faa342687074f031805cb7b34fbe1a
 
 RUN apk add -U --no-cache \
     ca-certificates \
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ RUN apk add -U --no-cache \
     mkdir -p /go/share/mcli && \
     cp /tmp/mcli-extract/LICENSE /tmp/mcli-extract/NOTICE /tmp/mcli-extract/CREDITS /go/share/mcli/
 
-FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:16e9e43d99e181463513cc84a514859b1abb9460f1c4d9e208da4b4e51cd5cc3 AS certs
+FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:8b212f75a0e5a156ac28b1c5c030d2e8a07715254e19d522286118279399af81 AS certs
 # Native root blocklist mitigation: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012
 RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
     if [ -d /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist ]; then \
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
     dnf clean all && \
     rm -rf /var/cache/dnf
 
-FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi-micro:latest@sha256:5be877a2a280ae36eb9ab80ca4efb28bbf77c57abbba38137cdc37a03b8465e6
+FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi-micro:latest@sha256:b59ac4f291d86027c2681f7a7b1cbf7448972fc55a6cb8e25cab5aa5eef5ce5f
 
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="Silo" \
       org.opencontainers.image.description="S3-Interface Libre Object Storage" \

PULL_REQUESTS_ETIQUETTE.md

@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ PRs must flow smoothly through review to reach production. Large PRs should be s
    - Document testing steps in the PR summary if manual testing was performed.
 
 4. **Before Submitting**:
-   - Run `make verify` to check formatting, linting, and tests.
+   - Sign off every commit under the Developer Certificate of Origin (`git commit -s`).
+   - Run `make verifiers` to check formatting, linting, code generation, and `rebrand-guard`.
    - Reference related issues (e.g., “Closes #1234”).
    - Notify team members via GitHub `@mentions` if urgent or complex.
 

README.md

@@ -32,29 +32,26 @@
 > [!IMPORTANT]
 > **PGSTY Silo** (hereinafter “Silo”) is an independent, community-maintained fork of the open-source MinIO server, published by [Pigsty](https://pigsty.io) from [`pgsty/silo`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo). It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by MinIO, Inc. “MinIO” is used only to identify the upstream project and compatibility lineage.
 
-> [!NOTE]
-> Renamed from `pgsty/minio` to `pgsty/silo`, default branch `master` → `main`, on 2026-08-06. Artifacts under the original MinIO identity stay published on the archived [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) branch and in releases up to [`RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z).
-
-## SILO 20261026000000
-
-[SILO 20261026000000](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z) is available as platform archives, Linux packages, and standard or distroless Docker images for amd64 and arm64. The release tag is `RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z`; the package version is `20261026000000.0.0`, built from source `c3ad836aed0d`.
-
-This release fixes LDAP long-DN login, IAM policy refresh, multi-pool deletion safety, tiered-object expiry, multipart replication checksums, and remote rollback-option propagation. It embeds Console v2.5.1 (`fff1618d9abb`) and uses silo-pkg v3.15.2, Go 1.27.3, and upstream minio-go `v7.4.2-0.20261025165926-320af050c445`. Use mcli 20261026 for administration; the container images bundle it as `mcli`.
-
-The Server IAM cache repair enables Console's **Reset to default** action. Existing storage timeouts and cancellation behavior remain: a timeout does not prove that a disk operation stopped or a write did not commit. Read the [coordinated release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261026/) and [remaining storage limits](CHANGELOG.md#release2026-10-26t00-00-00z) before upgrading. See [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md) for the people behind the code, reports, and documentation.
-
 ## Overview
 
 PGSTY SILO keeps one maintained release line of the open-source MinIO server alive after upstream ended community distribution: builds, packages, multi-arch images, security fixes, and the full web console. Pigsty runs it in production as its PostgreSQL backup repository.
 
-It follows one rule — **the product and its delivery surfaces are renamed; the protocol and your data are not.** Everything else lives on [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/).
+It follows one rule: **the product and its delivery surfaces are renamed; the protocol and your data are not.** Full documentation is published at [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/).
 
-**Related:** [`pgsty/mc`](https://github.com/pgsty/mc) client (shipped as `mcli`) · [`pgsty/silo-console`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console) · [`pgsty/silo-pkg`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg) · [`pgsty/pigsty`](https://github.com/pgsty/pigsty)
+**Related:** [`pgsty/mc`](https://github.com/pgsty/mc) · [`pgsty/silo-console`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console) · [`pgsty/silo-pkg`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg) · [`pgsty/kes`](https://github.com/pgsty/kes) · [`pgsty/pigsty`](https://github.com/pgsty/pigsty)
 
 <p align="center">
   <img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/silo-console/console-metrics-simple.webp" alt="Silo Console">
 </p>
 
+### SILO 20261109
+
+> [!WARNING]
+> [SILO 20261109](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z) (`20261109000000.0.0`, source `d998292387cc`) fixes storage, lifecycle, native restore, Object Lock, batch authorization, and IAM defects, embedding Console `v2.7.0` with `mcli 20261109`, `silo-pkg v3.16.0`, and Go `1.27.3`. Review the [release notes and upgrade requirements](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261109/) before upgrading.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> On 2026-08-06, `pgsty/minio` became `pgsty/silo`, and the default branch changed from `master` to `main`. The last MinIO-branded release is [`20260804`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z) on the [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) branch.
+
 ## Quick Start
 
 ```bash
@@ -62,7 +59,7 @@ docker run -d --name silo -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 \
   -e MINIO_ROOT_USER=minioadmin \
   -e MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-long-password \
   -v "$PWD/data:/data" \
-  docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
+  docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
 ```
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -89,7 +86,7 @@ docker exec silo mcli mb local/demo && docker exec silo mcli ls local
 | Kubernetes | Helm chart, see [Download & Install](https://silo.pgsty.com/download/) |
 | Source | `go build -o silo . && ./silo --version` |
 
-Every release ships checksums, SPDX SBOMs, Sigstore-signed manifests, and GitHub build attestations. Installation methods and verification commands are documented at [Download & Install](https://silo.pgsty.com/download/); migrating from upstream MinIO — taking over an existing `minio.service` and its `/etc/default/minio`, and keeping data ownership stable with a `/etc/systemd/system/silo.service.d/10-legacy-user.conf` drop-in — is covered by the [migration guide](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/migration/) and the [binary & service notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/binary/).
+Every release ships checksums, SPDX SBOMs, Sigstore-signed manifests, and GitHub build attestations. Installation methods and verification commands are documented at [Download & Install](https://silo.pgsty.com/download/). To migrate from upstream MinIO, take over `minio.service` and `/etc/default/minio`, and preserve data ownership with a `/etc/systemd/system/silo.service.d/10-legacy-user.conf` drop-in. See the [migration guide](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/migration/) and [binary & service notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/binary/).
 
 ## Compatibility
 
@@ -101,7 +98,7 @@ Every divergence from upstream is listed in the code-verified [compatibility aud
 
 ### TLS and Go upgrades
 
-Server 20260916 restored Go's default key exchange; Server 20261018 retains it with Go 1.27.2.
+Server 20260916 restored Go's default key exchange; Server 20261109 retains it with Go 1.27.3.
 TLS key exchange follows Go's defaults across the S3 listener, node links,
 replication, identity providers, etcd, and external HTTP services. If an endpoint
 cannot accept ML-KEM, `GODEBUG=tlsmlkem=0` disables the default hybrid exchanges

README_ZH.md

@@ -32,29 +32,26 @@
 > [!IMPORTANT]
 > **PGSTY Silo**（以下简称 Silo）是由 [Pigsty](https://pigsty.cc) 独立维护、从 [`pgsty/silo`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo) 发布的开源 MinIO 社区分支。本项目与 MinIO, Inc. 不存在隶属、背书或赞助关系；文中使用 “MinIO” 仅用于说明上游项目及兼容谱系。
 
-> [!NOTE]
-> 2026-08-06，本仓库由 `pgsty/minio` 更名为 `pgsty/silo`，默认分支由 `master` 更名为 `main`。以原 MinIO 形态维持的归档构件仍位于归档的 [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) 分支，以及截止 [`RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z) 的历次发布中。
-
-## SILO 20261026000000
-
-[SILO 20261026000000](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z) 已正式发布，提供各平台归档包、Linux 软件包，以及 amd64／arm64 标准版和 distroless Docker 镜像。版本标签为 `RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z`，包版本为 `20261026000000.0.0`，构建源码为 `c3ad836aed0d`。
-
-本版修复 LDAP 长 DN 登录、IAM 策略刷新、多池删除安全、分层对象过期、分片复制校验和及远端回滚参数透传。内置 Console v2.5.1（`fff1618d9abb`），使用 silo-pkg v3.15.2、Go 1.27.3 与上游 minio-go `v7.4.2-0.20261025165926-320af050c445`。配套管理客户端为 mcli 20261026，容器镜像内置该版本的 `mcli`。
-
-Server IAM 缓存修复使 Console **Reset to default（恢复默认）** 操作即时生效。存储超时与取消行为保持既有语义：超时不代表底层磁盘操作已停止，也不代表写入未提交。升级前请阅读[联合发布说明](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261026/)与[仍存的存储限制](CHANGELOG.md#release2026-10-26t00-00-00z)。代码、问题报告和文档贡献者见 [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md)。
-
 ## 概述
 
 上游停止社区发行后，Silo 为开源 MinIO 服务端维护一条持续可用的版本线：构建、软件包、多架构镜像、安全修复与完整 Web 控制台。Pigsty 在生产环境中用它承载 PostgreSQL 备份存储。
 
-它只遵循一条原则：**改名的是产品与交付物，不是协议与你的数据。** 其余内容都在 [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/)。
+它只遵循一条原则：**改名的是产品与交付物，不是协议与你的数据。** 完整文档发布在 [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/)。
 
-**相关项目：**[`pgsty/mc`](https://github.com/pgsty/mc) 客户端（以 `mcli` 发行） · [`pgsty/silo-console`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console) · [`pgsty/silo-pkg`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg) · [`pgsty/pigsty`](https://github.com/pgsty/pigsty)
+**相关项目：**[`pgsty/mc`](https://github.com/pgsty/mc) · [`pgsty/silo-console`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-console) · [`pgsty/silo-pkg`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg) · [`pgsty/kes`](https://github.com/pgsty/kes) · [`pgsty/pigsty`](https://github.com/pgsty/pigsty)
 
 <p align="center">
   <img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/silo-console/console-metrics-simple.webp" alt="Silo 控制台">
 </p>
 
+### SILO 20261109
+
+> [!WARNING]
+> [SILO 20261109](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z)（包版本 `20261109000000.0.0`，源码 `d998292387cc`）修复了多池生命周期、原生恢复、Object Lock、批处理授权与 IAM 等缺陷，内嵌 Console `v2.7.0` 并配套 `mcli 20261109`、`silo-pkg v3.16.0` 与 Go `1.27.3`。升级前请阅读[发布说明与升级要求](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261109/)。
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> 2026-08-06，`pgsty/minio` 更名为 `pgsty/silo`，默认分支由 `master` 改为 `main`。最后一个 MinIO 品牌发布是 [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) 分支上的 [`20260804`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z)。
+
 ## 快速上手
 
 ```bash
@@ -62,7 +59,7 @@ docker run -d --name silo -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 \
   -e MINIO_ROOT_USER=minioadmin \
   -e MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-long-password \
   -v "$PWD/data:/data" \
-  docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
+  docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
 ```
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -101,9 +98,9 @@ Silo 保留 S3 与存储格式兼容性，包括既有 `MINIO_*` 环境变量、
 
 ### TLS 与 Go 升级
 
-Server 20260916 已恢复 Go 默认密钥交换策略，20261018 在 Go 1.27.2 下保留该行为。
+Server 20260916 恢复了 Go 默认密钥交换策略，Server 20261109 在 Go 1.27.3 下保留该行为。S3 监听端口、节点间连接、站点与桶复制、身份提供方、etcd 及外部 HTTP 服务均使用 Go 默认 TLS 密钥交换。若对端无法接受 ML-KEM，设置 `GODEBUG=tlsmlkem=0` 可在当前进程禁用默认混合密钥交换（证书校验保持开启）；该选项不会禁用 ML-DSA 签名，也不能解决所有 TLS 连接重置问题，建议在升级不兼容对端后移除该临时配置。若仅新增的 SecP 混合组引发问题，可设置 `GODEBUG=tlssecpmlkem=0` 仅禁用这些组并保留 `X25519MLKEM768`。
-`GODEBUG=tlsmlkem=0`、`tlssecpmlkem=0` 的适用范围、macOS 根证书来源变化，
+
-以及 OIDC discovery 的诊断方法见 [Go 1.27 TLS 与 OIDC 指南](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/design/go127-tls-oidc-discovery/)。
+在 Go 1.27 构建中，macOS 上设置 `SSL_CERT_FILE` 或 `SSL_CERT_DIR` 会以磁盘根证书和 Go 验证器替代系统钥匙串信任；陈旧或不完整的 CA 路径可能导致原先受信任的连接失败，清除继承的环境变量即可恢复钥匙串信任。配置的 `CAs` 目录中的显式证书仍会叠加加入所选根证书池。Go 1.27 二进制要求 macOS 13 或更高版本。详见 [Go 1.27 发行说明](https://go.dev/doc/go1.27)与 [Go 1.27 TLS 与 OIDC 发现指南](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/design/go127-tls-oidc-discovery/)。
 
 ## 文档归属
 

SECURITY.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ For vulnerabilities in this fork:
 
 1. Follow the fork-specific expectations in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
 2. Prefer this repository's [private GitHub security advisory](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/security/advisories/new) workflow.
-3. If you cannot use GitHub private reporting, email [ron@pgsty.com](mailto:ron@pgsty.com)
+3. If you cannot use GitHub private reporting, email [ron@pgsty.com](mailto:ron@pgsty.com) or [rh@vonng.com](mailto:rh@vonng.com)
    directly. Do not publish vulnerability details or exploit code in public
    issues or pull requests.
 4. If you confirm the issue also affects upstream `minio/minio`, report it upstream separately.

buildscripts/check-release-commit.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+
+# Fail closed before a release job builds a commit that main never accepted or
+# that CI never validated.
+#
+# check-release-state.sh answers "is this tag safe to write to". This answers
+# the other half: "is this commit safe to ship". The release workflow already
+# proves the tag resolves to the checkout, but a tag can be pushed to any
+# commit at any time, including one that never landed on main and one whose
+# tests have not finished.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+release_commit="${1:-}"
+fixture="${2:-}"
+repository="${GITHUB_REPOSITORY:-pgsty/silo}"
+release_branch="${RELEASE_BRANCH:-origin/main}"
+
+# Workflows that must have a successful run for this exact commit, keyed by the
+# workflow file path rather than the display name: a name is free text, so a
+# second workflow could otherwise be added that calls itself "Go CI", succeeds
+# trivially, and satisfies this check while the real one fails.
+required_workflow_paths=(
+	".github/workflows/go.yml"
+	".github/workflows/vulncheck.yml"
+)
+
+if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	echo "jq is required to inspect workflow runs" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+if [[ ! "${release_commit}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]; then
+	echo "Invalid release commit: ${release_commit:-<empty>}" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ -z "${fixture}" ]; then
+	if ! git rev-parse --verify --quiet "${release_branch}" >/dev/null; then
+		echo "Cannot resolve ${release_branch}; fetch it before releasing" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	# The exact tip, not merely an ancestor: an older commit on main has no
+	# push run of its own when it arrived as part of a multi-commit push, and a
+	# release must not trail behind what main already contains.
+	tip="$(git rev-parse "${release_branch}^{commit}")"
+	if [ "${tip}" != "${release_commit}" ]; then
+		echo "Refusing to release ${release_commit}: ${release_branch} is at ${tip}" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	echo "Release commit ${release_commit} is the tip of ${release_branch}."
+
+	error_file="$(mktemp)"
+	trap 'rm -f "${error_file}"' EXIT
+	# A pull_request run checks out GitHub's synthetic merge ref, so a green
+	# run proves the merge result was good, not that this commit was ever built
+	# on its own. exclude_pull_requests only trims the pull_requests field of
+	# each run; the event/head_branch filter below is what drops those runs.
+	if ! runs_json="$(
+		gh api --paginate \
+			"repos/${repository}/actions/runs?head_sha=${release_commit}&exclude_pull_requests=true&per_page=100" \
+			--jq '.workflow_runs[] | {path, event, head_branch, head_sha, status, conclusion, run_number, run_attempt}' \
+			2>"${error_file}" | jq -s '.'
+	)"; then
+		cat "${error_file}" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+else
+	runs_json="$(<"${fixture}")"
+fi
+
+if ! jq -e 'type == "array" and all(.[]; type == "object" and (.path | type == "string"))' \
+	<<<"${runs_json}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	echo "Invalid workflow run response for ${release_commit}" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+fail=0
+for workflow in "${required_workflow_paths[@]}"; do
+	# Only runs that actually built this commit count: the right workflow file,
+	# triggered by the push that put this SHA on main. A manual dispatch is not
+	# substitute evidence - it can be run from any ref. Take the newest such
+	# run; an older success must not paper over a later failure.
+	latest="$(jq -c --arg path "${workflow}" --arg sha "${release_commit}" '
+		[ .[]
+		  | select(.path == $path)
+		  | select(.head_sha == $sha)
+		  | select(.event == "push" and .head_branch == "main")
+		]
+		| sort_by([.run_number // 0, .run_attempt // 0])
+		| last // null' <<<"${runs_json}")"
+
+	if [ "${latest}" = "null" ]; then
+		echo "Required workflow ${workflow} has no qualifying run for ${release_commit} (no run)" >&2
+		fail=1
+		continue
+	fi
+
+	status="$(jq -r '.status // "unknown"' <<<"${latest}")"
+	conclusion="$(jq -r '.conclusion // "none"' <<<"${latest}")"
+	if [ "${status}" != "completed" ] || [ "${conclusion}" != "success" ]; then
+		observed="${conclusion}"
+		if [ "${status}" != "completed" ]; then
+			observed="${status}"
+		fi
+		echo "Required workflow ${workflow} did not succeed for ${release_commit} (${observed})" >&2
+		fail=1
+	fi
+done
+
+if [ "${fail}" -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "Refusing to release ${release_commit}: required checks are not green" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "Required workflows are green for ${release_commit}."

buildscripts/check-release-commit_test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+checker="${script_dir}/check-release-commit.sh"
+commit="0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
+other_commit="89abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+fixture="$(mktemp)"
+stdout_file="$(mktemp)"
+stderr_file="$(mktemp)"
+trap 'rm -f "${fixture}" "${stdout_file}" "${stderr_file}"' EXIT
+
+expect_success() {
+	if ! "${checker}" "$@" >"${stdout_file}" 2>"${stderr_file}"; then
+		cat "${stderr_file}" >&2
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+expect_failure() {
+	if "${checker}" "$@" >"${stdout_file}" 2>"${stderr_file}"; then
+		echo "Expected release-commit check to fail: $*" >&2
+		cat "${stdout_file}" >&2
+		return 1
+	fi
+}
+
+# run <path> <conclusion> [event] [branch] [sha] [run_number] [status]
+run() {
+	local path="$1" conclusion="$2"
+	local event="${3:-push}" branch="${4:-main}" sha="${5:-${commit}}"
+	local number="${6:-1}" status="${7:-completed}"
+	local conclusion_json="\"${conclusion}\""
+	[ "${conclusion}" = "null" ] && conclusion_json=null
+	printf '{"path":"%s","event":"%s","head_branch":"%s","head_sha":"%s","status":"%s","conclusion":%s,"run_number":%s,"run_attempt":1}' \
+		"${path}" "${event}" "${branch}" "${sha}" "${status}" "${conclusion_json}" "${number}"
+}
+
+go_ok="$(run .github/workflows/go.yml success)"
+vuln_ok="$(run .github/workflows/vulncheck.yml success)"
+
+all_green() {
+	printf '[%s,%s]\n' "${go_ok}" "${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+}
+
+# Baseline: both required workflows green on a push to main.
+all_green
+expect_success "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Required workflows are green for ${commit}." "${stdout_file}"
+
+# A manual dispatch is not evidence: it can be run from any ref.
+printf '[%s,%s]\n' \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml success workflow_dispatch main)" \
+	"${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "no qualifying run" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# A re-run that finally succeeded is enough; the earlier failure is history.
+printf '[%s,%s,%s]\n' \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml failure push main "${commit}" 1)" \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml success push main "${commit}" 2)" \
+	"${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_success "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+
+# ...but a LATER failure must not be papered over by an earlier success.
+printf '[%s,%s,%s]\n' \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml success push main "${commit}" 1)" \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml failure push main "${commit}" 2)" \
+	"${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Required workflow .github/workflows/go.yml did not succeed" "${stderr_file}"
+grep -qF "(failure)" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# A decoy workflow that merely calls itself "Go CI" must not satisfy the gate.
+printf '[%s,%s]\n' \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/decoy.yml success)" "${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Required workflow .github/workflows/go.yml has no qualifying run" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# A pull_request run tests GitHub's merge ref, not this commit on its own.
+printf '[%s,%s]\n' \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml success pull_request feature)" "${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "no qualifying run" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# A push run on some other branch is not evidence that main accepted it.
+printf '[%s,%s]\n' \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml success push feature)" "${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "no qualifying run" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# A run reporting a different head_sha must be ignored.
+printf '[%s,%s]\n' \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/go.yml success push main "${other_commit}")" "${vuln_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "no qualifying run" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# Missing workflow entirely.
+printf '[%s]\n' "${go_ok}" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Required workflow .github/workflows/vulncheck.yml has no qualifying run" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# Still running.
+printf '[%s,%s]\n' "${go_ok}" \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/vulncheck.yml null push main "${commit}" 1 in_progress)" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "(in_progress)" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# Cancelled counts as not green.
+printf '[%s,%s]\n' "${go_ok}" \
+	"$(run .github/workflows/vulncheck.yml cancelled)" >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "(cancelled)" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# Malformed API response.
+printf '{not-json}\n' >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Invalid workflow run response for ${commit}" "${stderr_file}"
+
+# An empty array is a valid response that satisfies nothing.
+printf '[]\n' >"${fixture}"
+expect_failure "${commit}" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Required workflow .github/workflows/go.yml has no qualifying run" "${stderr_file}"
+
+expect_failure "not-a-commit" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Invalid release commit" "${stderr_file}"
+
+expect_failure "" "${fixture}"
+grep -qF "Invalid release commit: <empty>" "${stderr_file}"
+
+echo "release-commit decision tests passed"

buildscripts/checkdeps.sh

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ _init() {
 
 	## Minimum required versions for build dependencies
 	GIT_VERSION="1.0"
-	GO_VERSION="1.27.3"
+	GO_VERSION="1.27.4"
 	OSX_VERSION="10.8"
 	KNAME=$(uname -s)
 	ARCH=$(uname -m)

buildscripts/install-mcli.sh

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ if [ -n "${MCLI_BIN:-}" ]; then
 	exit 0
 fi
 
-release=${MCLI_RELEASE:-RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z}
+release=${MCLI_RELEASE:-RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z}
 version_hyphen=${release#RELEASE.}
 package_version=$(printf '%s\n' "${version_hyphen}" | sed -E 's/^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})T([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})Z$/\1\2\3\4\5\6.0.0/')
 if [ "${package_version}" = "${version_hyphen}" ]; then

buildscripts/release-dependency-guard/main.go

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+// release-dependency-guard checks the modules and bundled client actually used
+// by a release. A local workspace must not substitute unreleased source trees.
+package main
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
+	"strings"
+
+	"golang.org/x/mod/semver"
+)
+
+type module struct {
+	Path, Version, Dir string
+	Main               bool
+	Replace            *module
+}
+
+func selected(m module, path string) (module, error) {
+	if m.Replace != nil {
+		m = *m.Replace
+	}
+	if m.Main || m.Path != path || m.Version == "" {
+		return module{}, fmt.Errorf("%s must select an immutable maintained module, got %s@%s", path, m.Path, m.Version)
+	}
+	return m, nil
+}
+
+func atLeast(version, minimum string) bool {
+	return semver.IsValid(version) && semver.Prerelease(version) == "" && semver.Compare(version, minimum) >= 0
+}
+
+func validate(modules map[string]module, consoleVersion, mcTag, mcCommit string) error {
+	pkg, err := selected(modules["github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3"], "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !atLeast(pkg.Version, "v3.16.1") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("silo-pkg %s lacks the strict policy release; need v3.16.1 or newer", pkg.Version)
+	}
+	if _, err := selected(modules["github.com/minio/console"], "github.com/pgsty/silo-console"); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !atLeast("v"+consoleVersion, "v2.7.2") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("embedded Console %s lacks the v2.7.2 release; need 2.7.2 or newer", consoleVersion)
+	}
+	mc, err := selected(modules["github.com/minio/mc"], "github.com/pgsty/mc")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !regexp.MustCompile(`^RELEASE\.\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}-\d{2}-\d{2}Z$`).MatchString(mcTag) || mcTag <= "RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("bundled mcli %s must be a release after 20261109", mcTag)
+	}
+	if len(mcCommit) != 40 || !strings.HasSuffix(mc.Version, "-"+mcCommit[:12]) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("mc module %s does not match Dockerfile.goreleaser tag %s (%s)", mc.Version, mcTag, mcCommit)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func command(name string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
+	cmd := exec.Command(name, args...)
+	cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
+	return cmd.Output()
+}
+
+func check() error {
+	if err := os.Setenv("GOWORK", "off"); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	data, err := command("go", "list", "-mod=readonly", "-m", "-json", "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3", "github.com/minio/console", "github.com/minio/mc")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	modules := make(map[string]module)
+	dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
+	for {
+		var m module
+		if err := dec.Decode(&m); err != nil {
+			if err == io.EOF {
+				break
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+		modules[m.Path] = m
+	}
+	pkg, err := selected(modules["github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3"], "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if !atLeast(pkg.Version, "v3.16.1") {
+		return fmt.Errorf("release blocked: select silo-pkg v3.16.1 or newer (currently %s)", pkg.Version)
+	}
+	console, err := selected(modules["github.com/minio/console"], "github.com/pgsty/silo-console")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if console.Dir == "" {
+		data, err = command("go", "mod", "download", "-json", console.Path+"@"+console.Version)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &console); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+	data, err = os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(console.Dir, "web-app", "package.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	var metadata struct{ Version string }
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &metadata); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	data, err = os.ReadFile("Dockerfile.goreleaser")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	match := regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)^ARG MC_VERSION=(\S+)\s*$`).FindSubmatch(data)
+	if len(match) != 2 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("Dockerfile.goreleaser must pin MC_VERSION")
+	}
+	tag := string(match[1])
+	data, err = command("gh", "api", "repos/pgsty/mc/commits/"+tag, "--jq", ".sha")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	commit := strings.TrimSpace(string(data))
+	if err := validate(modules, metadata.Version, tag, commit); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	data, err = command("gh", "api", "repos/pgsty/mc/compare/d7262c2a5fbdf2b9503cc0283f1d37ae8da41baf..."+commit, "--jq", ".status")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if status := strings.TrimSpace(string(data)); status != "ahead" && status != "identical" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("mcli %s does not include the access-key policy repair", tag)
+	}
+	fmt.Printf("Release dependencies verified: silo-pkg %s, Console %s, mcli %s (%s)\n", pkg.Version, metadata.Version, tag, commit)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func main() {
+	if err := check(); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+		os.Exit(1)
+	}
+}

buildscripts/release-dependency-guard/main_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package main
+
+import "testing"
+
+func TestReleaseDependencySelection(t *testing.T) {
+	const commit = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, pkg, console, tag, mcSHA string
+		local, upstream, wantError     bool
+	}{
+		{name: "coordinated", pkg: "v3.16.1", console: "2.7.2", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: commit},
+		{name: "old-package", pkg: "v3.16.0", console: "2.7.2", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: commit, wantError: true},
+		{name: "prerelease-package", pkg: "v3.16.1-rc.1", console: "2.7.2", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: commit, wantError: true},
+		{name: "old-embedded-console", pkg: "v3.16.1", console: "2.7.1", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: commit, wantError: true},
+		{name: "old-container-client", pkg: "v3.16.1", console: "2.7.2", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: commit, wantError: true},
+		{name: "source-binary-mismatch", pkg: "v3.16.1", console: "2.7.2", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: "ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", wantError: true},
+		{name: "workspace-console", pkg: "v3.16.1", console: "2.7.2", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: commit, local: true, wantError: true},
+		{name: "upstream-console", pkg: "v3.16.1", console: "2.7.2", tag: "RELEASE.2026-11-12T00-00-00Z", mcSHA: commit, upstream: true, wantError: true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			modules := map[string]module{
+				"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3": {Path: "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3", Version: tc.pkg},
+				"github.com/minio/console": {Path: "github.com/minio/console", Replace: &module{
+					Path: "github.com/pgsty/silo-console", Version: "v0.0.0-20261112000000-0123456789ab",
+				}},
+				"github.com/minio/mc": {Path: "github.com/minio/mc", Replace: &module{
+					Path: "github.com/pgsty/mc", Version: "v0.0.0-20261112000000-0123456789ab",
+				}},
+			}
+			if tc.local {
+				modules["github.com/minio/console"].Replace.Version = ""
+			}
+			if tc.upstream {
+				modules["github.com/minio/console"].Replace.Path = "github.com/minio/console"
+			}
+			if err := validate(modules, tc.console, tc.tag, tc.mcSHA); (err != nil) != tc.wantError {
+				t.Fatalf("got %v, wantError=%t", err, tc.wantError)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

buildscripts/verify-helm-migration.sh

@@ -112,8 +112,21 @@ helm_run template my-release "${new_chart}" \
 
 go run ./buildscripts/helm-migration-guard "${old_render}" "${new_render}"
 
+# The templates deploy values.image.tag, not appVersion; a release must move both.
+chart_version="$(sed -n 's/^version: *//p' helm/silo/Chart.yaml)"
+app_version="$(sed -n 's/^appVersion: *//p' helm/silo/Chart.yaml)"
+image_tag="$(sed -n '/^image:/,/^[^ ]/s/^  tag: *//p' helm/silo/values.yaml)"
+if [ -z "${app_version}" ] || [ "${image_tag}" != "${app_version}" ]; then
+	echo "helm/silo: image.tag '${image_tag}' must equal appVersion '${app_version}'" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+if [ -n "${RELEASE_TAG:-}" ] && [ "${image_tag}" != "${RELEASE_TAG}" ]; then
+	echo "helm/silo: image.tag '${image_tag}' must equal RELEASE_TAG '${RELEASE_TAG}'" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
 helm_run package "${new_chart}" --destination "${output_dir}" >/dev/null
-test -s "${work_dir}/silo-7.0.3.tgz"
+test -s "${work_dir}/silo-${chart_version}.tgz"
 if find "${work_dir}" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'minio-*.tgz' | grep -q .; then
 	echo "Helm packaging emitted a legacy MinIO chart name" >&2
 	exit 1

cmd/admin-bucket-handlers.go

@@ -817,17 +817,17 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
 				bucketMap[bucket] = &v
 			}
 
-			if globalSiteReplicationSys.isEnabled() && v.Suspended() {
+			if globalSiteReplicationSys.isEnabled() && (v.Suspended() || v.PrefixesExcluded()) {
-				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, fmt.Errorf("Cluster replication is enabled for this site, so the versioning state cannot be suspended."))
+				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, fmt.Errorf("Cluster replication is enabled for this site, so the versioning state cannot be suspended or exclude prefixes."))
 				continue
 			}
 
-			if rcfg, _ := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucket); rcfg.LockEnabled && v.Suspended() {
+			if rcfg, _ := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucket); rcfg.LockEnabled && (v.Suspended() || v.PrefixesExcluded()) {
-				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, fmt.Errorf("An Object Lock configuration is present on this bucket, so the versioning state cannot be suspended."))
+				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, fmt.Errorf("An Object Lock configuration is present on this bucket, so the versioning state cannot be suspended or exclude prefixes."))
 				continue
 			}
-			if rcfg, _ := getReplicationConfig(ctx, bucket); rcfg != nil && v.Suspended() {
+			if rcfg, _ := getReplicationConfig(ctx, bucket); rcfg != nil && (v.Suspended() || v.PrefixesExcluded()) {
-				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, fmt.Errorf("A replication configuration is present on this bucket, so the versioning state cannot be suspended."))
+				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, fmt.Errorf("A replication configuration is present on this bucket, so the versioning state cannot be suspended or exclude prefixes."))
 				continue
 			}
 
@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
 				continue
 			}
 
-			bucketPolicy, err := policy.ParseBucketPolicyConfig(bytes.NewReader(bucketPolicyBytes), bucket)
+			bucketPolicy, err := parseBucketPolicyStrictBytes(bucketPolicyBytes, bucket)
 			if err != nil {
 				rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)
 				continue

cmd/admin-handlers-site-replication.go

@@ -165,10 +165,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) SRPeerReplicateIAMItem(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.
 	default:
 		err = errSRInvalidRequest(errInvalidArgument)
 	case madmin.SRIAMItemPolicy:
-		if item.Policy == nil {
+		if item.Policy == nil || bytes.Equal(bytes.TrimSpace(item.Policy), []byte("null")) {
 			err = globalSiteReplicationSys.PeerAddPolicyHandler(ctx, item.Name, nil, item.UpdatedAt)
 		} else {
-			policy, perr := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(item.Policy))
+			policy, perr := parsePolicySnapshotBytes(item.Policy)
 			if perr != nil {
 				writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, perr), r.URL)
 				return
@@ -222,10 +222,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) SRPeerReplicateBucketItem(w http.ResponseWriter, r *ht
 	default:
 		err = globalSiteReplicationSys.PeerBucketMetadataUpdateHandler(ctx, item)
 	case madmin.SRBucketMetaTypePolicy:
-		if item.Policy == nil {
+		if item.Policy == nil || bytes.Equal(bytes.TrimSpace(item.Policy), []byte("null")) {
 			err = globalSiteReplicationSys.PeerBucketPolicyHandler(ctx, item.Bucket, nil, item.UpdatedAt)
 		} else {
-			bktPolicy, berr := policy.ParseBucketPolicyConfig(bytes.NewReader(item.Policy), item.Bucket)
+			bktPolicy, berr := parseBucketPolicyStrictBytes(item.Policy, item.Bucket)
 			if berr != nil {
 				writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, berr), r.URL)
 				return

cmd/admin-handlers-users-authz_test.go

@@ -169,8 +169,9 @@ func TestIAMAdminEmptyPolicyDelegation(t *testing.T) {
 					{"{}", http.StatusOK, true},
 					{`{"Statement":null}`, http.StatusOK, true},
 					{limitedPolicy, http.StatusOK, false},
-					{`{"Version":"2012-10-17"}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
+					{`{"Version":"2012-10-17"}`, http.StatusOK, true},
-					{`{"Statement":[]}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
+					{`{"Statement":[]}`, http.StatusOK, true},
+					{`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[]}`, http.StatusOK, true},
 				} {
 					expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
 					req := madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Expiration: &expires}

cmd/admin-handlers-users.go

@@ -885,16 +885,17 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		return
 	}
 
+	// A request without a policy, or with a JSON null for one, keeps the
+	// policy the account has. An empty policy document is passed on as
+	// such: it is the request to remove the embedded policy.
 	var sp *policy.Policy
-	if len(updateReq.NewPolicy) > 0 {
+	trimmedPolicy := bytes.TrimSpace(updateReq.NewPolicy)
-		sp, err = policy.ParseConfigStrict(bytes.NewReader(updateReq.NewPolicy))
+	if len(trimmedPolicy) > 0 && !bytes.Equal(trimmedPolicy, []byte("null")) {
+		sp, err = parseSessionPolicyStrictBytes(trimmedPolicy)
 		if err != nil {
 			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
 			return
 		}
-		if sp.Version == "" && len(sp.Statements) == 0 {
-			sp = nil
-		}
 	}
 	opts := updateServiceAccountOpts{
 		secretKey:     updateReq.NewSecretKey,
@@ -903,6 +904,9 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		description:   updateReq.NewDescription,
 		expiration:    updateReq.NewExpiration,
 		sessionPolicy: sp,
+		// The edit applies to the stored account only while it still has
+		// the parent the checks above authorized.
+		parentUser: svcAccount.ParentUser,
 	}
 	updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, accessKey, opts)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -911,20 +915,12 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 	}
 
 	// Call site replication hook - non-root user accounts are replicated.
+	// The hook sends the account as it is stored after this edit, not the
+	// fields the request changed (see replicationItem).
 	if svcAccount.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey {
 		replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
 			Type:         madmin.SRIAMItemSvcAcc,
-			SvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{
+			SvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{Update: &madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{AccessKey: accessKey}},
-				Update: &madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{
-					AccessKey:     accessKey,
-					SecretKey:     opts.secretKey,
-					Status:        opts.status,
-					Name:          opts.name,
-					Description:   opts.description,
-					SessionPolicy: madmin.SRSessionPolicy(updateReq.NewPolicy),
-					Expiration:    updateReq.NewExpiration,
-				},
-			},
 			UpdatedAt:    updatedAt,
 		}))
 	}
@@ -1771,7 +1767,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddCannedPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 		return
 	}
 
-	iamPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfigStrict(bytes.NewReader(iamPolicyBytes))
+	iamPolicy, err := parsePolicyStrictBytes(iamPolicyBytes)
 	if err != nil {
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
 		return
@@ -2396,37 +2392,13 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ExportIAM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 					// skip site-replication service account.
 					continue
 				}
-				claims, err := globalIAMSys.GetClaimsForSvcAcc(ctx, acc.Credentials.AccessKey)
+				// The stored record only: this server's cache may not have
+				// heard of an edit made through another server.
+				svcAccts[user], err = serviceAccountSnapshot(acc)
 				if err != nil {
 					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, exportError(ctx, err, iamFile, ""), r.URL)
 					return
 				}
-				sa, policy, err := globalIAMSys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, acc.Credentials.AccessKey)
-				if err != nil {
-					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, exportError(ctx, err, iamFile, ""), r.URL)
-					return
-				}
-
-				var policyJSON []byte
-				if policy != nil {
-					policyJSON, err = json.Marshal(policy)
-					if err != nil {
-						writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, exportError(ctx, err, iamFile, ""), r.URL)
-						return
-					}
-				}
-				svcAccts[user] = madmin.SRSvcAccCreate{
-					Parent:        acc.Credentials.ParentUser,
-					AccessKey:     user,
-					SecretKey:     acc.Credentials.SecretKey,
-					Groups:        acc.Credentials.Groups,
-					Claims:        claims,
-					SessionPolicy: policyJSON,
-					Status:        acc.Credentials.Status,
-					Name:          sa.Name,
-					Description:   sa.Description,
-					Expiration:    &sa.Expiration,
-				}
 			}
 
 			svcAccData, err := json.Marshal(svcAccts)
@@ -2539,23 +2511,34 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) importIAM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, apiV
 			return
 		default:
 			defer f.Close()
-			var allPolicies map[string]policy.Policy
+			var policyDocuments map[string]json.RawMessage
 			data, err = io.ReadAll(f)
 			if err != nil {
 				writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, importErrorWithAPIErr(ctx, ErrInvalidRequest, err, allPoliciesFile, ""), r.URL)
 				return
 			}
-			err = json.Unmarshal(data, &allPolicies)
+			err = json.Unmarshal(data, &policyDocuments)
 			if err != nil {
 				writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, importErrorWithAPIErr(ctx, ErrAdminConfigBadJSON, err, allPoliciesFile, ""), r.URL)
 				return
 			}
+			// Validate the entire policy file before applying any entries. Keep
+			// legacy semantic validation, but never discard unknown wire fields.
+			allPolicies := make(map[string]*policy.Policy, len(policyDocuments))
+			for policyName, document := range policyDocuments {
+				parsed, parseErr := parsePolicySnapshotBytes(document)
+				if parseErr != nil {
+					writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, importErrorWithAPIErr(ctx, ErrAdminConfigBadJSON, parseErr, allPoliciesFile, policyName), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
+				allPolicies[policyName] = parsed
+			}
 			for policyName, policy := range allPolicies {
 				if policy.IsEmpty() {
 					err = globalIAMSys.DeletePolicy(ctx, policyName, true)
 					removed.Policies = append(removed.Policies, policyName)
 				} else {
-					_, err = globalIAMSys.SetPolicy(ctx, policyName, policy)
+					_, err = globalIAMSys.SetPolicy(ctx, policyName, *policy)
 					added.Policies = append(added.Policies, policyName)
 				}
 				if err != nil {
@@ -2647,8 +2630,17 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) importIAM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, apiV
 						return
 					}
 				}
-				if _, gerr := globalIAMSys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, group, grpInfo.Members); gerr != nil {
+				_, gerr := globalIAMSys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, group, grpInfo.Members)
-					failed.Groups = append(failed.Groups, madmin.IAMErrEntity{Name: group, Error: err})
+				if gerr == nil {
+					switch grpInfo.Status {
+					case statusDisabled:
+						_, gerr = globalIAMSys.SetGroupStatus(ctx, group, false)
+					case statusEnabled:
+						_, gerr = globalIAMSys.SetGroupStatus(ctx, group, true)
+					}
+				}
+				if gerr != nil {
+					failed.Groups = append(failed.Groups, madmin.IAMErrEntity{Name: group, Error: gerr})
 				} else {
 					added.Groups = append(added.Groups, group)
 				}
@@ -2694,12 +2686,15 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) importIAM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, apiV
 				var sp *policy.Policy
 				var err error
 				if len(svcAcctReq.SessionPolicy) > 0 {
-					sp, err = policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(svcAcctReq.SessionPolicy))
+					trimmedSP := bytes.TrimSpace(svcAcctReq.SessionPolicy)
+					if len(trimmedSP) > 0 && !bytes.Equal(trimmedSP, []byte("null")) {
+						sp, err = parsePolicySnapshotBytes(trimmedSP)
 						if err != nil {
 							writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, importError(ctx, err, allSvcAcctsFile, user), r.URL)
 							return
 						}
 					}
+				}
 				// service account access key cannot have space characters
 				// beginning and end of the string.
 				if hasSpaceBE(svcAcctReq.AccessKey) {
@@ -2728,12 +2723,14 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) importIAM(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, apiV
 				opts := newServiceAccountOpts{
 					accessKey:                   user,
 					secretKey:                   svcAcctReq.SecretKey,
+					status:                      svcAcctReq.Status,
 					sessionPolicy:               sp,
 					claims:                      svcAcctReq.Claims,
 					name:                        svcAcctReq.Name,
 					description:                 svcAcctReq.Description,
 					expiration:                  svcAcctReq.Expiration,
 					allowSiteReplicatorAccount:  false,
+					preserveEmptyEmbeddedPolicy: svcAcctClaimsHaveEmbeddedPolicy(svcAcctReq.Claims),
 				}
 
 				if _, _, err = globalIAMSys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, svcAcctReq.Parent, svcAcctReq.Groups, opts); err != nil {
@@ -3077,14 +3074,17 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
 	}
 
 	var sp *policy.Policy
-	if len(createReq.Policy) > 0 {
+	trimmedCreatePolicy := bytes.TrimSpace(createReq.Policy)
-		sp, err = policy.ParseConfigStrict(bytes.NewReader(createReq.Policy))
+	if bytes.Equal(trimmedCreatePolicy, []byte("null")) {
+		createReq.Policy = nil
+	} else if len(trimmedCreatePolicy) > 0 {
+		sp, err = parseSessionPolicyStrictBytes(trimmedCreatePolicy)
 		if err != nil {
 			return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err)
 		}
 		// Empty service policies mean inheritance, including for expiring keys.
 		// Normalize the replication request as well as the local credential.
-		if sp.Version == "" && sp.Statements == nil && sp.ID == "" {
+		if sp.IsEmpty() {
 			sp = nil
 			createReq.Policy = nil
 		}

cmd/admin-handlers.go

@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) MetricsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 
 	enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
 	for n > 0 {
-		var m madmin.RealtimeMetrics
+		var m realtimeMetrics
 		mLocal := collectLocalMetrics(types, collectMetricsOpts{
 			hosts: hostMap,
 			disks: diskMap,
@@ -2675,7 +2675,7 @@ func fetchHealthInfo(healthCtx context.Context, objectAPI ObjectLayer, query *ur
 	// collect all realtime metrics except disk
 	// disk metrics are already included under drive info of each server
 	getRealtimeMetrics := func() *madmin.RealtimeMetrics {
-		var m madmin.RealtimeMetrics
+		var m realtimeMetrics
 		types := madmin.MetricsAll &^ madmin.MetricsDisk
 		mLocal := collectLocalMetrics(types, collectMetricsOpts{})
 		m.Merge(&mLocal)
@@ -2690,7 +2690,8 @@ func fetchHealthInfo(healthCtx context.Context, objectAPI ObjectLayer, query *ur
 			m.ByHost[anonAddr(host)] = metrics
 			delete(m.ByHost, host)
 		}
-		return &m
+		legacy := m.legacy()
+		return &legacy
 	}
 
 	anonymizeCmdLine := func(cmdLine string) string {

cmd/api-headers.go

@@ -134,8 +134,8 @@ func setObjectHeaders(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, objInfo Object
 		w.Header().Set(xhttp.Expires, objInfo.Expires.UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat))
 	}
 
-	// Set tag count if object has tags
+	// Both the count and the optional values require permission to read tags.
-	if len(objInfo.UserTags) > 0 {
+	if opts.TaggingCount && len(objInfo.UserTags) > 0 {
 		tags, _ := tags.ParseObjectTags(objInfo.UserTags)
 		if tags != nil && tags.Count() > 0 {
 			w.Header()[xhttp.AmzTagCount] = []string{strconv.Itoa(tags.Count())}
@@ -159,6 +159,11 @@ func setObjectHeaders(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, objInfo Object
 			continue
 		}
 
+		// Tag count and tag values are gated above by opts.TaggingCount / opts.Tagging.
+		if equals(k, xhttp.AmzTagCount, xhttp.AmzObjectTagging) {
+			continue
+		}
+
 		// https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-76wf-9vgp-pj7w
 		if equals(k, xhttp.AmzMetaUnencryptedContentLength, xhttp.AmzMetaUnencryptedContentMD5) {
 			continue

cmd/api-response.go

@@ -568,18 +568,15 @@ func generateListVersionsResponse(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix, marker, v
 		DisplayName: "minio",
 	}
 	data := ListVersionsResponse{}
-	var lastObjMetaName string
 	var tagErr, metaErr APIErrorCode = -1, -1
 
 	for _, object := range resp.Objects {
 		if object.Name == "" {
 			continue
 		}
-		// Cache checks for the same object
+		if metadata != nil {
-		if metadata != nil && lastObjMetaName != object.Name {
+			tagErr = metadata(object, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction)
-			tagErr = metadata(object.Name, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction)
+			metaErr = metadata(object, policy.GetObjectAction)
-			metaErr = metadata(object.Name, policy.GetObjectAction)
-			lastObjMetaName = object.Name
 		}
 		content := ObjectVersion{}
 		content.Key = s3EncodeName(object.Name, encodingType)
@@ -727,10 +724,10 @@ func generateListObjectsV2Response(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix, token, n
 		}
 		content.Owner = owner
 		if metadata != nil {
-			if metadata(object.Name, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction) == ErrNone {
+			if metadata(object, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction) == ErrNone {
 				content.UserTags = object.UserTags
 			}
-			if metadata(object.Name, policy.GetObjectAction) == ErrNone {
+			if metadata(object, policy.GetObjectAction) == ErrNone {
 				content.UserMetadata = &Metadata{}
 				switch kind, _ := crypto.IsEncrypted(object.UserDefined); kind {
 				case crypto.S3:
@@ -774,7 +771,7 @@ func generateListObjectsV2Response(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix, token, n
 	return data
 }
 
-type metaCheckFn = func(name string, action policy.Action) (s3Err APIErrorCode)
+type metaCheckFn = func(object ObjectInfo, action policy.Action) (s3Err APIErrorCode)
 
 // generates CopyObjectResponse from the committed object information.
 func generateCopyObjectResponse(oi ObjectInfo, cs map[string]string) CopyObjectResponse {

cmd/auth-handler-unread-tags.go

@@ -0,0 +1,716 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Denis Babchuk
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/set"
+	"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/arn"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy/condition"
+	"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3"
+)
+
+func withScopedReqObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object, versionID string, fn func() APIErrorCode) APIErrorCode {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return ErrAccessDenied
+	}
+	prevBucket, prevObject, prevVID := reqInfo.BucketName, reqInfo.ObjectName, reqInfo.VersionID
+	reqInfo.BucketName = bucket
+	reqInfo.ObjectName = object
+	reqInfo.VersionID = versionID
+	defer func() {
+		reqInfo.BucketName = prevBucket
+		reqInfo.ObjectName = prevObject
+		reqInfo.VersionID = prevVID
+	}()
+	return fn()
+}
+
+func objectVersionAction(base policy.Action, versionID string) (policy.Action, bool) {
+	if versionID == "" {
+		return base, false
+	}
+	switch base {
+	case policy.GetObjectAction:
+		return policy.GetObjectVersionAction, true
+	case policy.GetObjectTaggingAction:
+		return policy.GetObjectVersionTaggingAction, true
+	case policy.PutObjectTaggingAction:
+		return policy.PutObjectVersionTaggingAction, true
+	case policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction:
+		return policy.DeleteObjectVersionTaggingAction, true
+	default:
+		return base, false
+	}
+}
+
+func (sys *IAMSys) policySetsForExplicitDeny(cred auth.Credentials) [][]policy.Policy {
+	derived := cred.IsTemp() || cred.IsServiceAccount()
+	name := cred.AccessKey
+	if derived {
+		name = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	cache := sys.store.rlock()
+	var names []string
+	roleARN := (policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}).GetRoleArn()
+	switch {
+	case name == globalActiveCred.AccessKey:
+	case derived && roleARN != "":
+		parsed, err := arn.Parse(roleARN)
+		if err != nil {
+			sys.store.runlock()
+			return nil
+		}
+		names = newMappedPolicy(sys.rolesMap[parsed]).toSlice()
+	default:
+		var err error
+		names, _, err = cache.policyDBGet(sys.store, name, false, false)
+		if err != nil && err != errNoSuchPolicy {
+			sys.store.runlock()
+			return nil
+		}
+		groups, gerr := cache.policyDBGetGroups(sys.store, len(names) > 0, cred.Groups...)
+		if gerr != nil && gerr != errNoSuchPolicy {
+			sys.store.runlock()
+			return nil
+		}
+		names = append(names, groups...)
+		if derived && len(names) == 0 {
+			claims, _ := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(cred.Claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
+			names = claims.ToSlice()
+		}
+	}
+	sys.store.runlock()
+
+	sets := [][]policy.Policy{nil}
+	slices.Sort(names)
+	compactNames := slices.Compact(names)
+	if len(compactNames) > 0 {
+		if avail, merged, err := sys.store.MergePolicies(strings.Join(compactNames, ",")); err == nil && avail != "" {
+			sets[0] = append(sets[0], merged)
+		}
+	}
+	if derived && (cred.IsTemp() || cred.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] != inheritedPolicyType) {
+		if sp, ok := cred.Claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted].(string); ok {
+			if p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(sp)); err == nil {
+				sets = append(sets, []policy.Policy{*p})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return sets
+}
+
+func isActionExplicitlyDenied(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action, existingTags string, requestTags *string) bool {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	if reqInfo.Owner {
+		return false
+	}
+	cred := reqInfo.Cred
+	bucket := reqInfo.BucketName
+	object := reqInfo.ObjectName
+	versionID := reqInfo.VersionID
+	buildValues := func(loc string, c auth.Credentials) map[string][]string {
+		values := getConditionValuesWithTags(r, loc, c, existingTags, requestTags)
+		if actionUsesObjectVersion(action) {
+			if versionID == "" {
+				delete(values, "versionid")
+			} else {
+				values["versionid"] = []string{versionID}
+			}
+		}
+		return values
+	}
+
+	if cred.AccessKey == "" {
+		p, err := globalPolicySys.Get(bucket)
+		if err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		bArgs := policy.BucketPolicyArgs{
+			Action:          action,
+			BucketName:      bucket,
+			ObjectName:      object,
+			ConditionValues: buildValues(reqInfo.Region, auth.AnonymousCredentials),
+			IsOwner:         false,
+		}
+		for _, st := range p.Statements {
+			if st.Effect != policy.Deny {
+				continue
+			}
+			probe := st
+			probe.Effect = policy.Allow
+			if probe.IsAllowed(bArgs) {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+
+	values := buildValues("", cred)
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() != nil {
+		return !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+			AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
+			Groups:          cred.Groups,
+			Action:          action,
+			BucketName:      bucket,
+			ObjectName:      object,
+			ConditionValues: values,
+			IsOwner:         false,
+			Claims:          cred.Claims,
+			DenyOnly:        true,
+		})
+	}
+	if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
+		return false
+	}
+	args := policy.Args{
+		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
+		Groups:          cred.Groups,
+		Action:          action,
+		BucketName:      bucket,
+		ObjectName:      object,
+		ConditionValues: values,
+		IsOwner:         false,
+		Claims:          cred.Claims,
+		DenyOnly:        true,
+	}
+	for _, policies := range globalIAMSys.policySetsForExplicitDeny(cred) {
+		if len(policies) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		merged := policy.MergePolicies(policies...)
+		if !merged.IsAllowed(args) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func authorizeVersionedRequestWithTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, baseAction policy.Action, versionID, existingTags string, requestTags *string) APIErrorCode {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return ErrAccessDenied
+	}
+	prevVID := reqInfo.VersionID
+	reqInfo.VersionID = versionID
+	defer func() { reqInfo.VersionID = prevVID }()
+
+	if verAction, ok := objectVersionAction(baseAction, versionID); ok {
+		if authorizeRequestWithTags(ctx, r, verAction, existingTags, requestTags) == ErrNone {
+			return ErrNone
+		}
+		if isActionExplicitlyDenied(ctx, r, verAction, existingTags, requestTags) {
+			return ErrAccessDenied
+		}
+	}
+	return authorizeRequestWithTags(ctx, r, baseAction, existingTags, requestTags)
+}
+
+func authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, baseAction policy.Action, versionID, existingTags string) APIErrorCode {
+	return authorizeVersionedRequestWithTags(ctx, r, baseAction, versionID, existingTags, nil)
+}
+
+func authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, baseAction policy.Action, versionID string, readErr error) APIErrorCode {
+	s3Err := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, baseAction, versionID, "")
+	if s3Err == ErrNone || toAPIError(ctx, readErr).HTTPStatusCode < http.StatusInternalServerError {
+		return s3Err
+	}
+	return authorizeVersionedRequestWithTagCandidates(ctx, r, baseAction, versionID, s3Err)
+}
+
+func authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, baseAction policy.Action, versionID string) APIErrorCode {
+	s3Err := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, baseAction, versionID, "")
+	if s3Err == ErrNone {
+		return ErrNone
+	}
+	return authorizeVersionedRequestWithTagCandidates(ctx, r, baseAction, versionID, s3Err)
+}
+
+func authorizeVersionedRequestWithTagCandidates(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, baseAction policy.Action, versionID string, s3Err APIErrorCode) APIErrorCode {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return ErrAccessDenied
+	}
+	prevVID := reqInfo.VersionID
+	reqInfo.VersionID = versionID
+	defer func() { reqInfo.VersionID = prevVID }()
+
+	candidates := policyExistingObjectTags(ctx, r, baseAction)
+	if verAction, ok := objectVersionAction(baseAction, versionID); ok {
+		candidates = append(candidates, policyExistingObjectTags(ctx, r, verAction)...)
+	}
+	for _, existingTags := range slices.Compact(candidates) {
+		if authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, baseAction, versionID, existingTags) == ErrNone {
+			return ErrNone
+		}
+	}
+	return s3Err
+}
+
+// canPotentiallyAllowAction reports whether the authenticated caller has any
+// grant capable of allowing action on bucket/object once condition values
+// (such as copied source tags on CopyObject) are resolved.
+func canPotentiallyAllowAction(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action, bucket, object string) bool {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	emptyTags := ""
+	if withScopedReqObject(ctx, bucket, object, "", func() APIErrorCode {
+		return authorizeRequestWithTags(ctx, r, action, "", &emptyTags)
+	}) == ErrNone {
+		return true
+	}
+	if reqInfo.Owner {
+		return true
+	}
+	cred := reqInfo.Cred
+	if cred.AccessKey == "" {
+		p, err := globalPolicySys.Get(bucket)
+		if err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+		values := getConditionValues(r, reqInfo.Region, auth.AnonymousCredentials)
+		for _, st := range p.Statements {
+			if st.Effect != policy.Allow {
+				continue
+			}
+			probe := st
+			probe.Conditions = nil
+			if probe.IsAllowed(policy.BucketPolicyArgs{Action: action, BucketName: bucket, ObjectName: object, ConditionValues: values}) {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() != nil || !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
+		return true
+	}
+	values := getConditionValues(r, "", cred)
+	for _, policies := range globalIAMSys.policySetsForExplicitDeny(cred) {
+		setAllows := false
+		for _, p := range policies {
+			for _, st := range p.Statements {
+				if st.Effect != policy.Allow {
+					continue
+				}
+				probe := st
+				probe.Conditions = nil
+				if probe.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+					AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
+					Groups:          cred.Groups,
+					Action:          action,
+					BucketName:      bucket,
+					ObjectName:      object,
+					ConditionValues: values,
+					Claims:          cred.Claims,
+				}) {
+					setAllows = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if setAllows {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if len(policies) > 0 && !setAllows {
+			return false
+		}
+		if len(policies) == 0 && cred.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey && cred.AccessKey != globalActiveCred.AccessKey {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func canReturnObjectTagsHeader(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, versionID, existingTags string) bool {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	prevVID := reqInfo.VersionID
+	reqInfo.VersionID = versionID
+	defer func() { reqInfo.VersionID = prevVID }()
+
+	if isActionExplicitlyDenied(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, existingTags, nil) {
+		return false
+	}
+	if verAction, ok := objectVersionAction(policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, versionID); ok {
+		if isActionExplicitlyDenied(ctx, r, verAction, existingTags, nil) {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	if authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, versionID, existingTags) == ErrNone {
+		return true
+	}
+	return reqInfo.Cred.AccessKey != "" &&
+		isRequestSignatureV4(r) &&
+		!isRequestPresignedSignatureV4(r) &&
+		authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.ReplicateTagsAction, existingTags) == ErrNone
+}
+
+// authorizeRequestWithUnreadTags decides whether to disclose readErr for an
+// object whose stored tags could not be read. It must not grant object access.
+//
+// Without the tags, an Allow statement that tests s3:ExistingObjectTag cannot
+// match, so a caller allowed only by such a statement would get AccessDenied,
+// which clients do not retry, for a transient server error such as lost read
+// quorum. For a server error, try a bounded set of tags from the caller's
+// policies and return the storage error if normal authorization accepts one.
+// If no candidate passes, keep AccessDenied. This is not an exhaustive policy
+// solver. For any other error, NoSuchKey among them, the tags stay empty.
+func authorizeRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action, readErr error) APIErrorCode {
+	s3Err := authorizeRequest(ctx, r, action)
+	if s3Err == ErrNone || toAPIError(ctx, readErr).HTTPStatusCode < http.StatusInternalServerError {
+		return s3Err
+	}
+	return authorizeRequestWithTagCandidates(ctx, r, action, s3Err)
+}
+
+func authorizeRequestWithTagCandidates(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action, s3Err APIErrorCode) APIErrorCode {
+	for _, existingTags := range policyExistingObjectTags(ctx, r, action) {
+		if authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, action, existingTags) == ErrNone {
+			return ErrNone
+		}
+	}
+	return s3Err
+}
+
+// maxExistingTagCandidates bounds the tag sets tried for one request; each
+// one costs an authorization.
+const maxExistingTagCandidates = 64
+
+// policyExistingObjectTags returns tag sets under which the policies that
+// authorize the request may let action through on its object: the bucket
+// policy for an anonymous request, else the cached IAM policies and, as a
+// second policy set, the session policy of the credential. A tag set passes
+// the s3:ExistingObjectTag tests of one Allow statement of each policy set and,
+// as far as the same tags allow, keeps the Deny statements that test tags from
+// matching. The tag sets are only candidates; the regular authorization
+// decides what they allow.
+func policyExistingObjectTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action) []string {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	bucket, object := reqInfo.BucketName, reqInfo.ObjectName
+	var (
+		allows [][]map[string]string // per policy set, the tags its Allow statements ask for
+		denies [][]map[string]string // per Deny statement, alternative tags that keep it from matching
+	)
+	// add collects the tags of a statement that applies to action on the
+	// object, whatever its conditions.
+	add := func(effect policy.Effect, conditions condition.Functions, values map[string][]string, fromSet *[]map[string]string) {
+		candidates := existingObjectTagsCandidatesFor(effect, conditions, values)
+		if effect == policy.Allow {
+			*fromSet = append(*fromSet, candidates...)
+		} else if len(candidates) > 0 {
+			denies = append(denies, candidates)
+		}
+	}
+	switch {
+	case reqInfo.Cred.AccessKey == "":
+		p, err := globalPolicySys.Get(bucket)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		values := getConditionValues(r, reqInfo.Region, auth.AnonymousCredentials)
+		var fromSet []map[string]string
+		for _, st := range p.Statements {
+			match := st
+			match.Effect, match.Conditions = policy.Allow, nil
+			if match.IsAllowed(policy.BucketPolicyArgs{Action: action, BucketName: bucket, ObjectName: object, ConditionValues: values}) {
+				add(st.Effect, st.Conditions, values, &fromSet)
+			}
+		}
+		allows = append(allows, fromSet)
+	case newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && globalIAMSys.Initialized():
+		values := getConditionValues(r, "", reqInfo.Cred)
+		policySets := globalIAMSys.unreadTagPolicySets(reqInfo.Cred)
+		for _, policies := range policySets {
+			var fromSet []map[string]string
+			for _, p := range policies {
+				for _, st := range p.Statements {
+					match := st
+					match.Effect, match.Conditions = policy.Allow, nil
+					if match.IsAllowed(policy.Args{Action: action, BucketName: bucket, ObjectName: object, ConditionValues: values}) {
+						add(st.Effect, st.Conditions, values, &fromSet)
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			allows = append(allows, fromSet)
+		}
+	}
+	return combineExistingObjectTags(append(allows, denies...))
+}
+
+// unreadTagMappings reuses the normal user/group mapping lookup without lazy
+// storage reads. Missing cache entries contribute no candidates; the regular
+// authorization still decides whether any candidate is allowed.
+type unreadTagMappings struct {
+	*IAMStoreSys
+}
+
+func (unreadTagMappings) loadMappedPolicy(context.Context, string, IAMUserType, bool, *xsync.MapOf[string, MappedPolicy]) error {
+	return errNoSuchPolicy
+}
+
+func (unreadTagMappings) loadGroup(context.Context, string, map[string]GroupInfo) error {
+	return errNoSuchGroup
+}
+
+// unreadTagPolicySets selects only this credential's cached policies. Base
+// and session policies remain separate because both must allow the request.
+// This only supplies candidates, so identity, claims and policy validity are
+// left to the normal authorization on each candidate.
+func (sys *IAMSys) unreadTagPolicySets(cred auth.Credentials) [][]policy.Policy {
+	derived := cred.IsTemp() || cred.IsServiceAccount()
+	name := cred.AccessKey
+	if derived {
+		name = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	cache := sys.store.rlock()
+	defer sys.store.runlock()
+	var names []string
+	roleARN := (policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}).GetRoleArn()
+	switch {
+	case name == globalActiveCred.AccessKey:
+	case derived && roleARN != "":
+		parsed, err := arn.Parse(roleARN)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		names = newMappedPolicy(sys.rolesMap[parsed]).toSlice()
+	default:
+		loader := unreadTagMappings{sys.store}
+		var err error
+		names, _, err = cache.policyDBGet(loader, name, false, false)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		groups, err := cache.policyDBGetGroups(loader, len(names) > 0, cred.Groups...)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil
+		}
+		names = append(names, groups...)
+		if derived && len(names) == 0 {
+			claims, _ := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(cred.Claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
+			names = claims.ToSlice()
+		}
+	}
+
+	sets := [][]policy.Policy{nil}
+	slices.Sort(names)
+	for _, name := range slices.Compact(names) {
+		if doc, ok := cache.iamPolicyDocsMap[name]; ok {
+			sets[0] = append(sets[0], doc.Policy)
+		}
+	}
+	if derived && (cred.IsTemp() || cred.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] != inheritedPolicyType) {
+		if sp, ok := cred.Claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted].(string); ok {
+			if p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(sp)); err == nil {
+				sets = append(sets, []policy.Policy{*p})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return sets
+}
+
+// combineExistingObjectTags combines alternatives from each base/session
+// Allow set and each tag-dependent Deny. A set may also contribute no tags:
+// another statement or another set may already supply what it needs. First
+// values win conflicts; the normal authorization decides whether they work.
+func combineExistingObjectTags(sets [][]map[string]string) []string {
+	combos := []map[string]string{{}}
+	for _, fromSet := range sets {
+		fromSet = append(uniqueExistingObjectTagMaps(fromSet), nil)
+		var next []map[string]string
+		seen := set.NewStringSet()
+	combinations:
+		for _, combo := range combos {
+			for _, addition := range fromSet {
+				merged := maps.Clone(combo)
+				for k, v := range addition {
+					if _, ok := merged[k]; !ok {
+						merged[k] = v
+					}
+				}
+				t, err := tags.MapToObjectTags(merged)
+				if err != nil || seen.Contains(t.String()) {
+					continue
+				}
+				seen.Add(t.String())
+				next = append(next, merged)
+				if len(next) == maxExistingTagCandidates {
+					break combinations
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		combos = next
+	}
+	var candidates []string
+	for _, combo := range combos {
+		if len(combo) != 0 { // empty tags were already authorized
+			t, _ := tags.MapToObjectTags(combo)
+			candidates = append(candidates, t.String())
+		}
+	}
+	return candidates
+}
+
+// existingObjectTagsCandidatesFor returns tag sets under which the
+// s3:ExistingObjectTag tests of conditions all pass, for an Allow statement,
+// or one of them fails, for a Deny statement; a tag left out is absent. For an
+// Allow, values for different tag keys are combined, while a Deny needs only
+// one failing key. It tries the values named in the conditions, with policy
+// variables resolved, wildcard fillers, and absence, then lets the policy
+// engine decide whether each candidate really satisfies the conditions.
+func existingObjectTagsCandidatesFor(effect policy.Effect, conditions condition.Functions, values map[string][]string) []map[string]string {
+	// Each function tests one key, so the tests of one tag pass or fail
+	// whatever the other tags are.
+	byKey := make(map[string]condition.Functions)
+	for _, f := range conditions {
+		for key := range condition.NewFunctions(f).Keys() {
+			if key.Is(condition.ExistingObjectTag) {
+				byKey[key.Name()] = append(byKey[key.Name()], f)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if len(byKey) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	keys := slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(byKey))
+	if effect == policy.Deny {
+		var candidates []map[string]string
+		for _, key := range keys {
+			candidates = append(candidates, existingObjectTagValues(key, strings.TrimPrefix(key, condition.ExistingObjectTag.Name()+"/"), byKey[key], values, false)...)
+		}
+		return uniqueExistingObjectTagMaps(candidates)
+	}
+
+	candidates := []map[string]string{{}}
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		keyCandidates := existingObjectTagValues(key, strings.TrimPrefix(key, condition.ExistingObjectTag.Name()+"/"), byKey[key], values, true)
+		if len(keyCandidates) == 0 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		next := make([]map[string]string, 0, min(maxExistingTagCandidates, len(candidates)*len(keyCandidates)))
+		for _, base := range candidates {
+			for _, keyCandidate := range keyCandidates {
+				merged := maps.Clone(base)
+				maps.Copy(merged, keyCandidate)
+				next = append(next, merged)
+				if len(next) == maxExistingTagCandidates {
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if len(next) == maxExistingTagCandidates {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		candidates = next
+	}
+	return uniqueExistingObjectTagMaps(candidates)
+}
+
+func uniqueExistingObjectTagMaps(candidates []map[string]string) []map[string]string {
+	seen := set.NewStringSet()
+	unique := make([]map[string]string, 0, len(candidates))
+	for _, candidate := range candidates {
+		t, err := tags.MapToObjectTags(candidate)
+		if err != nil || seen.Contains(t.String()) {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen.Add(t.String())
+		unique = append(unique, candidate)
+	}
+	return unique
+}
+
+// existingObjectTagValues looks for values of tag tagKey, or its absence,
+// under which the functions that test the condition key key evaluate to want.
+func existingObjectTagValues(key, tagKey string, tests condition.Functions, values map[string][]string, want bool) []map[string]string {
+	defer delete(values, key)
+	delete(values, key)
+	var candidates []map[string]string
+	if tests.Evaluate(values) == want {
+		candidates = append(candidates, map[string]string{})
+	}
+	// The functions keep their values unexported; JSON exposes them.
+	buf, err := json.Marshal(tests)
+	if err != nil {
+		return candidates
+	}
+	var byName map[string]map[string]condition.ValueSet
+	if err = json.Unmarshal(buf, &byName); err != nil {
+		return candidates
+	}
+	var tried []string
+	for name, byKey := range byName {
+		if name == "Null" {
+			continue // its operand says whether the tag is there, not a value
+		}
+		for _, valueSet := range byKey {
+			for _, v := range valueSet.ToSlice() {
+				s := substituteConditionVariables(v.String(), values)
+				tried = append(tried, s, strings.NewReplacer("*", "", "?", "_").Replace(s))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	slices.Sort(tried)
+	for _, v := range append(slices.Compact(tried), "", "_") {
+		if _, err := tags.MapToObjectTags(map[string]string{tagKey: v}); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		values[key] = []string{v}
+		if tests.Evaluate(values) == want {
+			candidates = append(candidates, map[string]string{tagKey: v})
+			if len(candidates) == maxExistingTagCandidates {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return uniqueExistingObjectTagMaps(candidates)
+}
+
+// substituteConditionVariables resolves the policy variables in v from the
+// condition values as the policy engine does for the values of a condition;
+// silo-pkg keeps its own function for this unexported.
+func substituteConditionVariables(v string, values map[string][]string) string {
+	for _, key := range condition.CommonKeys {
+		if rvalues, ok := values[key.Name()]; ok && len(rvalues) > 0 && rvalues[0] != "" {
+			v = strings.ReplaceAll(v, key.VarName(), rvalues[0])
+		}
+	}
+	return v
+}

cmd/auth-handler-unread-tags_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Denis Babchuk
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/arn"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy/condition"
+)
+
+// objectReadFault takes the first n drives of the set that holds object
+// offline for the metadata reads of that object only, so that IAM and bucket
+// metadata stay readable. It returns a function that restores the drives.
+func objectReadFault(z *erasureServerPools, bucket, object string, n int) func() {
+	pool := z.serverPools[0]
+	setIndex := pool.getHashedSetIndex(object)
+	pool.erasureDisksMu.Lock()
+	defer pool.erasureDisksMu.Unlock()
+	previous := pool.erasureDisks[setIndex]
+	disks := append([]StorageAPI(nil), previous...)
+	for i := range n {
+		disks[i] = consistencyReadFaultDisk{StorageAPI: disks[i], bucket: bucket, object: object}
+	}
+	pool.erasureDisks[setIndex] = disks
+	return func() {
+		pool.erasureDisksMu.Lock()
+		pool.erasureDisks[setIndex] = previous
+		pool.erasureDisksMu.Unlock()
+	}
+}
+
+// A caller allowed to read an object only through s3:ExistingObjectTag must
+// get the storage error, which clients retry, and not AccessDenied, when the
+// object's tags cannot be read because read quorum is lost. A caller that no
+// tags would let through must still get AccessDenied, and nothing changes
+// while the tags can be read.
+func TestExistingObjectTagAuthReadQuorumLost(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
+	defer cancel()
+	obj, dirs, err := prepareErasure16(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	z := obj.(*erasureServerPools)
+	previous := newObjectLayerFn()
+	setObjectLayer(z)
+	defer func() {
+		z.Shutdown(context.Background())
+		removeRoots(dirs)
+		setObjectLayer(previous)
+	}()
+	bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(ctx, z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	statement := func(effect, resource, conditions string) string {
+		st := fmt.Sprintf(`{"Effect": %q, "Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:GetObjectTagging", "s3:PutObjectTagging", "s3:DeleteObjectTagging"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::%s/%s"]`,
+			effect, bucket, resource)
+		if conditions != "" {
+			st += `, "Condition": ` + conditions
+		}
+		return st + "}"
+	}
+	tagStatement := func(effect, resource, value string) string {
+		return statement(effect, resource, fmt.Sprintf(`{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": %q}}`, value))
+	}
+	newUser := func(statements ...string) auth.Credentials {
+		return newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, "", bucket, "["+strings.Join(statements, ",")+"]")
+	}
+	newServiceAccount := func(parent auth.Credentials, statements string) auth.Credentials {
+		sessionPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [` + statements + `]}`))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		cred, _, err := globalIAMSys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: sessionPolicy})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return cred
+	}
+	newTempUser := func(parent auth.Credentials, statements string) auth.Credentials {
+		session := `{"Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [` + statements + `]}`
+		secret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
+			parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
+			policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(session)),
+		}, secret)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
+		if _, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, ""); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return cred
+	}
+	// An unrelated cached policy must not consume the candidate limit. The
+	// target user's policy is created below and sorts after this policy.
+	fillerStatements := make([]string, 0, maxExistingTagCandidates)
+	for i := range maxExistingTagCandidates {
+		fillerStatements = append(fillerStatements, statement("Allow", "*",
+			fmt.Sprintf(`{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/fill%02d": "v"}}`, i)))
+	}
+	fillerPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [` + strings.Join(fillerStatements, ",") + `]}`))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	fillerPolicyName := "000-unread-tags-filler-" + mustGetUUID()
+	if _, err = globalIAMSys.SetPolicy(ctx, fillerPolicyName, *fillerPolicy); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err := globalIAMSys.DeletePolicy(ctx, fillerPolicyName, false); err != nil {
+			t.Logf("delete filler policy: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	type user struct {
+		name  string
+		creds auth.Credentials
+		// The status with the object's tags readable and with read quorum
+		// lost: 200 and 503 for a caller that some tags let through, 403
+		// and 403 for a caller that none do.
+		healthy, quorumLost int
+	}
+	allowedByTags := func(name string, creds auth.Credentials) user {
+		return user{name, creds, http.StatusOK, http.StatusServiceUnavailable}
+	}
+	deniedByAnyTags := func(name string, creds auth.Credentials) user {
+		return user{name, creds, http.StatusForbidden, http.StatusForbidden}
+	}
+	// Each case below that tests a tag key of its own uses a key no other
+	// policy asks for.
+	ownerCondition := `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/owner": "${aws:username}"}}`
+	owner := newUser(statement("Allow", "*", ownerCondition))
+	users := []user{
+		// Allowed only while the object carries k=v.
+		allowedByTags("tagged", newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "*", "v"))),
+		// Allowed while the object carries a tag np, whatever its value.
+		allowedByTags("nullFalse", newUser(statement("Allow", "*", `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/np": "false"}}`))),
+		// Allowed while a tag ne is there and is not w.
+		allowedByTags("notEquals", newUser(statement("Allow", "*",
+			`{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/ne": "false"}, "StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/ne": "w"}}`))),
+		// Allowed while every value of tag fa differs from w; that needs a tag fa.
+		allowedByTags("forAllNotEquals", newUser(statement("Allow", "*", `{"ForAllValues:StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/fa": "w"}}`))),
+		// Allowed while the object is tagged with the caller's name.
+		allowedByTags("owner", owner),
+		// Allowed, but denied unless the object carries du=1.
+		allowedByTags("denyUnlessTagged", newUser(statement("Allow", "*", ""),
+			statement("Deny", "*", `{"StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/du": "1"}}`))),
+		// A service account whose parent asks for k=v and whose own policy
+		// asks for j=w: only an object carrying both lets it through.
+		allowedByTags("serviceAccount", newServiceAccount(newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "*", "v")),
+			statement("Allow", "*", `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/j": "w"}}`))),
+		allowedByTags("temporary", newTempUser(newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "*", "v")),
+			statement("Allow", "*", `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/j": "w"}}`))),
+		allowedByTags("rootTemporary", newTempUser(globalActiveCred, tagStatement("Allow", "*", "v"))),
+		allowedByTags("rootServiceAccount", newServiceAccount(globalActiveCred, tagStatement("Allow", "*", "v"))),
+		// The effective policy must be selected before applying the candidate
+		// limit; the unrelated cached policy above has 64 other tag statements.
+		allowedByTags("unrelatedPolicies", newUser(statement("Allow", "*",
+			`{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/target": "ok"}}`))),
+		// An alternative allowed value must survive a Deny that excludes the
+		// first value. With unread tags, k=v is the only valid candidate.
+		allowedByTags("alternativeAllowedValue", newUser(
+			statement("Allow", "*", `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": ["a", "v"]}}`),
+			tagStatement("Deny", "*", "a"))),
+		allowedByTags("alternativeValuesAcrossKeys", newUser(
+			statement("Allow", "*", `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": ["a", "v"], "s3:ExistingObjectTag/j": ["b", "w"]}}`),
+			tagStatement("Deny", "*", "a"),
+			statement("Deny", "*", `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/j": "b"}}`))),
+		// Both Deny statements must be avoided. The first candidate (k="")
+		// avoids the Null Deny but still matches the second Deny.
+		allowedByTags("multipleDenies", newUser(statement("Allow", "*", ""),
+			statement("Deny", "*", `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "true"}}`),
+			tagStatement("Deny", "*", ""))),
+		// The Deny can be avoided by k=v OR j=w. Only j=w is compatible
+		// with this Allow, so stopping at the first Deny key loses it.
+		{
+			"alternativeDenyKey", newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "*", "a"),
+				statement("Deny", "*", `{"StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "v", "s3:ExistingObjectTag/j": "w"}}`)),
+			http.StatusForbidden, http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
+		},
+
+		// Allowed only for k=w: the decision still depends on the tags.
+		{"otherValue", newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "*", "w")), http.StatusForbidden, http.StatusServiceUnavailable},
+
+		// Allowed for k=v under another prefix only.
+		deniedByAnyTags("otherPrefix", newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "other/*", "v"))),
+		// Allowed and denied for k=v alike.
+		deniedByAnyTags("allowDeny", newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "*", "v"), tagStatement("Deny", "*", "v"))),
+		// Allowed only without a tag nc that is 1.
+		deniedByAnyTags("nullConflict", newUser(statement("Allow", "*",
+			`{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/nc": "true"}, "StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/nc": "1"}}`))),
+		// Tagged with the caller's name, under another prefix only.
+		deniedByAnyTags("ownerPrefix", newUser(statement("Allow", "other/*", ownerCondition))),
+		// Denied unless the object carries db=1, and denied if it does.
+		deniedByAnyTags("denyBoth", newUser(statement("Allow", "*", ""),
+			statement("Deny", "*", `{"StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/db": "1"}}`),
+			statement("Deny", "*", `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/db": "1"}}`))),
+		// The parent asks for k=v and the service account for k=x.
+		deniedByAnyTags("serviceAccountConflict", newServiceAccount(newUser(tagStatement("Allow", "*", "v")),
+			tagStatement("Allow", "*", "x"))),
+	}
+
+	const object, missing = "tagged", "missing"
+	if _, err := z.PutObject(ctx, bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader([]byte("data")), 4, "", ""),
+		ObjectOptions{UserDefined: map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "k=v&j=w&np=1&ne=1&fa=1&du=1&target=ok&owner=" + owner.AccessKey}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Anonymous reads are allowed by the bucket policy while the object carries k=v.
+	if _, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(ctx, bucket, bucketPolicyConfig, []byte(`{"Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [
+  {"Effect": "Allow", "Principal": {"AWS": ["*"]}, "Action": ["s3:GetObject"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::`+bucket+`/*"],
+   "Condition": {"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "v"}}}]}`)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	type request struct {
+		name           string
+		method, target string
+		header         map[string]string
+		body           []byte
+	}
+	objectURL := getGetObjectURL("", bucket, object)
+	get := request{"GET", http.MethodGet, objectURL, nil, nil}
+	head := request{"HEAD", http.MethodHead, objectURL, nil, nil}
+	taggingURL := makeTestTargetURL("", bucket, object, url.Values{"tagging": []string{""}})
+	taggingBody := []byte(`<Tagging><TagSet><Tag><Key>k</Key><Value>v</Value></Tag></TagSet></Tagging>`)
+	putTagging := request{"PutObjectTagging", http.MethodPut, taggingURL, nil, taggingBody}
+	getTagging := request{"GetObjectTagging", http.MethodGet, taggingURL, nil, nil}
+	deleteTagging := request{"DeleteObjectTagging", http.MethodDelete, taggingURL, nil, nil}
+	check := func(stage string, creds auth.Credentials, name string, req request, want int) {
+		t.Helper()
+		var rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder
+		if creds.AccessKey == "" {
+			anonymous, err := newTestRequest(req.method, req.target, 0, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, anonymous)
+		} else {
+			var body io.ReadSeeker
+			if req.body != nil {
+				body = bytes.NewReader(req.body)
+			}
+			header := make(map[string]string)
+			for k, v := range req.header {
+				header[k] = v
+			}
+			if creds.IsTemp() {
+				header[xhttp.AmzSecurityToken] = creds.SessionToken
+			}
+			signed, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(req.method, req.target, int64(len(req.body)), body, creds.AccessKey, creds.SecretKey, header)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			rec = httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, signed)
+		}
+		if rec.Code != want {
+			var apiErr APIErrorResponse
+			_ = xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &apiErr)
+			t.Errorf("%s: %s by %s: status %d %s, want %d", stage, req.name, name, rec.Code, apiErr.Code, want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	var anonymous auth.Credentials
+	for _, u := range users {
+		check("healthy", u.creds, u.name, get, u.healthy)
+		check("healthy", u.creds, u.name, getTagging, u.healthy)
+	}
+	check("healthy", anonymous, "anonymous", get, http.StatusOK)
+	// The tags were read and allow the request: the range error is the answer.
+	check("healthy", users[0].creds, users[0].name,
+		request{"GET bytes=100-200", http.MethodGet, objectURL, map[string]string{xhttp.Range: "bytes=100-200"}, nil},
+		http.StatusRequestedRangeNotSatisfiable)
+	// Without an object there are no tags: AccessDenied, as before.
+	missingURL := getGetObjectURL("", bucket, missing)
+	check("missing key", users[0].creds, users[0].name, request{"GET", http.MethodGet, missingURL, nil, nil}, http.StatusForbidden)
+	check("missing key", users[0].creds, users[0].name, request{"HEAD", http.MethodHead, missingURL, nil, nil}, http.StatusForbidden)
+	check("missing key", users[0].creds, users[0].name, request{"GetObjectTagging", http.MethodGet, missingURL + "?tagging", nil, nil}, http.StatusForbidden)
+
+	defer objectReadFault(z, bucket, object, 10)()
+	if _, err := z.GetObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, object, ObjectOptions{}); !isErrReadQuorum(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("GetObjectInfo with 10 of 16 drives failing: %v, want InsufficientReadQuorum", err)
+	}
+	for _, req := range []request{get, head, getTagging, putTagging, deleteTagging} {
+		for _, u := range users {
+			check("read quorum lost", u.creds, u.name, req, u.quorumLost)
+		}
+	}
+	check("read quorum lost", anonymous, "anonymous", get, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+	check("read quorum lost", anonymous, "anonymous", head, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+}
+
+func TestExistingObjectTagsFor(t *testing.T) {
+	values := map[string][]string{"username": {"alice"}, "sub": {"u1"}}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		effect     policy.Effect
+		conditions string
+		want       string // the tags to set, encoded as in x-amz-tagging
+		ok         bool   // false: no tags for this statement
+	}{
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "v"}}`, "k=v", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringEqualsIgnoreCase": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "V"}, "IpAddress": {"aws:SourceIp": "10.0.0.0/8"}}`, "k=V", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"ForAnyValue:StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": ["b", "a"]}}`, "k=a", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringLike": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "a?c*"}}`, "k=a_c", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/b": "2", "s3:ExistingObjectTag/a": "1"}}`, "a=1&b=2", true},
+		// Passed without the tag.
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "v"}}`, "", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "true"}}`, "", true},
+		// Null "false" asks for the tag, with any value.
+		{policy.Allow, `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "false"}}`, "k=", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "false"}, "StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": ["", "w"]}}`, "k=_", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "false"}, "StringNotLike": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "*w"}}`, "k=", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"ForAllValues:StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "w"}}`, "k=", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "true"}, "StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "v"}}`, "", false},
+		// Policy variables take the values of the request.
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/owner": "${aws:username}"}}`, "owner=alice", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringLike": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/owner": "${jwt:sub}-*"}}`, "owner=u1-", true},
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/owner": "${ldap:user}"}}`, "", false},
+		// A Deny is kept from matching.
+		{policy.Deny, `{"StringNotEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "v"}}`, "k=v", true},
+		{policy.Deny, `{"Null": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "true"}}`, "k=", true},
+		{policy.Deny, `{"StringEquals": {"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k": "v"}}`, "", true},
+		{policy.Deny, `{"StringEquals": {"s3:prefix": "v"}}`, "", false},
+		// No tag tests.
+		{policy.Allow, `{"StringEquals": {"s3:prefix": "v"}}`, "", false},
+		{policy.Allow, "", "", false},
+	} {
+		var conditions condition.Functions // nil: a statement without a Condition
+		if tc.conditions != "" {
+			if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(tc.conditions), &conditions); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s: %v", tc.conditions, err)
+			}
+		}
+		candidates := existingObjectTagsCandidatesFor(tc.effect, conditions, values)
+		ok := len(candidates) > 0
+		got := ""
+		if ok {
+			encoded, err := tags.MapToObjectTags(candidates[0])
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s: %v", tc.conditions, err)
+			}
+			got = encoded.String()
+		}
+		if got != tc.want || ok != tc.ok {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s: got %q %v, want %q %v", tc.effect, tc.conditions, got, ok, tc.want, tc.ok)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Group-only and external identities need mapping lookups that normally
+// fall back to storage. Candidate collection must stay within the cache even
+// for those identities, while still finding their group/claim/role policy.
+func TestUnreadTagPolicySetsCacheOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys, _ := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+	const policyName = "unread-tag-policy"
+	batchAuthzPolicy(ctx, t, sys, policyName, `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/k":"v"}}}`)
+	member := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "unread-group-member", "")
+	_, err := sys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, "unread-group", []string{member.AccessKey})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, "unread-group", policyName, regUser, true)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	role, err := arn.NewIAMRoleARN("unread-role", "")
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	sys.rolesMap = map[arn.ARN]string{role: policyName}
+	claimUser := auth.Credentials{
+		AccessKey: "unread-sts", ParentUser: "external-parent", SessionToken: "token",
+		Expiration: UTCNow().Add(time.Hour), Claims: map[string]any{iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID(): policyName},
+	}
+	roleUser := claimUser
+	roleUser.Claims = map[string]any{roleArnClaim: role.String()}
+	original := sys.store.IAMStorageAPI
+	defer func() { sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = original }()
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		cred auth.Credentials
+	}{
+		{"group", member},
+		{"claims", claimUser},
+		{"role", roleUser},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			name := tc.cred.AccessKey
+			if tc.cred.ParentUser != "" {
+				name = tc.cred.ParentUser
+			}
+			probe := &batchBlockedIAMStore{
+				IAMStorageAPI: original, mapping: name, doc: policyName,
+				started: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{}),
+			}
+			close(probe.release) // report an accidental read without blocking the test
+			sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = probe
+			sets := sys.unreadTagPolicySets(tc.cred)
+			select {
+			case <-probe.started:
+				t.Error("candidate collection attempted a storage read")
+			default:
+			}
+			if len(sets) != 1 || len(sets[0]) != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("expected the cached policy through %s, got %v", tc.name, sets)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/auth-handler.go

@@ -340,16 +340,6 @@ func checkRequestAuthType(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Ac
 	return s3Err
 }
 
-func checkRequestAuthTypeWithExistingTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action, bucketName, objectName, existingTags string) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
-	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucketName
-	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = objectName
-
-	if s3Err = authenticateRequest(ctx, r, action); s3Err != ErrNone {
-		return s3Err
-	}
-	return authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, action, existingTags)
-}
-
 func checkRequestAuthTypeWithRequestTags(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action, bucketName, objectName string, requestTags *string) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
 	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucketName
 	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = objectName
@@ -425,6 +415,19 @@ func authorizeRequest(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action
 	return authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, action, "")
 }
 
+// authorizeBucketRequest authorizes a bucket action, such as s3:ListBucket,
+// on the bucket of a request made for one of its objects.
+func authorizeBucketRequest(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, action policy.Action) APIErrorCode {
+	reqInfo := logger.GetReqInfo(ctx)
+	if reqInfo == nil {
+		return ErrAccessDenied
+	}
+	objectName := reqInfo.ObjectName
+	reqInfo.ObjectName = ""
+	defer func() { reqInfo.ObjectName = objectName }()
+	return authorizeRequest(ctx, r, action)
+}
+
 func deleteObjectAction(versionID string) policy.Action {
 	if versionID != "" {
 		return policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction
@@ -435,7 +438,12 @@ func deleteObjectAction(versionID string) policy.Action {
 func actionUsesObjectVersion(action policy.Action) bool {
 	switch action {
 	case policy.DeleteObjectAction, policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction,
-		policy.ReplicateDeleteAction, policy.BypassGovernanceRetentionAction:
+		policy.ReplicateDeleteAction, policy.BypassGovernanceRetentionAction,
+		policy.GetObjectAction, policy.GetObjectVersionAction,
+		policy.GetObjectAttributesAction, policy.GetObjectVersionAttributesAction,
+		policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, policy.GetObjectVersionTaggingAction,
+		policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, policy.PutObjectVersionTaggingAction,
+		policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, policy.DeleteObjectVersionTaggingAction:
 		return true
 	default:
 		return false
@@ -676,7 +684,15 @@ func setAuthMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
 
 		aType := getRequestAuthType(r)
 		switch aType {
-		case authTypeSigned, authTypeSignedV2, authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeStreamingSignedTrailer:
+		case authTypeSigned, authTypeSignedV2, authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeStreamingSignedTrailer, authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer:
+			// STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER is valid for a genuinely
+			// anonymous request. Once Authorization is present, it is a
+			// signed REST-HEADER request and must obey the same date/skew
+			// bound as the other SigV4 streaming forms.
+			if aType == authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer && r.Header.Get(xhttp.Authorization) == "" {
+				h.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+				return
+			}
 			// Verify if date headers are set, if not reject the request
 			amzDate, errCode := parseAmzDateHeader(r)
 			if errCode != ErrNone {
@@ -774,11 +790,12 @@ func isPutActionAllowedWithRequestTags(ctx context.Context, atype authType, buck
 
 func isPutActionAllowedWithCred(bucketName, objectName string, r *http.Request, action policy.Action, requestTags *string, cred auth.Credentials, owner bool) APIErrorCode {
 	// Do not check for PutObjectRetentionAction permission,
-	// if mode and retain until date are not set.
+	// if neither retention values nor a replica retention revision are set.
 	// Can happen when bucket has default lock config set
 	if action == policy.PutObjectRetentionAction &&
 		r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode) == "" &&
-		r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate) == "" {
+		r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate) == "" &&
+		r.Header.Get(xhttp.MinIOSourceObjectRetentionTimestamp) == "" {
 		return ErrNone
 	}
 

cmd/batch-authz-context_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+// batchContextRead is the object read the tests below authorize.
+func batchContextRead(f *batchAuthzFixture) batchAuthzRequest {
+	return batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "data/a"}
+}
+
+// batchContextUser creates a user with statements as its only policy and
+// returns its submitter binding.
+func batchContextUser(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, name, statements string) (auth.Credentials, *batchJobSubmitter) {
+	t.Helper()
+	batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, name, statements)
+	cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, name+"-user", name)
+	sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	return cred, sub
+}
+
+func isBatchContextRefusal(err error) bool {
+	return isBatchJobAuthzError(err) && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "request context")
+}
+
+// A statement whose resources rule the object out does not apply, whatever
+// its conditions need, policy variables in condition values included. One
+// whose resources match still refuses.
+func TestBatchAuthzContextResourceFirst(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	const unrelated = `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::other-bucket/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/owner":"${aws:UserAgent}"}}}`
+	_, sub := batchContextUser(t, f, "context-unrelated", batchAuthzFullAccess+",\n"+unrelated)
+	if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f)); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("a Deny on another bucket refused an allowed read: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	related := strings.Replace(unrelated, "other-bucket", f.bucket, 1)
+	_, sub = batchContextUser(t, f, "context-related", batchAuthzFullAccess+",\n"+related)
+	if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f)); !isBatchContextRefusal(err) {
+		t.Errorf("a Deny on the object with an unsupplied variable must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// A variable in the resource leaves open whether it matches.
+	const resourceVar = `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/${aws:UserAgent}/*"]}`
+	_, sub = batchContextUser(t, f, "context-resource-var", batchAuthzFullAccess+",\n"+resourceVar)
+	if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f)); !isBatchContextRefusal(err) {
+		t.Errorf("a Deny whose resource holds an unsupplied variable must refuse, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// An Allow that needs request context the job does not have grants nothing
+// to the job; it neither refuses the job nor grants by an absent key.
+func TestBatchAuthzContextAllowDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	const ipAllow = `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::*"],"Condition":{"IpAddress":{"aws:SourceIp":["10.0.0.0/8"]}}}`
+	_, sub := batchContextUser(t, f, "context-ip-allow", batchAuthzFullAccess+",\n"+ipAllow)
+	if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f)); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("a conditional Allow refused a read another Allow grants: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// A Null condition holds for an absent key: evaluated without the
+	// context, this Allow would grant what no request with an address gets.
+	const nullAllow = `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:StartBatchJob"]},
+{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"Null":{"aws:SourceIp":"true"}}}`
+	cred, sub := batchContextUser(t, f, "context-null-allow", nullAllow)
+	if !f.sys.isAllowedLocally(policy.Args{AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "data/a", ConditionValues: map[string][]string{}}) {
+		t.Fatal("control: without the address the Null Allow grants")
+	}
+	err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f))
+	if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || isBatchContextRefusal(err) {
+		t.Errorf("an Allow that needs the address must grant nothing, and deny rather than refuse; got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// The same holds for the Allows of a session policy, which only narrows.
+func TestBatchAuthzContextSessionAllow(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "context-session-parent", batchAuthzFullAccess)
+	parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "context-session-parent", "context-session-parent")
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, statements string
+		allowed          bool
+	}{
+		{"null-only", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"Null":{"aws:SourceIp":"true"}}}`, false},
+		{"with-plain", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"Null":{"aws:SourceIp":"true"}}},
+{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/data/*"]}`, true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[` + tc.statements + `]}`))
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			created, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: sp})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			stored, ok := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, created.AccessKey)
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatal("service account missing")
+			}
+			sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(stored.Credentials)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			err = sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f))
+			switch {
+			case isBatchContextRefusal(err):
+				t.Errorf("a session-policy Allow refused the job: %v", err)
+			case tc.allowed && err != nil:
+				t.Errorf("the plain session Allow must still grant: %v", err)
+			case !tc.allowed && !isBatchJobAuthzError(err):
+				t.Errorf("a session policy whose only Allow needs the address must deny, got %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/batch-authz-review6_test.go

@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ func TestBatchReviewRotationKeepsMigrationCleanup(t *testing.T) {
 				t.Errorf("rotation changed a draining source after its version was copied (rotation error: %v)", rotationErr)
 			}
 			snapshot := []FileInfo{{VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: beforeInfo.ModTime}}
-			if err := z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), bucket, object, 0, snapshot, nil); err != nil {
+			if _, err := z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), bucket, object, 0, snapshot, nil); err != nil {
 				t.Fatalf("rotation prevented migration cleanup: %v", err)
 			}
 			if _, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID}); !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {

cmd/batch-authz-variables_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+// Use explicit condition values to exercise the evaluator, including literal
+// spellings that S3 tag validation does not permit in stored tags.
+func TestBatchPolicyConditionVariableParity(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	cases := []struct {
+		value, actual string
+		matches       bool
+		requestOnly   bool
+	}{
+		{"${$}100", "${$}100", true, false},
+		{"${$}100", "$100", false, false},
+		{"${*}", "${*}", true, false},
+		{"${?}", "${?}", true, false},
+		{"${custom:unknown}", "${custom:unknown}", true, false},
+		{"${aws:Unknown}", "${aws:Unknown}", true, false},
+		{"${aws:UserAgent", "${aws:UserAgent", true, false},
+		{"${aws:username}", "", true, false},
+		{"${aws:UserAgent}", "test-agent", true, true},
+		{"${prefix${aws:UserAgent}}", "${prefixtest-agent}", true, true},
+	}
+	for i, tc := range cases {
+		for opIndex, op := range []string{
+			"StringEquals", "StringNotEquals", "StringEqualsIgnoreCase", "StringNotEqualsIgnoreCase",
+			"StringLike", "StringNotLike", "ForAnyValue:StringEquals", "ForAllValues:StringEquals", "BinaryEquals",
+		} {
+			for _, effect := range []string{"Allow", "Deny"} {
+				t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d/%s/%s", i, op, effect), func(t *testing.T) {
+					name := fmt.Sprintf("var-%d-%d-%s", i, opIndex, effect)
+					conditionValue := tc.value
+					if op == "BinaryEquals" {
+						conditionValue = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(conditionValue))
+					}
+					statement := fmt.Sprintf(`{"Effect":%q,"Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/data/*"],"Condition":{%q:{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/label":%q}}}`, effect, op, conditionValue)
+					if effect == "Deny" {
+						statement += `,{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/data/*"]}`
+					}
+					cred, sub := batchContextUser(t, f, name, statement)
+					actual := tc.actual
+					if tc.value == "${aws:username}" {
+						actual = cred.AccessKey
+					}
+					values := map[string][]string{"ExistingObjectTag/label": {actual}}
+					ordinaryValues := maps.Clone(values)
+					ordinaryValues["username"] = []string{cred.AccessKey}
+					ordinaryValues["UserAgent"] = []string{"test-agent"}
+					ordinaryAllowed := f.sys.isAllowedLocally(policy.Args{
+						AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
+						Action:          policy.GetObjectAction,
+						BucketName:      f.bucket,
+						ObjectName:      "data/" + name,
+						ConditionValues: ordinaryValues,
+					})
+					matches := tc.matches
+					if strings.Contains(op, "Not") {
+						matches = !matches
+					}
+					if want := matches == (effect == "Allow"); ordinaryAllowed != want {
+						t.Fatalf("ordinary evaluator allowed=%v want %v", ordinaryAllowed, want)
+					}
+					batchErr := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{
+						action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "data/" + name, values: values,
+					})
+					if tc.requestOnly {
+						if !isBatchJobAuthzError(batchErr) {
+							t.Fatalf("missing request context must deny: %v", batchErr)
+						}
+						if (effect == "Deny") != isBatchContextRefusal(batchErr) {
+							t.Fatalf("only a Deny must refuse missing context: %v", batchErr)
+						}
+						return
+					}
+					if (batchErr == nil) != ordinaryAllowed {
+						t.Fatalf("ordinary allowed=%v; batch=%v", ordinaryAllowed, batchErr)
+					}
+				})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Condition keys themselves are never expanded.
+	const statement = `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/${aws:UserAgent}":"literal"}}}`
+	cred, sub := batchContextUser(t, f, "literal-condition-key", statement)
+	values := map[string][]string{"ExistingObjectTag/${aws:UserAgent}": {"literal"}}
+	if !f.sys.isAllowedLocally(policy.Args{AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "data/key", ConditionValues: values}) {
+		t.Fatal("ordinary evaluator did not match the literal condition key")
+	}
+	if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "data/key", values: values}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("batch treated a condition key as a variable: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// Object names permit these spellings, so also compare real S3 GETs with batch.
+func TestBatchPolicyResourceVariableParity(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	router := initTestAPIEndPoints(f.obj, []string{"GetObject"})
+	for i, raw := range []string{"${$}100", "${*}", "${?}", "${custom:unknown}", "${prefix${aws:UserAgent}}", "${aws:username}", "${aws:UserAgent}"} {
+		for _, effect := range []string{"Allow", "Deny"} {
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%d/%s", i, effect), func(t *testing.T) {
+				name := fmt.Sprintf("res-%d-%s", i, effect)
+				statement := fmt.Sprintf(`{"Effect":%q,"Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":[%q]}`, effect, "arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/"+raw)
+				if effect == "Deny" {
+					statement += `,{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}`
+				}
+				cred, sub := batchContextUser(t, f, name, statement)
+				object := strings.ReplaceAll(raw, "${aws:username}", cred.AccessKey)
+				if raw == "${aws:UserAgent}" {
+					object = "test-agent"
+				}
+				_, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader("data"), 4, "", ""), ObjectOptions{})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, getGetObjectURL("", f.bucket, object), 0, nil, cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, map[string]string{"User-Agent": "test-agent"})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+				router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+				wantStatus := http.StatusOK
+				if effect == "Deny" {
+					wantStatus = http.StatusForbidden
+				}
+				if rec.Code != wantStatus {
+					t.Fatalf("S3 read: %d want %d: %s", rec.Code, wantStatus, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+				err = sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: object})
+				if raw == "${aws:UserAgent}" {
+					if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || (effect == "Deny") != isBatchContextRefusal(err) {
+						t.Fatalf("batch did not reject missing request context: %v", err)
+					}
+					return
+				}
+				if (err == nil) != (rec.Code == http.StatusOK) {
+					t.Fatalf("resource %q %s: S3=%d batch=%v", raw, effect, rec.Code, err)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/batch-authz.go

@@ -34,12 +34,17 @@ import (
 //     (batchJobSubmitter). Nothing in the submitted definition names it.
 //   - Every start of the job, and every object it touches, resolves the
 //     binding against IAM again. A credential that is gone, disabled,
-//     expired, revoked or edited since submission fails the job; a reused
+//     expired or revoked fails the job, and so does one whose secret,
-//     access key does not match the binding.
+//     session token or parent changed since submission; a reused access key
+//     does not match the binding. Edits that leave the credential itself as
+//     it was (a name, a description, a later expiry of an expiring
+//     credential, the LDAP groups) keep the job: its policies, groups,
+//     status and expiry are read again each time.
 //   - Each action is evaluated with the submitter's policies and session
-//     policy but without a request. A policy statement that would need
+//     policy but without a request. A Deny that may apply and would need
 //     request context the job does not have (source address, transport,
-//     headers and so on) refuses the action instead of being skipped.
+//     headers and so on) refuses the action instead of being skipped; an
+//     Allow that would need it grants nothing to the job.
 //
 // A job without a binding was queued by an earlier release. It is never
 // authorized, whoever submitted it, and has to be submitted again.
@@ -54,8 +59,13 @@ type batchJobSubmitter struct {
 	AccessKey string `msg:"ak"`
 	// ParentUser is the parent of a derived credential.
 	ParentUser string `msg:"pu"`
-	// UpdatedAt and RevokedBefore are the revision of the identity record;
+	// UpdatedAt is the revision of the identity record at submission. It is
-	// any edit of the identity changes them. They are unset for root.
+	// recorded for diagnosis only: an edit that keeps the credential, such as
+	// a description, a later expiry or an LDAP group refresh, changes it and
+	// must not end the job. RevokedBefore is the revocation boundary of the
+	// record, which edits keep and a deletion advances, so a credential
+	// created again under the access key does not match. Both are unset for
+	// root.
 	UpdatedAt     time.Time `msg:"ua"`
 	RevokedBefore time.Time `msg:"rb"`
 	// Binding is a keyed fingerprint of the credential itself, see
@@ -228,8 +238,13 @@ func (s *batchJobSubmitter) principal(ctx context.Context) (batchJobPrincipal, e
 	}
 	cred := u.Credentials
 	typ := batchSubmitterType(cred)
+	// The binding covers the secret, the session token and the parent, so a
+	// rotated or reissued credential does not match it. The rest of the
+	// identity record (UpdatedAt) changes with edits that keep the
+	// credential and is not compared; what those edits decide, status,
+	// expiry, groups and policies, is evaluated below and per action.
 	if typ != s.Type || cred.AccessKey != s.AccessKey || cred.ParentUser != s.ParentUser ||
-		!u.UpdatedAt.Equal(s.UpdatedAt) || !u.RevokedBefore.Equal(s.RevokedBefore) ||
+		!u.RevokedBefore.Equal(s.RevokedBefore) ||
 		!hmac.Equal(s.Binding, batchSubmitterBinding(typ, cred)) {
 		return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobChanged
 	}
@@ -474,22 +489,36 @@ func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorizeArgs(args policy.Args, req *batchAuthzReques
 		snap = globalIAMSys.store.batchSnapshot(ctx)
 		defer snap.release()
 	}
-	policies, err := globalIAMSys.batchLocalPolicies(p, args, plugin == nil, snap)
+	mapped, session, err := globalIAMSys.batchLocalPolicies(p, args, plugin == nil, snap)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchPolicy) || errors.Is(err, errAuthentication) || errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) || errors.Is(err, errNoSuchGroup) {
 			return denied
 		}
 		return batchUnavailable("IAM policy lookup", err)
 	}
+	// sessionNarrowed: the session policy lost an Allow below, so the
+	// narrowed policy decides in its place.
+	sessionNarrowed := false
 	if req != nil {
 		supplied := req.suppliedConditionKeys()
-		for _, pol := range policies {
+		var refuse bool
-			for _, st := range pol.Statements {
+		if mapped, _, refuse = batchContextFree(mapped, args, supplied); !refuse {
-				if batchStatementNeedsRequest(st, args, supplied) {
+			session, sessionNarrowed, refuse = batchContextFree(session, args, supplied)
+		}
+		if refuse {
 			return batchJobAuthzError{reason: denied.reason + ": a policy statement depends on request context that a batch job does not have"}
 		}
 	}
+	sessionDenies := func() bool {
+		has, allowed := p.sessionPolicyDecision(args)
+		if has && allowed && sessionNarrowed {
+			// As sessionPolicyDecision evaluates it, without its dropped
+			// Allows. This can only turn an allow into a deny.
+			spArgs := args
+			spArgs.IsOwner, spArgs.DenyOnly = false, false
+			allowed = session.IsAllowed(spArgs)
 		}
+		return has && !allowed
 	}
 	if plugin != nil {
 		ok, err := plugin.IsAllowedContext(ctx, args)
@@ -500,7 +529,7 @@ func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorizeArgs(args policy.Args, req *batchAuthzReques
 			return denied
 		}
 		// The plugin does not see a session policy; it only limits further.
-		if has, allowed := p.sessionPolicyDecision(args); has && !allowed {
+		if sessionDenies() {
 			return denied
 		}
 		return nil
@@ -516,7 +545,7 @@ func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorizeArgs(args policy.Args, req *batchAuthzReques
 			return denied
 		}
 	}
-	if has, allowed := p.sessionPolicyDecision(args); has && !allowed {
+	if sessionDenies() {
 		return denied
 	}
 	ownerDerived := (p.temp || p.service) && p.parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey
@@ -524,13 +553,50 @@ func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorizeArgs(args policy.Args, req *batchAuthzReques
 		if p.service {
 			args.AccountName = p.parentUser
 		}
-		if len(policies) == 0 || !policies[0].IsAllowed(args) {
+		if mapped == nil || !mapped.IsAllowed(args) {
 			return denied
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
+// batchContextFree returns pol without the Allow statements that may apply
+// to args but need request context the job does not supply (see
+// batchStatementNeedsRequest), and whether it dropped any. Such an Allow
+// grants nothing to the job. It is dropped rather than evaluated, because
+// evaluated without the context it could grant what a request would not:
+// IfExists and Null conditions hold for an absent key. Dropping an Allow can
+// only narrow the decision. Dropping a Deny that needs the context could
+// allow what a request with that context would not, so refuse reports one,
+// and the job refuses the action.
+func batchContextFree(pol *policy.Policy, args policy.Args, supplied map[string]bool) (out *policy.Policy, dropped, refuse bool) {
+	if pol == nil {
+		return nil, false, false
+	}
+	var kept []policy.Statement
+	for i, st := range pol.Statements {
+		if !batchStatementNeedsRequest(st, args, supplied) {
+			if dropped {
+				kept = append(kept, st)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if st.Effect != policy.Allow {
+			return pol, false, true
+		}
+		if !dropped {
+			kept = append(make([]policy.Statement, 0, len(pol.Statements)-1), pol.Statements[:i]...)
+			dropped = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !dropped {
+		return pol, false, false
+	}
+	// A new policy: pol's statement index refers to pol's own statements, and
+	// pol may be a cached policy document.
+	return &policy.Policy{ID: pol.ID, Version: pol.Version, Statements: kept}, true, false
+}
+
 func batchDeniedReason(req batchAuthzRequest) string {
 	resource := req.bucket
 	if req.object != "" {
@@ -636,13 +702,13 @@ func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) loadPolicyDoc(name string, out map[string]PolicyDo
 }
 
 // batchLocalPolicies returns every local policy that can take part in the
-// decision on args: the mapped policies that IsAllowed would merge when
+// decision on args: mapped, the mapped policies merged as IsAllowed would
-// withMapped is set (no authorization plugin), and the session policy.
+// merge them, when withMapped is set (no authorization plugin), and session,
-func (sys *IAMSys) batchLocalPolicies(p batchJobPrincipal, args policy.Args, withMapped bool, snap *batchPolicySnapshot) ([]policy.Policy, error) {
+// the session policy. Each is nil when it takes no part.
-	var out []policy.Policy
+func (sys *IAMSys) batchLocalPolicies(p batchJobPrincipal, args policy.Args, withMapped bool, snap *batchPolicySnapshot) (mapped, session *policy.Policy, err error) {
 	if withMapped && args.IsOwner {
 		// IsAllowed does not evaluate any policy for the owner.
-		return nil, nil
+		return nil, nil, nil
 	}
 	if withMapped {
 		// The caller holds snap through evaluation. Lazy mapping loads and
@@ -664,28 +730,28 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) batchLocalPolicies(p batchJobPrincipal, args policy.Args, wit
 			if roleArn := args.GetRoleArn(); roleArn != "" {
 				a, err := arn.Parse(roleArn)
 				if err != nil {
-					return nil, err
+					return nil, nil, err
 				}
 				names = append(names, newMappedPolicy(sys.rolesMap[a]).toSlice()...)
 			} else {
-				mapped, err := mappedPolicies(p.parentUser)
+				parent, err := mappedPolicies(p.parentUser)
 				if err != nil {
-					return nil, err
+					return nil, nil, err
 				}
-				names = append(names, mapped...)
+				names = append(names, parent...)
 				// The claimed policies apply only when nothing is mapped.
-				if len(mapped) == 0 {
+				if len(parent) == 0 {
 					if claimed, ok := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(args.Claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()); ok {
 						names = append(names, claimed.ToSlice()...)
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		default:
-			mapped, err := mappedPolicies(p.accessKey)
+			own, err := mappedPolicies(p.accessKey)
 			if err != nil {
-				return nil, err
+				return nil, nil, err
 			}
-			names = append(names, mapped...)
+			names = append(names, own...)
 		}
 		var selected []policy.Policy
 		for _, name := range names {
@@ -700,63 +766,56 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) batchLocalPolicies(p batchJobPrincipal, args policy.Args, wit
 					continue
 				}
 				if err != nil {
-					return nil, err
+					return nil, nil, err
 				}
 				doc, ok = loaded[name]
 				if !ok {
-					return nil, fmt.Errorf("load IAM policy %q returned no document", name)
+					return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load IAM policy %q returned no document", name)
 				}
 			}
 			selected = append(selected, doc.Policy)
 		}
-		out = append(out, policy.MergePolicies(selected...))
+		merged := policy.MergePolicies(selected...)
+		mapped = &merged
 	}
 	if p.temp || p.service {
 		if p.service && p.claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
-			return out, nil
+			return mapped, nil, nil
 		}
 		if sp, ok := p.claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
 			s, ok := sp.(string)
 			if !ok {
-				return nil, errAuthentication
+				return nil, nil, errAuthentication
 			}
 			parsed, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(s))
 			if err != nil {
-				return nil, err
+				return nil, nil, err
 			}
-			out = append(out, *parsed)
+			session = parsed
 		}
 	}
-	return out, nil
+	return mapped, session, nil
 }
 
-// batchStatementNeedsRequest reports whether a statement that applies to
+// batchStatementNeedsRequest reports whether a statement may apply to args
-// args depends on a condition key that the job does not supply. Applying
+// and depends on request context that the job does not supply: a condition
+// key, or a policy variable in a resource or a condition value. Applying
 // such a statement without its value could grant (Allow) or drop (Deny)
-// what a request with that context would not, so the job refuses the action.
+// what a request with that context would not (see batchContextFree).
-// Resources are matched without conditions; a statement is taken to apply
+//
-// whenever it might.
+// Resources are matched first and without conditions; a statement is taken
+// to apply whenever it might. A statement whose resources rule args out
+// does not apply, whatever its conditions need. One whose resources hold a
+// variable the job does not supply might match, so it may apply.
 func batchStatementNeedsRequest(st policy.Statement, args policy.Args, supplied map[string]bool) bool {
 	if (!st.Actions.Match(args.Action) && !st.Actions.IsEmpty()) || st.NotActions.Match(args.Action) {
 		return false
 	}
-	// Policy variables in resources or condition values.
+	for _, resources := range []policy.ResourceSet{st.Resources, st.NotResources} {
-	if data, err := json.Marshal(st); err == nil {
+		for r := range resources {
-		s := string(data)
+			if batchUnsuppliedVariable(r.Pattern, supplied) {
-		for {
-			i := strings.Index(s, "${")
-			if i < 0 {
-				break
-			}
-			s = s[i+2:]
-			j := strings.IndexByte(s, '}')
-			if j < 0 {
-				break
-			}
-			if !batchKeySupplied(supplied, s[:j]) {
 				return true
 			}
-			s = s[j+1:]
 		}
 	}
 	if !batchStatementMayApply(st, args) {
@@ -767,6 +826,73 @@ func batchStatementNeedsRequest(st policy.Statement, args policy.Args, supplied
 			return true
 		}
 	}
+	// Policy variables in condition values.
+	if len(st.Conditions) > 0 {
+		data, err := json.Marshal(st.Conditions)
+		if err != nil || batchConditionsNeedVariables(data, supplied) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// batchUnsuppliedVariable follows Resource.Match: only CommonKeys are expanded,
+// and an unsupported ${...} sequence (including its nested text) stays literal.
+func batchUnsuppliedVariable(s string, supplied map[string]bool) bool {
+	for {
+		i := strings.Index(s, "${")
+		if i < 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+		s = s[i+2:]
+		j := strings.IndexByte(s, '}')
+		if j < 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+		if condition.CommonKeysMap[condition.KeyName(s[:j])] && !batchKeySupplied(supplied, s[:j]) {
+			return true
+		}
+		s = s[j+1:]
+	}
+}
+
+// Conditions replace each recognized variable wherever it occurs in a string
+// value, unlike the resource parser. Inspect values only, not condition keys,
+// and decode BinaryEquals as the policy evaluator does before substitution.
+func batchConditionsNeedVariables(data []byte, supplied map[string]bool) bool {
+	var conditions map[string]map[string]condition.ValueSet
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &conditions); err != nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	for name, keys := range conditions {
+		name = strings.TrimPrefix(strings.TrimPrefix(name, "ForAnyValue:"), "ForAllValues:")
+		name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, "IfExists")
+		switch name {
+		case "StringEquals", "StringNotEquals", "StringEqualsIgnoreCase", "StringNotEqualsIgnoreCase", "StringLike", "StringNotLike", "BinaryEquals":
+		default:
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, values := range keys {
+			for value := range values {
+				s, err := value.GetString()
+				if err != nil {
+					return true
+				}
+				if name == "BinaryEquals" {
+					decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
+					if err != nil {
+						return true
+					}
+					s = string(decoded)
+				}
+				for _, key := range condition.CommonKeys {
+					if strings.Contains(s, key.VarName()) && !batchKeySupplied(supplied, string(key)) {
+						return true
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
 	return false
 }
 

cmd/batch-expire-purge-authz_test.go

@@ -196,11 +196,23 @@ func TestBatchExpirePurgeRefusesLockedAfterWalk(t *testing.T) {
 func (f *batchAuthzFixture) transition(t *testing.T, key, versionID string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	set := f.obj.(*erasureServerPools).serverPools[0]
-	infos, errs := readAllFileInfo(f.ctx, set.getHashedSet(key).getDisks(), "", f.bucket, key, versionID, false, false)
+	er := set.getHashedSet(key)
+	// DecomTieredObject takes its parity from the global storage class, which
+	// earlier tests can leave at a parity this set cannot have; it then
+	// writes on no drive and still succeeds. Use the set's own parity; the
+	// whole configuration is restored when the test ends.
+	setTestStandardParity(t, er.defaultParityCount)
+	infos, errs := readAllFileInfo(f.ctx, er.getDisks(), "", f.bucket, key, versionID, false, false)
 	mustIAM(t, errs[0])
 	fi := infos[0]
 	fi.TransitionStatus, fi.TransitionTier, fi.TransitionedObjName = lifecycle.TransitionComplete, "WARM", "remote/"+key+"/"+versionID
 	mustIAM(t, set.DecomTieredObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, fi, ObjectOptions{}))
+	infos, errs = readAllFileInfo(f.ctx, er.getDisks(), "", f.bucket, key, versionID, false, false)
+	for i := range infos {
+		if errs[i] != nil || infos[i].TransitionStatus != lifecycle.TransitionComplete {
+			t.Fatalf("drive %d does not hold the transition: %v", i, errs[i])
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 // A key with a transitioned version is refused as a whole, as a key with a

cmd/batch-handlers.go

@@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) StartFromSource(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLay
 	if done, err := ri.startAuthorized(ctx, api, job); done || err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	ri.resetReplicationAttempt()
 	globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
 
 	retryAttempts := job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Attempts
@@ -576,9 +577,10 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) StartFromSource(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLay
 		s3Type := r.Target.Type == BatchJobReplicateResourceS3 || r.Source.Type == BatchJobReplicateResourceS3
 		minioSrc := r.Source.Type == BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO
 		ctx, cancelCause := context.WithCancelCause(ctx)
-		// refuse ends the job for its submitter: record why before stopping.
+		stop := func(err error) {
-		refuse := func(err error) {
+			if isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
 				ri.refuse(err)
+			}
 			cancelCause(err)
 		}
 		// Each run lists the source from the start and counts every locked
@@ -615,6 +617,15 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) StartFromSource(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLay
 				// Refused or canceled: schedule nothing more.
 				continue
 			}
+			if obj.Err != nil {
+				switch minio.ToErrorResponse(obj.Err).StatusCode {
+				case http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusForbidden:
+					stop(batchJobAuthzError{reason: "source listing denied: " + obj.Err.Error()})
+				default:
+					stop(batchListingError(obj.Err))
+				}
+				continue
+			}
 			oi := toObjectInfo(r.Source.Bucket, obj.Key, obj)
 			if !minioSrc {
 				// Check if metadata filter was requested and it is expected to have
@@ -663,8 +674,11 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) StartFromSource(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLay
 				stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricReplication, job.ID, attempts)
 				success := true
 				if err := r.ReplicateFromSource(ctx, api, core, oi, retry, job.Submitter); err != nil {
-					if isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
+					if isBatchJobStopped(err) {
-						refuse(err)
+						stop(err)
+						return
+					}
+					if ctx.Err() != nil {
 						return
 					}
 					// A locked destination version is left as it is: the
@@ -706,6 +720,14 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) StartFromSource(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLay
 			}
 			return nil
 		}
+		if cause := context.Cause(ctx); cause != nil {
+			cancelCause(nil)
+			if isBatchJobUnavailable(cause) {
+				ri.resetReplicationAttempt()
+				return ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, cause)
+			}
+			return cause
+		}
 
 		ri.RetryAttempts = attempts
 		ri.Complete = ri.ObjectsFailed == 0 && ri.DeleteMarkersFailed == 0
@@ -721,14 +743,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) StartFromSource(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLay
 
 		cancelCause(nil)
 		if ri.Failed {
-			ri.ObjectsFailed = 0
+			ri.resetReplicationAttempt()
-			ri.DeleteMarkersFailed = 0
-			ri.Bucket = ""
-			ri.Object = ""
-			ri.Objects = 0
-			ri.DeleteMarkers = 0
-			ri.BytesFailed = 0
-			ri.BytesTransferred = 0
 			retry = true // indicate we are retrying..
 			time.Sleep(delay + time.Duration(rnd.Float64()*float64(delay)))
 			continue
@@ -1337,6 +1352,21 @@ func (ri *batchJobInfo) trackCurrentBucketBatch(bucket string, batch []ObjectInf
 	}
 }
 
+func (ri *batchJobInfo) resetReplicationAttempt() {
+	ri.mu.Lock()
+	defer ri.mu.Unlock()
+	ri.Complete, ri.Failed = false, false
+	ri.ObjectsFailed = 0
+	ri.DeleteMarkersFailed = 0
+	ri.Bucket = ""
+	ri.Object = ""
+	ri.Objects = 0
+	ri.DeleteMarkers = 0
+	ri.BytesFailed = 0
+	ri.BytesTransferred = 0
+	ri.VersionsSkippedLocked = 0
+}
+
 // Start start the batch replication job, resumes if there was a pending job via "job.ID"
 func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest) error {
 	ri := &batchJobInfo{
@@ -1353,8 +1383,8 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 	if done, err := ri.startAuthorized(ctx, api, job); done || err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	ri.resetReplicationAttempt()
 	globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
-	lastObject := ri.Object
 
 	retryAttempts := job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Attempts
 	if retryAttempts <= 0 {
@@ -1461,9 +1491,10 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 			slowCh = make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], 100)
 		)
 		ctx, cancelCause := context.WithCancelCause(ctx)
-		// refuse ends the job for its submitter: record why before stopping.
+		stop := func(err error) {
-		refuse := func(err error) {
+			if isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
 				ri.refuse(err)
+			}
 			cancelCause(err)
 		}
 
@@ -1488,8 +1519,11 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 				writeFn := func(batch []ObjectInfo) {
 					if len(batch) > 0 {
 						if err := r.writeAsArchive(ctx, api, cl, batch, r.Target.Prefix, job.Submitter); err != nil {
-							if isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
+							if isBatchJobStopped(err) {
-								refuse(err)
+								stop(err)
+								return
+							}
+							if ctx.Err() != nil {
 								return
 							}
 							batchLogOnceIf(ctx, err, job.ID+"writeAsArchive")
@@ -1505,7 +1539,10 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 					}
 				}
 				for obj := range walkCh {
-					if obj.Item.DeleteMarker || !obj.Item.VersionPurgeStatus.Empty() || obj.Item.Size >= int64(smallerThan) {
+					if context.Cause(ctx) != nil {
+						continue
+					}
+					if obj.Err != nil || obj.Item.DeleteMarker || !obj.Item.VersionPurgeStatus.Empty() || obj.Item.Size >= int64(smallerThan) {
 						slowCh <- obj
 						continue
 					}
@@ -1518,7 +1555,9 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 					writeFn(batch)
 					batch = batch[:0]
 				}
+				if context.Cause(ctx) == nil {
 					writeFn(batch)
+				}
 				xioutil.SafeClose(slowCh)
 			}()
 		} else {
@@ -1551,11 +1590,10 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 			for _, prefix := range prefixes {
 				prefixWalkCh := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], 100)
 				if err := api.Walk(ctx, r.Source.Bucket, prefix, prefixWalkCh, WalkOptions{
-					Marker:   lastObject,
 					Filter:   selectObj,
 					AskDisks: walkQuorum,
 				}); err != nil {
-					cancelCause(err)
+					cancelCause(batchListingError(err))
 					xioutil.SafeClose(walkCh)
 					return
 				}
@@ -1575,7 +1613,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 				continue
 			}
 			if res.Err != nil {
-				ri.Failed = true
+				cancelCause(batchListingError(res.Err))
 				batchLogOnceIf(ctx, res.Err, job.ID+"res.Err")
 				continue
 			}
@@ -1594,8 +1632,11 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 				stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricReplication, job.ID, attempts)
 				success := true
 				if err := r.ReplicateToTarget(ctx, api, c, result, retry, job.Submitter); err != nil {
-					if isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
+					if isBatchJobStopped(err) {
-						refuse(err)
+						stop(err)
+						return
+					}
+					if ctx.Err() != nil {
 						return
 					}
 					if minio.ToErrorResponse(err).Code == "PreconditionFailed" {
@@ -1632,9 +1673,13 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 			}
 			return nil
 		}
-		// Do not need to retry if we can't list objects on source.
+		if cause := context.Cause(ctx); cause != nil {
-		if context.Cause(ctx) != nil {
+			cancelCause(nil)
-			return context.Cause(ctx)
+			if isBatchJobUnavailable(cause) {
+				ri.resetReplicationAttempt()
+				return ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, cause)
+			}
+			return cause
 		}
 		ri.RetryAttempts = attempts
 		ri.Complete = ri.ObjectsFailed == 0 && ri.DeleteMarkersFailed == 0
@@ -1650,14 +1695,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobReplicateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
 
 		cancelCause(nil)
 		if ri.Failed {
-			ri.ObjectsFailed = 0
+			ri.resetReplicationAttempt()
-			ri.DeleteMarkersFailed = 0
-			ri.Bucket = ""
-			ri.Object = ""
-			ri.Objects = 0
-			ri.DeleteMarkers = 0
-			ri.BytesFailed = 0
-			ri.BytesTransferred = 0
 			retry = true // indicate we are retrying..
 			time.Sleep(delay + time.Duration(rnd.Float64()*float64(delay)))
 			continue
@@ -2627,20 +2665,20 @@ func (ri *batchJobInfo) metric() madmin.JobMetric {
 	return m
 }
 
-func (m *batchJobMetrics) report(jobID string) (metrics *madmin.BatchJobMetrics) {
+func (m *batchJobMetrics) report(jobID string) (metrics *batchJobMetricsReport) {
-	metrics = &madmin.BatchJobMetrics{CollectedAt: time.Now(), Jobs: make(map[string]madmin.JobMetric)}
+	metrics = &batchJobMetricsReport{CollectedAt: time.Now(), Jobs: make(map[string]batchJobStatusMetric)}
 	m.RLock()
 	defer m.RUnlock()
 
 	if jobID != "" {
 		if job, ok := m.metrics[jobID]; ok {
-			metrics.Jobs[jobID] = job.metric()
+			metrics.Jobs[jobID] = job.statusMetric()
 		}
 		return metrics
 	}
 
 	for id, job := range m.metrics {
-		metrics.Jobs[id] = job.metric()
+		metrics.Jobs[id] = job.statusMetric()
 	}
 	return metrics
 }

cmd/batch-progress.go

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ type batchJobStatus struct {
 
 type batchJobStatusMetric struct {
 	madmin.JobMetric
-	VersionsSkippedLocked int64  `json:"versionsSkippedLocked,omitempty"`
+	VersionsSkippedLocked *int64 `json:"versionsSkippedLocked,omitempty"`
 	KeysRefused           int64  `json:"keysRefused,omitempty"`
 	FailureReason         string `json:"failureReason,omitempty"`
 	PausedReason          string `json:"pausedReason,omitempty"`
@@ -179,9 +179,10 @@ type batchJobStatusMetric struct {
 func (ri *batchJobInfo) statusMetric() batchJobStatusMetric {
 	ri.mu.RLock()
 	defer ri.mu.RUnlock()
+	versionsSkipped := ri.VersionsSkippedLocked
 	return batchJobStatusMetric{
 		JobMetric:             ri.metric(),
-		VersionsSkippedLocked: ri.VersionsSkippedLocked,
+		VersionsSkippedLocked: &versionsSkipped,
 		KeysRefused:           ri.KeysRefused,
 		FailureReason:         ri.FailureReason,
 		PausedReason:          ri.PausedReason,

cmd/batch-replicate-retry_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"archive/tar"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
+	xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+type batchReplicationWriteObserver struct {
+	ObjectLayer
+	written func(string, string)
+}
+
+type batchReplicationWalkFailure struct {
+	ObjectLayer
+	streamed bool
+}
+
+func (failure batchReplicationWalkFailure) Walk(ctx context.Context, _, _ string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], _ WalkOptions) error {
+	if !failure.streamed {
+		return errErasureReadQuorum
+	}
+	go func() {
+		defer close(results)
+		select {
+		case results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errErasureReadQuorum}:
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+		}
+	}()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func TestBatchReplicationListingUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, snowball := range []bool{false, true} {
+		for _, streamed := range []bool{false, true} {
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("snowball=%t/streamed=%t", snowball, streamed), func(t *testing.T) {
+				fixture := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+				job := BatchJobRequest{
+					ID: "replicate-listing" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
+					Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
+						Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{
+							Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: fixture.bucket,
+							Snowball: BatchJobSnowball{
+								Disable: ptr(!snowball), InMemory: ptr(true), Compress: ptr(false), SkipErrs: ptr(false),
+								Batch: ptr(1), SmallerThan: ptr("1MiB"),
+							},
+						},
+						Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://target.invalid"},
+					},
+				}
+				api := batchReplicationWalkFailure{ObjectLayer: fixture.obj, streamed: streamed}
+				if err := job.Replicate.Start(fixture.ctx, api, job); !isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
+					t.Fatalf("listing failure did not pause: %v", err)
+				}
+				report := fixture.jobInfo(t, &job)
+				if report.PausedReason == "" || report.Failed || report.Complete || report.Object != "" || report.ObjectsFailed != 0 {
+					t.Fatalf("listing failure saved an invalid outcome: %+v", report)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (observer batchReplicationWriteObserver) PutObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, reader *PutObjReader, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
+	info, err := observer.ObjectLayer.PutObject(ctx, bucket, object, reader, opts)
+	if err == nil {
+		observer.written(bucket, object)
+	}
+	return info, err
+}
+
+func TestBatchReplicationRemoteListingDenied(t *testing.T) {
+	fixture := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	previousTransport := remoteInstanceTransport
+	remoteInstanceTransport = atomic.Value{}
+	setRemoteInstanceTransport(batchLockTransport(func(request *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		status := http.StatusForbidden
+		body := `<Error><Code>AccessDenied</Code><Message>source listing denied</Message></Error>`
+		if request.URL.Query().Has("location") {
+			status = http.StatusOK
+			body = `<LocationConstraint xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">us-east-1</LocationConstraint>`
+		}
+		return &http.Response{
+			StatusCode: status, Header: make(http.Header),
+			Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)), ContentLength: int64(len(body)), Request: request,
+		}, nil
+	}))
+	defer func() { remoteInstanceTransport = previousTransport }()
+	job := BatchJobRequest{
+		ID: "replicate-listing-denied" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
+		Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
+			Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{
+				Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://source.invalid",
+				Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{AccessKey: "test-access", SecretKey: "test-secret"},
+			},
+			Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: fixture.bucket},
+		},
+	}
+	if err := job.Replicate.StartFromSource(fixture.ctx, fixture.obj, job); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("explicit remote denial was not terminal: %v", err)
+	}
+	report := fixture.jobInfo(t, &job)
+	if !report.Failed || report.Complete || report.FailureReason == "" || report.PausedReason != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("remote denial saved an invalid outcome: %+v", report)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBatchReplicationDependencyRecovery(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, mode := range []string{"push", "pull", "snowball"} {
+		for _, denied := range []bool{false, true} {
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/denied=%t", mode, denied), func(t *testing.T) {
+				t.Setenv("_MINIO_BATCH_REPLICATION_WORKERS", "2")
+				fixture := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+				keys := []string{"a-done", "b-pending", "c-later"}
+				versions := make(map[string]string)
+				for _, key := range keys {
+					versions[key] = mustGetUUID()
+					if mode != "pull" {
+						versions[key] = batchPutVersion(t, fixture.obj, fixture.bucket, key, nil).VersionID
+					}
+				}
+				laterDone := make(chan struct{})
+				signalLater := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(laterDone) })
+				var writtenMu sync.Mutex
+				written := make(map[string]bool)
+				recordWrite := func(bucket, key string) {
+					if bucket != fixture.bucket && bucket != "remote" {
+						return
+					}
+					writtenMu.Lock()
+					written[key] = true
+					writtenMu.Unlock()
+					if key == "c-later" {
+						signalLater()
+					}
+				}
+				var outage atomic.Bool
+				outage.Store(true)
+				var decisions atomic.Int32
+				pluginServer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(writer http.ResponseWriter, request *http.Request) {
+					var input struct {
+						Input policy.Args `json:"input"`
+					}
+					if err := json.NewDecoder(request.Body).Decode(&input); err != nil {
+						t.Error(err)
+						writer.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
+						return
+					}
+					action := policy.Action(policy.GetObjectAction)
+					if mode == "pull" {
+						action = policy.PutObjectAction
+					}
+					if outage.Load() && input.Input.Action == action && input.Input.ObjectName == "b-pending" {
+						decisions.Add(1)
+						if mode != "snowball" {
+							select {
+							case <-laterDone:
+							case <-request.Context().Done():
+								return
+							}
+						}
+						if denied {
+							io.WriteString(writer, `{"result":false}`)
+							return
+						}
+						writer.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+					}
+					io.WriteString(writer, `{"result":true}`)
+				}))
+				defer pluginServer.Close()
+				pluginURL, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(pluginServer.URL)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				previousPlugin := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
+				setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{
+					URL: pluginURL, CloseRespFn: func(reader io.ReadCloser) { reader.Close() },
+				}))
+				defer setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previousPlugin)
+				previousTransport := remoteInstanceTransport
+				remoteInstanceTransport = atomic.Value{}
+				setRemoteInstanceTransport(batchLockTransport(func(request *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+					if err := request.Context().Err(); err != nil {
+						return nil, err
+					}
+					body := ""
+					header := make(http.Header)
+					query := request.URL.Query()
+					switch {
+					case query.Has("location"):
+						body = `<LocationConstraint xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">us-east-1</LocationConstraint>`
+					case query.Has("versions"):
+						body = `<ListVersionsResult xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Name>remote</Name><IsTruncated>false</IsTruncated>`
+						for _, key := range keys {
+							body += fmt.Sprintf(`<Version><Key>%s</Key><VersionId>%s</VersionId><IsLatest>true</IsLatest><LastModified>2026-11-01T00:00:00.000Z</LastModified><ETag>"etag"</ETag><Size>7</Size><StorageClass>STANDARD</StorageClass></Version>`, key, versions[key])
+						}
+						body += `</ListVersionsResult>`
+					case request.Method == http.MethodGet:
+						body = "payload"
+						header.Set("Etag", `"etag"`)
+						header.Set("Last-Modified", UTCNow().Format(http.TimeFormat))
+						header.Set("X-Amz-Version-Id", query.Get("versionId"))
+					case request.Method == http.MethodPut:
+						if mode == "snowball" && request.Body != nil {
+							archive := tar.NewReader(request.Body)
+							for {
+								entry, readErr := archive.Next()
+								if readErr == io.EOF {
+									break
+								}
+								if readErr != nil {
+									return nil, readErr
+								}
+								recordWrite("remote", entry.Name)
+							}
+						} else if mode != "snowball" {
+							if _, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, request.Body); err != nil {
+								return nil, err
+							}
+							recordWrite("remote", strings.TrimPrefix(request.URL.Path, "/remote/"))
+						}
+						header.Set("Etag", `"etag"`)
+					default:
+						return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected replication request: %s %s", request.Method, request.URL)
+					}
+					header.Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
+					return &http.Response{
+						StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: header,
+						Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)), ContentLength: int64(len(body)), Request: request,
+					}, nil
+				}))
+				defer func() { remoteInstanceTransport = previousTransport }()
+				job := &BatchJobRequest{
+					ID: "replicate-retry" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
+					Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
+						Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: fixture.bucket},
+						Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{
+							Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://target.invalid",
+							Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{AccessKey: "test-access", SecretKey: "test-secret"},
+						},
+					},
+				}
+				if mode == "pull" {
+					job.Replicate.Source.Endpoint = job.Replicate.Target.Endpoint
+					job.Replicate.Source.Creds = job.Replicate.Target.Creds
+					job.Replicate.Source.Bucket = "remote"
+					job.Replicate.Target.Endpoint = ""
+					job.Replicate.Target.Bucket = fixture.bucket
+				}
+				if mode == "snowball" {
+					job.Replicate.Source.Snowball = BatchJobSnowball{
+						Disable: ptr(false), InMemory: ptr(true), Compress: ptr(false), SkipErrs: ptr(false),
+						Batch: ptr(1), SmallerThan: ptr("1MiB"),
+					}
+				}
+				job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Attempts = 1
+				job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Delay = time.Millisecond
+				interrupted := &batchJobInfo{
+					JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type()), StartTime: job.Started,
+					Object: "c-later", Objects: 2,
+				}
+				mustIAM(t, interrupted.updateAfter(fixture.ctx, fixture.obj, 0, *job))
+				pool := globalBatchJobPool
+				pool.objLayer = batchReplicationWriteObserver{ObjectLayer: fixture.obj, written: recordWrite}
+				ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(fixture.ctx)
+				pool.ctx = ctx
+				mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(job))
+				done := make(chan struct{})
+				go func() { defer close(done); pool.AddWorker() }()
+				defer func() {
+					cancel()
+					<-done
+					if t.Failed() {
+						t.Logf("last report: %+v", fixture.jobInfo(t, job))
+					}
+				}()
+				state := "paused"
+				if denied {
+					state = "terminal"
+				}
+				waitBatchState(t, pool, job.ID, state)
+				report := fixture.jobInfo(t, job)
+				if decisions.Load() == 0 {
+					t.Fatal("test did not reach per-object authorization")
+				}
+				if denied {
+					if !report.Failed || report.Complete || report.FailureReason == "" || report.PausedReason != "" {
+						t.Fatalf("denial was not terminal: %+v", report)
+					}
+					pool.retryDue(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+					if len(pool.jobCh) != 0 {
+						t.Fatal("denied job was retried")
+					}
+					return
+				}
+				if report.Failed || report.Complete || report.FailureReason != "" || report.PausedReason == "" ||
+					report.Object != "" || report.Objects != 0 || report.ObjectsFailed != 0 {
+					t.Fatalf("outage was not saved with a safe restart point: %+v", report)
+				}
+				pool.jmu.Lock()
+				owner := pool.jobOwners[job.ID]
+				sameOwner := owner.req == job && owner.retries == 1
+				pool.jmu.Unlock()
+				if !sameOwner {
+					t.Fatal("pause lost the job owner")
+				}
+				outage.Store(false)
+				pool.retryDue(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+				waitBatchState(t, pool, job.ID, "terminal")
+				report = fixture.jobInfo(t, job)
+				if !report.Complete || report.Failed || report.PausedReason != "" || report.Objects != int64(len(keys)) || report.ObjectsFailed != 0 {
+					t.Fatalf("retry did not finish with consistent counts: %+v", report)
+				}
+				writtenMu.Lock()
+				for _, key := range keys {
+					if !written[key] {
+						t.Errorf("retry skipped %s", key)
+					}
+				}
+				writtenMu.Unlock()
+				if mode == "pull" {
+					for _, key := range keys {
+						if !batchVersionExists(t, fixture.obj, fixture.bucket, key, versions[key]) {
+							t.Errorf("retry lost remote version of %s", key)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/batch-rotate-context_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
+)
+
+func TestBatchRotationContextValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := GlobalKMS
+	GlobalKMS = nil
+	t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previous })
+	for _, encoded := range []string{"not-base64!", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{`)), base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"tenant":1}`)), base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`[]`))} {
+		enc := BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "key", Context: encoded}
+		if err := enc.Validate(); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("accepted invalid context %q", encoded)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, raw := range []string{"", `{}`, `null`, `{"tenant":"acme"}`} {
+		encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(raw))
+		if raw == "" {
+			encoded = ""
+		}
+		if err := (BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "key", Context: encoded}).Validate(); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("context %q: %v", raw, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBatchRotationContextInitialRetryAndReload(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, mode := range []string{"initial", "retry", "reload"} {
+		t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
+			f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+			previous := GlobalKMS
+			t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previous })
+			configured, err := kms.NewBuiltin("context-key", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, 32))
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			GlobalKMS = configured
+			const object = "rotation/context"
+			const payload = "a context-bound encryption key keeps this readable"
+			metadata := map[string]string{}
+			key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3KMS, "context-key", nil, f.bucket, object, metadata, kms.Context{"tenant": "old"})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader(payload), key))
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			original, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(ciphertext), int64(len(ciphertext)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: metadata})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			contextJSON := `{"tenant":"acme","purpose":"batch-rotation","区域":"杭州","�":"replacement","emoji":"🔑"}`
+			encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(contextJSON))
+			rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf("keyrotate:\n  apiVersion: v1\n  bucket: %s\n  prefix: rotation/\n  encryption:\n    type: sse-kms\n    key: context-key\n    context: %s\n", f.bucket, encoded))
+			if job == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+			if mode == "retry" {
+				GlobalKMS = nil
+				err := job.KeyRotate.KeyRotate(f.ctx, f.obj, original, job.Submitter)
+				GlobalKMS = configured
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Fatal("rotation succeeded while KMS was unavailable")
+				}
+				before, err := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: original.VersionID})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaContext] != metadata[crypto.MetaContext] {
+					t.Fatal("failed attempt changed context")
+				}
+			}
+			if mode == "reload" {
+				loaded := &BatchJobRequest{}
+				mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
+				job = loaded
+			}
+			mustIAM(t, job.KeyRotate.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
+			progress := f.jobInfo(t, job)
+			if !progress.Complete || progress.Failed || progress.Objects != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("rotation incomplete: %+v", progress)
+			}
+			after, err := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: original.VersionID})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaContext])
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			var got kms.Context
+			mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &got))
+			if !maps.Equal(got, kms.Context{"tenant": "acme", "purpose": "batch-rotation", "区域": "杭州", "�": "replacement", "emoji": "🔑"}) {
+				t.Fatalf("stored context %v", got)
+			}
+			actual, err := crypto.S3KMS.UnsealObjectKey(configured, after.UserDefined, f.bucket, object)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			if actual != key {
+				t.Fatal("rotation changed the plaintext data key")
+			}
+			if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, f.obj, f.bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: original.VersionID}); string(got) != payload {
+				t.Fatal("rotated object is unreadable")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBatchRotationInvalidUTF8LeavesObjectReadable(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ name, raw string }{
+		{"colliding-keys", "{\"\xff\":\"a\",\"\xfe\":\"b\"}"},
+		{"replacement-key", "{\"\xff\":\"a\",\"�\":\"b\"}"},
+		{"invalid-value", "{\"tenant\":\"\xff\"}"},
+	} {
+		for _, phase := range []string{"submit", "reload"} {
+			t.Run(tc.name+"/"+phase, func(t *testing.T) {
+				f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+				previous := GlobalKMS
+				t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previous })
+				configured, err := kms.NewBuiltin("context-key", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, 32))
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				GlobalKMS = configured
+				const object, payload = "rotation/context", "the original encrypted payload must remain readable"
+				metadata := map[string]string{}
+				key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3KMS, "context-key", nil, f.bucket, object, metadata, kms.Context{"tenant": "old"})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader(payload), key))
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				original, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(ciphertext), int64(len(ciphertext)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: metadata})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(tc.raw))
+				submitContext := encoded
+				if phase == "reload" {
+					submitContext = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"tenant":"safe"}`))
+				}
+				rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf("keyrotate:\n  apiVersion: v1\n  bucket: %s\n  prefix: rotation/\n  encryption:\n    type: sse-kms\n    key: context-key\n    context: %s\n", f.bucket, submitContext))
+				if phase == "submit" {
+					if job != nil || rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+						t.Fatalf("invalid UTF-8 context accepted: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+				} else {
+					if job == nil {
+						t.Fatalf("valid submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+					// Simulate a manifest saved by a version which accepted these
+					// bytes. Execution must validate again before changing the key.
+					job.KeyRotate.Encryption.Context = encoded
+					job.KeyRotate.Flags.Retry.Attempts = 1
+					manifest, err := job.MarshalMsg([]byte(batchJobEnvelope))
+					mustIAM(t, err)
+					mustIAM(t, saveConfig(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job), manifest))
+					loaded := &BatchJobRequest{}
+					mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
+					mustIAM(t, loaded.KeyRotate.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *loaded))
+					progress := f.jobInfo(t, loaded)
+					if progress.Complete || !progress.Failed || progress.Objects != 0 || progress.ObjectsFailed != 1 {
+						t.Fatalf("invalid context reported as success: %+v", progress)
+					}
+				}
+				after, err := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: original.VersionID})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaContext] != metadata[crypto.MetaContext] {
+					t.Fatal("rejected rotation changed stored context")
+				}
+				actual, err := crypto.S3KMS.UnsealObjectKey(configured, after.UserDefined, f.bucket, object)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if actual != key {
+					t.Fatal("rejected rotation changed data key")
+				}
+				if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, f.obj, f.bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: original.VersionID}); string(got) != payload {
+					t.Fatal("rejected rotation damaged stored content")
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/batch-rotate.go

@@ -29,10 +29,13 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
+	"unicode/utf8"
 
 	jsoniter "github.com/json-iterator/go"
 	"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
 	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/etag"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
 	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
 	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
 	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
@@ -86,40 +89,64 @@ type BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption struct {
 	Type    BatchKeyRotationType `yaml:"type" json:"type"`
 	Key     string               `yaml:"key" json:"key"`
 	Context string               `yaml:"context" json:"context"`
-	kmsContext kms.Context          `msg:"-"`
+}
+
+// batchKeyRotateContext decodes the persisted configuration on every run. It
+// must not depend on unpersisted derived state or mutate shared job options.
+func batchKeyRotateContext(encoded string) (kms.Context, error) {
+	ctx := kms.Context{}
+	if encoded == "" {
+		return ctx, nil
+	}
+	b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// Saving the context replaces invalid UTF-8 and can collapse distinct
+	// keys, changing the associated data required to decrypt the object.
+	if !utf8.Valid(b) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("KMS context must be valid UTF-8: %w", errInvalidArgument)
+	}
+	if err = jsoniter.ConfigCompatibleWithStandardLibrary.Unmarshal(b, &ctx); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if ctx == nil {
+		ctx = kms.Context{}
+	}
+	return ctx, nil
 }
 
 // Validate validates input key rotation encryption options.
 func (e BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption) Validate() error {
+	_, err := e.validate()
+	return err
+}
+
+// validate also returns a fresh context for the actual rotation. Validation's
+// probe entry is added to a separate map, never to the object's context.
+func (e BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption) validate() (kms.Context, error) {
 	if e.Type != sses3 && e.Type != ssekms {
-		return errInvalidArgument
+		return nil, errInvalidArgument
 	}
 	spaces := strings.HasPrefix(e.Key, " ") || strings.HasSuffix(e.Key, " ")
 	if e.Type == ssekms && spaces {
-		return crypto.ErrInvalidEncryptionKeyID
+		return nil, crypto.ErrInvalidEncryptionKeyID
 	}
-
+	if e.Type != ssekms {
-	if e.Type == ssekms && GlobalKMS != nil {
+		return nil, nil
-		ctx := kms.Context{}
+	}
-		if e.Context != "" {
+	ctx, err := batchKeyRotateContext(e.Context)
-			b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(e.Context)
 	if err != nil {
-				return err
+		return nil, err
 	}
-
+	if GlobalKMS != nil {
-			json := jsoniter.ConfigCompatibleWithStandardLibrary
+		probe := maps.Clone(ctx)
-			if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &ctx); err != nil {
+		probe["MinIO batch API"] = "batchrotate" // Context for a test key operation
-				return err
+		if _, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(GlobalContext, &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{Name: e.Key, AssociatedData: probe}); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
 		}
 	}
-		e.kmsContext = kms.Context{}
+	return ctx, nil
-		maps.Copy(e.kmsContext, ctx)
-		ctx["MinIO batch API"] = "batchrotate" // Context for a test key operation
-		if _, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(GlobalContext, &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{Name: e.Key, AssociatedData: ctx}); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
 }
 
 // BatchKeyRotateFilter holds all the filters currently supported for batch replication
@@ -203,11 +230,11 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) rotateAuthzRequests(oi ObjectInfo) []batchAuthzReq
 	if versionID == "" {
 		versionID = nullVersionID
 	}
-	// The encryption the rewrite leaves: rotation keeps the kind of the
+	// The encryption the rewrite leaves: SSE-KMS takes the requested key,
-	// version (rotateKey), and SSE-KMS takes the requested key.
+	// including when migrating an SSE-S3 version to SSE-KMS.
 	values := map[string][]string{}
 	switch {
-	case crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(oi.UserDefined):
+	case crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(oi.UserDefined) || r.Encryption.Type == ssekms:
 		values[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption)] = []string{xhttp.AmzEncryptionKMS}
 		if r.Encryption.Type == ssekms && r.Encryption.Key != "" {
 			values[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID)] = []string{r.Encryption.Key}
@@ -287,29 +314,111 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) KeyRotate(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, ob
 	var (
 		newKeyID       string
 		newKeyContext  kms.Context
+		replaceContext bool
+		targetKind     crypto.Type = crypto.S3
 	)
+	if sseKMS || r.Encryption.Type == ssekms {
+		targetKind = crypto.S3KMS
+	}
+	if (sseKMS || sseS3) && r.Encryption.Type == ssekms {
+		newKeyContext, err = r.Encryption.validate()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		newKeyID = strings.TrimPrefix(r.Encryption.Key, crypto.ARNPrefix)
+		replaceContext = r.Encryption.Context != ""
+	}
+
+	srcOpts := ObjectOptions{VersionID: oi.VersionID}
+	dstOpts := ObjectOptions{
+		VersionID:        oi.VersionID,
+		Versioned:        versioned,
+		VersionSuspended: versionSuspended,
+		NoLock:           true,
+	}
+
+	if oi.Legacy {
+		if targetKind == crypto.S3KMS && !replaceContext && len(newKeyContext) == 0 && sseKMS {
+			_, _, _, newKeyContext, err = crypto.S3KMS.ParseMetadata(oi.UserDefined)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		readOpts := ObjectOptions{
+			VersionID:        oi.VersionID,
+			Versioned:        versioned,
+			VersionSuspended: versionSuspended,
+			NoLock:           true,
+			NoAuditLog:       true,
+		}
+		var gr *GetObjectReader
+		if z, ok := api.(*erasureServerPools); ok && pool >= 0 {
+			gr, err = z.serverPools[pool].GetObjectNInfo(ctx, r.Bucket, encodeDirObject(oi.Name), nil, http.Header{}, readOpts)
+		} else {
+			gr, err = api.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, r.Bucket, oi.Name, nil, http.Header{}, readOpts)
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		defer gr.Close()
+
+		actualSize, err := gr.ObjInfo.GetActualSize()
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		rawReader, err := hash.NewReader(ctx, gr, actualSize, "", "", actualSize)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		pReader := NewPutObjReader(rawReader)
+		encMetadata := make(map[string]string)
+		encReader, objEncKey, err := newEncryptReader(ctx, rawReader, targetKind, newKeyID, nil, r.Bucket, oi.Name, encMetadata, newKeyContext)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		crypto.RemoveInternalEntries(oi.UserDefined)
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, crypto.MetaContext)
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, ReservedMetadataPrefix+"compression")
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, ReservedMetadataPrefix+"actual-size")
+		maps.Copy(oi.UserDefined, encMetadata)
+
+		targetSize := (&ObjectInfo{Size: actualSize}).EncryptedSize()
+		wrapped := etag.Wrap(encReader, rawReader)
+		hReader, err := hash.NewReader(ctx, wrapped, targetSize, "", "", actualSize)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		pReader, err = pReader.WithEncryption(hReader, &objEncKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		oi.PutObjReader = pReader
+		oi.metadataOnly = false
+		oi.keyRotation = true
+		dstOpts.EncryptFn = metadataEncrypter(objEncKey)
+		if dstOpts.VersionID == "" && (versioned || versionSuspended) {
+			dstOpts.VersionID = nullVersionID
+		}
+	} else {
 		encMetadata := make(map[string]string)
 		for k, v := range oi.UserDefined {
 			if stringsHasPrefixFold(k, ReservedMetadataPrefixLower) {
 				encMetadata[k] = v
 			}
 		}
-
+		if err = rotateKeyWithTarget(ctx, []byte{}, targetKind, newKeyID, []byte{}, r.Bucket, oi.Name, encMetadata, newKeyContext, replaceContext); err != nil {
-	if (sseKMS || sseS3) && r.Encryption.Type == ssekms {
-		if err = r.Encryption.Validate(); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		newKeyID = strings.TrimPrefix(r.Encryption.Key, crypto.ARNPrefix)
-		newKeyContext = r.Encryption.kmsContext
-	}
-	if err = rotateKey(ctx, []byte{}, newKeyID, []byte{}, r.Bucket, oi.Name, encMetadata, newKeyContext); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
 		// Since we are rotating the keys, make sure to update the metadata.
 		oi.metadataOnly = true
 		oi.keyRotation = true
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3)
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, crypto.MetaSealedKeyKMS)
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, crypto.MetaKeyID)
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, crypto.MetaDataEncryptionKey)
+		delete(oi.UserDefined, crypto.MetaContext)
 		maps.Copy(oi.UserDefined, encMetadata)
+	}
 	// The rewrite replaces the stored metadata with UserDefined, which a
 	// read returns without the tags and the expiry: keep them.
 	if oi.UserTags != "" {
@@ -318,8 +427,6 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) KeyRotate(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, ob
 	if !oi.Expires.IsZero() {
 		oi.UserDefined["expires"] = oi.ExpiresStr()
 	}
-	srcOpts := ObjectOptions{VersionID: oi.VersionID}
-	dstOpts := ObjectOptions{VersionID: oi.VersionID, NoLock: true}
 	if z, ok := api.(*erasureServerPools); ok && pool >= 0 {
 		// Rewrite the copy that was read and authorized. The pools layer
 		// would route the rewrite by the latest version of the key, which

cmd/batch-submitter-authz_test.go

@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ func newBatchAuthzFixture(t *testing.T) *batchAuthzFixture {
 	t.Helper()
 	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
 	obj := newObjectLayerFn()
+	// Match storage-class parity to this fixture's single drive, even after
+	// an API test has loaded the configuration of a larger erasure set.
+	mustIAM(t, newTestConfig(globalMinioDefaultRegion, obj))
 	batchTestJobPool(ctx, t, obj)
 	f := &batchAuthzFixture{ctx: ctx, sys: sys, obj: obj, bucket: "batch-authz"}
 	mustIAM(t, obj.MakeBucket(ctx, f.bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))

cmd/batch-submitter-edits_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// Edits that keep the credential keep a job running; edits of the
+// credential itself, and its status, still end it.
+func TestBatchSubmitterCredentialEdits(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "edit-parent", batchAuthzFullAccess)
+	parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "edit-parent", "edit-parent")
+	soon := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+	later := UTCNow().Add(24 * time.Hour)
+	newService := func(t *testing.T, expiring bool) (auth.Credentials, *batchJobSubmitter) {
+		t.Helper()
+		var opts newServiceAccountOpts
+		if expiring {
+			opts.expiration = &soon
+		}
+		created, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, opts)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		stored, ok := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, created.AccessKey)
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("service account missing")
+		}
+		sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(stored.Credentials)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		mustIAM(t, sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f)))
+		return stored.Credentials, sub
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name     string
+		expiring bool
+		edit     func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials)
+		keep     bool
+	}{
+		{"description", false, func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials) {
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "cosmetic"})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, true},
+		{"name", false, func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials) {
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{name: "renamed"})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, true},
+		{"expiry-extended", true, func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials) {
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{expiration: &later})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, true},
+		// An expiry makes a service account a temporary credential, which
+		// IsAllowed evaluates differently.
+		{"expiry-added", false, func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials) {
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{expiration: &later})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, false},
+		{"groups-refreshed", false, func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials) {
+			// As the LDAP group refresh rewrites a derived credential.
+			u, ok := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey)
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatal("service account missing")
+			}
+			wrote, err := f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, u.Credentials, append(u.Credentials.Groups, "refreshed-group"))
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			if !wrote {
+				t.Fatal("control: the refresh did not write")
+			}
+		}, true},
+		{"secret-rotated", false, func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials) {
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{secretKey: "edit-rotated-secret-key"})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, false},
+		{"disabled", false, func(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials) {
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: string(madmin.AccountDisabled)})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, false},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			cred, sub := newService(t, tc.expiring)
+			before, _ := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey)
+			time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond) // a distinct UpdatedAt
+			tc.edit(t, cred)
+			after, _ := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey)
+			if after.UpdatedAt.Equal(before.UpdatedAt) {
+				t.Fatal("control: the edit did not change the identity record")
+			}
+			err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f))
+			if tc.keep && err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("an edit that keeps the credential ended the job: %v", err)
+			}
+			if !tc.keep && !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
+				t.Errorf("an edit of the credential must end the job, got %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// A user deleted and created again under its access key, with the same
+// secret, is not the credential that submitted the job.
+func TestBatchSubmitterRecreatedSameSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "recreate-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
+	cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "recreate-user", "recreate-full")
+	sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	mustIAM(t, sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f)))
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, false))
+	time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	again := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, cred.AccessKey, "recreate-full")
+	if again.SecretKey != cred.SecretKey {
+		t.Fatal("control: the user must be created again with the same secret")
+	}
+	err = sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchContextRead(f))
+	t.Logf("recreated: %v", err)
+	if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
+		t.Errorf("a recreated user must not run the job of the deleted one: %v", err)
+	}
+}

cmd/bucket-handlers.go

@@ -478,15 +478,11 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 	getObjectInfoFn := objectAPI.GetObjectInfo
 
 	var (
-		hasLockEnabled bool
 		dsc  ReplicateDecision
 		goi  ObjectInfo
 		gerr error
 	)
 	replicateDeletes := hasReplicationRules(ctx, bucket, deleteObjectsReq.Objects)
-	if rcfg, _ := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucket); rcfg.LockEnabled {
-		hasLockEnabled = true
-	}
 
 	type deleteResult struct {
 		delInfo DeletedObject
@@ -494,8 +490,16 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 	}
 
 	deleteResults := make([]deleteResult, len(deleteObjectsReq.Objects))
+	duplicateOf := make(map[int]int)
 
-	vc, _ := globalBucketVersioningSys.Get(bucket)
+	vc, rcfg, metaErr := checkBucketDeleteMetadata(bucket)
+	if metaErr != nil {
+		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, metaErr), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+	lockedNullDelete := func(obj ObjectToDelete) bool {
+		return obj.VersionID == "" && rcfg.LockEnabled && !vc.PrefixEnabled(obj.ObjectName)
+	}
 	oss := make([]*objSweeper, len(deleteObjectsReq.Objects))
 	for index, object := range deleteObjectsReq.Objects {
 		reqInfo.ObjectName = object.ObjectName
@@ -523,13 +527,32 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 			}
 		}
 
+		// All deletes on directory objects needs to be for `nullVersionID`.
+		// Decide this before the lookup below, so that the retention check
+		// reads the version the delete removes.
+		if isDirObject(object.ObjectName) && object.VersionID == "" {
+			object.VersionID = nullVersionID
+		}
+
 		opts := ObjectOptions{
 			VersionID:        object.VersionID,
 			Versioned:        vc.PrefixEnabled(object.ObjectName),
 			VersionSuspended: vc.Suspended(),
 		}
 
-		if replicateDeletes || object.VersionID != "" && hasLockEnabled || !globalTierConfigMgr.Empty() {
+		// Every physical version delete checks the version's own protection
+		// under its mutation lock. Bucket metadata may be stale or unavailable
+		// and cannot establish that a stored version is unprotected.
+		if object.VersionID != "" || lockedNullDelete(object) {
+			if first, ok := objectsToDelete[object]; ok {
+				duplicateOf[index] = first
+			} else {
+				objectsToDelete[object] = index
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if replicateDeletes || !globalTierConfigMgr.Empty() {
 			if !globalTierConfigMgr.Empty() && object.VersionID == "" && opts.VersionSuspended {
 				opts.VersionID = nullVersionID
 			}
@@ -541,11 +564,6 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 			oss[index].SetTransitionState(goi.TransitionedObject)
 		}
 
-		// All deletes on directory objects needs to be for `nullVersionID`
-		if isDirObject(object.ObjectName) && object.VersionID == "" {
-			object.VersionID = nullVersionID
-		}
-
 		if replicateDeletes {
 			dsc = checkReplicateDelete(ctx, bucket, ObjectToDelete{
 				ObjectV: ObjectV{
@@ -563,21 +581,10 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 				object.ReplicateDecisionStr = dsc.String()
 			}
 		}
-		if object.VersionID != "" && hasLockEnabled {
-			if err := enforceRetentionBypassForDelete(ctx, r, bucket, object, goi, gerr); err != nil {
-				apiErr := toAPIError(ctx, err)
-				deleteResults[index].errInfo = DeleteError{
-					Code:      apiErr.Code,
-					Message:   apiErr.Description,
-					Key:       object.ObjectName,
-					VersionID: object.VersionID,
-				}
-				continue
-			}
-		}
-
 		// Avoid duplicate objects, we use map to filter them out.
-		if _, ok := objectsToDelete[object]; !ok {
+		if first, ok := objectsToDelete[object]; ok {
+			duplicateOf[index] = first
+		} else {
 			objectsToDelete[object] = index
 		}
 	}
@@ -596,10 +603,72 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 	ctx = bgContext(ctx)
 
 	deleteList := toNames(objectsToDelete)
-	dObjects, errs := deleteObjectsFn(ctx, bucket, deleteList, ObjectOptions{
+	dObjects := make([]DeletedObject, len(deleteList))
+	errs := make([]error, len(deleteList))
+	bulk := make([]ObjectToDelete, 0, len(deleteList))
+	bulkIndex := make([]int, 0, len(deleteList))
+	for i, object := range deleteList {
+		if object.VersionID == "" && !lockedNullDelete(object) {
+			bulk = append(bulk, object)
+			bulkIndex = append(bulkIndex, i)
+			continue
+		}
+		reqInfo.ObjectName, reqInfo.VersionID = object.ObjectName, object.VersionID
+		opts := ObjectOptions{
+			VersionID:             object.VersionID,
+			Versioned:             vc.PrefixEnabled(object.ObjectName),
+			VersionSuspended:      vc.Suspended(),
+			RefuseLockedOverwrite: lockedNullDelete(object),
+		}
+		index := objectsToDelete[object]
+		if !globalTierConfigMgr.Empty() {
+			sweepVID := object.VersionID
+			if sweepVID == "" && opts.VersionSuspended {
+				sweepVID = nullVersionID
+			}
+			oss[index] = newObjSweeper(bucket, object.ObjectName).WithVersion(sweepVID).WithVersioning(opts.Versioned, opts.VersionSuspended)
+		}
+		opts.SetEvalRetentionBypassFn(func(oi ObjectInfo, err error) error {
+			checkObj := object
+			if checkObj.VersionID == "" {
+				checkObj.VersionID = nullVersionID
+			}
+			return enforceRetentionBypassForDelete(ctx, r, bucket, checkObj, oi, err)
+		})
+		opts.SetEvalMetadataFn(func(oi *ObjectInfo, err error) (ReplicateDecision, error) {
+			if err == nil && oss[index] != nil {
+				oss[index].SetTransitionState(oi.TransitionedObject)
+			}
+			if replicateDeletes {
+				return checkReplicateDelete(ctx, bucket, object, *oi, opts, err), nil
+			}
+			return ReplicateDecision{}, nil
+		})
+		// DeleteObject merges protection across pools before evaluating these
+		// callbacks and holds the same lock as retention and legal-hold writes.
+		oi, err := objectAPI.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, object.ObjectName, opts)
+		delObj := DeletedObject{
+			ObjectName:       object.ObjectName,
+			VersionID:        object.VersionID,
+			ReplicationState: oi.ReplicationState(),
+		}
+		if object.VersionID == "" && oi.DeleteMarker {
+			delObj.DeleteMarker = true
+			delObj.DeleteMarkerVersionID = oi.VersionID
+			delObj.DeleteMarkerMTime = DeleteMarkerMTime{oi.ModTime}
+		}
+		dObjects[i] = delObj
+		errs[i] = err
+	}
+	if len(bulk) > 0 {
+		deleted, bulkErrs := deleteObjectsFn(ctx, bucket, bulk, ObjectOptions{
 			PrefixEnabledFn:  vc.PrefixEnabled,
 			VersionSuspended: vc.Suspended(),
 		})
+		for i, index := range bulkIndex {
+			dObjects[index], errs[index] = deleted[i], bulkErrs[i]
+		}
+	}
 
 	// Are all objects saying bucket not found?
 	if isAllBucketsNotFound(errs) {
@@ -608,23 +677,11 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 	}
 
 	for i := range errs {
-		// DeleteMarkerVersionID is not used specifically to avoid
+		// Match by the input identity: replication decisions may have changed
-		// lookup errors, since DeleteMarkerVersionID is only
+		// under the mutation lock, and a missing version has no stored identity.
-		// created during DeleteMarker creation when client didn't
+		dindex := objectsToDelete[deleteList[i]]
-		// specify a versionID.
-		objToDel := ObjectToDelete{
-			ObjectV: ObjectV{
-				ObjectName: decodeDirObject(dObjects[i].ObjectName),
-				VersionID:  dObjects[i].VersionID,
-			},
-			VersionPurgeStatus:            dObjects[i].VersionPurgeStatus(),
-			VersionPurgeStatuses:          dObjects[i].ReplicationState.VersionPurgeStatusInternal,
-			DeleteMarkerReplicationStatus: dObjects[i].ReplicationState.ReplicationStatusInternal,
-			ReplicateDecisionStr:          dObjects[i].ReplicationState.ReplicateDecisionStr,
-		}
-		dindex := objectsToDelete[objToDel]
 		if errs[i] == nil || isErrObjectNotFound(errs[i]) || isErrVersionNotFound(errs[i]) {
-			if replicateDeletes {
+			if replicateDeletes && deleteList[i].VersionID == "" && !lockedNullDelete(deleteList[i]) {
 				dObjects[i].ReplicationState = deleteList[i].ReplicationState()
 			}
 			deleteResults[dindex].delInfo = dObjects[i]
@@ -638,20 +695,28 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 			VersionID: deleteList[i].VersionID,
 		}
 	}
+	for index, first := range duplicateOf {
+		deleteResults[index] = deleteResults[first]
+	}
 
 	// Generate response
 	deleteErrors := make([]DeleteError, 0, len(deleteObjectsReq.Objects))
 	deletedObjects := make([]DeletedObject, 0, len(deleteObjectsReq.Objects))
-	for _, deleteResult := range deleteResults {
+	eventObjects := make([]DeletedObject, 0, len(deleteObjectsReq.Objects))
+	for index, deleteResult := range deleteResults {
+		// Storage normalizes a directory to the null version. The response
+		// retains the caller's version identity, including an explicit null.
+		if isDirObject(deleteObjectsReq.Objects[index].ObjectName) {
+			deleteResult.delInfo.VersionID = deleteObjectsReq.Objects[index].VersionID
+			deleteResult.errInfo.VersionID = deleteObjectsReq.Objects[index].VersionID
+		}
 		if deleteResult.errInfo.Code != "" {
 			deleteErrors = append(deleteErrors, deleteResult.errInfo)
 		} else {
-			// All deletes on directory objects was with `nullVersionID`.
-			// Remove it from response.
-			if isDirObject(deleteResult.delInfo.ObjectName) && deleteResult.delInfo.VersionID == nullVersionID {
-				deleteResult.delInfo.VersionID = ""
-			}
 			deletedObjects = append(deletedObjects, deleteResult.delInfo)
+			if _, duplicate := duplicateOf[index]; !duplicate {
+				eventObjects = append(eventObjects, deleteResult.delInfo)
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -660,7 +725,7 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 
 	// Write success response.
 	writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodedSuccessResponse)
-	for _, dobj := range deletedObjects {
+	for _, dobj := range eventObjects {
 		if dobj.ObjectName == "" {
 			continue
 		}
@@ -703,8 +768,8 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
 	}
 
 	// Clean up transitioned objects from remote tier
-	for _, os := range oss {
+	for index, os := range oss {
-		if os == nil { // skip objects that weren't deleted due to invalid versionID etc.
+		if os == nil || deleteResults[index].errInfo.Code != "" { // Sweep only successful deletions.
 			continue
 		}
 		os.Sweep()

cmd/bucket-listobjects-handlers.go

@@ -90,8 +90,14 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) listObjectVersionsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 	}
 	var checkObjMeta metaCheckFn
 	if metadata {
-		checkObjMeta = func(name string, action policy.Action) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
+		checkObjMeta = func(obj ObjectInfo, action policy.Action) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
-			return checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, action, bucket, name)
+			vid := obj.VersionID
+			if vid == "" {
+				vid = nullVersionID
+			}
+			return withScopedReqObject(ctx, bucket, obj.Name, vid, func() APIErrorCode {
+				return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, action, vid, obj.UserTags)
+			})
 		}
 	}
 	urlValues := r.Form
@@ -176,8 +182,10 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) listObjectsV2Handler(ctx context.Context, w http.Re
 
 	var checkObjMeta metaCheckFn
 	if metadata {
-		checkObjMeta = func(name string, action policy.Action) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
+		checkObjMeta = func(obj ObjectInfo, action policy.Action) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
-			return checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, action, bucket, name)
+			return withScopedReqObject(ctx, bucket, obj.Name, "", func() APIErrorCode {
+				return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, action, "", obj.UserTags)
+			})
 		}
 	}
 	urlValues := r.Form
@@ -202,7 +210,7 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) listObjectsV2Handler(ctx context.Context, w http.Re
 
 	if r.Header.Get(xMinIOExtract) == "true" && strings.Contains(prefix, archivePattern) {
 		// Initiate a list objects operation inside a zip file based in the input params
-		listObjectsV2Info, err = listObjectsV2InArchive(ctx, objectAPI, bucket, prefix, token, delimiter, maxKeys, startAfter, r.Header)
+		listObjectsV2Info, err = listObjectsV2InArchive(ctx, objectAPI, bucket, prefix, token, delimiter, maxKeys, startAfter, r)
 	} else {
 		// Initiate a list objects operation based on the input params.
 		// On success would return back ListObjectsInfo object to be

cmd/bucket-metadata-cache-security_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+)
+
+type metadataCacheLoadBarrier struct {
+	ObjectLayer
+	key          string
+	read, resume chan struct{}
+	once         sync.Once
+}
+
+func (b *metadataCacheLoadBarrier) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, key string, rs *HTTPRangeSpec, h http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
+	r, err := b.ObjectLayer.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, key, rs, h, opts)
+	if bucket == minioMetaBucket && key == b.key {
+		b.once.Do(func() { close(b.read); <-b.resume })
+	}
+	return r, err
+}
+
+func TestBucketMetadataLoadPreservesConcurrentPublication(t *testing.T) {
+	defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t,
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, _ http.Handler, _ auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			// Disk has the old unlocked config; a concurrent publication enables
+			// lock and versioning after the cache miss has started loading it.
+			enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
+			newer, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			globalBucketMetadataSys.Remove(bucket)
+			barrier := &metadataCacheLoadBarrier{ObjectLayer: obj, key: pathJoin(bucketMetaPrefix, bucket, bucketMetadataFile), read: make(chan struct{}), resume: make(chan struct{})}
+			previous := newObjectLayerFn()
+			setObjectLayer(barrier)
+			defer setObjectLayer(previous)
+			release := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(barrier.resume) })
+			defer release()
+			type result struct {
+				meta     BucketMetadata
+				reloaded bool
+				err      error
+			}
+			done := make(chan result, 1)
+			go func() {
+				meta, reloaded, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetConfig(t.Context(), bucket)
+				done <- result{meta, reloaded, err}
+			}()
+			select {
+			case <-barrier.read:
+			case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("metadata load did not reach disk")
+			}
+			globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, newer)
+			release()
+			select {
+			case got := <-done:
+				if got.err != nil || got.reloaded || got.meta.objectLockConfig == nil || got.meta.objectLockConfig.ObjectLockEnabled != "Enabled" {
+					t.Fatalf("%s: stale load replaced the publication: %+v", backend, got)
+				}
+			case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("metadata load did not finish")
+			}
+			cached, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
+			if err != nil || cached.objectLockConfig == nil || cached.objectLockConfig.ObjectLockEnabled != "Enabled" {
+				t.Fatalf("cached lock lost: %+v %v", cached, err)
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+func TestBulkDeleteVersionLockWithStaleBucketCache(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
+		z, _ := bulkDeletePools(t, pools)
+		bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{LockEnabled: true})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		for _, protection := range batchLockKinds {
+			oi := batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, protection, batchLockMeta(protection))
+			saved, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, newBucketMetadata(bucket))
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, bulkDeleteLockRequest(t, bucket, protection, oi.VersionID))
+			globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, saved)
+			var response DeleteObjectsResponse
+			if err := xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || len(response.Errors) != 1 || len(response.DeletedObjects) != 0 || !batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, protection, oi.VersionID) {
+				t.Fatalf("pools=%d %s: stale bucket cache bypassed version lock: %s", pools, protection, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/bucket-metadata-replication.go

@@ -182,8 +182,13 @@ func bucketConfigPayload(bucket, file string, data []byte, lockEnabled bool) ([]
 	key := data
 	switch file {
 	case bucketPolicyConfig:
+		// Replication uses explicit null as a tombstone; ordinary policy PUTs
+		// validate their JSON before entering this metadata path.
+		if bytes.Equal(bytes.TrimSpace(data), []byte("null")) {
+			return nil, nil, nil
+		}
 		var cfg *policy.BucketPolicy
-		cfg, err = policy.ParseBucketPolicyConfig(bytes.NewReader(data), bucket)
+		cfg, err = parseBucketPolicyStrictBytes(data, bucket)
 		if err == nil {
 			if cfg.IsEmpty() {
 				return nil, nil, nil

cmd/bucket-metadata-sys.go

@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ func (sys *BucketMetadataSys) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, bucket string) (met
 	}
 
 	val, err, _ := sys.group.Do(bucket, func() (val any, err error) {
-		meta, err = loadBucketMetadata(ctx, objAPI, bucket)
+		meta, err := loadBucketMetadata(ctx, objAPI, bucket)
 		if err != nil {
 			if !sys.Initialized() {
 				// bucket metadata not yet initialized
@@ -707,13 +707,18 @@ func (sys *BucketMetadataSys) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, bucket string) (met
 		return meta, err
 	})
 	meta, _ = val.(BucketMetadata)
+	sys.Lock()
+	defer sys.Unlock()
+	// A writer may have published a newer configuration while the disk read
+	// was in flight. Never replace that publication with the older load.
+	if current, ok := sys.metadataMap[bucket]; ok {
+		return current, false, nil
+	}
 	if err != nil {
 		return meta, false, err
 	}
-	sys.Lock()
 	sys.metadataMap[bucket] = meta
 	sys.clearLoadFailure(bucket)
-	sys.Unlock()
 
 	return meta, true, nil
 }

cmd/bucket-object-lock.go

@@ -28,11 +28,27 @@ import (
 	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/amztime"
 	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
 	objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/versioning"
 	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
 	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
 	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
 )
 
+// checkBucketDeleteMetadata loads bucket versioning and Object Lock configs
+// fail-closed so delete handlers never fall back to unversioned/unlocked
+// defaults when bucket metadata cannot be read.
+func checkBucketDeleteMetadata(bucketName string) (*versioning.Versioning, objectlock.Retention, error) {
+	vc, err := globalBucketVersioningSys.Get(bucketName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, objectlock.Retention{}, err
+	}
+	rcfg, err := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucketName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, objectlock.Retention{}, err
+	}
+	return vc, rcfg, nil
+}
+
 // BucketObjectLockSys - map of bucket and retention configuration.
 type BucketObjectLockSys struct{}
 
@@ -354,6 +370,8 @@ func checkPutObjectLockAllowed(ctx context.Context, rq *http.Request, bucket, ob
 	var legalHold objectlock.ObjectLegalHold
 
 	retentionRequested := objectlock.IsObjectLockRetentionRequested(rq.Header)
+	// A timestamp without a value is a replicated retention removal.
+	retentionRequested = retentionRequested || replicaTrusted && rq.Header.Get(xhttp.MinIOSourceObjectRetentionTimestamp) != ""
 	legalHoldRequested := objectlock.IsObjectLockLegalHoldRequested(rq.Header)
 
 	retentionCfg, err := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucket)
@@ -472,6 +490,103 @@ func storedObjectLockState(metadata map[string]string) objectLockState {
 	}
 }
 
+// reducePoolLockState selects each field independently using a total order,
+// so neither pool enumeration nor the starting copy can change the result.
+// Active COMPLIANCE takes precedence over revisions; among those copies the
+// longest retention wins. Only expired COMPLIANCE may lose to a removal.
+func reducePoolLockState(copies []PoolObjInfo, readState func(map[string]string) objectLockState) objectLockState {
+	var now time.Time
+	clockRead := false
+	state := readState(copies[0].ObjInfo.UserDefined)
+	for _, copy := range copies[1:] {
+		next := readState(copy.ObjInfo.UserDefined)
+		if !clockRead && (state.mode == string(objectlock.RetCompliance) || next.mode == string(objectlock.RetCompliance)) {
+			var err error
+			now, err = objectlock.UTCNowNTP()
+			if err != nil {
+				now = time.Time{} // An unavailable clock cannot prove retention expired.
+			}
+			clockRead = true
+		}
+		if comparePoolRetention(next, state, now) > 0 {
+			state.mode, state.retainUntil, state.retentionTimestamp = next.mode, next.retainUntil, next.retentionTimestamp
+		}
+		order := compareLockRevision(next.legalHoldTimestamp, state.legalHoldTimestamp)
+		// Equal or unordered conflicting holds resolve to ON, then OFF, then
+		// absence. A strictly newer valid OFF still releases a prior hold.
+		if order == 0 {
+			order = strings.Compare(next.legalHold, state.legalHold)
+		}
+		if order == 0 {
+			order = strings.Compare(next.legalHoldTimestamp, state.legalHoldTimestamp)
+		}
+		if order > 0 {
+			state.legalHold, state.legalHoldTimestamp = next.legalHold, next.legalHoldTimestamp
+		}
+	}
+	return state
+}
+
+func compareLockRevision(a, b string) int {
+	ta, aok := lockRevisionTime(a)
+	tb, bok := lockRevisionTime(b)
+	if aok != bok {
+		if aok {
+			return 1
+		}
+		return -1
+	}
+	if !aok {
+		return 0
+	}
+	return ta.Compare(tb)
+}
+
+func comparePoolRetention(a, b objectLockState, now time.Time) int {
+	au, ae := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, a.retainUntil)
+	bu, be := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, b.retainUntil)
+	ap := a.mode == string(objectlock.RetCompliance) && (ae != nil || now.IsZero() || au.After(now))
+	bp := b.mode == string(objectlock.RetCompliance) && (be != nil || now.IsZero() || bu.After(now))
+	if ap != bp {
+		if ap {
+			return 1
+		}
+		return -1
+	}
+	if ap { // An unreadable COMPLIANCE deadline cannot be shortened either.
+		if (ae != nil) != (be != nil) {
+			if ae != nil {
+				return 1
+			}
+			return -1
+		}
+		if ae == nil && au.Compare(bu) != 0 {
+			return au.Compare(bu)
+		}
+	}
+	if order := compareLockRevision(a.retentionTimestamp, b.retentionTimestamp); order != 0 {
+		return order
+	}
+	// Ties and legacy unordered metadata must also have a stable winner.
+	// A retained value takes precedence over an unordered absence.
+	if order := strings.Compare(a.mode, b.mode); order != 0 {
+		return order
+	}
+	if (ae != nil) != (be != nil) {
+		if ae != nil {
+			return 1
+		}
+		return -1
+	}
+	if ae == nil && be == nil && au.Compare(bu) != 0 {
+		return au.Compare(bu)
+	}
+	if order := strings.Compare(a.retainUntil, b.retainUntil); order != 0 {
+		return order
+	}
+	return strings.Compare(a.retentionTimestamp, b.retentionTimestamp)
+}
+
 // olderThan reports whether a stored replication timestamp is missing,
 // unreadable, or earlier than the source timestamp, in which case the
 // replica update wins. A zero source timestamp never wins.
@@ -491,6 +606,25 @@ func (s objectLockState) legalHoldIsOlderThan(src time.Time) bool {
 	return olderThan(s.legalHoldTimestamp, src)
 }
 
+// A peer's ordering timestamp cannot override an unexpired COMPLIANCE lock.
+// Otherwise it could first remove retention with a same-content retransmit,
+// then replace the now-unprotected version in a second request.
+func (s objectLockState) complianceWouldWeaken(incoming objectLockState) bool {
+	if s.mode != string(objectlock.RetCompliance) {
+		return false
+	}
+	until, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, s.retainUntil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	now, err := objectlock.UTCNowNTP()
+	if err == nil && !until.After(now) {
+		return false
+	}
+	nextUntil, nextErr := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, incoming.retainUntil)
+	return incoming.mode != string(objectlock.RetCompliance) || nextErr != nil || nextUntil.Before(until)
+}
+
 // restoreRetention and restoreLegalHold put the stored state back into
 // metadata that was rebuilt from a request whose update was not applied.
 func (s objectLockState) restoreRetention(metadata map[string]string) {
@@ -524,14 +658,20 @@ func (s objectLockState) restoreLegalHold(metadata map[string]string) {
 // (an older incoming value must not win over a newer stored one just because the
 // read timed out).
 func replicaStoredLock(ctx context.Context, getObjectInfo GetObjectInfoFn, bucket, object, versionID string) (objectLockState, error) {
-	oi, err := getObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID})
+	oi, err := replicaStoredObjectInfo(ctx, getObjectInfo, bucket, object, versionID)
+	return storedObjectLockState(oi.UserDefined), err
+}
+
+// The same destination lookup supplies both Object Lock and tag revisions.
+func replicaStoredObjectInfo(ctx context.Context, getObjectInfo GetObjectInfoFn, bucket, object, versionID string) (ObjectInfo, error) {
+	oi, err := getObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID, ReplicationRequest: true})
 	switch {
 	case err == nil:
-		return storedObjectLockState(oi.UserDefined), nil
+		return oi, nil
 	case isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err):
-		return objectLockState{}, nil
+		return ObjectInfo{}, nil
 	default:
-		return objectLockState{}, err
+		return ObjectInfo{}, err
 	}
 }
 
@@ -610,7 +750,7 @@ func reconcileStoredObjectLock(metadata map[string]string, stored objectLockStat
 	incoming := storedObjectLockState(metadata)
 
 	incomingRetentionTS, _ := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, incoming.retentionTimestamp)
-	if !stored.retentionIsOlderThan(incomingRetentionTS) {
+	if !stored.retentionIsOlderThan(incomingRetentionTS) || stored.complianceWouldWeaken(incoming) {
 		// The stored retention is at least as new as the incoming one (or the
 		// incoming update is unordered): drop the incoming value and put the stored
 		// state back, which may itself be a removal (value keys absent, timestamp

cmd/bucket-policy-handlers.go

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 package cmd
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 
@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutBucketPolicyHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *ht
 		return
 	}
 
-	bucketPolicy, err := policy.ParseBucketPolicyConfig(bytes.NewReader(bucketPolicyBytes), bucket)
+	bucketPolicy, err := parseBucketPolicyStrictBytes(bucketPolicyBytes, bucket)
 	if err != nil {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, APIError{
 			Code:           "MalformedPolicy",

cmd/bucket-policy.go

@@ -213,16 +213,27 @@ func getConditionValuesWithTags(r *http.Request, lc string, cred auth.Credential
 	switch authType {
 	case authTypeSignedV2, authTypePresignedV2:
 		signatureVersion = signV2Algorithm
-	case authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned, authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypePostPolicy:
+	case authTypeSigned, authTypePresigned, authTypeStreamingSigned,
+		authTypeStreamingSignedTrailer, authTypePostPolicy:
 		signatureVersion = signV4Algorithm
+	case authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer:
+		// This form is also valid for a genuinely anonymous request. Only
+		// expose SigV4 condition values when header authentication is present.
+		if r.Header.Get(xhttp.Authorization) != "" {
+			signatureVersion = signV4Algorithm
+		}
 	}
 
 	var authtype string
 	switch authType {
 	case authTypePresignedV2, authTypePresigned:
 		authtype = "REST-QUERY-STRING"
-	case authTypeSignedV2, authTypeSigned, authTypeStreamingSigned:
+	case authTypeSignedV2, authTypeSigned, authTypeStreamingSigned, authTypeStreamingSignedTrailer:
 		authtype = "REST-HEADER"
+	case authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer:
+		if r.Header.Get(xhttp.Authorization) != "" {
+			authtype = "REST-HEADER"
+		}
 	case authTypePostPolicy:
 		authtype = "POST"
 	}

cmd/bucket-replication-metrics.go

@@ -119,7 +119,10 @@ func (a *ActiveWorkerStat) update() {
 	if a == nil {
 		return
 	}
-	a.Curr = globalReplicationPool.Get().ActiveWorkers()
+	a.Curr = 0
+	if pool := globalReplicationPool.Get(); pool != nil {
+		a.Curr = pool.ActiveWorkers()
+	}
 	a.hist.Update(int64(a.Curr))
 	a.Avg = float32(a.hist.Mean())
 	a.Max = int(a.hist.Max())

cmd/bucket-replication-metrics_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/once"
+	"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
+)
+
+func TestReplicationWorkerMetricsWithoutPool(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := globalReplicationPool
+	t.Cleanup(func() { globalReplicationPool = previous })
+
+	globalReplicationPool = once.NewSingleton[ReplicationPool]()
+	globalReplicationPool.Set(&ReplicationPool{activeWorkers: 8})
+	stat := newActiveWorkerStat(metrics.NewRegistry())
+	stat.update()
+	if got := stat.get(); got.Curr != 8 || got.Avg != 8 || got.Max != 8 {
+		t.Fatalf("active pool metrics = %+v, want current/average/maximum 8", got)
+	}
+
+	// A collector may still run after replication has been disabled.
+	globalReplicationPool = once.NewSingleton[ReplicationPool]()
+	globalReplicationPool.Set(nil)
+	stat.update()
+	if got := stat.get(); got.Curr != 0 || got.Avg != 4 || got.Max != 8 {
+		t.Fatalf("disabled pool metrics = %+v, want current 0, average 4, maximum 8", got)
+	}
+}

cmd/bucket-replication.go

@@ -2673,6 +2673,7 @@ func proxyHeadToRepTarget(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, rs *HTTPRa
 			},
 			PartNumber: opts.PartNumber,
 		}
+		gopts.Set(xhttp.AmzTagDirective, accessDirective)
 		if rs != nil {
 			h, err := rs.ToHeader()
 			if err != nil {
@@ -2710,6 +2711,9 @@ func proxyHeadToRepTarget(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, rs *HTTPRa
 		}
 		oi.UserDefined = make(map[string]string, len(objInfo.Metadata))
 		for k, v := range objInfo.Metadata {
+			if equals(k, xhttp.AmzTagCount, xhttp.AmzObjectTagging) {
+				continue
+			}
 			oi.UserDefined[k] = v[0]
 		}
 		ce, ok := oi.UserDefined[xhttp.ContentEncoding]
@@ -2773,127 +2777,135 @@ func scheduleReplication(ctx context.Context, oi ObjectInfo, o ObjectLayer, dsc
 	}
 }
 
-// proxyTaggingToRepTarget proxies tagging requests to remote targets for
+// taggingProxyTarget keeps the exact client and tags that were authorized.
-// active-active replicated setups
+// A second discovery must not introduce an unauthorized destination.
-func proxyTaggingToRepTarget(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, tags *tags.Tags, opts ObjectOptions, proxyTargets *madmin.BucketTargets) (proxy proxyResult) {
+type taggingProxyTarget struct {
-	// this option is set when active-active replication is in place between site A -> B,
+	client *TargetClient
-	// and request hits site B that does not have the object yet.
+	tags   *tags.Tags
-	if opts.ProxyRequest || (opts.ProxyHeaderSet && !opts.ProxyRequest) { // true only when site B sets MinIOSourceProxyRequest header
-		return proxy
 }
+
+// readTaggingProxyTargets authorizes all present replicas before returning any
+// tags or allowing any mutation. Missing replicas may simply lag replication;
+// unreadable replicas must still fail closed.
+func readTaggingProxyTargets(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions, proxyTargets *madmin.BucketTargets, authorize func(string, error) APIErrorCode) ([]taggingProxyTarget, proxyResult, APIErrorCode) {
+	var targets []taggingProxyTarget
+	for _, target := range proxyTargets.Targets {
+		tgt := globalBucketTargetSys.GetRemoteTargetClient(bucket, target.Arn)
+		if tgt == nil || globalBucketTargetSys.isOffline(tgt.EndpointURL()) || tgt.disableProxy {
+			continue
+		}
+		targets = append(targets, taggingProxyTarget{client: tgt})
+	}
+	if len(targets) == 0 {
+		err := RemoteTargetConnectionErr{Bucket: bucket, Err: errors.New("no available remote replication target")}
+		return nil, proxyResult{Err: err}, authorize("", err)
+	}
+
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	errs := make([]error, len(proxyTargets.Targets))
+	errs := make([]error, len(targets))
-	for idx, t := range proxyTargets.Targets {
+	for i := range targets {
-		tgt := globalBucketTargetSys.GetRemoteTargetClient(bucket, t.Arn)
+		wg.Go(func() {
-		if tgt == nil || globalBucketTargetSys.isOffline(tgt.EndpointURL()) {
+			tgt := &targets[i]
-			continue
+			tgt.tags, errs[i] = tgt.client.GetObjectTagging(ctx, tgt.client.Bucket, object, minio.GetObjectTaggingOptions{
-		}
-		// if proxying explicitly disabled on remote target
-		if tgt.disableProxy {
-			continue
-		}
-		idx := idx
-		wg.Add(1)
-		go func(idx int, tgt *TargetClient) {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			var err error
-			if tags != nil {
-				popts := minio.PutObjectTaggingOptions{
 				VersionID: opts.VersionID,
-					Internal: minio.AdvancedObjectTaggingOptions{
+				Internal:  minio.AdvancedObjectTaggingOptions{ReplicationProxyRequest: "true"},
-						ReplicationProxyRequest: "true",
+			})
-					},
+		})
-				}
-				err = tgt.PutObjectTagging(ctx, tgt.Bucket, object, tags, popts)
-			} else {
-				dopts := minio.RemoveObjectTaggingOptions{
-					VersionID: opts.VersionID,
-					Internal: minio.AdvancedObjectTaggingOptions{
-						ReplicationProxyRequest: "true",
-					},
-				}
-				err = tgt.RemoveObjectTagging(ctx, tgt.Bucket, object, dopts)
-			}
-			if err != nil {
-				errs[idx] = err
-			}
-		}(idx, tgt)
 	}
 	wg.Wait()
 
-	var (
+	var firstNotFound, readErr error
-		terr        error
-		taggedCount int
-	)
 	for _, err := range errs {
-		if err == nil {
+		switch {
-			taggedCount++
+		case err == nil:
+		case isRemoteTaggingNotFound(err):
+			if firstNotFound == nil {
+				firstNotFound = err
+			}
+		default:
+			if code := authorize("", err); code != ErrNone {
+				return nil, proxyResult{}, code
+			}
+			if readErr == nil {
+				readErr = err
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	present := make([]taggingProxyTarget, 0, len(targets))
+	for i, tgt := range targets {
+		if errs[i] != nil {
 			continue
 		}
-		if err != nil {
+		if tgt.tags == nil {
-			terr = err
+			tgt.tags, _ = tags.MapToObjectTags(nil)
 		}
+		if code := authorize(tgt.tags.String(), nil); code != ErrNone {
+			return nil, proxyResult{}, code
 		}
-	// don't return error if at least one target was tagged successfully
+		present = append(present, tgt)
-	if taggedCount == 0 && terr != nil {
-		proxy.Err = terr
 	}
-	return proxy
+	if readErr != nil {
+		return nil, proxyResult{Err: readErr}, ErrNone
+	}
+	if len(present) == 0 {
+		// With no object anywhere, authorize the empty tag set once before
+		// disclosing its absence. No write RPC can help a missing replica.
+		return nil, proxyResult{Err: firstNotFound}, authorize("", firstNotFound)
+	}
+	return present, proxyResult{}, ErrNone
+}
+
+// proxyTaggingToRepTarget proxies tagging requests to remote targets for
+// active-active replicated setups.
+func proxyTaggingToRepTarget(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, tags *tags.Tags, opts ObjectOptions, proxyTargets *madmin.BucketTargets, authorize func(string, error) APIErrorCode) (proxy proxyResult, authErr APIErrorCode) {
+	if opts.ProxyRequest || (opts.ProxyHeaderSet && !opts.ProxyRequest) {
+		return proxy, ErrNone
+	}
+	targets, proxy, authErr := readTaggingProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts, proxyTargets, authorize)
+	if authErr != ErrNone || proxy.Err != nil {
+		return proxy, authErr
+	}
+
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	writeErrs := make([]error, len(targets))
+	for i, target := range targets {
+		wg.Go(func() {
+			tgt := target.client
+			if tags != nil {
+				writeErrs[i] = tgt.PutObjectTagging(ctx, tgt.Bucket, object, tags, minio.PutObjectTaggingOptions{
+					VersionID: opts.VersionID,
+					Internal:  minio.AdvancedObjectTaggingOptions{ReplicationProxyRequest: "true"},
+				})
+			} else {
+				writeErrs[i] = tgt.RemoveObjectTagging(ctx, tgt.Bucket, object, minio.RemoveObjectTaggingOptions{
+					VersionID: opts.VersionID,
+					Internal:  minio.AdvancedObjectTaggingOptions{ReplicationProxyRequest: "true"},
+				})
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	var lastErr error
+	for _, err := range writeErrs {
+		if err == nil {
+			return proxy, ErrNone
+		}
+		lastErr = err
+	}
+	return proxyResult{Err: lastErr}, ErrNone
 }
 
 // proxyGetTaggingToRepTarget proxies get tagging requests to remote targets for
-// active-active replicated setups
+// active-active replicated setups.
-func proxyGetTaggingToRepTarget(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions, proxyTargets *madmin.BucketTargets) (tgs *tags.Tags, proxy proxyResult) {
+func proxyGetTaggingToRepTarget(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions, proxyTargets *madmin.BucketTargets, authorize func(string, error) APIErrorCode) (tgs *tags.Tags, proxy proxyResult, authErr APIErrorCode) {
-	// this option is set when active-active replication is in place between site A -> B,
+	if opts.ProxyRequest || (opts.ProxyHeaderSet && !opts.ProxyRequest) {
-	// and request hits site B that does not have the object yet.
+		return nil, proxy, ErrNone
-	if opts.ProxyRequest || (opts.ProxyHeaderSet && !opts.ProxyRequest) { // true only when site B sets MinIOSourceProxyRequest header
-		return nil, proxy
 	}
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	targets, proxy, authErr := readTaggingProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts, proxyTargets, authorize)
-	errs := make([]error, len(proxyTargets.Targets))
+	if authErr != ErrNone || proxy.Err != nil {
-	tagSlc := make([]map[string]string, len(proxyTargets.Targets))
+		return nil, proxy, authErr
-	for idx, t := range proxyTargets.Targets {
-		tgt := globalBucketTargetSys.GetRemoteTargetClient(bucket, t.Arn)
-		if tgt == nil || globalBucketTargetSys.isOffline(tgt.EndpointURL()) {
-			continue
 	}
-		// if proxying explicitly disabled on remote target
+	return targets[0].tags, proxy, ErrNone
-		if tgt.disableProxy {
-			continue
-		}
-		idx := idx
-		wg.Add(1)
-		go func(idx int, tgt *TargetClient) {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			var err error
-			gopts := minio.GetObjectTaggingOptions{
-				VersionID: opts.VersionID,
-				Internal: minio.AdvancedObjectTaggingOptions{
-					ReplicationProxyRequest: "true",
-				},
-			}
-			tgs, err = tgt.GetObjectTagging(ctx, tgt.Bucket, object, gopts)
-			if err != nil {
-				errs[idx] = err
-			} else {
-				tagSlc[idx] = tgs.ToMap()
-			}
-		}(idx, tgt)
-	}
-	wg.Wait()
-	for idx, err := range errs {
-		errCode := minio.ToErrorResponse(err).Code
-		if err != nil && errCode != "NoSuchKey" && errCode != "NoSuchVersion" {
-			return nil, proxyResult{Err: err}
-		}
-		if err == nil {
-			tgs, _ = tags.MapToObjectTags(tagSlc[idx])
-		}
-	}
-	if len(errs) == 1 {
-		proxy.Err = errs[0]
-	}
-	return tgs, proxy
 }
 
 func scheduleReplicationDelete(ctx context.Context, dv DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, o ObjectLayer) {

cmd/bulk-delete-invalid-name_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// A bulk delete joins each name to the request bucket on the drives, so a name
+// with a ".." segment names a path in another bucket or in the meta bucket.
+// Such a name is the error of its own entry and reaches no drive, and the
+// other entries of the request are deleted as usual. This holds for the one
+// bulk lock of a single node, for a pool that locks per set, and for more than
+// one pool.
+func TestPoolsBulkDeleteInvalidNames(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, topology := range []struct {
+		name string
+		new  func(t *testing.T) (*erasureServerPools, string)
+	}{
+		{"single node", func(t *testing.T) (*erasureServerPools, string) { return bulkDeletePools(t, 1) }},
+		{"set locks", func(t *testing.T) (*erasureServerPools, string) { return ldPool(t, ldLocal) }},
+		{"two pools", func(t *testing.T) (*erasureServerPools, string) { return bulkDeletePools(t, 2) }},
+	} {
+		t.Run(topology.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			z, bucket := topology.new(t)
+			ctx := t.Context()
+			other := "bulk-delete-other"
+			if err := z.MakeBucket(ctx, other, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			old := batchPutVersion(t, z, other, "kept", nil)
+			latest := batchPutVersion(t, z, other, "kept", nil)
+			batchPutVersion(t, z, other, "visible", nil)
+			metaKey := pathJoin(bucketMetaPrefix, other, bucketMetadataFile)
+			if !batchVersionExists(t, z, minioMetaBucket, metaKey, "") {
+				t.Fatal("the bucket metadata is not an object of the meta bucket")
+			}
+			for _, key := range []string{"own", "dir/"} {
+				if _, err := z.PutObject(ctx, bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(nil), 0, "", ""), ObjectOptions{}); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+			}
+
+			names := []ObjectToDelete{
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "../" + other + "/kept", VersionID: old.VersionID}}, // purge in another bucket
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "own"}},
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "a/../../" + other + "/visible"}},         // marker in another bucket
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "../" + minioMetaBucket + "/" + metaKey}}, // marker on bucket metadata
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "dir/"}},
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: ""}},
+			}
+			invalid := map[int]bool{0: true, 2: true, 3: true, 5: true}
+			// Without a version ID these options ask for a delete marker, the
+			// one write a bulk delete makes.
+			deleted, errs := z.DeleteObjects(ctx, bucket, slices.Clone(names), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+			for i, name := range names {
+				_, rejected := errs[i].(ObjectNameInvalid)
+				if rejected != invalid[i] || !invalid[i] && errs[i] != nil {
+					t.Errorf("%d %q: error = %v, rejected as invalid = %v, want %v", i, name.ObjectName, errs[i], rejected, invalid[i])
+				}
+				if deleted[i].ObjectName != name.ObjectName || deleted[i].found == invalid[i] {
+					t.Errorf("%d %q: result = %+v", i, name.ObjectName, deleted[i])
+				}
+			}
+
+			for _, version := range []string{old.VersionID, latest.VersionID} {
+				if !batchVersionExists(t, z, other, "kept", version) {
+					t.Errorf("version %q of the object in the other bucket was removed", version)
+				}
+			}
+			if !batchVersionExists(t, z, other, "visible", "") {
+				t.Error("the object of the other bucket is hidden by a marker")
+			}
+			if !batchVersionExists(t, z, minioMetaBucket, metaKey, "") {
+				t.Error("the metadata of the other bucket is hidden by a marker")
+			}
+			for _, key := range []string{"own", "dir/"} {
+				if batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, key, "") {
+					t.Errorf("%q of the request bucket was not deleted", key)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The names of an S3 DeleteObjects request come from its body, which the path
+// checks of the request URL do not see. A user allowed to delete in one bucket
+// reaches nothing outside it through such a name: a version under COMPLIANCE
+// retention in another bucket stays, and no delete marker lands on that object
+// or on the stored metadata of its bucket.
+func TestBulkDeleteObjectLockNameOutsideBucket(t *testing.T) {
+	defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t, endpoints: []string{"DeleteMultipleObjects"},
+		makeBucketOptions: MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true},
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, _ auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			ctx := t.Context()
+			user := newObjectAttributesAuthzUser(t, instance, bucket, `"s3:DeleteObject","s3:DeleteObjectVersion"`)
+			locked := getRandomBucketName()
+			if err := obj.MakeBucket(ctx, locked, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true, LockEnabled: true}); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			enableBucketObjectLock(t, locked)
+			worm := batchPutVersion(t, obj, locked, "secret", batchLockMeta("COMPLIANCE"))
+			batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, "own", nil)
+			metaKey := pathJoin(bucketMetaPrefix, locked, bucketMetadataFile)
+
+			outside := []ObjectToDelete{
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "../" + locked + "/secret", VersionID: worm.VersionID}},
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "../" + locked + "/secret"}},
+				{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "../" + minioMetaBucket + "/" + metaKey}},
+			}
+			body := encodeResponse(DeleteObjectsRequest{Objects: append(slices.Clone(outside), ObjectToDelete{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "own"}})})
+			req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPost, getDeleteMultipleObjectsURL("", bucket), int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body),
+				user.AccessKey, user.SecretKey, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+			var resp DeleteObjectsResponse
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp) != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("%s: status %d: %s", instance, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+
+			if len(resp.DeletedObjects) != 1 || resp.DeletedObjects[0].ObjectName != "own" || len(resp.Errors) != len(outside) {
+				t.Errorf("%s: want the three names outside the bucket refused and \"own\" deleted: %s", instance, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+			for _, e := range resp.Errors {
+				if e.Code != errorCodes[ErrInvalidObjectName].Code {
+					t.Errorf("%s: %q: code %s, want %s", instance, e.Key, e.Code, errorCodes[ErrInvalidObjectName].Code)
+				}
+			}
+			if !batchVersionExists(t, obj, locked, "secret", worm.VersionID) {
+				t.Errorf("%s: the version under COMPLIANCE retention in the other bucket was removed", instance)
+			}
+			if !batchVersionExists(t, obj, locked, "secret", "") {
+				t.Errorf("%s: a delete marker hides the object of the other bucket", instance)
+			}
+			if !batchVersionExists(t, obj, minioMetaBucket, metaKey, "") {
+				t.Errorf("%s: a delete marker hides the stored metadata of the other bucket", instance)
+			}
+			if batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, "own", "") {
+				t.Errorf("%s: the object of the request bucket was not deleted", instance)
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}

cmd/bulk-delete-object-lock-race_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	minio "github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/replication"
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+	"github.com/minio/mux"
+)
+
+// Schedule a protection update immediately before the storage mutation. Both
+// public delete entry points are gated so the test is independent of whether
+// the handler batches a version or uses the single-object deletion path.
+type bulkDeleteLockBarrier struct {
+	ObjectLayer
+	entered chan struct{}
+	release chan struct{}
+	once    sync.Once
+}
+
+func (g *bulkDeleteLockBarrier) DeleteObjects(ctx context.Context, bucket string, objects []ObjectToDelete, opts ObjectOptions) ([]DeletedObject, []error) {
+	g.wait()
+	return g.ObjectLayer.DeleteObjects(ctx, bucket, objects, opts)
+}
+
+func (g *bulkDeleteLockBarrier) wait() {
+	g.once.Do(func() { close(g.entered); <-g.release })
+}
+
+func (g *bulkDeleteLockBarrier) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
+	g.wait()
+	return g.ObjectLayer.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
+}
+
+func bulkDeleteLockRequest(t *testing.T, bucket, key, version string) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+	body := encodeResponse(DeleteObjectsRequest{Objects: []ObjectToDelete{{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: key, VersionID: version}}}})
+	req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPost, getDeleteMultipleObjectsURL("", bucket), int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return mux.SetURLVars(req, map[string]string{"bucket": bucket})
+}
+
+func TestBulkDeleteObjectLockInterleaving(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
+		for _, directory := range []bool{false, true} {
+			for _, kind := range []string{"legal-hold", "retention"} {
+				t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d/directory=%v/%s", pools, directory, kind), func(t *testing.T) {
+					z, _ := bulkDeletePools(t, pools)
+					bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true, LockEnabled: true})
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					key := "protection-update"
+					if directory {
+						key += "/"
+					}
+					var oi ObjectInfo
+					if directory {
+						oi, err = z.PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(nil), 0, "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: nullVersionID})
+						if err != nil {
+							t.Fatal(err)
+						}
+					} else {
+						oi = batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, key, nil)
+					}
+					gate := &bulkDeleteLockBarrier{ObjectLayer: z, entered: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
+					api := objectAPIHandlers{ObjectAPI: func() ObjectLayer { return gate }}
+					requestVersion := oi.VersionID
+					if directory {
+						requestVersion = ""
+					}
+					req := bulkDeleteLockRequest(t, bucket, key, requestVersion)
+					rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+					done := make(chan struct{})
+					go func() { defer close(done); api.DeleteMultipleObjectsHandler(rec, req) }()
+					var release sync.Once
+					unblock := func() { release.Do(func() { close(gate.release) }) }
+					defer func() {
+						unblock()
+						select {
+						case <-done:
+						case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+							t.Error("delete did not finish")
+						}
+					}()
+					select {
+					case <-gate.entered:
+					case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+						t.Fatal("bulk handler did not reach deletion after validation")
+					}
+					body := []byte(`<LegalHold xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>ON</Status></LegalHold>`)
+					if kind == "retention" {
+						body = retentionBody("COMPLIANCE", UTCNow().Add(24*time.Hour))
+					}
+					holdReq, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/"+key+"?"+kind+"&versionId="+url.QueryEscape(oi.VersionID), int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, nil)
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					holdRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+					router.ServeHTTP(holdRec, holdReq)
+					protected, getErr := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: oi.VersionID})
+					unblock()
+					select {
+					case <-done:
+					case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+						t.Fatal("delete did not finish")
+					}
+					if holdRec.Code != http.StatusOK || getErr != nil {
+						t.Fatalf("protection setup failed: status=%d body=%s err=%v", holdRec.Code, holdRec.Body.String(), getErr)
+					}
+					if kind == "legal-hold" && protected.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] != "ON" {
+						t.Fatal("legal hold was not stored")
+					}
+					if kind == "retention" && protected.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode)] != "COMPLIANCE" {
+						t.Fatal("retention was not stored")
+					}
+					var response DeleteObjectsResponse
+					if err := xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response); err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					exists := batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, key, oi.VersionID)
+					t.Logf("protection PUT=%d; delete POST=%d response=%s; protected_version_exists=%v", holdRec.Code, rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), exists)
+					if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !exists || len(response.Errors) != 1 || len(response.DeletedObjects) != 0 {
+						t.Errorf("bulk deletion removed a version after its protection update succeeded")
+					}
+				})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBulkDeleteObjectLockPoolCopies(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"COMPLIANCE", "LEGALHOLD"} {
+		t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
+			z, _ := bulkDeletePools(t, 2)
+			bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true, LockEnabled: true})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			for _, bulk := range []bool{false, true} {
+				key := "single-control"
+				if bulk {
+					key = "bulk"
+				}
+				id := mustGetUUID()
+				mtime := UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)
+				putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, 0, "same-data", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: id, MTime: mtime, UserDefined: nil})
+				putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, 1, "same-data", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: id, MTime: mtime, UserDefined: batchLockMeta(kind)})
+				selected, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: id})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				if selected.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode)] != "" || selected.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] != "" {
+					t.Fatal("fixture did not select the unprotected pool copy")
+				}
+				req := bulkDeleteLockRequest(t, bucket, key, id)
+				if !bulk {
+					req, err = newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodDelete, getDeleteObjectURL("", bucket, key)+"?versionId="+id, 0, nil, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, nil)
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+				}
+				rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+				router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+				if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "Object is WORM protected") {
+					t.Fatalf("expected Object Lock refusal: HTTP %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+				remaining := 0
+				for _, pool := range z.serverPools {
+					_, err := pool.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: id})
+					if err == nil {
+						remaining++
+					} else if !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+				}
+				t.Logf("bulk=%v HTTP=%d response=%s remaining_pool_copies=%d", bulk, rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), remaining)
+				if remaining != 2 {
+					t.Errorf("protected version copies removed by bulk=%v", bulk)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// One response must retain the identity and outcome of every requested item,
+// even when physical version removals and marker creation take different paths.
+func TestBulkDeleteObjectLockMixedResponse(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
+		for _, quiet := range []bool{false, true} {
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d/quiet=%v", pools, quiet), func(t *testing.T) {
+				z, _ := bulkDeletePools(t, pools)
+				bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true, LockEnabled: true})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				locked := batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, "locked", batchLockMeta("COMPLIANCE"))
+				free := batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, "free", nil)
+				marker := batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, "marker", batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD"))
+				if _, err := z.PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, "directory/", mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(nil), 0, "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: nullVersionID}); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				missing := mustGetUUID()
+				objects := []ObjectToDelete{
+					{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "locked", VersionID: locked.VersionID}},
+					{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "free", VersionID: free.VersionID}},
+					{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "missing", VersionID: missing}},
+					{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "marker"}},
+					{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "directory/"}},
+					{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "directory/", VersionID: nullVersionID}},
+					{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "invalid", VersionID: "invalid"}},
+				}
+				objects = append(objects, objects[0], objects[1])
+				body := encodeResponse(DeleteObjectsRequest{Quiet: quiet, Objects: objects})
+				rec := r5Request(t, router, globalActiveCred, http.MethodPost, getDeleteMultipleObjectsURL("", bucket), string(body), nil)
+				var response DeleteObjectsResponse
+				if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response) != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("HTTP %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+				wantErrors := []ObjectV{objects[0].ObjectV, objects[6].ObjectV, objects[0].ObjectV}
+				if len(response.Errors) != len(wantErrors) {
+					t.Fatalf("errors: %+v", response.Errors)
+				}
+				for i, e := range response.Errors {
+					if e.Key != wantErrors[i].ObjectName || e.VersionID != wantErrors[i].VersionID {
+						t.Errorf("error identity %d: %+v", i, e)
+					}
+				}
+				if quiet {
+					if len(response.DeletedObjects) != 0 {
+						t.Errorf("quiet successes: %+v", response.DeletedObjects)
+					}
+				} else {
+					want := []ObjectV{objects[1].ObjectV, objects[2].ObjectV, objects[3].ObjectV, objects[4].ObjectV, objects[5].ObjectV, objects[1].ObjectV}
+					if len(response.DeletedObjects) != len(want) {
+						t.Fatalf("successes: %+v", response.DeletedObjects)
+					}
+					for i, d := range response.DeletedObjects {
+						if d.ObjectName != want[i].ObjectName || d.VersionID != want[i].VersionID {
+							t.Errorf("success identity %d: %+v", i, d)
+						}
+						if i == 2 && (!d.DeleteMarker || d.DeleteMarkerVersionID == "") {
+							t.Errorf("missing delete marker: %+v", d)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				if !batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, "locked", locked.VersionID) || !batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, "marker", marker.VersionID) || batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, "free", free.VersionID) || batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, "directory/", nullVersionID) {
+					t.Fatal("unexpected stored versions after mixed deletion")
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBulkDeleteObjectLockGovernance(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d", pools), func(t *testing.T) {
+			z, _ := bulkDeletePools(t, pools)
+			bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true, LockEnabled: true})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			deleteOnly := newObjectAttributesAuthzUser(t, "bulk-governance", bucket, `"s3:DeleteObjectVersion"`)
+			for _, allowed := range []bool{false, true} {
+				for _, bypass := range []bool{false, true} {
+					key := fmt.Sprintf("allowed-%v-bypass-%v", allowed, bypass)
+					oi := batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, key, batchLockMeta("GOVERNANCE"))
+					cred := deleteOnly
+					if allowed {
+						cred = globalActiveCred
+					}
+					body := encodeResponse(DeleteObjectsRequest{Objects: []ObjectToDelete{{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: key, VersionID: oi.VersionID}}}})
+					header := map[string]string{}
+					if bypass {
+						header[xhttp.AmzObjectLockBypassGovernance] = "true"
+					}
+					rec := r5Request(t, router, cred, http.MethodPost, getDeleteMultipleObjectsURL("", bucket), string(body), header)
+					var response DeleteObjectsResponse
+					if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response) != nil {
+						t.Fatalf("HTTP %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+					deleted := allowed && bypass
+					if batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, key, oi.VersionID) == deleted || (len(response.Errors) == 0) != deleted {
+						t.Fatalf("%s: %s", key, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The locked path computes replication decisions while holding the mutation
+// lock. Keep pending purges and their queue entries, including duplicate input.
+func TestBulkDeleteObjectLockReplication(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d", pools), func(t *testing.T) {
+			z, _ := bulkDeletePools(t, pools)
+			bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true, LockEnabled: true})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			client, err := minio.New("localhost:1", &minio.Options{Region: "us-east-1", MaxRetries: 1})
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			worker, cleanup := r5ReplicationFixture(t, z, bucket, client)
+			defer cleanup()
+			free := batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, "free", nil)
+			locked := batchPutVersion(t, z, bucket, "locked", batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD"))
+			objects := []ObjectToDelete{{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "free", VersionID: free.VersionID}}, {ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "locked", VersionID: locked.VersionID}}}
+			objects = append(objects, objects[0])
+			body := encodeResponse(DeleteObjectsRequest{Objects: objects})
+			rec := r5Request(t, router, globalActiveCred, http.MethodPost, getDeleteMultipleObjectsURL("", bucket), string(body), nil)
+			var response DeleteObjectsResponse
+			if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response) != nil || len(response.Errors) != 1 || len(response.DeletedObjects) != 2 {
+				t.Fatalf("HTTP %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+			if len(worker) != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("want one purge queued, got %d", len(worker))
+			}
+			op, ok := (<-worker).(DeletedObjectReplicationInfo)
+			if !ok || op.ObjectName != "free" || op.VersionID != free.VersionID || op.VersionPurgeStatus() != replication.VersionPurgePending || op.ReplicationState.ReplicateDecisionStr == "" {
+				t.Fatalf("lost purge identity/state: %+v", op)
+			}
+			if !batchVersionExists(t, z, bucket, "locked", locked.VersionID) {
+				t.Fatal("protected version was deleted")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/bulk-delete-object-lock_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// A directory object always has the null version, and a bulk delete without a
+// version ID removes it. The retention check must read that version's lock.
+func TestBulkDeleteDirectoryObjectLock(t *testing.T) {
+	defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t, endpoints: []string{"DeleteMultipleObjects"},
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
+			for _, kind := range append([]string{"unlocked"}, batchLockKinds...) {
+				key := "dir-" + kind + "/"
+				if _, err := obj.PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(nil), 0, "", ""),
+					ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: nullVersionID, UserDefined: batchLockMeta(kind)}); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				body := encodeResponse(DeleteObjectsRequest{Objects: []ObjectToDelete{{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: key}}}})
+				req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPost, getDeleteMultipleObjectsURL("", bucket), int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body),
+					cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, nil)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+				router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+				var resp DeleteObjectsResponse
+				if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp) != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("%s: %s: status %d: %s", instance, key, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+				exists := batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, key, nullVersionID)
+				if kind == "unlocked" {
+					if exists || len(resp.DeletedObjects) != 1 {
+						t.Errorf("%s: %s: unlocked directory object was not deleted: %s", instance, key, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+					continue
+				}
+				if !exists || len(resp.Errors) != 1 || len(resp.DeletedObjects) != 0 ||
+					resp.Errors[0].Key != key || !strings.Contains(resp.Errors[0].Message, "WORM") {
+					t.Errorf("%s: %s: want the WORM error and the object kept (exists=%v): %s", instance, key, exists, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}

cmd/encryption-v1.go

@@ -260,6 +260,15 @@ func ParseSSECustomerHeader(header http.Header) (key []byte, err error) {
 // This function rotates old to new key.
 func rotateKey(ctx context.Context, oldKey []byte, newKeyID string, newKey []byte, bucket, object string, metadata map[string]string, cryptoCtx kms.Context) error {
 	kind, _ := crypto.IsEncrypted(metadata)
+	return rotateKeyWithTarget(ctx, oldKey, kind, newKeyID, newKey, bucket, object, metadata, cryptoCtx, len(cryptoCtx) > 0)
+}
+
+func rotateKeyWithTarget(ctx context.Context, oldKey []byte, targetKind crypto.Type, newKeyID string, newKey []byte, bucket, object string, metadata map[string]string, cryptoCtx kms.Context, replaceContext bool) error {
+	kind, _ := crypto.IsEncrypted(metadata)
+	if targetKind == nil {
+		targetKind = kind
+	}
+	var objectKey crypto.ObjectKey
 	switch kind {
 	case crypto.S3:
 		if GlobalKMS == nil {
@@ -269,7 +278,7 @@ func rotateKey(ctx context.Context, oldKey []byte, newKeyID string, newKey []byt
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		oldKey, err := GlobalKMS.Decrypt(ctx, &kms.DecryptRequest{
+		unsealKey, err := GlobalKMS.Decrypt(ctx, &kms.DecryptRequest{
 			Name:           keyID,
 			Ciphertext:     kmsKey,
 			AssociatedData: kms.Context{bucket: path.Join(bucket, object)},
@@ -277,66 +286,30 @@ func rotateKey(ctx context.Context, oldKey []byte, newKeyID string, newKey []byt
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		var objectKey crypto.ObjectKey
+		if err = objectKey.Unseal(unsealKey, sealedKey, crypto.S3.String(), bucket, object); err != nil {
-		if err = objectKey.Unseal(oldKey, sealedKey, crypto.S3.String(), bucket, object); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-
-		newKey, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(ctx, &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{
-			Name:           GlobalKMS.DefaultKey,
-			AssociatedData: kms.Context{bucket: path.Join(bucket, object)},
-		})
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		sealedKey = objectKey.Seal(newKey.Plaintext, crypto.GenerateIV(rand.Reader), crypto.S3.String(), bucket, object)
-		crypto.S3.CreateMetadata(metadata, newKey.KeyID, newKey.Ciphertext, sealedKey)
-		return nil
 	case crypto.S3KMS:
 		if GlobalKMS == nil {
 			return errKMSNotConfigured
 		}
-		objectKey, err := crypto.S3KMS.UnsealObjectKey(GlobalKMS, metadata, bucket, object)
+		var err error
+		objectKey, err = crypto.S3KMS.UnsealObjectKey(GlobalKMS, metadata, bucket, object)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-
+		if targetKind == crypto.S3KMS && !replaceContext && len(cryptoCtx) == 0 {
-		if len(cryptoCtx) == 0 {
 			_, _, _, cryptoCtx, err = crypto.S3KMS.ParseMetadata(metadata)
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
 		}
-
-		// If the context does not contain the bucket key
-		// we must add it for key generation. However,
-		// the context must be stored exactly like the
-		// client provided it. Therefore, we create a copy
-		// of the client provided context and add the bucket
-		// key, if not present.
-		kmsCtx := kms.Context{}
-		maps.Copy(kmsCtx, cryptoCtx)
-		if _, ok := kmsCtx[bucket]; !ok {
-			kmsCtx[bucket] = path.Join(bucket, object)
-		}
-		newKey, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(ctx, &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{
-			Name:           newKeyID,
-			AssociatedData: kmsCtx,
-		})
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-
-		sealedKey := objectKey.Seal(newKey.Plaintext, crypto.GenerateIV(rand.Reader), crypto.S3KMS.String(), bucket, object)
-		crypto.S3KMS.CreateMetadata(metadata, newKey.KeyID, newKey.Ciphertext, sealedKey, cryptoCtx)
-		return nil
 	case crypto.SSEC:
 		sealedKey, err := crypto.SSEC.ParseMetadata(metadata)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 
-		var objectKey crypto.ObjectKey
 		if err = objectKey.Unseal(oldKey, sealedKey, crypto.SSEC.String(), bucket, object); err != nil {
 			if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(oldKey, newKey) == 1 {
 				return errInvalidSSEParameters // AWS returns special error for equal but invalid keys.
@@ -353,6 +326,55 @@ func rotateKey(ctx context.Context, oldKey []byte, newKeyID string, newKey []byt
 	default:
 		return errObjectTampered
 	}
+
+	switch targetKind {
+	case crypto.S3:
+		genKey, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(ctx, &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{
+			Name:           GlobalKMS.DefaultKey,
+			AssociatedData: kms.Context{bucket: path.Join(bucket, object)},
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaSealedKeyKMS)
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaKeyID)
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaDataEncryptionKey)
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaContext)
+		sealedKey := objectKey.Seal(genKey.Plaintext, crypto.GenerateIV(rand.Reader), crypto.S3.String(), bucket, object)
+		crypto.S3.CreateMetadata(metadata, genKey.KeyID, genKey.Ciphertext, sealedKey)
+		return nil
+	case crypto.S3KMS:
+		// If the context does not contain the bucket key
+		// we must add it for key generation. However,
+		// the context must be stored exactly like the
+		// client provided it. Therefore, we create a copy
+		// of the client provided context and add the bucket
+		// key, if not present.
+		kmsCtx := kms.Context{}
+		maps.Copy(kmsCtx, cryptoCtx)
+		if _, ok := kmsCtx[bucket]; !ok {
+			kmsCtx[bucket] = path.Join(bucket, object)
+		}
+		genKey, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(ctx, &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{
+			Name:           newKeyID,
+			AssociatedData: kmsCtx,
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			if errors.Is(err, kes.ErrKeyNotFound) {
+				return errKMSKeyNotFound
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3)
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaKeyID)
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaDataEncryptionKey)
+		delete(metadata, crypto.MetaContext)
+		sealedKey := objectKey.Seal(genKey.Plaintext, crypto.GenerateIV(rand.Reader), crypto.S3KMS.String(), bucket, object)
+		crypto.S3KMS.CreateMetadata(metadata, genKey.KeyID, genKey.Ciphertext, sealedKey, cryptoCtx)
+		return nil
+	default:
+		return errInvalidEncryptionParameters
+	}
 }
 
 func newEncryptMetadata(ctx context.Context, kind crypto.Type, keyID string, key []byte, bucket, object string, metadata map[string]string, cryptoCtx kms.Context) (crypto.ObjectKey, error) {

cmd/erasure-multipart.go

@@ -1722,6 +1722,9 @@ func (er erasureObjects) CompleteMultipartUpload(ctx context.Context, bucket str
 		}
 	}
 
+	if err := er.checkReplicaContent(ctx, bucket, object, minioMetaMultipartBucket, uploadIDPath, partsMetadata, onlineDisks, opts); err != nil {
+		return oi, toObjectErr(err, bucket, object)
+	}
 	er.cleanupMultipartPath(ctx, paths...) // cleanup all part.N.meta, and skipped part.N's before final rename().
 
 	defer func() {

cmd/erasure-object.go

@@ -133,8 +133,25 @@ func (er erasureObjects) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, d
 	}
 
 	if dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile {
-		reconcileStoredObjectLock(srcInfo.UserDefined, storedObjectLockState(fi.Metadata))
+		stored := fi.ToObjectInfo(dstBucket, dstObject, dstOpts.Versioned || dstOpts.VersionSuspended)
-		reconcileStoredObjectTags(srcInfo.UserDefined, fi.Metadata[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging], fi.Metadata[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp])
+		if srcInfo.versionOnly || dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo != nil {
+			// fi describes the source of the new reference, not the version
+			// being replaced. A pooled lookup also preserves protection merged
+			// from another copy, even when this set holds a newer weak revision.
+			getInfo := er.getObjectInfo
+			if dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo != nil {
+				getInfo = dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo
+			}
+			stored, err = replicaStoredObjectInfo(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
+				opts.NoLock = true
+				return getInfo(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
+			}, dstBucket, dstObject, dstOpts.VersionID)
+			if err != nil {
+				return oi, err
+			}
+		}
+		reconcileStoredObjectLock(srcInfo.UserDefined, storedObjectLockState(stored.UserDefined))
+		reconcileStoredObjectTags(srcInfo.UserDefined, stored.UserTags, stored.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp])
 	}
 
 	filterOnlineDisksInplace(fi, metaArr, onlineDisks)
@@ -148,6 +165,17 @@ func (er erasureObjects) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, d
 			fi.IsLatest = true // we are creating a new version so this is latest.
 		}
 	}
+	if srcInfo.versionOnly && (dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile || dstOpts.ReplicationRequest) && !dstOpts.DataMovement {
+		candidate := slices.Clone(metaArr)
+		for i := range candidate {
+			candidate[i].VersionID = versionID
+			candidate[i].Metadata = srcInfo.UserDefined
+		}
+		readDisks, readMeta := shuffleDisksAndPartsMetadataByIndex(onlineDisks, candidate, fi)
+		if err := er.checkReplicaContent(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, srcBucket, srcObject, readMeta, readDisks, dstOpts); err != nil {
+			return oi, err
+		}
+	}
 
 	if !dstOpts.ReplicationRequest && !dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile && !dstOpts.DataMovement &&
 		(versionID == "" || versionID == nullVersionID) {
@@ -935,11 +963,14 @@ func (er erasureObjects) getObjectFileInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, object s
 	// to the disks; this value is not accurate because we do
 	// not know the storage class of the object yet
 	minDisks := 0
-	if p := globalStorageClass.GetParityForSC(""); p > -1 {
+	if p := globalStorageClass.GetParityForSC(""); p > -1 && p < er.setDriveCount {
 		minDisks = er.setDriveCount - p
 	} else {
 		minDisks = er.setDriveCount - er.defaultParityCount
 	}
+	if minDisks < 1 {
+		minDisks = 1
+	}
 
 	if minDisks == er.setDriveCount/2 {
 		// when data and parity are same we must atleast
@@ -1722,6 +1753,9 @@ func (er erasureObjects) putObject(ctx context.Context, bucket string, object st
 	}
 
 	// Rename the successfully written temporary object to final location.
+	if err := er.checkReplicaContent(ctx, bucket, object, minioMetaTmpBucket, tempObj, partsMetadata, onlineDisks, opts); err != nil {
+		return ObjectInfo{}, toObjectErr(err, bucket, object)
+	}
 	onlineDisks, versions, oldDataDir, err := renameData(ctx, onlineDisks, minioMetaTmpBucket, tempObj, partsMetadata, bucket, object, writeQuorum)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, errFileNotFound) {
@@ -2186,7 +2220,7 @@ func (er erasureObjects) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string
 			// A restored-copy expiry needs fresh metadata to confirm its target
 			// and deadline, a checked expiry to guard its protection; ordinary
 			// unversioned DELETE may still try a blind delete.
-			if opts.Transition.ExpireRestored || checkedExpiry || opts.Versioned || opts.VersionSuspended || countOnlineDisks(storageDisks) < len(storageDisks)/2+1 {
+			if opts.Transition.ExpireRestored || checkedExpiry || opts.Versioned || opts.VersionSuspended || opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite || countOnlineDisks(storageDisks) < len(storageDisks)/2+1 {
 				// Add an MRF heal for next time.
 				er.addPartial(bucket, object, opts.VersionID)
 				return objInfo, InsufficientWriteQuorum{}
@@ -2237,8 +2271,28 @@ func (er erasureObjects) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string
 		}
 	}
 
+	// When versioning is disabled or suspended for this key, an unaddressed
+	// delete overwrites or removes the null version even if a newer non-null
+	// version is returned as latest by getObjectInfoAndQuorum above.
+	retOI, retErr := goi, gerr
+	if !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker && opts.VersionID == "" && (opts.EvalRetentionBypassFn != nil || opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite) {
+		if gerr == nil && goi.VersionID != "" && goi.VersionID != nullVersionID {
+			nullOpts := opts
+			nullOpts.VersionID = nullVersionID
+			retOI, _, retErr = er.getObjectInfoAndQuorum(ctx, bucket, object, nullOpts)
+			if _, ok := retErr.(InsufficientReadQuorum); ok && opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite {
+				er.addPartial(bucket, object, nullVersionID)
+				return objInfo, InsufficientWriteQuorum{}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	if opts.EvalRetentionBypassFn != nil {
-		if err := opts.EvalRetentionBypassFn(goi, gerr); err != nil {
+		if err := opts.EvalRetentionBypassFn(retOI, retErr); err != nil {
+			return ObjectInfo{}, err
+		}
+	} else if opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite && !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker && opts.VersionID == "" {
+		if err := refuseLockedMarkerOverwrite(ctx, bucket, object, nullVersionID, retOI, retErr); err != nil {
 			return ObjectInfo{}, err
 		}
 	}
@@ -2560,7 +2614,7 @@ func (er erasureObjects) PutObjectTags(ctx context.Context, bucket, object strin
 
 	fi.Metadata[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = tags
 	fi.ReplicationState = opts.PutReplicationState()
-	stamp := monotonicTaggingTimestamp(opts.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp], fi.Metadata[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp])
+	stamp := monotonicMetadataTimestamp(opts.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp], fi.Metadata[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp])
 	maps.Copy(fi.Metadata, opts.UserDefined)
 	if stamp != "" {
 		fi.Metadata[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = stamp

cmd/erasure-server-pool-consistency.go

@@ -271,11 +271,33 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) applyMigrationExpiry(ctx context.Context, bucket, o
 // in the source until the ordinary expiry path has deleted them: that path
 // owns replication state and tier cleanup, and it re-evaluates the current
 // lifecycle rule. A migration cleanup must never turn an asynchronous ILM
-// decision into an unconditional physical purge.
+// decision into an unconditional physical purge. It returns how many source
-func (z *erasureServerPools) removeMovedVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, source int, versions []FileInfo, expired []migrationExpiredVersion) error {
+// versions were removed, including versions deleted by ILM before cleanup.
+func (z *erasureServerPools) removeMovedVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, source int, versions []FileInfo, expired []migrationExpiredVersion) (int, error) {
+	err := z.retireMovedVersions(ctx, bucket, object, source, versions, expired)
+	removed, countErr := z.countAbsentMigrationVersions(ctx, bucket, object, source, versions)
+	if ctx.Err() != nil {
+		return 0, ctx.Err()
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return removed, err
+	}
+	return removed, countErr
+}
+
+// retireMovedVersions does not infer physical progress from a pool-level read
+// or delete result. Decommission verifies the entire walk snapshot once after
+// this cleanup and tier GC, including versions concurrently deleted by clients.
+func (z *erasureServerPools) retireMovedVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, source int, versions []FileInfo, expired []migrationExpiredVersion) error {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	if err := z.applyMigrationExpiry(ctx, bucket, object, source, expired); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	if len(versions) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
 	object = encodeDirObject(object)
 	lk := z.NewNSLock(bucket, object)
 	lkctx, err := lk.GetLock(ctx, globalOperationTimeout)
@@ -289,6 +311,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) removeMovedVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, ob
 		if vid == "" {
 			vid = nullVersionID
 		}
+		expiredVersion := isExpiredVersion(expired, version)
 		copies, err := z.objectPoolInfos(ctx, bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: vid, NoAuditLog: true})
 		if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
 			continue
@@ -311,7 +334,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) removeMovedVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, ob
 		if !src.ModTime.Equal(version.ModTime) || src.DeleteMarker != version.Deleted {
 			return PreConditionFailed{}
 		}
-		if isExpiredVersion(expired, version) {
+		if expiredVersion {
 			// The logical expiry path owns this version. Keeping the source is
 			// also the retry point if that path failed or the pool check races it.
 			continue
@@ -370,19 +393,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) healObjectInPool(ctx context.Context, er *erasureOb
 // mergePoolLockState resolves each independently ordered field. An ordered
 // removal is a value in its own right; an absent unordered field is not one.
 func mergePoolLockState(copies []PoolObjInfo) objectLockState {
-	state := storedObjectLockState(copies[0].ObjInfo.UserDefined)
+	return reducePoolLockState(copies, storedObjectLockState)
-	for _, copy := range copies[1:] {
-		next := storedObjectLockState(copy.ObjInfo.UserDefined)
-		retentionTime, _ := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, next.retentionTimestamp)
-		if state.retentionIsOlderThan(retentionTime) || (state.retentionTimestamp == "" && state.mode == "" && next.mode != "") {
-			state.mode, state.retainUntil, state.retentionTimestamp = next.mode, next.retainUntil, next.retentionTimestamp
-		}
-		holdTime, _ := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, next.legalHoldTimestamp)
-		if state.legalHoldIsOlderThan(holdTime) || (state.legalHoldTimestamp == "" && state.legalHold == "" && next.legalHold != "") {
-			state.legalHold, state.legalHoldTimestamp = next.legalHold, next.legalHoldTimestamp
-		}
-	}
-	return state
 }
 
 func replaceObjectLockMetadata(metadata map[string]string, state objectLockState) {
@@ -534,10 +545,10 @@ func reconcileStoredObjectTags(metadata map[string]string, storedTags, storedTim
 	}
 }
 
-// Local tagging mutations must advance the revision they overwrite, even when
+// Local metadata mutations must advance the revision they overwrite, even when
 // a request's clock or lock acquisition order is behind the stored revision.
 // Replica writes use reconcileStoredObjectTags instead of minting a revision.
-func monotonicTaggingTimestamp(incoming, stored string) string {
+func monotonicMetadataTimestamp(incoming, stored string) string {
 	requested, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, incoming)
 	if err != nil {
 		return incoming
@@ -635,6 +646,26 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) deleteObjectReconciled(ctx context.Context, bucket,
 		case opts.VersionID != "":
 			// An addressed version already resolved every copy above.
 			logical = mergedPoolObjectInfo(copies)
+		case !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker:
+			// An unqualified delete when versioning is not active for this key
+			// removes or replaces the null version in every pool that holds one,
+			// even if a newer non-null version is current for reads.
+			nullOpts := opts
+			nullOpts.VersionID = nullVersionID
+			nullCopies, err := z.objectPoolInfos(ctx, bucket, object, nullOpts)
+			switch {
+			case err == nil:
+				if nullCopies[0].ObjInfo.DeleteMarker {
+					gerr = toObjectErr(errFileNotFound, bucket, object)
+					logical = nullCopies[0].ObjInfo
+				} else {
+					logical = mergedPoolObjectInfo(nullCopies)
+				}
+			case isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err):
+				gerr = toObjectErr(errFileNotFound, bucket, object)
+			default:
+				return ObjectInfo{}, err
+			}
 		default:
 			versions, err := z.metadataPoolInfos(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -650,6 +681,14 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) deleteObjectReconciled(ctx context.Context, bucket,
 				return ObjectInfo{}, err
 			}
 			opts.EvalRetentionBypassFn = nil
+			if !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker && opts.VersionID == "" {
+				opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite = false
+			}
+		} else if opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite && !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker && opts.VersionID == "" {
+			if err := refuseLockedMarkerOverwrite(ctx, bucket, object, nullVersionID, logical, gerr); err != nil {
+				return ObjectInfo{}, err
+			}
+			opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite = false
 		}
 		if opts.EvalMetadataFn != nil {
 			decision, err := opts.EvalMetadataFn(&logical, gerr)

cmd/erasure-server-pool-decom-keys-below_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Denis Babchuk
+//
+// This file is part of MinIO Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// A key below another key ("k/b" under "k") is a directory inside the
+// directory of that key. The listing treats the directory of an object as a
+// leaf, so a decommission walk does not see "k/b" while "k" is still in the
+// pool. The walk has to be repeated once the keys above are gone, or the
+// check after the bucket finds them and the decommission fails.
+
+func keysBelowDecommission(t *testing.T, z *erasureServerPools) PoolDecommissionInfo {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err := z.StartDecommission(t.Context(), 0); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	z.doDecommissionInRoutine(t.Context(), 0)
+	z.poolMetaMutex.RLock()
+	defer z.poolMetaMutex.RUnlock()
+	return *z.poolMeta.Pools[0].Decommission
+}
+
+func keysBelowPools(t *testing.T) (*erasureServerPools, string, []string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	z, _ := migrationTestPools(t)
+	const bucket = "keys-below"
+	if err := z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	keys := []string{"k", "k/b", "k/b/c"}
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, 0, key, ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+	}
+	return z, bucket, keys
+}
+
+func TestDecommissionMovesKeysBelowAKey(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket, keys := keysBelowPools(t)
+	if info := keysBelowDecommission(t, z); !info.Complete || info.Failed {
+		t.Errorf("decommission: complete %v, failed %v; want complete", info.Complete, info.Failed)
+	}
+	for _, key := range keys {
+		if _, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{}); !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
+			t.Errorf("%s still in pool 0: %v", key, err)
+		}
+		if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, key, ""); body != key {
+			t.Errorf("%s reads %q", key, body)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// An ILM expiry can remove the parent key during a decommission walk. That
+// removal must count as progress, or the next key below the parent remains
+// hidden from the listing and the source pool is left non-empty.
+func TestDecommissionContinuesAfterLifecycleRemovesParent(t *testing.T) {
+	z, _ := migrationTestPools(t)
+	const bucket = "decommission-ilm-keys-below"
+	if err := z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	meta.LifecycleConfigXML = []byte(`<LifecycleConfiguration><Rule><ID>expire-old</ID><Status>Enabled</Status><Filter><Prefix></Prefix></Filter><Expiration><Days>1</Days></Expiration></Rule></LifecycleConfiguration>`)
+	if err := meta.Save(t.Context(), z); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, meta)
+
+	putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "parent", ObjectOptions{MTime: UTCNow().Add(-72 * time.Hour)})
+	putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k/b", 0, "child", ObjectOptions{MTime: UTCNow()})
+
+	if info := keysBelowDecommission(t, z); !info.Complete || info.Failed {
+		t.Fatalf("decommission: complete %v, failed %v; want complete", info.Complete, info.Failed)
+	}
+	if _, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, "k/b", ObjectOptions{}); !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("child still in source pool: %v", err)
+	}
+	if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k/b", ""); body != "child" {
+		t.Fatalf("child reads %q", body)
+	}
+}

cmd/erasure-server-pool-decom.go

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ import (
 	"slices"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
@@ -752,7 +754,34 @@ func (set *erasureObjects) listObjectsToDecommission(ctx context.Context, bi dec
 	return err
 }
 
+// decommissionPool moves bucket bi out of pool idx. A key below another key
+// ("k/b" under "k") is a directory inside the directory of that key, and the
+// listing does not descend into the directory of an object: a walk sees "k/b"
+// only once "k" has left the pool. The walk is repeated while it removes
+// source versions, so each pass moves the keys that the previous one
+// uncovered. Each repeat needs a version removed from the pool, which takes
+// no new writes, so the repeats end.
 func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool *erasureSets, bi decomBucketInfo) error {
+	for {
+		if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		removed, err := z.decommissionPoolWalk(ctx, idx, pool, bi)
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return ctx.Err()
+		}
+		if err != nil || removed == 0 {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// decommissionPoolWalk walks bucket bi of pool idx once and returns the number
+// of snapshot versions verified absent from every online source drive afterwards.
+func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPoolWalk(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool *erasureSets, bi decomBucketInfo) (int64, error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
 	ctx = logger.SetReqInfo(ctx, &logger.ReqInfo{})
 
 	const envDecomWorkers = "_MINIO_DECOMMISSION_WORKERS"
@@ -766,9 +795,13 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 	// add that many extra workers.
 	workerSize += len(pool.sets)
 
+	var removed atomic.Int64
+	var verifyErr error
+	var verifyOnce sync.Once
+
 	wk, err := workers.New(workerSize)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return 0, err
 	}
 
 	var vc *versioning.Versioning
@@ -779,24 +812,24 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 	if bi.Name != minioMetaBucket {
 		vc, err = globalBucketVersioningSys.Get(bi.Name)
 		if err != nil {
-			return err
+			return 0, err
 		}
 
 		// Check if the current bucket has a configured lifecycle policy
 		lc, lifecycleUpdatedAt, err = globalBucketMetadataSys.GetLifecycleConfig(bi.Name)
 		if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, BucketLifecycleNotFound{Bucket: bi.Name}) {
-			return err
+			return 0, err
 		}
 
 		// Check if bucket is object locked.
 		lr, err = globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bi.Name)
 		if err != nil {
-			return err
+			return 0, err
 		}
 
 		rcfg, err = getReplicationConfig(ctx, bi.Name)
 		if err != nil {
-			return err
+			return 0, err
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -855,7 +888,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 			// to create the appropriate stack.
 			versionsSorter(fivs.Versions).reverse()
 
-			var decommissioned int
+			var candidates []FileInfo
 			var expired []migrationExpiredVersion
 			// The key's history in all pools, read once for its versions.
 			var history migrationHistory
@@ -863,8 +896,8 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 				stopFn := globalDecommissionMetrics.log(decomMetricDecommissionObject, idx, bi.Name, version.Name, version.VersionID)
 				// Apply lifecycle rules on the objects that are expired.
 				if action := filterLifecycle(bi.Name, version.Name, version, &history); action.Delete() {
-					decommissioned++
 					if ilmDeletesVersionOnly(action) || (action.DeleteAll() && !version.IsRemote()) {
+						candidates = append(candidates, version)
 						// Run the logical expiry before retiring the source.
 						// A full-object expiry is safe here only for hot-tier
 						// metadata; transitioned objects retain their tier cleanup
@@ -912,7 +945,6 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 						// This can happen when rebalance stop races with ongoing rebalance workers.
 						// These rebalance failures can be ignored.
 						if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isDataMovementOverWriteErr(err) {
-							ignore = true
 							stopFn(0, nil)
 							continue
 						}
@@ -926,8 +958,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 					z.poolMeta.CountItem(idx, 0, failure)
 					z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
 					if !failure {
-						// Success keep a count.
+						candidates = append(candidates, version)
-						decommissioned++
 					}
 					auditLogDecom(ctx, "DecomCopyDeleteMarker", bi.Name, version.Name, versionID, err)
 					continue
@@ -1013,16 +1044,32 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 				if failure {
 					break // break out on first error
 				}
-				decommissioned++
+				candidates = append(candidates, version)
 			}
 
-			// if all versions were decommissioned, then we can delete the object versions.
+			// Retire only successful moves and eligible expiries. A concurrently
-			if decommissioned == len(fivs.Versions) {
+			// deleted or failed sibling must not strand the successful copies.
+			// Skipped versions are checked for absence, never purged here.
+			{
 				stopFn := globalDecommissionMetrics.log(decomMetricDecommissionRemoveObject, idx, bi.Name, entry.name)
-				err := z.removeMovedVersions(ctx, bi.Name, entry.name, idx, fivs.Versions, expired)
+				err := z.retireMovedVersions(ctx, bi.Name, entry.name, idx, candidates, expired)
 				if err == nil {
 					err = z.removeFreeVersions(ctx, bi.Name, entry.name, idx, fivs.FreeVersions)
 				}
+				// One metadata-only read of each source drive per entry, regardless
+				// of its version count. No read error can become progress or trigger
+				// another walk; leave the bucket queued for an explicit retry.
+				snapshot := slices.Concat(fivs.Versions, fivs.FreeVersions)
+				n, countErr := z.countAbsentMigrationVersions(ctx, bi.Name, entry.name, idx, snapshot)
+				removed.Add(int64(n))
+				// The disposable usage cache is also excluded by the final
+				// verification. Its unreadability still never counts as progress.
+				if countErr != nil && (bi.Name != minioMetaBucket || !strings.Contains(entry.name, dataUsageCacheName)) {
+					verifyOnce.Do(func() { verifyErr = countErr })
+					if err == nil {
+						err = countErr
+					}
+				}
 				stopFn(0, err)
 				auditLogDecom(ctx, "DecomDeleteObject", bi.Name, entry.name, "", err)
 				if err != nil {
@@ -1057,12 +1104,19 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionPool(ctx context.Context, idx int, pool
 				setN := humanize.Ordinal(setIdx + 1)
 				retryDur := time.Duration(rand.Float64() * float64(5*time.Second))
 				decomLogOnceIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("listing objects from %s set failed with %v, retrying in %v", setN, err, retryDur), "decom-listing-failed"+setN)
-				time.Sleep(retryDur)
+				select {
+				case <-ctx.Done():
+					return
+				case <-time.After(retryDur):
+				}
 			}
 		}(setIdx)
 	}
 	wk.Wait()
-	return nil
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return removed.Load(), err
+	}
+	return removed.Load(), verifyErr
 }
 
 //msgp:ignore decomMetrics
@@ -1113,6 +1167,9 @@ func (m *decomMetrics) log(d decomMetric, poolIdx int, paths ...string) func(z i
 // decommission fails and a retry resumes with what is left. A canceled
 // context returns at once.
 func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionInBackground(ctx context.Context, idx int) error {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	pool := z.serverPools[idx]
 	z.poolMetaMutex.RLock()
 	pending := z.poolMeta.PendingBuckets(idx)
@@ -1151,7 +1208,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionInBackground(ctx context.Context, idx i
 		if err := z.decommissionPool(ctx, idx, pool, bucket); err != nil {
 			stopFn(0, err)
 			if contextCanceled(ctx) {
-				return err
+				return ctx.Err()
 			}
 			failed(bucket, err)
 			continue
@@ -1164,7 +1221,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionInBackground(ctx context.Context, idx i
 		if err := z.checkAfterDecomBucket(ctx, idx, bucket); err != nil {
 			stopFn(0, err)
 			if contextCanceled(ctx) {
-				return err
+				return ctx.Err()
 			}
 			failed(bucket, err)
 			continue
@@ -1177,6 +1234,9 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) decommissionInBackground(ctx context.Context, idx i
 		}
 		z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
 	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	return firstErr
 }
 
@@ -1211,34 +1271,74 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) removeFreeVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, obj
 	return nil
 }
 
-// checkAfterDecomBucket verifies that a source bucket is physically empty
+// checkAfterDecomBucket verifies that a source bucket's online drives are empty
 // before it is removed from the resumable decommission queue. ILM decisions
 // are deliberately not treated as an exemption: an expired version remains
 // until the expiry path has performed its logical delete, replication, and
 // tier cleanup.
 func (z *erasureServerPools) checkAfterDecomBucket(ctx context.Context, idx int, bi decomBucketInfo) error {
-	versionsFound := 0
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
-	for _, set := range z.serverPools[idx].sets {
-		if err := set.listObjectsToDecommission(ctx, bi, func(entry metaCacheEntry) {
-			if !entry.isObject() {
-				return
-			}
-			if bi.Name == minioMetaBucket && strings.Contains(entry.name, dataUsageCacheName) {
-				return
-			}
-			fivs, err := entry.fileInfoVersions(bi.Name)
-			if err != nil {
-				return
-			}
-			versionsFound += len(fivs.Versions) + len(fivs.FreeVersions)
-		}); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	for _, set := range z.serverPools[idx].sets {
+		disks := set.getDisks()
+		if len(disks) == 0 {
+			return toObjectErr(errErasureReadQuorum, bi.Name)
 		}
-	if versionsFound > 0 {
+		readQuorum := set.migrationReadQuorum(len(disks))
-		return fmt.Errorf("at least %d object(s)/version(s) were found in bucket `%s` after decommissioning", versionsFound, bi.Name)
+		onlineCount := 0
+		for _, disk := range disks {
+			if disk == nil {
+				continue
 			}
-	return nil
+			// Quorum listings omit minority versions, and WalkDir can skip
+			// unreadable metadata. Inspect physical directory entries instead:
+			// even a corrupt or truncated xl.meta must keep this pool queued.
+			pending := []string{bi.Prefix}
+			diskOffline := false
+			for len(pending) > 0 {
+				if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+				dir := pending[len(pending)-1]
+				pending = pending[:len(pending)-1]
+				entries, err := disk.ListDir(ctx, "", bi.Name, dir, -1)
+				if ctx.Err() != nil {
+					return ctx.Err()
+				}
+				if errors.Is(err, errFileNotFound) || errors.Is(err, errVolumeNotFound) {
+					continue // A concurrent deletion can remove the directory.
+				}
+				if errors.Is(err, errDiskNotFound) {
+					diskOffline = true
+					break
+				}
+				if err != nil {
+					return err
+				}
+				for _, entry := range entries {
+					name := pathJoin(dir, entry)
+					if bi.Name == minioMetaBucket && strings.Contains(name, dataUsageCacheName) {
+						continue
+					}
+					if entry == xlStorageFormatFile || entry == xlStorageFormatFileV1 {
+						return fmt.Errorf("object metadata %s remains in bucket %s after decommissioning", name, bi.Name)
+					}
+					if strings.HasSuffix(entry, SlashSeparator) {
+						pending = append(pending, name)
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			if diskOffline {
+				continue
+			}
+			onlineCount++
+		}
+		if onlineCount < readQuorum {
+			return toObjectErr(errErasureReadQuorum, bi.Name)
+		}
+	}
+	return ctx.Err()
 }
 
 func (z *erasureServerPools) checkAfterDecom(ctx context.Context, idx int) error {

cmd/erasure-server-pool-lifecycle-authority_test.go

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/binary"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/cespare/xxhash/v2"
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
 	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
@@ -632,6 +634,180 @@ func TestPoolsLifecycleLegacyHistory(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// authoritySignature2021 is the header signature of o, a version whose part
+// ETags are all empty, as the releases from RELEASE.2021-11-24 until
+// RELEASE.2022-01-25 computed it: with these ETags.
+func authoritySignature2021(o xlMetaV2Object) (sig [4]byte) {
+	o.ErasureIndex = 0
+	crc := hashDeterministicString(o.MetaUser) ^ hashDeterministicBytes(o.MetaSys)
+	o.MetaUser, o.MetaSys = nil, nil
+	bts, _ := o.MarshalMsg(nil)
+	crc ^= xxhash.Sum64(bts)
+	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(sig[:], uint32(crc^(crc>>32)))
+	return sig
+}
+
+// A drive holds the header that the release which wrote a version there
+// stored. Before RELEASE.2024-04-28 it has no erasure coding, and until
+// RELEASE.2022-01-25 its signature counted the empty part ETags of versions
+// written before RELEASE.2021-11-24. A heal writes the header of its own
+// release and leaves the other drives alone, so the drives of an old version
+// differ there for good once some were replaced. That is one revision, as
+// reads and heal take it, on however many of the drives.
+func TestPoolsLifecycleHeaderEras(t *testing.T) {
+	id := [16]byte{1}
+	current := func(drive int) xlMetaV2ShallowVersion { return authorityRevision(t, id, 1, drive+1, "") }
+	// stored returns the version as drive holds it after change, under the
+	// header that header derives from the one a current release writes.
+	stored := func(drive int, change func(*xlMetaV2Object), header func(xlMetaV2VersionHeader, xlMetaV2Object) xlMetaV2VersionHeader) xlMetaV2ShallowVersion {
+		ver := current(drive)
+		var v xlMetaV2Version
+		if _, err := v.UnmarshalMsg(ver.meta); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		change(v.ObjectV2)
+		meta, err := v.MarshalMsg(nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		return xlMetaV2ShallowVersion{header: header(ver.header, *v.ObjectV2), meta: meta}
+	}
+	eras := map[string]func(drive int) xlMetaV2ShallowVersion{
+		"no-erasure-coding": func(drive int) xlMetaV2ShallowVersion {
+			return stored(drive, func(*xlMetaV2Object) {}, func(h xlMetaV2VersionHeader, _ xlMetaV2Object) xlMetaV2VersionHeader {
+				h.EcN, h.EcM = 0, 0
+				return h
+			})
+		},
+		"empty-part-etags-signed": func(drive int) xlMetaV2ShallowVersion {
+			return stored(drive, func(o *xlMetaV2Object) { o.PartETags = []string{""} }, func(h xlMetaV2VersionHeader, o xlMetaV2Object) xlMetaV2VersionHeader {
+				h.EcN, h.EcM, h.Signature = 0, 0, authoritySignature2021(o)
+				return h
+			})
+		},
+	}
+	metaVs := slices.Repeat([]uint8{xlMetaVersion}, 16)
+	readQuorum := func(xlMetaV2ShallowVersion, uint8) int { return 12 }
+	for name, old := range eras {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if old(0).header == current(0).header {
+				t.Fatal("fixture: the old header is the current one")
+			}
+			if versionRevision(old(0), xlMetaVersion) != versionRevision(current(7), xlMetaVersion) {
+				t.Error("one version under the headers of two releases has two keys")
+			}
+			// The normalized current header orders the merge.
+			wantHeader := current(0).header
+			wantHeader.Flags &^= xlFlagUsesDataDir
+			if versionRevision(old(0), xlMetaVersion).header != wantHeader {
+				t.Error("the key does not carry the header of the current release")
+			}
+			for healed := range 17 {
+				metas := make([][]xlMetaV2ShallowVersion, 16)
+				for i := range metas {
+					if i < healed {
+						metas[i] = []xlMetaV2ShallowVersion{current(i)}
+					} else {
+						metas[i] = []xlMetaV2ShallowVersion{old(i)}
+					}
+				}
+				merged, err := authoritativeHistory(t.Context(), metas, metaVs, xlMetaVersion, 9, readQuorum)
+				if err != nil || len(merged) != 1 {
+					t.Errorf("%d healed drives: %d versions, err=%v", healed, len(merged), err)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	// Control: the erasure coding still tells revisions apart, by the
+	// metadata. Another one under the same header is another revision.
+	other := stored(0, func(o *xlMetaV2Object) { o.ErasureM, o.ErasureN = 8, 8 }, func(h xlMetaV2VersionHeader, _ xlMetaV2Object) xlMetaV2VersionHeader { return h })
+	if versionRevision(other, xlMetaVersion) == versionRevision(current(0), xlMetaVersion) {
+		t.Error("another erasure coding under one header keeps the revision")
+	}
+}
+
+// The same on drives, through a heal: two versions with headers from before
+// RELEASE.2024-04-28 on a set where half of the drives were replaced. GET
+// reads them and heal has nothing left to do. Their expiry has to run as
+// well: of a noncurrent version with several pools, and of all versions of a
+// key with one pool too, which reads the history like the pools do. A
+// restore takes the drives for one generation, not for a failed status write.
+func TestPoolsLifecycleHealedOldHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, single := range []bool{false, true} {
+		name, key := "noncurrent-version", "ncv-old-headers"
+		if single {
+			name, key = "all-versions-one-pool", "eav-old-headers"
+		}
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			s := newSplitILM(t, versioning.Enabled, splitILMRules)
+			ctx := t.Context()
+			s.write(key, splitAt("old", 5, 0))
+			s.write(key, splitAt("new", 3, 0))
+			ids := []string{s.ids[key+" old"], s.ids[key+" new"]}
+			if single {
+				prior := s.z.serverPools
+				t.Cleanup(func() { s.z.serverPools = prior })
+				s.z.serverPools = s.z.serverPools[:1]
+			}
+			set := s.z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(key)
+			disks := set.getDisks()
+			for _, disk := range disks {
+				rewriteTierTestMeta(t, disk, s.bucket, key, func(xl *xlMetaV2) {
+					for i := range xl.versions {
+						// Control: the key of a version this release wrote
+						// carries its header with only the time-derived flag removed.
+						wantHeader := xl.versions[i].header
+						wantHeader.Flags &^= xlFlagUsesDataDir
+						if versionRevision(xl.versions[i], xl.metaV).header != wantHeader {
+							t.Fatal("the key of a current version carries another header")
+						}
+						xl.versions[i].header.EcN, xl.versions[i].header.EcM = 0, 0
+					}
+				})
+			}
+			replaced := len(disks) / 2
+			for _, disk := range disks[:replaced] {
+				if err := disk.Delete(ctx, s.bucket, key, DeleteOptions{Recursive: true, Immediate: true}); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				for _, id := range ids {
+					if _, err := s.z.HealObject(ctx, s.bucket, key, id, madmin.HealOpts{ScanMode: madmin.HealNormalScan}); err != nil {
+						t.Fatalf("heal %s: %v", id, err)
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			for i, disk := range disks {
+				if authorityHeader(t, disk, s.bucket, key, ids[0]).hasEC() != (i < replaced) {
+					t.Fatalf("fixture: drive %d of %d, %d replaced, holds the other header", i, len(disks), replaced)
+				}
+			}
+			authorityPresent(t, s, 0, key, ids[0])
+			res, err := s.z.HealObject(ctx, s.bucket, key, ids[0], madmin.HealOpts{DryRun: true, ScanMode: madmin.HealNormalScan})
+			if err != nil || slices.ContainsFunc(res.Before.Drives, func(d madmin.HealDriveInfo) bool { return d.State != madmin.DriveStateOk }) {
+				t.Fatalf("fixture: heal has work left: %v", err)
+			}
+
+			if gen, err := set.readRestoreGeneration(ctx, s.bucket, key, ids[0]); err != nil || gen.split {
+				t.Errorf("restore generation: split=%v, err=%v", gen.split, err)
+			}
+			if single {
+				_, err = s.z.DeleteObject(ctx, s.bucket, key, authorityDeleteAll)
+			} else {
+				err = authorityExpireVersion(t, s, key, ids[0])
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expiry: %v", err)
+			}
+			if _, err := s.z.GetObjectInfo(ctx, s.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: ids[0]}); !isErrVersionNotFound(err) && !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
+				t.Errorf("the expired version: %v", err)
+			}
+			if !single {
+				authorityPresent(t, s, 0, key, ids[1])
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // authorityDeleteAll is the expiry of all versions of a key as the expiry
 // worker sends it: a purge of all versions, approved by the lifecycle.
 var authorityDeleteAll = ObjectOptions{DeleteAllVersions: true, Expiration: ExpirationOptions{Expire: true}}
@@ -1088,6 +1264,7 @@ func TestPoolsLifecycleCheckedExpirySafeguard(t *testing.T) {
 		{"hold-equal-stamps", poolLockMetadata("", "ON", old, recent), objectLockState{legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: recent}, false},
 		{"hold-missing-approved-stamp", poolLockMetadata("", "ON", old, old), objectLockState{legalHold: "OFF"}, false},
 		{"retention-newer-locally", poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "OFF", recent, old), objectLockState{retentionTimestamp: old, legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: old}, false},
+		{"compliance-cannot-release", poolLockMetadata("COMPLIANCE", "OFF", old, old), objectLockState{retentionTimestamp: recent, legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: old}, false},
 		// Controls: the approval strictly supersedes the local protection.
 		{"hold-released", poolLockMetadata("", "ON", old, old), objectLockState{legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: recent}, true},
 		{"retention-released", poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "OFF", old, old), objectLockState{retentionTimestamp: recent, legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: old}, true},
@@ -1494,7 +1671,7 @@ func TestPoolsMigrationLifecycleRefusedExpiryKeepsSource(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 	version := FileInfo{Name: key, VersionID: id, ModTime: source.ModTime}
-	err = s.z.removeMovedVersions(ctx, s.bucket, key, 0, []FileInfo{version}, []migrationExpiredVersion{{
+	_, err = s.z.removeMovedVersions(ctx, s.bucket, key, 0, []FileInfo{version}, []migrationExpiredVersion{{
 		version:            version,
 		event:              lifecycle.Event{Action: lifecycle.DeleteAction},
 		lifecycleUpdatedAt: updatedAt,

cmd/erasure-server-pool-lifecycle-safety_test.go

@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ func TestPoolsLifecycleDuplicateLockMetadata(t *testing.T) {
 		{name: "independent-fields", copies: [2]map[string]string{poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "OFF", recent, old), poolLockMetadata("", "ON", old, recent)}, mode: "GOVERNANCE", hold: "ON"},
 		{name: "hold-released", copies: [2]map[string]string{poolLockMetadata("", "ON", old, old), poolLockMetadata("", "OFF", old, recent)}, hold: "OFF", delete: true},
 		{name: "retention-released", copies: [2]map[string]string{poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "OFF", old, old), poolLockMetadata("", "OFF", recent, old)}, hold: "OFF", delete: true},
+		{name: "compliance-before-removal", copies: [2]map[string]string{poolLockMetadata("COMPLIANCE", "OFF", old, old), poolLockMetadata("", "OFF", recent, old)}, mode: "COMPLIANCE", hold: "OFF"},
+		{name: "compliance-after-removal", copies: [2]map[string]string{poolLockMetadata("", "OFF", recent, old), poolLockMetadata("COMPLIANCE", "OFF", old, old)}, mode: "COMPLIANCE", hold: "OFF"},
 	} {
 		for _, batch := range []bool{false, true} {
 			path := "single"

cmd/erasure-server-pool-lifecycle.go

@@ -187,9 +187,18 @@ type revisionKey struct {
 // input is canonical: each map, including the part checksums of a legacy
 // version, is its own section with its entry count and sorted,
 // length-prefixed entries, since msgp encodes maps in iteration order and an
-// entry must not move between maps unnoticed. The header of a
+// entry must not move between maps unnoticed.
-// legacy version carries a signature over its per-shard checksums, so the
+//
-// key replaces it with one from the digest.
+// A drive holds the header that the release which wrote the version there
+// stored, and a heal writes the one of its own release: headers from before
+// RELEASE.2024-04-28 carry no erasure coding, and the signature counted
+// empty part ETags until RELEASE.2022-01-25. Reads and heal take such drives
+// for one version (matchesNotStrict), and nothing rewrites them. The key has
+// both as the current release computes them from the metadata, so that the
+// header of a version it wrote stays as stored, except UsesDataDir, which can
+// change solely because a restored copy expired before healing. The signature
+// also orders versions of one time in the merge. The signature of a legacy version is
+// over its per-shard checksums; the key has one from the digest.
 func versionRevision(ver xlMetaV2ShallowVersion, metaV uint8) revisionKey {
 	h := sha256.New()
 	writeUint := func(n int) {
@@ -267,8 +276,13 @@ func versionRevision(ver xlMetaV2ShallowVersion, metaV uint8) revisionKey {
 			section("fields", 1)
 			writeField(bts)
 			h.Sum(key.digest[:0])
-			if v.Type == LegacyType {
+			switch v.Type {
+			case LegacyType:
 				copy(key.header.Signature[:], key.digest[:])
+			case ObjectType:
+				key.header.Signature = v.ObjectV2.Signature()
+				key.header.EcN, key.header.EcM = uint8(v.ObjectV2.ErasureN), uint8(v.ObjectV2.ErasureM)
+				key.header.Flags &^= xlFlagUsesDataDir
 			}
 			return key
 		}
@@ -350,7 +364,7 @@ func authoritativeHistory(ctx context.Context, metas [][]xlMetaV2ShallowVersion,
 	// its count, and one that shares the header could stand in for the
 	// accepted one, so the merge only sees the accepted revision of each
 	// version and free versions as they are. It sees the headers of the
-	// keys, which do not differ between the drives of a legacy version.
+	// keys, which do not differ between the drives of a revision.
 	filtered := make([][]xlMetaV2ShallowVersion, len(metas))
 	for i, versions := range metas {
 		for j, ver := range versions {
@@ -575,20 +589,10 @@ func setLifecycleLockState(metadata map[string]string, state objectLockState) {
 	set(ReservedMetadataPrefix+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp, state.legalHoldTimestamp)
 }
 
-// newestLockState returns the newest hold and the newest retention of the
+// newestLockState orders independently revised fields without weakening a
-// copies of a version, which lockRevisionsOrdered found equal or ordered.
+// COMPLIANCE retention that any copy still protects.
 func newestLockState(copies []PoolObjInfo) objectLockState {
-	state := lifecycleLockState(copies[0].ObjInfo.UserDefined)
+	return reducePoolLockState(copies, lifecycleLockState)
-	for _, copy := range copies[1:] {
-		next := lifecycleLockState(copy.ObjInfo.UserDefined)
-		if lockRevisionNewer(next.legalHoldTimestamp, state.legalHoldTimestamp) {
-			state.legalHold, state.legalHoldTimestamp = next.legalHold, next.legalHoldTimestamp
-		}
-		if lockRevisionNewer(next.retentionTimestamp, state.retentionTimestamp) {
-			state.mode, state.retainUntil, state.retentionTimestamp = next.mode, next.retainUntil, next.retentionTimestamp
-		}
-	}
-	return state
 }
 
 // checkedExpiryRefused reports whether a set must keep a version whose ILM
@@ -611,7 +615,7 @@ func checkedExpiryRefused(lc lifecycle.Lifecycle, lr objectlock.Retention, rcfg
 	if lockRevisionNewer(approved.legalHoldTimestamp, local.legalHoldTimestamp) {
 		obj.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = approved.legalHold
 	}
-	if lockRevisionNewer(approved.retentionTimestamp, local.retentionTimestamp) {
+	if lockRevisionNewer(approved.retentionTimestamp, local.retentionTimestamp) && !local.complianceWouldWeaken(approved) {
 		obj.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode)] = approved.mode
 		obj.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate)] = approved.retainUntil
 	}

cmd/erasure-server-pool-migration-delete_test.go

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ func TestPoolsMigrationCleanupRechecksSource(t *testing.T) {
 				_, err := z.serverPools[1].DeleteObject(t.Context(), bucket, oi.Name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
 				mustIAM(t, err)
 			}
-			err := z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), bucket, oi.Name, 0, snapshot, nil)
+			_, err := z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), bucket, oi.Name, 0, snapshot, nil)
 			if change != "delete-uuid" && err == nil {
 				t.Fatal("cleanup accepted changed or uncertain state")
 			}

cmd/erasure-server-pool-migration-ilm_test.go

@@ -414,6 +414,46 @@ func testMigrationLifecycleExpiry(t *testing.T, kind string) {
 	})
 }
 
+// Physical expiry advances the walk; creating a delete marker does not remove
+// the addressed version and must not make a walk repeat without progress.
+func TestPoolsMigrationLifecycleRemovalProgress(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, versioned := range []bool{false, true} {
+		status := versioning.State("")
+		name, wantRemoved := "physical-delete", 1
+		if versioned {
+			status = versioning.Enabled
+			name, wantRemoved = "delete-marker-only", 0
+		}
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			m := newMigrationILM(t, status, false, migrationILMExpireCurrent())
+			oi := m.put("obj-01", "v1", ObjectOptions{Versioned: versioned, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-72 * time.Hour)})
+			_, updatedAt, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetLifecycleConfig(m.bucket)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			version := FileInfo{Name: oi.Name, VersionID: oi.VersionID, ModTime: oi.ModTime}
+			removed, err := m.z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), m.bucket, oi.Name, 0, []FileInfo{version}, []migrationExpiredVersion{{
+				version:            version,
+				event:              lifecycle.Event{Action: lifecycle.DeleteAction},
+				lifecycleUpdatedAt: updatedAt,
+				source:             lcEventSrc_Decom,
+			}})
+			if err != nil || removed != wantRemoved {
+				t.Fatalf("removed %d versions, err %v; want %d, nil", removed, err, wantRemoved)
+			}
+			if versioned {
+				if body := migrationTestBody(t, m.z.GetObjectNInfo, m.bucket, oi.Name, oi.VersionID); body != "obj-01 v1" {
+					t.Fatalf("noncurrent version reads %q", body)
+				}
+			}
+			current, err := m.z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), m.bucket, oi.Name, ObjectOptions{})
+			if !isErrObjectNotFound(err) || current.DeleteMarker != versioned {
+				t.Fatalf("after expiry: delete marker %t, err %v", current.DeleteMarker, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // A lifecycle action found during the migration walk must not be applied
 // after the bucket's lifecycle configuration changes. The source copy stays
 // available for a fresh scan under the new policy.

cmd/erasure-server-pool-migration-progress_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"slices"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
+)
+
+// The walk has already captured the version when its data read reaches this
+// hook. Metadata-only checks made by a concurrent DELETE do not reenter it.
+type migrationProgressReadDisk struct {
+	StorageAPI
+	bucket, object, version string
+	before                  func() error
+}
+
+func (d migrationProgressReadDisk) ReadVersion(ctx context.Context, orig, bucket, object, version string, opts ReadOptions) (FileInfo, error) {
+	if opts.ReadData && bucket == d.bucket && object == d.object && version == d.version {
+		if err := d.before(); err != nil {
+			return FileInfo{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	return d.StorageAPI.ReadVersion(ctx, orig, bucket, object, version, opts)
+}
+
+// Buffer every drive's first walk before publishing any entry. Thus deleting
+// the parent cannot accidentally let this same walk discover the child.
+type migrationSnapshotWalk struct {
+	bucket string
+	drives int32
+	calls  atomic.Int32
+	ready  chan struct{}
+}
+
+type migrationSnapshotWalkDisk struct {
+	StorageAPI
+	snapshot *migrationSnapshotWalk
+}
+
+func (d migrationSnapshotWalkDisk) WalkDir(ctx context.Context, opts WalkDirOptions, out io.Writer) error {
+	if opts.Bucket != d.snapshot.bucket {
+		return d.StorageAPI.WalkDir(ctx, opts, out)
+	}
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	if err := d.StorageAPI.WalkDir(ctx, opts, &buf); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if d.snapshot.calls.Add(1) == d.snapshot.drives {
+		close(d.snapshot.ready)
+	}
+	select {
+	case <-d.snapshot.ready:
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		return ctx.Err()
+	}
+	_, err := io.Copy(out, &buf)
+	return err
+}
+
+func migrationProgressSnapshot(t *testing.T, z *erasureServerPools, bucket, key string) *migrationSnapshotWalk {
+	t.Helper()
+	s := &migrationSnapshotWalk{bucket: bucket, drives: int32(len(z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(key).getDisks())), ready: make(chan struct{})}
+	t.Cleanup(conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], key, func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+		return migrationSnapshotWalkDisk{StorageAPI: d, snapshot: s}
+	}))
+	return s
+}
+
+func migrationProgressPrepare(t *testing.T, z *erasureServerPools, kind string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	migrationTestMover(t, z, 0, kind)
+	z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
+	z.poolMeta.Pools[0].LastUpdate = UTCNow()
+	z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
+}
+
+func TestDecommissionSplitMetadataDoesNotAdvance(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newMigrationILM(t, "", false, migrationILMExpireCurrent())
+	const key = "obj-01"
+	m.put(key, "old", ObjectOptions{MTime: UTCNow().Add(-96 * time.Hour)})
+	disks := m.z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(key).getDisks()
+	old := make([][]byte, len(disks)/2)
+	for i := range old {
+		var err error
+		old[i], err = disks[i].ReadAll(t.Context(), m.bucket, pathJoin(key, xlStorageFormatFile))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	m.put(key, "new-and-longer", ObjectOptions{MTime: UTCNow().Add(-72 * time.Hour)})
+	for i := range old {
+		mustIAM(t, disks[i].WriteAll(t.Context(), m.bucket, pathJoin(key, xlStorageFormatFile), old[i]))
+	}
+	if _, err := m.z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), m.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID}); !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("fixture must expose the ambiguous logical NotFound, got %v", err)
+	}
+	migrationProgressPrepare(t, m.z, "decommission")
+	walk := migrationProgressSnapshot(t, m.z, m.bucket, key)
+	bi := decomBucketInfo{Name: m.bucket}
+	// Check a single pass first, so the unfixed implementation fails rather
+	// than looping until the test timeout.
+	removed, err := m.z.decommissionPoolWalk(t.Context(), 0, m.z.serverPools[0], bi)
+	if err != nil || removed != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("split metadata reported progress: removed=%d err=%v", removed, err)
+	}
+	mustIAM(t, m.z.decommissionPool(t.Context(), 0, m.z.serverPools[0], bi))
+	if got := walk.calls.Load(); got != 2*walk.drives {
+		t.Fatalf("unchanged metadata repeated the walk: calls=%d", got)
+	}
+	if err := m.z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, bi); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("final verification accepted split metadata still on disk")
+	}
+	for _, disk := range disks {
+		if _, err := disk.ReadVersion(t.Context(), "", m.bucket, key, nullVersionID, ReadOptions{}); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("migration removed an ambiguous source revision: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPoolsMigrationConcurrentDeleteCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"decommission", "rebalance"} {
+		t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
+			z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+			v1 := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "older", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
+			v2 := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "newer", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+			var once sync.Once
+			var deleteErr error
+			before := func() error {
+				once.Do(func() {
+					_, deleteErr = z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), bucket, "k", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: v2.VersionID})
+				})
+				return deleteErr
+			}
+			restore := conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+				return migrationProgressReadDisk{StorageAPI: d, bucket: bucket, object: "k", version: v2.VersionID, before: before}
+			})
+			defer restore()
+			if failed := migrationTestWalk(t, z, bucket, 0, kind); failed != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("failed moves: %d", failed)
+			}
+			restore()
+			for _, v := range []ObjectInfo{v1, v2} {
+				for _, disk := range z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet("k").getDisks() {
+					_, err := disk.ReadVersion(t.Context(), "", bucket, "k", v.VersionID, ReadOptions{})
+					if !errors.Is(err, errFileVersionNotFound) && !errors.Is(err, errFileNotFound) {
+						t.Fatalf("source version %s remained: %v", v.VersionID, err)
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k", v1.VersionID); body != "older" {
+				t.Fatalf("moved version reads %q", body)
+			}
+			if _, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, "k", ObjectOptions{VersionID: v2.VersionID}); !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
+				t.Fatalf("concurrently deleted version resurrected: %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPoolsMigrationSiblingFailureCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"decommission", "rebalance"} {
+		for _, loseDestination := range []bool{false, true} {
+			name := kind + "/destination-retained"
+			if loseDestination {
+				name = kind + "/destination-removed"
+			}
+			t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+				z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+				v1 := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "older", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
+				v2 := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "newer", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+				var once sync.Once
+				var deleteErr error
+				before := func() error {
+					once.Do(func() {
+						if loseDestination {
+							_, deleteErr = z.serverPools[1].DeleteObject(t.Context(), bucket, "k", ObjectOptions{VersionID: v1.VersionID})
+						}
+					})
+					return errDiskNotFound // only the sibling's data read fails
+				}
+				restore := conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+					return migrationProgressReadDisk{StorageAPI: d, bucket: bucket, object: "k", version: v2.VersionID, before: before}
+				})
+				defer restore()
+				migrationProgressPrepare(t, z, kind)
+				if kind == "rebalance" {
+					mustIAM(t, z.rebalanceBucket(t.Context(), bucket, 0))
+				} else {
+					_, err := z.decommissionPoolWalk(t.Context(), 0, z.serverPools[0], decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket})
+					mustIAM(t, err)
+					if err := z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}); err == nil {
+						t.Fatal("failed sibling must block final decommission verification")
+					}
+				}
+				restore()
+				mustIAM(t, deleteErr)
+				if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k", v2.VersionID); body != "newer" {
+					t.Fatalf("failed sibling reads %q", body)
+				}
+				if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k", v1.VersionID); body != "older" {
+					t.Fatalf("successful candidate lost: %q", body)
+				}
+				_, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, "k", ObjectOptions{VersionID: v1.VersionID})
+				if loseDestination && err != nil || !loseDestination && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
+					t.Fatalf("source cleanup ignored destination state: %v", err)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecommissionConcurrentParentDeleteRescansChildren(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+	putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "parent", ObjectOptions{})
+	putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k/b", 0, "child", ObjectOptions{})
+	migrationProgressSnapshot(t, z, bucket, "k")
+	var once sync.Once
+	var deleteErr error
+	t.Cleanup(conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+		return migrationProgressReadDisk{StorageAPI: d, bucket: bucket, object: "k", version: nullVersionID, before: func() error {
+			once.Do(func() {
+				_, deleteErr = z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), bucket, "k", ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
+			})
+			return deleteErr
+		}}
+	}))
+	if failed := migrationTestWalk(t, z, bucket, 0, "decommission"); failed != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("failed moves: %d", failed)
+	}
+	mustIAM(t, z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}))
+	if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k/b", ""); body != "child" {
+		t.Fatalf("child reads %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecommissionDegradedPoolRescansChildren(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+	putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "parent", ObjectOptions{})
+	putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k/b", 0, "child", ObjectOptions{})
+	var wrapped int
+	t.Cleanup(conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+		wrapped++
+		if wrapped == 1 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return d
+	}))
+	if failed := migrationTestWalk(t, z, bucket, 0, "decommission"); failed != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("failed moves: %d", failed)
+	}
+	mustIAM(t, z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}))
+	if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k/b", ""); body != "child" {
+		t.Fatalf("child reads %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFreeVersionDecommissionRescansChildren(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFreeVersionTest(t, "")
+	f.bucket = "free-parent"
+	mustIAM(t, f.z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), f.bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
+	f.deleteVersion(f.tiered("k", "parent", UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)))
+	f.put("k/b", "child", UTCNow())
+	migrationProgressSnapshot(t, f.z, f.bucket, "k")
+	migrationProgressPrepare(t, f.z, "decommission")
+	bi := decomBucketInfo{Name: f.bucket}
+	removed, err := f.z.decommissionPoolWalk(t.Context(), 0, f.z.serverPools[0], bi)
+	if err != nil || removed != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("free-only parent removal: removed=%d err=%v", removed, err)
+	}
+	if err := f.z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, bi); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("the newly exposed child must still block completion")
+	}
+	mustIAM(t, f.z.decommissionPool(t.Context(), 0, f.z.serverPools[0], bi))
+	mustIAM(t, f.z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, bi))
+	if body := migrationTestBody(t, f.z.GetObjectNInfo, f.bucket, "k/b", ""); body != "k/b child" {
+		t.Fatalf("child reads %q", body)
+	}
+	if !slices.Contains(f.tier.removed, f.remote("k", "parent")) {
+		t.Fatal("free version cleanup did not delete its remote object")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPoolsMigrationCancellation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"decommission", "rebalance"} {
+		for _, phase := range []string{"before-walk", "during-read", "deadline"} {
+			name := kind + "/" + phase
+			t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+				z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+				oi := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "source", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+				migrationProgressPrepare(t, z, kind)
+				ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
+				wantErr := context.Canceled
+				if phase == "deadline" {
+					cancel()
+					ctx, cancel = context.WithDeadline(t.Context(), time.Time{})
+					wantErr = context.DeadlineExceeded
+				}
+				defer cancel()
+				if phase == "during-read" {
+					t.Cleanup(conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+						return migrationProgressReadDisk{StorageAPI: d, bucket: bucket, object: "k", version: oi.VersionID, before: func() error { cancel(); return ctx.Err() }}
+					}))
+				} else {
+					cancel()
+				}
+				var err error
+				if kind == "decommission" {
+					err = z.decommissionPool(ctx, 0, z.serverPools[0], decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket})
+				} else {
+					err = z.rebalanceBucket(ctx, bucket, 0)
+				}
+				if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
+					t.Fatalf("cancellation returned %v", err)
+				}
+				if err := z.decommissionInBackground(ctx, 0); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
+					t.Fatalf("canceled background migration returned %v", err)
+				}
+				if err := z.rebalanceBuckets(ctx, 0); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
+					t.Fatalf("canceled background rebalance returned %v", err)
+				}
+				if n, err := z.countAbsentMigrationVersions(ctx, bucket, "k", 0, []FileInfo{{VersionID: oi.VersionID}}); n != 0 || !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
+					t.Fatalf("canceled progress verification: removed=%d err=%v", n, err)
+				}
+				if _, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, "k", ObjectOptions{VersionID: oi.VersionID}); err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("canceled migration lost source: %v", err)
+				}
+				if err := z.checkAfterDecomBucket(ctx, 0, decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
+					t.Fatalf("canceled verification returned %v", err)
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+type migrationProgressRawDisk struct {
+	StorageAPI
+	buf   []byte
+	err   error
+	reads *atomic.Int32
+}
+
+func (d migrationProgressRawDisk) ReadXL(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, data bool) (RawFileInfo, error) {
+	d.reads.Add(1)
+	if data {
+		return RawFileInfo{}, errors.New("progress check requested object data")
+	}
+	return RawFileInfo{Buf: d.buf}, d.err
+}
+
+func (d migrationProgressRawDisk) ListDir(context.Context, string, string, string, int) ([]string, error) {
+	return nil, errFileNotFound
+}
+
+func TestPoolsMigrationPhysicalProgress(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFreeVersionTest(t, "")
+	buf := f.xlMeta(0, "obj-01")
+	versions, err := getFileInfoVersions(buf, f.bucket, "obj-01", true)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if len(versions.Versions) != 3 || !versions.Versions[0].TierFreeVersion() {
+		t.Fatal("fixture must contain two live versions and one free version")
+	}
+	missing := FileInfo{VersionID: mustGetUUID()}
+	snapshot := append(slices.Clone(versions.Versions), missing)
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name    string
+		buf     []byte
+		err     error
+		want    int
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{name: "all-absent", err: errFileNotFound, want: 4},
+		{name: "missing-volume", err: errVolumeNotFound, want: 4},
+		{name: "minority-live-and-free", buf: buf, want: 1},
+		{name: "unavailable", err: errDiskNotFound, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "read-quorum", err: errErasureReadQuorum, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "corrupt-read", err: errFileCorrupt, wantErr: true},
+		{name: "corrupt-metadata", buf: []byte("broken xl.meta"), wantErr: true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			var reads atomic.Int32
+			disks := make([]StorageAPI, 4)
+			for i := range disks {
+				disks[i] = migrationProgressRawDisk{err: errFileNotFound, reads: &reads}
+			}
+			disks[3] = migrationProgressRawDisk{buf: tc.buf, err: tc.err, reads: &reads}
+			er := erasureObjects{getDisks: func() []StorageAPI { return disks }}
+			n, err := er.countAbsentMigrationVersions(t.Context(), f.bucket, "obj-01", snapshot)
+			if n != tc.want || (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
+				t.Fatalf("removed=%d err=%v, want %d / error=%t", n, err, tc.want, tc.wantErr)
+			}
+			if reads.Load() != int32(len(disks)) {
+				t.Fatalf("read count %d must not depend on version count", reads.Load())
+			}
+		})
+	}
+	putConsistencyObject(t, f.z, f.bucket, "null", 0, "null-data", ObjectOptions{})
+	nullBuf := f.xlMeta(0, "null")
+	var reads atomic.Int32
+	er := erasureObjects{getDisks: func() []StorageAPI {
+		return []StorageAPI{migrationProgressRawDisk{buf: nullBuf, reads: &reads}}
+	}}
+	if n, err := er.countAbsentMigrationVersions(t.Context(), f.bucket, "null", []FileInfo{{VersionID: nullVersionID}, {VersionID: ""}}); n != 0 || err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("null version normalization: removed=%d err=%v", n, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestCountAbsentMigrationVersionsToleratesConfiguredOfflineDrives(t *testing.T) {
+	makeDisks := func(offlineCount int, asError bool) []StorageAPI {
+		disks := make([]StorageAPI, 4)
+		for i := range disks {
+			disks[i] = migrationProgressRawDisk{err: errFileNotFound, reads: &atomic.Int32{}}
+		}
+		for i := range offlineCount {
+			if asError {
+				disks[i] = migrationProgressRawDisk{err: errDiskNotFound, reads: &atomic.Int32{}}
+			} else {
+				disks[i] = nil
+			}
+		}
+		return disks
+	}
+	snapshot := []FileInfo{{VersionID: mustGetUUID()}}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name      string
+		offline   int
+		parity    int
+		asError   bool
+		wantCount int
+		wantErr   bool
+	}{
+		{name: "nil-drive-within-parity", offline: 1, parity: 1, wantCount: 1},
+		{name: "read-error-within-parity", offline: 1, parity: 1, asError: true, wantCount: 1},
+		{name: "half-offline-within-parity", offline: 2, parity: 2, wantCount: 1},
+		{name: "offline-beyond-parity", offline: 2, parity: 1, wantErr: true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			disks := makeDisks(tc.offline, tc.asError)
+			er := erasureObjects{
+				setDriveCount:      len(disks),
+				defaultParityCount: tc.parity,
+				getDisks:           func() []StorageAPI { return disks },
+			}
+			got, err := er.countAbsentMigrationVersions(t.Context(), "bucket", "object", snapshot)
+			if got != tc.wantCount || (err != nil) != tc.wantErr {
+				t.Fatalf("removed=%d err=%v, want %d / error=%t", got, err, tc.wantCount, tc.wantErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// A successful quorum deletion can leave one source drive behind. It must not
+// count as physical removal or pass the final check, nor cause a retry loop.
+func TestDecommissionQuorumDeletionIsNotPhysicalProgress(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+	oi := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+	move := migrationTestMover(t, z, 0, "decommission")
+	mustIAM(t, move(t.Context(), 0, bucket, migrationTestReader(t, z, 0, oi)))
+	first := true
+	restore := conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+		if first {
+			first = false
+			return consistencyDeleteFaultDisk{StorageAPI: d, bucket: bucket, object: "k", version: oi.VersionID}
+		}
+		return d
+	})
+	defer restore()
+	snapshot := []FileInfo{{VersionID: oi.VersionID, ModTime: oi.ModTime}}
+	for range 2 {
+		n, err := z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), bucket, "k", 0, snapshot, nil)
+		if err != nil || n != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("partial deletion reported progress: removed=%d err=%v", n, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if err := z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("final verification accepted a minority-drive source copy")
+	}
+	if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k", oi.VersionID); body != "payload" {
+		t.Fatalf("destination copy lost: %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDecommissionProgressReadFailureStopsWalk(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+	putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "k", 0, "payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+	migrationProgressPrepare(t, z, "decommission")
+	walk := migrationProgressSnapshot(t, z, bucket, "k")
+	restore := conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+		return tierReadFaultDisk{StorageAPI: d, bucket: bucket, object: "k", err: errDiskNotFound}
+	})
+	defer restore()
+	if err := z.decommissionPool(t.Context(), 0, z.serverPools[0], decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unreadable source progress check reported success")
+	}
+	if got := walk.calls.Load(); got != walk.drives {
+		t.Fatalf("verification failure repeated the walk: calls=%d", got)
+	}
+	restore()
+	if body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "k", ""); body != "payload" {
+		t.Fatalf("quorum move lost destination: %q", body)
+	}
+}
+
+type migrationProgressListFaultDisk struct {
+	StorageAPI
+}
+
+func (d migrationProgressListFaultDisk) ListDir(context.Context, string, string, string, int) ([]string, error) {
+	return nil, errDiskAccessDenied
+}
+
+func TestDecommissionFinalVerificationFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, state := range []string{"offline-drive", "directory-error", "corrupt-metadata", "truncated-metadata", "legacy-metadata"} {
+		t.Run(state, func(t *testing.T) {
+			z, bucket := migrationTestPools(t)
+			switch state {
+			case "offline-drive":
+				set := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet("k")
+				maxOffline := set.defaultParityCount + 1
+				wrapped := 0
+				t.Cleanup(conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+					wrapped++
+					if wrapped <= maxOffline {
+						return nil
+					}
+					return d
+				}))
+			case "directory-error":
+				t.Cleanup(conditionalPutSwapDisks(z.serverPools[0], "k", func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
+					return migrationProgressListFaultDisk{StorageAPI: d}
+				}))
+			default:
+				// Real metadata on only one drive, without a readable quorum.
+				// This also covers errors that WalkDir deliberately skips.
+				disk := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet("k").getDisks()[0]
+				file, data := xlStorageFormatFile, []byte("broken xl.meta")
+				if state == "truncated-metadata" {
+					data = nil
+				}
+				if state == "legacy-metadata" {
+					file = xlStorageFormatFileV1
+				}
+				mustIAM(t, disk.WriteAll(t.Context(), bucket, pathJoin("k", file), data))
+			}
+			if err := z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}); err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("unreadable storage was accepted as physically empty")
+			}
+			if n, err := z.countAbsentMigrationVersions(t.Context(), bucket, "k", 0, []FileInfo{{VersionID: mustGetUUID()}}); n != 0 || err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("unreadable storage was counted as progress: removed=%d err=%v", n, err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFreeVersionDecommissionPreservesLiveRemoteOwner(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFreeVersionTest(t, "")
+	const key = "obj-02"
+	fv, tuple := f.freeRecord(0, key)
+	owner := putConsistencyObject(t, f.z, f.bucket, key, 1, "live-owner", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
+	infos, errs := readAllFileInfo(t.Context(), f.z.serverPools[1].getHashedSet(key).getDisks(), "", f.bucket, key, owner.VersionID, false, false)
+	mustIAM(t, errs[0])
+	fi := infos[0]
+	fi.TransitionStatus, fi.TransitionTier = lifecycle.TransitionComplete, tuple.Tier
+	fi.TransitionedObjName, fi.TransitionVersionID = tuple.Object, tuple.VersionID
+	mustIAM(t, f.z.serverPools[1].DecomTieredObject(t.Context(), f.bucket, key, fi, ObjectOptions{}))
+	if err := f.z.removeFreeVersions(t.Context(), f.bucket, key, 0, []FileInfo{fv}); !errors.Is(err, errTierStillReferenced) {
+		t.Fatalf("cleanup with a live remote owner: %v", err)
+	}
+	if n, err := f.z.countAbsentMigrationVersions(t.Context(), f.bucket, key, 0, []FileInfo{fv}); err != nil || n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("retained free record reported progress: removed=%d err=%v", n, err)
+	}
+	if slices.Contains(f.tier.removed, tuple.Object) {
+		t.Fatal("cleanup deleted a live remote object")
+	}
+	if err := f.z.checkAfterDecomBucket(t.Context(), 0, decomBucketInfo{Name: f.bucket}); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("retained free record must block final decommission verification")
+	}
+}

cmd/erasure-server-pool-migration.go

@@ -17,7 +17,147 @@
 
 package cmd
 
-import xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/sync/errgroup"
+)
+
+func migrationVersionKey(versionID string) string {
+	if versionID == "" || versionID == nullVersionID {
+		return nullVersionID
+	}
+	return versionID
+}
+
+// migrationReadQuorum requires enough online drives to intersect every
+// committed write quorum. All of those drives must be checked: a minority
+// remnant still prevents progress. Unknown set geometry tolerates no outages.
+func (er erasureObjects) migrationReadQuorum(diskCount int) int {
+	if er.setDriveCount <= 0 || er.setDriveCount != diskCount || er.defaultParityCount < 0 || er.defaultParityCount > er.setDriveCount/2 {
+		return diskCount
+	}
+	return er.defaultRQuorum()
+}
+
+// countAbsentMigrationVersions counts snapshot versions that no online source drive
+// holds anymore, including free versions. A pool-level NotFound is insufficient:
+// the ordinary read path can return it for inconsistent metadata. Only readable
+// per-drive metadata (or physical absence) proves progress for another walk.
+// The caller holds the object's writer lock while checking the source.
+func (er erasureObjects) countAbsentMigrationVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, versions []FileInfo) (int, error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	if len(versions) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	absent := make(map[string]struct{}, len(versions))
+	for _, version := range versions {
+		absent[migrationVersionKey(version.VersionID)] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	disks := er.getDisks()
+	if len(disks) == 0 {
+		return 0, toObjectErr(errErasureReadQuorum, bucket, object)
+	}
+	readQuorum := er.migrationReadQuorum(len(disks))
+	offline := make([]bool, len(disks))
+	stored := make([][]FileInfo, len(disks))
+	g := errgroup.WithNErrs(len(disks))
+	for i := range disks {
+		g.Go(func() error {
+			if disks[i] == nil {
+				offline[i] = true
+				return nil
+			}
+			raw, err := disks[i].ReadXL(ctx, bucket, object, false)
+			if errors.Is(err, errDiskNotFound) {
+				offline[i] = true
+				return nil
+			}
+			if errors.Is(err, errFileNotFound) {
+				// ReadXL also returns NotFound for an empty xl.meta, and may
+				// ignore legacy metadata. Confirm physical absence before using
+				// that result as progress. This does not descend into child keys.
+				// Both reads run in parallel across drives, once per object.
+				entries, err := disks[i].ListDir(ctx, "", bucket, object, -1)
+				if errors.Is(err, errDiskNotFound) {
+					offline[i] = true
+					return nil
+				}
+				if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errFileNotFound) && !errors.Is(err, errVolumeNotFound) {
+					return err
+				}
+				for _, entry := range entries {
+					if entry == xlStorageFormatFile || entry == xlStorageFormatFileV1 {
+						return errFileCorrupt
+					}
+				}
+				return nil
+			}
+			if errors.Is(err, errVolumeNotFound) {
+				return nil
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			// allParts=false omits part details, not free versions. Decode every
+			// version before concluding absence, so corrupt metadata fails closed.
+			fivs, err := getAllFileInfoVersions(raw.Buf, bucket, object, false)
+			stored[i] = fivs.Versions
+			return err
+		}, i)
+	}
+	errs := g.Wait()
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	for i, err := range errs {
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, toObjectErr(err, bucket, object)
+		}
+		for _, version := range stored[i] {
+			delete(absent, migrationVersionKey(version.VersionID))
+		}
+	}
+	offlineCount := 0
+	for _, unavailable := range offline {
+		if unavailable {
+			offlineCount++
+		}
+	}
+	if len(disks)-offlineCount < readQuorum {
+		return 0, toObjectErr(errErasureReadQuorum, bucket, object)
+	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return len(absent), nil
+}
+
+// countAbsentMigrationVersions checks ignored walk entries without authorizing
+// their deletion. A concurrent client delete may have uncovered child keys.
+func (z *erasureServerPools) countAbsentMigrationVersions(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, source int, versions []FileInfo) (int, error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	if len(versions) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	object = encodeDirObject(object)
+	lk := z.NewNSLock(bucket, object)
+	lkctx, err := lk.GetLock(ctx, globalOperationTimeout)
+	if err != nil {
+		if ctx.Err() != nil {
+			return 0, ctx.Err()
+		}
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	defer lk.Unlock(lkctx)
+	return z.serverPools[source].getHashedSet(object).countAbsentMigrationVersions(lkctx.Context(), bucket, object, versions)
+}
 
 // migrationObjectMetadata restores tags removed from the read representation.
 // Keep the original revision, including ordered empty states, for the existing

cmd/erasure-server-pool-multipart-lock-order_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+)
+
+type copyPartSourceContextKey struct{}
+
+// Pause the HTTP copy after the real reader has acquired its source lock.
+// IAM and other background readers do not carry the request's context key.
+type copyPartSourceGate struct {
+	ObjectLayer
+	opened, release chan struct{}
+}
+
+func (a *copyPartSourceGate) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, rs *HTTPRangeSpec, h http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
+	gr, err := a.ObjectLayer.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, object, rs, h, opts)
+	if err != nil || ctx.Value(copyPartSourceContextKey{}) != true {
+		return gr, err
+	}
+	close(a.opened)
+	select {
+	case <-a.release:
+		return gr, nil
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		gr.Close()
+		return nil, ctx.Err()
+	}
+}
+
+func copyPartLockRefs(l *localLockInstance) int32 {
+	l.ns.lockMapMutex.Lock()
+	defer l.ns.lockMapMutex.Unlock()
+	if lock := l.ns.lockMap[pathJoin(l.volume, l.paths[0])]; lock != nil {
+		return lock.ref
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+// A copy from the upload's own key holds object RLock before asking for the
+// upload RLock. Complete must wait for that reader without holding upload
+// Lock, on both single- and multi-pool backends. Cancellation of either
+// request must release its locks and let the other request finish.
+func TestUploadPartCopyConcurrentComplete(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
+		for _, action := range []string{"complete", "cancel-copy", "cancel-complete"} {
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d/%s", pools, action), func(t *testing.T) {
+				z, _ := bulkDeletePools(t, pools)
+				ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 15*time.Second)
+				var workers sync.WaitGroup
+				defer func() { cancel(); workers.Wait() }()
+				api := &copyPartSourceGate{ObjectLayer: z, opened: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
+				bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(ctx, api, nil, MakeBucketOptions{})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				setObjectLayer(api)
+				const key = "copy-part-self"
+				data := bytes.Repeat([]byte("existing source bytes"), 32768)
+				oi, err := z.PutObject(ctx, bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				if oi.Inlined {
+					t.Fatal("the source must retain its read lock until its reader closes")
+				}
+				upload, err := z.NewMultipartUpload(ctx, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				first := []byte("the completed part")
+				part, err := z.PutObjectPart(ctx, bucket, key, upload.UploadID, 1, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(first), int64(len(first)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+
+				objectLock := z.NewObjectNSLock(bucket, key).(*localLockInstance)
+				uploadLock := z.uploadIDNSLock(bucket, key, upload.UploadID).(*localLockInstance)
+				copyCtx, cancelCopy := context.WithCancel(context.WithValue(ctx, copyPartSourceContextKey{}, true))
+				defer cancelCopy()
+				req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPut, getPutObjectPartURL("", bucket, key, upload.UploadID, "2"), 0, nil, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, map[string]string{xhttp.AmzCopySource: "/" + bucket + "/" + key})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				copyDone := make(chan *httptest.ResponseRecorder, 1)
+				workers.Go(func() {
+					rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+					router.ServeHTTP(rec, req.WithContext(copyCtx))
+					copyDone <- rec
+				})
+				select {
+				case <-api.opened:
+				case <-ctx.Done():
+					t.Fatal("COPY did not open its source")
+				}
+				if refs := copyPartLockRefs(objectLock); refs != 1 {
+					t.Fatalf("COPY object lock references = %d, want 1", refs)
+				}
+
+				completeCtx, cancelComplete := context.WithCancel(ctx)
+				defer cancelComplete()
+				completeDone := make(chan error, 1)
+				workers.Go(func() {
+					_, err := z.CompleteMultipartUpload(completeCtx, bucket, key, upload.UploadID, []CompletePart{{PartNumber: 1, ETag: part.ETag}}, ObjectOptions{})
+					completeDone <- err
+				})
+				// One reference belongs to COPY, the second to Complete waiting
+				// for it. Check the actual lock resources, not elapsed time.
+				ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Millisecond)
+				defer ticker.Stop()
+				for copyPartLockRefs(objectLock) != 2 {
+					select {
+					case err := <-completeDone:
+						t.Fatalf("Complete exited before waiting for COPY: %v", err)
+					case <-ctx.Done():
+						t.Fatal("Complete did not wait for the source object lock")
+					case <-ticker.C:
+					}
+				}
+				if refs := copyPartLockRefs(uploadLock); refs != 0 {
+					t.Fatalf("Complete holds the upload lock while waiting for COPY's object lock: refs=%d", refs)
+				}
+
+				if action == "cancel-complete" {
+					cancelComplete()
+					select {
+					case err := <-completeDone:
+						if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
+							t.Fatalf("canceled Complete: %v", err)
+						}
+					case <-ctx.Done():
+						t.Fatal("Complete did not cancel while COPY held the source")
+					}
+				}
+				if action == "cancel-copy" {
+					cancelCopy()
+				} else {
+					close(api.release)
+				}
+				select {
+				case rec := <-copyDone:
+					want := http.StatusOK
+					if action == "cancel-copy" {
+						want = 499
+					}
+					if rec.Code != want {
+						t.Fatalf("COPY: %d, want %d: %s", rec.Code, want, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+				case <-ctx.Done():
+					t.Fatal("COPY did not finish")
+				}
+				if action != "cancel-complete" {
+					select {
+					case err := <-completeDone:
+						if err != nil {
+							t.Fatalf("Complete after source release: %v", err)
+						}
+					case <-ctx.Done():
+						t.Fatal("Complete did not finish after source release")
+					}
+				}
+				if copyPartLockRefs(objectLock) != 0 || copyPartLockRefs(uploadLock) != 0 {
+					t.Fatal("request left an object or upload lock behind")
+				}
+				wantBody := string(first)
+				if action == "cancel-complete" {
+					wantBody = string(data)
+					if _, err := z.GetMultipartInfo(ctx, bucket, key, upload.UploadID, ObjectOptions{}); err != nil {
+						t.Fatalf("canceled completion lost the upload: %v", err)
+					}
+				}
+				if body := bulkDeleteBody(t, z, bucket, key, ""); body != wantBody {
+					t.Fatalf("object body length = %d, want %d", len(body), len(wantBody))
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/erasure-server-pool-put-conditional_test.go

@@ -590,9 +590,9 @@ func TestSinglePoolConditionalPutHTTP(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// An internal replica callback without an addressed version is not a public
+// Replica overwrites must establish protection across every pool, including
-// condition. Preserve its availability when another pool is unreadable. An
+// the null version of an unversioned request. An unreadable pool may hold a
-// addressed replica already requires all pools for lock/tag reconciliation.
+// protected copy, so neither addressed nor unaddressed writes may replace it.
 func TestPoolsConditionalPutReplicaAvailability(t *testing.T) {
 	for _, addressed := range []bool{false, true} {
 		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("addressed=%t", addressed), func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -615,10 +615,9 @@ func TestPoolsConditionalPutReplicaAvailability(t *testing.T) {
 				xhttp.MinIOSourceETag:               fmt.Sprintf("%x", md5.Sum([]byte("replacement"))),
 			}
 			url := getPutObjectURL("", bucket, object)
-			wantStatus, wantBody := http.StatusOK, "replacement"
+			wantStatus, wantBody := http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "old"
 			if addressed {
 				url += "?versionId=" + oi.VersionID
-				wantStatus, wantBody = http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "old"
 			}
 			put := multipartConditionRequest(t, router, http.MethodPut, url, "replacement", headers)
 			if put.Code != wantStatus {

cmd/erasure-server-pool-rebalance.go

@@ -376,6 +376,9 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) IsPoolRebalancing(poolIndex int) bool {
 }
 
 func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBuckets(ctx context.Context, poolIdx int) (err error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	doneCh := make(chan error, 1)
 	defer xioutil.SafeClose(doneCh)
 
@@ -450,7 +453,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBuckets(ctx context.Context, poolIdx int)
 		select {
 		case <-ctx.Done():
 			doneCh <- ctx.Err()
-			return err
+			return ctx.Err()
 		default:
 		}
 
@@ -474,6 +477,10 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBuckets(ctx context.Context, poolIdx int)
 		z.bucketRebalanceDone(bucket, poolIdx)
 	}
 
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		doneCh <- err
+		return err
+	}
 	rebalanceLogEvent(GlobalContext, "Pool %d rebalancing is done", poolIdx+1)
 
 	return err
@@ -538,6 +545,9 @@ func (set *erasureObjects) listObjectsToRebalance(ctx context.Context, bucketNam
 
 // rebalanceBucket rebalances objects under bucket in poolIdx pool
 func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket string, poolIdx int) (err error) {
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
 	ctx = logger.SetReqInfo(ctx, &logger.ReqInfo{})
 
 	var vc *versioning.Versioning
@@ -643,7 +653,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket string,
 			// to create the appropriate stack.
 			versionsSorter(fivs.Versions).reverse()
 
-			var rebalanced int
+			var candidates []FileInfo
 			var expired []migrationExpiredVersion
 			// The key's history in all pools, read once for its versions.
 			var history migrationHistory
@@ -658,12 +668,8 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket string,
 
 				// Apply lifecycle rules on the objects that are expired.
 				if action := filterLifecycle(bucket, version.Name, version, &history); action.Delete() {
-					// Count the version, or the source copies of the moved
-					// ones stay behind as duplicates. Its own source copy
-					// goes with them when ILM deletes it alone; any other
-					// version stays until the expiry has run.
-					rebalanced++
 					if ilmDeletesVersionOnly(action) || action.DeleteAll() {
+						candidates = append(candidates, version)
 						expired = append(expired, migrationExpiredVersion{
 							version:            version,
 							event:              lifecycle.Event{Action: action},
@@ -706,7 +712,6 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket string,
 						// This can happen when rebalance stop races with ongoing rebalance workers.
 						// These rebalance failures can be ignored.
 						if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isDataMovementOverWriteErr(err) {
-							ignore = true
 							stopFn(0, nil)
 							continue
 						}
@@ -716,7 +721,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket string,
 					failure = err != nil
 					if !failure {
 						z.updatePoolStats(poolIdx, bucket, version)
-						rebalanced++
+						candidates = append(candidates, version)
 					}
 					auditLogRebalance(ctx, "Rebalance:DeleteMarker", bucket, version.Name, versionID, err)
 					continue
@@ -773,13 +778,14 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket string,
 					break // break out on first error
 				}
 				z.updatePoolStats(poolIdx, bucket, version)
-				rebalanced++
+				candidates = append(candidates, version)
 			}
 
-			// if all versions were rebalanced, we can delete the object versions.
+			// A skipped or failed sibling does not prevent retiring successful
-			if rebalanced == len(fivs.Versions) {
+			// moves. Cleanup still rechecks each candidate and its destination.
+			if len(candidates) > 0 {
 				stopFn := globalRebalanceMetrics.log(rebalanceMetricRebalanceRemoveObject, poolIdx, bucket, entry.name)
-				err := z.removeMovedVersions(ctx, bucket, entry.name, poolIdx, fivs.Versions, expired)
+				_, err := z.removeMovedVersions(ctx, bucket, entry.name, poolIdx, candidates, expired)
 				stopFn(0, err)
 				auditLogRebalance(ctx, "Rebalance:DeleteObject", bucket, entry.name, "", err)
 				if err != nil {
@@ -806,7 +812,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) rebalanceBucket(ctx context.Context, bucket string,
 	}
 
 	wk.Wait()
-	return nil
+	return ctx.Err()
 }
 
 type rebalSaveOpts uint8

cmd/erasure-server-pool.go

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import (
 	"math/rand"
 	"net/http"
 	"path"
+	"slices"
 	"sort"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -1194,6 +1195,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) PutObject(ctx context.Context, bucket string, objec
 	if opts.replicaObjectInfo == nil && (opts.ReplicaLockReconcile || !opts.ReplicationRequest) {
 		opts.replicaObjectInfo = z.replicaObjectInfo
 	}
+	opts.replicaContentGuard = z.guardReplicaContent
 	oi, err := z.serverPools[idx].PutObject(ctx, bucket, object, data, opts)
 	if err == nil && opts.ReplicaLockReconcile && !opts.DataMovement {
 		err = z.retireReplicaCopies(ctx, bucket, object, idx, oi)
@@ -1318,7 +1320,9 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket string, ob
 	approvedExpiry := opts.Expiration.Expire && opts.Expiration.CheckedAllPools && !opts.Transition.ExpireRestored
 	reconcileVersion := opts.VersionID != "" && !opts.DataMovement &&
 		(!opts.ReplicationRequest || opts.isVersionPurge()) && (!opts.Expiration.Expire || approvedExpiry) && !opts.InclFreeVersions
-	if !z.SinglePool() && (opts.CheckPrecondFn != nil || reconcileVersion) {
+	reconcileUnaddressedLock := opts.VersionID == "" && !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker &&
+		opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite && !opts.DataMovement && !opts.ReplicationRequest && !opts.Expiration.Expire && !opts.InclFreeVersions
+	if !z.SinglePool() && (opts.CheckPrecondFn != nil || reconcileVersion || reconcileUnaddressedLock) {
 		return z.deleteObjectReconciled(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
 	}
 
@@ -1543,6 +1547,27 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) DeleteObjects(ctx context.Context, bucket string, o
 		objSets.Add(objects[i].ObjectName)
 	}
 
+	// A name that fails the check keeps its error and goes no further. Joined
+	// to the bucket it can name a path in another bucket or in the meta
+	// bucket, so it is not locked, looked up or sent to a drive. The other
+	// names are deleted as a request of their own: everything below sees only
+	// names that passed.
+	if slices.ContainsFunc(derrs, func(err error) bool { return err != nil }) {
+		valid, at := make([]ObjectToDelete, 0, len(objects)), make([]int, 0, len(objects))
+		for i, obj := range objects {
+			if derrs[i] == nil {
+				valid, at = append(valid, obj), append(at, i)
+			}
+		}
+		if len(valid) > 0 {
+			deleted, errs := z.DeleteObjects(ctx, bucket, valid, opts)
+			for j, i := range at {
+				dobjects[i], derrs[i] = deleted[j], errs[j]
+			}
+		}
+		return dobjects, derrs
+	}
+
 	// A single pool locks each name in the set its writers lock it in, one
 	// set at a time. A single node keeps one lock table for all sets, so it
 	// keeps the one bulk lock below: its local lock takes the names one by
@@ -1666,6 +1691,51 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) DeleteObjects(ctx context.Context, bucket string, o
 	return dobjects, derrs
 }
 
+// copyObjectPlan fixes placement before a caller prepares encrypted or compressed
+// bytes. A reference can only be made in the pool holding the source version.
+type copyObjectPlan struct {
+	poolIdx int
+	rewrite bool
+}
+
+// prepareCopyObject requires the same source/destination locks as CopyObject.
+// In-place changes address the exact version; new versions retain the normal
+// write placement and rewrite the data when it lives in a different pool.
+func (z *erasureServerPools) prepareCopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject string, srcInfo ObjectInfo, srcOpts, dstOpts ObjectOptions) (copyObjectPlan, error) {
+	if err := checkCopyObjArgs(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject); err != nil {
+		return copyObjectPlan{}, err
+	}
+	srcObject, dstObject = encodeDirObject(srcObject), encodeDirObject(dstObject)
+	sameObject := isStringEqual(pathJoin(srcBucket, srcObject), pathJoin(dstBucket, dstObject))
+	reference := sameObject && !copyRewritesObjectData(srcInfo.metadataOnly && !srcInfo.Legacy, srcOpts, dstOpts)
+	inPlace := reference && (dstOpts.VersionID != "" && srcOpts.VersionID == dstOpts.VersionID || !dstOpts.Versioned && srcOpts.VersionID == "")
+	if inPlace {
+		// Metadata must stay with the authoritative source bytes, including
+		// when that pool is draining. Write allocation could select a stale
+		// duplicate and later retire the only current copy.
+		sourceOpts := srcOpts
+		sourceOpts.NoLock = true
+		sourceOpts.Transition = dstOpts.Transition
+		_, idx, err := z.getLatestObjectInfoWithIdx(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, sourceOpts)
+		return copyObjectPlan{poolIdx: idx}, err
+	}
+	idx, err := z.getPoolIdxNoLock(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo.Size)
+	if err != nil {
+		return copyObjectPlan{}, err
+	}
+	plan := copyObjectPlan{poolIdx: idx}
+	if reference && !z.SinglePool() {
+		sourceOpts := srcOpts
+		sourceOpts.NoLock = true
+		_, sourcePool, err := z.getLatestObjectInfoWithIdx(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, sourceOpts)
+		if err != nil {
+			return copyObjectPlan{}, err
+		}
+		plan.rewrite = sourcePool != idx
+	}
+	return plan, nil
+}
+
 func (z *erasureServerPools) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject string, srcInfo ObjectInfo, srcOpts, dstOpts ObjectOptions) (objInfo ObjectInfo, err error) {
 	if err := checkCopyObjArgs(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject); err != nil {
 		return ObjectInfo{}, err
@@ -1692,6 +1762,15 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObjec
 		dstOpts.NoLock = true
 	}
 
+	if dstOpts.copyPlan == nil {
+		plan, err := z.prepareCopyObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo, srcOpts, dstOpts)
+		if err != nil {
+			return ObjectInfo{}, err
+		}
+		dstOpts.copyPlan = &plan
+	}
+	poolIdx := dstOpts.copyPlan.poolIdx
+
 	if !z.SinglePool() && cpSrcDstSame && srcInfo.metadataOnly && dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile && srcOpts.VersionID == dstOpts.VersionID {
 		copies, err := z.metadataPoolInfos(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, dstOpts)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -1700,7 +1779,8 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObjec
 		stored := mergedPoolObjectInfo(copies)
 		reconcileStoredObjectLock(srcInfo.UserDefined, storedObjectLockState(stored.UserDefined))
 		reconcileStoredObjectTags(srcInfo.UserDefined, stored.UserTags, stored.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp])
-		idx := copies[0].Index
+		dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo = z.replicaObjectInfo
+		idx := poolIdx
 		oi, err := z.serverPools[idx].CopyObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo, srcOpts, dstOpts)
 		if err == nil {
 			err = z.retireReplicaCopies(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, idx, oi)
@@ -1708,25 +1788,9 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObjec
 		return oi, err
 	}
 
-	var poolIdx int
+	if !z.SinglePool() {
-	if dstOpts.MetadataChg && cpSrcDstSame && srcInfo.metadataOnly && srcOpts.VersionID == dstOpts.VersionID {
+		dstOpts.replicaContentGuard = z.guardReplicaContent
-		// Restore status updates address an existing version. Keep ordinary
-		// copy/write allocation unchanged, including its latest-version lookup.
-		poolIdx, err = z.getPoolIdxExistingWithOpts(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, ObjectOptions{
-			VersionID:          dstOpts.VersionID,
-			MetadataChg:        true,
-			NoLock:             true,
-			Transition:         dstOpts.Transition,
-			SkipDecommissioned: true,
-			SkipRebalancing:    true,
-		})
-	} else {
-		poolIdx, err = z.getPoolIdxNoLock(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo.Size)
 	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return objInfo, err
-	}
-
 	if !z.SinglePool() && (dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile || !dstOpts.ReplicationRequest) {
 		dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo = z.replicaObjectInfo
 		if dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile && !dstOpts.DataMovement {
@@ -1738,9 +1802,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObjec
 		}
 	}
 
-	// CopyObjectHandler predicts the outcome of this decision in
+	if cpSrcDstSame && !copyRewritesObjectData(srcInfo.metadataOnly && !srcInfo.Legacy, srcOpts, dstOpts) {
-	// copyRewritesObjectData(); keep the two in sync.
-	if cpSrcDstSame && srcInfo.metadataOnly {
 		// Version ID is set for the destination and source == destination version ID.
 		if dstOpts.VersionID != "" && srcOpts.VersionID == dstOpts.VersionID {
 			return z.serverPools[poolIdx].CopyObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo, srcOpts, dstOpts)
@@ -1762,6 +1824,10 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObjec
 		}
 	}
 
+	if srcInfo.PutObjReader == nil {
+		return ObjectInfo{}, errInvalidArgument
+	}
+
 	putOpts := ObjectOptions{
 		ServerSideEncryption:       dstOpts.ServerSideEncryption,
 		UserDefined:                srcInfo.UserDefined,
@@ -1771,12 +1837,15 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObjec
 		MTime:                      dstOpts.MTime,
 		NoLock:                     true,
 		EncryptFn:                  dstOpts.EncryptFn,
+		IndexCB:                    dstOpts.IndexCB,
 		WantChecksum:               dstOpts.WantChecksum,
 		WantServerSideChecksumType: dstOpts.WantServerSideChecksumType,
+		PreserveETag:               dstOpts.PreserveETag,
 		ReplicationRequest:         dstOpts.ReplicationRequest,
 		ReplicaLockReconcile:       dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile,
 		DataMovement:               dstOpts.DataMovement,
 		replicaObjectInfo:          dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo,
+		replicaContentGuard:        dstOpts.replicaContentGuard,
 	}
 
 	return z.serverPools[poolIdx].PutObject(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo.PutObjReader, putOpts)
@@ -2437,10 +2506,9 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CompleteMultipartUpload(ctx context.Context, bucket
 		}
 	}()
 
-	// Several pools take the object lock first, then the upload lock below.
+	// Take the object lock before the upload lock for every pool count.
-	// A single pool takes the upload lock here and the set takes the object
+	// UploadPartCopy holds its source read lock while it reads upload
-	// lock, in the object's own erasure set, only right before it commits.
+	// metadata, including when the source and destination are the same key.
-	if !z.SinglePool() {
 	if !opts.NoLock {
 		lk := z.NewObjectNSLock(bucket, encodeDirObject(object))
 		lkctx, err := lk.GetLock(ctx, globalOperationTimeout)
@@ -2452,6 +2520,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CompleteMultipartUpload(ctx context.Context, bucket
 	}
 	opts.NoLock = true
 
+	if !z.SinglePool() {
 		// A conditional completion must be evaluated against the logical
 		// latest object across pools, under the object write lock held for
 		// this operation. The pool hosting the upload may only hold a stale
@@ -2502,6 +2571,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) CompleteMultipartUpload(ctx context.Context, bucket
 		opts.replicaObjectInfo = z.replicaObjectInfo
 	}
 
+	opts.replicaContentGuard = z.guardReplicaContent
 	for idx, pool := range z.serverPools {
 		if z.IsSuspended(idx) {
 			continue
@@ -3345,7 +3415,7 @@ func (z *erasureServerPools) PutObjectTags(ctx context.Context, bucket, object s
 	// revision beyond all copies, so the returned value and every pool agree.
 	if stamp := opts.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp]; stamp != "" {
 		for _, copy := range copies {
-			stamp = monotonicTaggingTimestamp(stamp, copy.ObjInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp])
+			stamp = monotonicMetadataTimestamp(stamp, copy.ObjInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp])
 		}
 		opts.UserDefined = cloneMSS(opts.UserDefined)
 		opts.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = stamp

cmd/erasure-sets.go

@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ func (s *erasureSets) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, dstB
 	// Check if this request is only metadata update.
 	// CopyObjectHandler predicts the outcome of this decision in
 	// copyRewritesObjectData(); keep the two in sync.
-	if cpSrcDstSame && srcInfo.metadataOnly {
+	if cpSrcDstSame && srcInfo.metadataOnly && !srcInfo.Legacy {
 		// Version ID is set for the destination and source == destination version ID.
 		// perform an in-place update.
 		if dstOpts.VersionID != "" && srcOpts.VersionID == dstOpts.VersionID {
@@ -868,6 +868,10 @@ func (s *erasureSets) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, dstB
 		}
 	}
 
+	if srcInfo.PutObjReader == nil {
+		return ObjectInfo{}, errInvalidArgument
+	}
+
 	putOpts := ObjectOptions{
 		ServerSideEncryption:       dstOpts.ServerSideEncryption,
 		UserDefined:                srcInfo.UserDefined,
@@ -879,10 +883,12 @@ func (s *erasureSets) CopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, dstB
 		EncryptFn:                  dstOpts.EncryptFn,
 		WantChecksum:               dstOpts.WantChecksum,
 		WantServerSideChecksumType: dstOpts.WantServerSideChecksumType,
+		PreserveETag:               dstOpts.PreserveETag,
 		ReplicationRequest:         dstOpts.ReplicationRequest,
 		ReplicaLockReconcile:       dstOpts.ReplicaLockReconcile,
 		DataMovement:               dstOpts.DataMovement,
 		replicaObjectInfo:          dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo,
+		replicaContentGuard:        dstOpts.replicaContentGuard,
 	}
 
 	return dstSet.putObject(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo.PutObjReader, putOpts)

cmd/iam-import-state_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+func iamImportArchive(t *testing.T, assets map[string]any) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	zw := zip.NewWriter(&buf)
+	for name, value := range assets {
+		w, err := zw.Create(pathJoin(iamAssetsDir, name))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		mustIAM(t, json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(value))
+	}
+	mustIAM(t, zw.Close())
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+func iamImportCall(t *testing.T, data []byte) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPut, "http://localhost/minio/admin/v3/import-iam-v2", int64(len(data)), bytes.NewReader(data), globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, nil)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	mustIAM(t, req.ParseForm())
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	adminAPIHandlers{}.ImportIAMV2(rec, req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "ImportIAM")))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("import-iam-v2: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+	return rec
+}
+
+func TestIAMImportExportState(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, target := range []string{"fresh", "existing"} {
+		t.Run(target, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "import-parent", "")
+			for _, status := range []string{statusDisabled, statusEnabled} {
+				group := "import-" + status
+				_, err := sys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, group, []string{parent.AccessKey})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				_, err = sys.SetGroupStatus(ctx, group, status == statusEnabled)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			_, err := sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, "import-disabled", "readwrite", regUser, true)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(svcAccEditPolicy))
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Truncate(time.Second)
+			_, _, err = sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+				accessKey: "import-service", secretKey: "import-service-secret", status: auth.AccountOff,
+				sessionPolicy: sp, expiration: &expires, name: "disabled service", claims: map[string]any{"identity-attribute": "preserved"},
+			})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			exported := iamAdminCall(t, globalActiveCred, http.MethodGet, "/minio/admin/v3/export-iam", nil, nil, adminAPIHandlers{}.ExportIAM)
+			if exported.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Fatalf("export-iam: %d %s", exported.Code, exported.Body.String())
+			}
+			if target == "fresh" {
+				ctx, sys = iamAdminFixture(t)
+			} else {
+				// Import must also replace an existing enabled account/group and
+				// restore an enabled group that is disabled on the target.
+				_, err = sys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, "import-service", updateServiceAccountOpts{status: auth.AccountOn})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				_, err = sys.SetGroupStatus(ctx, "import-disabled", true)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				_, err = sys.SetGroupStatus(ctx, "import-enabled", false)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			rec := iamImportCall(t, exported.Body.Bytes())
+			var result madmin.ImportIAMResult
+			mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+			if len(result.Failed.Groups) != 0 || len(result.Failed.ServiceAccounts) != 0 || len(result.Added.ServiceAccounts) != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("import did not restore the exported entities: %s", rec.Body.String())
+			}
+			mustIAM(t, sys.store.LoadIAMCache(ctx, false))
+			for _, status := range []string{statusDisabled, statusEnabled} {
+				group, err := sys.GetGroupDescription("import-" + status)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if group.Status != status || len(group.Members) != 1 || group.Members[0] != parent.AccessKey {
+					t.Fatalf("group status or members changed: %+v", group)
+				}
+			}
+			if sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: parent.AccessKey, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: "edit", ObjectName: "object"}) {
+				t.Error("the disabled imported group grants access")
+			}
+			cr, gotPolicy, err := sys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, "import-service")
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			if cr.Status != auth.AccountOff || !cr.Expiration.Equal(expires) || cr.Name != "disabled service" || gotPolicy == nil || !gotPolicy.Equals(*sp) {
+				t.Fatal("import changed the service account status, expiration, name or inline policy")
+			}
+			if _, valid, err := sys.CheckKey(ctx, "import-service"); err != nil || valid {
+				t.Fatalf("imported disabled credential is usable: valid=%v err=%v", valid, err)
+			}
+			var stored UserIdentity
+			mustIAM(t, sys.store.loadIAMConfig(ctx, &stored, getUserIdentityPath("import-service", svcUser)))
+			raw, err := auth.ExtractClaims(stored.Credentials.SessionToken, stored.Credentials.SecretKey)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			if _, ok := raw.Map()[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok || raw.Map()["identity-attribute"] != "preserved" {
+				t.Fatal("import polluted the raw JWT or lost identity claims")
+			}
+			// Old exports may contain a derived claim and omit the policy version.
+			snapshot, err := serviceAccountSnapshot(stored)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			snapshot.Claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted] = "stale decoded policy"
+			snapshot.SessionPolicy = []byte(strings.ReplaceAll(svcAccEditPolicy, `"Version":"2012-10-17",`, ""))
+			rec = iamImportCall(t, iamImportArchive(t, map[string]any{allSvcAcctsFile: map[string]madmin.SRSvcAccCreate{"import-service": snapshot}}))
+			mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+			if len(result.Failed.ServiceAccounts) != 0 {
+				t.Fatalf("legacy snapshot import failed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+			}
+			_, gotPolicy, err = sys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, "import-service")
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			if gotPolicy == nil || !gotPolicy.Equals(*sp) {
+				t.Fatal("import did not normalize the inline policy")
+			}
+			mustIAM(t, sys.store.loadIAMConfig(ctx, &stored, getUserIdentityPath("import-service", svcUser)))
+			raw, err = auth.ExtractClaims(stored.Credentials.SessionToken, stored.Credentials.SecretKey)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			if _, ok := raw.Map()[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
+				t.Fatal("legacy import signed a derived claim into the JWT")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+type iamImportGroupFailureStore struct {
+	IAMStorageAPI
+	statusOnly bool
+	err        error
+}
+
+func (s *iamImportGroupFailureStore) saveIAMConfig(ctx context.Context, item any, path string, opts ...options) error {
+	mutation, _ := ctx.Value(iamGroupMutationKey{}).(iamGroupMutation)
+	if path == getGroupInfoPath("import-failure") && mutation.StatusOnly == s.statusOnly {
+		return s.err
+	}
+	return s.IAMStorageAPI.saveIAMConfig(ctx, item, path, opts...)
+}
+
+func TestIAMImportGroupFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, operation := range []string{"members", "status"} {
+		t.Run(operation, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			injected := madmin.ErrorResponse{Code: "InjectedGroupWrite", Message: operation + " write failed"}
+			sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = &iamImportGroupFailureStore{IAMStorageAPI: sys.store.IAMStorageAPI, statusOnly: operation == "status", err: injected}
+			rec := iamImportCall(t, iamImportArchive(t, map[string]any{allGroupsFile: map[string]GroupInfo{
+				"import-failure": {Status: statusDisabled},
+			}}))
+			var result struct {
+				Added  madmin.IAMEntities `json:"added"`
+				Failed struct {
+					Groups []struct {
+						Name  string          `json:"name"`
+						Error json.RawMessage `json:"error"`
+					} `json:"groups"`
+				} `json:"failed"`
+			}
+			mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+			wantError, err := json.Marshal(injected)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			if len(result.Added.Groups) != 0 || len(result.Failed.Groups) != 1 || result.Failed.Groups[0].Name != "import-failure" || !bytes.Equal(result.Failed.Groups[0].Error, wantError) {
+				t.Fatalf("import did not report the actual %s error: %s", operation, rec.Body.String())
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/iam-ldap-group-refresh_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// The LDAP group refresh computes groups from a snapshot of a server's cache
+// taken before a slow directory lookup, then writes them. These tests take
+// such a snapshot, change the credential the way an administrator would on
+// this or another server, and run the write: it must change only the
+// groups of what is stored now, and never undo the change.
+
+type groupRefreshFixture struct {
+	ctx    context.Context
+	sys    *IAMSys
+	obj    ObjectLayer
+	parent auth.Credentials
+}
+
+func newGroupRefreshFixture(t *testing.T) *groupRefreshFixture {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx, sys, obj := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+	batchAuthzPolicy(ctx, t, sys, "refresh-parent", batchAuthzFullAccess)
+	parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "refresh-parent", "refresh-parent")
+	return &groupRefreshFixture{ctx: ctx, sys: sys, obj: obj, parent: parent}
+}
+
+// service creates a service account of the fixture's parent and returns
+// its stored credential, the snapshot a refresh would take.
+func (f *groupRefreshFixture) service(t *testing.T, accessKey string) auth.Credentials {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, f.parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: accessKey, secretKey: "refresh-original-secret"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	u, ok := f.sys.store.GetUser(accessKey)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("service account missing")
+	}
+	return u.Credentials
+}
+
+// sibling is another server: the same storage, its own cache.
+func (f *groupRefreshFixture) sibling(t *testing.T) *IAMStoreSys {
+	t.Helper()
+	s := &IAMStoreSys{IAMStorageAPI: newIAMObjectStore(f.obj, f.sys.usersSysType)}
+	mustIAM(t, s.LoadIAMCache(f.ctx, false))
+	return s
+}
+
+// stored is the record as a server that starts now loads it.
+func (f *groupRefreshFixture) stored(t *testing.T, accessKey string) (UserIdentity, bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+	return f.sibling(t).GetUser(accessKey)
+}
+
+func TestIAMGroupRefreshKeepsRotation(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "refresh-rotate")
+	_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{secretKey: "refresh-rotated-secret", description: "rotated"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+
+	wrote, err := f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, snapshot, []string{"g1"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if !wrote {
+		t.Fatal("a refresh of a live credential must write its new groups")
+	}
+	check := func(where string, u UserIdentity, ok bool) {
+		t.Helper()
+		switch {
+		case !ok:
+			t.Fatalf("%s: credential missing", where)
+		case u.Credentials.SecretKey != "refresh-rotated-secret":
+			t.Errorf("%s: the refresh undid the rotation", where)
+		case u.Credentials.Description != "rotated":
+			t.Errorf("%s: the refresh undid an edit", where)
+		case !slices.Equal(u.Credentials.Groups, []string{"g1"}):
+			t.Errorf("%s: groups %v, want [g1]", where, u.Credentials.Groups)
+		}
+	}
+	u, ok := f.sys.store.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey)
+	check("cache", u, ok)
+	u, ok = f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+	check("storage", u, ok)
+	if _, valid, _ := f.sys.CheckKey(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey); !valid {
+		t.Error("the rotated credential must stay valid")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMGroupRefreshKeepsDeletion(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "refresh-delete")
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+
+	wrote, err := f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, snapshot, []string{"g1"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if wrote {
+		t.Error("a refresh wrote a deleted credential")
+	}
+	if _, ok := f.sys.store.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); ok {
+		t.Error("a refresh brought a deleted credential back into the cache")
+	}
+	if _, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey); ok {
+		t.Error("a refresh brought a deleted credential back in storage")
+	}
+}
+
+// Another server changed the credential and this server's cache has not
+// heard of it: its snapshot and its cache are both stale.
+func TestIAMGroupRefreshStaleSiblingCache(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		change func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, accessKey string)
+		check  func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool)
+	}{
+		{"rotated", func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, accessKey string) {
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, accessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{secretKey: "refresh-rotated-secret"})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool) {
+			if !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != "refresh-rotated-secret" {
+				t.Errorf("a stale server undid the rotation of another (present=%v)", ok)
+			}
+		}},
+		{"deleted", func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, accessKey string) {
+			mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, accessKey, false))
+		}, func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool) {
+			if ok {
+				t.Error("a stale server brought back a credential another deleted")
+			}
+		}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+			snapshot := f.service(t, "refresh-sib-"+tc.name)
+			other := f.sibling(t)
+			stale, ok := other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey)
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatal("sibling fixture did not load the credential")
+			}
+			tc.change(t, f, snapshot.AccessKey)
+			if cached, _ := other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); cached.Credentials.SecretKey != stale.Credentials.SecretKey {
+				t.Fatal("control: the sibling cache must not have heard of the change")
+			}
+			_, err := other.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, stale.Credentials, []string{"g1"})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			u, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+			tc.check(t, u, ok)
+			// The refreshing server's own cache follows storage too: it holds
+			// the stored record, or nothing, so a lookup loads it.
+			u, ok = other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey)
+			tc.check(t, u, ok)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// A stored record may lack its access key; the loaders take it from the
+// path, and so does the refresh. Such a credential still gets its groups,
+// including a removal.
+func TestIAMGroupRefreshRecordWithoutAccessKey(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "refresh-nokey")
+	path := getUserIdentityPath(snapshot.AccessKey, svcUser)
+	var u UserIdentity
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.store.loadIAMConfig(f.ctx, &u, path))
+	u.Credentials.AccessKey = ""
+	u.Credentials.Groups = []string{"admins"}
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.store.saveIAMConfig(f.ctx, &u, path))
+	loaded, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+	if !ok || loaded.Credentials.AccessKey != snapshot.AccessKey {
+		t.Fatal("control: the loaders must take the access key from the path")
+	}
+	wrote, err := f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, loaded.Credentials, []string{"users"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	after, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+	if !wrote || !ok || !slices.Equal(after.Credentials.Groups, []string{"users"}) {
+		t.Errorf("wrote=%v present=%v groups=%v: a record without its access key must still lose a group", wrote, ok, after.Credentials.Groups)
+	}
+}
+
+// The access key was deleted and created again. Under the same parent the
+// groups the lookup computed are that parent's, and the new record gets
+// them with everything else it has; under another parent it is left alone.
+func TestIAMGroupRefreshRecreated(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "refresh-recreate")
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+	_, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, f.parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: snapshot.AccessKey, secretKey: "refresh-original-secret", description: "recreated"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	_, err = f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, snapshot, []string{"g1"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	u, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+	if !ok || u.Credentials.Description != "recreated" || !slices.Equal(u.Credentials.Groups, []string{"g1"}) {
+		t.Errorf("same parent: present=%v description=%q groups=%v, want the recreated record with [g1]", ok, u.Credentials.Description, u.Credentials.Groups)
+	}
+
+	other := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "refresh-other-parent", "refresh-parent")
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+	_, _, err = f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, other.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: snapshot.AccessKey, secretKey: "refresh-other-secret"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	wrote, err := f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, snapshot, []string{"g2"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	u, ok = f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+	if wrote || !ok || u.Credentials.ParentUser != other.AccessKey || slices.Contains(u.Credentials.Groups, "g2") {
+		t.Errorf("another parent: wrote=%v present=%v parent=%q groups=%v, want it left alone", wrote, ok, u.Credentials.ParentUser, u.Credentials.Groups)
+	}
+}
+
+// Groups the record already has are not written again.
+func TestIAMGroupRefreshUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "refresh-unchanged")
+	_, err := f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, snapshot, []string{"g1"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	before, _ := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+	wrote, err := f.sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(f.ctx, snapshot, []string{"g1"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	after, _ := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey)
+	if wrote || !after.UpdatedAt.Equal(before.UpdatedAt) {
+		t.Errorf("wrote=%v, revision %s -> %s: unchanged groups must not be written", wrote, before.UpdatedAt, after.UpdatedAt)
+	}
+}

cmd/iam-load-user-race_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"slices"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+// Hold a lazy user load after it has read storage. This makes the ordering
+// between an in-flight read and a completed credential edit deterministic.
+type iamLoadUserBlocker struct {
+	IAMStorageAPI
+	key          string
+	waiting      chan struct{}
+	release      chan struct{}
+	once         sync.Once
+	loads        atomic.Int32
+	retryWaiting chan struct{}
+	retryRelease chan struct{}
+	retryErr     error
+}
+
+func (s *iamLoadUserBlocker) loadUser(ctx context.Context, key string, userType IAMUserType, out map[string]UserIdentity) error {
+	if key == s.key && userType == regUser && s.loads.Add(1) == 2 {
+		if s.retryWaiting != nil {
+			close(s.retryWaiting)
+			select {
+			case <-s.retryRelease:
+			case <-ctx.Done():
+				return ctx.Err()
+			}
+		}
+		if s.retryErr != nil {
+			return s.retryErr
+		}
+	}
+	err := s.IAMStorageAPI.loadUser(ctx, key, userType, out)
+	if err == nil && key == s.key && userType == regUser {
+		s.once.Do(func() { close(s.waiting) })
+		select {
+		case <-s.release:
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return ctx.Err()
+		}
+	}
+	return err
+}
+
+func TestIAMLoadUserConcurrentUpdates(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, change := range []string{"unrelated-edit", "unrelated-load", "delete", "mapping", "policy"} {
+		t.Run(change, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys, _ := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+			const policyName = "lazy-policy"
+			batchAuthzPolicy(ctx, t, sys, policyName, `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]}`)
+			cold := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "lazy-cold", policyName)
+			other := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "lazy-other", "readwrite")
+			cache := sys.store.lock()
+			delete(cache.iamUsersMap, cold.AccessKey)
+			sys.store.unlock()
+			original := sys.store.IAMStorageAPI
+			blocker := &iamLoadUserBlocker{
+				IAMStorageAPI: original, key: cold.AccessKey,
+				waiting: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{}),
+			}
+			sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = blocker
+			unblock := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(blocker.release) })
+			done := make(chan struct{})
+			t.Cleanup(func() {
+				unblock()
+				<-done
+				sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = original
+			})
+			var valid bool
+			var loadErr error
+			go func() {
+				defer close(done)
+				_, valid, loadErr = sys.CheckKey(ctx, cold.AccessKey)
+			}()
+			select {
+			case <-blocker.waiting:
+			case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("cold load did not read the identity")
+			}
+			switch change {
+			case "unrelated-edit":
+				mustIAM(t, sys.SetUserSecretKey(ctx, other.AccessKey, "unrelated-rotated-secret"))
+			case "unrelated-load":
+				mustIAM(t, sys.store.LoadUser(ctx, other.AccessKey))
+			case "delete":
+				mustIAM(t, sys.DeleteUser(ctx, cold.AccessKey, false))
+			case "mapping":
+				_, err := sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, cold.AccessKey, "readonly", regUser, false)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			case "policy":
+				batchAuthzPolicy(ctx, t, sys, policyName, `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]}`)
+			}
+			unblock()
+			select {
+			case <-done:
+			case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("cold load did not finish")
+			}
+			if loadErr != nil || valid != (change != "delete") {
+				t.Fatalf("valid=%v err=%v after %s", valid, loadErr, change)
+			}
+			if blocker.loads.Load() != 2 {
+				t.Fatalf("conflicting load read the identity %d times, want 2", blocker.loads.Load())
+			}
+			if change == "mapping" {
+				names, err := sys.store.PolicyDBGet(cold.AccessKey)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if !slices.Equal(names, []string{"readonly"}) {
+					t.Fatalf("restored stale mapping: %v", names)
+				}
+			}
+			if change == "policy" {
+				current, err := sys.store.GetPolicy(policyName)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if current.IsAllowed(policy.Args{Action: policy.PutObjectAction, BucketName: "bucket", ObjectName: "object"}) {
+					t.Fatal("restored stale policy")
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMLoadUserRetryKeepsCachedReadsAvailable(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, unavailable := range []bool{false, true} {
+		t.Run(map[bool]string{false: "loaded", true: "unavailable"}[unavailable], func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys, _ := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+			cold := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "retry-cold", "readwrite")
+			other := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "retry-cached", "readwrite")
+			cache := sys.store.lock()
+			delete(cache.iamUsersMap, cold.AccessKey)
+			sys.store.unlock()
+			original := sys.store.IAMStorageAPI
+			blocker := &iamLoadUserBlocker{
+				IAMStorageAPI: original, key: cold.AccessKey,
+				waiting: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{}),
+				retryWaiting: make(chan struct{}), retryRelease: make(chan struct{}),
+			}
+			if unavailable {
+				blocker.retryErr = errErasureReadQuorum
+			}
+			sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = blocker
+			unblock := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(blocker.release) })
+			unblockRetry := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(blocker.retryRelease) })
+			done := make(chan struct{})
+			t.Cleanup(func() {
+				unblock()
+				unblockRetry()
+				<-done
+				sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = original
+			})
+			var valid bool
+			var loadErr error
+			go func() {
+				defer close(done)
+				_, valid, loadErr = sys.CheckKey(ctx, cold.AccessKey)
+			}()
+			awaitIAMPolicyReload(t, blocker.waiting)
+			mustIAM(t, sys.SetUserSecretKey(ctx, other.AccessKey, "retry-rotated-secret"))
+			unblock()
+			awaitIAMPolicyReload(t, blocker.retryWaiting)
+			readDone := make(chan struct{})
+			go func() {
+				defer close(readDone)
+				user, ok, err := sys.CheckKey(ctx, other.AccessKey)
+				if err != nil || !ok || user.Credentials.SecretKey != "retry-rotated-secret" {
+					t.Errorf("cached read failed: valid=%v err=%v", ok, err)
+				}
+			}()
+			select {
+			case <-readDone:
+			case <-time.After(time.Second):
+				unblockRetry()
+				<-readDone
+				t.Fatal("cold-load retry blocked cached authentication")
+			}
+			unblockRetry()
+			<-done
+			if unavailable {
+				if valid || !errors.Is(loadErr, errIAMNotInitialized) {
+					t.Fatalf("retry outage was not retryable: valid=%v err=%v", valid, loadErr)
+				}
+			} else if !valid || loadErr != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("retry lost the cold identity: valid=%v err=%v", valid, loadErr)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMLoadUserRefreshesAssociatedRecords(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("_MINIO_IAM_GROUP_REFRESH", "on")
+	for _, change := range []string{"policy", "mapping", "group", "parent"} {
+		t.Run(change, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys, obj := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+			const policyName = "associated-policy"
+			const groupName = "associated-group"
+			batchAuthzPolicy(ctx, t, sys, policyName, `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]}`)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "associated-parent", policyName)
+			_, err := sys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, groupName, []string{parent.AccessKey})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			key := parent.AccessKey
+			if change == "parent" {
+				key = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "associated-service", "").AccessKey
+			}
+			gate := &iamPolicyRefreshReadGate{
+				ObjectLayer: obj, userPath: getGroupInfoPath(groupName),
+				refreshEntered: make(chan struct{}), refreshRelease: make(chan struct{}),
+			}
+			sys.store.IAMStorageAPI.(*IAMObjectStore).objAPI = gate
+			unblock := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(gate.refreshRelease) })
+			done := make(chan struct{})
+			var loadErr error
+			t.Cleanup(func() {
+				unblock()
+				<-done
+			})
+			go func() {
+				defer close(done)
+				loadErr = sys.store.LoadUser(context.WithValue(ctx, iamPolicyRefreshContext{}, "refresh"), key)
+			}()
+			awaitIAMPolicyReload(t, gate.refreshEntered)
+			switch change {
+			case "policy":
+				batchAuthzPolicy(ctx, t, sys, policyName, `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::bucket/*"]}`)
+			case "mapping":
+				_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, parent.AccessKey, "readonly", regUser, false)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			case "group":
+				_, err = sys.RemoveUsersFromGroup(ctx, groupName, []string{parent.AccessKey})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			case "parent":
+				mustIAM(t, sys.SetUserSecretKey(ctx, parent.AccessKey, "associated-rotated-secret"))
+			}
+			unblock()
+			select {
+			case <-done:
+				mustIAM(t, loadErr)
+			case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+				t.Fatal("associated-record reload did not finish")
+			}
+			switch change {
+			case "policy":
+				current, err := sys.store.GetPolicy(policyName)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if current.IsAllowed(policy.Args{Action: policy.PutObjectAction, BucketName: "bucket", ObjectName: "object"}) {
+					t.Fatal("partial snapshot restored old policy")
+				}
+			case "mapping":
+				mapping, ok := sys.store.GetMappedPolicy(parent.AccessKey, false)
+				if !ok || mapping.Policies != "readonly" {
+					t.Fatalf("partial snapshot restored old mapping: %+v", mapping)
+				}
+			case "group":
+				cache := sys.store.rlock()
+				member := cache.iamUserGroupMemberships[parent.AccessKey].Contains(groupName)
+				sys.store.runlock()
+				if member {
+					t.Fatal("partial snapshot restored old group membership")
+				}
+			case "parent":
+				current, valid, err := sys.CheckKey(ctx, parent.AccessKey)
+				if err != nil || !valid || current.Credentials.SecretKey != "associated-rotated-secret" {
+					t.Fatal("child reload restored old parent credential")
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMLoadUserDoesNotRestoreRotatedCredential(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys, _ := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+	user := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "load-user-race", "readwrite")
+	original := sys.store.IAMStorageAPI
+	blocker := &iamLoadUserBlocker{
+		IAMStorageAPI: original,
+		key:           user.AccessKey,
+		waiting:       make(chan struct{}),
+		release:       make(chan struct{}),
+	}
+	sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = blocker
+	t.Cleanup(func() { sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = original })
+
+	loadDone := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() { loadDone <- sys.store.LoadUser(ctx, user.AccessKey) }()
+	select {
+	case <-blocker.waiting:
+	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("LoadUser did not reach the controlled read barrier")
+	}
+
+	const rotatedSecret = "load-user-rotated-secret"
+	if err := sys.SetUserSecretKey(ctx, user.AccessKey, rotatedSecret); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	current, valid, err := sys.CheckKey(ctx, user.AccessKey)
+	if err != nil || !valid || current.Credentials.SecretKey != rotatedSecret {
+		t.Fatalf("rotation did not update the serving cache: valid=%v secret=%q err=%v", valid, current.Credentials.SecretKey, err)
+	}
+
+	close(blocker.release)
+	select {
+	case err := <-loadDone:
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("LoadUser did not finish after the read barrier was released")
+	}
+	loaded, valid, err := sys.CheckKey(ctx, user.AccessKey)
+	if err != nil || !valid || loaded.Credentials.SecretKey != rotatedSecret {
+		t.Fatalf("an in-flight LoadUser restored the old credential: valid=%v secret=%q err=%v", valid, loaded.Credentials.SecretKey, err)
+	}
+}

cmd/iam-replication-protocol.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
 package cmd
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"crypto/sha256"
 	"encoding/hex"
@@ -172,14 +171,41 @@ func (c *SiteReplicationSys) replicationItem(ctx context.Context, item madmin.SR
 			key = item.SvcAccChange.Update.AccessKey
 		}
 		if key != "" {
-			r, err := loadIAMRevision(ctx, globalIAMSys.store, getUserIdentityPath(key, svcUser))
+			// A create or an edit goes out as the account stored now: the
+			// whole record, under its revision, whatever the caller's item
+			// says. A peer orders items by revision and drops an older one,
+			// so an edit sent as the fields it changed would lose every
+			// earlier edit that did not reach the peer, or reaches it late.
+			// A later write that won before sending goes out in place of
+			// this one.
+			stored := make(map[string]UserIdentity, 1)
+			err := globalIAMSys.store.loadUser(ctx, key, svcUser, stored)
+			if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) {
+				return out, err
+			}
+			u, ok := stored[key]
+			if !ok {
+				// Nothing is sent for an account that is deleted, expired or
+				// of a revoked parent meanwhile; a deletion replicates itself.
+				// A stored token that cannot be read is an error, and the
+				// account is not taken for sent.
+				var raw UserIdentity
+				err := globalIAMSys.store.loadIAMConfig(ctx, &raw, getUserIdentityPath(key, svcUser))
+				if err == nil && !raw.Deleted && !raw.Credentials.IsExpired() {
+					_, err = extractJWTClaims(raw)
+				}
+				if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound) {
+					return out, err
+				}
+				return out, errIAMStaleUpdate
+			}
+			snapshot, err := serviceAccountSnapshot(u)
 			if err != nil {
 				return out, err
 			}
-			if r.Deleted || r.timestamp().After(item.UpdatedAt) {
+			out.SvcAccChange = &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{Create: &snapshot}
-				return out, errIAMStaleUpdate
+			out.UpdatedAt = u.UpdatedAt
-			}
+			out.RevokedBefore = u.RevokedBefore
-			out.RevokedBefore = r.RevokedBefore
 		}
 	}
 	if item.Type == madmin.SRIAMItemGroupInfo && item.GroupInfo != nil && !item.GroupInfo.UpdateReq.IsRemove {
@@ -275,7 +301,7 @@ func applyIAMReplicationItem(ctx context.Context, item iamReplicationItem) error
 		if len(item.Policy) == 0 {
 			return globalSiteReplicationSys.PeerAddPolicyHandler(ctx, item.Name, nil, item.UpdatedAt)
 		}
-		p, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(item.Policy))
+		p, err := parsePolicySnapshotBytes(item.Policy)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}

cmd/iam-revision.go

@@ -45,6 +45,35 @@ type iamGroupRevocation struct {
 // its revision so an older non-expiring credential cannot return.
 type iamExpireIdentity struct{}
 
+// An edit of an identity applies to the identity as it is stored now, under
+// its revision lock, not to a server's cached copy. A copy written back
+// whole would undo a rotation or an edit made meanwhile through this or
+// another server, whose notification this one may have missed, and bring
+// back an identity deleted meanwhile. edit receives the stored record and
+// changes it in place; it returns errIAMIdentityUnchanged to write nothing,
+// or any other error to refuse. An identity that is absent or deleted is
+// refused with errIAMIdentityGone.
+type iamIdentityEdit struct {
+	UserIdentity // the record written, or found unchanged
+	accessKey    string
+	edit         func(u *UserIdentity) error
+	unchanged    bool
+}
+
+// An identity create is checked against the record under the same revision
+// lock as the write. Local callers may recreate a deleted access key, but may
+// never replace a live stored service account that their cache did not contain.
+// Replicated creates retain the normal revision ordering below and may replace
+// an older live snapshot when their source revision wins.
+type iamIdentityCreate struct {
+	UserIdentity
+}
+
+var (
+	errIAMIdentityGone      = errors.New("IAM identity is absent or deleted in storage")
+	errIAMIdentityUnchanged = errors.New("IAM identity edit changes nothing")
+)
+
 // The authoritative revocation is durable even if dependent cleanup fails.
 // Callers must publish it to sibling caches before returning the error.
 type iamCommittedCleanupError struct {
@@ -252,6 +281,69 @@ func saveIAMRevision(ctx context.Context, store IAMStorageAPI, path string, item
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	if op, ok := item.(*iamIdentityCreate); ok {
+		if _, replicated := iamReplicationTime(ctx); !replicated {
+			var current UserIdentity
+			err := store.loadIAMConfig(ctx, &current, path)
+			switch {
+			case err == nil && !current.Deleted:
+				return fmt.Errorf("%w: access key already exists in storage", errIAMServiceAccountNotAllowed)
+			case err == nil, errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound):
+				// A tombstone or an absent record can be recreated. The
+				// existing revision path below retains its revocation boundary.
+			default:
+				return err
+			}
+		}
+		item = &op.UserIdentity
+	}
+	if op, ok := item.(*iamIdentityEdit); ok {
+		var current UserIdentity
+		err := store.loadIAMConfig(ctx, &current, path)
+		if errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound) {
+			return errIAMIdentityGone
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if current.Deleted {
+			if origin, replicated := iamReplicationTime(ctx); replicated && !origin.After(previous.timestamp()) {
+				// A peer's edit from before this deletion: acknowledged.
+				return errIAMStaleUpdate
+			}
+			return errIAMIdentityGone
+		}
+		// Normalize the record as the identity loaders do: the path names the
+		// access key, the claims are the token's, and a deprecated comment
+		// stands in for an empty description.
+		if current.Credentials.AccessKey == "" {
+			current.Credentials.AccessKey = op.accessKey
+		}
+		if current.Credentials.SessionToken != "" {
+			claims, err := extractJWTClaims(current)
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			current.Credentials.Claims = claims.Map()
+		}
+		if current.Credentials.Description == "" {
+			current.Credentials.Description = current.Credentials.Comment
+		}
+		if err := op.edit(&current); err != nil {
+			if errors.Is(err, errIAMIdentityUnchanged) {
+				op.UserIdentity, op.unchanged = current, true
+				return nil
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+		current.UpdatedAt = time.Time{} // a new revision, as for any local edit
+		op.UserIdentity = current
+		item = &op.UserIdentity
+		if strings.HasPrefix(path, iamConfigSTSPrefix) {
+			// Keep the record expiring with its token, as SetTempUser stores it.
+			opts = []options{{ttl: max(1, int64(time.Until(current.Credentials.Expiration).Seconds()))}}
+		}
+	}
 	if _, expiring := item.(*iamExpireIdentity); expiring {
 		sts := strings.HasPrefix(path, iamConfigSTSPrefix)
 		if previous.Deleted {
@@ -584,9 +676,8 @@ func (c *SiteReplicationSys) healIAMDeletions(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 	}()
 	c.iamHealMu.Lock()
 	defer c.iamHealMu.Unlock()
-	c.RLock()
+	state, ok := c.stateSnapshot()
-	defer c.RUnlock()
+	if !ok {
-	if !c.enabled {
 		return nil
 	}
 	snapshot := globalIAMSys.store.revisionIndex().snapshot()
@@ -627,17 +718,17 @@ func (c *SiteReplicationSys) healIAMDeletions(ctx context.Context) (err error) {
 		c.iamRevisionProgress = make(map[string]iamRevisionProgress)
 	}
 	for id := range c.iamRevisionProgress {
-		if _, present := c.state.Peers[id]; !present {
+		if _, present := state.Peers[id]; !present {
 			delete(c.iamRevisionProgress, id)
 		}
 	}
 	var progressMu sync.Mutex
-	cerr := c.concDo(nil, func(id string, p madmin.PeerInfo) error {
+	cerr := state.concDo(nil, func(id string, p madmin.PeerInfo) error {
 		// Bound each pass, but retain acknowledgements independently of the
 		// pass deadline or unrelated changes at either site.
 		peerCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, defaultContextTimeout)
 		defer cancel()
-		client, err := c.getAdminClient(peerCtx, id)
+		client, err := state.getAdminClient(id)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}

cmd/iam-store.go

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"maps"
@@ -2778,37 +2777,26 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) SetUserStatus(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, s
 	cache := store.lock()
 	defer store.unlock()
 
-	ui, ok := cache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]
+	if ui, ok := cache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]; ok && (ui.Credentials.IsTemp() || ui.Credentials.IsServiceAccount()) {
-	if !ok {
-		return updatedAt, errNoSuchUser
-	}
-	cred := ui.Credentials
-
-	if cred.IsTemp() || cred.IsServiceAccount() {
 		return updatedAt, errIAMActionNotAllowed
 	}
-
+	u, _, err := store.editStoredIdentity(ctx, cache, accessKey, regUser, func(stored *UserIdentity) error {
-	uinfo := newUserIdentity(auth.Credentials{
+		if stored.Credentials.IsTemp() || stored.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
-		AccessKey: accessKey,
+			return errIAMActionNotAllowed
-		SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
-		Status: func() string {
-			switch string(status) {
-			case string(madmin.AccountEnabled), string(auth.AccountOn):
-				return auth.AccountOn
 		}
-			return auth.AccountOff
+		stored.Credentials.Status = auth.AccountOff
-		}(),
+		if status == madmin.AccountEnabled {
+			stored.Credentials.Status = auth.AccountOn
+		}
+		return nil
 	})
-
+	if errors.Is(err, errIAMIdentityGone) {
-	if err := store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, accessKey, regUser, &uinfo); err != nil {
+		return updatedAt, errNoSuchUser
+	}
+	if err != nil {
 		return updatedAt, err
 	}
-
+	return u.UpdatedAt, nil
-	if err := cache.updateUserWithClaims(accessKey, uinfo); err != nil {
-		return updatedAt, err
-	}
-
-	return uinfo.UpdatedAt, nil
 }
 
 // AddServiceAccount - add a new service account
@@ -2842,10 +2830,12 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) AddServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, cred auth.Crede
 	}
 
 	u := newUserIdentity(cred)
-	err = store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, u.Credentials.AccessKey, svcUser, &u)
+	create := &iamIdentityCreate{UserIdentity: u}
+	err = store.saveIAMRevision(ctx, getUserIdentityPath(u.Credentials.AccessKey, svcUser), create)
 	if err != nil {
 		return updatedAt, err
 	}
+	u = create.UserIdentity
 
 	if err := cache.updateUserWithClaims(u.Credentials.AccessKey, u); err != nil {
 		// Persistence already replaced the credential. A failed refresh must
@@ -2863,15 +2853,39 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) UpdateServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, accessKey st
 	cache := store.lock()
 	defer store.unlock()
 
-	ui, ok := cache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]
+	u, _, err := store.editStoredIdentity(ctx, cache, accessKey, svcUser, func(stored *UserIdentity) error {
-	if !ok || !ui.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
+		if !stored.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
+			return errIAMIdentityGone
+		}
+		if opts.parentUser != "" && stored.Credentials.ParentUser != opts.parentUser {
+			// Not the account the caller was authorized for: it was
+			// deleted and created again for another parent meanwhile.
+			return errIAMIdentityGone
+		}
+		cr, err := updatedServiceAccountCredentials(ctx, accessKey, stored.Credentials, opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		stored.Credentials = cr
+		return nil
+	})
+	if errors.Is(err, errIAMIdentityGone) {
 		return updatedAt, errNoSuchServiceAccount
 	}
-	cr := ui.Credentials
+	if err != nil {
+		return updatedAt, err
+	}
+	return u.UpdatedAt, nil
+}
+
+// updatedServiceAccountCredentials returns cr, the stored credential of
+// service account accessKey, with the edits of opts and a session token
+// signed again for them.
+func updatedServiceAccountCredentials(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, cr auth.Credentials, opts updateServiceAccountOpts) (auth.Credentials, error) {
 	currentSecretKey := cr.SecretKey
 	if opts.secretKey != "" {
 		if !auth.IsSecretKeyValid(opts.secretKey) {
-			return updatedAt, auth.ErrInvalidSecretKeyLength
+			return cr, auth.ErrInvalidSecretKeyLength
 		}
 		cr.SecretKey = opts.secretKey
 	}
@@ -2887,7 +2901,7 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) UpdateServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, accessKey st
 	if opts.expiration != nil {
 		expirationInUTC := opts.expiration.UTC()
 		if err := validateSvcExpirationInUTC(ctx, expirationInUTC); err != nil {
-			return updatedAt, err
+			return cr, err
 		}
 		cr.Expiration = expirationInUTC
 	}
@@ -2903,42 +2917,31 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) UpdateServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, accessKey st
 	case auth.AccountOn, auth.AccountOff:
 		cr.Status = opts.status
 	default:
-		return updatedAt, errors.New("unknown account status value")
+		return cr, errors.New("unknown account status value")
 	}
 
 	m, err := getClaimsFromTokenWithSecret(cr.SessionToken, currentSecretKey)
 	if err != nil {
-		return updatedAt, fmt.Errorf("unable to get svc acc claims: %v", err)
+		return cr, fmt.Errorf("unable to get svc acc claims: %v", err)
 	}
 
 	// Extracted session policy name string can be removed as its not useful
 	// at this point.
 	m.Delete(sessionPolicyNameExtracted)
 
-	nosp := opts.sessionPolicy == nil || opts.sessionPolicy.Version == "" && len(opts.sessionPolicy.Statements) == 0
+	// A nil sessionPolicy is an edit that does not concern the policy, and
-
+	// the embedded one stays. Only a policy that was given, and is empty,
-	// sessionPolicy is nil and there is embedded policy attached we remove
+	// removes it: the account then has all its parent is allowed, which is
-	// embedded policy at that point.
+	// usually more.
-	if _, ok := m.Lookup(policy.SessionPolicyName); ok && nosp {
+	if opts.sessionPolicy != nil {
+		policyBuf, err := marshalServiceAccountPolicy(opts.sessionPolicy)
+		if err != nil {
+			return cr, err
+		}
+		if len(policyBuf) == 0 {
 			m.Delete(policy.SessionPolicyName)
 			m.Set(iamPolicyClaimNameSA(), inheritedPolicyType)
-	}
+		} else {
-
-	if opts.sessionPolicy != nil { // session policies is being updated
-		if err := opts.sessionPolicy.Validate(); err != nil {
-			return updatedAt, err
-		}
-
-		if opts.sessionPolicy.Version != "" && len(opts.sessionPolicy.Statements) > 0 {
-			policyBuf, err := json.Marshal(opts.sessionPolicy)
-			if err != nil {
-				return updatedAt, err
-			}
-
-			if len(policyBuf) > maxSVCSessionPolicySize {
-				return updatedAt, errSessionPolicyTooLarge
-			}
-
 			// Overwrite session policy claims.
 			m.Set(policy.SessionPolicyName, base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(policyBuf))
 			m.Set(iamPolicyClaimNameSA(), embeddedPolicyType)
@@ -2947,21 +2950,11 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) UpdateServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, accessKey st
 
 	cr.SessionToken, err = auth.JWTSignWithAccessKey(accessKey, m.Map(), cr.SecretKey)
 	if err != nil {
-		return updatedAt, err
+		return cr, err
 	}
-
+	// The stored claims are those of the new token; the save extracts them.
-	u := newUserIdentity(cr)
+	cr.Claims = nil
-	if err := store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, u.Credentials.AccessKey, svcUser, &u); err != nil {
+	return cr, nil
-		return updatedAt, err
-	}
-
-	if err := cache.updateUserWithClaims(u.Credentials.AccessKey, u); err != nil {
-		delete(cache.iamUsersMap, accessKey)
-		cache.updatedAt = UTCNow()
-		return updatedAt, err
-	}
-
-	return u.UpdatedAt, nil
 }
 
 // ListTempAccounts - lists only temporary accounts from the cache.
@@ -3105,22 +3098,16 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) UpdateUserSecretKey(ctx context.Context, accessKey, se
 	cache := store.lock()
 	defer store.unlock()
 
-	cache.updatedAt = time.Now()
+	_, _, err := store.editStoredIdentity(ctx, cache, accessKey, regUser, func(stored *UserIdentity) error {
-
+		stored.Credentials.SecretKey = secretKey
-	ui, ok := cache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]
+		return nil
-	if !ok {
+	})
+	if errors.Is(err, errIAMIdentityGone) {
 		return errNoSuchUser
 	}
-	cred := ui.Credentials
-	cred.SecretKey = secretKey
-	u := newUserIdentity(cred)
-	if err := store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, accessKey, regUser, &u); err != nil {
 	return err
 }
 
-	return cache.updateUserWithClaims(accessKey, u)
-}
-
 // GetSTSAndServiceAccounts - returns all STS and Service account credentials.
 func (store *IAMStoreSys) GetSTSAndServiceAccounts() []auth.Credentials {
 	cache := store.rlock()
@@ -3144,39 +3131,99 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) getSTSAndServiceAccounts(cache *iamCache) []auth.Crede
 	return res
 }
 
-// UpdateUserIdentity - updates a user credential.
+// RefreshUserGroups sets the groups of the STS or service-account
-func (store *IAMStoreSys) UpdateUserIdentity(ctx context.Context, cred auth.Credentials) error {
+// credential that cred was read from to groups, on the record stored now
+// (see editStoredIdentity). Nothing else of the record changes. A
+// credential that is gone, expired or now has another parent, whose groups
+// the directory lookup did not compute, is left alone in storage and
+// dropped from the cache. It reports whether it wrote.
+func (store *IAMStoreSys) RefreshUserGroups(ctx context.Context, cred auth.Credentials, groups []string) (bool, error) {
 	cache := store.lock()
 	defer store.unlock()
 
-	cache.updatedAt = time.Now()
+	userType := svcUser
-
+	if !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
-	userType := regUser
+		if !cred.IsTemp() {
-	if cred.IsServiceAccount() {
+			return false, errInvalidArgument
-		userType = svcUser
+		}
-	} else if cred.IsTemp() {
 		userType = stsUser
 	}
-	ui := newUserIdentity(cred)
+	_, unchanged, err := store.editStoredIdentity(ctx, cache, cred.AccessKey, userType, func(stored *UserIdentity) error {
-	// Overwrite the user identity here. As store should be
+		if stored.Credentials.ParentUser != cred.ParentUser || stored.Credentials.IsExpired() {
-	// atomic, it shouldn't cause any corruption.
+			return errIAMIdentityGone
-	if err := store.saveUserIdentity(ctx, cred.AccessKey, userType, &ui); err != nil {
+		}
-		return err
+		if set.CreateStringSet(stored.Credentials.Groups...).Equals(set.CreateStringSet(groups...)) {
+			return errIAMIdentityUnchanged
+		}
+		stored.Credentials.Groups = groups
+		return nil
+	})
+	if errors.Is(err, errIAMIdentityGone) || errors.Is(err, errIAMStaleUpdate) {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	return !unchanged, nil
 }
 
-	return cache.updateUserWithClaims(cred.AccessKey, ui)
+// editStoredIdentity applies edit to identity accessKey of userType as it
+// is stored now, under its revision lock (see iamIdentityEdit), and caches
+// the result. The caller holds the cache lock. When the identity is absent
+// or deleted in storage, or edit returns errIAMIdentityGone because it is
+// no longer the identity the edit addressed, errIAMIdentityGone is
+// returned; a replicated edit older than what is stored returns
+// errIAMStaleUpdate. Either way storage holds something else than the
+// cached copy, which is dropped, so a lookup loads what is stored.
+func (store *IAMStoreSys) editStoredIdentity(ctx context.Context, cache *iamCache, accessKey string, userType IAMUserType, edit func(u *UserIdentity) error) (UserIdentity, bool, error) {
+	op := &iamIdentityEdit{accessKey: accessKey, edit: edit}
+	err := store.saveIAMRevision(ctx, getUserIdentityPath(accessKey, userType), op)
+	if errors.Is(err, errIAMIdentityGone) || errors.Is(err, errIAMStaleUpdate) {
+		// Storage holds something else than the cached copy: drop it.
+		store.forgetCachedIdentity(cache, accessKey, userType)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return UserIdentity{}, false, err
+	}
+	if err := cache.updateUserWithClaims(accessKey, op.UserIdentity); err != nil {
+		// Stored but not cached: a lookup loads it.
+		store.forgetCachedIdentity(cache, accessKey, userType)
+		return UserIdentity{}, false, err
+	}
+	return op.UserIdentity, op.unchanged, nil
+}
+
+// forgetCachedIdentity drops identity accessKey of userType from the cache;
+// a lookup then loads it from storage. Users and service accounts share a
+// map, so an entry of the other kind under the same key is kept.
+func (store *IAMStoreSys) forgetCachedIdentity(cache *iamCache, accessKey string, userType IAMUserType) {
+	switch userType {
+	case stsUser:
+		delete(cache.iamSTSAccountsMap, accessKey)
+	default:
+		if ui, ok := cache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]; ok && ui.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() == (userType == svcUser) {
+			delete(cache.iamUsersMap, accessKey)
+		}
+	}
+	cache.updatedAt = time.Now()
+	if store.group != nil {
+		store.group.Forget(accessKey)
+	}
 }
 
 // LoadUser - attempts to load user info from storage and updates cache.
 func (store *IAMStoreSys) LoadUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string) error {
 	groupLoad := env.Get("_MINIO_IAM_GROUP_REFRESH", config.EnableOff) == config.EnableOn
 
-	newCachePopulate := func() (val any, err error) {
+	newCachePopulate := func(ctx context.Context) (newCache *iamCache, err error) {
-		newCache := newIamCache()
+		newCache = newIamCache()
 		newCache.revisions = store.revisionIndex()
 
 		// Check for service account first
-		store.loadUser(ctx, accessKey, svcUser, newCache.iamUsersMap)
+		err = store.loadUser(ctx, accessKey, svcUser, newCache.iamUsersMap)
+		if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) && !errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound) {
+			return nil, err
+		}
 
 		svc, found := newCache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]
 		if found {
@@ -3194,6 +3241,9 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) LoadUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string) error
 
 		if !found {
 			err = store.loadUser(ctx, accessKey, regUser, newCache.iamUsersMap)
+			if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) && !errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound) {
+				return nil, err
+			}
 			if _, found = newCache.iamUsersMap[accessKey]; found {
 				// NOTE: we are not worried about loading errors from policies.
 				store.loadMappedPolicyWithRetry(ctx, accessKey, regUser, false, newCache.iamUserPolicyMap, 3)
@@ -3237,32 +3287,26 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) LoadUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string) error
 		return newCache, err
 	}
 
-	var (
+	load := func() (any, error) {
-		val any
+		loadedAt := time.Now()
-		err error
+		newCache, err := newCachePopulate(ctx)
-	)
-	if store.group != nil {
-		val, err, _ = store.group.Do(accessKey, newCachePopulate)
-	} else {
-		val, err = newCachePopulate()
-	}
-
-	// Return error right away if any.
 		if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) || errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound) {
+			return nil, err
-			return nil
-		}
-		return err
-	}
-
-	newCache, ok := val.(*iamCache)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil
 		}
 
 		cache := store.lock()
 		defer store.unlock()
 
+		if cache.updatedAt.After(loadedAt) {
+			err = store.withIAMStorage(ctx, func(ctx context.Context) error {
+				newCache, err = newCachePopulate(ctx)
+				return err
+			})
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+		}
+
 		// We need to merge the new cache with the existing cache because the
 		// periodic IAM reload is partial. The periodic load here is to account.
 		newCache.iamGroupPolicyMap.Range(func(k string, v MappedPolicy) bool {
@@ -3291,9 +3335,20 @@ func (store *IAMStoreSys) LoadUser(ctx context.Context, accessKey string) error
 		})
 
 		cache.updatedAt = time.Now()
+		return nil, nil
+	}
 
+	var err error
+	if store.group != nil {
+		_, err, _ = store.group.Do(accessKey, load)
+	} else {
+		_, err = load()
+	}
+	if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) || errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound) {
 		return nil
 	}
+	return err
+}
 
 var errTokenSigningKeyUnavailable = errors.New("token signing key unavailable")
 

cmd/iam-stored-identity-edit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+// An administrator edits an identity through a server whose cache missed
+// a rotation or a deletion made through another. The edit applies to what
+// is stored and must not write the stale copy back.
+
+func TestIAMStaleServiceAccountEdit(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("rotated", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+		snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-rotated")
+		other := f.sibling(t)
+		_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{secretKey: "edit-rotated-secret"})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		if cached, _ := other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); cached.Credentials.SecretKey != snapshot.SecretKey {
+			t.Fatal("control: the stale server must not have heard of the rotation")
+		}
+		_, err = other.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "edited on a stale server"})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		for where, get := range map[string]func() (UserIdentity, bool){
+			"storage":      func() (UserIdentity, bool) { return f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey) },
+			"stale server": func() (UserIdentity, bool) { return other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey) },
+		} {
+			u, ok := get()
+			if !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != "edit-rotated-secret" || u.Credentials.Description != "edited on a stale server" {
+				t.Errorf("%s: present=%v rotated=%v description=%q: the edit must apply to the rotated credential",
+					where, ok, u.Credentials.SecretKey == "edit-rotated-secret", u.Credentials.Description)
+			}
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("deleted", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+		snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-deleted")
+		other := f.sibling(t)
+		mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+		_, err := other.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "edited on a stale server"})
+		if !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
+			t.Errorf("an edit of a deleted account must fail with no such service account, got %v", err)
+		}
+		if _, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey); ok {
+			t.Error("an edit on a stale server brought a deleted account back")
+		}
+		if _, ok := other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); ok {
+			t.Error("the stale server still caches the deleted account")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+// A server that missed the create notification must not replace a live
+// service account merely because its local cache has no entry for the key.
+func TestIAMStaleServiceAccountCreate(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	other := f.sibling(t)
+	original := f.service(t, "create-stale")
+	if _, ok := other.GetUser(original.AccessKey); ok {
+		t.Fatal("control: the stale server must not have loaded the new account")
+	}
+
+	claims := map[string]any{
+		parentClaim:            f.parent.AccessKey,
+		iamPolicyClaimNameSA(): inheritedPolicyType,
+	}
+	mustIAM(t, setIAMParentRevocationClaim(f.ctx, other, f.parent.AccessKey, claims))
+	replacement, err := auth.CreateNewCredentialsWithMetadata(original.AccessKey, "create-replacement-secret", claims, "create-replacement-secret")
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	replacement.ParentUser = f.parent.AccessKey
+	replacement.Status = auth.AccountOn
+	if _, err := other.AddServiceAccount(f.ctx, replacement); !errors.Is(err, errIAMServiceAccountNotAllowed) {
+		t.Fatalf("stale create should be rejected, got %v", err)
+	}
+
+	stored, ok := f.stored(t, original.AccessKey)
+	if !ok || stored.Credentials.SecretKey != original.SecretKey || stored.Credentials.ParentUser != original.ParentUser {
+		t.Fatalf("stale create changed the live account: present=%v parent=%q secret=%q", ok, stored.Credentials.ParentUser, stored.Credentials.SecretKey)
+	}
+}
+
+// A session policy edit stores the claims of the token it signs.
+func TestIAMServiceAccountEditStoresNewClaims(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-claims")
+	sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::edit/*"]}]}`))
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	_, err = f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: sp})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	var raw UserIdentity
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.store.loadIAMConfig(f.ctx, &raw, getUserIdentityPath(snapshot.AccessKey, svcUser)))
+	claims, err := getClaimsFromTokenWithSecret(raw.Credentials.SessionToken, raw.Credentials.SecretKey)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if raw.Credentials.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] != embeddedPolicyType || claims.MapClaims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] != embeddedPolicyType {
+		t.Errorf("stored claims %v, token claims %v: both must name the embedded policy", raw.Credentials.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()], claims.MapClaims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMStaleUserEdit(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		change func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials)
+		edit   func(s *IAMStoreSys, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) error
+		check  func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool, err error)
+	}{
+		{"status-after-delete", func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) {
+			mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, false))
+		}, func(s *IAMStoreSys, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) error {
+			_, err := s.SetUserStatus(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, madmin.AccountEnabled)
+			return err
+		}, func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool, err error) {
+			if !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) || ok {
+				t.Errorf("err=%v present=%v: a status change on a stale server must not bring a deleted user back", err, ok)
+			}
+		}},
+		{"status-after-rotation", func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) {
+			mustIAM(t, f.sys.SetUserSecretKey(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, "edit-user-rotated"))
+		}, func(s *IAMStoreSys, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) error {
+			_, err := s.SetUserStatus(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, madmin.AccountDisabled)
+			return err
+		}, func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool, err error) {
+			if err != nil || !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != "edit-user-rotated" || u.Credentials.Status != auth.AccountOff {
+				t.Errorf("err=%v present=%v rotated=%v status=%q: the status change must apply to the rotated user",
+					err, ok, u.Credentials.SecretKey == "edit-user-rotated", u.Credentials.Status)
+			}
+		}},
+		{"secret-after-delete", func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) {
+			mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, false))
+		}, func(s *IAMStoreSys, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) error {
+			return s.UpdateUserSecretKey(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, "edit-user-new-secret")
+		}, func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool, err error) {
+			if !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) || ok {
+				t.Errorf("err=%v present=%v: a secret change on a stale server must not bring a deleted user back", err, ok)
+			}
+		}},
+		{"secret-after-disable", func(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) {
+			_, err := f.sys.SetUserStatus(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, madmin.AccountDisabled)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+		}, func(s *IAMStoreSys, f *groupRefreshFixture, user auth.Credentials) error {
+			return s.UpdateUserSecretKey(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, "edit-user-new-secret")
+		}, func(t *testing.T, u UserIdentity, ok bool, err error) {
+			if err != nil || !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != "edit-user-new-secret" || u.Credentials.Status != auth.AccountOff {
+				t.Errorf("err=%v present=%v status=%q: a secret change on a stale server must keep the user disabled", err, ok, u.Credentials.Status)
+			}
+		}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+			user := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "edit-user", "refresh-parent")
+			other := f.sibling(t)
+			tc.change(t, f, user)
+			if cached, ok := other.GetUser(user.AccessKey); !ok || cached.Credentials.SecretKey != user.SecretKey {
+				t.Fatal("control: the stale server must not have heard of the change")
+			}
+			err := tc.edit(other, f, user)
+			u, ok := f.stored(t, user.AccessKey)
+			tc.check(t, u, ok, err)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// An edit that the caller was authorized for under one parent does not
+// apply to an account stored under another parent: the account was deleted
+// and created again for it meanwhile.
+func TestIAMServiceAccountEditKeepsAuthorizedParent(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-parent")
+	other := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "edit-other-parent", "refresh-parent")
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+	_, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, other.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: snapshot.AccessKey, secretKey: "edit-other-secret"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	_, err = f.sys.store.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{secretKey: "edit-chosen-secret", parentUser: snapshot.ParentUser})
+	if !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
+		t.Errorf("an edit authorized for another parent must fail, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if u, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey); !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != "edit-other-secret" {
+		t.Errorf("present=%v: the account of the other parent must keep its secret", ok)
+	}
+	// Without a bound parent (replication), the edit applies.
+	_, err = f.sys.store.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "replicated"})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+}
+
+// A record stored without claims, or with only a deprecated comment, is
+// edited as the loaders present it.
+func TestIAMServiceAccountEditLegacyRecord(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-legacy")
+	path := getUserIdentityPath(snapshot.AccessKey, svcUser)
+	var raw UserIdentity
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.store.loadIAMConfig(f.ctx, &raw, path))
+	raw.Credentials.Claims = nil
+	raw.Credentials.Description, raw.Credentials.Comment = "", "legacy comment"
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.store.saveIAMConfig(f.ctx, &raw, path))
+	_, err := f.sys.store.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: string(madmin.AccountDisabled)})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	for where, get := range map[string]func() (UserIdentity, bool){
+		"storage": func() (UserIdentity, bool) { return f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey) },
+		"cache":   func() (UserIdentity, bool) { return f.sys.store.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey) },
+	} {
+		u, ok := get()
+		if !ok || u.Credentials.Status != auth.AccountOff || u.Credentials.Description != "legacy comment" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: present=%v status=%q description=%q", where, ok, u.Credentials.Status, u.Credentials.Description)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// A peer's edit from before a deletion this site applied is acknowledged as
+// stale; one from after it is not found.
+func TestIAMReplicatedEditAfterDeletion(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-repl")
+	user := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "edit-repl-user", "refresh-parent")
+	before := UTCNow()
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+	mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, user.AccessKey, false))
+	after := UTCNow().Add(time.Second)
+
+	_, err := f.sys.store.UpdateServiceAccount(withIAMReplicationTime(f.ctx, before), snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "late"})
+	if iamReplicationError(err) != nil {
+		t.Errorf("an older service-account edit must be acknowledged, got %v", err)
+	}
+	_, err = f.sys.store.SetUserStatus(withIAMReplicationTime(f.ctx, before), user.AccessKey, madmin.AccountDisabled)
+	if iamReplicationError(err) != nil {
+		t.Errorf("an older status edit must be acknowledged, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err = f.sys.store.UpdateServiceAccount(withIAMReplicationTime(f.ctx, after), snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "late"}); !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
+		t.Errorf("a newer edit of a deleted account must not be acknowledged as stale, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, ok := f.stored(t, snapshot.AccessKey); ok {
+		t.Error("a replicated edit brought a deleted account back")
+	}
+}
+
+// A status change addressed to a service account is refused as before, and
+// the account stays cached.
+func TestIAMUserStatusOnServiceAccount(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-sa-status")
+	_, err := f.sys.store.SetUserStatus(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, madmin.AccountDisabled)
+	if !errors.Is(err, errIAMActionNotAllowed) {
+		t.Errorf("got %v, want errIAMActionNotAllowed", err)
+	}
+	if _, ok := f.sys.store.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); !ok {
+		t.Error("a refused status change dropped the service account from the cache")
+	}
+	if err := f.sys.store.UpdateUserSecretKey(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, "edit-not-a-user"); !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) {
+		t.Errorf("a user secret change of a service account must find no user, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if u, ok := f.sys.store.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != snapshot.SecretKey {
+		t.Error("a user secret change of a service account touched the account")
+	}
+}
+
+// A server whose cache still holds the account of the first parent drops
+// it when its edit is refused, whether the edit was bound to that parent or
+// replicated from before the deletion: storage says the cached copy is gone.
+func TestIAMRefusedEditDropsStaleCache(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("rebound-parent", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+		snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-rebind")
+		other := f.sibling(t)
+		next := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "edit-rebind-next", "refresh-parent")
+		mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+		_, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, next.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: snapshot.AccessKey, secretKey: "edit-rebind-secret"})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		if cached, ok := other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); !ok || cached.Credentials.ParentUser != snapshot.ParentUser {
+			t.Fatal("control: the stale server must still cache the first account")
+		}
+		_, err = other.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "stale", parentUser: snapshot.ParentUser})
+		if !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
+			t.Errorf("got %v, want errNoSuchServiceAccount", err)
+		}
+		if _, ok := other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); ok {
+			t.Error("the stale server still caches the account of the first parent")
+		}
+	})
+	t.Run("replicated-stale", func(t *testing.T) {
+		f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+		snapshot := f.service(t, "edit-repl-stale")
+		other := f.sibling(t)
+		before := UTCNow()
+		mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(f.ctx, snapshot.AccessKey, false))
+		_, err := other.UpdateServiceAccount(withIAMReplicationTime(f.ctx, before), snapshot.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "late"})
+		if iamReplicationError(err) != nil {
+			t.Errorf("an older replicated edit must be acknowledged, got %v", err)
+		}
+		if _, ok := other.GetUser(snapshot.AccessKey); ok {
+			t.Error("the server that acknowledged a stale edit still caches the deleted account")
+		}
+	})
+}

cmd/iam-svcacct-policy-edit_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"reflect"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	minio "github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+// An edit of a service account that names no policy keeps the embedded
+// policy: the account must not come out of a status change, a key rotation
+// or a rename with all its parent is allowed. Only a policy that is given
+// and empty removes the embedded one.
+
+const svcAccEditPolicy = `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::edit/*"]}]}`
+
+func TestIAMServiceAccountPolicySemantics(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, expiring := range []bool{false, true} {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("expiring=%v", expiring), func(t *testing.T) {
+			f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+			readPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(svcAccEditPolicy))
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			writePolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(strings.ReplaceAll(svcAccEditPolicy, "s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject")))
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			_, err = f.sys.PolicyDBSet(f.ctx, f.parent.AccessKey, "readwrite", regUser, false)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			for _, action := range []policy.Action{policy.GetObjectAction, policy.PutObjectAction} {
+				if !f.sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: f.parent.AccessKey, Action: action, BucketName: "edit", ObjectName: "object"}) {
+					t.Fatal("control: the parent must allow reads and writes to the test object")
+				}
+			}
+			noVersion, invalidVersion, oversized := *writePolicy, *writePolicy, *writePolicy
+			noVersion.Version = ""
+			invalidVersion.Version = "2008-10-17"
+			oversized.ID = policy.ID(strings.Repeat("x", maxSVCSessionPolicySize))
+			var expiration *time.Time
+			if expiring {
+				later := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+				expiration = &later
+			}
+			for i, tc := range []struct {
+				name    string
+				input   *policy.Policy
+				invalid bool
+			}{
+				{"nil", nil, false},
+				{"empty", &policy.Policy{}, false},
+				{"empty-statements", &policy.Policy{Statements: []policy.Statement{}}, false},
+				{"empty-with-version", &policy.Policy{Version: policy.DefaultVersion, Statements: []policy.Statement{}}, false},
+				{"missing-version", &noVersion, false},
+				{"version", writePolicy, false},
+				{"invalid-version", &invalidVersion, true},
+				{"empty-invalid-version", &policy.Policy{Version: "2008-10-17"}, true},
+				{"invalid-statement", &policy.Policy{Statements: []policy.Statement{{}}}, true},
+				{"oversized", &oversized, true},
+			} {
+				for _, edit := range []bool{false, true} {
+					t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/edit=%v", tc.name, edit), func(t *testing.T) {
+						key := fmt.Sprintf("policy-%d-%v", i, edit)
+						inputBefore, err := json.Marshal(tc.input)
+						mustIAM(t, err)
+						var before UserIdentity
+						if edit {
+							_, _, err = f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, f.parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+								accessKey: key, secretKey: "policy-valid-secret", sessionPolicy: readPolicy, expiration: expiration,
+							})
+							mustIAM(t, err)
+							mustIAM(t, f.sys.store.loadIAMConfig(f.ctx, &before, getUserIdentityPath(key, svcUser)))
+							_, err = f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, key, updateServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: tc.input, description: "edited"})
+						} else {
+							// Snapshots can carry a stale copy of the policy in claims.
+							var claims map[string]any
+							if tc.input != nil {
+								claims = map[string]any{policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(svcAccEditPolicy))}
+							}
+							_, _, err = f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, f.parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+								accessKey: key, secretKey: "policy-valid-secret", sessionPolicy: tc.input, expiration: expiration,
+								claims: claims,
+							})
+						}
+						if (err != nil) != tc.invalid {
+							t.Fatalf("operation error = %v, want rejected=%v", err, tc.invalid)
+						}
+						inputAfter, err := json.Marshal(tc.input)
+						mustIAM(t, err)
+						if !bytes.Equal(inputBefore, inputAfter) {
+							t.Fatal("operation changed the caller's policy")
+						}
+						var stored UserIdentity
+						loadErr := f.sys.store.loadIAMConfig(f.ctx, &stored, getUserIdentityPath(key, svcUser))
+						if tc.invalid {
+							if edit {
+								mustIAM(t, loadErr)
+								if !reflect.DeepEqual(stored, before) {
+									t.Fatal("rejected edit changed the stored account")
+								}
+							} else if loadErr != errConfigNotFound {
+								t.Fatalf("rejected create left an account: %v", loadErr)
+							}
+							return
+						}
+						mustIAM(t, loadErr)
+						claims, err := auth.ExtractClaims(stored.Credentials.SessionToken, stored.Credentials.SecretKey)
+						mustIAM(t, err)
+						if _, ok := claims.Map()[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
+							t.Fatal("raw JWT contains the derived policy claim")
+						}
+						var want *policy.Policy
+						if tc.input != nil && !tc.input.IsEmpty() {
+							want = writePolicy
+						} else if tc.input == nil && edit {
+							want = readPolicy
+						}
+						got, err := embeddedServiceAccountPolicy(claims)
+						mustIAM(t, err)
+						if (got == nil) != (want == nil) || (got != nil && !got.Equals(*want)) {
+							t.Fatalf("stored policy = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
+						}
+						if want == nil {
+							if _, ok := claims.Lookup(policy.SessionPolicyName); ok || claims.Map()[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] != inheritedPolicyType {
+								t.Fatal("inheritance must remove the embedded policy claim")
+							}
+						}
+						mustIAM(t, f.sys.store.LoadIAMCache(f.ctx, false))
+						u, valid, err := f.sys.CheckKey(f.ctx, key)
+						mustIAM(t, err)
+						if !valid || u.Credentials.IsTemp() != expiring {
+							t.Fatal("credential validity or expiration changed")
+						}
+						for _, action := range []policy.Action{policy.GetObjectAction, policy.PutObjectAction} {
+							allowed := f.sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: key, Claims: u.Credentials.Claims, Action: action, BucketName: "edit", ObjectName: "object"})
+							wantAllowed := want == nil || (want == readPolicy && action == policy.GetObjectAction) || (want == writePolicy && action == policy.PutObjectAction)
+							if allowed != wantAllowed {
+								t.Errorf("%s allowed=%v, want %v", action, allowed, wantAllowed)
+							}
+						}
+					})
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMServiceAccountEditKeepsPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	want, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(svcAccEditPolicy))
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+
+	// restricted creates a service account with the embedded policy.
+	restricted := func(t *testing.T, key, status string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		_, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, f.parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: key, secretKey: "edit-original-secret", status: status, sessionPolicy: want})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	// embedded reports whether this server and storage have the policy, and
+	// returns the stored credential.
+	embedded := func(t *testing.T, key string) (cached, stored bool, cr auth.Credentials) {
+		t.Helper()
+		_, got, err := f.sys.GetServiceAccount(f.ctx, key)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		if got != nil && !got.Equals(*want) {
+			t.Fatalf("the embedded policy changed: %+v", got)
+		}
+		u, ok := f.stored(t, key)
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("service account missing in storage")
+		}
+		claims, err := getClaimsFromTokenWithSecret(u.Credentials.SessionToken, u.Credentials.SecretKey)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		_, hasPolicy := claims.Lookup(policy.SessionPolicyName)
+		return got != nil, hasPolicy && claims.MapClaims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == embeddedPolicyType, u.Credentials
+	}
+	// check wants the edit applied, and the policy kept or removed.
+	check := func(t *testing.T, key string, keep bool, took func(auth.Credentials) bool) {
+		t.Helper()
+		cached, stored, cr := embedded(t, key)
+		if cached != keep || stored != keep {
+			t.Errorf("embedded policy: cached=%v stored=%v, want %v", cached, stored, keep)
+		}
+		if took != nil && !took(cr) {
+			t.Errorf("the edit did not apply: status=%q name=%q description=%q expiration=%v", cr.Status, cr.Name, cr.Description, cr.Expiration)
+		}
+	}
+
+	later := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+	for _, edit := range []struct {
+		name, start string
+		opts        updateServiceAccountOpts
+		took        func(auth.Credentials) bool
+	}{
+		{"disable", auth.AccountOn, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: string(madmin.AccountDisabled)}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Status == auth.AccountOff }},
+		{"enable", auth.AccountOff, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: string(madmin.AccountEnabled)}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Status == auth.AccountOn }},
+		{"status-off", auth.AccountOn, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: auth.AccountOff}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Status == auth.AccountOff }},
+		{"status-on", auth.AccountOff, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: auth.AccountOn}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Status == auth.AccountOn }},
+		{"secret-key", auth.AccountOn, updateServiceAccountOpts{secretKey: "edit-rotated-secret"}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.SecretKey == "edit-rotated-secret" }},
+		{"name", auth.AccountOn, updateServiceAccountOpts{name: "renamed"}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Name == "renamed" }},
+		{"description", auth.AccountOn, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "described"}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Description == "described" }},
+		{"expiration", auth.AccountOn, updateServiceAccountOpts{expiration: &later}, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Expiration.Equal(later) }},
+	} {
+		t.Run(edit.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			key := "edit-" + edit.name
+			restricted(t, key, edit.start)
+			_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, key, edit.opts)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			check(t, key, true, edit.took)
+		})
+	}
+
+	t.Run("empty-policy", func(t *testing.T) {
+		const key = "edit-empty-policy"
+		restricted(t, key, auth.AccountOn)
+		_, err := f.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(f.ctx, key, updateServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: &policy.Policy{}})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		check(t, key, false, nil)
+	})
+
+	// A peer applies the edit as the site that took it did. The edit goes
+	// through the encoding of the wire, which is where no policy and a null
+	// one become the same.
+	for _, edit := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		update madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate
+		keep   bool
+		took   func(auth.Credentials) bool
+	}{
+		{"peer-status", madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{Status: auth.AccountOff}, true, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Status == auth.AccountOff }},
+		{"peer-null", madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{Description: "described", SessionPolicy: madmin.SRSessionPolicy("null")}, true, func(c auth.Credentials) bool { return c.Description == "described" }},
+		{"peer-empty", madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{SessionPolicy: madmin.SRSessionPolicy(`{"Statement":[]}`)}, false, nil},
+		{"peer-empty-v", madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{SessionPolicy: madmin.SRSessionPolicy(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[]}`)}, false, nil},
+	} {
+		t.Run(edit.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			key := "edit-" + edit.name
+			restricted(t, key, auth.AccountOn)
+			edit.update.AccessKey = key
+			sent, err := json.Marshal(iamReplicationItem{SRIAMItem: madmin.SRIAMItem{
+				Type:         madmin.SRIAMItemSvcAcc,
+				SvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{Update: &edit.update},
+				UpdatedAt:    UTCNow(),
+			}})
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			var got iamReplicationItem
+			mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(sent, &got))
+			mustIAM(t, applyIAMReplicationItem(f.ctx, got))
+			check(t, key, edit.keep, edit.took)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The same over the admin API, with what a client can send for no policy.
+func TestServiceAccountUpdateKeepsPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == globalWindowsOSName {
+		t.Skip("IAM integration harness is disabled on Windows")
+	}
+	s := newTestSuiteIAM(TestSuiteCommon{serverType: "ErasureSD", signer: signerV4}, false)
+	c := &check{t, s.serverType}
+	s.SetUpSuite(c)
+	defer s.TearDownSuite(c)
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), testDefaultTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	bucket := getRandomBucketName()
+	if err := s.client.MakeBucket(ctx, bucket, minio.MakeBucketOptions{}); err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("bucket create error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := s.adm.AddCannedPolicy(ctx, "keeps-policy-parent", fmt.Appendf(nil, `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[
+{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ListBucket"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s"]},
+{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:PutObject","s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]}]}`, bucket, bucket)); err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("policy add error: %v", err)
+	}
+	parentAK, parentSK := mustGenerateCredentials(c)
+	if err := s.adm.SetUser(ctx, parentAK, parentSK, madmin.AccountEnabled); err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("unable to set user: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := s.adm.AttachPolicy(ctx, madmin.PolicyAssociationReq{Policies: []string{"keeps-policy-parent"}, User: parentAK}); err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("unable to attach policy: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// The account may read objects; listing is its parent's to do.
+	svcAK, svcSK := mustGenerateCredentials(c)
+	cr, err := s.adm.AddServiceAccount(ctx, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{
+		Policy:     fmt.Appendf(nil, `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]}]}`, bucket),
+		TargetUser: parentAK,
+		AccessKey:  svcAK,
+		SecretKey:  svcSK,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("unable to create svc acc: %v", err)
+	}
+	c.mustUpload(ctx, s.client, bucket)
+	svcClient := s.getUserClient(c, cr.AccessKey, cr.SecretKey, "")
+	c.mustDownload(ctx, svcClient, bucket)
+	c.mustNotListObjects(ctx, svcClient, bucket)
+
+	info := func() madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp {
+		info, err := s.adm.InfoServiceAccount(ctx, svcAK)
+		if err != nil {
+			c.Fatalf("unable to get svc acc info: %v", err)
+		}
+		return info
+	}
+
+	_, rotatedSK := mustGenerateCredentials(c)
+	later := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Truncate(time.Second)
+	for _, edit := range []struct {
+		name string
+		req  madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq
+		took func(madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool
+	}{
+		{"disable", madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewStatus: "off"}, func(i madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool { return i.AccountStatus == auth.AccountOff }},
+		{"enable", madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewStatus: "on"}, func(i madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool { return i.AccountStatus == auth.AccountOn }},
+		{"description", madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewDescription: "described"}, func(i madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool { return i.Description == "described" }},
+		{"name", madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "renamed"}, func(i madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool { return i.Name == "renamed" }},
+		{"expiry", madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewExpiration: &later}, func(i madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool { return i.Expiration != nil && i.Expiration.Equal(later) }},
+		{"secret-key", madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: rotatedSK}, func(madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool {
+			// The new key signs a request the embedded policy allows.
+			svcClient = s.getUserClient(c, svcAK, rotatedSK, "")
+			_, err := svcClient.StatObject(ctx, bucket, "some-object", minio.StatObjectOptions{})
+			return err == nil
+		}},
+		{"null-policy", madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage("null"), NewDescription: "null"}, func(i madmin.InfoServiceAccountResp) bool { return i.Description == "null" }},
+	} {
+		if err := s.adm.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, svcAK, edit.req); err != nil {
+			c.Fatalf("%s: unable to update svc acc: %v", edit.name, err)
+		}
+		got := info()
+		if got.ImpliedPolicy {
+			c.Fatalf("%s: the account lost its embedded policy", edit.name)
+		}
+		if !edit.took(got) {
+			c.Fatalf("%s: the edit did not apply: %+v", edit.name, got)
+		}
+	}
+	c.mustNotListObjects(ctx, svcClient, bucket)
+
+	// An empty policy document asks for the parent's policies.
+	if err := s.adm.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, svcAK, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewPolicy: []byte(`{"Statement":[]}`)}); err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("unable to remove the policy of svc acc: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !info().ImpliedPolicy {
+		c.Fatalf("an empty policy document must remove the embedded policy")
+	}
+	c.mustListObjects(ctx, svcClient, bucket)
+}

cmd/iam-svcacct-replication-snapshot_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"path"
+	"reflect"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+// Site replication sends a service account as the record its site has
+// stored, whole. A peer that applies the last item it was sent then has
+// the account of the sending site, whatever it received or lost before,
+// and whatever the sending server holds in its cache.
+
+const svcAccSnapshotPolicy = `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::snapshot/*"]}]}`
+
+// svcAccRecord is what a site has of a service account.
+type svcAccRecord struct {
+	Parent, Secret, Status, Name, Description, Policy string
+	Expiration, UpdatedAt                             time.Time
+}
+
+// svcAccPolicyText is a policy document in the one form it is compared in;
+// an account without an embedded policy has "".
+func svcAccPolicyText(t *testing.T, document []byte) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	if len(document) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	p, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(document))
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	text, err := json.Marshal(p)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	return string(text)
+}
+
+// svcAccStored is the account as a server that starts now loads it.
+func svcAccStored(t *testing.T, f *groupRefreshFixture, key string) svcAccRecord {
+	t.Helper()
+	u, ok := f.stored(t, key)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("service account %s is not stored", key)
+	}
+	cr := u.Credentials
+	rawClaims, err := auth.ExtractClaims(cr.SessionToken, cr.SecretKey)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if _, ok := rawClaims.Map()[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
+		t.Fatal("stored JWT contains the derived policy claim")
+	}
+	claims, err := getClaimsFromTokenWithSecret(cr.SessionToken, cr.SecretKey)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	rec := svcAccRecord{Parent: cr.ParentUser, Secret: cr.SecretKey, Status: cr.Status, Name: cr.Name, Description: cr.Description, Expiration: cr.Expiration, UpdatedAt: u.UpdatedAt}
+	if sp, ok := claims.Lookup(policy.SessionPolicyName); ok && claims.MapClaims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == embeddedPolicyType {
+		document, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sp)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		rec.Policy = svcAccPolicyText(t, document)
+	}
+	return rec
+}
+
+// svcAccSite is a site that replicates to one peer, which records the IAM
+// items it is sent.
+type svcAccSite struct {
+	*groupRefreshFixture
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	sent []iamReplicationItem
+}
+
+func newSvcAccSite(t *testing.T) *svcAccSite {
+	t.Helper()
+	s := &svcAccSite{groupRefreshFixture: newGroupRefreshFixture(t)}
+	globalObjLayerMutex.Lock()
+	globalObjectAPI = s.obj
+	globalObjLayerMutex.Unlock()
+
+	peer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.Method == http.MethodPut && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, iamRevisionPeerPath) {
+			var batch iamRevisionBatch
+			if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&batch); err != nil {
+				t.Error(err)
+			}
+			s.mu.Lock()
+			s.sent = append(s.sent, batch.Items...)
+			s.mu.Unlock()
+		}
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(iamRevisionResponse{iamRevisionStatus: iamRevisionStatus{Version: iamRevisionProtocol, Node: "node", Instance: "boot", Digest: "fixture"}})
+	}))
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set("snapshot-site-signing-key")
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = true
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.state = srState{ServiceAccountAccessKey: s.parent.AccessKey, Peers: s.peers(peer.URL)}
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		s.leave()
+		peer.Close()
+	})
+	return s
+}
+
+func (s *svcAccSite) peers(endpoint string) map[string]madmin.PeerInfo {
+	return map[string]madmin.PeerInfo{
+		globalDeploymentID(): {Name: "local", DeploymentID: globalDeploymentID()},
+		"remote":             {Name: "remote", DeploymentID: "remote", Endpoint: endpoint},
+	}
+}
+
+// leave ends the replication of this process, for the site that comes next.
+func (s *svcAccSite) leave() {
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = false
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.state = srState{}
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set("")
+}
+
+// items are the creates and edits of account key the peer was sent, in the
+// order of sending.
+func (s *svcAccSite) items(key string) []iamReplicationItem {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	var items []iamReplicationItem
+	for _, item := range s.sent {
+		c := item.SvcAccChange
+		if c != nil && ((c.Create != nil && c.Create.AccessKey == key) || (c.Update != nil && c.Update.AccessKey == key)) {
+			items = append(items, item)
+		}
+	}
+	return items
+}
+
+// create and edit are an administrator's requests to this site.
+func (s *svcAccSite) create(t *testing.T, key string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	rec := iamAdminCall(t, globalActiveCred, http.MethodPut, "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account",
+		madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{TargetUser: s.parent.AccessKey, AccessKey: key, SecretKey: "snapshot-original-secret"}, nil, adminAPIHandlers{}.AddServiceAccount)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("add-service-account: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *svcAccSite) edit(t *testing.T, key string, req madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq) {
+	t.Helper()
+	rec := iamAdminCall(t, globalActiveCred, http.MethodPost, "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+key,
+		req, map[string]string{"accessKey": key}, adminAPIHandlers{}.UpdateServiceAccount)
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Fatalf("update-service-account: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// svcAccPeer is the site that applies items, in the order given, and what
+// it then has of account key. It has the parent user, as a peer does.
+func svcAccPeer(t *testing.T, from *svcAccSite, key string, items ...iamReplicationItem) svcAccRecord {
+	t.Helper()
+	from.leave()
+	peer := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	for i, item := range items {
+		// As the peer reads it off the wire.
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(item)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		var received iamReplicationItem
+		mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &received))
+		if create := received.SvcAccChange.Create; create != nil {
+			if _, ok := create.Claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
+				t.Fatal("replication snapshot contains the derived policy claim")
+			}
+		}
+		if err := applyIAMReplicationItem(peer.ctx, received); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("the peer refused item %d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	return svcAccStored(t, peer, key)
+}
+
+func wantSvcAccRecord(t *testing.T, where string, got, want svcAccRecord) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if got != want {
+		t.Errorf("%s:\n got %+v\nwant %+v", where, got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// An edit of a service account reaches a peer whatever became of the edits
+// before it: one that arrives late, or never, is not lost.
+func TestSiteReplicationServiceAccountEdits(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "snapshot-edits"
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name  string
+		edits []madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq
+		took  func(svcAccRecord) bool // control: what the site has after them
+	}{
+		{"policy-secret-description", []madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(svcAccSnapshotPolicy)},
+			{NewSecretKey: "snapshot-rotated-secret"},
+			{NewDescription: "described"},
+		}, func(r svcAccRecord) bool {
+			return r.Policy != "" && r.Secret == "snapshot-rotated-secret" && r.Description == "described"
+		}},
+		{"secret-disable", []madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(svcAccSnapshotPolicy), NewSecretKey: "snapshot-rotated-secret"},
+			{NewStatus: string(madmin.AccountDisabled)},
+		}, func(r svcAccRecord) bool {
+			return r.Policy != "" && r.Secret == "snapshot-rotated-secret" && r.Status == auth.AccountOff
+		}},
+		// The last edit removes the embedded policy: the peer gets an
+		// account without one, and the description set before.
+		{"policy-removed", []madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(svcAccSnapshotPolicy)},
+			{NewDescription: "described"},
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(`{"Statement":[]}`)},
+		}, func(r svcAccRecord) bool { return r.Policy == "" && r.Description == "described" }},
+		{"policy-removed-with-version", []madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(svcAccSnapshotPolicy)},
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[]}`), NewName: "named"},
+			{NewDescription: "described"},
+		}, func(r svcAccRecord) bool {
+			return r.Policy == "" && r.Name == "named" && r.Description == "described"
+		}},
+		{"policy-missing-version", []madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(svcAccSnapshotPolicy)},
+			{NewPolicy: json.RawMessage(strings.ReplaceAll(strings.ReplaceAll(svcAccSnapshotPolicy, `"Version":"2012-10-17",`, ""), "s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"))},
+			{NewDescription: "described"},
+		}, func(r svcAccRecord) bool {
+			return r.Policy == svcAccPolicyText(t, []byte(strings.ReplaceAll(svcAccSnapshotPolicy, "s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"))) && r.Description == "described"
+		}},
+	} {
+		for _, delivery := range []string{"late", "lost"} {
+			t.Run(tc.name+"/"+delivery, func(t *testing.T) {
+				site := newSvcAccSite(t)
+				site.create(t, key)
+				for _, edit := range tc.edits {
+					site.edit(t, key, edit)
+				}
+				sent := site.items(key)
+				if len(sent) != 1+len(tc.edits) {
+					t.Fatalf("the site sent %d items for the account, want one for the create and each edit", len(sent))
+				}
+				want := svcAccStored(t, site.groupRefreshFixture, key)
+				if !tc.took(want) {
+					t.Fatalf("control: the site did not apply the edits: %+v", want)
+				}
+				// The peer has the account and gets the last edit. The edits
+				// before it were lost, or reach it after the last.
+				last := len(sent) - 1
+				deliver := []iamReplicationItem{sent[0], sent[last]}
+				if delivery == "late" {
+					deliver = append(deliver, sent[1:last]...)
+				}
+				wantSvcAccRecord(t, "peer", svcAccPeer(t, site, key, deliver...), want)
+			})
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Two requests edit the account through this site at once, and the
+	// first comes to replicate when the second is stored.
+	t.Run("concurrent", func(t *testing.T) {
+		site := newSvcAccSite(t)
+		site.create(t, key)
+		sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(svcAccSnapshotPolicy))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		first, err := site.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(site.ctx, key, updateServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: sp})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		second, err := site.sys.UpdateServiceAccount(site.ctx, key, updateServiceAccountOpts{description: "described"})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		for _, at := range []time.Time{first, second} {
+			mustIAM(t, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(site.ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
+				Type:         madmin.SRIAMItemSvcAcc,
+				SvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{Update: &madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{AccessKey: key}},
+				UpdatedAt:    at,
+			}))
+		}
+		want := svcAccStored(t, site.groupRefreshFixture, key)
+		if want.Policy == "" || want.Description != "described" {
+			t.Fatalf("control: the site did not apply the edits: %+v", want)
+		}
+		wantSvcAccRecord(t, "peer", svcAccPeer(t, site, key, site.items(key)...), want)
+	})
+}
+
+// Another server of the site restricted, rotated and disabled the account,
+// and this server's cache has not heard of it. What this server sends, and
+// exports, is the account that is stored.
+func TestSiteReplicationServiceAccountStaleCache(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "snapshot-stale"
+	// prepare returns the site, the stored account and what it sent for the
+	// create.
+	prepare := func(t *testing.T) (*svcAccSite, svcAccRecord, iamReplicationItem) {
+		t.Helper()
+		site := newSvcAccSite(t)
+		site.create(t, key)
+		created := site.items(key)
+		if len(created) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("the site sent %d items for the create", len(created))
+		}
+		sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(svcAccSnapshotPolicy))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		_, err = site.sibling(t).UpdateServiceAccount(site.ctx, key, updateServiceAccountOpts{
+			sessionPolicy: sp, secretKey: "snapshot-rotated-secret", status: auth.AccountOff, description: "restricted",
+		})
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		if cached, _ := site.sys.store.GetUser(key); cached.Credentials.SecretKey != "snapshot-original-secret" || cached.Credentials.Status != auth.AccountOn {
+			t.Fatal("control: this server's cache must not have heard of the edit")
+		}
+		want := svcAccStored(t, site.groupRefreshFixture, key)
+		if want.Policy == "" || want.Secret != "snapshot-rotated-secret" || want.Status != auth.AccountOff {
+			t.Fatalf("control: the edit is not stored: %+v", want)
+		}
+		return site, want, created[0]
+	}
+
+	t.Run("heal", func(t *testing.T) {
+		site, want, created := prepare(t)
+		local := madmin.UserInfo{Status: madmin.AccountStatus(want.Status), UpdatedAt: want.UpdatedAt}
+		remote := madmin.UserInfo{Status: madmin.AccountStatus(auth.AccountOn), UpdatedAt: created.UpdatedAt}
+		info := srStatusInfo{Sites: globalSiteReplicationSys.state.Peers, UserStats: map[string]map[string]srUserStatsSummary{key: {
+			globalDeploymentID(): {userInfo: srUserInfo{UserInfo: local}},
+			"remote":             {SRUserStatsSummary: madmin.SRUserStatsSummary{UserInfoMismatch: true}, userInfo: srUserInfo{UserInfo: remote}},
+		}}}
+		mustIAM(t, globalSiteReplicationSys.healUsers(site.ctx, site.obj, key, info))
+		sent := site.items(key)
+		if len(sent) != 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("heal sent %d items for the account, want 1", len(sent)-1)
+		}
+		wantSvcAccRecord(t, "healed peer", svcAccPeer(t, site, key, sent...), want)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("sync", func(t *testing.T) {
+		site, want, _ := prepare(t)
+		mustIAM(t, globalSiteReplicationSys.syncToAllPeers(site.ctx, madmin.SRAddOptions{}))
+		sent := site.items(key)
+		if len(sent) != 2 {
+			t.Fatalf("sync sent %d items for the account, want 1", len(sent)-1)
+		}
+		wantSvcAccRecord(t, "new peer", svcAccPeer(t, site, key, sent[1]), want)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("export", func(t *testing.T) {
+		_, want, _ := prepare(t)
+		rec := iamAdminCall(t, globalActiveCred, http.MethodGet, "/minio/admin/v3/export-iam", nil, nil, adminAPIHandlers{}.ExportIAM)
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("export-iam: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+		archive, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(rec.Body.Bytes()), int64(rec.Body.Len()))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		file, err := archive.Open(path.Join(iamAssetsDir, allSvcAcctsFile))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		raw, err := io.ReadAll(file)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		var accounts map[string]madmin.SRSvcAccCreate
+		mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &accounts))
+		a, ok := accounts[key]
+		if !ok || a.Expiration == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("the export has no account %s with an expiration (present=%v)", key, ok)
+		}
+		got := svcAccRecord{Parent: a.Parent, Secret: a.SecretKey, Status: a.Status, Name: a.Name, Description: a.Description, Policy: svcAccPolicyText(t, a.SessionPolicy), Expiration: *a.Expiration}
+		want.UpdatedAt = time.Time{} // an export has no revisions
+		wantSvcAccRecord(t, "export", got, want)
+		if a.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] != embeddedPolicyType {
+			t.Errorf("exported claims say %v, want %s", a.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()], embeddedPolicyType)
+		}
+		if _, ok := a.Claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
+			t.Error("exported claims contain the derived policy claim")
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func TestIAMServiceAccountSnapshotClaims(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(svcAccSnapshotPolicy))
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	_, _, err = f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, f.parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+		accessKey: "snapshot-claims", secretKey: "snapshot-valid-secret", sessionPolicy: sp,
+		claims: map[string]any{"identity-attribute": "preserved"},
+	})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	u, ok := f.stored(t, "snapshot-claims")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("service account missing")
+	}
+	cr := u.Credentials
+	rawClaims, err := auth.ExtractClaims(cr.SessionToken, cr.SecretKey)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	derived, ok := cr.Claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("control: loaded claims must contain the derived policy")
+	}
+	snapshot, err := serviceAccountSnapshot(u)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(snapshot.Claims, rawClaims.Map()) {
+		t.Fatal("snapshot claims differ from the raw JWT")
+	}
+	if u.Credentials.SessionToken != cr.SessionToken || u.Credentials.Claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted] != derived {
+		t.Fatal("snapshot changed the source token or its cached claims")
+	}
+}
+
+// The parent was deleted and created again on both sites. The token of a
+// service account created afterwards names that revocation, and a peer
+// refuses a credential of the parent that does not: the create must carry
+// the claims of the token.
+func TestSiteReplicationServiceAccountOfRecreatedParent(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "snapshot-reparent"
+	site := newSvcAccSite(t)
+	mustIAM(t, site.sys.DeleteUser(site.ctx, site.parent.AccessKey, false))
+	iamAdminUser(site.ctx, t, site.sys, site.parent.AccessKey, "refresh-parent")
+	revoked, err := loadIAMRevision(site.ctx, site.sys.store, getUserIdentityPath(site.parent.AccessKey, regUser))
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if revoked.RevokedBefore.IsZero() {
+		t.Fatal("control: the parent must have a revocation boundary")
+	}
+	site.create(t, key)
+	sent := site.items(key)
+	if len(sent) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("the site sent %d items for the create", len(sent))
+	}
+	want := svcAccStored(t, site.groupRefreshFixture, key)
+
+	// The peer's parent is newer than the deletion, which leaves it live
+	// with the boundary: a parent that was deleted and created again.
+	site.leave()
+	peer := newGroupRefreshFixture(t)
+	mustIAM(t, peer.sys.DeleteUser(withIAMReplicationTime(peer.ctx, revoked.RevokedBefore), peer.parent.AccessKey, false))
+	if r, err := loadIAMRevision(peer.ctx, peer.sys.store, getUserIdentityPath(peer.parent.AccessKey, regUser)); err != nil || r.Deleted || !r.RevokedBefore.Equal(revoked.RevokedBefore) {
+		t.Fatalf("control: the peer's parent must be live with the boundary (err=%v deleted=%v)", err, r.Deleted)
+	}
+	mustIAM(t, applyIAMReplicationItem(peer.ctx, sent[0]))
+	if _, ok := peer.stored(t, key); !ok {
+		t.Fatal("the peer dropped the new service account")
+	}
+	wantSvcAccRecord(t, "peer", svcAccStored(t, peer, key), want)
+}
+
+// An account that is deleted is not sent, and that is not an error. An
+// account whose stored token cannot be read is not taken for deleted: the
+// site signing key is not available here, and no token is read without it.
+func TestSiteReplicationServiceAccountUnreadable(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "snapshot-unreadable"
+	site := newSvcAccSite(t)
+	site.create(t, key)
+	item := madmin.SRIAMItem{Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSvcAcc, SvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{Update: &madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{AccessKey: key}}}
+
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set("")
+	if _, err := globalSiteReplicationSys.replicationItem(site.ctx, item); err == nil || errors.Is(err, errIAMStaleUpdate) {
+		t.Errorf("an account whose token cannot be read must be an error, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(site.ctx, item); err == nil {
+		t.Error("the hook reported an account as sent that it could not read")
+	}
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set("snapshot-site-signing-key")
+
+	mustIAM(t, site.sys.DeleteServiceAccount(site.ctx, key, false))
+	if _, err := globalSiteReplicationSys.replicationItem(site.ctx, item); !errors.Is(err, errIAMStaleUpdate) {
+		t.Errorf("a deleted account must not be sent, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if sent := site.items(key); len(sent) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("the site sent %d items for the account, want only the create", len(sent))
+	}
+}
+
+// svcAccPausedStore holds every load of a user until proceed is closed.
+type svcAccPausedStore struct {
+	IAMStorageAPI
+	once             sync.Once
+	loading, proceed chan struct{}
+}
+
+func (s *svcAccPausedStore) loadUser(ctx context.Context, user string, userType IAMUserType, m map[string]UserIdentity) error {
+	s.once.Do(func() { close(s.loading) })
+	<-s.proceed
+	return s.IAMStorageAPI.loadUser(ctx, user, userType, m)
+}
+
+// The hook reads the account from storage without the lock of the
+// replication configuration. Loading an identity takes that lock for
+// reading; if the hook held it too, a change of the configuration that
+// arrives in between would wait for the hook, and the hook for it.
+func TestSiteReplicationHookReadsStorageUnlocked(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "snapshot-unlocked"
+	site := newSvcAccSite(t)
+	site.create(t, key)
+	paused := &svcAccPausedStore{IAMStorageAPI: site.sys.store.IAMStorageAPI, loading: make(chan struct{}), proceed: make(chan struct{})}
+	site.sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = paused
+
+	sent := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		sent <- globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(site.ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
+			Type:         madmin.SRIAMItemSvcAcc,
+			SvcAccChange: &madmin.SRSvcAccChange{Update: &madmin.SRSvcAccUpdate{AccessKey: key}},
+		})
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-paused.loading:
+	case err := <-sent:
+		t.Fatalf("the hook did not read the account from storage (err=%v)", err)
+	}
+	// A writer that had to wait here would never get the lock, nor the
+	// hook its next read lock behind that writer: try, do not wait.
+	if globalSiteReplicationSys.TryLock() {
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock() //nolint:staticcheck // only the lock is of interest
+	} else {
+		t.Error("the hook holds the lock of the replication configuration while it reads storage")
+	}
+	close(paused.proceed)
+	select {
+	case err := <-sent:
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("the hook did not return")
+	}
+	if got := site.items(key); len(got) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("the site sent %d items for the account, want the create and the edit", len(got))
+	}
+}
+
+// Healing must release its own configuration lock before calling the hook.
+// Otherwise a waiting configuration writer blocks the hook's next read lock.
+func TestSiteReplicationHealReadsStorageUnlocked(t *testing.T) {
+	const key = "heal-unlocked"
+	site := newSvcAccSite(t)
+	site.create(t, key)
+	stored := svcAccStored(t, site.groupRefreshFixture, key)
+	local := madmin.UserInfo{Status: madmin.AccountEnabled, UpdatedAt: stored.UpdatedAt}
+	remote := madmin.UserInfo{Status: madmin.AccountDisabled, UpdatedAt: stored.UpdatedAt.Add(-time.Minute)}
+	info := srStatusInfo{Sites: globalSiteReplicationSys.state.Peers, UserStats: map[string]map[string]srUserStatsSummary{key: {
+		globalDeploymentID(): {userInfo: srUserInfo{UserInfo: local}},
+		"remote":             {SRUserStatsSummary: madmin.SRUserStatsSummary{UserInfoMismatch: true}, userInfo: srUserInfo{UserInfo: remote}},
+	}}}
+	paused := &svcAccPausedStore{IAMStorageAPI: site.sys.store.IAMStorageAPI, loading: make(chan struct{}), proceed: make(chan struct{})}
+	site.sys.store.IAMStorageAPI = paused
+	release := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(paused.proceed) })
+	defer release()
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- globalSiteReplicationSys.healUsers(site.ctx, site.obj, key, info)
+	}()
+	select {
+	case <-paused.loading:
+	case err := <-done:
+		t.Fatalf("heal did not read the account from storage (err=%v)", err)
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("heal did not reach the storage read")
+	}
+	// Testing the writer lock without waiting keeps a regression from leaving
+	// deadlocked goroutines behind in the test process.
+	if globalSiteReplicationSys.TryLock() {
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock() //nolint:staticcheck // only the lock is of interest
+	} else {
+		t.Error("heal holds the replication configuration lock during a storage read")
+	}
+	release()
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("heal did not return")
+	}
+	if got := site.items(key); len(got) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("the site sent %d items, want the create and the healed snapshot", len(got))
+	}
+}

cmd/iam.go

@@ -1094,10 +1094,45 @@ type newServiceAccountOpts struct {
 	name, description           string
 	expiration                  *time.Time
 	allowSiteReplicatorAccount  bool // allow creating internal service account for site-replication.
+	preserveEmptyEmbeddedPolicy bool // preserve historical deny-all empty embedded policies on snapshot import/replication.
 
 	claims map[string]any
 }
 
+func svcAcctClaimsHaveEmbeddedPolicy(claims map[string]any) bool {
+	if claims == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	pt, _ := claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()].(string)
+	return pt == embeddedPolicyType
+}
+
+// marshalServiceAccountPolicy validates a supplied policy and normalizes its
+// version without changing the caller's policy. An empty policy means inheritance.
+func marshalServiceAccountPolicy(sp *policy.Policy) ([]byte, error) {
+	if sp == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	p := *sp
+	if p.Version == "" {
+		p.Version = policy.DefaultVersion
+	}
+	if err := p.Validate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if p.IsEmpty() {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	buf, err := json.Marshal(p)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if len(buf) > maxSVCSessionPolicySize {
+		return nil, errSessionPolicyTooLarge
+	}
+	return buf, nil
+}
+
 // NewServiceAccount - create a new service account
 func (sys *IAMSys) NewServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, parentUser string, groups []string, opts newServiceAccountOpts) (auth.Credentials, time.Time, error) {
 	if !sys.Initialized() {
@@ -1115,20 +1150,10 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) NewServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, parentUser string, gro
 		return auth.Credentials{}, time.Time{}, auth.ErrNoAccessKeyWithSecretKey
 	}
 
-	var policyBuf []byte
+	policyBuf, err := marshalServiceAccountPolicy(opts.sessionPolicy)
-	if opts.sessionPolicy != nil {
-		err := opts.sessionPolicy.Validate()
 	if err != nil {
 		return auth.Credentials{}, time.Time{}, err
 	}
-		policyBuf, err = json.Marshal(opts.sessionPolicy)
-		if err != nil {
-			return auth.Credentials{}, time.Time{}, err
-		}
-		if len(policyBuf) > maxSVCSessionPolicySize {
-			return auth.Credentials{}, time.Time{}, errSessionPolicyTooLarge
-		}
-	}
 
 	// found newly requested service account, to be same as
 	// parentUser, reject such operations.
@@ -1141,15 +1166,45 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) NewServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, parentUser string, gro
 	m := make(map[string]any)
 	m[parentClaim] = parentUser
 
-	if len(policyBuf) > 0 {
+	switch {
+	case len(policyBuf) > 0:
 		m[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(policyBuf)
 		m[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] = embeddedPolicyType
+	case opts.preserveEmptyEmbeddedPolicy:
+		switch {
+		case opts.sessionPolicy != nil:
+			p := *opts.sessionPolicy
+			if p.Version == "" {
+				p.Version = policy.DefaultVersion
+			}
+			buf, merr := json.Marshal(p)
+			if merr != nil {
+				return auth.Credentials{}, time.Time{}, merr
+			}
+			m[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(buf)
+			m[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] = embeddedPolicyType
+		default:
+			if raw, ok := opts.claims[policy.SessionPolicyName].(string); ok && raw != "" {
+				m[policy.SessionPolicyName] = raw
+				m[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] = embeddedPolicyType
 			} else {
 				m[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] = inheritedPolicyType
 			}
+		}
+	default:
+		m[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] = inheritedPolicyType
+	}
 
 	// Add all the necessary claims for the service account.
 	for k, v := range opts.claims {
+		// Older snapshots may carry this cache-only, decoded policy claim.
+		if k == sessionPolicyNameExtracted {
+			continue
+		}
+		// An explicit policy, including an empty one, owns this claim.
+		if k == policy.SessionPolicyName && opts.sessionPolicy != nil {
+			continue
+		}
 		_, ok := m[k]
 		if !ok {
 			m[k] = v
@@ -1162,7 +1217,6 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) NewServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, parentUser string, gro
 	}
 
 	var accessKey, secretKey string
-	var err error
 	if len(opts.accessKey) > 0 || len(opts.secretKey) > 0 {
 		accessKey, secretKey = opts.accessKey, opts.secretKey
 	} else {
@@ -1211,6 +1265,9 @@ type updateServiceAccountOpts struct {
 	status            string
 	name, description string
 	expiration        *time.Time
+	// parentUser, when set, is the parent the caller was authorized for; an
+	// account stored under another parent is refused as absent.
+	parentUser string
 }
 
 // UpdateServiceAccount - edit a service account
@@ -1308,22 +1365,65 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) getServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, accessKey string) (Use
 		return UserIdentity{}, nil, errNoSuchServiceAccount
 	}
 
-	var embeddedPolicy *policy.Policy
+	embeddedPolicy, err := embeddedServiceAccountPolicy(jwtClaims)
+	if err != nil {
+		return UserIdentity{}, nil, err
+	}
+	return sa, embeddedPolicy, nil
+}
 
+// embeddedServiceAccountPolicy returns the policy embedded in the token of a
+// service account, or nil when the account has the policies of its parent.
+func embeddedServiceAccountPolicy(jwtClaims *jwt.MapClaims) (*policy.Policy, error) {
 	pt, ptok := jwtClaims.Lookup(iamPolicyClaimNameSA())
 	sp, spok := jwtClaims.Lookup(policy.SessionPolicyName)
-	if ptok && spok && pt == embeddedPolicyType {
+	if !ptok || !spok || pt != embeddedPolicyType {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
 	policyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sp)
 	if err != nil {
-			return UserIdentity{}, nil, err
+		return nil, err
-		}
-		embeddedPolicy, err = policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(policyBytes))
-		if err != nil {
-			return UserIdentity{}, nil, err
 	}
+	return policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader(policyBytes))
 }
 
-	return sa, embeddedPolicy, nil
+// serviceAccountSnapshot returns service account u, a record loaded from
+// storage, as the create that replication, the first sync, heal and export
+// carry. Its claims and its embedded policy are read from the token of that
+// record, so that every part of the snapshot is of one revision: a server's
+// cache may hold the account as it was before an edit made through another
+// server.
+func serviceAccountSnapshot(u UserIdentity) (madmin.SRSvcAccCreate, error) {
+	jwtClaims, err := extractJWTClaims(u)
+	if err != nil {
+		return madmin.SRSvcAccCreate{}, err
+	}
+	// Extraction adds a decoded policy for local authorization. Transport only
+	// the token's claims, so peers and imports do not sign this derived value.
+	jwtClaims.Delete(sessionPolicyNameExtracted)
+	embeddedPolicy, err := embeddedServiceAccountPolicy(jwtClaims)
+	if err != nil {
+		return madmin.SRSvcAccCreate{}, err
+	}
+	var policyJSON []byte
+	if embeddedPolicy != nil {
+		if policyJSON, err = json.Marshal(embeddedPolicy); err != nil {
+			return madmin.SRSvcAccCreate{}, err
+		}
+	}
+	cr := u.Credentials
+	return madmin.SRSvcAccCreate{
+		Parent:        cr.ParentUser,
+		AccessKey:     cr.AccessKey,
+		SecretKey:     cr.SecretKey,
+		Groups:        cr.Groups,
+		Claims:        jwtClaims.Map(),
+		SessionPolicy: policyJSON,
+		Status:        cr.Status,
+		Name:          cr.Name,
+		Description:   cr.Description,
+		Expiration:    &cr.Expiration,
+	}, nil
 }
 
 // GetTemporaryAccount - wrapper method to get information about a temporary account
@@ -1395,25 +1495,6 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) getAccountWithClaims(ctx context.Context, accessKey string) (
 	return acc, jwtClaims, nil
 }
 
-// GetClaimsForSvcAcc - gets the claims associated with the service account.
-func (sys *IAMSys) GetClaimsForSvcAcc(ctx context.Context, accessKey string) (map[string]any, error) {
-	if !sys.Initialized() {
-		return nil, errServerNotInitialized
-	}
-
-	sa, ok := sys.store.GetUser(accessKey)
-	if !ok || !sa.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
-		return nil, errNoSuchServiceAccount
-	}
-
-	jwtClaims, err := extractJWTClaims(sa)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	return jwtClaims.Map(), nil
-}
-
 // DeleteServiceAccount - delete a service account
 func (sys *IAMSys) DeleteServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, accessKey string, notifyPeers bool) error {
 	if !sys.Initialized() {
@@ -1658,8 +1739,10 @@ func (sys *IAMSys) updateGroupMembershipsForLDAP(ctx context.Context) {
 				continue
 			}
 
-			cred.Groups = currGroups
+			// Only the groups change, on the credential as it is stored now:
-			if err := sys.store.UpdateUserIdentity(ctx, cred); err != nil {
+			// cred is a snapshot from before the lookup, and a rotation, an
+			// edit or a deletion since then must stand.
+			if _, err := sys.store.RefreshUserGroups(ctx, cred, currGroups); err != nil {
 				// Log and continue error - perhaps it'll work the next time.
 				iamLogIf(GlobalContext, err)
 			}

cmd/metrics-batch.go

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"maps"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+)
+
+type realtimeMetrics struct {
+	madmin.RealtimeMetrics
+	Aggregated realtimeMetricGroups            `json:"aggregated"`
+	ByHost     map[string]realtimeMetricGroups `json:"by_host,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type realtimeMetricGroups struct {
+	madmin.Metrics
+	BatchJobs *batchJobMetricsReport `json:"batchJobs,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type batchJobMetricsReport struct {
+	CollectedAt time.Time `json:"collected"`
+	Jobs        map[string]batchJobStatusMetric
+}
+
+func (metrics *realtimeMetrics) Merge(other *realtimeMetrics) {
+	if other == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	metrics.RealtimeMetrics.Merge(&other.RealtimeMetrics)
+	metrics.Aggregated.Merge(&other.Aggregated.Metrics)
+	if other.Aggregated.BatchJobs != nil {
+		if metrics.Aggregated.BatchJobs == nil {
+			metrics.Aggregated.BatchJobs = &batchJobMetricsReport{Jobs: make(map[string]batchJobStatusMetric)}
+		}
+		jobs := metrics.Aggregated.BatchJobs
+		if other.Aggregated.BatchJobs.CollectedAt.After(jobs.CollectedAt) {
+			jobs.CollectedAt = other.Aggregated.BatchJobs.CollectedAt
+		}
+		for id, job := range other.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs {
+			if current, ok := jobs.Jobs[id]; !ok || !job.LastUpdate.Before(current.LastUpdate) {
+				jobs.Jobs[id] = job
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if len(other.ByHost) != 0 {
+		if metrics.ByHost == nil {
+			metrics.ByHost = make(map[string]realtimeMetricGroups, len(other.ByHost))
+		}
+		maps.Copy(metrics.ByHost, other.ByHost)
+	}
+}
+
+func (metrics realtimeMetricGroups) legacy() madmin.Metrics {
+	out := metrics.Metrics
+	if metrics.BatchJobs != nil {
+		out.BatchJobs = &madmin.BatchJobMetrics{
+			CollectedAt: metrics.BatchJobs.CollectedAt,
+			Jobs:        make(map[string]madmin.JobMetric, len(metrics.BatchJobs.Jobs)),
+		}
+		for id, job := range metrics.BatchJobs.Jobs {
+			out.BatchJobs.Jobs[id] = job.JobMetric
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func (metrics realtimeMetrics) legacy() madmin.RealtimeMetrics {
+	out := metrics.RealtimeMetrics
+	out.Aggregated = metrics.Aggregated.legacy()
+	if metrics.ByHost != nil {
+		out.ByHost = make(map[string]madmin.Metrics, len(metrics.ByHost))
+		for host, groups := range metrics.ByHost {
+			out.ByHost[host] = groups.legacy()
+		}
+	}
+	return out
+}

cmd/metrics-batch_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"reflect"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/grid"
+)
+
+func TestBatchMetricsStatusSnapshots(t *testing.T) {
+	fixture := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
+	job := BatchJobRequest{
+		ID: "expire-metrics-snapshot" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(),
+		Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t), Expire: &BatchJobExpire{},
+	}
+	for _, state := range []string{"skipped", "paused", "failed", "running"} {
+		t.Run(state, func(t *testing.T) {
+			report := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type()), StartTime: job.Started}
+			switch state {
+			case "skipped":
+				report.Complete = true
+				report.VersionsSkippedLocked, report.KeysRefused = 2, 1
+			case "paused":
+				report.PausedReason = "authorization plugin unavailable"
+			case "failed":
+				report.Failed = true
+				report.FailureReason = "authorization denied"
+			}
+			mustIAM(t, report.updateAfter(fixture.ctx, fixture.obj, 0, job))
+			globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, report)
+			saved := batchJobStatusJSON(t, job.ID)
+			for _, field := range []string{"startTime", "lastUpdate"} {
+				stamp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, saved[field].(string))
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				saved[field] = stamp.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
+			}
+			target := fmt.Sprintf("http://localhost/minio/admin/v3/metrics?types=%d&by-jobID=%s&n=1&by-host=true", madmin.MetricsBatchJobs, job.ID)
+			request, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, target, 0, nil, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, nil)
+			mustIAM(t, err)
+			mustIAM(t, request.ParseForm())
+			response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			request = request.WithContext(newContext(request, response, "Metrics"))
+			adminAPIHandlers{}.MetricsHandler(response, request)
+			if response.Code != http.StatusOK {
+				t.Fatalf("metrics returned %d: %s", response.Code, response.Body.String())
+			}
+			var wire struct {
+				Aggregated struct {
+					BatchJobs struct{ Jobs map[string]map[string]any }
+				}
+				ByHost map[string]struct {
+					BatchJobs struct{ Jobs map[string]map[string]any }
+				} `json:"by_host"`
+			}
+			mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &wire))
+			if !reflect.DeepEqual(wire.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[job.ID], saved) {
+				t.Fatalf("live snapshot differs from saved status: live=%v saved=%v", wire.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[job.ID], saved)
+			}
+			if len(wire.ByHost) != 1 {
+				t.Fatalf("missing per-host snapshot: %s", response.Body.String())
+			}
+			for _, host := range wire.ByHost {
+				if !reflect.DeepEqual(host.BatchJobs.Jobs[job.ID], saved) {
+					t.Fatal("per-host metrics lost details")
+				}
+			}
+			var legacy madmin.RealtimeMetrics
+			mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &legacy))
+			if legacy.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[job.ID].JobID != job.ID || legacy.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[job.ID].Complete != report.Complete {
+				t.Fatal("additive details changed legacy metrics")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBatchMetricsPeerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	report := &batchJobInfo{JobID: "remote-job", LastUpdate: UTCNow(), PausedReason: "IAM unavailable", VersionsSkippedLocked: 3, KeysRefused: 2}
+	remote := realtimeMetrics{}
+	remote.Hosts = []string{"peer"}
+	remote.Aggregated.BatchJobs = &batchJobMetricsReport{
+		CollectedAt: UTCNow(), Jobs: map[string]batchJobStatusMetric{report.JobID: report.statusMetric()},
+	}
+	remote.ByHost = map[string]realtimeMetricGroups{"peer": remote.Aggregated}
+	encoded := madminRealtimeMetrics.NewJSONWith(&remote)
+	data, err := encoded.MarshalMsg(nil)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	decoded := madminRealtimeMetrics.NewJSON()
+	defer decoded.Recycle()
+	_, err = decoded.UnmarshalMsg(data)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	var merged realtimeMetrics
+	received := decoded.ValueOrZero()
+	merged.Merge(&received)
+	got := merged.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[report.JobID]
+	if got.PausedReason != report.PausedReason || got.KeysRefused != 2 || got.VersionsSkippedLocked == nil || *got.VersionsSkippedLocked != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("peer aggregation lost details: %+v", got)
+	}
+	older := received
+	older.Aggregated.BatchJobs = &batchJobMetricsReport{Jobs: map[string]batchJobStatusMetric{
+		report.JobID: {JobMetric: madmin.JobMetric{JobID: report.JobID, LastUpdate: report.LastUpdate.Add(-time.Second), Complete: true}},
+	}}
+	merged.Merge(&older)
+	if got := merged.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[report.JobID]; got.Complete || got.PausedReason != report.PausedReason {
+		t.Fatal("older peer snapshot replaced current progress")
+	}
+	legacyPool := grid.NewJSONPool[madmin.RealtimeMetrics]()
+	legacy := legacyPool.NewJSON()
+	defer legacy.Recycle()
+	_, err = legacy.UnmarshalMsg(data)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if got := legacy.ValueOrZero().Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[report.JobID]; got.JobID != report.JobID || !got.LastUpdate.Equal(report.LastUpdate) {
+		t.Fatal("legacy peer could not read base metrics")
+	}
+	legacyData, err := legacy.MarshalMsg(nil)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	_, err = decoded.UnmarshalMsg(legacyData)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	received = decoded.ValueOrZero()
+	if received.Aggregated.BatchJobs.Jobs[report.JobID].VersionsSkippedLocked != nil {
+		t.Fatal("legacy peer falsely advertised complete status details")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBatchMetricsPreservesOtherMetrics(t *testing.T) {
+	var legacy madmin.RealtimeMetrics
+	var extended realtimeMetrics
+	for _, host := range []string{"first", "second"} {
+		groups := madmin.Metrics{
+			Disk: &madmin.DiskMetric{CollectedAt: time.Unix(1, 0).UTC(), NDisks: 2, Offline: 1},
+			CPU:  &madmin.CPUMetrics{CPUCount: 4},
+		}
+		sample := madmin.RealtimeMetrics{
+			Hosts: []string{host}, Errors: []string{host + ": test"},
+			Aggregated: groups, ByHost: map[string]madmin.Metrics{host: groups},
+			ByDisk: map[string]madmin.DiskMetric{host: *groups.Disk},
+		}
+		data, err := json.Marshal(sample)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		var decoded realtimeMetrics
+		mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &decoded))
+		extended.Merge(&decoded)
+		legacy.Merge(&sample)
+	}
+	if got := extended.legacy(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, legacy) {
+		t.Fatalf("batch extension changed other metrics: got=%+v want=%+v", got, legacy)
+	}
+}

cmd/metrics-realtime.go

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ type collectMetricsOpts struct {
 	depID string
 }
 
-func collectLocalMetrics(types madmin.MetricType, opts collectMetricsOpts) (m madmin.RealtimeMetrics) {
+func collectLocalMetrics(types madmin.MetricType, opts collectMetricsOpts) (m realtimeMetrics) {
 	if types == madmin.MetricsNone {
 		return m
 	}
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ func collectLocalMetrics(types madmin.MetricType, opts collectMetricsOpts) (m ma
 	// Add types...
 
 	// ByHost is a shallow reference, so careful about sharing.
-	m.ByHost = map[string]madmin.Metrics{byHostName: m.Aggregated}
+	m.ByHost = map[string]realtimeMetricGroups{byHostName: m.Aggregated}
 	m.Hosts = append(m.Hosts, byHostName)
 
 	return m
@@ -221,11 +221,11 @@ func collectLocalDisksMetrics(disks map[string]struct{}) map[string]madmin.DiskM
 	return metrics
 }
 
-func collectRemoteMetrics(ctx context.Context, types madmin.MetricType, opts collectMetricsOpts) (m madmin.RealtimeMetrics) {
+func collectRemoteMetrics(ctx context.Context, types madmin.MetricType, opts collectMetricsOpts) (m realtimeMetrics) {
 	if !globalIsDistErasure {
 		return m
 	}
-	all := globalNotificationSys.GetMetrics(ctx, types, opts)
+	all := globalNotificationSys.getMetrics(ctx, types, opts)
 	for _, remote := range all {
 		m.Merge(&remote)
 	}

cmd/metrics-resource.go

@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func updateDriveIOStats(currentStats madmin.DiskIOStats, latestStats madmin.Disk
 	updateResourceMetrics(driveSubsystem, percUtil, float64(diffStats.TotalTicks)/(diffInSeconds*10), labels, false)
 }
 
-func collectDriveMetrics(m madmin.RealtimeMetrics) {
+func collectDriveMetrics(m realtimeMetrics) {
 	latestDriveStatsMu.Lock()
 	for d, dm := range m.ByDisk {
 		labels := map[string]string{"drive": d}

cmd/metrics-v2.go

@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ func getBatchJobsMetrics(opts MetricsGroupOpts) *MetricsGroupV2 {
 	}
 
 	mg.RegisterRead(func(ctx context.Context) (metrics []MetricV2) {
-		var m madmin.RealtimeMetrics
+		var m realtimeMetrics
 		mLocal := collectLocalMetrics(madmin.MetricsBatchJobs, collectMetricsOpts{})
 		m.Merge(&mLocal)
 

cmd/notification.go

@@ -873,9 +873,9 @@ func (sys *NotificationSys) GetOSInfo(ctx context.Context) []madmin.OSInfo {
 	return reply
 }
 
-// GetMetrics - Get metrics from all peers.
+// getMetrics - Get metrics from all peers.
-func (sys *NotificationSys) GetMetrics(ctx context.Context, t madmin.MetricType, opts collectMetricsOpts) []madmin.RealtimeMetrics {
+func (sys *NotificationSys) getMetrics(ctx context.Context, t madmin.MetricType, opts collectMetricsOpts) []realtimeMetrics {
-	reply := make([]madmin.RealtimeMetrics, len(sys.peerClients))
+	reply := make([]realtimeMetrics, len(sys.peerClients))
 
 	g := errgroup.WithNErrs(len(sys.peerClients))
 	for index, client := range sys.peerClients {

cmd/object-api-interface.go

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ type ObjectOptions struct {
 	DeleteMarker            bool // Is only set in DELETE operations for delete marker replication
 	CheckDMReplicationReady bool // Is delete marker ready to be replicated - set only during HEAD
 	Tagging                 bool // Is only in GET/HEAD operations to return tagging metadata along with regular metadata and body.
+	TaggingCount            bool // GET/HEAD caller is authorized to receive object tag metadata.
 
 	UserDefined         map[string]string   // only set in case of POST/PUT operations
 	ObjectAttributes    map[string]struct{} // Attribute tags defined by the users for the GetObjectAttributes request
@@ -122,6 +123,10 @@ type ObjectOptions struct {
 
 	// Pools-layer version resolver; the caller holds the shared object lock.
 	replicaObjectInfo GetObjectInfoFn
+	// Verifies protected content in every pool before a replica commits.
+	replicaContentGuard replicaContentGuardFn
+	// Selected under the object locks, before copy encryption/compression.
+	copyPlan *copyObjectPlan
 
 	// RefuseLockedOverwrite refuses, under the destination's write lock, a
 	// write that would replace a stored version Object Lock protects: the
@@ -297,6 +302,7 @@ type ObjectLayer interface {
 	NewObjectNSLock(bucket, object string) RWLocker
 	// lockObjects locks several objects together, see erasureServerPools.
 	lockObjects(ctx context.Context, reqs ...objectLockRequest) (LockContext, func(), error)
+	prepareCopyObject(ctx context.Context, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject string, srcInfo ObjectInfo, srcOpts, dstOpts ObjectOptions) (copyObjectPlan, error)
 
 	// Storage operations.
 	Shutdown(context.Context) error

cmd/object-api-options.go

@@ -303,13 +303,18 @@ func delOpts(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, bucket, object string) (opts
 		}
 	}
 
+	vc, _, err := checkBucketDeleteMetadata(bucket)
+	if err != nil {
+		return opts, err
+	}
+
 	opts.DeletePrefix = deletePrefix
-	opts.Versioned = globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(bucket, object)
+	opts.Versioned = vc.PrefixEnabled(object)
 	// Objects matching prefixes should not leave delete markers,
 	// dramatically reduces namespace pollution while keeping the
 	// benefits of replication, make sure to apply version suspension
 	// only at bucket level instead.
-	opts.VersionSuspended = globalBucketVersioningSys.Suspended(bucket)
+	opts.VersionSuspended = vc.Suspended()
 	// For directory objects, delete `null` version permanently.
 	if isDirObject(object) && opts.VersionID == "" {
 		opts.VersionID = nullVersionID

cmd/object-api-utils.go

@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@ func NewGetObjectReader(rs *HTTPRangeSpec, oi ObjectInfo, opts ObjectOptions, h
 			}
 			// Decompression reader.
 			var dopts []s2.ReaderOption
-			if off > 0 || decOff > 0 {
+			if off > 0 || decOff > 0 || decryptSkip > 0 {
 				// We are not starting at the beginning, so ignore stream identifiers.
 				dopts = append(dopts, s2.ReaderIgnoreStreamIdentifier())
 			}

cmd/object-attributes-archive-tags_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"archive/zip"
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+)
+
+func TestAPIAttributesAndArchiveStoredTags(t *testing.T) {
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t, makeBucketOptions: MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true},
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, router http.Handler, root auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			var archive bytes.Buffer
+			zw := zip.NewWriter(&archive)
+			entry, err := zw.Create("entry.txt")
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if _, err = entry.Write([]byte("private entry")); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if err = zw.Close(); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			for _, indexed := range []bool{false, true} {
+				key := fmt.Sprintf("tagged-%v.zip", indexed)
+				put := func(tag string) ObjectInfo {
+					oi, err := obj.PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(archive.Bytes()), int64(archive.Len()), "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "tier=" + tag}})
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					return oi
+				}
+				old := put("public")
+				latest := put("restricted")
+				if indexed {
+					if _, err := updateObjectMetadataWithZipInfo(t.Context(), obj, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: latest.VersionID}); err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+				}
+				for _, anonymous := range []bool{false, true} {
+					for _, effect := range []string{"Allow", "Deny"} {
+						actions := `"s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectAttributes","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:GetObjectVersionAttributes"`
+						condition := `"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/tier":"restricted"}}`
+						statement := fmt.Sprintf(`{"Effect":"%s","Action":[%s],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],%s}`, effect, actions, bucket, condition)
+						if effect == "Deny" {
+							statement += fmt.Sprintf(`,{"Effect":"Allow","Action":[%s],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]}`, actions, bucket)
+						}
+						statement += fmt.Sprintf(`,{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ListBucket"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s"]}`, bucket)
+						creds := newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, backend, bucket, "["+statement+"]")
+						if anonymous {
+							document := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[` + strings.ReplaceAll(statement, `"Effect":`, `"Principal":"*","Effect":`) + `]}`
+							if _, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketPolicyConfig, []byte(document)); err != nil {
+								t.Fatal(err)
+							}
+						}
+						for _, operation := range []string{"attributes", "version-attributes", http.MethodGet, http.MethodHead, "LIST"} {
+							t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/indexed=%v/anonymous=%v/%s/%s", backend, indexed, anonymous, effect, operation), func(t *testing.T) {
+								verb := http.MethodGet
+								target := getGetObjectURL("", bucket, key+"/entry.txt")
+								headers := map[string]string{xMinIOExtract: "true", xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "tier=public"}
+								want := http.StatusOK
+								if effect == "Deny" {
+									want = http.StatusForbidden
+								}
+								switch operation {
+								case "attributes", "version-attributes":
+									q := url.Values{"attributes": {""}}
+									if operation == "version-attributes" {
+										q.Set("versionId", old.VersionID)
+										if effect == "Allow" {
+											want = http.StatusForbidden
+										} else {
+											want = http.StatusOK
+										}
+									}
+									target = makeTestTargetURL("", bucket, key, q)
+									headers[xhttp.AmzObjectAttributes] = "ETag,ObjectSize"
+								case http.MethodHead:
+									verb = http.MethodHead
+								case "LIST":
+									target = "/" + bucket + "?list-type=2&prefix=" + key + "/"
+								}
+								req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(verb, target, 0, nil, creds.AccessKey, creds.SecretKey, headers)
+								if err != nil {
+									t.Fatal(err)
+								}
+								if anonymous {
+									req.Header.Del("Authorization")
+								}
+								rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+								router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+								if rec.Code != want {
+									t.Fatalf("status %d, want %d: %s", rec.Code, want, rec.Body.String())
+								}
+								if rec.Code == http.StatusOK && operation == http.MethodGet && rec.Body.String() != "private entry" {
+									t.Fatalf("wrong extracted content: %s", rec.Body.String())
+								}
+								if rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden && strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "private entry") {
+									t.Fatal("denied response disclosed content")
+								}
+							})
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			// Each Attributes action is necessary; a conditional Deny on either
+			// action must win even when the other action is unconditionally allowed.
+			for _, versioned := range []bool{false, true} {
+				for _, deniedAction := range []string{"GetObject", "GetObjectAttributes"} {
+					actions := `"s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectAttributes"`
+					if versioned {
+						actions = `"s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:GetObjectVersionAttributes"`
+						deniedAction = strings.Replace(deniedAction, "GetObject", "GetObjectVersion", 1)
+					}
+					statements := fmt.Sprintf(`[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":[%s],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:%s"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/tier":"restricted"}}}]`, actions, bucket, deniedAction, bucket)
+					creds := newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, backend, bucket, statements)
+					q := url.Values{"attributes": {""}}
+					if versioned {
+						oi, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, "tagged-true.zip", ObjectOptions{})
+						if err != nil {
+							t.Fatal(err)
+						}
+						q.Set("versionId", oi.VersionID)
+					}
+					req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, makeTestTargetURL("", bucket, "tagged-true.zip", q), 0, nil, creds.AccessKey, creds.SecretKey, map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectAttributes: "ETag"})
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+					router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+					if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+						t.Fatalf("%s Deny: %d %s", deniedAction, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			listOnly := newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, backend, bucket, fmt.Sprintf(`[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ListBucket"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s"]}]`, bucket))
+			for _, extract := range []bool{false, true} {
+				req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, "/"+bucket+"?list-type=2&prefix=tagged-true.zip/", 0, nil, listOnly.AccessKey, listOnly.SecretKey, map[string]string{xMinIOExtract: fmt.Sprint(extract)})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+				router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+				want := http.StatusOK
+				if extract {
+					want = http.StatusForbidden
+				}
+				if rec.Code != want {
+					t.Fatalf("list-only extract=%v: %d %s", extract, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}

cmd/object-attributes-read-error_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Denis Babchuk
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/xml"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+)
+
+// GetObjectAttributes answers NoSuchKey with AccessDenied to a caller without
+// s3:ListBucket on the bucket, as S3 does, so that a missing object cannot be
+// told apart from a forbidden one. A server error, such as lost read quorum,
+// must reach a caller allowed to read the object as the error it is.
+func TestGetObjectAttributesReadQuorumLost(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
+	defer cancel()
+	obj, dirs, err := prepareErasure16(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	z := obj.(*erasureServerPools)
+	previous := newObjectLayerFn()
+	setObjectLayer(z)
+	defer func() {
+		z.Shutdown(context.Background())
+		removeRoots(dirs)
+		setObjectLayer(previous)
+	}()
+	bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(ctx, z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	const object, missing = "object", "missing"
+	if _, err := z.PutObject(ctx, bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader([]byte("data")), 4, "", ""), ObjectOptions{UserDefined: map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "tier=restricted"}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	read := `{"Effect": "Allow", "Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:GetObjectAttributes"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::` + bucket + `/*"]}`
+	withoutList := newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, "", bucket, "["+read+"]")
+	withList := newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, "", bucket, "["+read+
+		`, {"Effect": "Allow", "Action": ["s3:ListBucket"], "Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::`+bucket+`"]}]`)
+
+	tagged := newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, "", bucket, `[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectAttributes"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::`+bucket+`/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/tier":"restricted"}}}]`)
+	unauthorized := newDeleteAuthzPolicyUser(t, "", bucket, `[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObjectAttributes"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::`+bucket+`/*"]}]`)
+
+	check := func(stage, user string, creds auth.Credentials, key string, want int) {
+		t.Helper()
+		target := makeTestTargetURL("", bucket, key, url.Values{"attributes": []string{""}})
+		req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, target, 0, nil, creds.AccessKey, creds.SecretKey,
+			map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectAttributes: "ETag"})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		if rec.Code != want {
+			var apiErr APIErrorResponse
+			_ = xml.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &apiErr)
+			t.Errorf("%s: GetObjectAttributes %s by %s: status %d %s, want %d", stage, key, user, rec.Code, apiErr.Code, want)
+		}
+	}
+
+	check("healthy", "withoutList", withoutList, object, http.StatusOK)
+	check("healthy", "withList", withList, object, http.StatusOK)
+	check("healthy", "withoutList", withoutList, missing, http.StatusForbidden)
+	check("healthy", "withList", withList, missing, http.StatusNotFound)
+
+	check("healthy", "tagged", tagged, object, http.StatusOK)
+	check("healthy", "unauthorized", unauthorized, object, http.StatusForbidden)
+
+	defer objectReadFault(z, bucket, object, 10)()
+	check("read quorum lost", "withoutList", withoutList, object, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+	check("read quorum lost", "withList", withList, object, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+	check("read quorum lost", "tagged", tagged, object, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+	check("read quorum lost", "unauthorized", unauthorized, object, http.StatusForbidden)
+}

cmd/object-compressed-range_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
+)
+
+// Indexed reads may skip into the first decrypted block while both the disk
+// offset and the remaining decompressed skip are zero. The reader must still
+// accept a compression block without the original stream identifier.
+func TestAPICompressedEncryptedRange(t *testing.T) {
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t,
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			previousKMS, previousTLS := GlobalKMS, globalIsTLS
+			var err error
+			GlobalKMS, err = kms.NewBuiltin("range-key", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, 32))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			globalIsTLS = true
+			defer func() { GlobalKMS, globalIsTLS = previousKMS, previousTLS }()
+			restore := setCopyChecksumCompression(true)
+			defer restore()
+			part := bytes.Repeat([]byte("compressible-A"), 1<<20)
+			for _, mode := range []string{"compressed", "sse-s3", "sse-kms"} {
+				for _, multipart := range []bool{false, true} {
+					t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/multipart=%t", backend, mode, multipart), func(t *testing.T) {
+						key := fmt.Sprintf("range-%s-%t.txt", mode, multipart)
+						headers := map[string]string{}
+						switch mode {
+						case "sse-s3":
+							headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES
+						case "sse-kms":
+							headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionKMS
+							headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID] = "range-key"
+						}
+						data := part
+						if multipart {
+							data = attributesPartsUpload(t, router, cred, bucket, key, headers,
+								[][]byte{part, bytes.Repeat([]byte("compressible-B"), 1<<20)}, []int{1, 2})
+						} else {
+							putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, key, data, headers)
+						}
+						oi, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
+						if err != nil {
+							t.Fatal(err)
+						}
+						_, encrypted := crypto.IsEncrypted(oi.UserDefined)
+						if !oi.IsCompressed() || encrypted != (mode != "compressed") || len(oi.Parts) == 0 || len(oi.Parts[0].Index) == 0 {
+							t.Fatal("fixture must have indexed compression and the requested encryption")
+						}
+						if encrypted {
+							off, decOff, _, skip, _ := getCompressedOffsets(oi, 1<<20, func(b []byte) ([]byte, error) { return oi.compressionIndexDecrypt(b, nil) })
+							if off != 0 || decOff != 0 || skip <= 0 {
+								t.Fatalf("fixture misses boundary: off=%d decOff=%d decryptSkip=%d", off, decOff, skip)
+							}
+						}
+						offsets := []int{0, 100, 1 << 20, 1<<20 + 1, len(data) - 1000}
+						if multipart {
+							offsets = append(offsets, len(part)-500, len(part), len(part)+1<<20)
+						}
+						for _, start := range offsets {
+							rec := attributesPartsSignedRequest(t, router, cred, http.MethodGet, getGetObjectURL("", bucket, key), nil,
+								map[string]string{"Range": fmt.Sprintf("bytes=%d-%d", start, start+999)})
+							if rec.Code != http.StatusPartialContent || !bytes.Equal(rec.Body.Bytes(), data[start:start+1000]) {
+								t.Errorf("range at %d: status=%d bytes=%d, want 206 and exact slice", start, rec.Code, rec.Body.Len())
+							}
+						}
+						rec := attributesPartsSignedRequest(t, router, cred, http.MethodGet, getGetObjectURL("", bucket, key), nil, nil)
+						if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !bytes.Equal(rec.Body.Bytes(), data) {
+							t.Fatal("full read changed after ranged reads")
+						}
+					})
+				}
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+func TestAPICompressedEncryptedRangeCorruptBlockRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	resetTestGlobals()
+	ctx := GlobalContext
+	obj, fsDir, err := prepareFSWithDisks(ctx, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer removeAll(fsDir)
+	defer obj.Shutdown(ctx)
+
+	bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(ctx, obj, nil, MakeBucketOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := newTestConfig(globalMinioDefaultRegion, obj); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	previousKMS, previousTLS := GlobalKMS, globalIsTLS
+	GlobalKMS, err = kms.NewBuiltin("range-key", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, 32))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	globalIsTLS = true
+	defer func() { GlobalKMS, globalIsTLS = previousKMS, previousTLS }()
+	restore := setCopyChecksumCompression(true)
+	defer restore()
+
+	cred := globalActiveCred
+	payload := bytes.Repeat([]byte("compressible-A"), 1<<20)
+
+	for _, mode := range []string{"compressed", "sse-kms"} {
+		key := "corrupt-" + mode + ".txt"
+		headers := map[string]string{}
+		if mode == "sse-kms" {
+			headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionKMS
+			headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID] = "range-key"
+		}
+		putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, key, payload, headers)
+
+		rec := attributesPartsSignedRequest(t, router, cred, http.MethodGet, getGetObjectURL("", bucket, key), nil,
+			map[string]string{"Range": fmt.Sprintf("bytes=%d-%d", 1<<20, (1<<20)+999)})
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusPartialContent || !bytes.Equal(rec.Body.Bytes(), payload[1<<20:(1<<20)+1000]) {
+			t.Fatalf("%s pre-corrupt range failed: code=%d", mode, rec.Code)
+		}
+
+		corruptedAny := false
+		_ = filepath.Walk(fsDir, func(path string, info os.FileInfo, walkErr error) error {
+			if walkErr != nil || info.IsDir() || !strings.Contains(path, key) {
+				return nil
+			}
+			raw, rerr := os.ReadFile(path)
+			if rerr != nil {
+				return nil
+			}
+			if strings.HasSuffix(path, "part.1") {
+				raw[len(raw)/2] ^= 0xff
+				_ = os.WriteFile(path, raw, info.Mode())
+				corruptedAny = true
+			} else if strings.HasSuffix(path, xlStorageFormatFile) && len(raw) > 256 {
+				raw[len(raw)-64] ^= 0xff
+				_ = os.WriteFile(path, raw, info.Mode())
+				corruptedAny = true
+			}
+			return nil
+		})
+		if !corruptedAny {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: failed to locate backing storage file to corrupt", mode)
+		}
+
+		recAfter := attributesPartsSignedRequest(t, router, cred, http.MethodGet, getGetObjectURL("", bucket, key), nil,
+			map[string]string{"Range": fmt.Sprintf("bytes=%d-%d", 1<<20, (1<<20)+999)})
+		if recAfter.Code == http.StatusPartialContent && recAfter.Body.Len() == 1000 {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: corrupted range unexpectedly returned 206 with 1000 bytes", mode)
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/object-copy-pools_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/md5"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
+)
+
+// Place uploaded versions in specific pools, while retaining the real HTTP
+// encryption/compression pipeline and the normal pools-layer copy operation.
+type copyUploadPool struct {
+	*erasureServerPools
+	uploadPool int
+}
+
+func (z *copyUploadPool) PutObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, r *PutObjReader, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
+	return z.serverPools[z.uploadPool].PutObject(ctx, bucket, object, r, opts)
+}
+
+func TestAPICopyHistoricalVersionAcrossPools(t *testing.T) {
+	z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
+	placed := &copyUploadPool{erasureServerPools: z}
+	bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), placed, nil, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	setObjectLayer(placed)
+	if _, err = globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	previousKMS, previousTLS := GlobalKMS, globalIsTLS
+	GlobalKMS, err = kms.NewBuiltin("copy-key", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x33}, 32))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	globalIsTLS = true
+	defer func() { GlobalKMS, globalIsTLS = previousKMS, previousTLS }()
+	customer := func(value byte) map[string]string {
+		key := bytes.Repeat([]byte{value}, 32)
+		sum := md5.Sum(key)
+		return map[string]string{xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm: xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES, xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKey: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key), xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKeyMD5: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])}
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ mode, movement string }{
+		{"plain", "active"},
+		{"compressed", "active"},
+		{"sse-s3", "active"},
+		{"sse-c", "active"},
+		{"sse-kms", "active"},
+		{"sse-c", "decommission"},
+		{"sse-kms", "rebalance"},
+	} {
+		mode := tc.mode
+		for _, sourcePool := range []int{0, 1} {
+			t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/source=%d", mode, tc.movement, sourcePool), func(t *testing.T) {
+				compressed := mode == "compressed"
+				restore := setCopyChecksumCompression(true)
+				globalCompressConfigMu.Lock()
+				globalCompressConfig.Enabled = compressed
+				globalCompressConfigMu.Unlock()
+				defer restore()
+				sourceHeaders := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzChecksumCRC32: ""}
+				if mode == "sse-s3" {
+					sourceHeaders[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES
+				}
+				if mode == "sse-kms" {
+					sourceHeaders[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionKMS
+					sourceHeaders[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID] = "copy-key"
+					sourceHeaders[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsContext] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"tenant":"source"}`))
+				}
+				if mode == "sse-c" {
+					maps.Copy(sourceHeaders, customer(0x11))
+				}
+				pattern := []byte("historical encrypted compressed content-")
+				repeats := 8192
+				if mode == "plain" {
+					repeats = compMinIndexSize/len(pattern) + 1
+				}
+				data := bytes.Repeat(pattern, repeats)
+				sourceHeaders[xhttp.AmzChecksumCRC32] = mustChecksum(t, hash.ChecksumCRC32, data)
+				key := fmt.Sprintf("copy-%s-%s-%d.txt", mode, tc.movement, sourcePool)
+				placed.uploadPool = sourcePool
+				putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, globalActiveCred, bucket, key, data, sourceHeaders)
+				original, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				if original.VersionID == "" {
+					t.Fatal("fixture has no version ID")
+				}
+				if _, err := z.serverPools[sourcePool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: original.VersionID}); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				if original.IsCompressed() != compressed {
+					t.Fatalf("fixture compressed=%v", original.IsCompressed())
+				}
+				placed.uploadPool = 1 - sourcePool
+				putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, globalActiveCred, bucket, key, []byte("newer version"), nil)
+				newer, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				setCopyMovingPool(t, z, sourcePool, tc.movement)
+				// Toggle compression so metadata has to describe the bytes written now.
+				restore()
+				restoreTarget := setCopyChecksumCompression(true)
+				globalCompressConfigMu.Lock()
+				globalCompressConfig.Enabled = !compressed
+				globalCompressConfigMu.Unlock()
+				defer restoreTarget()
+				headers := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective: "REPLACE"}
+				getHeaders := map[string]string{}
+				if mode == "sse-s3" {
+					headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES
+				}
+				if mode == "sse-kms" {
+					headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionKMS
+					headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID] = "copy-key"
+					headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsContext] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"tenant":"destination"}`))
+				}
+				if mode == "sse-c" {
+					maps.Copy(headers, customer(0x22))
+					maps.Copy(getHeaders, customer(0x22))
+					old := customer(0x11)
+					headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCopyCustomerAlgorithm] = old[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerAlgorithm]
+					headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCopyCustomerKey] = old[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKey]
+					headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCopyCustomerKeyMD5] = old[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionCustomerKeyMD5]
+				}
+				rec := copyChecksumRequest(t, router, globalActiveCred, bucket, key+"?versionId="+original.VersionID, key, headers)
+				if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+					t.Fatalf("copy: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+				copied, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
+				if err != nil || copied.VersionID == "" || copied.VersionID == original.VersionID || copied.VersionID == newer.VersionID {
+					t.Fatalf("copy did not create a version: %+v %v", copied, err)
+				}
+				if copied.IsCompressed() != (!compressed && mode != "sse-c") {
+					t.Fatalf("copy did not use destination compression setting: %v", copied.IsCompressed())
+				}
+				if copied.IsCompressed() && len(data) > compMinIndexSize {
+					if len(copied.Parts) == 0 || len(copied.Parts[0].Index) == 0 {
+						t.Fatalf("compressed multi-block copy lost seek index: %+v", copied.Parts)
+					}
+					rangeHeaders := maps.Clone(getHeaders)
+					rangeHeaders["Range"] = "bytes=6000000-6000127"
+					req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, getGetObjectURL("", bucket, key)+"?versionId="+copied.VersionID, 0, nil, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, rangeHeaders)
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					rrec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+					router.ServeHTTP(rrec, req)
+					if rrec.Code != http.StatusPartialContent || !bytes.Equal(rrec.Body.Bytes(), data[6000000:6000128]) {
+						t.Fatalf("ranged GET on compressed copy: %d len=%d", rrec.Code, rrec.Body.Len())
+					}
+				}
+				if mode == "sse-kms" {
+					assertFederationKMSContext(t, copied, headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsContext])
+					assertFederationKMSContext(t, original, sourceHeaders[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsContext])
+				}
+				if _, err = z.serverPools[1-sourcePool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: copied.VersionID}); err != nil {
+					t.Fatalf("copy was not placed with destination: %v", err)
+				}
+				read := func(version string, headers map[string]string, want []byte) {
+					t.Helper()
+					req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, getGetObjectURL("", bucket, key)+"?versionId="+version, 0, nil, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey, headers)
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+					router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+					if rec.Code != http.StatusOK || !bytes.Equal(rec.Body.Bytes(), want) {
+						t.Fatalf("GET version %s: %d body length=%d, want %d", version, rec.Code, rec.Body.Len(), len(want))
+					}
+				}
+				read(copied.VersionID, getHeaders, data)
+				oldHeaders := map[string]string{}
+				if mode == "sse-c" {
+					oldHeaders = customer(0x11)
+				}
+				read(original.VersionID, oldHeaders, data)
+				read(newer.VersionID, nil, []byte("newer version"))
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Internal metadata updates do not all set MetadataChg. They must still
+// address the requested historical version, and must never create a new one.
+func TestPoolsCopyExactVersionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
+	for sourcePool := range 2 {
+		key := fmt.Sprintf("exact-%d", sourcePool)
+		older := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, sourcePool, "old data", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
+		newer := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, 1-sourcePool, "new data", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, MTime: UTCNow()})
+		gr, err := z.GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{VersionID: older.VersionID, NoLock: true})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		info := gr.ObjInfo
+		info.Reader, err = hash.NewReader(t.Context(), gr, info.Size, "", "", info.Size)
+		if err != nil {
+			gr.Close()
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		info.PutObjReader = NewPutObjReader(info.Reader)
+		info.metadataOnly = true
+		info.UserDefined["updated"] = "yes"
+		_, err = z.CopyObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, bucket, key, info, ObjectOptions{VersionID: older.VersionID}, ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: older.VersionID, MTime: older.ModTime})
+		gr.Close()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		got, err := z.serverPools[sourcePool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: older.VersionID})
+		if err != nil || got.UserDefined["updated"] != "yes" {
+			t.Fatalf("historical metadata not updated: %v %v", got.UserDefined, err)
+		}
+		got, err = z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
+		if err != nil || got.VersionID != newer.VersionID || got.UserDefined["updated"] != "" {
+			t.Fatalf("latest changed: %+v %v", got, err)
+		}
+		if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, z, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: older.VersionID}); string(got) != "old data" {
+			t.Fatalf("historical body changed: %q", got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func setCopyMovingPool(t *testing.T, z *erasureServerPools, pool int, movement string) {
+	t.Helper()
+	switch movement {
+	case "decommission":
+		z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
+		z.poolMeta.Pools[pool].Decommission = &PoolDecommissionInfo{}
+		z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
+		t.Cleanup(func() {
+			z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
+			z.poolMeta.Pools[pool].Decommission = nil
+			z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
+		})
+	case "rebalance":
+		z.rebalMu.Lock()
+		z.rebalMeta = &rebalanceMeta{PoolStats: []*rebalanceStats{{}, {}}}
+		z.rebalMeta.PoolStats[pool] = &rebalanceStats{Participating: true, Info: rebalanceInfo{Status: rebalStarted}}
+		z.rebalMu.Unlock()
+		t.Cleanup(func() { z.rebalMu.Lock(); z.rebalMeta = nil; z.rebalMu.Unlock() })
+	}
+}
+
+// The content that a metadata-only replica preserves must be the same content
+// that reads selected, even when write allocation would skip its pool.
+func TestCopyReplicaMetadataMovingPool(t *testing.T) {
+	z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
+	bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), z, nil, MakeBucketOptions{LockEnabled: true})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	setObjectLayer(z)
+	_, err = globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	const body = "current-body"
+	for _, api := range []bool{false, true} {
+		for sourcePool := range 2 {
+			for _, movement := range []string{"decommission", "rebalance"} {
+				for _, kind := range []string{"uuid", "null"} {
+					for _, duplicate := range []string{"absent", "older", "tie"} {
+						// The lower pool index wins equal ModTimes, just as on reads.
+						if duplicate == "tie" && sourcePool != 0 {
+							continue
+						}
+						t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("api=%t/source=%d/%s/%s/%s", api, sourcePool, movement, kind, duplicate), func(t *testing.T) {
+							key := fmt.Sprintf("metadata-%t-%d-%s-%s-%s", api, sourcePool, movement, kind, duplicate)
+							oi := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, sourcePool, body, ObjectOptions{
+								Versioned: kind == "uuid", MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute),
+								WantChecksum: hash.NewChecksumFromData(hash.ChecksumCRC32, []byte(body)),
+							})
+							version := oi.VersionID
+							if version == "" {
+								version = nullVersionID
+							}
+							if duplicate != "absent" {
+								stamp := oi.ModTime
+								if duplicate == "older" {
+									stamp = stamp.Add(-time.Hour)
+								}
+								putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, 1-sourcePool, "stale---body", ObjectOptions{
+									Versioned: kind == "uuid", VersionID: version, MTime: stamp,
+									UserDefined: poolLockMetadata("", "ON", "", objectLockTestStamp1000),
+								})
+							}
+							if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, z, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: version}); string(got) != body {
+								t.Fatalf("fixture: %q", got)
+							}
+							setCopyMovingPool(t, z, sourcePool, movement)
+							if api {
+								headers := map[string]string{
+									xhttp.AmzCopySource:        "/" + bucket + "/" + key + "?versionId=" + version,
+									xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective: "REPLACE", "X-Amz-Meta-Updated": "yes",
+									xhttp.MinIOSourceReplicationRequest: "true", xhttp.AmzBucketReplicationStatus: "REPLICA",
+								}
+								rec := r5Request(t, router, globalActiveCred, http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/"+key+"?versionId="+version, "", headers)
+								if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+									t.Fatalf("metadata copy: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+								}
+								assertCopyChecksumResponse(t, rec, hash.ChecksumCRC32, []byte(body))
+							} else {
+								oi.metadataOnly = true
+								oi.UserDefined["X-Amz-Meta-Updated"] = "yes"
+								_, err = z.CopyObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, bucket, key, oi,
+									ObjectOptions{VersionID: version}, ObjectOptions{Versioned: kind == "uuid", VersionID: version, MTime: oi.ModTime, ReplicaLockReconcile: true})
+								mustIAM(t, err)
+							}
+							if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, z, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: version}); string(got) != body {
+								t.Fatalf("metadata copy replaced content: %q", got)
+							}
+							stored, err := z.serverPools[sourcePool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: version})
+							mustIAM(t, err)
+							if stored.UserDefined["X-Amz-Meta-Updated"] != "yes" || !bytes.Equal(stored.Checksum, oi.Checksum) {
+								t.Fatalf("metadata/checksum: %v, %x; want checksum %x", stored.UserDefined, stored.Checksum, oi.Checksum)
+							}
+							if duplicate != "absent" && storedObjectLockState(stored.UserDefined).legalHold != "ON" {
+								t.Fatal("lost protection from the retired copy")
+							}
+							_, err = z.serverPools[1-sourcePool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: version})
+							if !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
+								t.Fatalf("stale copy not retired: %v", err)
+							}
+						})
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAPICopyRewriteMovingPool(t *testing.T) {
+	z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
+	placed := &copyUploadPool{erasureServerPools: z}
+	bucket, router, err := initAPIHandlerTest(t.Context(), placed, nil, MakeBucketOptions{})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	setObjectLayer(placed)
+	previousKMS := GlobalKMS
+	GlobalKMS, err = kms.NewBuiltin("copy-key", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x33}, 32))
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	defer func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS }()
+	for sourcePool := range 2 {
+		for _, movement := range []string{"decommission", "rebalance"} {
+			for _, mode := range []string{"sse-s3", "checksum", "default-checksum", "invalid-self-copy"} {
+				t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("source=%d/%s/%s", sourcePool, movement, mode), func(t *testing.T) {
+					key := fmt.Sprintf("rewrite-%d-%s-%s", sourcePool, movement, mode)
+					data := []byte("rewriting a source on a draining pool")
+					sourceHeaders := map[string]string{}
+					if mode != "default-checksum" {
+						sourceHeaders[xhttp.AmzChecksumCRC32] = mustChecksum(t, hash.ChecksumCRC32, data)
+					}
+					placed.uploadPool = sourcePool
+					putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, globalActiveCred, bucket, key, data, sourceHeaders)
+					setCopyMovingPool(t, z, sourcePool, movement)
+					headers := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective: "REPLACE"}
+					wantChecksum := hash.ChecksumCRC32
+					switch mode {
+					case "sse-s3":
+						headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES
+					case "checksum", "invalid-self-copy":
+						headers[xhttp.AmzChecksumAlgo] = "SHA256"
+						wantChecksum = hash.ChecksumSHA256
+						if mode == "invalid-self-copy" {
+							delete(headers, xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective)
+						}
+					case "default-checksum":
+						wantChecksum = hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME
+					}
+					rec := copyChecksumRequest(t, router, globalActiveCred, bucket, key, key, headers)
+					if mode == "invalid-self-copy" {
+						if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+							t.Fatalf("invalid self-copy: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+						}
+						_, err := z.serverPools[1-sourcePool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
+						if !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
+							t.Fatalf("rejected copy wrote a destination: %v", err)
+						}
+						return
+					}
+					if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+						t.Fatalf("rewrite: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+					}
+					assertCopyChecksumResponse(t, rec, wantChecksum, data)
+					if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, z, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{}); !bytes.Equal(got, data) {
+						t.Fatalf("rewritten body: %q", got)
+					}
+					if _, err := z.serverPools[1-sourcePool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{}); err != nil {
+						t.Fatalf("rewrite did not reach active pool: %v", err)
+					}
+					assertCopyChecksum(t, z, bucket, key, wantChecksum, data, false, nil)
+				})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

cmd/object-copy-replication-tagging_test.go

@@ -35,22 +35,15 @@ import (
 // the single-disk and 16-disk fixtures are single-pool backends.
 func TestAPICopyObjectReplicaTaggingTimestampUnderKMS(t *testing.T) {
 	defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
-	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{t: t, objAPITest: testAPICopyObjectReplicaTaggingTimestampUnderKMS})
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t, objAPITest: testAPICopyObjectReplicaTaggingTimestampUnderKMS,
+		// Ignore host free-space percentage while retaining real disk I/O.
+		// Install once before IAM starts and keep the disks until shutdown.
+		wrapDisk: func(disk StorageAPI) StorageAPI { return tagTestCapacityDisk{StorageAPI: disk} },
+	})
 }
 
 func testAPICopyObjectReplicaTaggingTimestampUnderKMS(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, creds auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
-	// Ignore the host free-space percentage while retaining real disk I/O.
-	for _, pool := range obj.(*erasureServerPools).serverPools {
-		for _, set := range pool.sets {
-			original := set.getDisks
-			disks := append([]StorageAPI(nil), original()...)
-			for i := range disks {
-				disks[i] = tagTestCapacityDisk{StorageAPI: disks[i]}
-			}
-			set.getDisks = func() []StorageAPI { return disks }
-			defer func() { set.getDisks = original }()
-		}
-	}
 	oldKMS, oldAuto := GlobalKMS, globalAutoEncryption
 	GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("replica-tags-key")
 	globalAutoEncryption = false

cmd/object-handlers.go

@@ -139,7 +139,13 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) SelectObjectContentHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 
 	// Check for auth type to return S3 compatible error.
 	// type to return the correct error (NoSuchKey vs AccessDenied)
-	if s3Error := checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, bucket, object); s3Error != ErrNone {
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
+	s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction)
+	if s3Error == ErrNone {
+		s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID)
+	}
+	if s3Error != ErrNone {
 		if getRequestAuthType(r) == authTypeAnonymous {
 			// As per "Permission" section in
 			// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/RESTObjectGET.html
@@ -199,6 +205,19 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) SelectObjectContentHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 	gopts.NoLock = true // We already have a lock, we can live with it.
 	objInfo, err := getObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, object, gopts)
 	if err != nil {
+		if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, err); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			if getRequestAuthType(r) == authTypeAnonymous && toAPIError(ctx, err).Code == "NoSuchKey" &&
+				globalPolicySys.IsAllowed(policy.BucketPolicyArgs{
+					Action:          policy.ListBucketAction,
+					BucketName:      bucket,
+					ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", auth.AnonymousCredentials),
+					IsOwner:         false,
+				}) {
+				s3Error = ErrNoSuchKey
+			}
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
 		// Versioning enabled quite possibly object is deleted might be delete-marker
 		// if present set the headers, no idea why AWS S3 sets these headers.
 		if objInfo.VersionID != "" && objInfo.DeleteMarker {
@@ -208,10 +227,14 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) SelectObjectContentHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
+	if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, objInfo.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
+		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
 
 	// filter object lock metadata if permission does not permit
-	getRetPerms := checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectRetentionAction, bucket, object)
+	getRetPerms := authorizeRequest(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectRetentionAction)
-	legalHoldPerms := checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectLegalHoldAction, bucket, object)
+	legalHoldPerms := authorizeRequest(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectLegalHoldAction)
 
 	// filter object lock metadata if permission does not permit
 	objInfo.UserDefined = objectlock.FilterObjectLockMetadata(objInfo.UserDefined, getRetPerms != ErrNone, legalHoldPerms != ErrNone)
@@ -326,6 +349,8 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Obj
 
 	// Check for auth type to return S3 compatible error.
 	// type to return the correct error (NoSuchKey vs AccessDenied)
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
 	if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
 		if getRequestAuthType(r) == authTypeAnonymous {
 			// As per "Permission" section in
@@ -395,14 +420,16 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Obj
 	}
 
 	// Validate pre-conditions if any.
+	var storedTags *string // set once the object has been read far enough
 	opts.CheckPrecondFn = func(oi ObjectInfo) bool {
-		if _, err := DecryptObjectInfo(&oi, r); err != nil {
+		storedTags = &oi.UserTags
-			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
+		if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, oi.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 			return true
 		}
 
-		if s3Error := authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, oi.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
+		if _, err := DecryptObjectInfo(&oi, r); err != nil {
-			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 			return true
 		}
 
@@ -421,7 +448,7 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Obj
 
 		if (isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isErrReadQuorum(err)) && (gr == nil || !gr.ObjInfo.DeleteMarker) {
 			proxytgts := getProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
-			if !proxytgts.Empty() {
+			if !proxytgts.Empty() && authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID) == ErrNone {
 				globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, getObjectAPI, false)
 				// proxy to replication target if active-active replication is in place.
 				reader, proxy, perr = proxyGetToReplicationTarget(ctx, bucket, object, rs, r.Header, opts, proxytgts)
@@ -439,14 +466,29 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Obj
 			}
 		}
 		if reader == nil || !proxy.Proxy {
-			// The conditional callback has already written 304/412. Do not
+			// The conditional callback has already written 304/412 (or 403). Do not
 			// authorize again without the stored tags or write a second response.
-			if isErrPreconditionFailed(err) {
+			if isErrPreconditionFailed(err) || isErrPreconditionFailed(perr) {
 				return
 			}
 			// validate if the request indeed was authorized, if it wasn't we need to return "ErrAccessDenied"
-			// instead of any namespace related error.
+			// instead of any namespace related error. Use the stored tags if the callback read them.
-			if s3Error := authorizeRequest(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			var s3Error APIErrorCode
+			if storedTags != nil {
+				s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, *storedTags)
+			} else {
+				readErr := err
+				if proxy.Err != nil {
+					readErr = proxy.Err
+				}
+				if getRequestAuthType(r) == authTypeAnonymous && toAPIError(ctx, readErr).Code == "NoSuchKey" &&
+					authorizeBucketRequest(ctx, r, policy.ListBucketAction) == ErrNone {
+					s3Error = ErrNone
+				} else {
+					s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, readErr)
+				}
+			}
+			if s3Error != ErrNone {
 				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 				return
 			}
@@ -478,6 +520,12 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Obj
 	defer gr.Close()
 
 	objInfo := gr.ObjInfo
+	if storedTags == nil {
+		if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, objInfo.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+	}
 
 	if !proxy.Proxy { // apply lifecycle rules only for local requests
 		// Automatically remove the object/version if an expiry lifecycle rule can be applied
@@ -539,6 +587,8 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Obj
 		hash.AddChecksumHeader(w, cs)
 	}
 
+	opts.TaggingCount = len(objInfo.UserTags) > 0 && canReturnObjectTagsHeader(ctx, r, opts.VersionID, objInfo.UserTags)
+
 	if err = setObjectHeaders(ctx, w, objInfo, rs, opts); err != nil {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 		return
@@ -597,20 +647,14 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectAttributesHandler(ctx context.Context, obj
 		return
 	}
 
-	var s3Error APIErrorCode
+	actions := [2]policy.Action{policy.GetObjectAttributesAction, policy.GetObjectAction}
 	if opts.VersionID != "" {
-		s3Error = checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectVersionAttributesAction, bucket, object)
+		actions = [2]policy.Action{policy.GetObjectVersionAttributesAction, policy.GetObjectVersionAction}
-		if s3Error == ErrNone {
-			s3Error = checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectVersionAction, bucket, object)
 	}
-	} else {
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
-		s3Error = checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAttributesAction, bucket, object)
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
-		if s3Error == ErrNone {
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).VersionID = opts.VersionID
-			s3Error = checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, bucket, object)
+	if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, actions[0]); s3Error != ErrNone {
-		}
-	}
-
-	if s3Error != ErrNone {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
@@ -622,13 +666,30 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) getObjectAttributesHandler(ctx context.Context, obj
 	}
 
 	objInfo, err := objectAPI.GetObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
+	// Both actions must be authorized with the stored tags. Authorizing first
+	// with empty tags would reject conditional Allows and miss conditional Denies.
+	for _, action := range actions {
+		var s3Error APIErrorCode
 		if err != nil {
-		s3Error = authorizeRequest(ctx, r, policy.ListBucketAction)
+			s3Error = authorizeRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, action, err)
-		if s3Error == ErrNone {
+		} else {
-			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
+			s3Error = authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, action, objInfo.UserTags)
+		}
+		if s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 			return
 		}
-		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		// As with S3, a caller without s3:ListBucket on the bucket gets
+		// AccessDenied in place of NoSuchKey. A server error, such as lost
+		// read quorum, tells nothing about the object and reaches the caller,
+		// who may read the object, as it is.
+		apiErr := toAPIError(ctx, err)
+		if apiErr.HTTPStatusCode < http.StatusInternalServerError && authorizeBucketRequest(ctx, r, policy.ListBucketAction) != ErrNone {
+			apiErr = errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
+		}
+		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -833,6 +894,8 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) headObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Ob
 
 	// Check for auth type to return S3 compatible error.
 	// type to return the correct error (NoSuchKey vs AccessDenied)
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
 	if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
 		if getRequestAuthType(r) == authTypeAnonymous {
 			// As per "Permission" section in
@@ -910,25 +973,43 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) headObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Ob
 	if err != nil && !objInfo.DeleteMarker && (isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isErrReadQuorum(err)) {
 		// proxy HEAD to replication target if active-active replication configured on bucket
 		proxytgts := getProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
-		if !proxytgts.Empty() {
+		if !proxytgts.Empty() && authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID) == ErrNone {
 			globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, headObjectAPI, false)
 			var oi ObjectInfo
 			oi, proxy = proxyHeadToReplicationTarget(ctx, bucket, object, rs, opts, proxytgts)
-			if proxy.Proxy {
+			if proxy.Proxy && proxy.Err == nil {
 				objInfo = oi
 			}
 			if proxy.Err != nil {
 				globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, headObjectAPI, true)
-				writeErrorResponseHeadersOnly(w, toAPIError(ctx, proxy.Err))
-				return
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	if s3Error := authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, objInfo.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
+	// objInfo carries the stored tags unless reading the object failed.
+	var s3Error APIErrorCode
+	if (err != nil && !proxy.Proxy) || proxy.Err != nil {
+		readErr := err
+		if proxy.Err != nil {
+			readErr = proxy.Err
+		}
+		if getRequestAuthType(r) == authTypeAnonymous && toAPIError(ctx, readErr).Code == "NoSuchKey" &&
+			authorizeBucketRequest(ctx, r, policy.ListBucketAction) == ErrNone {
+			s3Error = ErrNone
+		} else {
+			s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, readErr)
+		}
+	} else {
+		s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, opts.VersionID, objInfo.UserTags)
+	}
+	if s3Error != ErrNone {
 		writeErrorResponseHeadersOnly(w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error))
 		return
 	}
+	if proxy.Err != nil {
+		writeErrorResponseHeadersOnly(w, toAPIError(ctx, proxy.Err))
+		return
+	}
 
 	if err != nil && !proxy.Proxy {
 		switch {
@@ -1033,6 +1114,8 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) headObjectHandler(ctx context.Context, objectAPI Ob
 		hash.AddChecksumHeader(w, cs)
 	}
 
+	opts.TaggingCount = len(objInfo.UserTags) > 0 && canReturnObjectTagsHeader(ctx, r, opts.VersionID, objInfo.UserTags)
+
 	// Set standard object headers.
 	if err = setObjectHeaders(ctx, w, objInfo, rs, opts); err != nil {
 		writeErrorResponseHeadersOnly(w, toAPIError(ctx, err))
@@ -1292,13 +1375,11 @@ func isRemoteCallRequired(ctx context.Context, bucket string, objAPI ObjectLayer
 
 // copyRewritesObjectData reports whether the object layer stores new object data
 // for this copy instead of updating metadata in place or adding a
-// self-referential version. It mirrors the metadata-only decision taken by
+// self-referential version. The selected pool must contain the source data to
-// erasureServerPools.CopyObject and erasureSets.CopyObject. CopyObjectHandler
+// add a reference. metadataOnly already excludes legacy sources, which the
-// has to predict that decision because the compression metadata it records must
+// object layer always rewrites.
-// describe whichever bytes are finally stored. metadataOnly already excludes
-// legacy sources, which the object layer always rewrites.
 func copyRewritesObjectData(metadataOnly bool, srcOpts, dstOpts ObjectOptions) bool {
-	if !metadataOnly {
+	if !metadataOnly || dstOpts.copyPlan != nil && dstOpts.copyPlan.rewrite {
 		return true
 	}
 	switch {
@@ -1343,10 +1424,24 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		return
 	}
 
+	if isDirectiveReplace(r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzTagDirective)) {
 		if s3Error := checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectAction, dstBucket, dstObject); s3Error != ErrNone {
 			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 			return
 		}
+	} else {
+		logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = dstBucket
+		logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = dstObject
+		logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).VersionID = ""
+		if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+		if !canPotentiallyAllowAction(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectAction, dstBucket, dstObject) {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+	}
 
 	// Read escaped copy source path to check for parameters.
 	cpSrcPath := r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzCopySource)
@@ -1379,7 +1474,9 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		}
 	}
 
-	if s3Error := checkRequestAuthType(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, srcBucket, srcObject); s3Error != ErrNone {
+	if s3Error := withScopedReqObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, vid, func() APIErrorCode {
+		return authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, vid)
+	}); s3Error != ErrNone {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
@@ -1463,7 +1560,15 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	getObjectNInfo := objectAPI.GetObjectNInfo
 
+	var storedSrcTags *string
 	checkCopyPrecondFn := func(o ObjectInfo) bool {
+		storedSrcTags = &o.UserTags
+		if s3Error := withScopedReqObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, vid, func() APIErrorCode {
+			return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, vid, o.UserTags)
+		}); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return true
+		}
 		if _, err := DecryptObjectInfo(&o, r); err != nil {
 			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 			return true
@@ -1515,6 +1620,20 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		if isErrPreconditionFailed(err) {
 			return
 		}
+		var s3Error APIErrorCode
+		if storedSrcTags != nil {
+			s3Error = withScopedReqObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, vid, func() APIErrorCode {
+				return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, vid, *storedSrcTags)
+			})
+		} else {
+			s3Error = withScopedReqObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, vid, func() APIErrorCode {
+				return authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, vid, err)
+			})
+		}
+		if s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
 
 		// Versioning enabled quite possibly object is deleted might be delete-marker
 		// if present set the headers, no idea why AWS S3 sets these headers.
@@ -1532,6 +1651,23 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 	}
 	defer gr.Close()
 	srcInfo := gr.ObjInfo
+	if storedSrcTags == nil {
+		if s3Error := withScopedReqObject(ctx, srcBucket, srcObject, vid, func() APIErrorCode {
+			return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectAction, vid, srcInfo.UserTags)
+		}); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	if !isDirectiveReplace(r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzTagDirective)) {
+		copiedTags := srcInfo.UserTags
+		if s3Error := withScopedReqObject(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, "", func() APIErrorCode {
+			return authorizeRequestWithTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectAction, "", &copiedTags)
+		}); s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+	}
 	// A trusted SSE-C replica reads raw ciphertext. Federation's ordinary PUT
 	// expects plaintext and does not forward the replica's sealed-key metadata.
 	if remoteCallRequired && replicaTrusted && crypto.SSEC.IsEncrypted(srcInfo.UserDefined) {
@@ -1673,16 +1809,23 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 	// Without a requested destination checksum algorithm, an in-place SSE-C
 	// rotation preserves the stored checksum state, including absence; it does
 	// not add the default CRC64NVME.
-	canRotateKeyInPlace := !srcInfo.Legacy &&
+	canRotateKeyInPlace := cpSrcDstSame && sseCopyC && sseC && !chStorageClass && !srcInfo.Legacy &&
 		!copyRewritesObjectData(srcInfo.metadataOnly, copySrcOpts, dstOpts) &&
 		(replicaTrusted || !hash.NewChecksumHeader(r.Header).IsSet())
 
-	// If src == dst and either
+	if canRotateKeyInPlace {
-	// - the object is encrypted using SSE-C and two different SSE-C keys are present
+		// A new version may need another pool. Resolve that before rewrapping
-	// - the object is encrypted using SSE-S3 and the SSE-S3 header is present
+		// the key, since a cross-pool copy must re-encrypt the source stream.
-	// - the object storage class is not changing
+		plan, err := objectAPI.prepareCopyObject(lockCtx, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject, srcInfo, copySrcOpts, dstOpts)
-	// then execute a key rotation.
+		if err != nil {
-	if cpSrcDstSame && (sseCopyC && sseC) && !chStorageClass && canRotateKeyInPlace {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+		dstOpts.copyPlan = &plan
+		canRotateKeyInPlace = !plan.rewrite
+	}
+
+	if canRotateKeyInPlace {
 		oldKey, err = ParseSSECopyCustomerRequest(r.Header, srcInfo.UserDefined)
 		if err != nil {
 			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
@@ -1773,6 +1916,20 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 			}
 		}
 
+		if !remoteCallRequired && dstOpts.copyPlan == nil {
+			// Encryption and checksum recomputation require new data. Plan
+			// with that final decision before starting either transform, but
+			// retain metadataOnly for the invalid self-copy check below.
+			planInfo := srcInfo
+			planInfo.metadataOnly = srcInfo.metadataOnly && !dstOpts.WantServerSideChecksumType.IsSet()
+			plan, err := objectAPI.prepareCopyObject(lockCtx, srcBucket, srcObject, dstBucket, dstObject, planInfo, copySrcOpts, dstOpts)
+			if err != nil {
+				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
+				return
+			}
+			dstOpts.copyPlan = &plan
+		}
+
 		if isDstCompressed {
 			checksumReader := srcInfo.Reader
 			wantEncryption := crypto.Requested(r.Header)
@@ -1829,12 +1986,27 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	srcInfo.PutObjReader = pReader
 
-	// Object Lock state as stored on disk, captured before the metadata
+	// Reconcile against the addressed destination version under its write
-	// directive rebuilds the map. A replica update is applied only when its
+	// lock. The source can be a different object or version, including when
-	// source timestamp is newer than the stored one, and a stale update must
+	// the destination version has never been written.
-	// leave the stored state in place instead of erasing it.
+	getObjectInfo := func(_ context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
-	storedLock := storedObjectLockState(srcInfo.UserDefined)
+		opts.NoLock = true
-	storedTagTimestamp := srcInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp]
+		return objectAPI.GetObjectInfo(lockCtx, bucket, object, opts)
+	}
+	var storedInfo ObjectInfo
+	if replicaTrusted && !remoteCallRequired {
+		storedInfo, err = replicaStoredObjectInfo(lockCtx, getObjectInfo, dstBucket, dstObject, dstOpts.VersionID)
+		if err != nil {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	storedLock := storedObjectLockState(storedInfo.UserDefined)
+	storedTagTimestamp := storedInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp]
+	localTagTimestamp := ""
+	if cpSrcDstSame {
+		localTagTimestamp = srcInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp]
+	}
 
 	srcInfo.UserDefined, err = getCpObjMetadataFromHeader(ctx, r, srcInfo.UserDefined, allowReplicationMetadata)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1859,9 +2031,9 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 			// the captured state even if metadata REPLACE rebuilt the map.
 			srcInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = srcTimestamp.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
 			srcInfo.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = objTags
-			reconcileStoredObjectTags(srcInfo.UserDefined, srcInfo.UserTags, storedTagTimestamp)
+			reconcileStoredObjectTags(srcInfo.UserDefined, storedInfo.UserTags, storedTagTimestamp)
 		} else {
-			srcInfo.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = srcInfo.UserTags
+			srcInfo.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = storedInfo.UserTags
 			if storedTagTimestamp != "" {
 				srcInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = storedTagTimestamp
 			} else {
@@ -1870,7 +2042,18 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		}
 	} else {
 		srcInfo.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = objTags
-		srcInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
+		srcInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = monotonicMetadataTimestamp(UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), localTagTimestamp)
+	}
+	if !isDirectiveReplace(r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzTagDirective)) {
+		finalDstTags := srcInfo.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging]
+		if finalDstTags != srcInfo.UserTags {
+			if s3Error := withScopedReqObject(ctx, dstBucket, dstObject, "", func() APIErrorCode {
+				return authorizeRequestWithTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectAction, "", &finalDstTags)
+			}); s3Error != ErrNone {
+				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+				return
+			}
+		}
 	}
 	// SSE-C rotation snapshots reserved metadata before the tag decision. Its
 	// later merge must not put the old timestamp back over the accepted state.
@@ -1878,14 +2061,12 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	srcInfo.UserDefined = filterReplicationStatusMetadata(srcInfo.UserDefined)
 	srcInfo.UserDefined = objectlock.FilterObjectLockMetadata(srcInfo.UserDefined, true, true)
+	// COPY may have preserved the source's reserved timestamps. Only the
+	// addressed destination and the incoming update may order a replica.
+	delete(srcInfo.UserDefined, ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockRetentionTimestamp)
+	delete(srcInfo.UserDefined, ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp)
 	retPerms := isPutActionAllowed(ctx, getRequestAuthType(r), dstBucket, dstObject, r, policy.PutObjectRetentionAction)
 	holdPerms := isPutActionAllowed(ctx, getRequestAuthType(r), dstBucket, dstObject, r, policy.PutObjectLegalHoldAction)
-	// The destination is locked above: look it up without its lock, in the
-	// locks' context.
-	getObjectInfo := func(_ context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
-		opts.NoLock = true
-		return objectAPI.GetObjectInfo(lockCtx, bucket, object, opts)
-	}
 
 	// apply default bucket configuration/governance headers for dest side.
 	retentionMode, retentionDate, legalHold, s3Err := checkPutObjectLockAllowed(ctx, r, dstBucket, dstObject, getObjectInfo, retPerms, holdPerms, replicaTrusted)
@@ -2236,9 +2417,13 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 				return
 			}
+			if size < 0 {
+				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidArgument), r.URL)
+				return
 			}
 		}
-	if size == -1 {
+	}
+	if size < 0 {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMissingContentLength), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
@@ -2701,10 +2886,14 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectExtractHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 				return
 			}
+			if size < 0 {
+				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidArgument), r.URL)
+				return
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	if size == -1 {
+	if size < 0 {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrMissingContentLength), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
@@ -3140,6 +3329,22 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Check before delOpts reads bucket versioning: unavailable bucket metadata
+	// must fail the request before a force-delete can reach the object layer.
+	if forceDelete, _ := strconv.ParseBool(r.Header.Get(xhttp.MinIOForceDelete)); forceDelete {
+		rcfg, err := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucket)
+		if err != nil {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+		if rcfg.LockEnabled {
+			apiErr := toAPIError(ctx, errInvalidArgument)
+			apiErr.Description = "force-delete is forbidden on Object Locking enabled buckets"
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
 	opts, err := delOpts(ctx, r, bucket, object)
 	if err != nil {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
@@ -3160,14 +3365,6 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.
 		}
 	}
 
-	rcfg, _ := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucket)
-	if rcfg.LockEnabled && opts.DeletePrefix {
-		apiErr := toAPIError(ctx, errInvalidArgument)
-		apiErr.Description = "force-delete is forbidden on Object Locking enabled buckets"
-		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
-		return
-	}
-
 	os := newObjSweeper(bucket, object).WithVersion(opts.VersionID).WithVersioning(opts.Versioned, opts.VersionSuspended)
 
 	opts.SetEvalMetadataFn(func(oi *ObjectInfo, gerr error) (dsc ReplicateDecision, err error) {
@@ -3190,28 +3387,44 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.
 		return dsc, nil
 	})
 
+	_, rcfg, err := checkBucketDeleteMetadata(bucket)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+
 	vID := opts.VersionID
 	if replica {
 		opts.SetReplicaStatus(replication.Replica)
-		if opts.VersionPurgeStatus().Empty() {
+		if opts.DeleteMarker && opts.VersionPurgeStatus().Empty() {
-			// opts.VersionID holds delete marker version ID to replicate and not yet present on disk
+			// opts.VersionID names the delete marker to replicate, not yet
+			// present here. It must not replace a stored version this site
+			// protects; a replicated purge keeps the retention check below.
 			vID = ""
+			opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite = true
 		}
 	}
+	checkUnaddressedLock := vID == "" && !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker && rcfg.LockEnabled
+	if checkUnaddressedLock {
+		opts.RefuseLockedOverwrite = true
+	}
 	opts.SetEvalRetentionBypassFn(func(goi ObjectInfo, gerr error) (err error) {
-		err = nil
+		if vID != "" || checkUnaddressedLock || (vID == "" && !opts.Versioned && !opts.DeleteMarker && gerr == nil) {
-		if vID != "" {
+			checkVID := vID
+			if checkVID == "" {
+				checkVID = nullVersionID
+			}
 			err := enforceRetentionBypassForDelete(ctx, r, bucket, ObjectToDelete{
 				ObjectV: ObjectV{
 					ObjectName: object,
-					VersionID:  vID,
+					VersionID:  checkVID,
 				},
 			}, goi, gerr)
 			if err != nil && !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
 				return err
 			}
 		}
-		return err
+		return nil
 	})
 
 	deleteObject := objectAPI.DeleteObject
@@ -3363,7 +3576,7 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectLegalHoldHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 		VersionID: opts.VersionID,
 		EvalMetadataFn: func(oi *ObjectInfo, gerr error) (ReplicateDecision, error) {
 			oi.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = strings.ToUpper(string(legalHold.Status))
-			oi.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
+			oi.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp] = monotonicMetadataTimestamp(UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), oi.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp])
 
 			dsc := mustReplicate(ctx, bucket, object, oi.getMustReplicateOptions(replication.MetadataReplicationType, opts))
 			if dsc.ReplicateAny() {
@@ -3540,7 +3753,7 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectRetentionHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 				oi.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode)] = ""
 				oi.UserDefined[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate)] = ""
 			}
-			oi.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockRetentionTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
+			oi.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockRetentionTimestamp] = monotonicMetadataTimestamp(UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano), oi.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockRetentionTimestamp])
 			dsc = mustReplicate(ctx, bucket, object, oi.getMustReplicateOptions(replication.MetadataReplicationType, opts))
 			if dsc.ReplicateAny() {
 				oi.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ReplicationTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
@@ -3665,6 +3878,8 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) GetObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 		return
 	}
 
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
 	if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 		return
@@ -3684,9 +3899,22 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) GetObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 		if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
 			proxytgts := getProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
 			if !proxytgts.Empty() {
+				if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID); s3Error != ErrNone {
+					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
 				globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, getObjectTaggingAPI, false)
 				// proxy to replication target if site replication is in place.
-				tags, gerr := proxyGetTaggingToRepTarget(ctx, bucket, object, opts, proxytgts)
+				tags, gerr, s3Error := proxyGetTaggingToRepTarget(ctx, bucket, object, opts, proxytgts, func(existingTags string, readErr error) APIErrorCode {
+					if readErr != nil && !isRemoteTaggingNotFound(readErr) {
+						return authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, readErr)
+					}
+					return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, existingTags)
+				})
+				if s3Error != ErrNone {
+					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
 				if gerr.Err != nil || tags == nil {
 					globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, getObjectTaggingAPI, true)
 					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, gerr.Err), r.URL)
@@ -3695,16 +3923,24 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) GetObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 				ot = tags
 				w.Header()[xhttp.MinIOTaggingProxied] = []string{"true"} // indicate that the request was proxied.
 			} else {
+				if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, ""); s3Error != ErrNone {
+					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
 				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 				return
 			}
 		} else {
+			if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, err); s3Error != ErrNone {
+				writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+				return
+			}
 			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 			return
 		}
 	}
 
-	if s3Error := authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, ot.String()); s3Error != ErrNone {
+	if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, ot.String()); s3Error != ErrNone {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
@@ -3733,6 +3969,18 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) GetObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 	writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodeResponse(otags))
 }
 
+func isRemoteTaggingNotFound(err error) bool {
+	if err == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	switch miniogo.ToErrorResponse(err).Code {
+	case "NoSuchKey", "NoSuchVersion":
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
 // PutObjectTaggingHandler - PUT object tagging
 func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	ctx := newContext(r, w, "PutObjectTagging")
@@ -3752,6 +4000,13 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 		return
 	}
 
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
+	if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
+		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+
 	// Tags XML will not be bigger than 1MiB in size, fail if its bigger.
 	tags, err := tags.ParseObjectXML(io.LimitReader(r.Body, 1<<20))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -3760,13 +4015,6 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 	}
 	tagsStr := tags.String()
 
-	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
-	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
-	if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
-		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
-		return
-	}
-
 	// Set this such that authorization policies can be applied on the object
 	// tags. This is derived from the request body, so it must be injected only
 	// after signature verification: the SigV4 verifier now rejects unsigned
@@ -3780,14 +4028,6 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 	}
 
 	objInfo, err := objAPI.GetObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
-	existingTags := ""
-	if err == nil {
-		existingTags = objInfo.UserTags
-	}
-	if s3Error := authorizeRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, existingTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
-		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
-		return
-	}
 	if err != nil {
 		// if object is not found locally, but exists on peer site - proxy
 		// the tagging request to peer site. The response to client will
@@ -3795,9 +4035,21 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 		if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
 			proxytgts := getProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
 			if !proxytgts.Empty() {
+				if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID); s3Error != ErrNone {
+					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
+				perr, s3Error := proxyTaggingToRepTarget(ctx, bucket, object, tags, opts, proxytgts, func(existingTags string, readErr error) APIErrorCode {
+					if readErr != nil && !isRemoteTaggingNotFound(readErr) {
+						return authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, readErr)
+					}
+					return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, existingTags)
+				})
+				if s3Error != ErrNone {
+					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
 				globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, putObjectTaggingAPI, false)
-				// proxy to replication target if site replication is in place.
-				perr := proxyTaggingToRepTarget(ctx, bucket, object, tags, opts, proxytgts)
 				if perr.Err != nil {
 					globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, putObjectTaggingAPI, true)
 					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, perr.Err), r.URL)
@@ -3818,9 +4070,26 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PutObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
 				return
 			}
 		}
+		// A local read failure must never be turned into a write grant. A
+		// server error may still be disclosed to an otherwise authorized
+		// caller for retry, while a missing object is evaluated as untagged.
+		var s3Error APIErrorCode
+		if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
+			s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, "")
+		} else {
+			s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, err)
+		}
+		if s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
+	if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.PutObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, objInfo.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
+		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
 
 	dsc := mustReplicate(ctx, bucket, object, getMustReplicateOptions(objInfo.UserDefined, tagsStr, objInfo.ReplicationStatus, replication.MetadataReplicationType, opts))
 	stamp := UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
@@ -3877,6 +4146,13 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 		return
 	}
 
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).BucketName = bucket
+	logger.GetReqInfo(ctx).ObjectName = object
+	if s3Error := authenticateRequest(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction); s3Error != ErrNone {
+		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+
 	opts, err := getOpts(ctx, r, bucket, object)
 	if err != nil {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
@@ -3891,9 +4167,21 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 		if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
 			proxytgts := getProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
 			if !proxytgts.Empty() {
+				if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithPotentialTags(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID); s3Error != ErrNone {
+					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
+				perr, s3Error := proxyTaggingToRepTarget(ctx, bucket, object, nil, opts, proxytgts, func(existingTags string, readErr error) APIErrorCode {
+					if readErr != nil && !isRemoteTaggingNotFound(readErr) {
+						return authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, readErr)
+					}
+					return authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, existingTags)
+				})
+				if s3Error != ErrNone {
+					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+					return
+				}
 				globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, removeObjectTaggingAPI, false)
-				// proxy to replication target if active-active replication is in place.
-				perr := proxyTaggingToRepTarget(ctx, bucket, object, nil, opts, proxytgts)
 				if perr.Err != nil {
 					globalReplicationStats.Load().incProxy(bucket, removeObjectTaggingAPI, true)
 					writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, perr.Err), r.URL)
@@ -3915,12 +4203,22 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) DeleteObjectTaggingHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r
 				return
 			}
 		}
+		var s3Error APIErrorCode
+		if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
+			s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, "")
+		} else {
+			s3Error = authorizeVersionedRequestWithUnreadTags(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, err)
+		}
+		if s3Error != ErrNone {
+			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
+			return
+		}
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
 
 	// Allow deleteObjectTagging if policy action is set
-	if s3Error := checkRequestAuthTypeWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, bucket, object, oi.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
+	if s3Error := authorizeVersionedRequestWithExistingTags(ctx, r, policy.DeleteObjectTaggingAction, opts.VersionID, oi.UserTags); s3Error != ErrNone {
 		writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Error), r.URL)
 		return
 	}

cmd/object-lock-reconciliation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/md5"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"maps"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
+)
+
+func TestPoolLockReductionOrderIndependent(t *testing.T) {
+	const old = objectLockTestStamp0900
+	const recent = objectLockTestStamp1000
+	const newest = objectLockTestStamp1100
+	compliance := objectLockState{mode: "COMPLIANCE", retainUntil: "2035-01-01T00:00:00Z", retentionTimestamp: old}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name   string
+		states [3]objectLockState
+		want   objectLockState
+	}{
+		{"compliance-before-newer-removal", [3]objectLockState{compliance, {retentionTimestamp: recent}, {mode: "GOVERNANCE", retainUntil: "2036-01-01T00:00:00Z", retentionTimestamp: newest}}, compliance},
+		{"longer-compliance-before-newer-shortening", [3]objectLockState{compliance, {mode: "COMPLIANCE", retainUntil: "2034-01-01T00:00:00Z", retentionTimestamp: newest}, {retentionTimestamp: recent}}, compliance},
+		{"unordered-compliance", [3]objectLockState{{mode: "COMPLIANCE", retainUntil: compliance.retainUntil, retentionTimestamp: "invalid"}, {retentionTimestamp: newest}, {}}, objectLockState{mode: "COMPLIANCE", retainUntil: compliance.retainUntil, retentionTimestamp: "invalid"}},
+		{"expired-compliance-can-release", [3]objectLockState{{mode: "COMPLIANCE", retainUntil: "2000-01-01T00:00:00Z", retentionTimestamp: old}, {retentionTimestamp: newest}, {retentionTimestamp: recent}}, objectLockState{retentionTimestamp: newest}},
+		{"governance-can-release", [3]objectLockState{{mode: "GOVERNANCE", retainUntil: compliance.retainUntil, retentionTimestamp: old}, {retentionTimestamp: newest}, {}}, objectLockState{retentionTimestamp: newest}},
+		{"unordered-hold-conflict", [3]objectLockState{{legalHold: "OFF"}, {legalHold: "ON"}, {}}, objectLockState{legalHold: "ON"}},
+		{"newer-hold-release", [3]objectLockState{{legalHold: "ON", legalHoldTimestamp: old}, {legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: newest}, {legalHold: "ON", legalHoldTimestamp: "invalid"}}, objectLockState{legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: newest}},
+		{"independent-fields", [3]objectLockState{compliance, {retentionTimestamp: newest, legalHold: "ON", legalHoldTimestamp: recent}, {legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: old}}, objectLockState{mode: compliance.mode, retainUntil: compliance.retainUntil, retentionTimestamp: old, legalHold: "ON", legalHoldTimestamp: recent}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			for _, order := range [][3]int{{0, 1, 2}, {0, 2, 1}, {1, 0, 2}, {1, 2, 0}, {2, 0, 1}, {2, 1, 0}} {
+				var copies []PoolObjInfo
+				for _, i := range order {
+					meta := make(map[string]string)
+					tc.states[i].restoreRetention(meta)
+					tc.states[i].restoreLegalHold(meta)
+					copies = append(copies, PoolObjInfo{Index: i, ObjInfo: ObjectInfo{UserDefined: meta}})
+				}
+				for name, reduce := range map[string]func([]PoolObjInfo) objectLockState{"merge": mergePoolLockState, "lifecycle": newestLockState} {
+					if got := reduce(copies); got != tc.want {
+						t.Errorf("%s order=%v: got %+v want %+v", name, order, got, tc.want)
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// All requests copy the same bytes. Revisions belong to the addressed
+// destination, even if the source is the latest version of the same key.
+func TestAPICopyReplicaDestinationState(t *testing.T) {
+	defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t, makeBucketOptions: MakeBucketOptions{LockEnabled: true},
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			for _, sameKey := range []bool{true, false} {
+				for _, missing := range []bool{false, true} {
+					for _, directive := range []string{copyDirective, replaceDirective} {
+						name := fmt.Sprintf("copy-destination/%t/%t/%s", sameKey, missing, directive)
+						source := name
+						if !sameKey {
+							source += "-source"
+						}
+						targetMeta := poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "ON", objectLockTestStamp1000, objectLockTestStamp1000)
+						targetMeta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "state=destination"
+						targetMeta[r5TagStamp] = objectLockTestStamp1000
+						targetID := mustGetUUID()
+						if !missing {
+							targetID = putObjectLockVersion(t, obj, bucket, name, targetMeta)
+						}
+						sourceMeta := poolLockMetadata("", "OFF", objectLockTestStamp1100, objectLockTestStamp1100)
+						sourceMeta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "state=source"
+						sourceMeta[r5TagStamp] = objectLockTestStamp1100
+						sourceID := putObjectLockVersion(t, obj, bucket, source, sourceMeta)
+						headers := map[string]string{
+							xhttp.AmzCopySource:        "/" + bucket + "/" + source + "?versionId=" + sourceID,
+							xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective: directive, xhttp.AmzTagDirective: replaceDirective,
+							xhttp.MinIOSourceReplicationRequest: "true", xhttp.AmzBucketReplicationStatus: "REPLICA",
+						}
+						// No source revision means no change, including no
+						// inheritance from a different source for a first write.
+						rec := r5Request(t, router, cred, http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/"+name+"?versionId="+targetID, "", headers)
+						if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+							t.Fatalf("%s %s: %d %s", backend, name, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+						}
+						want := storedObjectLockState(targetMeta)
+						wantTags, wantStamp := "state=destination", objectLockTestStamp1000
+						if missing {
+							want = objectLockState{}
+							wantTags = ""
+							wantStamp = ""
+						}
+						got := r5Stored(t, obj, bucket, name, targetID, wantTags, wantStamp)
+						if state := storedObjectLockState(got.UserDefined); state != want {
+							t.Fatalf("%s absent revision: got %+v want %+v", name, state, want)
+						}
+						// The incoming update is older than the source but may
+						// still win at a new destination. A source lookup loses it.
+						headers[xhttp.MinIOSourceObjectRetentionTimestamp] = objectLockTestStamp0930
+						headers[xhttp.MinIOSourceObjectLegalHoldTimestamp] = objectLockTestStamp0930
+						headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode] = "GOVERNANCE"
+						headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate] = objectLockTestRetainUntil
+						headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold] = "ON"
+						headers[xhttp.MinIOSourceTaggingTimestamp] = objectLockTestStamp0930
+						headers[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "state=incoming"
+						rec = r5Request(t, router, cred, http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/"+name+"?versionId="+targetID, "", headers)
+						if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+							t.Fatalf("incoming %s: %d %s", name, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+						}
+						if missing {
+							want = objectLockState{mode: "GOVERNANCE", retainUntil: "2030-01-01T00:00:00.000Z", retentionTimestamp: objectLockTestStamp0930, legalHold: "ON", legalHoldTimestamp: objectLockTestStamp0930}
+							wantTags = "state=incoming"
+							wantStamp = objectLockTestStamp0930
+						}
+						got = r5Stored(t, obj, bucket, name, targetID, wantTags, wantStamp)
+						if state := storedObjectLockState(got.UserDefined); state != want {
+							t.Fatalf("%s stale revision: got %+v want %+v", name, state, want)
+						}
+						// Authorized same-content release needs no governance
+						// bypass header; it must not be rejected by the data guard.
+						delete(headers, xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode)
+						delete(headers, xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate)
+						headers[xhttp.MinIOSourceObjectRetentionTimestamp] = "2026-09-03T10:30:00Z"
+						headers[xhttp.MinIOSourceObjectLegalHoldTimestamp] = "2026-09-03T10:30:00Z"
+						headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold] = "OFF"
+						rec = r5Request(t, router, cred, http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/"+name+"?versionId="+targetID, "", headers)
+						if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+							t.Fatalf("release %s: %d %s", name, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+						}
+						got = r5Stored(t, obj, bucket, name, targetID, wantTags, wantStamp)
+						want = objectLockState{retentionTimestamp: "2026-09-03T10:30:00Z", legalHold: "OFF", legalHoldTimestamp: "2026-09-03T10:30:00Z"}
+						if state := storedObjectLockState(got.UserDefined); state != want {
+							t.Fatalf("%s release: got %+v want %+v", name, state, want)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+func TestReplicaReferenceCopyDestinationState(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
+	for _, missing := range []bool{false, true} {
+		key := fmt.Sprintf("reference-copy-%t", missing)
+		id := mustGetUUID()
+		targetMeta := poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "ON", objectLockTestStamp1000, objectLockTestStamp1000)
+		targetMeta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "state=destination"
+		targetMeta[r5TagStamp] = objectLockTestStamp1000
+		if !missing {
+			putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, 0, "data", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: id, UserDefined: targetMeta})
+		}
+		sourceMeta := poolLockMetadata("", "OFF", objectLockTestStamp1100, objectLockTestStamp1100)
+		sourceMeta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "state=source"
+		sourceMeta[r5TagStamp] = objectLockTestStamp1100
+		src := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, 0, "data", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: sourceMeta})
+		src.metadataOnly = true
+		src.UserDefined = make(map[string]string)
+		_, err := z.CopyObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, bucket, key, src, ObjectOptions{VersionID: src.VersionID}, ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: id, ReplicaLockReconcile: true, ReplicationRequest: true})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		want := storedObjectLockState(targetMeta)
+		wantTags, wantStamp := "state=destination", objectLockTestStamp1000
+		if missing {
+			want = objectLockState{}
+			wantTags = ""
+			wantStamp = ""
+		}
+		got := r5Stored(t, z, bucket, key, id, wantTags, wantStamp)
+		if state := storedObjectLockState(got.UserDefined); state != want {
+			t.Fatalf("missing=%t: got %+v want %+v", missing, state, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// The set must not undo the all-pools decision with a newer weak revision
+// from its own copy before the protected competing copy is retired.
+func TestPoolsReplicaComplianceMetadataCopyOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
+	for _, protectedPool := range []int{0, 1} {
+		key := fmt.Sprintf("compliance-copy-%d", protectedPool)
+		id := mustGetUUID()
+		stamp := UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)
+		var source ObjectInfo
+		for pool := range 2 {
+			meta := poolLockMetadata("", "OFF", objectLockTestStamp1100, objectLockTestStamp1000)
+			if pool == protectedPool {
+				meta = poolLockMetadata("COMPLIANCE", "OFF", objectLockTestStamp0900, objectLockTestStamp1000)
+			}
+			oi := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, key, pool, "data", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: id, MTime: stamp, UserDefined: meta})
+			if pool == 0 {
+				source = oi
+			}
+		}
+		source.metadataOnly = true
+		source.UserDefined = map[string]string{}
+		_, err := z.CopyObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, bucket, key, source, ObjectOptions{VersionID: id}, ObjectOptions{VersionID: id, Versioned: true, ReplicaLockReconcile: true, ReplicationRequest: true})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		got := readObjectLockFields(t, z, bucket, key, id)
+		if got.mode != "COMPLIANCE" || got.retainUntil != "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z" {
+			t.Fatalf("protected pool %d lost COMPLIANCE: %+v", protectedPool, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAPIReplicaRetentionTimestampAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
+	defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t, makeBucketOptions: MakeBucketOptions{LockEnabled: true},
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, router http.Handler, _ auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			basic := `"s3:GetObject","s3:PutObject","s3:ReplicateObject"`
+			noRetention := newObjectAttributesAuthzUser(t, backend, bucket, basic)
+			withRetention := newObjectAttributesAuthzUser(t, backend, bucket, basic+`,"s3:PutObjectRetention"`)
+			for _, operation := range []string{"put", "copy", "multipart"} {
+				for _, authorized := range []bool{false, true} {
+					for _, timestamp := range []bool{false, true} {
+						key := fmt.Sprintf("replica-permission/%s/%t/%t", operation, authorized, timestamp)
+						meta := poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "", objectLockTestStamp0900, "")
+						id := putObjectLockVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, meta)
+						headers := map[string]string{xhttp.MinIOSourceReplicationRequest: "true", xhttp.AmzBucketReplicationStatus: "REPLICA"}
+						if timestamp {
+							headers[xhttp.MinIOSourceObjectRetentionTimestamp] = objectLockTestStamp1000
+						}
+						method, path, body := http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/"+key+"?versionId="+id, "data"
+						switch operation {
+						case "copy":
+							headers[xhttp.AmzCopySource] = "/" + bucket + "/" + key + "?versionId=" + id
+							headers[xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective] = replaceDirective
+							body = ""
+						case "multipart":
+							method = http.MethodPost
+							path += "&uploads"
+							body = ""
+						}
+						cred := noRetention
+						if authorized {
+							cred = withRetention
+						}
+						rec := r5Request(t, router, cred, method, path, body, headers)
+						want := http.StatusOK
+						if timestamp && !authorized {
+							want = http.StatusForbidden
+						}
+						if rec.Code != want {
+							t.Fatalf("%s: %d want %d: %s", key, rec.Code, want, rec.Body.String())
+						}
+						if want == http.StatusForbidden || !timestamp {
+							got := readObjectLockFields(t, obj, bucket, key, id)
+							if got.mode != "GOVERNANCE" || got.retentionStamp != objectLockTestStamp0900 {
+								t.Fatalf("unrequested/denied retention changed: %+v", got)
+							}
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+func TestAPILocalObjectLockTimestampsAdvance(t *testing.T) {
+	defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
+		t: t, makeBucketOptions: MakeBucketOptions{LockEnabled: true},
+		objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+			future := UTCNow().Add(48 * time.Hour)
+			meta := poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "ON", future.Format(time.RFC3339Nano), future.Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
+			id := putObjectLockVersion(t, obj, bucket, "local-lock", meta)
+			for n := 1; n <= 2; n++ {
+				if status := putRetention(t, router, cred, bucket, "local-lock", id, "GOVERNANCE", time.Date(2035, 1, n, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), false); status != http.StatusOK {
+					t.Fatalf("%s retention: %d", backend, status)
+				}
+				body := []byte(`<LegalHold xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>OFF</Status></LegalHold>`)
+				sum := md5.Sum(body)
+				rec := retentionAuthzRequest(t, router, cred, http.MethodPut, makeTestTargetURL("", bucket, "local-lock", url.Values{"legal-hold": {""}, "versionId": {id}}), body, map[string]string{xhttp.ContentMD5: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:])})
+				if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+					t.Fatalf("%s hold: %d %s", backend, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+				}
+				got := readObjectLockFields(t, obj, bucket, "local-lock", id)
+				want := future.Add(time.Duration(n) * time.Nanosecond).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
+				if got.retentionStamp != want || got.legalHoldStamp != want {
+					t.Fatalf("local mutation %d regressed: %+v want %s", n, got, want)
+				}
+			}
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+type lockBoundaryReadFailure struct {
+	ObjectLayer
+	bucket, key, version string
+	metadataError        error
+	destinationError     error
+	deleteCalls          int
+}
+
+func (f *lockBoundaryReadFailure) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, key string, rs *HTTPRangeSpec, h http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
+	if f.metadataError != nil && bucket == minioMetaBucket && strings.HasPrefix(key, pathJoin(bucketMetaPrefix, f.bucket)+"/") {
+		return nil, f.metadataError
+	}
+	return f.ObjectLayer.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, key, rs, h, opts)
+}
+
+func (f *lockBoundaryReadFailure) GetObjectInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, key string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
+	if f.destinationError != nil && bucket == f.bucket && key == f.key && opts.VersionID == f.version {
+		return ObjectInfo{}, f.destinationError
+	}
+	return f.ObjectLayer.GetObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, key, opts)
+}
+
+func (f *lockBoundaryReadFailure) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, key string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
+	f.deleteCalls++
+	return f.ObjectLayer.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, key, opts)
+}
+
+func TestAPICopyReplicaDestinationReadFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{t: t, makeBucketOptions: MakeBucketOptions{LockEnabled: true}, objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, _ http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+		id := putObjectLockVersion(t, obj, bucket, "destination", poolLockMetadata("GOVERNANCE", "ON", objectLockTestStamp1000, objectLockTestStamp1000))
+		source := putObjectLockVersion(t, obj, bucket, "source", nil)
+		f := &lockBoundaryReadFailure{ObjectLayer: obj, bucket: bucket, key: "destination", version: id, destinationError: errErasureReadQuorum}
+		router := initTestAPIEndPoints(f, []string{"CopyObject"})
+		headers := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzCopySource: "/" + bucket + "/source?versionId=" + source, xhttp.MinIOSourceReplicationRequest: "true", xhttp.AmzBucketReplicationStatus: "REPLICA"}
+		rec := r5Request(t, router, cred, http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/destination?versionId="+id, "", headers)
+		if rec.Code < 500 {
+			t.Fatalf("%s read failure allowed copy: %d %s", backend, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+		if got := readObjectLockFields(t, obj, bucket, "destination", id); got.legalHold != "ON" || got.mode != "GOVERNANCE" {
+			t.Fatalf("failed read changed state: %+v", got)
+		}
+	}})
+}
+
+func TestAPIForceDeleteLockConfigFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, locked := range []bool{false, true} {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("locked=%t", locked), func(t *testing.T) {
+			ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{t: t, makeBucketOptions: MakeBucketOptions{LockEnabled: locked}, objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, _ http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+				saved, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
+				if err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				restoreInit := markBucketMetadataInitialized(t)
+				defer restoreInit()
+				previous := newObjectLayerFn()
+				defer setObjectLayer(previous)
+				defer globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, saved)
+				for _, failure := range []string{"quorum", "unavailable", "cache-miss"} {
+					key := "force-" + failure + "/data"
+					putObjectLockVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, nil)
+					f := &lockBoundaryReadFailure{ObjectLayer: obj, bucket: bucket}
+					globalBucketMetadataSys.Remove(bucket)
+					switch failure {
+					case "quorum":
+						f.metadataError = errErasureReadQuorum
+					case "unavailable":
+						f.metadataError = errServerNotInitialized
+					}
+					router := initTestAPIEndPoints(f, []string{"DeleteObject"})
+					rec := r5Request(t, router, cred, http.MethodDelete, "/"+bucket+"/force-"+failure, "", map[string]string{xhttp.MinIOForceDelete: "true"})
+					setObjectLayer(previous)
+					globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, saved)
+					allowed := failure == "cache-miss" && !locked
+					if allowed {
+						if rec.Code != http.StatusNoContent || f.deleteCalls != 1 {
+							t.Fatalf("%s missing unlocked cache: %d calls=%d %s", backend, rec.Code, f.deleteCalls, rec.Body.String())
+						}
+					} else {
+						if rec.Code < 400 || f.deleteCalls != 0 {
+							t.Fatalf("%s %s: force-delete proceeded: %d calls=%d %s", backend, failure, rec.Code, f.deleteCalls, rec.Body.String())
+						}
+						if _, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{}); err != nil {
+							t.Fatalf("rejected force-delete lost data: %v", err)
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}})
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAPILocalCopyTagTimestampAdvances(t *testing.T) {
+	ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{t: t, objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, backend, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
+		stamp := UTCNow().Add(48 * time.Hour)
+		meta := map[string]string{r5TagStamp: stamp.Format(time.RFC3339Nano), xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "key=old"}
+		_, err := obj.PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, "local-copy", mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader("data"), 4, "", ""), ObjectOptions{UserDefined: maps.Clone(meta)})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		rec := r5Request(t, router, cred, http.MethodPut, "/"+bucket+"/local-copy", "", map[string]string{xhttp.AmzCopySource: "/" + bucket + "/local-copy", xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective: replaceDirective, xhttp.AmzTagDirective: replaceDirective})
+		if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("%s copy: %d %s", backend, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+		}
+		r5Stored(t, obj, bucket, "local-copy", "", "", stamp.Add(time.Nanosecond).Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
+	}})
+}