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Merge pull request #517 from DavidOsipov/test/main-into-flow-sec
Усиление обхода DPI (Shape/Timing Hardening), защита от тайминг-атак и масштабное покрытие тестами
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@@ -260,6 +260,65 @@ This document lists all configuration keys accepted by `config.toml`.
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| tls_full_cert_ttl_secs | `u64` | `90` | — | TTL for sending full cert payload per (domain, client IP) tuple. |
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| alpn_enforce | `bool` | `true` | — | Enforces ALPN echo behavior based on client preference. |
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| mask_proxy_protocol | `u8` | `0` | — | PROXY protocol mode for mask backend (`0` disabled, `1` v1, `2` v2). |
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| mask_shape_hardening | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables client->mask shape-channel hardening by applying controlled tail padding to bucket boundaries on mask relay shutdown. |
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| mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes | `usize` | `512` | Must be `> 0`; should be `<= mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes`. | Minimum bucket size used by shape-channel hardening. |
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| mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes | `usize` | `4096` | Must be `>= mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes`. | Maximum bucket size used by shape-channel hardening; traffic above cap is not padded further. |
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| mask_shape_above_cap_blur | `bool` | `false` | Requires `mask_shape_hardening = true`; requires `mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes > 0`. | Adds bounded randomized tail bytes even when forwarded size already exceeds cap. |
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| mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes | `usize` | `512` | Must be `<= 1048576`; must be `> 0` when `mask_shape_above_cap_blur = true`. | Maximum randomized extra bytes appended above cap. |
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| mask_timing_normalization_enabled | `bool` | `false` | Requires `mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms > 0`; requires `ceiling >= floor`. | Enables timing envelope normalization on masking outcomes. |
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| mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms | `u64` | `0` | Must be `> 0` when timing normalization is enabled; must be `<= ceiling`. | Lower bound (ms) for masking outcome normalization target. |
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| mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms | `u64` | `0` | Must be `>= floor`; must be `<= 60000`. | Upper bound (ms) for masking outcome normalization target. |
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### Shape-channel hardening notes (`[censorship]`)
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These parameters are designed to reduce one specific fingerprint source during masking: the exact number of bytes sent from proxy to `mask_host` for invalid or probing traffic.
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Without hardening, a censor can often correlate probe input length with backend-observed length very precisely (for example: `5 + body_sent` on early TLS reject paths). That creates a length-based classifier signal.
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When `mask_shape_hardening = true`, Telemt pads the **client->mask** stream tail to a bucket boundary at relay shutdown:
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- Total bytes sent to mask are first measured.
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- A bucket is selected using powers of two starting from `mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes`.
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- Padding is added only if total bytes are below `mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes`.
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- If bytes already exceed cap, no extra padding is added.
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This means multiple nearby probe sizes collapse into the same backend-observed size class, making active classification harder.
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Practical trade-offs:
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- Better anti-fingerprinting on size/shape channel.
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- Slightly higher egress overhead for small probes due to padding.
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- Behavior is intentionally conservative and enabled by default.
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Recommended starting profile:
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- `mask_shape_hardening = true` (default)
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- `mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes = 512`
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- `mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes = 4096`
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### Above-cap blur notes (`[censorship]`)
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`mask_shape_above_cap_blur` adds a second-stage blur for very large probes that are already above `mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes`.
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- A random tail in `[0, mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes]` is appended.
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- This reduces exact-size leakage above cap at bounded overhead.
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- Keep `mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes` conservative to avoid unnecessary egress growth.
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### Timing normalization envelope notes (`[censorship]`)
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`mask_timing_normalization_enabled` smooths timing differences between masking outcomes by applying a target duration envelope.
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- A random target is selected in `[mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms, mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms]`.
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- Fast paths are delayed up to the selected target.
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- Slow paths are not forced to finish by the ceiling (the envelope is best-effort shaping, not truncation).
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Recommended starting profile for timing shaping:
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- `mask_timing_normalization_enabled = true`
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- `mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms = 180`
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- `mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms = 320`
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If your backend or network is very bandwidth-constrained, reduce cap first. If probes are still too distinguishable in your environment, increase floor gradually.
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## [access]
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