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https://github.com/telemt/telemt.git
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91be148b72
This commit introduces a comprehensive set of improvements to enhance the security, reliability, and configurability of the proxy server, specifically targeting adversarial resilience and high-load concurrency. Security & Cryptography: - Zeroize MTProto cryptographic key material (`dec_key`, `enc_key`) immediately after use to prevent memory leakage on early returns. - Move TLS handshake replay tracking after full policy/ALPN validation to prevent cache poisoning by unauthenticated probes. - Add `proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs` configuration to restrict PROXY protocol headers to trusted networks, rejecting spoofed IPs. Adversarial Resilience & DoS Mitigation: - Implement "Tiny Frame Debt" tracking in the middle-relay to prevent CPU exhaustion from malicious 0-byte or 1-byte frame floods. - Add `mask_relay_max_bytes` to strictly bound unauthenticated fallback connections, preventing the proxy from being abused as an open relay. - Add a 5ms prefetch window (`mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms`) to correctly assemble and classify fragmented HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 probes (e.g., `PRI * HTTP/2.0`) before routing them to masking heuristics. - Prevent recursive masking loops (FD exhaustion) by verifying the mask target is not the proxy's own listener via local interface enumeration. Concurrency & Reliability: - Eliminate executor waker storms during quota lock contention by replacing the spin-waker task with inline `Sleep` and exponential backoff. - Roll back user quota reservations (`rollback_me2c_quota_reservation`) if a network write fails, preventing Head-of-Line (HoL) blocking from permanently burning data quotas. - Recover gracefully from idle-registry `Mutex` poisoning instead of panicking, ensuring isolated thread failures do not break the proxy. - Fix `auth_probe_scan_start_offset` modulo logic to ensure bounds safety. Testing: - Add extensive adversarial, timing, fuzzing, and invariant test suites for both the client and handshake modules.
43 lines
1.4 KiB
Rust
43 lines
1.4 KiB
Rust
use super::*;
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fn handshake_source() -> &'static str {
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include_str!("../handshake.rs")
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}
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#[test]
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fn security_dec_key_derivation_is_zeroized_in_candidate_loop() {
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let src = handshake_source();
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assert!(
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src.contains("let dec_key = Zeroizing::new(sha256(&dec_key_input));"),
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"candidate-loop dec_key derivation must be wrapped in Zeroizing to clear secrets on early-continue paths"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn security_enc_key_derivation_is_zeroized_in_candidate_loop() {
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let src = handshake_source();
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assert!(
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src.contains("let enc_key = Zeroizing::new(sha256(&enc_key_input));"),
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"candidate-loop enc_key derivation must be wrapped in Zeroizing to clear secrets on early-continue paths"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn security_aes_ctr_initialization_uses_zeroizing_references() {
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let src = handshake_source();
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assert!(
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src.contains("let mut decryptor = AesCtr::new(&dec_key, dec_iv);")
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&& src.contains("let encryptor = AesCtr::new(&enc_key, enc_iv);"),
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"AES-CTR initialization must use Zeroizing key wrappers directly without creating extra plain key variables"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn security_success_struct_copies_out_of_zeroizing_wrappers() {
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let src = handshake_source();
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assert!(
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src.contains("dec_key: *dec_key,") && src.contains("enc_key: *enc_key,"),
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"HandshakeSuccess construction must copy from Zeroizing wrappers so loop-local key material is dropped and zeroized"
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);
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}
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