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Merge pull request #228 from yupoet/docs/single-node-upgrade-from-archived-minio
Preserve the single-node migration report contributed by @yupoet. Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
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# Upgrading a Single-Node Deployment from the Archived MinIO Community Edition
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The MinIO community edition repository was archived on 2026-04-25 and its binary
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distribution channels (`dl.min.io`, the Docker Hub tags, quay.io) were withdrawn
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afterwards. Operators still running the final community release need a documented,
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validated path forward. This guide records a real-world, single-node upgrade from
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`RELEASE.2025-10-15T17-29-55Z` (the last community release) to Silo
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`RELEASE.2026-09-16T00-00-00Z`, performed in production on 2026-09-26.
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The [compatibility audit](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/server/) covers
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the server behavior changes but does not specifically address the
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single-node/single-drive (FS mode) case. This document fills that gap with
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field data.
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## Validated environment
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- Single node, single drive: `server /data` in FS mode, running under Docker Compose
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- Root credentials only — no IAM sub-users, no OIDC, no notification targets, no reverse proxy
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- ~5,900 objects / ~34,000 stored chunks accumulated over 15 months on the source version
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- Source: `RELEASE.2025-10-15T17-29-55Z` → target: `RELEASE.2026-09-16T00-00-00Z`
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## Why this is a low-risk swap for standalone deployments
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- **Zero data migration.** `.minio.sys`, erasure metadata, bucket/object layout and
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encryption formats keep their names and schemas; the existing data volume is opened
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in place, with no copy and no metadata rewrite.
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- **Single nodes are unaffected by the removed private `ReadMultiple` storage REST
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call** — that only constrains mixed-version multi-node clusters.
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- **The IAM/password-policy tightening does not apply** to plain root-credential
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standalone setups (no sub-users, no OIDC, no bucket policies in use).
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## Procedure
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1. **Back up the data volume first** (tar the volume or snapshot the disk). Even with
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a compatible format, an upgrade window is the worst time to discover your only
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copy is damaged.
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2. **Pin the exact target image tag** in your deployment tooling. Floating tags make
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both upgrades and rollbacks ambiguous.
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3. **Stop dependent services before swapping the storage container**, so no writes
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race the restart.
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4. **Recreate the storage container with the Silo image, keeping the data volume
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unchanged.** Compatibility notes:
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- `minio server …` invocations translate transparently; the official container
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entrypoint handles the rename.
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- Healthchecks that run `curl -f /minio/health/live` inside the container work
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out of the box with the official images (curl is bundled). If you build custom
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images, remember to include curl — the upstream release images shipped a static
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curl, minimal bases may not have one.
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5. **Verify in layers**:
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- Startup log: expect zero errors. Watch specifically for hardening rejections —
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Silo refuses malformed historical objects (poisoned metadata, invalid erasure
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geometry) that older code tolerated; such objects need manual remediation
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before they will serve again.
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- `GET /minio/health/live` and `/minio/health/ready` → 200.
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- Application-level S3 smoke: upload → read back → delete, through the real client.
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## Observed results (2026-09-26 field run)
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- In-place upgrade with zero migration steps; the 15-month-old data volume opened
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with no errors and **no objects were rejected by the new hardening**.
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- A full application regression against the storage (multipart upload, object read
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by a parser service, listing, deletion) passed end to end.
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- **Rollback path is image-swap only** (same on-disk schema), but note we did not
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exercise a reverse downgrade in production. Our evidence is a staged forward
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migration — the same data volume was opened read-write by three engine builds
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in sequence (`2025-09` → `2025-10` → `2026-09`) with no format intervention —
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plus the documented schema retention. Keep the previous image available locally:
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registry tags you depend on may disappear, as the community tags already have.
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## Post-upgrade behavior changes to check
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These did not affect the validated standalone setup, but review them against your
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own clients before upgrading:
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- **TLS defaults changed** across 20260903/20260916 — verify clients if you serve TLS
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directly from the storage node or front it with older proxies/identity providers.
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- **`If-Match` on `DeleteObject`** was ignored in 20260903 and is enforced in 20260916.
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- **Multipart listing is capped at 1,000 entries** per request in newer releases.
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- `MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES` still defaults to trusting every proxy header; set it
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explicitly if the node sits behind a proxy.
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