Normalize IP + Masking + TLS

This commit is contained in:
Alexey 2026-02-20 16:32:14 +03:00
parent be2ec4b9b4
commit 2ea4c83d9d
No known key found for this signature in database
7 changed files with 104 additions and 30 deletions

View File

@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ impl ProxyConfig {
validate_network_cfg(&mut config.network)?;
if config.general.use_middle_proxy && config.network.ipv6 == Some(true) {
warn!("IPv6 with Middle Proxy is experimental and may cause KDF address mismatch; consider disabling IPv6 or ME");
}
// Random fake_cert_len only when default is in use.
if !config.censorship.tls_emulation && config.censorship.fake_cert_len == default_fake_cert_len() {
config.censorship.fake_cert_len = rand::rng().gen_range(1024..4096);

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@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use rand::Rng;
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::signal;
use tokio::sync::Semaphore;
@ -275,21 +276,42 @@ async fn main() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
&config.censorship.tls_front_dir,
));
let port = config.censorship.mask_port;
// Initial synchronous fetch to warm cache before serving clients.
for domain in tls_domains.clone() {
match crate::tls_front::fetcher::fetch_real_tls(
&domain,
port,
&domain,
Duration::from_secs(5),
)
.await
{
Ok(res) => cache.update_from_fetch(&domain, res).await,
Err(e) => warn!(domain = %domain, error = %e, "TLS emulation fetch failed"),
}
}
// Periodic refresh with jitter.
let cache_clone = cache.clone();
let domains = tls_domains.clone();
let port = config.censorship.mask_port;
tokio::spawn(async move {
for domain in domains {
match crate::tls_front::fetcher::fetch_real_tls(
&domain,
port,
&domain,
Duration::from_secs(5),
)
.await
{
Ok(res) => cache_clone.update_from_fetch(&domain, res).await,
Err(e) => warn!(domain = %domain, error = %e, "TLS emulation fetch failed"),
loop {
let base_secs = rand::rng().random_range(4 * 3600..=6 * 3600);
let jitter_secs = rand::rng().random_range(0..=7200);
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(base_secs + jitter_secs)).await;
for domain in &domains {
match crate::tls_front::fetcher::fetch_real_tls(
domain,
port,
domain,
Duration::from_secs(5),
)
.await
{
Ok(res) => cache_clone.update_from_fetch(domain, res).await,
Err(e) => warn!(domain = %domain, error = %e, "TLS emulation refresh failed"),
}
}
}
});

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@ -351,6 +351,9 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
fake_cert_len: usize,
rng: &SecureRandom,
) -> Vec<u8> {
const MIN_APP_DATA: usize = 64;
const MAX_APP_DATA: usize = 16640; // RFC 8446 §5.2 upper bound
let fake_cert_len = fake_cert_len.max(MIN_APP_DATA).min(MAX_APP_DATA);
let x25519_key = gen_fake_x25519_key(rng);
// Build ServerHello
@ -373,7 +376,13 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
app_data_record.push(TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION);
app_data_record.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
app_data_record.extend_from_slice(&(fake_cert_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
app_data_record.extend_from_slice(&fake_cert);
if fake_cert_len > 17 {
app_data_record.extend_from_slice(&fake_cert[..fake_cert_len - 17]);
app_data_record.push(0x16); // inner content type marker
app_data_record.extend_from_slice(&rng.bytes(16)); // AEAD-like tag mimic
} else {
app_data_record.extend_from_slice(&fake_cert);
}
// Combine all records
let mut response = Vec::with_capacity(

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@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ use crate::stats::{ReplayChecker, Stats};
use crate::stream::{BufferPool, CryptoReader, CryptoWriter};
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use crate::transport::{UpstreamManager, configure_client_socket, parse_proxy_protocol};
use crate::transport::socket::normalize_ip;
use crate::tls_front::TlsFrontCache;
use crate::proxy::direct_relay::handle_via_direct;
@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
stats.increment_connects_all();
let mut real_peer = peer;
let mut real_peer = normalize_ip(peer);
if config.server.proxy_protocol {
match parse_proxy_protocol(&mut stream, peer).await {
@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ where
version = info.version,
"PROXY protocol header parsed"
);
real_peer = info.src_addr;
real_peer = normalize_ip(info.src_addr);
}
Err(e) => {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
pub async fn run(mut self) -> Result<()> {
self.stats.increment_connects_all();
self.peer = normalize_ip(self.peer);
let peer = self.peer;
let ip_tracker = self.ip_tracker.clone();
debug!(peer = %peer, "New connection");
@ -310,7 +312,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
version = info.version,
"PROXY protocol header parsed"
);
self.peer = info.src_addr;
self.peer = normalize_ip(info.src_addr);
}
Err(e) => {
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
//! Masking - forward unrecognized traffic to mask host
use std::time::Duration;
use std::str;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
#[cfg(unix)]
use tokio::net::UnixStream;
@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ use tracing::debug;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
const MASK_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
/// Maximum duration for the entire masking relay.
/// Limits resource consumption from slow-loris attacks and port scanners.
const MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
/// Maximum duration for the entire masking relay.
/// Limits resource consumption from slow-loris attacks and port scanners.
const MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
const MASK_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = 8192;
/// Detect client type based on initial data
@ -78,7 +78,9 @@ where
match connect_result {
Ok(Ok(stream)) => {
let (mask_read, mask_write) = stream.into_split();
relay_to_mask(reader, writer, mask_read, mask_write, initial_data).await;
if timeout(MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT, relay_to_mask(reader, writer, mask_read, mask_write, initial_data)).await.is_err() {
debug!("Mask relay timed out (unix socket)");
}
}
Ok(Err(e)) => {
debug!(error = %e, "Failed to connect to mask unix socket");
@ -110,7 +112,9 @@ where
match connect_result {
Ok(Ok(stream)) => {
let (mask_read, mask_write) = stream.into_split();
relay_to_mask(reader, writer, mask_read, mask_write, initial_data).await;
if timeout(MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT, relay_to_mask(reader, writer, mask_read, mask_write, initial_data)).await.is_err() {
debug!("Mask relay timed out");
}
}
Ok(Err(e)) => {
debug!(error = %e, "Failed to connect to mask host");

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@ -5,6 +5,28 @@ use crate::protocol::constants::{
use crate::protocol::tls::{TLS_DIGEST_LEN, TLS_DIGEST_POS, gen_fake_x25519_key};
use crate::tls_front::types::CachedTlsData;
const MIN_APP_DATA: usize = 64;
const MAX_APP_DATA: usize = 16640; // RFC 8446 §5.2 allows up to 2^14 + 256
fn jitter_and_clamp_sizes(sizes: &[usize], rng: &SecureRandom) -> Vec<usize> {
sizes
.iter()
.map(|&size| {
let base = size.max(MIN_APP_DATA).min(MAX_APP_DATA);
let jitter_range = ((base as f64) * 0.03).round() as i64;
if jitter_range == 0 {
return base;
}
let mut rand_bytes = [0u8; 2];
rand_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rng.bytes(2));
let span = 2 * jitter_range + 1;
let delta = (u16::from_le_bytes(rand_bytes) as i64 % span) - jitter_range;
let adjusted = (base as i64 + delta).clamp(MIN_APP_DATA as i64, MAX_APP_DATA as i64);
adjusted as usize
})
.collect()
}
/// Build a ServerHello + CCS + ApplicationData sequence using cached TLS metadata.
pub fn build_emulated_server_hello(
secret: &[u8],
@ -76,6 +98,7 @@ pub fn build_emulated_server_hello(
if sizes.is_empty() {
sizes.push(cached.total_app_data_len.max(1024));
}
let sizes = jitter_and_clamp_sizes(&sizes, rng);
let mut app_data = Vec::new();
for size in sizes {
@ -83,7 +106,14 @@ pub fn build_emulated_server_hello(
rec.push(TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION);
rec.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
rec.extend_from_slice(&(size as u16).to_be_bytes());
rec.extend_from_slice(&rng.bytes(size));
if size > 17 {
let body_len = size - 17;
rec.extend_from_slice(&rng.bytes(body_len));
rec.push(0x16); // inner content type marker (handshake)
rec.extend_from_slice(&rng.bytes(16)); // AEAD-like tag
} else {
rec.extend_from_slice(&rng.bytes(size));
}
app_data.extend_from_slice(&rec);
}

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use rustls::pki_types::{CertificateDer, ServerName, UnixTime};
use rustls::{DigitallySignedStruct, Error as RustlsError};
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
use crate::protocol::constants::{TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION, TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE, TLS_VERSION};
use crate::protocol::constants::{TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION, TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE};
use crate::tls_front::types::{ParsedServerHello, TlsExtension, TlsFetchResult};
/// No-op verifier: accept any certificate (we only need lengths and metadata).
@ -163,12 +163,15 @@ fn build_client_hello(sni: &str, rng: &SecureRandom) -> Vec<u8> {
exts.extend_from_slice(alpn_proto);
// padding to reduce recognizability and keep length ~500 bytes
if exts.len() < 180 {
let pad_len = 180 - exts.len();
exts.extend_from_slice(&0x0015u16.to_be_bytes()); // padding extension
exts.extend_from_slice(&(pad_len as u16 + 2).to_be_bytes());
exts.extend_from_slice(&(pad_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
exts.resize(exts.len() + pad_len, 0);
const TARGET_EXT_LEN: usize = 180;
if exts.len() < TARGET_EXT_LEN {
let remaining = TARGET_EXT_LEN - exts.len();
if remaining > 4 {
let pad_len = remaining - 4; // minus type+len
exts.extend_from_slice(&0x0015u16.to_be_bytes()); // padding extension
exts.extend_from_slice(&(pad_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
exts.resize(exts.len() + pad_len, 0);
}
}
// Extensions length prefix