telemt/src/stream/tls_stream_size_adversarial...

819 lines
19 KiB
Rust

use super::*;
use crate::protocol::constants::MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
#[test]
fn handshake_record_above_plaintext_limit_must_be_rejected_early() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: (MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE + 1) as u16,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"control-plane handshake record > MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE must fail closed"
);
}
#[test]
fn alert_record_above_plaintext_limit_must_be_rejected_early() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: (MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE + 1) as u16,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"TLS alert record > MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE must be rejected"
);
}
#[test]
fn ccs_record_len_not_equal_one_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 2,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"ChangeCipherSpec length must be exactly 1 byte in compat mode"
);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_record_len_zero_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 0,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"zero-length handshake record is structurally invalid"
);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_record_len_one_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 1,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"tiny handshake record must be rejected to avoid malformed parser states"
);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_record_len_four_is_accepted() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 4,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_ok(),
"4-byte handshake payload is the minimum carrying handshake header"
);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_record_at_plaintext_limit_is_accepted() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE as u16,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_ok(),
"handshake record at plaintext RFC limit must be accepted"
);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_record_at_ciphertext_limit_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE as u16,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"control-plane handshake must never use ciphertext upper bound"
);
}
#[test]
fn alert_record_len_zero_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 0,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"TLS alert must always carry level+description bytes"
);
}
#[test]
fn alert_record_len_one_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 1,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"one-byte TLS alert is malformed and must fail closed"
);
}
#[test]
fn alert_record_len_two_is_accepted() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 2,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_ok(),
"standard TLS alert shape should be accepted"
);
}
#[test]
fn alert_record_len_three_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 3,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"oversized plaintext alert should be rejected to avoid parser confusion"
);
}
#[test]
fn ccs_record_len_zero_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 0,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"ChangeCipherSpec with zero length is malformed"
);
}
#[test]
fn ccs_record_len_one_is_accepted() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 1,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_ok(),
"ChangeCipherSpec compat record length must be accepted only for len=1"
);
}
#[test]
fn ccs_record_len_at_plaintext_limit_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE as u16,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"oversized CCS control frame must fail closed"
);
}
#[test]
fn unknown_record_type_small_len_must_be_rejected_early() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: 0x19,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: 8,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"unknown TLS record type should be rejected during header validation"
);
}
#[test]
fn unknown_record_type_large_len_must_be_rejected_early() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: 0x7f,
version: TLS_VERSION,
length: MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE as u16,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"unknown record type with large payload must fail before body allocation"
);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_tls10_header_with_plaintext_plus_one_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
version: [0x03, 0x01],
length: (MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE + 1) as u16,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"TLS 1.0 compatibility header must not bypass plaintext size cap"
);
}
#[test]
fn alert_tls10_header_with_invalid_len_must_be_rejected() {
let header = TlsRecordHeader {
record_type: TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
version: [0x03, 0x01],
length: 3,
};
assert!(
header.validate().is_err(),
"TLS 1.0 compatibility header must not bypass strict alert framing"
);
}
fn validates(record_type: u8, version: [u8; 2], length: u16) -> bool {
TlsRecordHeader {
record_type,
version,
length,
}
.validate()
.is_ok()
}
macro_rules! expect_reject {
($name:ident, $record_type:expr, $version:expr, $length:expr) => {
#[test]
fn $name() {
assert!(
!validates($record_type, $version, $length),
"expected reject for type=0x{:02x} version={:02x?} len={}",
$record_type,
$version,
$length
);
}
};
}
macro_rules! expect_accept {
($name:ident, $record_type:expr, $version:expr, $length:expr) => {
#[test]
fn $name() {
assert!(
validates($record_type, $version, $length),
"expected accept for type=0x{:02x} version={:02x?} len={}",
$record_type,
$version,
$length
);
}
};
}
expect_reject!(
appdata_zero_len_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
0
);
expect_accept!(
appdata_one_len_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
1
);
expect_accept!(
appdata_small_len_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
32
);
expect_accept!(
appdata_medium_len_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
1024
);
expect_accept!(
appdata_plaintext_limit_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE as u16
);
expect_accept!(
appdata_ciphertext_limit_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE as u16
);
expect_reject!(
appdata_ciphertext_plus_one_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
(MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE as u16) + 1
);
expect_reject!(
appdata_tls10_header_len_one_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
[0x03, 0x01],
1
);
expect_reject!(
appdata_tls10_header_medium_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
[0x03, 0x01],
1024
);
expect_reject!(
appdata_tls10_header_ciphertext_limit_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
[0x03, 0x01],
MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE as u16
);
expect_reject!(
ccs_tls10_header_len_one_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
[0x03, 0x01],
1
);
expect_reject!(
ccs_tls10_header_len_zero_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
[0x03, 0x01],
0
);
expect_reject!(
ccs_tls10_header_len_two_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
[0x03, 0x01],
2
);
expect_reject!(
alert_tls10_header_len_two_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
[0x03, 0x01],
2
);
expect_reject!(
alert_tls10_header_len_one_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
[0x03, 0x01],
1
);
expect_reject!(
alert_tls10_header_len_three_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
[0x03, 0x01],
3
);
expect_accept!(
handshake_tls10_header_min_len_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
[0x03, 0x01],
4
);
expect_accept!(
handshake_tls10_header_plaintext_limit_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
[0x03, 0x01],
MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE as u16
);
expect_reject!(
handshake_tls10_header_too_small_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
[0x03, 0x01],
3
);
expect_reject!(
handshake_tls10_header_too_large_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
[0x03, 0x01],
(MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE as u16) + 1
);
expect_reject!(
unknown_type_tls13_zero_must_be_rejected,
0x00,
TLS_VERSION,
0
);
expect_reject!(
unknown_type_tls13_small_must_be_rejected,
0x13,
TLS_VERSION,
32
);
expect_reject!(
unknown_type_tls13_large_must_be_rejected,
0xfe,
TLS_VERSION,
MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE as u16
);
expect_reject!(
unknown_type_tls10_small_must_be_rejected,
0x13,
[0x03, 0x01],
32
);
expect_reject!(
appdata_invalid_version_0302_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
[0x03, 0x02],
128
);
expect_reject!(
handshake_invalid_version_0302_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
[0x03, 0x02],
128
);
expect_reject!(
alert_invalid_version_0302_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
[0x03, 0x02],
2
);
expect_reject!(
ccs_invalid_version_0302_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
[0x03, 0x02],
1
);
expect_reject!(
appdata_invalid_version_0304_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
[0x03, 0x04],
128
);
expect_reject!(
handshake_invalid_version_0304_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
[0x03, 0x04],
128
);
expect_reject!(
alert_invalid_version_0304_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
[0x03, 0x04],
2
);
expect_reject!(
ccs_invalid_version_0304_must_be_rejected,
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
[0x03, 0x04],
1
);
expect_accept!(
handshake_tls13_len_5_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
TLS_VERSION,
5
);
expect_accept!(
appdata_tls13_len_16385_is_accepted,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION,
(MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE as u16) + 1
);
#[test]
fn matrix_version_policy_is_strict_and_deterministic() {
let versions = [
[0x03, 0x01],
TLS_VERSION,
[0x03, 0x02],
[0x03, 0x04],
[0x00, 0x00],
];
let record_types = [
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
];
for version in versions {
for record_type in record_types {
let len = match record_type {
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION => 1,
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER => 1,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT => 2,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE => 4,
_ => unreachable!(),
};
let accepted = validates(record_type, version, len);
let expected = if version == TLS_VERSION {
true
} else {
version == [0x03, 0x01] && record_type == TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE
};
assert_eq!(
accepted, expected,
"version policy mismatch for type=0x{:02x} version={:02x?}",
record_type, version
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn appdata_partition_property_holds_for_all_u16_edges() {
for len in [
0u16,
1,
2,
3,
64,
255,
1024,
4096,
8192,
16_384,
16_385,
16_640,
16_641,
u16::MAX,
] {
let accepted = validates(TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION, TLS_VERSION, len);
let expected = len >= 1 && usize::from(len) <= MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE;
assert_eq!(
accepted, expected,
"unexpected appdata decision for len={len}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn handshake_partition_property_holds_for_all_u16_edges() {
for len in [
0u16,
1,
2,
3,
4,
5,
64,
255,
1024,
4096,
8192,
16_383,
16_384,
16_385,
u16::MAX,
] {
let accepted_tls13 = validates(TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE, TLS_VERSION, len);
let accepted_tls10 = validates(TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE, [0x03, 0x01], len);
let expected = (4..=MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE).contains(&usize::from(len));
assert_eq!(
accepted_tls13, expected,
"TLS1.3 handshake mismatch for len={len}"
);
assert_eq!(
accepted_tls10, expected,
"TLS1.0 compat handshake mismatch for len={len}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn control_record_exact_lengths_are_enforced_under_fuzzed_lengths() {
let mut x: u32 = 0xC0FFEE11;
for _ in 0..5000 {
x = x.wrapping_mul(1664525).wrapping_add(1013904223);
let len = (x & 0xFFFF) as u16;
let ccs_ok = validates(TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER, TLS_VERSION, len);
let alert_ok = validates(TLS_RECORD_ALERT, TLS_VERSION, len);
assert_eq!(ccs_ok, len == 1, "ccs length gate mismatch for len={len}");
assert_eq!(
alert_ok,
len == 2,
"alert length gate mismatch for len={len}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn unknown_record_types_never_validate_under_supported_versions() {
for record_type in 0u8..=255 {
if matches!(
record_type,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION
| TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER
| TLS_RECORD_ALERT
| TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE
) {
continue;
}
assert!(
!validates(record_type, TLS_VERSION, 1),
"unknown type must not validate under TLS_VERSION: 0x{record_type:02x}"
);
assert!(
!validates(record_type, [0x03, 0x01], 4),
"unknown type must not validate under TLS1.0 compat: 0x{record_type:02x}"
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn reader_rejects_tls10_appdata_header_before_payload_processing() {
let (mut tx, rx) = tokio::io::duplex(128);
tx.write_all(&[TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xAB])
.await
.unwrap();
tx.shutdown().await.unwrap();
let mut reader = FakeTlsReader::new(rx);
let mut out = [0u8; 1];
let err = reader.read(&mut out).await.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn reader_rejects_zero_len_appdata_record() {
let (mut tx, rx) = tokio::io::duplex(128);
tx.write_all(&[
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION[0],
TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00,
0x00,
])
.await
.unwrap();
tx.shutdown().await.unwrap();
let mut reader = FakeTlsReader::new(rx);
let mut out = [0u8; 1];
let err = reader.read(&mut out).await.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn reader_accepts_single_byte_tls13_appdata_and_yields_payload() {
let (mut tx, rx) = tokio::io::duplex(128);
tx.write_all(&[
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION[0],
TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00,
0x01,
0x5A,
])
.await
.unwrap();
tx.shutdown().await.unwrap();
let mut reader = FakeTlsReader::new(rx);
let mut out = [0u8; 1];
let n = reader.read(&mut out).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(n, 1);
assert_eq!(out[0], 0x5A);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn reader_rejects_tls10_alert_even_with_structural_length() {
let (mut tx, rx) = tokio::io::duplex(128);
tx.write_all(&[TLS_RECORD_ALERT, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x02, 0x28])
.await
.unwrap();
tx.shutdown().await.unwrap();
let mut reader = FakeTlsReader::new(rx);
let mut out = [0u8; 8];
let err = reader.read(&mut out).await.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn reader_rejects_unknown_record_type_fast() {
let (mut tx, rx) = tokio::io::duplex(128);
tx.write_all(&[0x7f, TLS_VERSION[0], TLS_VERSION[1], 0x00, 0x01, 0x01])
.await
.unwrap();
tx.shutdown().await.unwrap();
let mut reader = FakeTlsReader::new(rx);
let mut out = [0u8; 8];
let err = reader.read(&mut out).await.unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn reader_preserves_data_after_valid_ccs_then_valid_appdata() {
let (mut tx, rx) = tokio::io::duplex(256);
tx.write_all(&[
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
TLS_VERSION[0],
TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00,
0x01,
0x01,
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION,
TLS_VERSION[0],
TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00,
0x03,
0xDE,
0xAD,
0xBE,
])
.await
.unwrap();
tx.shutdown().await.unwrap();
let mut reader = FakeTlsReader::new(rx);
let mut out = [0u8; 3];
let n = reader.read(&mut out).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(n, 3);
assert_eq!(out, [0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE]);
}
#[test]
fn deterministic_lcg_never_breaks_validation_invariants() {
let mut x: u64 = 0xD1A5_CE55_0BAD_F00D;
for _ in 0..20000 {
x = x.wrapping_mul(6364136223846793005).wrapping_add(1);
let record_type = (x & 0xFF) as u8;
let version = match (x >> 8) & 0x3 {
0 => TLS_VERSION,
1 => [0x03, 0x01],
2 => [0x03, 0x02],
_ => [0x03, 0x04],
};
let len = ((x >> 16) & 0xFFFF) as u16;
let accepted = validates(record_type, version, len);
let expected = match record_type {
TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION => {
version == TLS_VERSION && len >= 1 && usize::from(len) <= MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE
}
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER => version == TLS_VERSION && len == 1,
TLS_RECORD_ALERT => version == TLS_VERSION && len == 2,
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE => {
(version == TLS_VERSION || version == [0x03, 0x01])
&& (4..=MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE).contains(&usize::from(len))
}
_ => false,
};
assert_eq!(
accepted, expected,
"invariant mismatch: type=0x{record_type:02x} version={version:02x?} len={len}"
);
}
}