- Relocate tg_connect from [timeouts] to [general] with validation and docs updates.
- Apply rustfmt to per-attempt upstream connect timeout expression in upstream.rs.
- Pass tg_connect_timeout_secs in all UpstreamManager::new test call sites.
- Wire hot reload and runtime snapshot to general.tg_connect.
Add [server].listen_backlog (default 1024) for client-facing listen(2)
queue size; use the same value for metrics HTTP listeners. Hot reload
logs restart-required when this field changes.
Wire config.timeouts.tg_connect into UpstreamManager; per-attempt timeout uses
the same .max(1) pattern as connect_budget_ms.
Reject timeouts.tg_connect = 0 at config load (consistent with
general.upstream_connect_budget_ms and related checks). Default when the key
is omitted remains default_connect_timeout() via serde.
Fixestelemt/telemt#439
Lightweight endpoint that returns only users with active TCP connections
and their IP addresses. Calls only get_active_ips_for_users() without
collecting recent IPs or building full UserInfo, significantly reducing
CPU and memory overhead compared to /v1/stats/users.
- Introduced `relay_dual_lock_race_harness_security_tests.rs` to validate user liveness during lock hold and release cycles.
- Added `relay_quota_extended_attack_surface_security_tests.rs` to cover various quota scenarios including positive, negative, edge cases, and adversarial conditions.
- Implemented `relay_quota_lock_eviction_lifecycle_tdd_tests.rs` to ensure proper eviction of stale entries and lifecycle management of quota locks.
- Created `relay_quota_lock_eviction_stress_security_tests.rs` to stress test the eviction mechanism under high churn conditions.
- Enhanced `relay_quota_lock_pressure_adversarial_tests.rs` to verify reclaiming of unreferenced entries after explicit eviction.
- Developed `relay_quota_retry_allocation_latency_security_tests.rs` to benchmark and validate latency and allocation behavior under contention.
This commit introduces a comprehensive set of improvements to enhance
the security, reliability, and configurability of the proxy server,
specifically targeting adversarial resilience and high-load concurrency.
Security & Cryptography:
- Zeroize MTProto cryptographic key material (`dec_key`, `enc_key`)
immediately after use to prevent memory leakage on early returns.
- Move TLS handshake replay tracking after full policy/ALPN validation
to prevent cache poisoning by unauthenticated probes.
- Add `proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs` configuration to restrict PROXY
protocol headers to trusted networks, rejecting spoofed IPs.
Adversarial Resilience & DoS Mitigation:
- Implement "Tiny Frame Debt" tracking in the middle-relay to prevent
CPU exhaustion from malicious 0-byte or 1-byte frame floods.
- Add `mask_relay_max_bytes` to strictly bound unauthenticated fallback
connections, preventing the proxy from being abused as an open relay.
- Add a 5ms prefetch window (`mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms`) to
correctly assemble and classify fragmented HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 probes
(e.g., `PRI * HTTP/2.0`) before routing them to masking heuristics.
- Prevent recursive masking loops (FD exhaustion) by verifying the mask
target is not the proxy's own listener via local interface enumeration.
Concurrency & Reliability:
- Eliminate executor waker storms during quota lock contention by replacing
the spin-waker task with inline `Sleep` and exponential backoff.
- Roll back user quota reservations (`rollback_me2c_quota_reservation`)
if a network write fails, preventing Head-of-Line (HoL) blocking from
permanently burning data quotas.
- Recover gracefully from idle-registry `Mutex` poisoning instead of
panicking, ensuring isolated thread failures do not break the proxy.
- Fix `auth_probe_scan_start_offset` modulo logic to ensure bounds safety.
Testing:
- Add extensive adversarial, timing, fuzzing, and invariant test suites
for both the client and handshake modules.
