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https://github.com/telemt/telemt.git
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Hardened TLS-F ServerHello selection
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -561,7 +561,6 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
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fake_cert_len,
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rng,
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cipher_suite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
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TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519MLKEM768,
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alpn,
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new_session_tickets,
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)
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@@ -579,7 +578,6 @@ pub(crate) fn build_server_hello_with_cipher(
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fake_cert_len: usize,
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rng: &SecureRandom,
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selected_cipher_suite: [u8; 2],
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selected_key_share_group: u16,
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alpn: Option<Vec<u8>>,
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new_session_tickets: u8,
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) -> Vec<u8> {
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@@ -588,21 +586,12 @@ pub(crate) fn build_server_hello_with_cipher(
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let fake_cert_len = fake_cert_len.clamp(MIN_APP_DATA, MAX_APP_DATA);
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// Build ServerHello
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let server_hello = if selected_key_share_group == TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519MLKEM768 {
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let key_share = gen_fake_x25519mlkem768_server_key_share(rng);
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ServerHelloBuilder::new(session_id.to_vec())
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.with_cipher_suite(selected_cipher_suite)
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.with_key_share(TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519MLKEM768, &key_share)
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.with_tls13_version()
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.build_record()
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} else {
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let key_share = gen_fake_x25519_key(rng);
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ServerHelloBuilder::new(session_id.to_vec())
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.with_cipher_suite(selected_cipher_suite)
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.with_key_share(TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519, &key_share)
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.with_tls13_version()
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.build_record()
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};
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let key_share = gen_fake_x25519mlkem768_server_key_share(rng);
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let server_hello = ServerHelloBuilder::new(session_id.to_vec())
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.with_cipher_suite(selected_cipher_suite)
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.with_key_share(TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519MLKEM768, &key_share)
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.with_tls13_version()
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.build_record();
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// Build Change Cipher Spec record
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let change_cipher_spec = [
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@@ -1201,20 +1190,23 @@ fn is_tls13_cipher_suite(suite: [u8; 2]) -> bool {
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/// Select the ServerHello cipher suite from the already-received ClientHello.
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///
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/// This is intentionally a borrowed, zero-allocation scan. It runs only for an
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/// authenticated success response and keeps malformed or unexpected ClientHello
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/// shapes on the previous fallback behavior.
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pub(crate) fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite(handshake: &[u8], preferred: [u8; 2]) -> [u8; 2] {
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/// authenticated success response and fails closed for malformed or unsupported
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/// ClientHello shapes that cannot produce a DPI-consistent ServerHello.
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pub(crate) fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite(
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handshake: &[u8],
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preferred: [u8; 2],
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) -> Option<[u8; 2]> {
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let preferred = if is_tls13_cipher_suite(preferred) {
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preferred
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} else {
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cipher_suite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
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};
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let Some(range) = client_hello_cipher_suites_range(handshake) else {
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return preferred;
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return None;
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};
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if client_hello_offers_cipher_suite(handshake, range, preferred) {
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return preferred;
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return Some(preferred);
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}
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for fallback in [
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@@ -1223,26 +1215,26 @@ pub(crate) fn select_server_hello_cipher_suite(handshake: &[u8], preferred: [u8;
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cipher_suite::TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
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] {
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if client_hello_offers_cipher_suite(handshake, range, fallback) {
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return fallback;
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return Some(fallback);
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}
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}
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preferred
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None
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}
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/// Select the ServerHello key_share named group from the authenticated ClientHello.
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/// Select the hybrid ServerHello key_share named group from the authenticated ClientHello.
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///
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/// Malformed key_share structures intentionally keep the legacy X25519 response
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/// to avoid breaking older clients that do not advertise the hybrid group.
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pub(crate) fn select_server_hello_key_share_group(handshake: &[u8]) -> u16 {
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/// Malformed or non-hybrid key_share structures fail closed so authenticated
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/// but DPI-inconsistent ClientHellos take the ordinary masking fallback path.
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pub(crate) fn select_server_hello_key_share_group(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<u16> {
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if client_hello_offers_key_share_group(
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handshake,
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TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519MLKEM768,
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X25519MLKEM768_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_LEN,
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) {
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TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519MLKEM768
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Some(TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519MLKEM768)
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} else {
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TLS_NAMED_GROUP_X25519
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None
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}
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}
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