- Introduced `BOOT_TIME_MAX_SECS` constant to define the maximum accepted boot-time timestamp.
- Updated `validate_tls_handshake_at_time` to utilize the new boot time constant for timestamp validation.
- Enhanced `extract_sni_from_client_hello` to validate SNI hostnames against specified criteria, rejecting invalid hostnames.
- Added tests to ensure proper handling of boot time timestamps and SNI validation.
feat(handshake): improve user secret decoding and ALPN enforcement
- Refactored user secret decoding to provide better error handling and logging for invalid secrets.
- Added tests for concurrent identical handshakes to ensure replay protection works as expected.
- Implemented ALPN enforcement in handshake processing, rejecting unsupported protocols and allowing valid ones.
fix(masking): implement timeout handling for masking operations
- Added timeout handling for writing proxy headers and consuming client data in masking.
- Adjusted timeout durations for testing to ensure faster feedback during unit tests.
- Introduced tests to verify behavior when masking is disabled and when proxy header writes exceed the timeout.
test(masking): add tests for slowloris connections and proxy header timeouts
- Created tests to validate that slowloris connections are closed by consume timeout when masking is disabled.
- Added a test for proxy header write timeout to ensure it returns false when the write operation does not complete.
- forward valid-TLS/invalid-MTProto clients to mask backend in both client paths\n- harden TLS validation against timing and clock edge cases\n- move replay tracking behind successful authentication to avoid cache pollution\n- tighten secret decoding and key-material handling paths\n- add dedicated security test modules for tls/client/handshake/masking\n- include production-path regression for ClientHandler fallback behavior
David Osipov