mirror of
https://github.com/telemt/telemt.git
synced 2026-04-26 06:54:09 +03:00
Add stress and manual benchmark tests for handshake protocols
- Introduced `handshake_real_bug_stress_tests.rs` to validate TLS and MTProto handshake behaviors under various conditions, including ALPN rejection and session ID handling. - Implemented tests to ensure replay cache integrity and proper handling of malicious input without panicking. - Added `handshake_timing_manual_bench_tests.rs` for performance benchmarking of user authentication paths, comparing preferred user handling against full user scans in both MTProto and TLS contexts. - Included timing-sensitive tests to measure the impact of SNI on handshake performance.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -605,16 +605,6 @@ where
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Replay tracking is applied only after successful authentication to avoid
|
||||
// letting unauthenticated probes evict valid entries from the replay cache.
|
||||
let digest_half = &validation.digest[..tls::TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
|
||||
if replay_checker.check_and_add_tls_digest(digest_half) {
|
||||
auth_probe_record_failure(peer.ip(), Instant::now());
|
||||
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
|
||||
warn!(peer = %peer, "TLS replay attack detected (duplicate digest)");
|
||||
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let secret = match secrets.iter().find(|(name, _)| *name == validation.user) {
|
||||
Some((_, s)) => s,
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
@@ -670,6 +660,16 @@ where
|
||||
None
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Replay tracking is applied only after full policy validation (including
|
||||
// ALPN checks) so rejected handshakes cannot poison replay state.
|
||||
let digest_half = &validation.digest[..tls::TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
|
||||
if replay_checker.check_and_add_tls_digest(digest_half) {
|
||||
auth_probe_record_failure(peer.ip(), Instant::now());
|
||||
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
|
||||
warn!(peer = %peer, "TLS replay attack detected (duplicate digest)");
|
||||
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let response = if let Some((cached_entry, use_full_cert_payload)) = cached {
|
||||
emulator::build_emulated_server_hello(
|
||||
secret,
|
||||
@@ -979,6 +979,22 @@ mod saturation_poison_security_tests;
|
||||
#[path = "tests/handshake_auth_probe_hardening_adversarial_tests.rs"]
|
||||
mod auth_probe_hardening_adversarial_tests;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
#[path = "tests/handshake_advanced_clever_tests.rs"]
|
||||
mod advanced_clever_tests;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
#[path = "tests/handshake_more_clever_tests.rs"]
|
||||
mod more_clever_tests;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
#[path = "tests/handshake_real_bug_stress_tests.rs"]
|
||||
mod real_bug_stress_tests;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
#[path = "tests/handshake_timing_manual_bench_tests.rs"]
|
||||
mod timing_manual_bench_tests;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Compile-time guard: HandshakeSuccess holds cryptographic key material and
|
||||
/// must never be Copy. A Copy impl would allow silent key duplication,
|
||||
/// undermining the zeroize-on-drop guarantee.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user