Merge pull request #177 from pgsty/codex/release-consolidation-20260911

Fix signed payloads, Object Lock and federated copies; secure AMQP
This commit is contained in:
Feng Ruohang
2026-09-11 17:08:34 +08:00
committed by GitHub
18 changed files with 1203 additions and 90 deletions
+4 -11
View File
@@ -632,18 +632,11 @@ func isReqAuthenticated(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, region string, sty
return ErrInvalidDigest
}
// Extract either 'X-Amz-Content-Sha256' header or 'X-Amz-Content-Sha256' query parameter (if V4 presigned)
// Do not verify 'X-Amz-Content-Sha256' if skipSHA256.
// Honor the selected header/query checksum, including the header fallback
// for a presigned request. STS separately hashes its body for its signature.
var contentSHA256 []byte
if skipSHA256 := skipContentSha256Cksum(r); !skipSHA256 && isRequestPresignedSignatureV4(r) {
if sha256Sum, ok := r.Form[xhttp.AmzContentSha256]; ok && len(sha256Sum) > 0 {
contentSHA256, err = hex.DecodeString(sha256Sum[0])
if err != nil {
return ErrContentSHA256Mismatch
}
}
} else if _, ok := r.Header[xhttp.AmzContentSha256]; !skipSHA256 && ok {
contentSHA256, err = hex.DecodeString(r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzContentSha256))
if !skipContentSha256Cksum(r) {
contentSHA256, err = hex.DecodeString(getContentSha256Cksum(r, serviceS3))
if err != nil || len(contentSHA256) == 0 {
return ErrContentSHA256Mismatch
}
+4 -5
View File
@@ -334,11 +334,10 @@ func checkPutObjectLockAllowed(ctx context.Context, rq *http.Request, bucket, ob
return mode, retainDate, legalHold, ErrObjectLocked
}
if !legalHoldRequested && retentionCfg.LockEnabled {
// inherit retention from bucket configuration
return retentionCfg.Mode, objectlock.RetentionDate{Time: t.Add(retentionCfg.Validity)}, legalHold, ErrNone
}
return "", objectlock.RetentionDate{}, legalHold, ErrNone
// Inherit retention from the bucket configuration. A legal-hold header
// on the same request, ON or OFF, is independent of retention and must
// not suppress the default (#165).
return retentionCfg.Mode, objectlock.RetentionDate{Time: t.Add(retentionCfg.Validity)}, legalHold, ErrNone
}
return mode, retainDate, legalHold, ErrNone
}
+26 -7
View File
@@ -255,13 +255,32 @@ func getConditionValuesWithTags(r *http.Request, lc string, cred auth.Credential
}
cloneHeader := r.Header.Clone()
signatureAge := cloneHeader.Get(xhttp.AmzSignatureAge)
cloneHeader.Del(xhttp.AmzSignatureAge)
// The presigned V4 verifier overwrites this internal scratch header after
// validating the signature. Ignore a value supplied on every other request
// type, where it would otherwise synthesize s3:signatureAge.
if authType == authTypePresigned && signatureAge != "" {
args["signatureAge"] = []string{signatureAge}
// s3:signatureAge is derived from the presigned X-Amz-Date rather than from
// anything the verifier writes back: PutObject and UploadPart authorize
// before they verify the signature, so a post-verification value is not yet
// available on the first evaluation. The date is bound by the signature
// (doesPresignedSignatureMatch rebuilds and compares it), so a forged date
// only changes the authorization outcome of a request that then fails
// verification. A date that does not parse leaves the key absent; the
// verifier rejects the request as ErrMalformedPresignedDate.
if authType == authTypePresigned {
if signedDate, err := time.Parse(iso8601Format, r.Form.Get(xhttp.AmzDate)); err == nil {
args["signatureAge"] = []string{strconv.FormatInt(currTime.Sub(signedDate).Milliseconds(), 10)}
}
}
// s3:x-amz-content-sha256 must name the payload hash the request is actually
// verified and enforced against, and only one such value. Presence of the
// header controls whether the key exists at all (AWS documents that the
// query-string form does not populate it), but the value comes from the same
// selection getContentSha256Cksum makes for verification: the presigned query
// value takes precedence over the header, and a repeated header contributes
// only its first value. Exposing every raw header value instead let a
// request satisfy a policy with a value the verifier never checked.
if _, ok := cloneHeader[xhttp.AmzContentSha256]; ok {
args[xhttp.AmzContentSha256] = []string{getContentSha256Cksum(r, serviceS3)}
cloneHeader.Del(xhttp.AmzContentSha256)
}
userTags := cloneHeader.Get(xhttp.AmzObjectTagging)
+34 -6
View File
@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ import (
"net/url"
"os"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/handlers"
@@ -579,8 +581,20 @@ func TestGetConditionValuesRejectsAbsentInternalKeys(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// s3:signatureAge is derived from the presigned X-Amz-Date, which the signature
// binds. A client header under the former scratch name must never supply it on
// any auth type, and a presign whose date is missing or malformed leaves the
// key absent (the verifier then rejects the request).
func TestGetConditionValuesOnlyAcceptsPresignedSignatureAge(t *testing.T) {
const signatureAgeHeader = "x-amz-signature-age"
signedDate := UTCNow().Add(-90 * time.Second)
presignQuery := func(date string) string {
q := url.Values{xhttp.AmzCredential: {"access/20260803/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request"}}
if date != "" {
q.Set(xhttp.AmzDate, date)
}
return "http://minio.local/bkt/obj?" + q.Encode()
}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
@@ -602,19 +616,33 @@ func TestGetConditionValuesOnlyAcceptsPresignedSignatureAge(t *testing.T) {
},
},
{
name: "presigned verifier value",
target: "http://minio.local/bkt/obj?" + url.Values{
xhttp.AmzCredential: {"access/20260803/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request"},
}.Encode(),
name: "presigned client header without date",
target: presignQuery(""),
headers: map[string]string{signatureAgeHeader: "250"},
},
{
name: "presigned malformed date",
target: presignQuery("yesterday"),
},
{
name: "presigned signed date",
target: presignQuery(signedDate.Format(iso8601Format)),
headers: map[string]string{signatureAgeHeader: "250"},
want: true,
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := condValuesForRequest(t, tc.target, tc.headers)
_, ok := got["signatureAge"]
v, ok := got["signatureAge"]
if ok != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("signatureAge presence: expected %v, got %v", tc.want, got["signatureAge"])
t.Fatalf("signatureAge presence: expected %v, got %v", tc.want, v)
}
if !tc.want {
return
}
age, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.Join(v, ""), 10, 64)
if err != nil || age < (90*time.Second).Milliseconds() || age > (2*time.Minute).Milliseconds() {
t.Fatalf("signatureAge = %v, want about 90s derived from X-Amz-Date rather than the client header", v)
}
})
}
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
// Copyright (c) 2015-2026 MinIO, Inc.
//
// This file is part of MinIO Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
)
// enableBucketObjectLock puts a lock-enabled configuration on an existing
// bucket so checkPutObjectLockAllowed accepts a legal-hold header instead of
// rejecting the request with ErrInvalidBucketObjectLockConfiguration.
func enableBucketObjectLock(t *testing.T, bucket string) {
t.Helper()
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to read bucket metadata for %s: %v", bucket, err)
}
updated := meta
updated.ObjectLockConfigXML = enabledBucketObjectLockConfig
updated.VersioningConfigXML = enabledBucketVersioningConfig
// The XML alone is not enough: BucketMetadata keeps a parsed copy that the
// lookups actually read, and it is only populated by parseAllConfigs.
if err := updated.parseAllConfigs(t.Context(), newObjectLayerFn()); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to parse bucket metadata for %s: %v", bucket, err)
}
globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, updated)
}
// Exercise #165 and #166 together, including hold OFF, default retention and
// explicit subsecond retention. Ordinary copies must not inherit source locks.
func TestAPIFederatedCopyObjectLockParity(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
endpoints: []string{"CopyObject", "PutObject", "HeadObject", "GetObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
testKMS, err := kms.NewBuiltin(federationTestKMSKeyID, bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x58}, 32))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = testKMS
defer func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS }()
remoteBucket, capture, cleanup := setupCopyObjectFederation(t, obj, router, instanceType, bucket)
defer cleanup()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
until := UTCNow().Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour).Truncate(time.Second).Add(789 * time.Millisecond).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
for _, sourceType := range []string{"plain", "s3"} {
source := sourceType + "-held-source"
headers := federationSSEHeaders(sourceType, 0, false)
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold] = "ON"
putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, source, []byte("held source"), headers)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, hold, defaultMode, explicitMode string
replace bool
}{
{name: "on", hold: "ON"},
{name: "off", hold: "OFF"},
{name: "no source inheritance"},
{name: "on with default", hold: "ON", defaultMode: "GOVERNANCE"},
{name: "off with default", hold: "OFF", defaultMode: "COMPLIANCE"},
{name: "explicit retention", explicitMode: "GOVERNANCE"},
{name: "hold and explicit retention", hold: "ON", explicitMode: "COMPLIANCE"},
{name: "replace metadata", hold: "ON", explicitMode: "GOVERNANCE", replace: true},
} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+sourceType+"/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
setTestBucketDefaultRetention(t, bucket, tc.defaultMode)
setTestBucketDefaultRetention(t, remoteBucket, tc.defaultMode)
headers := map[string]string{}
if tc.hold != "" {
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold] = tc.hold
}
if tc.explicitMode != "" {
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode] = tc.explicitMode
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate] = until
}
if tc.replace {
headers[xhttp.AmzMetadataDirective] = "REPLACE"
headers["X-Amz-Meta-Origin"] = "replacement"
}
capture.mu.Lock()
capture.headers = nil
capture.mu.Unlock()
for _, destinationBucket := range []string{bucket, remoteBucket} {
destination := sourceType + "-copy-" + strings.ReplaceAll(tc.name, " ", "-")
rec := federatedCopyRequest(t, router, cred, bucket, source, destinationBucket, destination, headers)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("copy to %s: %d %s", destinationBucket, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
info, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), destinationBucket, destination, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := objectlock.GetObjectLegalHoldMeta(info.UserDefined).Status; string(got) != tc.hold {
t.Errorf("stored hold = %q, want %q", got, tc.hold)
}
retention := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(info.UserDefined)
mode := tc.explicitMode
if mode == "" {
mode = tc.defaultMode
}
if string(retention.Mode) != mode {
t.Errorf("stored retention = %q, want %q", retention.Mode, mode)
}
if tc.explicitMode != "" && retention.RetainUntilDate.Format(time.RFC3339Nano) != until {
t.Errorf("retention date lost precision: %s, want %s", retention.RetainUntilDate, until)
}
for key := range info.UserDefined {
if stringsHasPrefixFold(key, "X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Object-Lock-") {
t.Errorf("lock state became user metadata: %s", key)
}
}
if tc.replace && info.UserDefined["X-Amz-Meta-Origin"] != "replacement" {
t.Errorf("replacement metadata was lost: %v", info.UserDefined)
}
}
typed, asMetadata := capture.legalHoldHeaders()
if len(asMetadata) != 0 || (tc.hold != "" && strings.Join(typed, "") != tc.hold) || (tc.hold == "" && len(typed) != 0) {
t.Errorf("forwarded hold headers = %v, metadata = %v; want %q", typed, asMetadata, tc.hold)
}
})
}
}
},
})
}
// legalHoldHeaders returns the forwarded legal-hold headers the remote saw,
// separated into the real Object Lock header and the user-metadata spelling
// minio-go produces for an unrecognized UserMetadata key.
func (c *federationRemoteCapture) legalHoldHeaders() (typed, asMetadata []string) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
metaKey := "X-Amz-Meta-" + xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold
for _, h := range c.headers {
for k, v := range h {
switch {
case strings.EqualFold(k, xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold):
typed = append(typed, strings.Join(v, ","))
case strings.EqualFold(k, metaKey):
asMetadata = append(asMetadata, strings.Join(v, ","))
}
}
}
return typed, asMetadata
}
// TestAPIFederatedCopyObjectLegalHold drives the legacy etcd federation branch
// of CopyObjectHandler with an explicit legal hold on the copy.
//
// Before the fix the resolved hold was forwarded inside
// PutObjectOptions.UserMetadata. minio-go's Header() prefixes every
// UserMetadata key it does not recognize with "x-amz-meta-", and
// x-amz-object-lock-legal-hold is in neither supportedHeaders nor isAmzHeader,
// so the hold reached the remote as X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Object-Lock-Legal-Hold.
// The destination stored no hold and the copy still answered 200 -- a silent
// loss of a WORM control (#166). Retention requested on the same copy survived,
// which is what made it easy to miss.
func TestAPIFederatedCopyObjectLegalHold(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
objAPITest: testAPIFederatedCopyObjectLegalHold,
endpoints: []string{"CopyObject", "PutObject", "HeadObject", "GetObject"},
})
}
func testAPIFederatedCopyObjectLegalHold(objectAPI ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucketName string,
apiRouter http.Handler, credentials auth.Credentials, t *testing.T,
) {
data := []byte("federated copy with a legal hold")
srcObject := "federation/legal-hold-source"
putCopyChecksumSource(t, apiRouter, credentials, bucketName, srcObject, data, nil)
remoteBucket, capture, cleanup := setupCopyObjectFederation(t, objectAPI, apiRouter, instanceType, bucketName)
defer cleanup()
// Both roles read bucket metadata from the shared backend in this fixture,
// so one configuration covers the proxy's own check and the remote's.
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucketName)
enableBucketObjectLock(t, remoteBucket)
dstObject := "federation/legal-hold-destination"
rec := federatedCopyRequest(t, apiRouter, credentials, bucketName, srcObject, remoteBucket, dstObject,
map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold: string(objectlock.LegalHoldOn)})
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("%s: federated CopyObject with a legal hold failed: %d %s",
instanceType, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// The wire is the point: the hold must arrive as the Object Lock header,
// never as user metadata. A 200 with the metadata spelling is exactly the
// silent loss this test exists for.
typed, asMetadata := capture.legalHoldHeaders()
if len(asMetadata) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("%s: legal hold forwarded as user metadata %v; the destination stores no hold",
instanceType, asMetadata)
}
if len(typed) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("%s: no %s header reached the remote deployment", instanceType, xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)
}
for _, got := range typed {
if !strings.EqualFold(got, string(objectlock.LegalHoldOn)) {
t.Fatalf("%s: forwarded legal hold = %q, want %q", instanceType, got, objectlock.LegalHoldOn)
}
}
// And it must actually be stored on the destination version.
oi, err := objectAPI.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), remoteBucket, dstObject, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: unable to stat the federated copy destination: %v", instanceType, err)
}
if hold := objectlock.GetObjectLegalHoldMeta(oi.UserDefined); hold.Status != objectlock.LegalHoldOn {
t.Fatalf("%s: destination legal hold = %q, want %q (metadata: %v)",
instanceType, hold.Status, objectlock.LegalHoldOn, oi.UserDefined)
}
}
+158
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
sse "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/encryption"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/event"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/pubsub"
)
func TestAPIFederatedCopyObjectVersionAndEvent(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
endpoints: []string{"CopyObject", "PutObject", "GetObject", "HeadObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
testKMS, err := kms.NewBuiltin(federationTestKMSKeyID, bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x58}, 32))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = testKMS
defer func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS }()
restore := setCopyChecksumCompression(true)
defer restore()
remoteBucket, _, cleanup := setupCopyObjectFederation(t, obj, router, instanceType, bucket)
defer cleanup()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, remoteBucket)
events := make(chan event.Event, 8)
done := make(chan struct{})
defer close(done)
if err := globalHTTPListen.Subscribe(pubsub.MaskFromMaskable(event.ObjectCreatedCopy), events, done, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, kind := range []string{"plain", "compressed", "encrypted"} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+kind, func(t *testing.T) {
data := []byte("logical object size")
source := kind + "-source.bin"
var headers map[string]string
if kind == "compressed" {
data = bytes.Repeat(data, 8192)
source = kind + "-source.txt"
}
if kind == "encrypted" {
headers = federationSSEHeaders("s3", 0, false)
}
putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, source, data, headers)
destination := "result/" + kind + " with space.bin"
rec := federatedCopyRequest(t, router, cred, bucket, source, remoteBucket, destination, nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("copy: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
versionID := strings.Join(rec.Header()[xhttp.AmzVersionID], "")
if versionID == "" {
t.Error("copy response omitted destination version ID")
} else {
info, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), remoteBucket, destination, ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID})
if err != nil || info.VersionID != versionID {
t.Fatalf("response does not name the written version: %v, %q", err, info.VersionID)
}
}
select {
case evt := <-events:
key, err := url.QueryUnescape(evt.S3.Object.Key)
if err != nil || key != destination || evt.S3.Bucket.Name != remoteBucket || evt.S3.Object.Size != int64(len(data)) || evt.S3.Object.VersionID == "" || evt.S3.Object.VersionID != versionID {
t.Errorf("copy event does not describe the written object: %+v", evt.S3)
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("copy event was not emitted")
}
})
}
},
})
}
func TestAPIFederatedCopyObjectDestinationSSEDefaults(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
endpoints: []string{"CopyObject", "PutObject", "GetObject", "HeadObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
data := []byte("destination chooses default encryption")
putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, "source", data, nil)
testKMS, err := kms.NewBuiltin(federationTestKMSKeyID, bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x58}, 32))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
previousKMS, previousAuto := GlobalKMS, globalAutoEncryption
GlobalKMS, globalAutoEncryption = testKMS, true
defer func() { GlobalKMS, globalAutoEncryption = previousKMS, previousAuto }()
remoteBucket, capture, cleanup := setupCopyObjectFederationRemote(t, obj, router, instanceType, bucket, true)
defer cleanup()
destinationConfig, err := sse.ParseBucketSSEConfig(strings.NewReader(`<ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration><Rule><ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault><SSEAlgorithm>aws:kms</SSEAlgorithm><KMSMasterKeyID>destination-bucket-key</KMSMasterKeyID></ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault></Rule></ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration>`))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, kind := range []string{"plain", "s3", "kms", "kms-default", "c"} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+kind, func(t *testing.T) {
var headers map[string]string
if kind == "kms-default" {
headers = map[string]string{xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption: xhttp.AmzEncryptionKMS}
} else {
headers = federationSSEHeaders(kind, 0x22, false)
}
rec := federatedCopyRequest(t, router, cred, bucket, "source", remoteBucket, kind, headers)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("copy: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
capture.mu.Lock()
forwarded := capture.headers[len(capture.headers)-1].Clone()
capture.mu.Unlock()
if kind == "plain" {
if forwarded.Get(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption) != "" {
t.Errorf("proxy injected SSE %q into a request with no client SSE", forwarded.Get(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption))
}
// With nothing injected, the KMS encryption the destination
// stores can only be the remote applying its own defaults.
info, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), remoteBucket, kind, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil || federationStoredSSE(info.UserDefined) != "kms" {
t.Errorf("remote destination did not apply its own auto-encryption: %v, %v", err, info.UserDefined)
}
}
// Replay the actual inbound headers against an independent bucket
// configuration. No handler flips shared globals while serving.
destinationConfig.Apply(forwarded, sse.ApplyOptions{})
wantKey := headers[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID]
if kind == "plain" {
wantKey = "destination-bucket-key"
}
if got := forwarded.Get(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID); got != wantKey {
t.Errorf("destination selected key %q, want %q", got, wantKey)
}
})
}
// A local destination still inherits the server's auto-encryption.
rec := federatedCopyRequest(t, router, cred, bucket, "source", bucket, "local-copy", nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("local copy: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
info, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, "local-copy", ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil || federationStoredSSE(info.UserDefined) != "kms" {
t.Errorf("local copy lost auto-encryption: %v, %v", err, info.UserDefined)
}
},
})
}
+47 -21
View File
@@ -1404,11 +1404,27 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
}
allowReplicationMetadata := replicaTrusted
// Check if bucket encryption is enabled
sseConfig, _ := globalBucketSSEConfigSys.Get(dstBucket)
sseConfig.Apply(r.Header, sse.ApplyOptions{
AutoEncrypt: globalAutoEncryption,
})
// Federation only: the destination bucket lives on another deployment and
// the copy is forwarded to it as a PutObject. That remote write owns the
// destination's storage transformations, so this handler hands it the
// logical (decompressed, decrypted) bytes at their logical size and lets
// the remote compress and encrypt once. Encrypting here as well would
// forward ciphertext under the destination's own SSE option, which either
// fails the length check or, for SSE to SSE, has the remote encrypt the
// ciphertext a second time and store an unreadable object (#158).
remoteCallRequired := isRemoteCopyRequired(ctx, srcBucket, dstBucket, objectAPI)
// Apply the destination bucket's default encryption only when this
// deployment writes the destination. For a remote destination the proxy
// has no authority over that bucket's defaults: applying its own here
// would forward an explicit SSE header that the remote then honors in
// place of the destination's configuration (#167).
if !remoteCallRequired {
sseConfig, _ := globalBucketSSEConfigSys.Get(dstBucket)
sseConfig.Apply(r.Header, sse.ApplyOptions{
AutoEncrypt: globalAutoEncryption,
})
}
var srcOpts, dstOpts ObjectOptions
srcOpts, err = copySrcOpts(ctx, r, srcBucket, srcObject)
if err != nil {
@@ -1518,16 +1534,6 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
}
}
// Federation only: the destination bucket lives on another deployment and
// the copy is forwarded to it as a PutObject. That remote write owns the
// destination's storage transformations, so this handler hands it the
// logical (decompressed, decrypted) bytes at their logical size and lets
// the remote compress and encrypt once. Encrypting here as well would
// forward ciphertext under the destination's own SSE option, which either
// fails the length check or, for SSE to SSE, has the remote encrypt the
// ciphertext a second time and store an unreadable object (#158).
remoteCallRequired := isRemoteCopyRequired(ctx, srcBucket, dstBucket, objectAPI)
var compressMetadata map[string]string
// No need to compress for remote etcd calls
// Pass the decompressed stream to such calls.
@@ -1945,10 +1951,23 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
delete(srcInfo.UserDefined, k)
}
}
// Forward a clone: request-only keys are removed or added below and
// srcInfo.UserDefined stays the resolved record for the response.
forwardedMeta := cloneMSS(srcInfo.UserDefined)
// minio-go prefixes any UserMetadata key it does not recognize with
// x-amz-meta-, and it recognizes the retention headers but not
// x-amz-object-lock-legal-hold, so a hold left in the map reaches the
// remote as user metadata and is silently dropped (#166). Carry it on
// the typed option instead. Retention stays in the map: the typed
// RetainUntilDate would truncate the date to whole seconds.
legalHoldKey := strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)
forwardedLegalHold := forwardedMeta[legalHoldKey]
delete(forwardedMeta, legalHoldKey)
opts := miniogo.PutObjectOptions{
UserMetadata: srcInfo.UserDefined,
UserMetadata: forwardedMeta,
ServerSideEncryption: dstOpts.ServerSideEncryption,
UserTags: tag.ToMap(),
LegalHold: miniogo.LegalHoldStatus(forwardedLegalHold),
}
// The destination must carry the same checksum the local path would
// produce; the federated path has the remote compute, validate, persist
@@ -1996,11 +2015,18 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) CopyObjectHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, rerr), r.URL)
return
}
objInfo.UserDefined = cloneMSS(opts.UserMetadata)
// A forwarded checksum header is a request detail, not object metadata.
if checksumHeaderValue != "" {
delete(objInfo.UserDefined, wantChecksumType.Key())
}
// Keep the resolved legal hold in response and event metadata; the
// request-only checksum header exists only in the forwarding map.
objInfo.UserDefined = cloneMSS(srcInfo.UserDefined)
// The response headers and the ObjectCreated:Copy event describe the
// object this handler wrote, so name it: without these the response
// carries no x-amz-version-id and the event has an empty key and zero
// size (#170). Size is the logical size the remote was handed, which is
// what it reports back.
objInfo.Bucket = dstBucket
objInfo.Name = dstObject
objInfo.Size = actualSize
objInfo.VersionID = remoteObjInfo.VersionID
objInfo.ETag = remoteObjInfo.ETag
objInfo.ModTime = remoteObjInfo.LastModified
// Bind the checksum the remote computed for this exact write. A single
+140
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
)
func setTestBucketDefaultRetention(t *testing.T, bucket, mode string) {
t.Helper()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
if mode == "" {
return
}
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
meta.ObjectLockConfigXML = fmt.Appendf(nil, `<ObjectLockConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><ObjectLockEnabled>Enabled</ObjectLockEnabled><Rule><DefaultRetention><Mode>%s</Mode><Days>2</Days></DefaultRetention></Rule></ObjectLockConfiguration>`, mode)
if err := meta.parseAllConfigs(t.Context(), newObjectLayerFn()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, meta)
}
func TestAPIObjectLockDefaultRetentionWithLegalHold(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
endpoints: []string{"NewMultipart", "PutObjectPart", "CompleteMultipart", "CopyObject", "PutObject", "DeleteObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
data := []byte("default retention and legal hold are independent")
putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, "source", data, nil)
for _, mode := range []string{"GOVERNANCE", "COMPLIANCE", ""} {
setTestBucketDefaultRetention(t, bucket, mode)
for _, hold := range []string{"ON", "OFF"} {
for _, operation := range []string{"put", "copy", "multipart"} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+mode+"/"+hold+"/"+operation, func(t *testing.T) {
object := mode + "-" + hold + "-" + operation
headers := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold: hold}
// The stored retention date carries millisecond precision.
before := UTCNow().Truncate(time.Millisecond)
switch operation {
case "put":
putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, object, data, headers)
case "copy":
rec := federatedCopyRequest(t, router, cred, bucket, "source", bucket, object, headers)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("copy: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
case "multipart":
putFederationMultipartSource(t, router, cred, bucket, object, [][]byte{data}, headers)
}
info, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ret := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(info.UserDefined)
if string(ret.Mode) != mode {
t.Errorf("stored retention mode = %q, want %q", ret.Mode, mode)
}
if mode != "" && (ret.RetainUntilDate.Before(before.Add(48*time.Hour)) || ret.RetainUntilDate.After(UTCNow().Add(48*time.Hour))) {
t.Errorf("default retention date = %s, want write time + 2 days", ret.RetainUntilDate)
}
if got := objectlock.GetObjectLegalHoldMeta(info.UserDefined).Status; string(got) != hold {
t.Errorf("stored legal hold = %q, want %q", got, hold)
}
if mode == "COMPLIANCE" && hold == "OFF" {
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodDelete, getPutObjectURL("", bucket, object)+"?versionId="+info.VersionID, 0, nil, cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest || !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "InvalidRequest") {
t.Errorf("version DELETE must enforce retention: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
}
})
}
}
}
},
})
}
func TestObjectLockDefaultRetentionBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, _ http.Handler, _ auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
setTestBucketDefaultRetention(t, bucket, "COMPLIANCE")
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
replica, marker, explicit bool
retentionErr, holdErr APIErrorCode
wantMode objectlock.RetMode
wantErr APIErrorCode
}{
{name: "trusted replica", replica: true},
{name: "marker-only ordinary write", marker: true, wantMode: objectlock.RetCompliance},
{name: "explicit retention", explicit: true, wantMode: objectlock.RetGovernance},
{name: "retention permission denied", retentionErr: ErrAccessDenied, wantErr: ErrAccessDenied},
{name: "legal hold permission denied", holdErr: ErrAccessDenied, wantErr: ErrAccessDenied},
} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://minio.local/"+bucket+"/object", nil)
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold, "OFF")
if tc.marker {
r.Header.Set(xhttp.MinIOSourceReplicationRequest, "true")
}
until := UTCNow().Add(24 * time.Hour).Truncate(time.Second).Add(789 * time.Millisecond)
if tc.explicit {
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode, "GOVERNANCE")
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate, until.Format(time.RFC3339Nano))
}
mode, date, _, code := checkPutObjectLockAllowed(t.Context(), r, bucket, "object", obj.GetObjectInfo, tc.retentionErr, tc.holdErr, tc.replica)
if code != tc.wantErr || mode != tc.wantMode {
t.Fatalf("got mode %s error %s, want mode %s error %s", mode, niceError(code), tc.wantMode, niceError(tc.wantErr))
}
if tc.explicit && !date.Equal(until) {
t.Errorf("explicit retention lost precision: %s != %s", date, until)
}
if tc.replica && !date.IsZero() {
t.Errorf("replica acquired a destination default: %s", date)
}
})
}
},
})
}
+114
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
)
func TestPresignedHeaderPayloadHashIsEnforced(t *testing.T) {
setupSignatureBoundaryTest(t)
digest := getSHA256Hash([]byte("expected"))
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, query, header string
unsigned bool
}{
{name: "header only", header: digest},
{name: "query only", query: digest},
{name: "query wins", query: digest, header: getSHA256Hash([]byte("different"))},
{name: "unsigned query wins", query: unsignedPayload, header: digest, unsigned: true},
{name: "unsigned header", header: unsignedPayload, unsigned: true},
{name: "absent", unsigned: true},
} {
for _, body := range []string{"expected", "modified"} {
t.Run(tc.name+"/"+body, func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://minio.local/bucket/object", strings.NewReader(body))
if tc.header != "" {
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzContentSha256, tc.header)
}
if tc.query != "" {
query := r.URL.Query()
query.Set(xhttp.AmzContentSha256, tc.query)
r.URL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
}
presignBoundaryRequest(t, r, UTCNow(), []string{"host"}, globalActiveCred)
if code := isReqAuthenticated(t.Context(), r, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3); code != ErrNone {
t.Fatal(niceError(code))
}
_, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
wantMismatch := body == "modified" && !tc.unsigned
if wantMismatch {
if toAPIErrorCode(t.Context(), err) != ErrContentSHA256Mismatch {
t.Errorf("modified signed payload: got %v, want SHA-256 mismatch", err)
}
} else if err != nil {
t.Errorf("valid payload: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestAPIPresignedBucketPolicyPayloadHash(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
objAPITest: func(objectAPI ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, apiRouter http.Handler, credentials auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(apiRouter)
defer server.Close()
client := server.Client()
client.Timeout = 10 * time.Second
expected := fmt.Sprintf(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Principal":{"AWS":["*"]},"Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]}]}`, bucket)
modified := strings.Replace(expected, "s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject", 1)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, body string
status int
}{
{"original", expected, http.StatusNoContent},
{"modified", modified, http.StatusBadRequest},
} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(t.Context(), http.MethodPut, server.URL+"/"+bucket+"?policy=", strings.NewReader(tc.body))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzContentSha256, getSHA256Hash([]byte(expected)))
presignBoundaryRequest(t, r, UTCNow(), []string{"host"}, credentials)
response, err := client.Do(r)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer response.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(response.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if response.StatusCode != tc.status {
t.Fatalf("PutBucketPolicy: got %d %s, want %d", response.StatusCode, body, tc.status)
}
if tc.status == http.StatusBadRequest && !strings.Contains(string(body), "XAmzContentSHA256Mismatch") {
t.Fatalf("expected payload checksum rejection, got %s", body)
}
})
}
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Contains(string(meta.PolicyConfigJSON), "s3:PutObject") {
t.Fatal("tampered presigned request replaced the bucket policy")
}
},
endpoints: []string{"PutBucketPolicy"},
})
}
+324
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/xml"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// forgedSignatureAgeHeader is the name of the scratch header the presigned
// verifier once wrote s3:signatureAge through. Production code no longer knows
// it; a client that sends it is sending an ordinary unsigned x-amz-* header.
const forgedSignatureAgeHeader = "X-Amz-Signature-Age"
// Presign at a chosen time, including exactly the supplied operation headers.
func presignBoundaryRequest(t *testing.T, r *http.Request, date time.Time, signedHeaders []string, cred auth.Credentials) {
t.Helper()
query := r.URL.Query()
query.Del(xhttp.AmzSignature)
query.Set(xhttp.AmzAlgorithm, signV4Algorithm)
query.Set(xhttp.AmzDate, date.Format(iso8601Format))
query.Set(xhttp.AmzExpires, "3600")
query.Set(xhttp.AmzSignedHeaders, strings.Join(signedHeaders, ";"))
query.Set(xhttp.AmzCredential, cred.AccessKey+"/"+getScope(date, globalSite.Region()))
r.Form = query
headers, code := extractSignedHeaders(signedHeaders, r)
if code != ErrNone {
t.Fatal(niceError(code))
}
canonical := getCanonicalRequest(headers, getContentSha256Cksum(r, serviceS3), query.Encode(), r.URL.Path, r.Method)
key := getSigningKey(cred.SecretKey, date, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3)
query.Set(xhttp.AmzSignature, getSignature(key, getStringToSign(canonical, date, getScope(date, globalSite.Region()))))
r.URL.RawQuery = query.Encode()
r.Form = query
}
func setupSignatureBoundaryTest(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
obj, fsDir, err := prepareFS(t.Context())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { os.RemoveAll(fsDir) })
if err = newTestConfig(globalMinioDefaultRegion, obj); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// Canonicalization comma-joins repeated header fields, so a signature over one
// x-amz-copy-source value containing a comma also covers the same text split
// into two fields, while the copy handlers act on Header.Get alone. A single
// value may contain a literal or percent-encoded comma; a repeated header is
// rejected at the shared SigV4 boundary for both signed and presigned requests.
func TestV4CopySourceMultiplicity(t *testing.T) {
setupSignatureBoundaryTest(t)
for _, presigned := range []bool{false, true} {
for _, source := range []string{"/source/allowed,tail", "/source/allowed%2Ctail"} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("presigned=%v/%s", presigned, source), func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://minio.local/destination/object", nil)
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzContentSha256, emptySHA256)
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzCopySource, source)
if presigned {
presignBoundaryRequest(t, r, UTCNow(), []string{"host", "x-amz-copy-source"}, globalActiveCred)
} else {
if err := signRequestV4(r, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, globalActiveCred.SecretKey); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
r.Form = r.URL.Query()
}
if code := reqSignatureV4Verify(r, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3); code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("a single source key containing a comma must remain valid: %s", niceError(code))
}
if source != "/source/allowed,tail" {
return
}
r.Header[xhttp.AmzCopySource] = []string{"/source/allowed", "tail"}
if code := reqSignatureV4Verify(r, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3); code != ErrInvalidCopySource {
t.Fatalf("split copy source: got %s, want %s; handler would copy %q",
niceError(code), niceError(ErrInvalidCopySource), r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzCopySource))
}
})
}
}
}
// PutObject and UploadPart authorize before they verify the signature, so
// s3:signatureAge must come from the signed X-Amz-Date on the first policy
// evaluation. A client header under the former scratch name must neither
// supply the value nor survive verification, and verifying the same request
// twice must give the same answer.
func TestGetConditionValuesPresignedAgeFromDate(t *testing.T) {
setupSignatureBoundaryTest(t)
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, header string
age time.Duration
wantVerify APIErrorCode
}{
{name: "old", age: 10 * time.Minute},
{name: "old forged 0", age: 10 * time.Minute, header: "0", wantVerify: ErrUnsignedHeaders},
{name: "old forged 1", age: 10 * time.Minute, header: "1", wantVerify: ErrUnsignedHeaders},
// A signer slightly ahead of the server stays within globalMaxSkewTime.
{name: "future within skew", age: -2 * time.Minute},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://minio.local/bucket/object", nil)
presignBoundaryRequest(t, r, UTCNow().Add(-tc.age), []string{"host"}, globalActiveCred)
if tc.header != "" {
r.Header.Set(forgedSignatureAgeHeader, tc.header)
}
values := getConditionValues(r, "", globalActiveCred)
age, err := strconv.ParseInt(strings.Join(values["signatureAge"], ""), 10, 64)
lo, hi := (tc.age - time.Minute).Milliseconds(), (tc.age + time.Minute).Milliseconds()
if err != nil || age < lo || age > hi {
t.Errorf("pre-verification policy got age %v; want the age of the signed date (about %d ms)", values["signatureAge"], tc.age.Milliseconds())
}
code := reqSignatureV4Verify(r, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3)
if code != tc.wantVerify {
t.Fatalf("verification: got %s, want %s", niceError(code), niceError(tc.wantVerify))
}
if again := reqSignatureV4Verify(r, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3); again != code {
t.Fatalf("second verification changed the outcome: %s -> %s", niceError(code), niceError(again))
}
})
}
}
// The s3:x-amz-content-sha256 policy value must be the single payload hash the
// request is verified and enforced against. Header presence decides whether the
// key exists at all; the value is the one getContentSha256Cksum selects, so a
// presigned query value wins over the header and a repeated header contributes
// only its first value. None of these requests is rejected at the protocol
// level; the policy simply sees what verification bound.
func TestGetConditionValuesPayloadHashMatchesVerifiedValue(t *testing.T) {
setupSignatureBoundaryTest(t)
hashA, hashB := getSHA256Hash([]byte("a")), getSHA256Hash([]byte("b"))
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
presigned bool
query string
header []string
want []string
}{
{name: "signed header", header: []string{hashA}, want: []string{hashA}},
{name: "signed absent"},
{name: "signed present empty", header: []string{""}, want: []string{""}},
{name: "signed duplicate header", header: []string{hashA, hashB}, want: []string{hashA}},
{name: "signed streaming with second value", header: []string{streamingContentSHA256, hashA}, want: []string{streamingContentSHA256}},
{name: "presigned query only", presigned: true, query: hashA},
{name: "presigned header only", presigned: true, header: []string{hashA}, want: []string{hashA}},
{name: "presigned matching query and header", presigned: true, query: hashA, header: []string{hashA}, want: []string{hashA}},
{name: "presigned unsigned query with forged header", presigned: true, query: unsignedPayload, header: []string{hashA}, want: []string{unsignedPayload}},
{name: "presigned duplicate header", presigned: true, header: []string{hashA, hashB}, want: []string{hashA}},
{name: "presigned query with empty header", presigned: true, query: hashA, header: []string{""}, want: []string{hashA}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
target := "http://minio.local/bucket/object"
if tc.query != "" {
target += "?" + xhttp.AmzContentSha256 + "=" + tc.query
}
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, target, nil)
if tc.header != nil {
r.Header[xhttp.AmzContentSha256] = tc.header
}
if tc.presigned {
presignBoundaryRequest(t, r, UTCNow(), []string{"host"}, globalActiveCred)
} else {
r.Header.Set(xhttp.Authorization, signV4Algorithm+" Credential=x/20260910/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request, SignedHeaders=host, Signature=x")
r.Form = r.URL.Query()
}
got, ok := getConditionValues(r, "", globalActiveCred)[xhttp.AmzContentSha256]
if ok != (tc.want != nil) || !slices.Equal(got, tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("policy value = %v (present=%v), want %v (present=%v)", got, ok, tc.want, tc.want != nil)
}
if tc.presigned {
if code := reqSignatureV4Verify(r, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3); code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("the presigned request must still verify: %s", niceError(code))
}
}
})
}
}
func newSignatureBoundaryUser(t *testing.T, bucket, statements string) auth.Credentials {
t.Helper()
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentials()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := globalIAMSys.CreateUser(t.Context(), cred.AccessKey, madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq{SecretKey: cred.SecretKey, Status: madmin.AccountEnabled}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(fmt.Sprintf(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":"s3:PutObject","Resource":"arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"},%s]}`, bucket, statements)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
name := "signature-boundary-" + mustGetUUID()
if _, err := globalIAMSys.SetPolicy(t.Context(), name, *p); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBSet(t.Context(), cred.AccessKey, name, regUser, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return cred
}
func TestAPIPresignedSignatureAgeBeforeAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
endpoints: []string{"NewMultipart", "PutObjectPart", "PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, router http.Handler, root auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
user := newSignatureBoundaryUser(t, bucket, fmt.Sprintf(`{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"s3:PutObject","Resource":"arn:aws:s3:::%s/*","Condition":{"NumericGreaterThan":{"s3:signatureAge":"60000"}}}`, bucket))
initReq, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPost, getNewMultipartURL("", bucket, "multipart"), 0, nil, root.AccessKey, root.SecretKey, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
initRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(initRec, initReq)
var upload InitiateMultipartUploadResponse
if initRec.Code != http.StatusOK || xml.Unmarshal(initRec.Body.Bytes(), &upload) != nil {
t.Fatalf("multipart initiation: %d %s", initRec.Code, initRec.Body.String())
}
for _, operation := range []string{"put", "part"} {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name, header string
age time.Duration
want int
}{
{name: "fresh", want: http.StatusOK},
{name: "old without header", age: 10 * time.Minute, want: http.StatusForbidden},
{name: "old forged header", age: 10 * time.Minute, header: "0", want: http.StatusForbidden},
// Policy allows a fresh signature; the unsigned header then fails
// verification with the existing ErrUnsignedHeaders (HTTP 400).
{name: "fresh with unsigned header", header: "0", want: http.StatusBadRequest},
} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+operation+"/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
target := getPutObjectURL("", bucket, "put-"+strings.ReplaceAll(tc.name, " ", "-"))
if operation == "part" {
target = getPutObjectPartURL("", bucket, "multipart", upload.UploadID, "1")
}
r, err := newTestRequest(http.MethodPut, target, 4, bytes.NewReader([]byte("body")))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
r.Header.Del(xhttp.AmzContentSha256)
presignBoundaryRequest(t, r, UTCNow().Add(-tc.age), []string{"host"}, user)
if tc.header != "" {
r.Header.Set(forgedSignatureAgeHeader, tc.header)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, r)
if rec.Code != tc.want {
t.Errorf("got %d %s, want %d", rec.Code, rec.Body.String(), tc.want)
}
})
}
}
},
})
}
func TestAPIPayloadHashPolicyMatchesVerifiedValue(t *testing.T) {
defer DetectTestLeak(t)()
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t,
endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(_ ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, router http.Handler, _ auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
allowedHash := getSHA256Hash([]byte("expected"))
user := newSignatureBoundaryUser(t, bucket, fmt.Sprintf(`{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"s3:PutObject","Resource":"arn:aws:s3:::%s/*","Condition":{"StringNotEquals":{"s3:x-amz-content-sha256":"%s"}}}`, bucket, allowedHash))
for _, kind := range []string{"signed control", "presigned control", "unsigned query forged header", "signed duplicate header", "presigned duplicate header"} {
t.Run(instanceType+"/"+kind, func(t *testing.T) {
control := strings.HasSuffix(kind, "control")
body := "modified"
if control {
body = "expected"
}
r, err := newTestRequest(http.MethodPut, getPutObjectURL("", bucket, strings.ReplaceAll(kind, " ", "-")), int64(len(body)), strings.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Contains(kind, "duplicate") {
r.Header.Add(xhttp.AmzContentSha256, allowedHash)
}
if kind == "unsigned query forged header" {
q := r.URL.Query()
q.Set(xhttp.AmzContentSha256, unsignedPayload)
r.URL.RawQuery = q.Encode()
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzContentSha256, allowedHash)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(kind, "signed") {
if err := signRequestV4(r, user.AccessKey, user.SecretKey); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
} else {
presignBoundaryRequest(t, r, UTCNow(), []string{"host"}, user)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, r)
if control && rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("control rejected: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !control && rec.Code < http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("payload-hash policy bypass returned %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
})
}
},
})
}
+12 -12
View File
@@ -211,7 +211,16 @@ func extractSignedHeaders(signedHeaders []string, r *http.Request) (http.Header,
// `host` will not be found in the headers, can be found in r.Host.
// but its always necessary that the list of signed headers containing host in it.
val, ok := reqHeaders[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(header)]
if !ok {
if ok {
// Canonicalization comma-joins repeated header fields, so a signature
// over the single value "/src/a,tail" also verifies a request carrying
// ["/src/a", "tail"]. The copy handlers read only Header.Get, so that
// rewrite would copy a different source than the one signed. Reject a
// repeated x-amz-copy-source; a single value may still contain commas.
if len(val) > 1 && strings.EqualFold(header, strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzCopySource)) {
return nil, ErrInvalidCopySource
}
} else {
// try to set headers from Query String
val, ok = reqQueries[header]
}
@@ -274,9 +283,8 @@ func signV4TrimAll(input string) string {
// object the signing key can reach.
//
// Only headers actually sent by the client are inspected. Server-synthesized
// x-amz-* headers (e.g. x-amz-tagging derived from a request body, or the
// post-verification x-amz-signature-age scratch header) are set after signature
// verification and therefore never reach this walk.
// x-amz-* headers (e.g. x-amz-tagging derived from a request body) are set
// after signature verification and therefore never reach this walk.
func checkUnsignedHeaders(signedHeadersMap http.Header, r *http.Request) APIErrorCode {
// check headers that arrived on the request
for k := range r.Header {
@@ -294,14 +302,6 @@ func checkUnsignedHeaders(signedHeadersMap http.Header, r *http.Request) APIErro
if strings.EqualFold(k, xhttp.AmzContentSha256) {
continue
}
// X-Amz-Signature-Age is an internal scratch header written by the
// presigned verifier itself, after this check, purely so bucket-policy
// evaluation can expose s3:signatureAge. It is never sent or signed by a
// client, and exempting it keeps signature verification idempotent when
// the same request is verified more than once.
if strings.EqualFold(k, xhttp.AmzSignatureAge) {
continue
}
// The header must be a member of the signed-headers list. Testing
// membership (not value equality) is essential: an unsigned header whose
// first value is empty would otherwise compare equal to the empty string
+7 -6
View File
@@ -469,15 +469,16 @@ func TestCheckUnsignedHeaders(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("unsigned x-amz-content-sha256 must be exempt: expected %d, got %d", ErrNone, errCode)
}
// X-Amz-Signature-Age is the presigned verifier's own scratch header,
// written after this check. Exempting it keeps verification idempotent when
// the same request object is verified more than once.
// X-Amz-Signature-Age was once a scratch header the presigned verifier wrote
// back and this check exempted. s3:signatureAge is now derived from the
// signed date, so a client that sends the header is sending an ordinary
// unsigned x-amz-* header and must be rejected like any other.
r, err = http.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://play.min.io:9000", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal("Unable to create http.Request :", err)
}
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzSignatureAge, "1234")
if errCode = checkUnsignedHeaders(signedHeadersMap, r); errCode != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("internal x-amz-signature-age must be exempt: expected %d, got %d", ErrNone, errCode)
r.Header.Set("X-Amz-Signature-Age", "1234")
if errCode = checkUnsignedHeaders(signedHeadersMap, r); errCode != ErrUnsignedHeaders {
t.Fatalf("unsigned x-amz-signature-age must be rejected: expected %d, got %d", ErrUnsignedHeaders, errCode)
}
}
-2
View File
@@ -336,8 +336,6 @@ func doesPresignedSignatureMatch(hashedPayload string, r *http.Request, region s
return ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch
}
r.Header.Set(xhttp.AmzSignatureAge, strconv.FormatInt(UTCNow().Sub(pSignValues.Date).Milliseconds(), 10))
return ErrNone
}
+9 -9
View File
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ import (
"os"
"testing"
"time"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
)
func niceError(code APIErrorCode) string {
@@ -317,11 +315,11 @@ func TestDoesPresignedSignatureMatch(t *testing.T) {
}
// TestPresignedVerifyIdempotent guards against a regression where verifying the
// same presigned request twice began to fail. doesPresignedSignatureMatch
// writes an internal x-amz-signature-age header after validating the signature;
// the unsigned-header check must exempt that scratch header (and an unsigned
// x-amz-content-sha256 the client may carry) so a second verification of the
// same *http.Request still succeeds.
// same presigned request twice began to fail. The verifier must not write
// anything back to the request (it once recorded an internal
// x-amz-signature-age header that the unsigned-header check then had to
// exempt), and an unsigned x-amz-content-sha256 the client may carry stays
// exempt, so a second verification of the same *http.Request still succeeds.
func TestPresignedVerifyIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -350,7 +348,9 @@ func TestPresignedVerifyIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("first verification: expected ErrNone, got %s", niceError(got))
}
if got := reqSignatureV4Verify(req, globalSite.Region(), serviceS3); got != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("second verification of the same request: expected ErrNone, got %s (x-amz-signature-age=%q)",
niceError(got), req.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzSignatureAge))
t.Fatalf("second verification of the same request: expected ErrNone, got %s", niceError(got))
}
if _, ok := req.Header["X-Amz-Signature-Age"]; ok {
t.Fatal("the verifier wrote a scratch header back to the request")
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ go 1.27.1
// Console and MC retain their historical module paths for best-effort upstream
// compatibility. Pin the maintained PGSTY implementations used by SILO.
replace github.com/minio/console => github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260910093545-6a0b31b5ade2
replace github.com/minio/console => github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260911085047-638eefd7aece
replace github.com/minio/mc => github.com/pgsty/mc v0.0.0-20260910093317-e6a60edf0952
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ require (
github.com/prometheus/common v0.71.0
github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.22.0
github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3 v3.5.1
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go v1.10.0
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go v1.14.0
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20250401214520-65e299d6c5c9
github.com/rs/cors v1.11.1
github.com/secure-io/sio-go v0.3.1
+4 -4
View File
@@ -547,8 +547,8 @@ github.com/pborman/getopt v0.0.0-20170112200414-7148bc3a4c30/go.mod h1:85jBQOZwp
github.com/pelletier/go-toml v1.2.0/go.mod h1:5z9KED0ma1S8pY6P1sdut58dfprrGBbd/94hg7ilaic=
github.com/pgsty/mc v0.0.0-20260910093317-e6a60edf0952 h1:b6jpBuZWUiZhBox64eF1cmNL4HWGwdSk/LVXNc3DBQ0=
github.com/pgsty/mc v0.0.0-20260910093317-e6a60edf0952/go.mod h1:VsGNEmditljwBgmYKy7X+//dXLN8gEfSPR2m4lcMPmo=
github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260910093545-6a0b31b5ade2 h1:v/AXKa/UZkDheLLGrpKmyu8bVHo11dVrDHdbDvjX1/M=
github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260910093545-6a0b31b5ade2/go.mod h1:bCyOnZactQajLOqlgCn0lHwQWMNylvP6MUOqqLako00=
github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260911085047-638eefd7aece h1:1QGCeVCRV4TzDLww9IFfRT70YOI8r/X88pRo+KILvZ4=
github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260911085047-638eefd7aece/go.mod h1:bCyOnZactQajLOqlgCn0lHwQWMNylvP6MUOqqLako00=
github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3 v3.13.4-0.20260910091716-2d8fd3cbbf07 h1:IKm2AyPsvuL4NyniK3ixqqQz1CIargmhyCkL2eZvlhA=
github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3 v3.13.4-0.20260910091716-2d8fd3cbbf07/go.mod h1:1JdcUcM+TRXObb9QrC8FWhav0RKk6/u8RT2RgimfxRQ=
github.com/philhofer/fwd v1.2.0 h1:e6DnBTl7vGY+Gz322/ASL4Gyp1FspeMvx1RNDoToZuM=
@@ -590,8 +590,8 @@ github.com/prometheus/prometheus v0.314.0 h1:YjsimqsIi6/mOtzZcrPEYUALO6zpfaht9O5
github.com/prometheus/prometheus v0.314.0/go.mod h1:zjg3pMTAkY0/JG8jy/h8/YgSQUVB+aCXMhUqN6l64jg=
github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3 v3.5.1 h1:GJYJZwO6IdxN/IKbneznS6yPkVC+c3zyY/j19c++5Fg=
github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3 v3.5.1/go.mod h1:VjzYrABPabuM4KyBh1Ftq6u8nhwY5tBPKP9jpmh0nnA=
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go v1.10.0 h1:STpn5XsHlHGcecLmMFCtg7mqq0RnD+zFr4uzukfVhBw=
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go v1.10.0/go.mod h1:Hy4jKW5kQART1u+JkDTF9YYOQUHXqMuhrgxOEeS7G4o=
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go v1.14.0 h1:RSaT7aOKt/OrkVUyswPDW29lnRz9psuGmfZFBmLqLek=
github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go v1.14.0/go.mod h1:Hy4jKW5kQART1u+JkDTF9YYOQUHXqMuhrgxOEeS7G4o=
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20250401214520-65e299d6c5c9 h1:bsUq1dX0N8AOIL7EB/X911+m4EHsnWEHeJ0c+3TTBrg=
github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics v0.0.0-20250401214520-65e299d6c5c9/go.mod h1:bCqnVzQkZxMG4s8nGwiZ5l3QUCyqpo9Y+/ZMZ9VjZe4=
github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.1.0/go.mod h1:J6wj4VEh+S6ZtnVlnTBMWIodfgj8LQOQFoIToxlJtxc=
+77
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
package target
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go"
)
// A broker must not make the notification client allocate or read an oversized
// frame, including before connection.tune negotiates the frame size limit.
func TestAMQPRejectsOversizedHandshakeFrame(t *testing.T) {
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { listener.Close() })
uri, err := amqp091.ParseURI("amqp://" + listener.Addr().String())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
target, err := NewAMQPTarget("oversized-frame", AMQPArgs{Enable: true, URL: uri},
func(context.Context, error, string, ...any) {})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { target.Close() })
brokerDone := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
brokerDone <- func() error {
conn, err := listener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer conn.Close()
if err := conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)); err != nil {
return err
}
var protocol [8]byte
if _, err := io.ReadFull(conn, protocol[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if protocol != [8]byte{'A', 'M', 'Q', 'P', 0, 0, 9, 1} {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected AMQP protocol header: %x", protocol)
}
// A method frame declaring an 8 KiB payload exceeds the 4 KiB
// pre-negotiation limit. Send only its header: rejection must
// happen without allocating or waiting for the declared body.
if _, err := conn.Write([]byte{1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x20, 0}); err != nil {
return err
}
var response [1]byte
if n, err := conn.Read(response[:]); n != 0 || !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return fmt.Errorf("client did not close after oversized frame header: read %d bytes, error %v", n, err)
}
return nil
}()
}()
active, err := target.IsActive()
if active || err == nil {
t.Errorf("oversized handshake frame accepted: active=%v, error=%v", active, err)
}
if err := <-brokerDone; err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
-5
View File
@@ -132,11 +132,6 @@ const (
AmzMaxParts = "X-Amz-Max-Parts"
AmzPartNumberMarker = "X-Amz-Part-Number-Marker"
// AmzSignatureAge is an internal scratch header the presigned verifier
// writes after validating the signature so that bucket-policy evaluation can
// expose s3:signatureAge. It is never sent or signed by a client.
AmzSignatureAge = "X-Amz-Signature-Age"
// Constants used for GetObjectAttributes and GetObjectVersionAttributes
AmzObjectAttributes = "X-Amz-Object-Attributes"