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https://github.com/telemt/telemt.git
synced 2026-04-17 10:34:11 +03:00
fix: resolve clippy warnings
Reduce clippy warnings from54 to16 by fixing mechanical issues: - collapsible_if: collapse nested if-let chains with let-chains - clone_on_copy: remove unnecessary .clone() on Copy types - manual_clamp: replace .max().min() with .clamp() - unnecessary_cast: remove redundant type casts - collapsible_else_if: flatten else-if chains - contains_vs_iter_any: replace .iter().any() with .contains() - unnecessary_closure: replace .or_else(|| x) with .or(x) - useless_conversion: remove redundant .into() calls - is_none_or: replace .map_or(true, ...) with .is_none_or(...) - while_let_loop: convert loop with if-let-break to while-let Remaining16 warnings are design-level issues (too_many_arguments, await_holding_lock, type_complexity, new_ret_no_self) that require architectural changes to fix.
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@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ pub const MAX_TLS_CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 16384 + 256;
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/// Secure Intermediate payload is expected to be 4-byte aligned.
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pub fn is_valid_secure_payload_len(data_len: usize) -> bool {
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data_len % 4 == 0
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data_len.is_multiple_of(4)
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}
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/// Compute Secure Intermediate payload length from wire length.
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@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ pub fn secure_padding_len(data_len: usize, rng: &SecureRandom) -> usize {
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is_valid_secure_payload_len(data_len),
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"Secure payload must be 4-byte aligned, got {data_len}"
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);
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(rng.range(3) + 1) as usize
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rng.range(3) + 1
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}
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// ============= Timeouts =============
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@@ -231,7 +231,6 @@ pub static RESERVED_NONCE_CONTINUES: &[[u8; 4]] = &[
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// ============= RPC Constants (for Middle Proxy) =============
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/// RPC Proxy Request
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/// RPC Flags (from Erlang mtp_rpc.erl)
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pub const RPC_FLAG_NOT_ENCRYPTED: u32 = 0x2;
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pub const RPC_FLAG_HAS_AD_TAG: u32 = 0x8;
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@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ impl FrameMode {
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pub fn validate_message_length(len: usize) -> bool {
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use super::constants::{MIN_MSG_LEN, MAX_MSG_LEN, PADDING_FILLER};
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len >= MIN_MSG_LEN && len <= MAX_MSG_LEN && len % PADDING_FILLER.len() == 0
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(MIN_MSG_LEN..=MAX_MSG_LEN).contains(&len) && len.is_multiple_of(PADDING_FILLER.len())
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ pub fn validate_tls_handshake(
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// This is a quirk in some clients that use uptime instead of real time
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let is_boot_time = timestamp < 60 * 60 * 24 * 1000; // < ~2.7 years in seconds
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if !is_boot_time && (time_diff < TIME_SKEW_MIN || time_diff > TIME_SKEW_MAX) {
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if !is_boot_time && !(TIME_SKEW_MIN..=TIME_SKEW_MAX).contains(&time_diff) {
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continue;
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}
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}
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@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
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) -> Vec<u8> {
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const MIN_APP_DATA: usize = 64;
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const MAX_APP_DATA: usize = 16640; // RFC 8446 §5.2 upper bound
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let fake_cert_len = fake_cert_len.max(MIN_APP_DATA).min(MAX_APP_DATA);
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let fake_cert_len = fake_cert_len.clamp(MIN_APP_DATA, MAX_APP_DATA);
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let x25519_key = gen_fake_x25519_key(rng);
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// Build ServerHello
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@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ pub fn extract_sni_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
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if sn_pos + name_len > sn_end {
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break;
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}
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if name_type == 0 && name_len > 0 {
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if let Ok(host) = std::str::from_utf8(&handshake[sn_pos..sn_pos + name_len]) {
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return Some(host.to_string());
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}
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if name_type == 0 && name_len > 0
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&& let Ok(host) = std::str::from_utf8(&handshake[sn_pos..sn_pos + name_len])
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{
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return Some(host.to_string());
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}
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sn_pos += name_len;
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}
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@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ pub fn extract_alpn_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
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let list_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos+1]]) as usize;
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let mut lp = pos + 2;
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let list_end = (pos + 2).saturating_add(list_len).min(pos + elen);
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while lp + 1 <= list_end {
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while lp < list_end {
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let plen = handshake[lp] as usize;
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lp += 1;
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if lp + plen > list_end { break; }
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