diff --git a/docs/WEB/WEB_PROXY.en.md b/docs/WEB/WEB_PROXY.en.md
index 0d9797f..bb5ef51 100644
--- a/docs/WEB/WEB_PROXY.en.md
+++ b/docs/WEB/WEB_PROXY.en.md
@@ -115,6 +115,157 @@ Accepted-socket overload handling is independently configurable. `drop` preserve
 
 `decoy_fasttrack_mode` controls only capability work for `GET/HEAD` at the configured base root. `off` is the default and preserves the legacy full scan without fast-track counters. `shadow` records which structurally impossible requests could bypass the scan but still performs the complete legacy scan. `enforce` bypasses capability work only for `HEAD` or an absent/noncanonical `bridge` query. Every exact canonical bridge GET at the base root performs a complete scan across all profiles of the selected vhost, for both matches and misses. The setting requires a process restart; reload persists the desired value but reports `web.decoy_fasttrack_mode` as deferred. Fast-track does not protect against adversarial CPU load because a scanner can always submit canonical candidates, and enforce mode may expose a public request-shape timing class, especially with a static decoy. Do not enable enforce without external timing measurements through the production TLS terminator.
 
+## Sharing profiles across exact hostnames
+
+Replace a vhost's `host` selector with a non-empty `hosts` list to share its
+profile definitions and decoy snapshot:
+
+```toml
+[[web.vhosts]]
+hosts = ["proxy.example.com", "backup.example.com"]
+base_path = "telegram/web"
+public_addr = "203.0.113.10:443"
+
+[web.vhosts.decoy]
+mode = "http_upstream"
+upstream = "http://127.0.0.1:18081"
+
+[[web.vhosts.profiles]]
+user = "web-user"
+secret_mode = "dd"
+max_sessions = 8
+max_streams = 512
+max_streams_per_session = 64
+```
+
+Use this fragment with the access user and WEB listener from the preceding
+example. Specify exactly one of `host` or `hosts`. Hostnames are normalized at
+configuration load; duplicate normalized names are rejected. Wildcard patterns and `*` require the
+explicit process-level opt-in described below. All members use the same `base_path`, `public_addr`, profiles, and
+decoy. Use separate groups when those settings differ. The TLS terminator must
+serve every listed hostname and forward the original canonical `Host`.
+
+Each hostname has its own capability, bootstrap/session ownership, and profile
+quota. The example allows up to eight sessions for this profile on each domain,
+subject to the existing process-wide, IP, and access-user limits. Startup links
+are emitted separately for each selected user/profile and actual hostname.
+Grouping does not redirect clients or make credentials transferable between
+aliases.
+
+`max_vhosts` counts actual hostname entries, and `max_profiles` counts expanded
+host/profile pairs. For example, eight domains with 100 profiles require limits
+of at least eight vhosts and 800 profiles. A group's static files and bytes are
+loaded and charged once; separate groups retain separate snapshots. Configured
+session ceilings do not reserve sessions in advance. Shared immutable policy
+reduces duplication, but capability indexes still scale with host/profile pairs.
+
+Deploy the new binary with the existing scalar-host configuration first, then
+combine equivalent entries through reload. Grouping and alias reordering retain
+compatible bootstrap credentials, quota identities, and profile learning state.
+Removing an alias rejects new requests for that hostname without introducing
+new termination rules for existing connections. Limit increases remain
+restart-only and must take effect before adding bindings beyond the active
+ceilings. Before downgrading to a binary without `hosts`, expand groups back to
+scalar `host` entries and recheck static snapshot budgets.
+
+## Automatic wildcard hosts
+
+Exact `host` / `hosts` entries remain the default. To accept arbitrary subdomains,
+set `web.allow_wildcard_hosts = true` and restart Telemt. The existing selectors
+then also accept `*.example.com` and `*`, including mixed exact/pattern lists:
+
+```toml
+[web]
+enabled = true
+allow_wildcard_hosts = true
+
+[web.limits]
+# Additional wildcard reservations must fit the declared envelope.
+memory_envelope_bytes = 1610612736
+
+[web.limits.wildcard]
+max_rules = 32
+max_profiles_per_request = 256
+cache_hosts = 256
+cache_bytes = 8388608
+cold_hmac_per_minute = 1000000
+cold_hmac_burst = 65536
+
+[[web.vhosts]]
+hosts = ["proxy.example.com", "*.example.com"]
+base_path = "relay"
+public_addr = "203.0.113.10:443"
+
+[web.vhosts.decoy]
+mode = "http_upstream"
+upstream = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
+
+[[web.vhosts.profiles]]
+user = "alice"
+secret_mode = "dd"
+```
+
+This extends the listener and access-user configuration shown earlier. Patterns
+match one whole group: exact host first, then the longest matching suffix, then
+`*`. A suffix matches any descendant depth, including `a.b.example.com`, but not
+its apex `example.com`. Failed authentication never falls through to another
+rule. Embedded wildcards and regexes are rejected; normalized duplicate selectors
+are rejected across groups. Every selected group retains its fixed `public_addr`,
+endpoint base, profiles, and decoy. Request Host never chooses an origin address.
+
+In this opt-in mode, HTTP Host is ASCII-case normalized and only a literal
+optional `:443` is stripped. Duplicate Host headers, IP literals, invalid DNS/ACE
+label syntax, trailing dots and other ports are rejected. `X-Forwarded-Host` is
+not consulted. Capabilities use the actual canonical hostname and the existing
+client derivation; no client changes are required. Session/stream/profile quotas
+remain per actual `(host, user, secret_mode)`, with all process, IP and access-user
+restrictions still active. Startup links include only configured exact hosts.
+
+The frontend **must restrict accepted Host values**, and the plain WEB backend
+must remain private. Its TLS certificates must cover each actual client hostname. This is an explicit security boundary: a capability for an
+unknown or evicted foreign wildcard hostname, misplaced on another hostname, can
+reach that hostname's decoy, including an exact host in a mixed configuration.
+Current-host capabilities, finite exact-host capabilities, process-authentic
+bootstrap/session tokens, and known positive-cache capabilities remain contained
+in request URI/header metadata, including percent-encoded forms. Public URLs,
+cookies and headers are not rejected merely for looking like credentials.
+Diagnostic copies instead conservatively mask credential-shaped text, including
+truncated prefixes; public request/response bytes and original User-Agent hashes
+are unchanged. Diagnostic displays can therefore mask ordinary long strings.
+
+A cold request reserves the complete selected profile count from the process-wide
+HMAC budget before deriving anything. Failure returns an immediate no-store HTTP
+503 with no queue or partial scan. One request reuses its table for containment
+and bridge authentication. Warm cache hits avoid derivation. Authenticated
+carriers bypass capability-table caching and derivation entirely. Off/Shadow/
+Enforce fast-track policies still govern root authentication scans; misplaced
+current-host credentials remain contained in every mode.
+
+Only successful bridge/recovery bootstrap issuance populates the FIFO cache.
+`cache_hosts = 0` disables retention. Entry and byte ceilings are independent;
+evicted entries retain their byte charge while a request still borrows them.
+Insertion failure does not reject a valid bootstrap, and eviction never resets
+quotas. Cache keys include a unique immutable WEB snapshot ID, including reloads
+within the same runtime generation. Cached entries retain no decoy or generation.
+
+`max_vhosts` counts exact entries; `max_profiles` counts exact bindings plus one
+shared profile set per wildcard source group. `max_rules` bounds patterns, and
+`max_profiles_per_request` bounds each wildcard group's complete scan. Limits
+must be positive except `cache_hosts`; the HMAC burst must cover a complete
+per-request table. Checked memory reservations cover templates/rules, cache,
+handler scratch, and live host bindings only when wildcard mode is enabled.
+With otherwise standard limits, the existing 1280 MiB envelope is insufficient;
+1290 MiB fits the current calculation, while the example declares 1536 MiB.
+The default exact-only envelope and processing policy remain unchanged.
+
+The enable flag and all `web.limits` values require process restart. Once enabled,
+selectors and profiles are reloadable. An API update can stage the flag and
+sufficient limits, reporting them as deferred. Adding patterns before the actual
+restart is rejected atomically even if the desired file already contains the
+flag. To disable wildcard mode, first replace patterns with exact selectors,
+then restart with the flag disabled. Before downgrade, remove wildcard selectors
+and the new flag/limit table.
+
 ## Server-side carrier negotiation
 
 Auto-negotiation is optional and disabled unless `carriers` is an explicit non-empty array. The configured `carrier` remains the final fallback and is appended exactly once, even when it also appears in the array:
@@ -335,7 +486,7 @@ Set `web_trusted_proxy_cidrs` to the address Caddy uses to connect to Telemt, fo
 | Configuration | Runtime behavior |
 | --- | --- |
 | WEB listener inventory, bind address, and trust policy | Process-owned; restart Telemt. |
-| Any `[web.limits]` value | Process-owned memory/resource contract; restart Telemt. |
+| `web.allow_wildcard_hosts` and any `[web.limits]` value | Process-owned memory/resource contract; restart Telemt. |
 | `web.enabled`, carrier/negotiation policy, `web.debug`, timeouts, vhosts, profiles, and decoys | Applied by the config watcher or a runtime generation reload. |
 | A vhost `base_path` change | Atomically switches new HTTP routing and capability derivation. Reissue the generated link. Already upgraded WebSockets and in-flight routed exchanges continue. Later old-base requests carrying a process-authentic bootstrap or session token receive a local no-store `404`; the now-inactive old capability follows ordinary decoy handling. An existing session bearer remains usable only on the new exact base, while an unused bootstrap issued for the old capability cannot create a session on the new base. |
 | Operator pause/drain state | Process-owned and ephemeral; survives generation reload, never writes config, and resets to `running` after process restart. |
@@ -356,7 +507,7 @@ WEB configuration, runtime status, and bounded runtime controls share the authen
 
 | Operation | API support |
 | --- | --- |
-| Read or patch `[web]`, vhosts, profiles, decoys, timeouts, or limits | Yes, through `GET` or `PATCH /v1/config`. The derived `web.runtime` snapshot is never returned or writable. Nested tables merge field-by-field; arrays replace the previous array wholesale. Every `[web.limits]` change is accepted as desired configuration but reported as deferred until process restart. |
+| Read or patch `[web]`, vhosts, profiles, decoys, timeouts, or limits | Yes, through `GET` or `PATCH /v1/config`. The derived `web.runtime` snapshot is never returned or writable. Nested tables merge field-by-field; arrays replace the previous array wholesale. Changes to `web.allow_wildcard_hosts` and `[web.limits]` are deferred until process restart. Patterns require an already-enabled active process. |
 | Persist `server.listeners` | Yes, through `PATCH /v1/config`, but a changed WEB listener remains deferred until process restart. |
 | Apply an externally edited WEB configuration | Yes, through `POST /v1/system/reload`, then inspect the operation status. |
 | Inspect bounded server-side WEB request and lifecycle details | Yes, through authenticated `GET /web-status`. |