This commit introduces a comprehensive set of improvements to enhance
the security, reliability, and configurability of the proxy server,
specifically targeting adversarial resilience and high-load concurrency.
Security & Cryptography:
- Zeroize MTProto cryptographic key material (`dec_key`, `enc_key`)
immediately after use to prevent memory leakage on early returns.
- Move TLS handshake replay tracking after full policy/ALPN validation
to prevent cache poisoning by unauthenticated probes.
- Add `proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs` configuration to restrict PROXY
protocol headers to trusted networks, rejecting spoofed IPs.
Adversarial Resilience & DoS Mitigation:
- Implement "Tiny Frame Debt" tracking in the middle-relay to prevent
CPU exhaustion from malicious 0-byte or 1-byte frame floods.
- Add `mask_relay_max_bytes` to strictly bound unauthenticated fallback
connections, preventing the proxy from being abused as an open relay.
- Add a 5ms prefetch window (`mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms`) to
correctly assemble and classify fragmented HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 probes
(e.g., `PRI * HTTP/2.0`) before routing them to masking heuristics.
- Prevent recursive masking loops (FD exhaustion) by verifying the mask
target is not the proxy's own listener via local interface enumeration.
Concurrency & Reliability:
- Eliminate executor waker storms during quota lock contention by replacing
the spin-waker task with inline `Sleep` and exponential backoff.
- Roll back user quota reservations (`rollback_me2c_quota_reservation`)
if a network write fails, preventing Head-of-Line (HoL) blocking from
permanently burning data quotas.
- Recover gracefully from idle-registry `Mutex` poisoning instead of
panicking, ensuring isolated thread failures do not break the proxy.
- Fix `auth_probe_scan_start_offset` modulo logic to ensure bounds safety.
Testing:
- Add extensive adversarial, timing, fuzzing, and invariant test suites
for both the client and handshake modules.