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Fix for TLS-F, ALPN и SNI/ALPN helpers

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Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alexey
2026-06-11 19:17:06 +03:00
parent 0f8aca56d9
commit c36eb81808
7 changed files with 339 additions and 46 deletions
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src/proxy/tests/handshake_advanced_clever_tests.rs
+65 -14
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@@ -21,11 +21,52 @@ fn test_config_with_secret_hex(secret_hex: &str) -> ProxyConfig {
}
fn make_valid_tls_handshake(secret: &[u8], timestamp: u32) -> Vec<u8> {
const TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256: [u8; 2] = [0x13, 0x01];
const TLS_EXTENSION_KEY_SHARE: u16 = 0x0033;
const X25519_KEY_SHARE_LEN: usize = 32;
let session_id_len: usize = 32;
let len = tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN + 1 + session_id_len;
let mut handshake = vec![0x42u8; len];
let fill = 0x42u8;
handshake[tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN] = session_id_len as u8;
let mut extensions = Vec::new();
let mut key_share = Vec::new();
key_share.extend_from_slice(&tls::TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519.to_be_bytes());
key_share.extend_from_slice(&(X25519_KEY_SHARE_LEN as u16).to_be_bytes());
key_share.push(9);
key_share.resize(key_share.len() + X25519_KEY_SHARE_LEN - 1, 0);
let mut key_share_extension = Vec::new();
key_share_extension.extend_from_slice(&(key_share.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
key_share_extension.extend_from_slice(&key_share);
extensions.extend_from_slice(&TLS_EXTENSION_KEY_SHARE.to_be_bytes());
extensions.extend_from_slice(&(key_share_extension.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
extensions.extend_from_slice(&key_share_extension);
let body_len =
2 + 32 + 1 + session_id_len + 2 + TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.len() + 1 + 1 + 2
+ extensions.len();
let mut body = Vec::with_capacity(body_len);
body.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
body.extend_from_slice(&[fill; 32]);
body.push(session_id_len as u8);
body.extend_from_slice(&[fill; 32]);
body.extend_from_slice(&(TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
body.extend_from_slice(&TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256);
body.push(1);
body.push(0);
body.extend_from_slice(&(extensions.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
body.extend_from_slice(&extensions);
assert_eq!(body.len(), body_len);
let mut handshake = Vec::with_capacity(5 + 4 + body_len);
handshake.push(TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE);
handshake.extend_from_slice(&[0x03, 0x01]);
handshake.extend_from_slice(&((4 + body_len) as u16).to_be_bytes());
handshake.push(0x01);
let body_len_bytes = (body_len as u32).to_be_bytes();
handshake.extend_from_slice(&body_len_bytes[1..4]);
handshake.extend_from_slice(&body);
// The proxy authenticates TLS-fronted clients through the random field.
handshake[tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS..tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN].fill(0);
let computed = sha256_hmac(secret, &handshake);
@@ -85,6 +126,9 @@ fn make_valid_tls_client_hello_with_alpn(
timestamp: u32,
alpn_protocols: &[&[u8]],
) -> Vec<u8> {
const TLS_EXTENSION_KEY_SHARE: u16 = 0x0033;
const X25519_KEY_SHARE_LEN: usize = 32;
let mut body = Vec::new();
body.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
body.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
@@ -96,6 +140,19 @@ fn make_valid_tls_client_hello_with_alpn(
body.push(0);
let mut ext_blob = Vec::new();
let mut key_share = Vec::new();
key_share.extend_from_slice(&tls::TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519.to_be_bytes());
key_share.extend_from_slice(&(X25519_KEY_SHARE_LEN as u16).to_be_bytes());
key_share.push(9);
key_share.resize(key_share.len() + X25519_KEY_SHARE_LEN - 1, 0);
let mut key_share_extension = Vec::new();
key_share_extension.extend_from_slice(&(key_share.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
key_share_extension.extend_from_slice(&key_share);
ext_blob.extend_from_slice(&TLS_EXTENSION_KEY_SHARE.to_be_bytes());
ext_blob.extend_from_slice(&(key_share_extension.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
ext_blob.extend_from_slice(&key_share_extension);
if !alpn_protocols.is_empty() {
let mut alpn_list = Vec::new();
for proto in alpn_protocols {
@@ -150,13 +207,7 @@ async fn tls_minimum_viable_length_boundary() {
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.1:12345".parse().unwrap();
let min_len = tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN + 1;
let mut exact_min_handshake = vec![0x42u8; min_len];
exact_min_handshake[min_len - 1] = 0;
exact_min_handshake[tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS..tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN].fill(0);
let digest = sha256_hmac(&secret, &exact_min_handshake);
exact_min_handshake[tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS..tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN]
.copy_from_slice(&digest);
let exact_min_handshake = make_valid_tls_handshake(&secret, 0);
let res = handle_tls_handshake(
&exact_min_handshake,
@@ -171,12 +222,12 @@ async fn tls_minimum_viable_length_boundary() {
.await;
assert!(
matches!(res, HandshakeResult::Success(_)),
"Exact minimum length TLS handshake must succeed"
"Minimum valid TLS ClientHello must succeed"
);
let short_handshake = vec![0x42u8; min_len - 1];
let short_handshake = &exact_min_handshake[..exact_min_handshake.len() - 1];
let res_short = handle_tls_handshake(
&short_handshake,
short_handshake,
tokio::io::empty(),
tokio::io::sink(),
peer,
@@ -188,7 +239,7 @@ async fn tls_minimum_viable_length_boundary() {
.await;
assert!(
matches!(res_short, HandshakeResult::BadClient { .. }),
"Handshake 1 byte shorter than minimum must fail closed"
"Handshake 1 byte shorter than minimum valid ClientHello must fail closed"
);
}