mirror of
https://github.com/pgsty/minio.git
synced 2026-11-12 02:25:34 +03:00
Feng Ruohang
34ba7cc1ff
Harden IAM/bucket/import/replication policy validation, enforce tag and version authorization across read/copy/list/archive endpoints, bind SigV4 credential-scope dates and streaming trailer limits, validate HTTP SSE-KMS contexts as strict UTF-8 JSON, add release-commit and coordinated dependency gates, and pin silo-pkg v3.16.1, Console v2.7.1, mcli 20261112, Go 1.27.4, and Helm chart 7.0.5. Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
73 lines
3.7 KiB
Docker
73 lines
3.7 KiB
Docker
# The distroless variant ships exactly one program: the silo binary.
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# No shell, no mc, no curl, no entrypoint script; health checking is
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# provided by the binary itself (`silo healthcheck`).
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# Design note: https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/feature/healthcheck/
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# A distroless final stage cannot RUN anything, so /data is prepared in a
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# throwaway stage. It ships world-writable (see pgsty/silo#55): Docker
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# seeds fresh volumes from the image-layer mountpoint, no entrypoint
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# exists to repair ownership at runtime, and 0777 is what keeps every
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# privilege mode working, --user included.
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FROM busybox:1.37.0@sha256:a7dbc319b1438115a207e11930dc4bb3e643dcb3ec0bdd694bb36cd8fad289ec AS prep
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RUN mkdir -p /prep/data && chmod 0777 /prep/data
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# Debian's bundle in distroless still trusts the roots the classic image
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# blocklists. Build the same bundle as Dockerfile.goreleaser so both variants
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# trust the same roots; it is architecture-neutral, so build it natively.
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FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:8b212f75a0e5a156ac28b1c5c030d2e8a07715254e19d522286118279399af81 AS certs
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# Native root blocklist mitigation: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012
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RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
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if [ -d /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist ]; then \
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blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist; \
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else \
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blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blacklist; \
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fi && \
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trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
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--filter='pkcs11:object=Comodo%20AAA%20Services%20root;type=cert' \
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"$blocklist/Comodo_AAA_Services_root.pem" && \
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trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
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--filter='pkcs11:object=emSign%20ECC%20Root%20CA%20-%20G3;type=cert' \
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"$blocklist/emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3.pem" && \
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update-ca-trust && \
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cp /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem /tmp/ca-certificates.crt
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FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:latest@sha256:d75cdd72874d4790092fcb1b058493ecf6bb5bf2b2b897045b00ff01d91843f2
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LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="Silo" \
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org.opencontainers.image.description="S3-Interface Libre Object Storage (distroless)" \
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org.opencontainers.image.url="https://silo.pgsty.com" \
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org.opencontainers.image.source="https://github.com/pgsty/silo" \
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org.opencontainers.image.licenses="AGPL-3.0-or-later" \
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maintainer="PGSTY <https://silo.pgsty.com>"
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ENV MINIO_ACCESS_KEY_FILE=access_key \
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MINIO_SECRET_KEY_FILE=secret_key \
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MINIO_ROOT_USER_FILE=access_key \
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MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE=secret_key \
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MINIO_KMS_SECRET_KEY_FILE=kms_master_key \
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MINIO_CONFIG_ENV_FILE=config.env \
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HOME=/tmp
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# The only file under /etc/ssl/certs, so replacing it is sufficient.
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COPY --from=certs /tmp/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
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COPY --chmod=0755 silo /usr/bin/silo
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# COPY of a directory copies its contents, not the directory entry, so an
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# empty /prep/data would arrive as a default root:0755 /data and non-root
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# runs would fail storage init. Copying the parent makes data/ itself a
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# copied entry, which --chmod then actually applies to.
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COPY --from=prep --chmod=0777 /prep/ /
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COPY LICENSE NOTICE CREDITS /licenses/
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EXPOSE 9000
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VOLUME ["/data"]
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# Exec form is mandatory: there is no /bin/sh in this image. `ready`
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# rather than `live` because Docker health feeds start-order gating
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# (readiness semantics); the two are identical unless KMS/etcd are used.
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# The outer timeout stays above the probe's own 5s deadline so the
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# probe can report its diagnostic line instead of being SIGKILLed.
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HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=2m --start-interval=2s --retries=3 \
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CMD ["/usr/bin/silo", "healthcheck", "ready"]
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ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/silo"]
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