Align ServerHello cipher and opaque ALPN behavior in TLS-F

This commit is contained in:
Aleksei K
2026-05-28 16:11:25 +03:00
parent 31da0a1356
commit 2a0fcd6e35
6 changed files with 427 additions and 89 deletions

View File

@@ -1385,6 +1385,7 @@ fn emulated_server_hello_never_places_alpn_in_server_hello_extensions() {
false,
true,
ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls13,
[0x13, 0x01],
&rng,
Some(b"h2".to_vec()),
0,
@@ -1509,12 +1510,22 @@ fn test_validate_tls_handshake_format() {
}
fn build_client_hello_with_exts(exts: Vec<(u16, Vec<u8>)>, host: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
build_client_hello_with_ciphers_and_exts(&[[0x13, 0x01]], exts, host)
}
fn build_client_hello_with_ciphers_and_exts(
cipher_suites: &[[u8; 2]],
exts: Vec<(u16, Vec<u8>)>,
host: &str,
) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut body = Vec::new();
body.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
body.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
body.push(0);
body.extend_from_slice(&2u16.to_be_bytes());
body.extend_from_slice(&[0x13, 0x01]);
body.extend_from_slice(&((cipher_suites.len() * 2) as u16).to_be_bytes());
for suite in cipher_suites {
body.extend_from_slice(suite);
}
body.push(1);
body.push(0);
@@ -1654,6 +1665,51 @@ fn detect_client_hello_tls_version_rejects_malformed_supported_versions() {
assert!(detect_client_hello_tls_version(&ch).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite_keeps_profile_cipher_when_offered() {
let ch = build_client_hello_with_ciphers_and_exts(
&[[0x13, 0x01], [0x13, 0x03]],
Vec::new(),
"example.com",
);
assert_eq!(
select_server_hello_cipher_suite(&ch, [0x13, 0x03]),
[0x13, 0x03]
);
}
#[test]
fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite_ignores_profile_tls12_cipher() {
let ch = build_client_hello_with_ciphers_and_exts(
&[[0xc0, 0x2f], [0x13, 0x03]],
Vec::new(),
"example.com",
);
assert_eq!(
select_server_hello_cipher_suite(&ch, [0xc0, 0x2f]),
[0x13, 0x03]
);
}
#[test]
fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite_falls_back_to_offered_tls13_suite() {
let ch = build_client_hello_with_ciphers_and_exts(&[[0x13, 0x03]], Vec::new(), "example.com");
assert_eq!(
select_server_hello_cipher_suite(&ch, [0x13, 0x01]),
[0x13, 0x03]
);
}
#[test]
fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite_keeps_preferred_for_malformed_clienthello() {
let mut ch = build_client_hello_with_ciphers_and_exts(&[[0x13, 0x03]], Vec::new(), "example.com");
ch.truncate(12);
assert_eq!(
select_server_hello_cipher_suite(&ch, [0x13, 0x01]),
[0x13, 0x01]
);
}
#[test]
fn extract_sni_rejects_zero_length_host_name() {
let mut sni_ext = Vec::new();
@@ -2179,7 +2235,7 @@ fn light_fuzz_boot_time_timestamp_matrix_with_short_replay_window_obeys_boot_cap
}
#[test]
fn server_hello_application_data_contains_alpn_marker_when_selected() {
fn server_hello_application_data_omits_alpn_marker_when_selected() {
let secret = b"alpn_marker_test";
let client_digest = [0x55u8; TLS_DIGEST_LEN];
let session_id = vec![0xAB; 32];
@@ -2206,8 +2262,8 @@ fn server_hello_application_data_contains_alpn_marker_when_selected() {
assert!(
app_payload
.windows(expected.len())
.any(|window| window == expected),
"first application payload must carry ALPN marker for selected protocol"
.all(|window| window != expected),
"first application payload must not expose plaintext ALPN marker bytes"
);
}
@@ -2303,14 +2359,14 @@ fn server_hello_ignores_oversized_alpn_when_marker_would_not_fit() {
}
#[test]
fn server_hello_embeds_full_alpn_marker_when_it_exactly_fits_fake_cert_len() {
fn server_hello_omits_alpn_marker_even_when_it_would_fit_fake_cert_len() {
let secret = b"alpn_exact_fit_test";
let client_digest = [0x58u8; TLS_DIGEST_LEN];
let session_id = vec![0xA5; 32];
let rng = crate::crypto::SecureRandom::new();
let proto = vec![b'z'; 57];
// marker_len = 4 + (2 + (1 + proto_len)) = 7 + proto_len = 64
// marker_len = 4 + (2 + (1 + proto_len)) = 7 + proto_len = 64.
let response = build_server_hello(
secret,
&client_digest,
@@ -2336,7 +2392,7 @@ fn server_hello_embeds_full_alpn_marker_when_it_exactly_fits_fake_cert_len() {
expected_marker.extend_from_slice(&proto);
assert_eq!(app_payload.len(), expected_marker.len());
assert_eq!(app_payload, expected_marker.as_slice());
assert_ne!(app_payload, expected_marker.as_slice());
}
#[test]

View File

@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ mod extension_type {
/// TLS Cipher Suites
mod cipher_suite {
pub const TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: [u8; 2] = [0x13, 0x01];
pub const TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384: [u8; 2] = [0x13, 0x02];
pub const TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256: [u8; 2] = [0x13, 0x03];
}
/// TLS Named Curves
@@ -241,6 +243,13 @@ impl ServerHelloBuilder {
self
}
fn with_cipher_suite(mut self, cipher_suite: [u8; 2]) -> Self {
if cipher_suite != [0, 0] {
self.cipher_suite = cipher_suite;
}
self
}
/// Build ServerHello message (without record header)
fn build_message(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let Ok(session_id_len) = u8::try_from(self.session_id.len()) else {
@@ -520,6 +529,33 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
rng: &SecureRandom,
alpn: Option<Vec<u8>>,
new_session_tickets: u8,
) -> Vec<u8> {
build_server_hello_with_cipher(
secret,
client_digest,
session_id,
fake_cert_len,
rng,
cipher_suite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
alpn,
new_session_tickets,
)
}
/// Build TLS ServerHello response with a caller-selected cipher suite.
///
/// The caller is responsible for selecting a suite that is compatible with the
/// already-authenticated ClientHello. Keeping the selection outside this
/// builder avoids extra ClientHello parsing in the response construction path.
pub(crate) fn build_server_hello_with_cipher(
secret: &[u8],
client_digest: &[u8; TLS_DIGEST_LEN],
session_id: &[u8],
fake_cert_len: usize,
rng: &SecureRandom,
selected_cipher_suite: [u8; 2],
alpn: Option<Vec<u8>>,
new_session_tickets: u8,
) -> Vec<u8> {
const MIN_APP_DATA: usize = 64;
const MAX_APP_DATA: usize = MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE;
@@ -528,6 +564,7 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
// Build ServerHello
let server_hello = ServerHelloBuilder::new(session_id.to_vec())
.with_cipher_suite(selected_cipher_suite)
.with_x25519_key(&x25519_key)
.with_tls13_version()
.build_record();
@@ -538,28 +575,14 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
TLS_VERSION[0],
TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00,
0x01, // length = 1
0x01, // CCS byte
0x01,
0x01,
];
// Build first encrypted flight mimic as opaque ApplicationData bytes.
// Embed a compact EncryptedExtensions-like ALPN block when selected.
// ALPN belongs inside encrypted EncryptedExtensions in real TLS 1.3.
let mut fake_cert = Vec::with_capacity(fake_cert_len);
if let Some(proto) = alpn
.as_ref()
.filter(|p| !p.is_empty() && p.len() <= u8::MAX as usize)
{
let proto_list_len = 1usize + proto.len();
let ext_data_len = 2usize + proto_list_len;
let marker_len = 4usize + ext_data_len;
if marker_len <= fake_cert_len {
fake_cert.extend_from_slice(&0x0010u16.to_be_bytes());
fake_cert.extend_from_slice(&(ext_data_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
fake_cert.extend_from_slice(&(proto_list_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
fake_cert.push(proto.len() as u8);
fake_cert.extend_from_slice(proto);
}
}
let _ = alpn;
if fake_cert.len() < fake_cert_len {
fake_cert.extend_from_slice(&rng.bytes(fake_cert_len - fake_cert.len()));
} else if fake_cert.len() > fake_cert_len {
@@ -580,7 +603,7 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
let ticket_count = new_session_tickets.min(4);
if ticket_count > 0 {
for _ in 0..ticket_count {
let ticket_len: usize = rng.range(48) + 48; // 48-95 bytes
let ticket_len: usize = rng.range(48) + 48;
let mut record = Vec::with_capacity(5 + ticket_len);
record.push(TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION);
record.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
@@ -927,6 +950,112 @@ pub fn detect_client_hello_tls_version(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<ClientHelloTl
}
}
fn client_hello_cipher_suites_range(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<(usize, usize)> {
if handshake.len() < 5 || handshake[0] != TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE {
return None;
}
let record_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[3], handshake[4]]) as usize;
let record_end = 5usize.checked_add(record_len)?;
if record_end > handshake.len() {
return None;
}
let mut pos = 5;
if handshake.get(pos) != Some(&0x01) {
return None;
}
pos += 1;
if pos + 3 > record_end {
return None;
}
let handshake_len = ((handshake[pos] as usize) << 16)
| ((handshake[pos + 1] as usize) << 8)
| handshake[pos + 2] as usize;
pos += 3;
let handshake_end = pos.checked_add(handshake_len)?;
if handshake_end > record_end {
return None;
}
if pos + 2 + 32 > handshake_end {
return None;
}
pos += 2 + 32;
let session_id_len = *handshake.get(pos)? as usize;
pos = pos.checked_add(1)?.checked_add(session_id_len)?;
if pos + 2 > handshake_end {
return None;
}
let cipher_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]) as usize;
if cipher_len == 0 || cipher_len % 2 != 0 {
return None;
}
pos += 2;
let cipher_end = pos.checked_add(cipher_len)?;
if cipher_end > handshake_end {
return None;
}
Some((pos, cipher_end))
}
fn client_hello_offers_cipher_suite(
handshake: &[u8],
range: (usize, usize),
suite: [u8; 2],
) -> bool {
let mut pos = range.0;
while pos + 1 < range.1 {
if handshake[pos] == suite[0] && handshake[pos + 1] == suite[1] {
return true;
}
pos += 2;
}
false
}
fn is_tls13_cipher_suite(suite: [u8; 2]) -> bool {
suite == cipher_suite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
|| suite == cipher_suite::TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
|| suite == cipher_suite::TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
}
/// Select the ServerHello cipher suite from the already-received ClientHello.
///
/// This is intentionally a borrowed, zero-allocation scan. It runs only for an
/// authenticated success response and keeps malformed or unexpected ClientHello
/// shapes on the previous fallback behavior.
pub(crate) fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite(handshake: &[u8], preferred: [u8; 2]) -> [u8; 2] {
let preferred = if is_tls13_cipher_suite(preferred) {
preferred
} else {
cipher_suite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
};
let Some(range) = client_hello_cipher_suites_range(handshake) else {
return preferred;
};
if client_hello_offers_cipher_suite(handshake, range, preferred) {
return preferred;
}
for fallback in [
cipher_suite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_suite::TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
cipher_suite::TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
] {
if client_hello_offers_cipher_suite(handshake, range, fallback) {
return fallback;
}
}
preferred
}
/// Check if bytes look like a TLS ClientHello
pub fn is_tls_handshake(first_bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
if first_bytes.len() < 3 {