Merge pull request #242 from pgsty/codex/fix-iam-admin-authorization

Enforce Admin self-service denials, session credential boundaries, root credential protection, and safe service-account issuance/cleanup.

Accepted commit 2616d43fbc after the complete IAM/STS integration selection, focused race tests, build/verifiers, and all eight hosted checks passed.

Related to #222; release and deployment remain separate.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>

cmd/admin-handlers-idp-ldap.go

@@ -249,8 +249,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccountLDAP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
 
 		// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
 		// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
+		// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
 		for k, v := range cred.Claims {
-			if k == expClaim {
+			switch k {
+			case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
 				continue
 			}
 			opts.claims[k] = v

cmd/admin-handlers-users-authz_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
+	"github.com/minio/mux"
+	xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+func iamAdminFixture(t *testing.T) (context.Context, *IAMSys) {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx, sys, obj := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+	globalObjLayerMutex.Lock()
+	globalObjectAPI = obj
+	globalObjLayerMutex.Unlock()
+	return ctx, sys
+}
+
+func iamAdminUser(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, name, policyName string) auth.Credentials {
+	t.Helper()
+	cred := auth.Credentials{AccessKey: name, SecretKey: "review-user-valid-secret"}
+	_, err := sys.CreateUser(ctx, name, madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq{SecretKey: cred.SecretKey, Status: madmin.AccountEnabled})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if policyName != "" {
+		_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, name, policyName, regUser, false)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	return cred
+}
+
+func iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, parent, key, document string) auth.Credentials {
+	t.Helper()
+	var sp *policy.Policy
+	var err error
+	if document != "" {
+		sp, err = policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	cred, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: key, secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", sessionPolicy: sp})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	return cred
+}
+
+func iamAdminRequest(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+	var body []byte
+	if payload != nil {
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(payload)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		body, err = madmin.EncryptData(cred.SecretKey, raw)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	headers := map[string]string{}
+	if cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
+		headers["X-Amz-Security-Token"] = cred.SessionToken
+	}
+	req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(method, "http://localhost"+target, int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, headers)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	mustIAM(t, req.ParseForm())
+	return req
+}
+
+func iamAdminCall(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any, vars map[string]string, handler http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	req := iamAdminRequest(t, cred, method, target, payload)
+	req = mux.SetURLVars(req, vars)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "IAMAdminAuthorization"))
+	handler(rec, req)
+	return rec
+}
+
+func assertIAMAdminStatus(t *testing.T, operation string, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, want int) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if rec.Code != want {
+		t.Errorf("%s status=%d want=%d body=%s", operation, rec.Code, want, rec.Body.String())
+		return
+	}
+	if want == http.StatusForbidden || want == http.StatusNotFound {
+		var response APIErrorResponse
+		mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response))
+		wantCode := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied).Code
+		if want == http.StatusNotFound {
+			wantCode = errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound).Code
+		}
+		if response.Code != wantCode {
+			t.Errorf("%s error code=%s want=%s", operation, response.Code, wantCode)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func iamAdminPlugin(t *testing.T, allow bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"result": allow})
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
+	u, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(server.URL)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
+	setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{URL: u, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { r.Close() }}))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous) })
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminRootEmptyPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, doc := range []string{"", "null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
+		t.Run("policy="+doc, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			caller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-empty", doc)
+			sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-sibling", "")
+			req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+			checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
+			if code != ErrNone {
+				t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
+			}
+			active, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(policy.Args{Claims: checked.Claims})
+			t.Logf("owner=%v parsed_active_session_policy=%v", owner, active)
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-root-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "review"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminEmptyPolicyDelegation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, parentType := range []string{"root", "user"} {
+		for _, document := range []string{"null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
+			t.Run(parentType+"/"+document, func(t *testing.T) {
+				ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+				parent := globalActiveCred
+				if parentType == "user" {
+					parent = iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "empty-policy-parent", "readwrite")
+				}
+				sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+					accessKey: "empty-policy-caller", secretKey: "empty-policy-caller-secret", sessionPolicy: sp,
+					claims: map[string]any{"identity-attribute": "preserved"},
+				})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				const limitedPolicy = `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts"]}]}`
+				for _, tc := range []struct {
+					policy      string
+					listStatus  int
+					allowObject bool
+				}{
+					{"", http.StatusOK, true},
+					{"null", http.StatusOK, true},
+					{"{}", http.StatusOK, true},
+					{`{"Statement":null}`, http.StatusOK, true},
+					{limitedPolicy, http.StatusOK, false},
+					{`{"Version":"2012-10-17"}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
+					{`{"Statement":[]}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
+				} {
+					expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+					req := madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Expiration: &expires}
+					if tc.policy != "" {
+						req.Policy = json.RawMessage(tc.policy)
+					}
+					api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+					rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", req, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
+					assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create expiring child", rec, http.StatusOK)
+					data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
+					mustIAM(t, err)
+					var response madmin.AddServiceAccountResp
+					mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
+					child, ok := sys.store.GetUser(response.Credentials.AccessKey)
+					if !ok {
+						t.Fatal("new service account missing")
+					}
+					// Exercise the issued key through authentication and authorization.
+					assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "use expiring child policy="+tc.policy, iamAdminCall(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), tc.listStatus)
+					signed := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/example/object", nil)
+					checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(signed, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
+					if code != ErrNone {
+						t.Fatalf("child authentication: %v", code)
+					}
+					if checked.Claims["identity-attribute"] != "preserved" {
+						t.Fatal("creation lost the caller's identity context")
+					}
+					allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: checked.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: "example", ObjectName: "object"})
+					if allowed != tc.allowObject {
+						t.Errorf("GetObject allowed=%v with requested policy=%s", allowed, tc.policy)
+					}
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminCorruptServiceCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, status := range []string{auth.AccountOn, auth.AccountOff, "expired"} {
+		t.Run(status, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-admin", "consoleAdmin")
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-parent", "readwrite")
+			svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-corrupt", "")
+			if status == auth.AccountOff {
+				_, err := sys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: status})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			cache := sys.store.lock()
+			u := cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey]
+			u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
+			if status == "expired" {
+				u.Credentials.Expiration = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute)
+			}
+			cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey] = u
+			sys.store.unlock()
+			_, _, err := sys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("fault injection failed")
+			}
+			raw, exists := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey)
+			_, loginOK := sys.GetUser(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
+			t.Logf("metadata_exists=%v parent_known=%v GetUser_ok=%v", exists, raw.Credentials.ParentUser == parent.AccessKey, loginOK)
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			outsider := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-outsider", "readwrite")
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "unauthorized cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, outsider, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "admin cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+			if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey); ok {
+				t.Fatal("deleted service account remains in the IAM cache")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminPolicylessSelf(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-policyless", "")
+	svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, caller.AccessKey, "rv-policyless-child", "")
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 200)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 200)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 200)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminExpiringInheritedPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-legacy-parent", "consoleAdmin")
+	document := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
+	// Model a credential persisted by the old handler: it copied its caller's
+	// policy claims but set the newly created service's type to inherited.
+	expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+	caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+		accessKey: "rv-exp-inherited", secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", expiration: &expires,
+		claims: map[string]any{policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(document))},
+	})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+	checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
+	if code != ErrNone {
+		t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
+	}
+	args := policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.CreateServiceAccountAdminAction, DenyOnly: true}
+	if !sys.IsAllowed(args) {
+		t.Fatal("fixture cannot create")
+	}
+	args.Action = policy.CreateUserAdminAction
+	args.DenyOnly = false
+	if sys.IsAllowed(args) {
+		t.Fatal("fixture not constrained")
+	}
+	t.Logf("service=%v temp=%v inherited=%v; create allowed, create-user denied", checked.IsServiceAccount(), checked.IsTemp(), checked.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType)
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-escaped", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
+	if rec.Code == 200 {
+		child, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, "review-escaped")
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("new key missing")
+		}
+		childReq := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+		childChecked, childOwner, childCode := checkKeyValid(childReq, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
+		if childCode != ErrNone {
+			t.Fatalf("child auth=%v", childCode)
+		}
+		allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: childChecked.AccessKey, Claims: childChecked.Claims, IsOwner: childOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
+		t.Errorf("constrained inherited service created a new key; new key CreateUser allowed=%v", allowed)
+	} else {
+		assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject derived creation", rec, 403)
+	}
+	updated := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+caller.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "metadata-only"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": caller.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount)
+	if updated.Code == 204 {
+		after, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey)
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("updated key missing")
+		}
+		afterReq := iamAdminRequest(t, after.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+		afterChecked, afterOwner, afterCode := checkKeyValid(afterReq, caller.AccessKey)
+		if afterCode != ErrNone {
+			t.Fatalf("updated auth=%v", afterCode)
+		}
+		allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: afterChecked.Claims, IsOwner: afterOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
+		t.Errorf("constrained inherited service updated itself; CreateUser allowed after update=%v", allowed)
+	} else {
+		assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject inherited self update", updated, 403)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminSessionPolicyCannotDelegate(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, temp := range []bool{false, true} {
+		t.Run(map[bool]string{false: "service", true: "sts"}[temp], func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-parent", "consoleAdmin")
+			doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
+			var caller auth.Credentials
+			if !temp {
+				caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "review-restricted", doc)
+			} else {
+				var err error
+				caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(doc))}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
+				_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-sibling", "")
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict LDAP create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/idp/ldap/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccountLDAP), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
+			if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser("review-bad-new"); ok {
+				t.Fatal("denied creation persisted a credential")
+			}
+			u, ok := sys.store.GetUser(sibling.AccessKey)
+			if !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != sibling.SecretKey {
+				t.Fatal("denied update changed the target credential")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminSelfDenials(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, mode := range []string{"parent_deny", "group_deny", "session_implicit_deny", "session_explicit_deny", "plugin_deny"} {
+		t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-self-parent", "readwrite")
+			target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-target", "")
+			caller := parent
+			doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts","admin:RemoveServiceAccount"]}]}`
+			switch mode {
+			case "parent_deny", "group_deny":
+				p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(doc))
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				_, err = sys.SetPolicy(ctx, "review-self-deny", *p)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if mode == "group_deny" {
+					_, err = sys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, "self-deny-group", []string{parent.AccessKey})
+					mustIAM(t, err)
+					_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, "self-deny-group", "review-self-deny", regUser, true)
+				} else {
+					_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, parent.AccessKey, "readwrite,review-self-deny", regUser, false)
+				}
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			case "session_implicit_deny":
+				caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::example/*"]}]}`)
+			case "session_explicit_deny":
+				caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", doc)
+			case "plugin_deny":
+				iamAdminPlugin(t, false)
+			}
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminNonRootCannotManageRoot(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-console-admin", "consoleAdmin")
+	target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "rv-root-target", "")
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "rv-new-root", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", TargetUser: globalActiveCred.AccessKey}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+	// Restricted root-derived credentials and the site replicator are not root
+	// administrators, even when their effective policy allows these actions.
+	limited := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "limited-root", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:*"]}]}`)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root delete", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root revoke", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+	replicator, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: siteReplicatorSvcAcc, secretKey: "replicator-valid-secret", allowSiteReplicatorAccount: true})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicator create root", iamAdminCall(t, replicator, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
+
+	// An external plugin remains authoritative, including for root targets.
+	iamAdminPlugin(t, true)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin update root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "plugin-authorized"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin create root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminDeleteCorruptServiceReplicates(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-admin", "consoleAdmin")
+	parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-parent", "readwrite")
+	target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "cleanup-target", "")
+	cache := sys.store.lock()
+	u := cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey]
+	u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
+	u.Credentials.Status = auth.AccountOff
+	cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey] = u
+	sys.store.unlock()
+
+	var deletions atomic.Int32
+	peer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path == "/minio/health/live" {
+			return
+		}
+		var batch iamRevisionBatch
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&batch); err != nil {
+			t.Error(err)
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		if len(batch.Items) != 1 || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete.AccessKey != target.AccessKey {
+			t.Error("replication did not carry the service account deletion")
+		} else {
+			deletions.Add(1)
+		}
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(iamRevisionResponse{iamRevisionStatus: iamRevisionStatus{Version: iamRevisionProtocol, Node: "peer", Instance: "peer-boot", Digest: "deleted"}})
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(peer.Close)
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.RLock()
+	previousSecret := globalSiteReplicatorCred.secretKey
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.RUnlock()
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(caller.SecretKey)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(previousSecret) })
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = true
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.state = srState{ServiceAccountAccessKey: caller.AccessKey, Peers: map[string]madmin.PeerInfo{
+		globalDeploymentID(): {DeploymentID: globalDeploymentID(), Name: "local"},
+		"peer":               {DeploymentID: "peer", Name: "peer", Endpoint: peer.URL},
+	}}
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = false
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
+	})
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicated cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+	if deletions.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected one immediate deletion notification, got %d", deletions.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminListSelfAliases(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"service", "sts"} {
+		t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "alias-parent", "readwrite")
+			target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-target", "")
+			caller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-caller", "")
+			if kind == "sts" {
+				var err error
+				caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
+				_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			for _, alias := range []string{"", caller.AccessKey, parent.AccessKey} {
+				rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+alias, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts)
+				assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list self alias", rec, 200)
+				data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				var response madmin.ListServiceAccountsResp
+				mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
+				found := false
+				for _, account := range response.Accounts {
+					found = found || account.AccessKey == target.AccessKey
+				}
+				if !found {
+					t.Fatalf("self alias %q did not list the parent's service accounts", alias)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/admin-handlers-users.go

@@ -714,8 +714,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 
 		// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
 		// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
+		// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
 		for k, v := range cred.Claims {
-			if k == expClaim {
+			switch k {
+			case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
 				continue
 			}
 			opts.claims[k] = v
@@ -855,10 +857,9 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	// Permission checks:
 	//
-	// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service
-	// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the
-	// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service
-	// account.
+	// 1. Updating requires policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction. Under built-in
+	// IAM, session-limited callers cannot update credentials, and only unrestricted
+	// root credentials can manage root's service accounts.
 	//
 	// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it
 	// is currently blocked pending a re-design. Users are still able to delete
@@ -874,6 +875,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
+		(svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
 
 	var sp *policy.Policy
 	if len(updateReq.NewPolicy) > 0 {
@@ -951,23 +957,21 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
 		return
 	}
 
-	if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	requestUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		requestUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
+		DenyOnly:        requestUser == svcAccount.ParentUser,
 	}) {
-		requestUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			requestUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-
-		if requestUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
 	}
 
 	// if session policy is nil or empty, then it is implied policy
@@ -1039,29 +1043,27 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListServiceAccounts(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 		return
 	}
 
-	var targetAccount string
-
-	// If listing is requested for a specific user (who is not the request
-	// sender), check that the user has permissions.
+	selfUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		selfUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
 	user := r.Form.Get("user")
-	if user != "" && user != cred.AccessKey {
-		if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
-			AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
-			Groups:          cred.Groups,
-			Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
-			ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
-			IsOwner:         owner,
-			Claims:          cred.Claims,
-		}) {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
-		targetAccount = user
-	} else {
-		targetAccount = cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			targetAccount = cred.ParentUser
-		}
+	selfOnly := user == "" || user == cred.AccessKey || user == selfUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
+		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
+		Groups:          cred.Groups,
+		Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
+		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
+		IsOwner:         owner,
+		Claims:          cred.Claims,
+		DenyOnly:        selfOnly,
+	}) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+	targetAccount := user
+	if selfOnly {
+		targetAccount = selfUser
 	}
 
 	serviceAccounts, err := globalIAMSys.ListServiceAccounts(ctx, targetAccount)
@@ -1110,7 +1112,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	// Get current object layer instance.
 	objectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()
-	if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {
+	if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil || !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
@@ -1131,35 +1133,41 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidArgument), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
-	// We do not care if service account is readable or not at this point,
-	// since this is a delete call we shall allow it to be deleted if possible.
-	svcAccount, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount)
-	if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
+	// Deletion needs the stored identity, not a valid token or session policy.
+	// Keep disabled, expired and damaged service accounts removable, and retain
+	// their parent for authorization and the site replication hook below.
+	u, ok := globalIAMSys.store.GetUser(serviceAccount)
+	if !ok || !u.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
+	svcAccount := u.Credentials
 
-	adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	parentUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		parentUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	isSelf := parentUser == svcAccount.ParentUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
-	})
-
-	if !adminPrivilege {
-		parentUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			parentUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-		if svcAccount.ParentUser != "" && parentUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
-			// The service account belongs to another user but return not
-			// found error to mitigate brute force attacks. or the
-			// serviceAccount doesn't exist.
+		DenyOnly:        isSelf,
+	}) {
+		if !isSelf {
+			// Hide the existence of another user's service account.
 			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
 			return
 		}
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
+		return
 	}
 
 	if err := globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount, true); err != nil {
@@ -2046,26 +2054,30 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) RevokeTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	parentUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		parentUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	isSelfTarget := isTokenSelfRevoke || user == parentUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
-	})
-
-	if !adminPrivilege || isTokenSelfRevoke {
-		parentUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			parentUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-		if !isTokenSelfRevoke && user != parentUser {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
+		DenyOnly:        isSelfTarget,
+	}) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+	if isSelfTarget {
 		user = parentUser
 	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && user == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
 
 	// Infer token revoke type from the request if requestor is STS.
 	if isTokenSelfRevoke && tokenRevokeType == "" && !fullRevoke {
@@ -2112,29 +2124,22 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoAccessKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 	u, ok := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)
 	targetCred := u.Credentials
 
-	if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	requestUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		requestUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	isSelf := ok && targetCred.ParentUser != "" && requestUser == targetCred.ParentUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
+		DenyOnly:        isSelf,
 	}) {
-		// If requested user does not exist and requestor is not allowed to list service accounts, return access denied.
-		if !ok {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
-
-		requestUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			requestUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-
-		if requestUser != targetCred.ParentUser {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
 	}
 
 	if !ok {
@@ -2908,6 +2913,44 @@ func addExpirationToCondValues(exp *time.Time, condValues map[string][]string) e
 	return nil
 }
 
+// hasActiveSessionPolicy follows the same credential dispatch as IAMSys.IsAllowed.
+// Expiring service accounts also satisfy IsTemp and are evaluated as STS there.
+// Callers use this only after authorization under built-in IAM.
+func hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
+	args := policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}
+	if cred.IsTemp() {
+		hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicy(args)
+		return hasSP
+	}
+	if cred.IsServiceAccount() {
+		if cred.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
+			return false
+		}
+		hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(args)
+		return hasSP
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// canManageRootCredentials is an additional guard after built-in IAM authorization.
+// The signature's owner flag is insufficient: historical empty session policies
+// clear it even though the service account still inherits root's permissions.
+func canManageRootCredentials(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
+	return cred.AccessKey == globalActiveCred.AccessKey ||
+		(cred.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && cred.AccessKey != siteReplicatorSvcAcc && !hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred))
+}
+
+// isAllowedServiceAccountAction preserves regular users' self inspection and
+// cleanup even without a policy attachment, while enforcing explicit denies.
+// Derived credentials and external authorization plugins use full IAM evaluation.
+func isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred auth.Credentials, args policy.Args) bool {
+	if args.DenyOnly && !args.IsOwner && !cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() && newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
+		policies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(args.AccountName, args.Groups...)
+		return err == nil && globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...).IsAllowed(args)
+	}
+	return globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(args)
+}
+
 func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.Credentials, newServiceAccountOpts, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq, string, APIError) {
 	ctx := r.Context()
 
@@ -2996,6 +3039,14 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
 	}) {
 		return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
 	}
+	effectiveTarget := targetUser
+	if (targetUser == cred.AccessKey || targetUser == cred.ParentUser) && cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		effectiveTarget = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
+		(effectiveTarget == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
+		return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
+	}
 
 	var sp *policy.Policy
 	if len(createReq.Policy) > 0 {
@@ -3003,6 +3054,12 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
 		if err != nil {
 			return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err)
 		}
+		// Empty service policies mean inheritance, including for expiring keys.
+		// Normalize the replication request as well as the local credential.
+		if sp.Version == "" && sp.Statements == nil && sp.ID == "" {
+			sp = nil
+			createReq.Policy = nil
+		}
 	}
 
 	opts.sessionPolicy = sp

cmd/iam-peer-reload_test.go

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ func TestIAMPeerDeleteNotificationReloadsCommittedState(t *testing.T) {
 			resetTestGlobals()
 			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 			defer cancel()
+			// Both caches use object storage, independent of earlier etcd suites.
+			globalEtcdClient = nil
 			obj, disk, err := prepareFS(ctx)
 			if err != nil {
 				t.Fatal(err)

cmd/sts-handlers_test.go

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
 	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
 	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/ldap"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
 )
 
 func runAllIAMSTSTests(suite *TestSuiteIAM, c *check) {
@@ -2384,8 +2385,10 @@ func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestIAMImport(c *check, exportedContent []byte, caseNum i
 	if err != nil {
 		c.Fatalf("import %d: Unable to list policies: %v", caseNum, err)
 	}
-	defaultCannedPolicies := set.CreateStringSet("consoleAdmin", "readwrite", "readonly",
-		"diagnostics", "writeonly")
+	defaultCannedPolicies := set.CreateStringSet()
+	for _, p := range policy.DefaultPolicies {
+		defaultCannedPolicies.Add(p.Name)
+	}
 	for policy, policyBytes := range policyContentMap {
 		if defaultCannedPolicies.Contains(policy) {
 			continue
@@ -2991,6 +2994,21 @@ func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestLDAPSTSServiceAccounts(c *check) {
 	// 6. Check that service account cannot be created for some other user.
 	c.mustNotCreateSvcAccount(ctx, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, userAdmClient)
 
+	// An empty policy must not contaminate an expiring LDAP child credential.
+	emptyPolicyCred, err := userAdmClient.AddServiceAccountLDAP(ctx, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Policy: []byte("null")})
+	if err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("Unable to create empty-policy LDAP service account: %v", err)
+	}
+	emptyPolicyAdmin := s.getAdminClient(c, emptyPolicyCred.AccessKey, emptyPolicyCred.SecretKey, "")
+	expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+	for _, childPolicy := range [][]byte{nil, []byte("null")} {
+		child, err := emptyPolicyAdmin.AddServiceAccountLDAP(ctx, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Expiration: &expires, Policy: childPolicy})
+		if err != nil {
+			c.Fatalf("Unable to create expiring LDAP child: %v", err)
+		}
+		c.assertSvcAccS3Access(ctx, s, child, bucket)
+	}
+
 	// Detach the policy from the user
 	if _, err = s.adm.DetachPolicyLDAP(ctx, userReq); err != nil {
 		c.Fatalf("Unable to detach user policy: %v", err)