Merge pull request #770 from konstpic/feat/user-source-deny-list

feat(access): add per-user source IP deny list checks
This commit is contained in:
Alexey
2026-05-07 11:56:54 +03:00
committed by GitHub
4 changed files with 85 additions and 0 deletions
+39
View File
@@ -1450,6 +1450,20 @@ where
validated_secret.copy_from_slice(secret);
}
if config
.access
.is_user_source_ip_denied(validated_user.as_str(), peer.ip())
{
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
warn!(
peer = %peer,
user = %validated_user,
"TLS handshake rejected: client source IP on per-user deny list (access.user_source_deny)"
);
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Reject known replay digests before expensive cache/domain/ALPN policy work.
let digest_half = &validation_digest[..tls::TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
if replay_checker.check_tls_digest(digest_half) {
@@ -1795,6 +1809,20 @@ where
let validation = matched_validation.expect("validation must exist when matched");
if config
.access
.is_user_source_ip_denied(matched_user.as_str(), peer.ip())
{
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
warn!(
peer = %peer,
user = %matched_user,
"MTProto handshake rejected: client source IP on per-user deny list (access.user_source_deny)"
);
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Apply replay tracking only after successful authentication.
//
// This ordering prevents an attacker from producing invalid handshakes that
@@ -1873,6 +1901,17 @@ where
.auth_expensive_checks_total
.fetch_add(validation_checks as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
if config.access.is_user_source_ip_denied(user.as_str(), peer.ip()) {
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
warn!(
peer = %peer,
user = %user,
"MTProto handshake rejected: client source IP on per-user deny list (access.user_source_deny)"
);
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Apply replay tracking only after successful authentication.
//
// This ordering prevents an attacker from producing invalid handshakes that