Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: John Preston <17900494+john-preston@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alexey
2026-08-23 03:12:11 +03:00
parent 8dbd24b11b
commit 1029703c2c
58 changed files with 7460 additions and 2646 deletions
+240
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@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::Arc;
use base64::Engine as _;
use hyper::header;
use hyper::Request;
use ipnetwork::IpNetwork;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use crate::config::{
WebClientIpSource, WebRuntimeProfile, WebRuntimeVhost,
};
use crate::web::manager::TokenHash;
/// Parses one lowercase canonical Host value restricted to the public HTTPS port.
pub(super) fn canonical_request_host<B>(request: &Request<B>) -> Option<&str> {
let values = request.headers().get_all(header::HOST);
let mut values = values.iter();
let value = values.next()?.to_str().ok()?;
if values.next().is_some() {
return None;
}
let authority = value.parse::<hyper::http::uri::Authority>().ok()?;
if authority.port_u16().is_some_and(|port| port != 443) {
return None;
}
let host = value.strip_suffix(":443").unwrap_or(value);
if authority.host() != host || host.bytes().any(|byte| byte.is_ascii_uppercase())
{
return None;
}
Some(host)
}
/// Accepts one canonical forwarded client address from an explicitly trusted peer.
pub(super) fn client_ip<B>(
request: &Request<B>,
peer: SocketAddr,
source: WebClientIpSource,
trusted_proxy_cidrs: &[IpNetwork],
) -> Option<IpAddr> {
if !trusted_proxy_cidrs
.iter()
.any(|network| network.contains(peer.ip()))
{
return None;
}
let header_name = match source {
WebClientIpSource::XForwardedFor => "x-forwarded-for",
};
let values = request.headers().get_all(header_name);
let mut values = values.iter();
let value = values.next()?.to_str().ok()?;
if values.next().is_some()
|| value.is_empty()
|| value.trim() != value
|| value.contains(',')
{
return None;
}
let ip = value.parse::<IpAddr>().ok()?;
(ip.to_string() == value).then_some(ip)
}
/// Decodes an exact canonical bridge query without allocating credential strings.
pub(super) fn bridge_candidate(query: Option<&str>) -> ([u8; 32], bool) {
let mut candidate = [0u8; 32];
let Some(value) = query.and_then(|query| query.strip_prefix("bridge=")) else {
return (candidate, false);
};
if value.len() != 43 {
return (candidate, false);
}
let mut decoded = [0u8; 32];
let Ok(decoded_len) = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode_slice(value, &mut decoded)
else {
return (candidate, false);
};
let mut canonical = [0u8; 43];
let Ok(encoded_len) = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.encode_slice(decoded, &mut canonical)
else {
return (candidate, false);
};
if decoded_len != decoded.len()
|| encoded_len != canonical.len()
|| !bool::from(canonical.ct_eq(value.as_bytes()))
{
return (candidate, false);
}
candidate = decoded;
(candidate, true)
}
/// Matches a capability in constant time across every profile of one virtual host.
pub(super) fn match_profile(
vhost: &WebRuntimeVhost,
candidate: &[u8; 32],
) -> Option<Arc<WebRuntimeProfile>> {
let mut matched = None;
for profile in &vhost.profiles {
if bool::from(profile.capability.ct_eq(candidate)) {
matched = Some(Arc::clone(profile));
}
}
matched
}
/// Validates and hashes one canonical bearer credential for map lookup.
pub(super) fn bearer_token_hash<B>(request: &Request<B>) -> Option<TokenHash> {
let values = request.headers().get_all(header::AUTHORIZATION);
let mut values = values.iter();
let value = values.next()?.to_str().ok()?;
if values.next().is_some() || !value.starts_with("Bearer ") || value.matches(' ').count() != 1
{
return None;
}
let token = value.strip_prefix("Bearer ")?;
if token.len() != 43 {
return None;
}
let mut decoded = [0u8; 32];
let decoded_len = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.decode_slice(token, &mut decoded)
.ok()?;
let mut canonical = [0u8; 43];
let encoded_len = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.encode_slice(decoded, &mut canonical)
.ok()?;
(decoded_len == decoded.len()
&& encoded_len == canonical.len()
&& bool::from(canonical.ct_eq(token.as_bytes())))
.then(|| Sha256::digest(decoded).into())
}
/// Checks the exact carrier media type without accepting duplicate headers.
pub(super) fn binary_content_type<B>(request: &Request<B>) -> bool {
let values = request.headers().get_all(header::CONTENT_TYPE);
let mut values = values.iter();
let value = values.next().and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok());
values.next().is_none()
&& value.is_some_and(|value| value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("application/octet-stream"))
}
/// Parses one canonical unsigned decimal carrier sequence header.
pub(super) fn canonical_u64_header<B>(
request: &Request<B>,
name: &'static str,
) -> Option<u64> {
let values = request.headers().get_all(name);
let mut values = values.iter();
let value = values.next()?.to_str().ok()?;
if values.next().is_some()
|| value.is_empty()
|| value.starts_with('+')
|| (value.len() > 1 && value.starts_with('0'))
{
return None;
}
let parsed = value.parse::<u64>().ok()?;
(parsed.to_string() == value).then_some(parsed)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn canonical_bridge_query_rejects_aliases() {
let token = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode([7u8; 32]);
assert!(bridge_candidate(Some(&format!("bridge={token}"))).1);
assert!(!bridge_candidate(Some(&format!("x=1&bridge={token}"))).1);
assert!(!bridge_candidate(Some(&format!("bridge={token}="))).1);
}
#[test]
fn host_and_forwarded_identity_require_canonical_single_values() {
let request = Request::builder()
.header(header::HOST, "proxy.example.com:443")
.header("x-forwarded-for", "192.0.2.10")
.body(())
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
canonical_request_host(&request),
Some("proxy.example.com")
);
let trusted: [IpNetwork; 1] = ["127.0.0.1/32".parse().unwrap()];
assert_eq!(
client_ip(
&request,
"127.0.0.1:40000".parse().unwrap(),
WebClientIpSource::XForwardedFor,
&trusted,
),
Some("192.0.2.10".parse().unwrap())
);
let uppercase = Request::builder()
.header(header::HOST, "Proxy.Example.com")
.body(())
.unwrap();
assert!(canonical_request_host(&uppercase).is_none());
let appended = Request::builder()
.header("x-forwarded-for", "192.0.2.10, 198.51.100.4")
.body(())
.unwrap();
assert!(
client_ip(
&appended,
"127.0.0.1:40000".parse().unwrap(),
WebClientIpSource::XForwardedFor,
&trusted,
)
.is_none()
);
}
#[test]
fn bearer_and_sequence_headers_reject_noncanonical_aliases() {
let token = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode([1u8; 32]);
let request = Request::builder()
.header(header::AUTHORIZATION, format!("Bearer {token}"))
.header("x-up-seq", "17")
.body(())
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
bearer_token_hash(&request),
Some(Sha256::digest([1u8; 32]).into())
);
assert_eq!(canonical_u64_header(&request, "x-up-seq"), Some(17));
let leading_zero = Request::builder()
.header("x-up-seq", "017")
.body(())
.unwrap();
assert!(canonical_u64_header(&leading_zero, "x-up-seq").is_none());
}
}