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fix(api): GET /v1/config returns only editable sections; tolerate commented TOML headers; doc fixes

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This commit is contained in:
Mirotin Artem
2026-06-09 12:13:32 +03:00
parent 27ee634f4a
commit ff7a12d5f8
3 changed files with 49 additions and 10 deletions
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32
src/api/config_edit.rs
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@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ pub(super) async fn apply_patch_to_path(
})
}
/// Return the editable config sections (no `access.*`) + current revision.
/// Return only the editable config sections + current revision.
pub(super) async fn read_managed_config(config_path: &Path) -> Result<(Toml, String), ApiFailure> {
let original = tokio::fs::read_to_string(config_path)
.await
@@ -133,11 +133,19 @@ pub(super) async fn read_managed_config(config_path: &Path) -> Result<(Toml, Str
let parsed: Toml = toml::from_str(&original)
.map_err(|e| ApiFailure::internal(format!("failed to parse config: {}", e)))?;
let mut table = parsed
let parsed_table = parsed
.as_table()
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_else(toml::value::Table::new);
table.remove("access"); // never expose users/secrets via this endpoint
// Whitelist: return ONLY the editable sections. A blacklist (just removing
// `access`) would leak `server` (carries the API `auth_header` + per-node
// identity) and `network` (per-node addresses). Mirror the PATCH contract.
let mut table = toml::value::Table::new();
for section in EDITABLE_SECTIONS {
if let Some(value) = parsed_table.get(*section) {
table.insert((*section).to_string(), value.clone());
}
}
let revision = compute_revision(&original);
Ok((Toml::Table(table), revision))
@@ -279,6 +287,24 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(revision, current_revision(&path).await.unwrap());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn read_managed_config_returns_only_editable_sections() {
// server carries the API auth_header + per-node identity; network carries
// per-node addresses. Neither must be exposed by GET /v1/config.
let (path, _d) = temp_config(concat!(
"[censorship]\ntls_domain = \"a\"\n",
"[server]\nport = 443\n[server.api]\nauth_header = \"SECRET\"\n",
"[network]\nipv4 = \"1.2.3.4\"\n",
"[access.users]\nbob = \"deadbeef\"\n",
));
let (value, _rev) = read_managed_config(&path).await.unwrap();
let table = value.as_table().unwrap();
assert!(table.contains_key("censorship"));
assert!(!table.contains_key("server")); // no API auth_header / identity leak
assert!(!table.contains_key("network")); // no per-node identity leak
assert!(!table.contains_key("access")); // no users/secrets
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn patch_rejects_server_section() {
let (path, _d) = temp_config("[censorship]\ntls_domain = \"a\"\n");