Condensing the READMEs dropped the systemd drop-in that keeps data ownership
stable when silo.service takes over an existing minio.service, which the
rebrand guard pins in both files precisely so it cannot vanish quietly. The
path is back as a clause in the install note rather than a section, so the
guard is satisfied and the migration-critical detail stays discoverable in
the repository, not only on the portal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
GitHub generates no contributor graph for forks, so this fork had no
attribution record at all. CONTRIBUTORS.md becomes that record, in three
tiers: the four contributors with code merged into main, each listed with
the pull request and the commit that carries their authorship; the five who
opened pull requests; and the twenty-two who filed the bug reports and
compatibility findings that shaped the releases.
Both READMEs are condensed and gain a Contributors section that shows the
avatars and points at the full record, with README_ZH realigned to README
section for section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
GPG-signing the RPMs rewrites their bytes after release.yml has already
generated SBOMs, the packages checksum manifest, and attestations from
the as-built files. The new workflow_dispatch-only finalize-release lane
runs between signing and publishing: it refuses non-Draft releases,
verifies the signed RPMs against their sha256 sidecars and the committed
PGSTY public key, confirms every other package still matches the
original manifest, regenerates the RPM SBOMs and the manifest from the
published bytes, cosign-signs the manifest under the workflow identity,
and attests the finalized set before replacing the assets in place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The substring grep for the archive line also captured the archive's
.sbom.json entry, whose file is deliberately not downloaded in this
lane, so the sha256sum check failed on every run. awk now matches the
manifest filename column exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rpm carried a bare -1 release while the deb carried none. Both now
ship the PGDG-style 1PGSTY segment: silo-VER-1PGSTY.arch.rpm and
silo_VER-1PGSTY_arch.deb, with nfpm rendering it as the RPM Release tag
and the Debian revision respectively. The apk stays bare because Alpine
pkgrel admits only -r<integer>.
sign-release-rpms.sh declares the value once as expected_release;
package-release.sh names artifacts from its own PKG_RELEASE copy, and
test-release.yml evals the signing script's value and asserts both the
download names and the packaged RPM Release/DEB Version against it, so
the copies cannot drift apart silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The go list -deps closure is GOOS-specific, so the CREDITS generated on
darwin (carrying go-m1cpu) could never match a Linux regeneration
(ethtool, numcpus), and the check-gen guard failed on its first CI run.
Generation now pins linux/amd64 with the release build tags, so the
output is identical on every host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bundle mcli RELEASE.2026-08-06T00-00-00Z in the container image (pin
and both architecture digests; interop with the new server was
verified end to end during release acceptance) and align the CI
fixture default in install-mcli.sh.
Point the Helm chart defaults at the first real silo image tag:
docker.io/pgsty/silo is a fresh repository, so the inherited
RELEASE.2026-08-04 default could never pull. Chart version moves to
7.0.1 with appVersion RELEASE.2026-08-06T00-00-00Z; the packaging
tripwire in verify-helm-migration.sh follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
gocritic's ifElseChain check fails make lint on the --json/--quiet
branch introduced by b6d47b739; the quality job runs make lint on
every push to main. Behavior is unchanged (verified by re-running the
json/quiet success and failure cases byte-for-byte).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Findings from an adversarial review (Codex, gpt-5.6-sol at max effort)
of 2ff594f4b and 4c34d2309, each independently verified before fixing:
- SBOM generation: buildx attaches a provenance attestation, so every
per-arch digest names an OCI index; Syft's platform default on an
amd64 runner cannot resolve an arm64-only index and the step dies.
Pass --platform explicitly on all four Syft calls (the two classic
lanes had the same latent defect - the renamed workflow has not run
yet, which is why it never fired).
- Release ordering: the HEALTHCHECK survival check now runs against
the pushed architecture image before the versioned and rolling
multi-arch manifests are created, so a broken health config blocks
their promotion; the comment now states honestly that the
arch-suffixed tags are already public at that point.
- Gate assertions: tar's member-argument mode exits non-zero on any
missing name, which under pipefail masked a found forbidden file
when exactly one of them existed; -tv prints symlinks as
'name -> target', defeating $-anchored greps; and the licenses
check proved only one-of-three. Export the rootfs once and assert
every required and forbidden entry individually (busybox/sh and
usr/bin/mc[li] now covered), and match the image healthcheck as an
exact array instead of a substring.
- Probe target vs CLI-configured servers: a probe process cannot see
PID 1's argv, so --url gains EnvVar MINIO_HEALTHCHECK_URL as the
documented way to point the baked-in HEALTHCHECK at a server whose
address/TLS comes from command-line arguments (verified end to end:
server on --address :9010, env var alone turns the container
healthy). Baseline regenerated for the new env token.
- IPv6 zone identifiers: serialize probe URLs via url.URL.String()
so [fe80::1%eth0]:9000 becomes a valid %25-escaped URL (tests added).
- Boolean flags: read --json/--quiet via Bool() so --json=false is
false, instead of IsSet() which treats any occurrence as true.
- Docker's HEALTHCHECK timeout raised to 10s: an outer deadline equal
to the probe's own 5s always SIGKILLed the probe before it could
print its diagnostic line.
- test-release path filter now also triggers on cmd/healthcheck-main.go
and cmd/main.go, so subcommand regressions run the image gate.
Not adopted: require_text's comment-insensitivity in verify-rebrand.sh
(snapshot-tripwire by design, consistent with its other assertions -
the semantic check lives in the CI gate now), and full
staging-then-promote tag publishing (a workflow-wide redesign shared
with the classic lanes, tracked as follow-up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Publish pgsty/silo:<RELEASE>-distroless (and a rolling :distroless tag)
alongside the classic image: gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12 plus
exactly one program, the silo binary. No shell, no mc, no curl, no
entrypoint script - the binary is the ENTRYPOINT and the baked-in
exec-form HEALTHCHECK runs 'silo healthcheck ready'. The classic image
and its mc-based health checks are deliberately unchanged.
Design: silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/feature/healthcheck/
/data is created in the image layer, world-writable, because Docker
seeds fresh volumes from the layer mountpoint and no entrypoint exists
to repair ownership at runtime (issue #55); the parent directory is
copied from a throwaway busybox stage since COPY of a directory copies
contents rather than the entry itself, which would silently leave
/data at root:0755 and break every non-root run. The MINIO_USERNAME
drop-user path is not supported in this variant; use --user.
test-release.yml now builds the real Dockerfile.distroless on every
gate run (it has no download stages, so it stays offline) and asserts:
the HEALTHCHECK survives into the image config, /data ships 0777, no
shell and no /usr/bin/minio are present, Docker's health state turns
healthy from the baked probe alone, the probe binary execs without a
shell, and SIGTERM still stops the server gracefully - as root and as
--user 1001:1001. docker-release.yml gains the distroless build lanes,
multi-arch manifests, SBOM and provenance attestations, and a
release-blocking check that the pushed manifest still carries the
HEALTHCHECK (a Docker extension absent from the OCI image spec).
Verified locally on linux/arm64: full gate assertions plus bare
'docker run ... healthcheck' exit-code semantics and --version
passthrough.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add 'silo healthcheck [live|ready|cluster|cluster-read]', a thin
anonymous HTTP client for the server's own /minio/health/* endpoints,
so containers without a shell, curl, or mc can still run health
checks. Design: silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/feature/healthcheck/
The check vocabulary maps 1:1 onto the health API paths; the probe
target is derived from the server's own --address/MINIO_ADDRESS
contract with HTTPS auto-detected from the certs directory, and can
be overridden with --url. Exit codes are 0/1 only (Docker reserves 2);
diagnostics (x-minio-server-status, quorum headers) go into a single
output line for docker inspect. The request is strictly anonymous (a
credentialed request would be rejected by the reserved-path guard),
the transport bypasses HTTP_PROXY, and certificate verification is
skipped to match kubelet HTTPS probe behavior. Cluster checks default
to a 15s deadline so the server's 10s cluster_deadline can elapse.
Compatibility notes: the preserved /minio/health/* path literals and
the MINIO_ADDRESS env var are upstream wire/config surface, reused on
purpose; the rebrand-guard baseline is regenerated for the new route
literals (tests included) with zero new exported symbols. The docker
entrypoint argv translation learns the new command name.
Verified: unit tests, entrypoint tests, go vet, plus an end-to-end
run against a live server covering all four checks, --maintenance
(412), --json, usage errors, unreachable and timeout paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The RPM, DEB and APK payloads carried no license material at all, and
the OCI image copied LICENSE and CREDITS but not NOTICE. For an AGPL
distribution that is not defensible packaging. Every delivery channel
now carries the same license set:
- nfpm packages install LICENSE and NOTICE under /usr/share/doc/silo/.
The entries are declared once per packager because nfpm only honors
type: license on rpm and silently drops such entries from deb and apk
-- the rpm keeps its %license flag, deb and apk carry plain files at
the same path. CREDITS stays out of the OS packages deliberately: at
1.8MB it would dominate an otherwise ~40MB payload.
- The OCI image gains /licenses/NOTICE next to the existing LICENSE and
CREDITS, in the Dockerfile and in both context-staging paths (the
make docker target and docker-release.yml).
- The GoReleaser archives list their files explicitly; the default
globs would keep missing NOTICE.
NOTICE's first line now reads 2015-2025 to match the banner constants
fixed in b57275be3 -- it had kept upstream's stale 2015-2023 claim --
and verify-rebrand.sh pins both NOTICE copyright lines.
The payload locks move in the same commit: sign-release-rpms.sh expects
the six-file listing, and the test-release validation asserts presence,
count, the rpm %license flag, and sha256 equality of the packaged
LICENSE and NOTICE against the repository files across all three
formats and both architectures.
Also dropped the unit's WorkingDirectory=/usr/local, a leftover from
upstream's /usr/local/bin install layout. Debian policy 9.1.2 keeps
packages out of /usr/local entirely; the binary already installs to
/usr/bin and the service does not depend on its working directory.
Verified locally with nfpm v2.47.0 (the CI-pinned version): built all
six packages via package-release.sh, then ran the test-release
validation step verbatim (extracted from the workflow YAML) and the
signing script's payload comparison against them in an Ubuntu 24.04
container -- both pass. Built the arm64 image from the real
Dockerfile.goreleaser and confirmed /licenses holds CREDITS, LICENSE
and NOTICE. make rebrand-guard passes with the new NOTICE pins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
The shipped CREDITS predated the fork's dependency work: 38 of the
modules in the current go.mod, among them lestrrat-go/jwx, go-tpm,
go-spiffe and the charmbracelet family, had no entry at all, while
entries lingered for modules no longer in the build. An attribution
file that silently drifts from go.mod is worse than none, so it is now
generated, not curated.
buildscripts/gen-credits.sh (make credits) rebuilds the file from the
licenses of every module go list -deps reports for the main package --
the set actually linked into the silo binary, so test-only and tool
dependencies stay out. Entries keep the established name / URL /
license-text layout. New over the old file:
- Modules replaced in go.mod are annotated with the repository that
actually serves them, so the pgsty/silo-console, pgsty/mc and
pgsty/silo-pkg forks are named next to their upstream import paths.
- Bundled NOTICE files are reproduced after the license text, which
Apache License 2.0 section 4(d) requires when redistributing; 23
modules carry one.
- minio/colorjson, minio/csvparser and minio/filepath publish no
license file at all; they repackage Go standard library code and
their sources carry the Go Authors' BSD-style header, so the Go
project license is reproduced for them with a note saying why.
- The Go license text itself comes from the pinned golang.org/x/sys
module rather than GOROOT, because Homebrew's Go omits
GOROOT/LICENSE and the module copy is version-locked.
check-gen now runs the generator and fails on a CREDITS diff, the same
treatment go.mod and go.sum already get, so dependency changes cannot
leave stale attributions behind. Output is deterministic: two runs are
byte-identical, and LC_ALL=C sorting plus version-pinned inputs keep it
that way across machines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Pins pgsty/silo-console at 72fc0a5e, the v2.1.1 tag, replacing the
v2.1.0 commit from earlier today. The pseudo-version form stays because
the compatibility module path github.com/minio/console carries no /v2
suffix, so a v2.x semver tag is not directly selectable.
v2.1.1 is 5 commits over v2.1.0. The one substantive change for the
server is a fix that keeps unresolved i18n placeholders out of the
metrics dashboard legends; the rest is the v2.1.1 changelog, dropping
the container-image advertising from the Console docs, and regenerated
embedded web assets.
Verified: go mod tidy -compat=1.26 is a clean no-op afterwards, which is
what make check-gen asserts in CI, and go build ./... and go vet ./...
pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Brings the server in line with the contribution and copyright policy
already adopted in pgsty/mc.
Copyright terms were derived from the clock: startupBanner overwrote the
ldflags-injected CopyrightYear with time.Now().Year() and printed it as
the end of MinIO, Inc.'s term, so every January would have extended the
upstream copyright claim past the 2025 end of upstream development, and
release builds silently discarded the injected year. Both banners now
credit MinIO, Inc. for 2015-2025 and PGSTY from 2025 through the
release-stamped year, falling back to the current year in source builds.
NOTICE names PGSTY as the holder of the fork's modifications, matching
the banners and the packaging vendor field.
Contributions are accepted inbound=outbound under AGPL-3.0-or-later with
no CLA - the core is Copyright MinIO, Inc., so the combined work can
never be relicensed and a CLA would buy nothing. What a fork carrying a
downstream delta does need is provenance, so DCO 1.1 sign-off is now
mandatory and enforced by a workflow that rejects unsigned non-bot
commits. CONTRIBUTING documents sign-off, repair, cherry-pick provenance,
dual copyright headers, trailer preservation across squash merges, and
that assistive-tooling trailers carry no authorship or copyright claim.
verify-rebrand.sh pins the copyright split and the policy files so
neither can regress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
actions/checkout@v4 and actions/setup-go@v5 declare runs.using: node20, so
every Go CI job printed the runner's Node 20 deprecation warning. The
release, test-release and docker-release workflows carried six more node20
actions that never appeared in that warning only because those workflows
run on a tag or a dispatch rather than on every push: upload-artifact v4,
goreleaser-action v6, build-push v6 and the docker qemu/buildx/login v3
line. All of them move to the current majors, which declare node24. The
SHA-pinned rest already qualified -- attest and sbom-action are node24,
cosign-installer is composite.
Checked against what those majors removed. build-push v7 dropped
DOCKER_BUILD_NO_SUMMARY and DOCKER_BUILD_EXPORT_RETENTION_DAYS and
setup-buildx v4 dropped its deprecated inputs, none of which are used here.
checkout v7 refuses to check out fork PRs under pull_request_target and
workflow_run, and no workflow here triggers on either.
setup-go v6 exports GOTOOLCHAIN=local, the one change with teeth. go.mod
declares `go 1.26.5` and carries no toolchain directive, every job resolves
that same version through go-version-file, and nothing in the module graph
asks for more, so there is nothing left for the go command to fetch:
`go build ./...` passes under GOTOOLCHAIN=local. The tools installed from
outside the module are in range too -- nfpm v2.47.0 requires 1.26.4 and
govulncheck v1.6.0 requires 1.25.0 -- and golangci-lint arrives as a
prebuilt binary from upstream's install script, not through the toolchain.
The runner floor that comes with node24 (v2.327.1) is met by GitHub-hosted
runners, and every job here is ubuntu-latest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pins pgsty/silo-console at 343d9442, the v2.1.0 tag, replacing the v2.0.0 commit
from 2026-08-04. The pseudo-version is still the form used here because the
compatibility module path github.com/minio/console carries no /v2 suffix, so a
v2.x semver tag is not directly selectable; the comment above the directive now
names the release the commit actually corresponds to.
v2.1.0 is 23 commits over v2.0.0. The substantive ones for the server are a
hand-rolled EN/ZH i18n layer with a language toggle covering login, navigation,
dashboard, buckets and object browser, identity and configuration, event
destinations, observability and admin tools; a dashboard migration to MinIO
Metrics V3; and removal of the remaining SUBNET references from health
reporting, which matches this repository's own decision to close the upstream
telemetry surfaces. The rest is UI polish and regenerated embedded web assets.
Verified: go mod tidy -compat=1.26 is a clean no-op afterwards, which is what
make check-gen asserts in CI, and go build ./... and go vet ./... pass.
Not included here: the GitHub Action version bumps and the .gitignore entry
sitting in the working tree are someone else's change and stay uncommitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous commit added a rename note to both READMEs and broke the gate I
added one commit earlier. That gate rejected the string pgsty/minio anywhere
outside three guard files, which was the wrong invariant: the point is that the
old name must never be a live target, not that it must never be spoken. A README
explaining where the MinIO-named artifacts went has to name them, and doing so
is the opposite of stranding a reader on a dead repository.
Split into two rules that say what is actually meant:
- No live URL may resolve to the old repository anywhere, READMEs included -
github.com/pgsty/minio and hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/minio are rejected outright.
This is the rule that protects users.
- The bare name is allowed only in five files: the pinned pre-rebrand image
digest in the upgrade test, the two guards that refuse a legacy image, and the
two READMEs.
Both halves are negative-tested: adding a github.com/pgsty/minio link to
README.md fails rule one, and adding a bare pgsty/minio to docs/docker/README.md
fails rule two.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Someone arriving at main after the rename has one question the README did not
answer: where did the MinIO-named builds go. Both READMEs now say it directly —
the archived minio branch and the releases up to RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z
hold the artifacts maintained under the original identity, and those assets and
the docker.io/pgsty/minio image stay published and unmodified.
The note also records the rename itself with its date, and repeats the one fact
that determines whether an operator has any work to do: only product and
artifact names changed. MINIO_* variables, minio_* metrics, x-minio-* headers,
/minio/* routes and the on-disk format are the same.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The transitional references land in one commit, because they are only correct
together: the repository is pgsty/silo, its default branch is main, and nothing
in the tree should point a user at the old names.
Changed:
- Workflow branch filters. go.yml and vulncheck.yml gated on `branches: master`
for both push and pull_request, so renaming the default branch would have
taken automatic CI offline with no error and no signal - the workflows would
simply never trigger again. They now name main.
- Release target. goreleaser's `release.github.name` becomes silo, which is
what actually decides where a tagged build publishes. sign-release-rpms.sh's
GH_REPO default follows.
- The OCI `image.source` label, the Helm chart `sources` entry, the security
advisory link in the issue-template config, and the go.mod comment citing the
LDAP TLS fix.
- 115 occurrences across README, README_ZH, SECURITY, CONTRIBUTING and 30 docs
pages, including 72 links that also carried the master branch in their path.
Those matter most: GitHub redirects clone, fetch, push and web URLs after a
rename, but raw.githubusercontent.com does not, and neither follows a branch
rename - every one of those links would 404 twice over.
- Three error strings in cmd/erasure-sets.go, cmd/storage-errors.go and
internal/config/errors.go that print an issue URL to operators. These are Go
string literals inside rebrand-guard's brand allowlist, so the baseline is
regenerated. The regeneration removes exactly those three entries and adds
none; all twelve other protected sets, including the 9014 exported symbols,
are byte-identical.
- The transitional-naming disclaimers in README, README_ZH, SECURITY and
CONTRIBUTING are dropped, since they no longer describe anything.
Deliberately unchanged, all three because they exist to reject or freeze the old
name rather than to point at it:
- buildscripts/minio-upgrade.sh pins pgsty/minio@sha256:b6bfe72... - the frozen
pre-rebrand image is the control group for the MinIO-to-Silo upgrade test.
- helm-migration-guard rejects any rendered container still pulling pgsty/minio.
- verify-rebrand.sh rejects the same in the delivery surfaces.
Also unchanged: docs/config/README.md links to pgsty/mc/blob/master, and that
repository's default branch really is still master. It moves when mc does.
verify-rebrand.sh gains three assertions so this cannot silently regress: no
source reference may name pgsty/minio outside the three allowlisted guards, no
link may target pgsty/silo's master branch, and go.yml and vulncheck.yml must
filter on main. Both new rejections were negative-tested - reintroducing a
master branch filter and adding a pgsty/minio URL each fail the gate with the
specific message.
This commit assumes the rename actually happens. Until the GitHub branch and
repository renames are executed, the links it introduces do not resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
README, README_ZH, SECURITY, COMPLIANCE, CONTRIBUTING, NOTICE,
code_of_conduct, the vulnerability and PR-etiquette documents, the GitHub issue
and pull request templates, and the docs/ tree all present Silo as the product.
The Grafana dashboards under docs/metrics/prometheus/grafana/ have their panel
titles and descriptions rebranded while every minio_* query, label and
expression is left alone, so existing alerts and recording rules keep matching.
The distinction the review demanded is applied per hit rather than by
search-and-replace:
- Product and command text becomes Silo and silo: install and run instructions,
systemd examples, compose services, download links, badges.
- Protocol and interface text keeps MinIO: MINIO_* variables, minio_* metrics,
x-minio-* headers, /minio/* routes, .minio.sys, arn:minio, and API field and
error names.
- Attribution keeps MinIO and gains the fork's own: the AGPL obligations,
original copyright, CREDITS and NOTICE stay, with the modification notice
added alongside rather than replacing them.
- Historical and third-party references are left as facts, not rewritten for
brand tidiness.
README and README_ZH each carry an explicit non-affiliation notice, document
the side-by-side package migration including the
/etc/systemd/system/silo.service.d/10-legacy-user.conf drop-in for keeping a
legacy UID/GID, and state that recursive chown is never performed. The trademark
attribution uses the policy's approved "based on MinIO technology" wording, not
the shortened form the policy rejects.
github.com/pgsty/minio links are left in place and labelled transitional. The
repository has not been renamed, and rewriting them now would produce documented
URLs that 404 until the cutover; they change in the cutover commit together with
the goreleaser release target, the OCI source label and the raw-content branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test and verification scripts invoked ./minio and pulled their tooling from
upstream infrastructure with no integrity check. Every `curl | tar` of a client
or an old server binary was an unverified execution path in a script that
regularly runs as a privileged user, and several fetched a floating "latest".
Two installers replace all of it:
- install-mcli.sh resolves a pinned pgsty/mc release, downloads the archive and
its checksum manifest, requires exactly one valid manifest entry for the
asset, verifies it, and installs. MCLI_BIN with a mandatory MCLI_SHA256 lets
an offline or air-gapped run supply its own binary, still checksum-checked.
- install-verified-fixture.sh takes source, expected SHA-256 and target, and
refuses anything that does not match. Sources may be a URL or a local file.
Every script that previously downloaded mc now calls install-mcli.sh. The three
places that genuinely need an upstream artifact - the old MinIO server binary
for the LDAP IAM upgrade-import test, the 2021 mc for the three-site
replication test, and the functional-tests.sh fixture - go through
install-verified-fixture.sh with the digest recorded inline. Those dl.min.io
URLs remain on purpose: they are historical upstream artifacts needed to prove
upgrade compatibility, and they are now pinned and verified rather than
trusted.
The scripts otherwise switch to ./silo, silo.service, the silo container and
compose service names, and SILO_CONFIG_DIR. run-multi-site-minio-idp.sh is
renamed to run-multi-site-silo-idp.sh with the Makefile target following.
buildscripts/minio-upgrade.sh keeps its name and its `minio server` argv - it
exists to test the MinIO-to-Silo upgrade, so the old side must stay old - but
it is now pinned to an image digest rather than a tag, and its `docker system
prune` and `docker volume prune` calls are removed. Those ran unfiltered
against the developer's whole Docker installation; the resiliency tests had the
same problem and lose their prune and `docker ps -q` sweeps too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A rebrand of this size cannot be reviewed by reading the diff. The risk is not
what was renamed but what was renamed by accident: an environment variable, a
metric, a header, a route, a storage marker or an exported symbol that some
deployment depends on. So the invariants get a machine check.
rebrand-guard extracts the identifiers a product rename must not touch - the
go.mod module path, github.com/minio/* imports, MINIO_* variables, minio_*
metric literals, x-minio-* headers, route string literals, the hardcoded grid
routes in internal/grid/manager.go, the reserved bucket root, .minio.sys
markers, arn:minio and minio:s3 policy values, every exported symbol in cmd/
and internal/, and every branded string literal - and compares them to a
checked-in baseline. Any removal or addition fails the build, in both
directions, so a future change cannot quietly drop one either.
The recorded delta against the pre-rebrand tree is: module path, 137 imports,
19 metrics, 15 storage markers, 58 policy values and all 9014 exported symbols
byte-identical; environment 437 -> 436, headers 85 -> 84, routes 331 -> 330.
Each of those three is accounted for. MINIO_CONFIG_DIR and MINIO_VERSION were a
shell local and a compose variable in test scripts, never server settings.
x-minio-common was a docker-compose extension key, never an HTTP header.
/api/health/upload was the SUBNET upload path in the deleted callhome.go.
verify-rebrand.sh covers what the identifier guard cannot see: that the retired
upstream delivery paths stay deleted, that the packaging and container files
name silo, that silo.service keeps its Conflicts and both EnvironmentFile
lines, that silo.env contains no active assignment that would shadow the legacy
file, that no active delivery surface still publishes pgsty/minio, and that no
non-test Go source contains a dl.min.io, subnet.min.io, api.min.io,
slack.min.io or play.min.io URL.
Both, plus the entrypoint argv test, run in go.yml, release.yml and
test-release.yml. test-release.yml also gets the path filters right: it was
watching minio.service, which no longer exists, so the packaging gate would
have gone silently dormant. It now watches the unit, defaults, sysusers,
lifecycle scripts, helm chart and both guards, and asserts the four-file
payload, the absence of any cross-name Provides/Obsoletes/Conflicts, and that a
container started with the legacy `minio server` argv really runs silo as PID 1.
release.yml and docker-release.yml additionally verify that the checked-out
revision matches GITHUB_SHA before building. GitHub's OIDC certificate records
GITHUB_SHA, not the ref passed to actions/checkout, so a manual dispatch from
the wrong ref would have produced provenance describing different source from
the bytes being published. They now emit SBOMs and attestations for archives,
packages and images, and docker-release verifies the release workflow's
attestation on every artifact it consumes. Images publish to pgsty/silo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
helm/minio becomes helm/silo: chart name silo, version 6.0.0 -> 7.0.0, the
MinIO wordmark icon replaced with the project's own, image.repository and
mcImage.repository pointing at pgsty/silo, and the container command changed to
silo. User-visible titles, comments and documentation links are rebranded. The
MINIO_* environment variables and every existing values key are kept - the
first Silo chart is a rename, not a values-schema migration.
The hard problem is that a chart rename normally rewrites Kubernetes resource
identity, and a StatefulSet's selector and volumeClaimTemplate are immutable.
An existing release upgraded carelessly would either fail or orphan its PVCs.
Two things address that:
- Templates no longer derive the container name from .Chart.Name. It comes from
a helper, so nameOverride can pin it, which means an existing release can be
upgraded with nameOverride=minio, fullnameOverride=<existing-fullname> and
serviceAccount.name=minio-sa and render byte-stable identity while switching
chart and image.
- helm-migration-guard and verify-helm-migration.sh make that a gate rather
than a documented hope. The script lints the chart, renders it in distributed
and standalone modes plus the optional templates, then renders the legacy
chart from a pinned commit and the new chart with those three overrides and
compares resource identity. The guard additionally rejects any rendered
container still pulling pgsty/minio or invoking /usr/bin/minio. It runs
through a pinned alpine/helm image when helm is not installed locally, so the
gate does not depend on the developer's machine. Currently green over 7
compared resources.
Rollback is asymmetric and the README says so: the old chart with the new image
survives via the entrypoint argv shim, but the new chart with an old MinIO
image does not, because `silo server` is not a command that binary knows. Only
`helm rollback` is supported, never an image-only downgrade.
Not addressed here: the default image tag is pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z,
which does not exist yet. The chart must not be published until the first Silo
image is pushed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dockerfile.goreleaser now copies silo to /usr/bin/silo, defaults to
CMD ["silo"], and labels the image as Silo. MINIO_UPDATE_MINISIGN_PUBKEY is
removed from the image environment: with the updater permanently disabled it
was dead weight, and leaving upstream's verification key in a Silo image
implied a trust relationship that does not exist. The MINIO_* runtime
environment variables, ports, volume and health endpoints are unchanged.
The image keeps shipping mcli with an /usr/bin/mc symlink. That is the client,
not a MinIO-branded alias for the server binary, and the Helm post-install job
and existing container scripts call it by name.
docker-entrypoint.sh translates a legacy first argument: `minio server /data`
becomes `silo server /data`, so an existing `command: minio server ...` in
compose or a Pod spec keeps working across the image swap. The translation is
argv-level only - no file named minio is installed, and an explicitly
overridden `entrypoint: /usr/bin/minio` still fails, which is the honest
outcome since that path genuinely no longer exists.
The entrypoint also fixes an unrelated startup hazard it was already carrying:
when the image runs under an arbitrary UID, HOME points at an unreadable /root
and the server probes its default config directory during initialization. It
now falls back to /tmp when HOME is unset, /root, missing or unwritable.
docker-entrypoint_test.sh pins all of it - empty argv, legacy minio, native
silo, bare flags, and an explicit shell command that must stay explicit. It is
wired into make rebrand-guard and into the go.yml, release.yml and
test-release.yml gates, so removing the shim breaks CI rather than breaking
users. Passing locally.
download-static-curl.sh gains checksum verification for the curl it fetches
into the build stage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Everything a user installs is renamed, and the package finally installs enough
to be startable on a clean host.
Artifact names
- goreleaser.yml: build id, binary, archive and checksum manifest become silo_*.
release.github.name stays "minio" with a comment - the GitHub repository has
not been renamed yet, and pointing at pgsty/silo before the rename would 404.
Also adds per-archive SPDX SBOMs and a keyless cosign signature over the
checksum manifest, so the signed manifest covers archives and SBOMs together.
- nfpm.yml: package name silo, and the binary moves from /usr/local/bin/minio
to /usr/bin/silo. /usr/local is not on the default PATH of a systemd unit and
is not FHS-correct for a distribution package.
- package-release.sh, sign-release-rpms.sh and verify-build-provenance.sh follow
the new names; the RPM signing script asserts NAME=silo and the new four-file
payload. nfpm is now invoked from the repository root so relative script paths
in the config resolve regardless of the caller's directory.
Package relationships are deliberately empty
No Provides, Obsoletes, Replaces or package-level Conflicts. Obsoletes: minio
cannot distinguish a pgsty package from upstream's own identically named one,
so an unattended dnf upgrade could silently swap a different vendor's product
for this one. With no relationships, both packages coexist, their file sets do
not overlap, and migration and rollback are single explicit commands. The
mutual exclusion lives in the unit instead: silo.service carries
Conflicts=minio.service plus After=minio.service.
Payload, from two files to four
- /usr/bin/silo
- /usr/lib/systemd/system/silo.service
- /etc/default/silo, installed config|noreplace
- /usr/lib/sysusers.d/silo.conf
The old package shipped a unit referencing an account nothing created, so a
clean install could not start. postinstall.sh now creates the silo system
account through systemd-sysusers, useradd or BusyBox adduser in that order and
runs daemon-reload. It never stops a service, never chowns data and never
touches /etc/default/minio. preremove.sh disables silo.service only on a real
removal - Debian "remove", RPM 0, Alpine's dotted version - so upgrades leave
the running service alone. lifecycle_test.sh exercises both against a stubbed
PATH, so a green run cannot create an account or touch the host.
silo.service reads /etc/default/minio then /etc/default/silo, in that order, so
an existing node's MINIO_* values keep working and the new file overrides them.
The packaged silo.env therefore ships comments only: any active assignment
would shadow the legacy file with an empty value.
Makefile: build/install/install-race produce ./silo, and the docker target now
assembles a context from a locally built linux binary plus Dockerfile.goreleaser
instead of the deleted Dockerfile. The hotfix, hotfix-push, docker-hotfix and
docker-hotfix-push targets are gone - they downloaded upstream's pkger, signed
with upstream's minisign key and scp'd to dl-N.minio.io. verifiers now depends
on a new rebrand-guard target.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two coupled changes that must land together, because the same files carry both:
the server now identifies itself as Silo, and every path that would have called
home to a MinIO-operated service is closed.
Product identity
- build-constants.go: store name, UA name and startup banner become Silo. The
Go identifiers (MinioStoreName, MinioBannerName, ...) keep their names on
purpose - renaming exported symbols would churn the compatibility surface for
a cosmetic gain, and the rebrand guard freezes that surface.
- main.go, server-startup-msg.go, ftp-server.go and the user-visible log, help
and error strings across cmd/ and internal/ switch to Silo. Original MinIO
copyright, LICENSE, NOTICE and CREDITS are untouched; --version now prints
the upstream copyright, the pgsty modification notice, and the trademark
policy's approved "based on MinIO technology" attribution.
- api-headers.go: the HTTP Server header becomes "Silo". This is the one
externally observable identity change, so TestCommonHeadersUseSiloProductName
pins it - probes that sniff for "MinIO" must move to capability detection.
- Prometheus metric HELP strings keep their MinIO wording. They are part of the
metrics contract the guard protects, not product copy.
Configuration directory
- config-dir.go: new installs use ~/.silo. If only ~/.minio exists it is still
read, with a one-time notice and no files moved. If both exist ~/.silo wins
and an ambiguity warning is emitted; an explicit --config-dir always wins.
Covered by TestSelectDefaultConfigDir. The internal .minio.sys layout is
never renamed - this rule applies to the user config directory only.
Upstream service lockdown
- globalInplaceUpdateDisabled is now true at initialization rather than being
set from MINIO_UPDATE. common-main.go still parses MINIO_UPDATE so upgrading
nodes do not fail on an unknown key, but warns that the value is ignored;
there is no way to re-enable the updater. TestInplaceUpdateCannotBeEnabled
guards that. Without this, an admin with mc could have overwritten
/usr/bin/silo with an upstream MinIO binary.
- verifyBinary and commitBinary refuse early; the ServerUpdate v1/v2 admin
routes and the peer-rest update endpoints stay registered and keep returning
the existing programmatic error, so clients see a stable failure rather than
a 404.
- MinioReleaseBaseURL and defaultMinisignPubkey are emptied: no dl.min.io
download root, and upstream's minisign key is no longer a trust root for
anything this fork ships.
- cmd/callhome.go is deleted and internal/config/subnet/ is reduced to parsing
its old keys and reporting that the integration is disabled. config-current.go
warns instead of failing when callhome or SUBNET settings are present, so an
upgraded node with those keys still starts.
- internal/config/errors.go replaces the MinIO Slack and support entry points
with Silo documentation and issue links. Error codes and programmatic fields
are unchanged.
Verified: the compatibility baseline is unchanged except for the deliberate
removal of the /api/health/upload SUBNET route; go build, go vet and the full
cmd/ and internal/ unit suites pass; a locally built binary starts, serves
S3/Admin/metrics on the unchanged /minio/* routes, answers with Server: Silo,
and falls back to a pre-existing ~/.minio with the expected notice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tree still carried a complete second publishing pipeline inherited from
upstream that pgsty has never operated, plus MinIO-branded artwork the fork has
no right to redistribute. None of it is a pgsty release artifact, so the
history-is-immutable rule does not protect it: nothing here was ever published
under this repository's name, and git history plus the pre-cutover tag keep the
provenance.
Removed, by category:
- charts.min.io machinery: CNAME (charts.min.io), _config.yml, index.yaml,
helm-reindex.sh and 90 helm-releases/minio-*.tgz. GitHub Pages is not enabled
on this repository, so this was dormant - but enabling Pages for any reason
would have stood up a convincing impostor of the official MinIO chart
repository from our own domain.
- Dockerfiles that consume upstream binaries: Dockerfile, Dockerfile.cicd,
Dockerfile.hotfix, Dockerfile.release, Dockerfile.release.old_cpu,
Dockerfile.scratch and docker-buildx.sh. These fetch or expect a MinIO-built
binary; a Silo image must only ever contain an artifact this repository built
from this commit. Dockerfile.goreleaser, the one the release workflow
actually uses, stays.
- buildscripts/upgrade-tests/ (compose.yml, minio.env, nginx.conf), which
pinned minio/minio images through a MINIO_VERSION compose variable. The
upgrade test is rebuilt on image digests in a later commit.
- docs/hotfixes.md, describing an upstream hotfix distribution channel that
does not exist for this fork.
- MinIO trademark artwork: .github/logo.svg (a recoloured MinIO wordmark), the
docs/screenshots/ set, the Grafana dashboard screenshots and
docs/federation/lookup/bucket-lookup.png. The dashboards themselves are kept
and rebranded separately; only the images carrying MinIO chrome go.
Deliberately not touched: published releases, tags, image digests and package
signatures remain byte-identical. This commit only removes paths that were
never part of a pgsty release.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The release image (Dockerfile.goreleaser) was only ever built by
docker-release.yml, which is workflow_dispatch only - so the runtime layer and
entrypoint were never exercised by CI until an actual publish, where a broken
COPY path or a signal-handling regression would surface at the worst possible
moment. MC already covers this in its test-release; the server did not.
Add an offline, deterministic smoke: assemble a minimal image from the
linux/amd64 binary goreleaser already built and the real entrypoint, then start
the server and `docker stop` it on both the default and the MINIO_USERNAME
drop-privilege paths, asserting PID 1 is minio, the exit is 0, the shutdown is
sub-timeout, and the "Exiting on signal" log is present. The mcli-download build
stage is skipped deliberately - it hits the GitHub API and would make this gate
flaky and non-reproducible; its simple, checksum-guarded logic still runs at
publish time.
This is the regression guard for the exec-into-chroot entrypoint fix. Also add
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh to the pull_request paths so an entrypoint
change actually triggers this pipeline. Verified locally end to end: the fixed
entrypoint passes both paths; reverting the exec makes the drop-privilege path
time out to exit 137 and the step fails.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three gate-correctness fixes:
- lint: `command typos && typos ./ || echo skipping` ran typos twice (POSIX
`command` executes it) and, via `&& ... || echo`, turned a real typo finding
(nonzero exit) into the "not installed" message with exit 0 - so spelling
issues could never fail the gate. Use `command -v` to test presence and run
typos once, letting its findings surface.
- getdeps: `curl -sSfL ... | sh` took the pipeline's exit from sh, and make's
/bin/sh has no pipefail, so a failed or partial download of the golangci-lint
installer was reported as success and a truncated script could run. Download
to a temp file under `set -e` (with a trap to clean it up) and execute that,
so a curl failure aborts the target. Verified: a 404 now exits nonzero
instead of silently continuing.
- release: workflow_dispatch checked out github.ref (the branch it ran from)
while naming artifacts after the input tag, so a release could be built from
one ref and published under another. Pin checkout to the requested tag.
Not addressed here: the server's release container image is still only built
by the publish-time docker-release workflow, never in CI (MC covers this in
its test-release). Flagged for a separate decision.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
nFPM placed minio.service at /lib/systemd/system. On merged-usr EL/Fedora the
file lands correctly through the symlink, but the RPM database records /lib/...,
so `rpm -qf` disowns it and - more importantly - systemd's
%transfiletriggerin watches /usr/lib/systemd/system, so the path recorded as
/lib/... never fires the automatic `daemon-reload` on install or removal. Move
the unit to the canonical /usr/lib/systemd/system, which both restores that
trigger and makes the package own the path it ships.
The destination is asserted verbatim in several places, all updated in lockstep
so the packaging gate still passes: the six name/payload/sha checks in
test-release.yml (rpm/deb/apk) and expected_payload in sign-release-rpms.sh.
Verified by building a real deb with the new config: the unit is at
./usr/lib/systemd/system/minio.service.
Also drop the `# Built for ${project.name}...` line from minio.service. nFPM
expands variables in content src paths, not file bodies, so that pkger-era
placeholder was being written verbatim into every installed unit.
Not addressed here, deliberately: the package still does not create the
minio-user account the unit references. That matches upstream MinIO's own
packages (both rely on the documented manual useradd) and is not a fork
regression, so it stays a documentation step rather than a scriptlet.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
A gitignored .goreleaser.yml sat in the repo root, so a bare `goreleaser`
invocation - the default discovery path - picked it up instead of the
.github/goreleaser.yml that CI passes with --config. The two had diverged
completely: the shadow published the GitHub release directly (draft: false),
pushed pgsty/minio:latest from a dockers section, and stamped a different
vendor and artifact naming. Since RPM signing runs on the maintainer's own
machine, that shadow config was one stray `goreleaser release` away from
publishing a mislabelled release and overwriting the Docker latest tag.
Delete the file and drop its .gitignore entry so any future .goreleaser.yml
shows up as untracked and is caught by the release workflow's clean-checkout
check, rather than silently steering local builds. CI is unaffected: it names
its config explicitly. (A copy of the removed file is preserved out of tree
for reference.)
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
gen-ldflags injected -X cmd.GOPATH / cmd.GOROOT from the builder's environment,
baking absolute paths like /Users/<user>/go into every released binary. That
defeats -trimpath and makes the build unreproducible: a third party rebuilding
the same tag gets different bytes and cannot verify checksums.txt.
The values only seed logger.Init's source-path trim list, and under -trimpath
the binary's paths are already relative, so there is no build-machine prefix
left to trim - the trim list also still gets runtime.GOROOT() and
build.Default.GOPATH at run time. Dropping the two stamps changes no observable
logging behaviour; cmd.GOPATH/GOROOT keep the empty defaults a plain go build
leaves.
Verified: gen-ldflags output no longer contains cmd.GOPATH/GOROOT; a
-trimpath release build has zero occurrences of the builder path (was 1);
Version, ReleaseTag and CommitID stamps are intact.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The compute step spliced ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }} straight into the
run: body, so a dispatch tag containing shell metacharacters was parsed as
script - arbitrary code in a job holding a contents:write token. Pass the
input through the environment instead (INPUT_TAG), the same shape
docker-release.yml already uses, so the value reaches bash as data.
Second vector: the old format check compared the sed output against the input
to decide validity, and sed anchors ^...$ per line. A tag carrying a newline
passed the check on its first line and the remaining lines flowed into
$GITHUB_ENV, setting arbitrary variables (PATH, LD_PRELOAD, ...) for every
later step. Replace it with a bash =~ whitelist anchored to the whole string,
which rejects any multi-line value up front.
Verified: a legal RELEASE.* tag is accepted and yields the right PKG_VERSION;
a `"; touch ...; #` injection and a newline-carrying PATH/LD_PRELOAD payload
are both rejected; an empty input falls back to the git ref name.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The crosscompile gate built 15 OS/arch combinations, ten of which we never
ship (ppc64le, mips64, s390x, mips, riscv64, 386, arm, freebsd, netbsd,
openbsd). On a cold CI cache each target costs ~80s, so the full set ran ~21
min and tripped the job's 20-min timeout, cancelling the only CI run for the
release HEAD. Trim the list to the exact goos/goarch matrix the release
actually produces (see .github/goreleaser.yml): linux, darwin, windows on
amd64 and arm64.
This also closes a coverage gap: windows/arm64 is published but was not being
compile-checked. The trimmed set builds all six in well under the timeout.
Note: netbsd is no longer compile-checked here, so the go-systemd v22.6.0 pin
(kept because v22.7.0 does not build on netbsd) loses its CI guard. The pin is
retained deliberately - it is harmless on the platforms we ship and upgrading
go-systemd is a separate decision - but a netbsd regression in a dependency
would now surface only if that build is exercised out of band.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two chroot branches that drop privileges when MINIO_USERNAME/GROUPNAME
(and optionally MINIO_UID/GID) are set ran chroot as a child of the entry
shell, leaving the shell as PID 1. A SIGTERM from `docker stop` or an
orchestrator then went to the shell, which does not forward it, so MinIO was
never asked to shut down and was killed after the stop timeout (exit 137) with
no "Exiting on signal" log - risking in-flight requests and data at the flush
boundary. The default branch already exec's; these two now do too, so MinIO
runs as PID 1 and receives the signal directly.
Verified in a faithful reproduction of the release runtime layer: all three
paths (default, USERNAME only, USERNAME+UID/GID) now stop in ~0.2s with exit 0
and log the graceful shutdown, where the two drop-privilege paths previously
timed out to exit 137.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the repository's actual quality contract visible in CI. Check formatting, build and vet the tree, run cmd and internal tests, enforce pinned lint and generated-file cleanliness, exercise S3 Select under the race detector, and cross-compile every supported target.
Keep each concern in a separate job so failures identify the missing guarantee instead of hiding behind a single aggregate test result.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
SelectResults spawns a parser goroutine that drains and closes the
response body when the stream ends; deferring res.Close() had the test
drain and close the same bytes.Reader concurrently, which the race
detector catches reliably. Give the test body a close signal and wait
for the parser to finish instead of competing with it.
The double-close lives in minio-go's client parser, which no server
code path uses; it remains worth an upstream report.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Expand the generated-file gate beyond *_gen.go and go.sum to cover generated tests, msgp output, stringer files, go.mod, and untracked generated artifacts.
Regenerate the 19 stale stringer outputs with the go.mod-pinned x/tools version. Runtime String output is unchanged, and a repeated generation pass now leaves the tree byte-identical.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Installing golangci-lint from the moving master branch made local and CI results depend on the day they ran. Pin v2.11.3 and install it into a versioned path so version changes cannot accidentally reuse a stale binary.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The release workflow built and pushed the container images in the same
run that created the draft, so pgsty/minio:latest moved to a build
nobody had signed or published yet. Abandoning that draft left latest
pointing at it with no way to notice, and the images were the one
artifact of a release that escaped the draft gate entirely.
Image publishing moves to its own dispatch-triggered workflow that
takes a tag and refuses to touch anything that is not a published,
non-prerelease release, and that is not the latest one - since it moves
the latest image tag, running it for an older release would silently
roll users back. It builds from the archives attached to that release,
checked against the published checksums, rather than rebuilding from
source: the image then contains the same binary the tarball does, by
construction rather than by assumption.
GoReleaser loses its dockers and docker_manifests sections along with
the QEMU, buildx and registry-login steps that only existed to serve
them, and the release job drops packages: write, which was granted for
a GHCR push that never happened.
Releasing now has one more manual step. That is the point: tagging no
longer moves docker latest, so the tag can be cut, inspected, signed
and published before anything reaches users who pull by tag.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refuse dirty release checkouts and verify that every GoReleaser binary records the tagged revision with vcs.modified=false before packaging or publication.
Exercise the complete nFPM output in the release test pipeline: assert the six public names, validate every checksum and package identity field, and prove that RPM, DEB, and APK payloads contain the exact source binary and systemd unit. Validate release scripts and make their identity expectations the single source of truth.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace minio/pkger's hard-coded upstream identity with an in-tree nFPM configuration. Packages now name PGSTY as vendor and maintainer, use the SILO homepage and SPDX license, and preserve the established package names, versions, payload paths, modes, and checksum format.
Resolve both the release binary and systemd unit independently of the caller's working directory. The release and test workflows share the same package script, while the signing script consumes the same final metadata contract.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
GitHub Actions cannot hold the Pigsty RPM signing key, so the release workflow must stop before publication. Create releases as append-only drafts, refuse to overwrite existing assets, and make publication an explicit action after local signing and review.
Add a maintainer-side signing command that downloads the two RPMs, verifies checksums and package identity, signs them with the Pigsty key, regenerates checksums, and only replaces draft assets when --upload is explicitly requested. Published releases are never modified.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Consolidate the release-cycle security ledger after the implementation commits are stable. Document internode containment, policy-condition source hardening, the opt-in trusted-proxy boundary, and the bucket/object authorization tightening with fork-local identifiers where no CVE exists.
Use silo-pkg v3.11.0 as the maintained dependency reference, explain compatibility and migration behavior, and link each entry to the rewritten commit that actually carries the fix.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keep unpublished security working notes, local agent instructions, and maintainer scratch material out of the public source tree. Already tracked security documentation remains tracked; the ignore rules only prevent accidental additions.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Point both the server and bundled client jobs at the release tag being cut, keep chart appVersion aligned, and retain the maintained pgsty/minio image selected by the public chart baseline.
Stop creating the console/console123 administrator by default. Leave an explicit change-me example while rendering no user-creation job unless an operator opts in. Chart packaging and repository indexing remain separate release steps.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
ReadParts built its disk-health trace path from partMetaPaths[0] with
no length check, so a caller passing no paths at all indexed an empty
slice. xlStorage.ReadParts handles an empty list perfectly well - it
returns an empty result - so the panic came entirely from the metrics
bookkeeping wrapped around it.
The reachable caller is ReadPartsHandler, which decodes its path list
from a msgpack request body that an authenticated peer controls, and
neither the handler, the storage-REST client, nor the path guard
rejects an empty one: guardPaths ranges over the slice, so an empty
slice passes vacuously.
net/http recovers a panicking handler, so this is not a crash - which
is what makes it worth fixing rather than merely tidy. ReadPartsHandler
calls keepHTTPResponseAlive before it calls ReadParts, and that helper
spawns a goroutine whose only exit is receiving from the channel done()
writes. Panicking in between skips both done(err) and done(nil), so the
process survives and the keep-alive goroutine and its ten-second ticker
stay parked forever - one per request, driven by a request body the
caller chooses. Repeating one malformed frame exhausts the node.
The fix follows DeleteVersions in the same decorator, which already
guards the identical "merely for tracing" lookup; ReadParts was the one
method missing the pattern. It also covers the second entry point, the
per-disk errgroup in readParts, where a panic has no recover at all and
would take the process down. That path is screened at the S3 boundary
today, so this is defence in depth there.
No error is returned for the empty case. The storage layer's answer to
an empty list is an empty result, and turning that into an error would
be a behaviour change on a path that is merely degenerate.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
joinErrs ranged over its own empty accumulator string instead of the
errs slice, so the loop body never executed and the function
unconditionally returned "". Its only caller feeds the merrs tag of the
DeleteDanglingObject audit event, so every dangling deletion was
recorded without the per-drive metadata errors: the record showed what
was deleted but not which drives errored or why quorum was lost.
Range over errs instead. The existing separator logic is already right
once the loop runs, since a leading nil error appends "<nil>" and every
later element gets its comma. Upstream's open minio/minio#21580 fixes
the same bug with a strings.Builder rewrite, not taken here: the
function runs once per dangling deletion over a drive-count-sized
slice, and the one-word change is the entire defect.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The discrete PostgreSQL connection path concatenated raw values into a libpq keyword/value string. Whitespace, quotes, or backslashes could split a value into additional parameters or make an otherwise valid configuration fail to parse; the path also used the unsupported keyword username instead of user.
Render every generated value as a single-quoted libpq parameter, escape quotes and backslashes, and use the correct user key. Keep the existing connection_string form untouched. The earlier attempt to register migrated PostgreSQL and MySQL fields is deliberately absent because those key names collide with the legacy connection-string tokenizer.
Focused tests cover ordinary values, whitespace, quotes, backslashes, and parameter-shaped input.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
GetNotifyNATS reads user_credentials, nkey_seed and tls_handshake_first
and GetNotifyAMQP reads immediate, but none of them were registered in
DefaultNATSKVS/DefaultAMQPKVS or the help schema, so CheckValidKeys
rejected any enable=on target carrying them. Worse, the legacy config
migration wrote exactly these keys - including the env var name
MINIO_NOTIFY_NATS_USER_CREDENTIALS used as a config key, because the
NATSUserCredentials constant doubled as both - so a migrated NATS config
failed validation on every load, and the FetchEnabledTargets fail-fast
then silently disabled all bucket notification targets.
- Register user_credentials/nkey_seed/tls_handshake_first (NATS) and
immediate (AMQP) in the default KVS and help schema; split
NATSUserCredentials into a real config key plus EnvNATSUserCredentials
(all env var names byte-stable)
- Fix legacy migration: SetNotifyNATS writes the proper key;
SetNotifyAMQP no longer writes cfg.Immediate under the internal key
and now carries both immediate and internal
- Tolerate the legacy MINIO_NOTIFY_NATS_USER_CREDENTIALS key written by
pre-fix migrations (NATS-scoped, load path only) with fallback read;
env > user_credentials > legacy key
- Print key names only, never values, in the invalid-keys error of both
CheckValidKeys forms; rejected values can carry credentials
- Add an AST-based audit test asserting parser reads, migration writes
and help entries stay within the registered key set for all ten notify
subsystems, with floor assertions so collector drift fails loudly
- Document (unchanged) FetchEnabledTargets fail-fast and pin it with a
characterization test
Known same-class gap left in place and pinned by the audit's allowlist:
SetNotifyPostgres/SetNotifyMySQL write five unregistered DSN-era keys;
tracked for a follow-up issue.
Closes#39
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The address MinIO attributes a request to is read from X-Forwarded-For,
X-Real-IP or RFC 7239 Forwarded, and never from the connection unless all
three are absent. It becomes aws:SourceIp and the audit remotehost field,
so any client that can reach the API port chooses the value an IpAddress
condition is evaluated against and the address every logged action is
attributed to.
MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES now selects who may make that claim:
unset the historical behaviour, unchanged
none no forwarded header is believed; the TCP peer wins
<CIDRs> believed only from listed peers, chains read right-to-left
Reading right-to-left is what makes an appending proxy safe: each hop
appends the peer it actually saw, so an entry a client injected can only
sit to the left of one a proxy wrote. The stock nginx recipe
$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for appends, which leaves the client's entry
left-most - exactly where the untrusted path reads - so a deployment with
no direct route to the API port was forgeable too.
_MINIO_API_XFF_HEADER is deliberately untouched, in semantics and in read
timing. Widening it to mean "trust nothing" was implemented and reverted:
it is the only part of this change that could alter a deployed
configuration, and the new variable expresses the same guarantee at no
compatibility cost. Upstream's TestXFFDisabled is retained verbatim.
Notes on the allow-list mode, all covered by tests:
- it must name proxies, not the subnet they sit in; listed entries are
skipped while walking, so a range covering clients lets them forge
- a cluster must list its own nodes, because MinIO forwards between
them and a client can force a hop via the ListObjectsV2 token
- loopback is trusted as a peer, not as a chain entry, so FTP and SFTP
keep attributing their sessions
- the node-to-node forwarder drops X-Real-IP and Forwarded from a peer
not entitled to have set them
- the walk scans the header in place and stops after 100 hops, so a
long chain costs neither allocation nor unbounded work
No behaviour change for any deployment that does not set the new
variable: the untrusted path is a verbatim copy of the previous function
body, differentially verified against it over ~5.1M header combinations.
The LDAP STS allow-list now shares the list parser as pure code motion,
verified identical across every combination of 37 allow-list values and
21 peer addresses.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
A bucket policy that allows s3:DeleteObject only when s3:versionid is null
-- Condition {"Null": {"s3:versionid": "true"}}, the idiom for "let clients
delete current objects but not roll back versions" -- denied every delete,
including the version-less ones it was meant to permit (upstream issue
minio/minio#21735).
getConditionValues wrote "versionid": {""} unconditionally. The condition
engine decides Null by slice length (nullfunc.evaluate), so a present-but-
empty value reads as "key present": Null:true never matched and Null:false
always did. Absent and empty were indistinguishable.
Writing the key only when the request names a version fixes the reported
case but, alone, opens a worse one. DeleteObjects carries each object's
version in the XML body, which getConditionValues -- reading only r.Form --
never sees. A body version would then vanish from the map, read as null,
and a policy meant to protect old versions would authorize deleting a
specific one. So authorization also rebinds versionid to the effective,
server-resolved reqInfo.VersionID for DeleteObjectAction: the per-entry
body value that checkRequestAuthTypeWithVID already sets in the
DeleteObjects loop, deleting the key when that value is empty. A
query-level ?versionId on a DeleteObjects POST no longer leaks into any
entry's decision.
Finally, trim the version the condition builder reads. newContext and
getOpts both TrimSpace it before the object layer acts, so an untrimmed
value here let a padded ?versionId=V%20 present a different s3:versionid
than the version actually operated on, sidestepping a Deny keyed on
StringEquals s3:versionid. DeleteObjectAction was already immune via the
trimmed reqInfo value; this covers GetObject, tagging, retention, and the
copy-source read.
Tests: an end-to-end DeleteObjects against a Null:{s3:versionid:true}
policy over versioned objects (with a decoy query versionId proving the
per-entry body value wins), and a unit test asserting key presence,
trimming, and the copy-source fallback.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Policy evaluation mixed server-derived identity and transport values with raw headers and query parameters. A client could therefore shadow internal condition keys, synthesize LDAP or JWT resource variables, substitute request tags for stored tags, or make a condition observe a value different from the one the handler actually used.
Partition condition sources, reserve internal names, adopt exact-name lookup from silo-pkg, and bind authorization to the effective request state. Preserve compatible query forms for storage class and upload tags with explicit header precedence, while restricting signature age and existing-object tags to authenticated or server-resolved values.
Tests sweep every supported key across header and query routes and exercise LDAP/OIDC variables, object-lock spelling, STS tags, metadata extraction, and end-to-end policy decisions.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Upgrade directly to silo-pkg v3.11.0, the fork's first non-colliding release, and carry the completed minio/minio#20449 hardening without exposing the retired v3.7.0, v3.8.0, or v3.8.1 tags in the rewritten history.
Twelve sensitive bucket-level writes now require the bare bucket resource in addition to the historical bucket/ form, so an object-only bucket/* grant cannot delete a bucket or change protections. Read/list behavior, ordinary tenant self-service, Deny statements, and NotResource exclusions retain their compatible behavior; MINIO_API_LEGACY_BUCKET_RESOURCE_MATCH restores the old matcher when migration requires it.
End-to-end tests cover direct clients, session policies, service accounts, wildcard edge cases, compatible resource pairs, and real bucket deletion.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
sort.SliceIsSorted with a strict '<' predicate treats equal neighbours
as sorted, so a completion list like [1,1] passed the order check and
the same part was assembled into the object twice: a single uploaded
5 MiB part produced a 10 MiB object. Replace the check with an explicit
strictly-increasing scan that rejects repeats with InvalidPartOrder
before anything is assembled. Gaps and lists not starting at part 1
remain legal, matching AWS semantics.
The regression test drives the real CompleteMultipartUpload handler on
both Erasure backends and asserts that rejected completions leave no
object behind and keep the upload retryable.
Closes#49
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
httpStreamResponse, streamHTTPResponse, waitForHTTPStream, and their
8k buffer pool lost their last caller when ReadMultipleHandler went
away (73ac52472). Nothing references them anywhere in the tree, and
the storage REST wire surface is untouched - these encoded a framing
no registered handler still speaks.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
ReadPartsHandler completed its keepalive stream before reporting storage failures, then tried to write an ordinary error response after the body was already owned. Clients consequently decoded the error text as msgpack and lost the real failure.
Send failures through the keepalive completion channel and mark success only after ReadParts returns cleanly, preserving the existing wire framing and error identity.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
AppendFile, DeleteVersions, and ReadFile sized memory directly from peer-controlled Content-Length or query parameters. Tiny requests could therefore reserve gigabytes before delivering a body, while negative declarations could reach make and panic.
Cap preallocation without capping accepted append bodies, grow version slices as entries decode, reject negative counts, and enforce the format-implied 5 GiB ceiling on legacy whole-file reads. Regression tests drive raw handler inputs, measure total allocations, and retain legitimate round trips.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Malformed erasure layouts can divide by zero, while negative part sizes collapse expected shard sizes to zero and make truncated data appear healthy. Boundary validation alone is insufficient because poisoned metadata may already exist on disk or arrive through local heal paths.
Reject non-positive block sizes at the sole Erasure constructor, guard the metadata arithmetic helpers and rebalance calculation, refuse negative part sizes before persistence, and make CheckParts and VerifyFile reject previously stored poison. Tests cover both shard-size implementations, construction, persistence, local verification, and the wire boundary.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Storage REST request bodies and Grid RPC frames bypass the HTTP validity middleware, allowing wire-supplied paths and malformed FileInfo values to reach xlStorage unchecked.
Wrap the remotely exposed StorageAPI with a guard that covers every path-bearing method, including nested metadata fields. Reject traversal and destructive volume-root aliases before path cleaning can erase them, and validate erasure geometry and part sizes at the same wire boundary. Keep a raw-volume check in getVolDir for peer-S3 calls that bypass the wrapper.
Reflection, fuzz, traversal, peer-S3, compatibility, and malformed-erasure tests pin the complete method surface and prove that legal object names remain accepted.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
WithDeadline runs its work function on a goroutine of its own, so a panic
inside it is reachable by no recover() the caller can install: net/http
and internal/grid each recover only on the goroutine they own. Left
unhandled it terminates the process, which turns any malformed internode
payload that trips a bug in work() into a remote node kill.
Eleven call sites run wire-derived storage work through this path. The
project already recovers panics at both request boundaries; this extends
the same policy to the one goroutine those recovers cannot reach.
Stack dumps are capped over the process lifetime. The panic is by
definition reachable from untrusted input, so writing a full stack per
occurrence would trade a node kill for unbounded log amplification, one
small request each. The error is returned every time regardless, so the
caller's own rate-limited logging still sees each occurrence.
Inherited from upstream; the fork added no lines to this path.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mark trackingResponseWriter committed when Write or an effective Flush implicitly sends a 200 response. This keeps duplicate-response detection aligned with the actual writer chain while preserving no-op Flush behavior when unsupported.
Add direct and gzip-streaming regression coverage for implicit headers, Flush delegation, and suppression of a second response.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace bytebufferpool-backed return values with bytes.Buffer storage so
the downloaded and compressed slices remain valid after downloadBinary
returns. Close the zstd encoder on copy failure and propagate final close
errors.
Add round-trip and pool-reuse regression coverage for both returned
buffers.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wire the preallocated pooled shard slices into parallelReader instead
of discarding them and allocating a buffer for each disk.
Keep readerToBuf as a permutation while preferred readers are reordered.
The former assignments could duplicate a buffer slot after multiple
swaps, causing concurrent writes and a possible decode stall. Add pool
aliasing and mapping regression coverage.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
hash.Checksum.AddPart returned before seeding the accumulator when the
part was empty, so a multipart object with no content at all ended up
with no checksum instead of the checksum of zero bytes. Completing such
an upload failed with XAmzContentChecksumMismatch when the client
supplied the correct object checksum, and stored an empty checksum when
it did not.
Run the type check and the first checksum seeding before the zero size
early return. Appending zero bytes still leaves an existing accumulator
unchanged, so only the all empty case changes: a zero length part
followed by content already merged correctly, because prepending no bytes
does not alter a CRC.
AddPart has a single production caller, the multipart completion path, and
its part checksum type is derived from the upload's own checksum type, so
the type check now reached for zero sized parts cannot fire there.
Add a table test over CRC32, CRC32C and CRC64NVME covering every position
an empty part can take, and an API level zero length full object upload
that exercises the persisted AppendTo/ReadCheckSums round trip.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
CompleteMultipartUpload compared the per-part checksum taken from the
request body against the stored part checksum unconditionally, so a
client that sent only PartNumber and ETag for each part failed with
InvalidPart.
AWS S3 requires part level checksums in the completion body only for
composite checksum types. For full object types the client sends the
object level checksum in the request headers instead and does not retain
per-part values - that is the point of FULL_OBJECT. Reproduced with
boto3 1.43.58: it puts x-amz-checksum-crc32 on each UploadPart and the
full object checksum on the completion headers, but emits only ETag and
PartNumber in the completion body. A caller could only get such an upload
through by collecting the per-part checksums from the UploadPart
responses and echoing them back, which is exactly the bookkeeping
FULL_OBJECT exists to avoid and which no off-the-shelf SDK call does.
minio-go does echo them, which is why mc never hit this.
Treat the part checksum as optional when the upload declared a full
object checksum type and the client sent no part checksum at all. A part
carrying any checksum is still validated against the stored one -
including one sent under the wrong algorithm, which cannot match and is
rejected - composite uploads keep requiring a checksum for every part,
and the merged object checksum is still computed from the server stored,
upload time validated part checksums, never from client supplied values,
so integrity is unchanged.
Covered by API level tests over CRC32, CRC32C and CRC64NVME on both the
single drive and erasure backends, with guards for a wrong object
checksum, a wrong part checksum, a part checksum under another algorithm,
a mix of present and omitted part checksums, an absent object checksum,
and composite uploads still requiring every part checksum.
Fixes#31
Reported-by: Christophe Bornet <cbornet@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace Georg Mangold's console fork (v1.9.1) with pgsty/silo-console
at the v2.0.0 release, Pigsty's maintained console carrying the SILO
identity, the redesigned and hardened web app, and regenerated embedded
assets. The fork keeps the upstream github.com/minio/console module
path without a /v2 suffix, so the replace pins v2.0.0's tagged commit
(b952a120) as a pseudo-version rather than the tag itself.
highwayhash v1.0.4 and go-m1cpu v0.2.2 follow from the new console's
requirements; the previous console resolved a v1.0.4 pre-release and
v0.2.1. Full-tree build verified against the new pin.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace github.com/minio/mc with the pinned pgsty/mc 2026-08-01 release while preserving the upstream module identity. Refresh the module graph, including the fork-required etcd 3.6.9 patch update.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move MinIO from v1.18.6 to v1.18.7 to pick up the GO-2026-5841
fix. The vulnerable dictionary symbols are not reachable in this tree,
but keeping the direct compression dependency patched avoids carrying
the affected release.
Verified with go mod verify, full go test and go vet runs, and
govulncheck reporting no reachable symbol or imported-package
vulnerabilities.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
thrift 0.23.0 compares an int against math.MaxUint32, which does not
compile on 32-bit platforms and has broken linux/arm and linux/386
builds since the 2026-06-18 dependency refresh; 0.24.0 carries the
upstream fix. The library only reaches us through fraugster/parquet-go
for S3 Select, whose decode tests still pass.
go-systemd v22.7.0 moved CLOCK_MONOTONIC into a file built for every
unix platform and no longer compiles on NetBSD. Pin v22.6.0 with a
replace directive - a plain require cannot hold because Console pulls
v22.7.0 back in through MVS - until upstream ships the fix. The server
only consumes daemon.SdNotify, which both versions provide.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Require Go 1.26.5, gRPC 1.82.1, and x/text 0.39.0 while retaining the dependency graph's existing pins wherever MVS permits. Restore the blocking govulncheck job and correct the documented security advisories.
Use the maintained Silo image for both the server and post-install mc jobs. The image bundles mcli with an mc compatibility link.
Bump the chart major version because changing the default registry can affect admission and pull policies. Keep Helm repository packaging and indexes outside this source-chart change.
Replace upstream docs.min.io references with the SILO documentation domain and remove the upstream community path prefix.
Co-authored-by: waterkip <6317502+waterkip@users.noreply.github.com>
Update the module Go directive and release Docker build images from Go 1.26.2 to Go 1.26.4 so local, CI, hotfix, and release builds use the same patched toolchain.
Keep ordinary Go module requirements and replacements unchanged; this intentionally avoids a third-party dependency refresh while allowing container system packages to refresh through the newer golang Alpine base image and existing apk resolution.
Update the security advisory index to record the Go 1.26.4 toolchain bump alongside the earlier Go 1.26.2 security update.
Verified with go build ./..., go vet ./cmd/, and focused cmd tests. go mod tidy -diff was attempted as a read-only dependency drift check but could not complete because proxy.golang.org timed out while fetching uncached transitive test modules.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
The internode storage-REST ReadMultiple endpoint (/rmpl) joined
attacker-controlled Bucket/Prefix/Files into a filesystem path with no
validation, letting a peer with internode credentials read files outside
the drive root (GHSA-xh8f-g2qw-gcm7).
ReadMultiple has had no production caller since upstream #20390 removed
the last one (listParts) in Sep 2024; multipart now uses ReadParts (/rps).
Following the upstream fix, remove the whole API instead of validating
paths: route constant and registration, server handler, REST client
wrapper, the StorageAPI/xlStorage/xlStorageDiskIDCheck methods, the
storageMetricReadMultiple metric, and the ReadMultipleReq/Resp datatypes.
Regenerated the msgp and stringer outputs; storageRESTVersion stays at v63.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Route JSON Lines through the bounded PReader path so oversized records are rejected consistently instead of bypassing the limit on SIMD-capable CPUs.
Preserve S3 Select error codes in stream error events, wrap JSON parser errors as JSONParsingError, and flush completed records before returning a terminal error event. Add regression coverage for oversized JSON Lines input and error code preservation.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Remove the per-username LDAP STS throttle bucket and keep the limiter keyed only by source IP. A username bucket is shared across all clients and lets one source keep a known account's bucket drained with bad-password attempts, locking the legitimate user out before LDAP bind.
For trusted proxies, stop trusting the left-most forwarded address. Resolve X-Forwarded-For right-to-left, skip trusted proxy hops, reject catch-all trusted-proxy CIDRs, and intentionally ignore RFC 7239 Forwarded for this security-sensitive bucket. Document that X-Real-IP is trusted verbatim and must be overwritten by the trusted proxy, not passed through from clients.
Update focused limiter, source-IP, trusted-proxy, and LDAP config tests to cover source-only buckets, spoofed appended XFF, multi-hop trusted proxies, Forwarded fallback, catch-all rejection, and the X-Real-IP deployment contract.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Allows the trackingResponseWriter to properly proxy flush
requests to the underlying http.Flusher. This ensures
compatibility with streaming responses.
Update the STS, security, select, and Docker documentation to reflect the recent hardening work, including LDAP STS throttling details, OIDC JWT verification changes, and the new pgsty-specific security policy and advisory index.
Rewrite repository and raw-document links that still pointed at minio/minio so the docs consistently reference pgsty/minio instead.
The core idea is to keep the documentation aligned with the fork's actual security behavior, ownership, and upgrade guidance without mixing in unrelated code changes.
Prevent LDAP STS reservation cancel paths from over-crediting rate-limit buckets by capping refill and refund capacity against in-flight reservations.
Add an explicit trusted-proxy allowlist for LDAP STS source bucketing, prefer clean X-Real-IP values on trusted peers, and extend tests/docs for the new behavior.
Use the socket peer address for LDAP STS per-IP rate limiting instead of the generic forwarded-header-aware helper. This keeps the security-sensitive rate-limit key from trusting spoofable X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and Forwarded headers while leaving the rest of the source-IP behavior unchanged.
Add focused regression coverage for RemoteAddr parsing, header spoofing, and peer-address bucket selection.
Update go.mod and all golang build images from 1.26.1 to 1.26.2 to pick up the upstream 2026-04-07 security release.
This includes fixes for CVE-2026-32280 / CVE-2026-32281 in crypto/x509, CVE-2026-32283 in crypto/tls, and the related toolchain and standard library security fixes shipped in go1.26.2, without changing any unrelated dependencies.
Track issue #28 / GHSA-9c4q-hq6p-c237 as fake CVE-2026-40028. Close the Snowball auto-extract auth gap in PutObjectExtractHandler by treating authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer the same as ordinary PUTs: honor X-Amz-Decoded-Content-Length, initialize newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader(), and verify the SigV4 request before any tar bytes reach untar(). This removes the forged-signature write primitive that let a single request fan out into arbitrary extracted object creation.
Add regression coverage for forged-signature Snowball unsigned-trailer writes, anonymous Snowball requests against non-public buckets, and legitimate signed Snowball extraction with trailing CRC32 trailers. Validate the new tests against the vulnerable parent and patched tree, and confirm with containerized before/after smoke runs that the exploit succeeds pre-fix, fails post-fix, and normal signed Snowball uploads still extract correctly.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Track issue #27 / GHSA-hv4r-mvr4-25vw as fake CVE-2026-40027. Close the unsigned-trailer trust flaw that let query-string credentials skip signature verification in PutObject and PutObjectPart by moving presigned rejection and SigV4 verification into newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader(), so authTypeStreamingUnsignedTrailer can no longer silently downgrade query auth into an anonymous body read.
Add focused regression coverage for forged query-string-only unsigned-trailer PUTs and multipart uploads, mixed header/query auth rejection, and anonymous unsigned-trailer writes that remain allowed only when bucket policy explicitly permits them. Validate the new tests against the vulnerable parent and confirm with before/after live-server runs that presigned unsigned-trailer attacks are rejected while legitimate header-authenticated and policy-driven flows still work.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Enforce the 1 MiB maxCharsPerRecord limit while splitting CSV and line-delimited JSON input so oversized records are rejected before they can be buffered and parsed.
Return OverMaxRecordSize for these failures instead of collapsing them into InternalError, and preserve splitter errors in the JSON worker so oversized-record failures are not lost after successful partial decode.
Close the replication-header trust flaw that allowed ordinary PutObject and CopyObject requests to smuggle X-Minio-Replication-* headers into X-Minio-Internal-* SSE metadata and write objects into an unreadable state. Stop accepting replication-only metadata in the default extraction path, restore it only after a trusted replication write has passed ReplicateObjectAction, and tighten CopyObject by sanitizing replication-only request headers before metadata, precondition, and SSE-C source handling consume them. Also gate replica status writes on the same trusted replication path and restore replication SSE metadata in multipart and snowball upload flows so legitimate replication continues to work.
Add focused regression coverage for untrusted PUT and COPY header poisoning at the handler layer, plus helper tests for trusted vs untrusted metadata extraction and CopyObject header sanitization. Validate the new tests against both the patched tree and the vulnerable HEAD baseline, and confirm with live server before/after runs that malicious PUT/COPY requests no longer turn objects unreadable.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Prevent username enumeration in AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity by returning the same external STS error for unknown users and invalid passwords, while preserving LDAP infrastructure failures as upstream errors so they continue to surface as 500s and remain visible in server logs.
Add a small in-memory rate limiter for LDAP STS login attempts, keyed by source IP and normalized username, and add regression coverage for auth failure classification, throttling, and Docker-backed LDAP end-to-end flows.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Close the OIDC JWT algorithm confusion flaw in AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity by restoring a JWKS-only verification path. Stop injecting the client secret into the verifier keyring and restrict accepted signing methods to the asymmetric algorithms already supported by the existing JWKS flow.
Add regression coverage to verify HS256 tokens are rejected, RS256 tokens remain valid, and JWKS refresh and retry logic cannot bypass the method allowlist.
Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Code <claude-code@anthropic.com>
Replace minio/pkg/v3 with pgsty/minio-pkg/v3 v3.6.3 to fix LDAP TLS
regression where DialURL() was not passing TLS config for ldaps://
connections, causing InsecureSkipVerify and RootCAs to be silently
ignored (x509: certificate signed by unknown authority).
Pin four dependencies to avoid breaking changes introduced in 5abd9a80f:
- go-ldap/ldap/v3 v3.4.12: v3.4.13 rewrote GetLDAPError() internals
- IBM/sarama v1.45.1: v1.46.0 changed Kafka protocol version negotiation
- lib/pq v1.10.9: v1.11.0 treats nil []byte as NULL and drops PG <14
- etcd v3.6.8: stay on intermediate version per policy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
We maintain our own release pipeline (release.yml, test-release.yml)
and have no use for the upstream test/lint/integration workflows.
They reference infrastructure and secrets we don't have, and the
PR-triggered jobs never fire since we don't take external pull requests.
Closes#14
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rework Dockerfile.goreleaser to download the latest mcli binary from
pgsty/mc GitHub releases, verify its SHA-256 checksum, and install both
mcli and mc (symlink) into the final image alongside minio and curl.
Also add download-static-curl.sh to goreleaser extra_files and enable
workflow_dispatch for the release workflow.
Go 1.26.1 tightens a few toolchain checks that older builds tolerated.\n\nCast aliased replication status values back to their defining type before calling the generated msgp helpers, and replace Sprintf+WriteString pairs with direct Fprintf calls where needed.\n\nThese are compatibility-only source changes to keep the cmd package building cleanly under the newer linker/toolchain.
Switch to community-maintained console fork (georgmangold/console v1.9.1)
and update dependencies accordingly. Fix go vet format directive in
grid_test.go and adapt test status code for Go 1.26 HTTP semantics.
- Revert console dependency from stripped v1.7.7-pre to v1.7.6,
restoring the full embedded management console
- Rewrite README disclaimer with proper trademark attribution and
nominative fair use language for AGPL compliance
- Update documentation links and Go module paths to this repository
- Restore docs removed upstream (hotfixes.md, metrics/v3.md)
- Restore feature request issue template
- Update Go version to 1.26.0
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix(api): Don't send responses twice.
In some cases multiple responses are being sent for one request, causing
the API server to incorrectly drop connections.
This change introduces a ResponseWriter which tracks whether a
response has already been sent. This is used to prevent a response being
sent if something already has (e.g. by a preconditions check function).
Fixes#21633.
Co-authored-by: Menno Finlay-Smits <hello@menno.io>
This fixes a security issue where sub-policy attached to a service
account or STS account is not properly validated under certain "own"
account operations (like creating new service accounts). This allowed a
service account to create new service accounts for the same user
bypassing the inline policy restriction.
fix: use correct dummy ARN for claim-based OIDC provider
When listing OIDC access keys, use the correct ARN when looking up the provider configuration for the claim-based provider. Without this it was impossible to list access keys for a claim-based provider, only for a role-policy-based provider.
Fixesminio/minio#21548
Commit b6eb8dff64 renamed compression
setting environment variables to follow consistent style.
Although it preserved backward compatibility for the most part (i.e. it
handled MINIO_COMPRESS_ALLOW_ENCRYPTION, MINIO_COMPRESS_EXTENSIONS, and
MINIO_COMPRESS_MIME_TYPES), MINIO_COMPRESS_ENABLE was left behind.
Additionally, due to incorrect fallback ordering, and DefaultKVS
containing enable=off allow_encryption=off (so kvs.Get should've been
tried last), that commit broke MINIO_COMPRESS_ALLOW_ENCRYPTION (even
though it appeared to be handled), and even older MINIO_COMPRESS, too.
The legacy MIME types and extensions variables take precedence over both
config and new variables, so they don't need fixing.
`go run golang.org/x/tools/gopls/internal/analysis/modernize/cmd/modernize@latest -fix -test ./...` executed.
`go generate ./...` ran afterwards to keep generated.
* Store `ctx.Done` channel in a struct instead of a `ctx`. See: https://go.dev/blog/context-and-structs
* Return from `handleListener` on `ctx` cancellation, preventing goroutine leaks
* Simplify `handleListener` by removing the `send` closure. The `handleListener` is inlined by the compiler
* Return the first error from `Close`
* Preallocate slice in `Addrs`
* Reduce duplication in handling `opts.Trace`
* http/listener: revert error propagation from Close()
* http/listener: preserve original listener address in Addr()
* Preserve the original address when calling Addr() with multiple listeners
* Remove unused listeners from the slice
RoleARN is a required parameter in AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity,
according to the standard AWS implementation, and the official
AWS SDKs and CLI will not allow you to assume a role from a JWT
without also specifying a RoleARN. This meant that it was not
possible to use the official SDKs for claim-based OIDC with Minio
(minio/minio#21421), since Minio required you to _omit_ the RoleARN in this case.
minio/minio#21468 attempted to fix this by disabling the validation
of the RoleARN when a claim-based provider was configured, but this had
the side effect of making it impossible to have a mixture of claim-based
and role-based OIDC providers configured at the same time - every
authentication would be treated as claim-based, ignoring the RoleARN entirely.
This is an alternative fix, whereby:
- _if_ the `RoleARN` is one that Minio knows about, then use the associated role policy
- if the `RoleARN` is not recognised, but there is a claim-based provider configured, then ignore the role ARN and attempt authentication with the claim-based provider
- if the `RoleARN` is not recognised, and there is _no_ claim-based provider, then return an error.
Fixes incorrect application of ilm expiry rules on versioned objects
when replication is enabled.
Regression from https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/20441 which sends
DeleteObject calls to all pools. This is a problem for replication + ilm
scenario since replicated version can end up in a pool by itself instead of
pool where remaining object versions reside.
For example, if the delete marker is set on pool1 and object versions exist on
pool2, the second rule below will cause the delete marker to be expired by ilm
policy since it is the single version present in pool1
```
{
"Rules": [
{
"ID": "cs6il1ri2hp48g71mdjg",
"NoncurrentVersionExpiration": {
"NoncurrentDays": 14
},
"Status": "Enabled"
},
{
"Expiration": {
"ExpiredObjectDeleteMarker": true
},
"ID": "cs6inj3i2hp4po19cil0",
"Status": "Enabled"
}
]
}
```
this is minor PR that supports building on RISC-V 64,
this PR is for compilation only. There is no guarantee
that code is tested and will work in production.
S3 listing call is usually sent with a 'max-keys' parameter. This
'max-keys' will also be passed to WalkDir() call. However, when ILM is
enabled in a bucket and some objects are skipped, the listing can
return IsTruncated set to false even if there are more entries in
the drives.
The reason is that drives stop feeding the listing code because it has
max-keys parameter and the listing code thinks listing is finished
because it is being fed anymore.
Ask the drives to not stop listing and relies on the context
cancellation to stop listing in the drives as fast as possible.
This commit removes FIPS 140-2 related code for the following
reasons:
- FIPS 140-2 is a compliance, not a security requirement. Being
FIPS 140-2 compliant has no security implication on its own.
From a tech. perspetive, a FIPS 140-2 compliant implementation
is not necessarily secure and a non-FIPS 140-2 compliant implementation
is not necessarily insecure. It depends on the concret design and
crypto primitives/constructions used.
- The boringcrypto branch used to achieve FIPS 140-2 compliance was never
officially supported by the Go team and is now in maintainance mode.
It is replaced by a built-in FIPS 140-3 module. It will be removed
eventually. Ref: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/69536
- FIPS 140-2 modules are no longer re-certified after Sep. 2026.
Ref: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
Fixes#21249
Example params: `-ftp=force-tls=true -ftp="tls-private-key=ftp/private.key" -ftp="tls-public-cert=ftp/public.crt"`
If MinIO is set up for TLS those certs will be used.
we had a chicken and egg problem with this feature even
when used with kes the credentials generation would
not work in correct sequence causing setup/deployment
disruptions.
This PR streamlines all of this properly to ensure that
this functionality works as advertised.
On buffered streams the final entries could be missing, if a lot
are delivered when stream ends.
Fixes end-of-stream cancelling return of final entries by canceling
with the StreamEOF error.
in a specific corner case when you only have dangling
objects with single shard left over, we end up a situation
where healing is unable to list this dangling object to
purge due to the fact that listing logic expected only
`len(disks)/2+1` - where as when you make this choice you
end up with a situation that the drive where this object
is present is not part of your expected disks list, causing
it to be never listed and ignored into perpetuity.
change the logic such that HealObjects() would be able
to listAndHeal() per set properly on all its drives, since
there is really no other way to do this cleanly, however
instead of "listing" on all erasure sets simultaneously, we
list on '3' at a time. So in a large enough cluster this is
fairly staggered.
To make sure that no objects were skipped for any reason,
decommissioning does a second phase of listing to check if there
are some objects that need to be decommissioned. However, the code
forgot to skip orphan delete markers since the decom code already
skips it.
Make the code ignore delete markers in in the verification phase.
Co-authored-by: Anis Eleuch <anis@min.io>
There is prefix in json, but not in the equivalent command line. Although the role of prefix has been explained in the previous example, I think it should be supplemented.
This is a security incident fix, it would seem like since
the implementation of unsigned payload trailer on PUTs,
we do not validate the signature of the incoming request.
The signature can be invalid and is totally being ignored,
this in-turn allows any arbitrary secret to upload objects
given the user has "WRITE" permissions on the bucket, since
acces-key is a public information in general exposes these
potential users with WRITE on the bucket to be used by any
arbitrary client to make a fake request to MinIO the signature
under Authorization: header is totally ignored.
A test has been added to cover this scenario and fail
appropriately.
- Move VersionPurgeStatus into replication package
- ilm: Evaluate policy w/ obj retention/replication
- lifecycle: Use Evaluator to enforce ILM in scanner
- Unit tests covering ILM, replication and retention
- Simplify NewEvaluator constructor
When decommissioning is started, the list of buckets to decommission is
calculated, however, a bucket can be removed before decommissioning reaches
it. This will cause an infinite loop of listing error complaining about
the non-existence of the bucket. This commit will ignore
errVolumeNotFound to skip the not found bucket.
Enforce a bucket count limit on metrics for v2 calls.
If people hit this limit, they should move to v3, as certain calls explode with high bucket count.
Reviewers: This *should* only affect v2 calls, but the complexity is overwhelming.
If a user attempts to authenticate with a key but does not have an
sshpubkey attribute in LDAP, the server allows the connection, which
means the server trusted the key without reason. This is now fixed,
and a test has been added for validation.
Allow multiple private keys and extract all files from streams.
Place files in the folder with `.enc` removed.
Do basic checks so streams cannot traverse outside of the folder.
This commit adds the `MINIO_KMS_REPLICATE_KEYID` env. variable.
By default - if not specified or not set to `off` - MinIO will
replicate the KMS key ID of an object.
If `MINIO_KMS_REPLICATE_KEYID=off`, MinIO does not include the
object's KMS Key ID when replicating an object. However, it always
sets the SSE-KMS encryption header. This ensures that the object
gets encrypted using SSE-KMS. The target site chooses the KMS key
ID that gets used based on the site and bucket config.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
This commit allows clients to provide a set of intermediate CA
certificates (up to `MaxIntermediateCAs`) that the server will
use as intermediate CAs when verifying the trust chain from the
client leaf certificate up to one trusted root CA.
This is required if the client leaf certificate is not issued by
a trusted CA directly but by an intermediate CA. Without this commit,
MinIO rejects such certificates.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
If object is uploaded with tags, the internal tagging-timestamp tracked
for replication will be missing. Default to ModTime in such cases to
allow tags to be synced correctly.
Also fixing a regression in fetching tags and tag comparison
* fix: proxy requests to honor global transport
Load the globalProxyEndpoint properly
also, currently, the proxy requests will fail silently for batch cancel
even if the proxy fails; instead,d properly send the corresponding error back
for such proxy failures if opted
* pass the transport to the GetProxyEnpoints function
---------
Co-authored-by: Praveen raj Mani <praveen@minio.io>
Reject new lock requests immediately when 1000 goroutines are queued
for the local lock mutex.
We do not reject unlocking, refreshing, or maintenance; they add to the count.
The limit is set to allow for bursty behavior but prevent requests from
overloading the server completely.
Currently, DeleteObjects() tries to find the object's pool before
sending a delete request. This only works well when an object has
multiple versions in different pools since looking for the pool does
not consider the version-id. When an S3 client wants to
remove a version-id that exists in pool 2, the delete request will be
directed to pool one because it has another version of the same object.
This commit will remove looking for pool logic and will send a delete
request to all pools in parallel. This should not cause any performance
regression in most of the cases since the object will unlikely exist
in only one pool, and the performance price will be similar to
getPoolIndex() in that case.
Earlier, cluster and bucket metrics were named
`minio_usage_last_activity_nano_seconds`.
The bucket level is now named as
`minio_bucket_usage_last_activity_nano_seconds`
Signed-off-by: Shubhendu Ram Tripathi <shubhendu@minio.io>
When compression is enabled, the final object size is not calculated in
that case, we need to make sure that the provided buffer is always
more significant than the shard size, the bitrot will always calculate
the hash of blocks with shard size, except the last block.
Before https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/20575, files could pick up indices
from unrelated files if no index was added.
This would result in these files not being consistent across a set.
When loading, search for the compression indicators and check if they
are within the problematic date range, and clean up any parts that have
an index but shouldn't.
The test validates that the signature matches the one in files stored without an index.
Bumps xlMetaVersion, so this check doesn't have to be made for future versions.
It is possible delete marker was received on old pool as decom
move in progress, this PR allows decom retry to ensure these
delete markers are moved to new pool so that decommission can
be completed.
Fixes#20819
Add profiling potential crash wourkaround
Using admin traces could potentially crash the server (or handler more likely) due to upstream divide by 0: https://github.com/felixge/fgprof/pull/34
Ensure the profile always runs 100ms before stopping, so sample count isn't 0 (default sample rate ~10ms/sample, but allow for cpu starvation)
If one object has many parts where all parts are readable but some parts
are missing from some drives, this object can be sometimes un-healable,
which is wrong.
This commit will avoid reading from drives that have missing, corrupted or
outdated xl.meta. It will also check if any part is unreadable to avoid
healing in that case.
we do not need to hold the read locks at the higher
layer instead before reading the body, instead hold
the read locks properly at the time of renamePart()
for protection from racy part overwrites to compete
with concurrent completeMultipart().
CheckParts call can take time to verify 10k parts of a single object in a single drive.
To avoid an internal dealine of one minute in the single handler RPC, this commit will
switch to streaming RPC instead.
This API had missing permissions checking, allowing a user to change
their policy mapping by:
1. Craft iam-info.zip file: Update own user permission in
user_mappings.json
2. Upload it via `mc admin cluster iam import nobody iam-info.zip`
Here `nobody` can be a user with pretty much any kind of permission (but
not anonymous) and this ends up working.
Some more detailed steps - start from a fresh setup:
```
./minio server /tmp/d{1...4} &
mc alias set myminio http://localhost:9000 minioadmin minioadmin
mc admin user add myminio nobody nobody123
mc admin policy attach myminio readwrite nobody nobody123
mc alias set nobody http://localhost:9000 nobody nobody123
mc admin cluster iam export myminio
mkdir /tmp/x && mv myminio-iam-info.zip /tmp/x
cd /tmp/x
unzip myminio-iam-info.zip
echo '{"nobody":{"version":1,"policy":"consoleAdmin","updatedAt":"2024-08-13T19:47:10.1Z"}}' > \
iam-assets/user_mappings.json
zip -r myminio-iam-info-updated.zip iam-assets/
mc admin cluster iam import nobody ./myminio-iam-info-updated.zip
mc admin service restart nobody
```
`mc admin heal ALIAS/bucket/object` does not have any flag to heal
object noncurrent versions, this commit will make healing of the object
noncurrent versions implicitly asked.
This also fixes the 'mc admin heal ALIAS/bucket/object' that does not work
correctly when the bucket is versioned. This has been broken since Apr 2023.
Golang http.Server will call SetReadDeadline overwriting the previous
deadline configuration set after a new connection Accept in the custom
listener code. Therefore, --idle-timeout was not correctly respected.
Make http.Server read/write timeout similar to --idle-timeout.
The code assigns corrupted state to a drive for any unexpected error,
which is confusing for users. This change will make sure to assign
corrupted state only for corrupted parts or xl.meta. Use unknown state
with a explanation for any unexpected error, like canceled, deadline
errors, drive timeout, ...
Also make sure to return the bucket/object name when the object is not
found or marked not found by the heal dangling code.
* Add the policy name to the audit log tags when doing policy-based API calls
* Audit log the retention settings requested in the API call
* Audit log of retention on PutObjectRetention API path too
The RemoveUser API only removes internal users, and it reports success
when it didnt find the internal user account for deletion. When provided
with a service account, it should not report success as that is misleading.
Update github.com/cosnicolaou/pbzip2 to latest version for
significant performance improvements. This update brings a 45%
reduction in processing time.
Previously, not setting http.Config.HTTPTimeout for logger webhook
was resulting in a timeout of 0, and causing "deadline exceeded"
errors in log webhook.
This change introduces a new env variable for configuring log webhook
timeout and more importantly sets it when the config is initialised.
Manual heal can return XMinioHealInvalidClientToken if the manual
healing is started in the first node, and the next mc call to get the
heal status is landed on another node. The reason is that redirection
based on the token ID is not able to redirect requests to the first node
due to a typo.
This also affects the batch cancel command if the batch is being done in
the first node, the user will never be able to cancel it due to the same
bug.
HTTP likes to slap an infinite read deadline on a connection and
do a blocking read while the response is being written.
This effectively means that a reading deadline becomes the
request-response deadline.
Instead of enforcing our timeout, we pass it through and keep
"infinite deadline" is sticky on connections.
However, we still "record" when reads are aborted, so we never overwrite that.
The HTTP server should have `ReadTimeout` and `IdleTimeout` set for the deadline to be effective.
Use --idle-timeout for incoming connections.
Since DeadlineConn would send deadline updates directly upstream,
it would race with Read/Write operations. The stdlib will perform a read,
but do an async SetReadDeadLine(unix(1)) to cancel the Read in
`abortPendingRead`. In this case, the Read may override the
deadline intended to cancel the read.
Stop updating deadlines if a deadline in the past is seen and when Close is called.
A mutex now protects all upstream deadline calls to avoid races.
This should fix the short-term buildup of...
```
365 @ 0x44112e 0x4756b9 0x475699 0x483525 0x732286 0x737407 0x73816b 0x479601
# 0x475698 sync.runtime_notifyListWait+0x138 runtime/sema.go:569
# 0x483524 sync.(*Cond).Wait+0x84 sync/cond.go:70
# 0x732285 net/http.(*connReader).abortPendingRead+0xa5 net/http/server.go:729
# 0x737406 net/http.(*response).finishRequest+0x86 net/http/server.go:1676
# 0x73816a net/http.(*conn).serve+0x62a net/http/server.go:2050
```
AFAICT Only affects internode calls that create a connection (non-grid).
These are needed checks for the functions to be un-crashable with any input
given to `msgUnPath` (tested with fuzzing).
Both conditions would result in a crash, which prevents that. Some
additional upstream checks are needed.
Fixes#20610
This PR fixes a regression introduced in https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/19797
by restoring the healing ability of transitioned objects
Bonus: support for transitioned objects to carry original
The object name is for future reverse lookups if necessary.
Also fix parity calculation for tiered objects to n/2 for n/2 == (parity)
Existing implementation runs IAM purge routines for expired LDAP and
OIDC accounts with a probability of 0.25 after every IAM refresh. This
change ensures that they are run once in each hour.
xlStorage.Healing() returns nil if there is an error reading
.healing.bin or if this latter is empty. healing.bin update()
call returns early if .healing.bin is empty; hence, no further update
of .healing.bin is possible.
A .healing.bin can be empty if os.Open() with O_TRUNC is successful
but the next Write returns an error.
To avoid this weird situation, avoid making healingTracker.update()
to return early if .healing.bin is empty, so write again.
This commit also fixes wrong error log printing when an object is
healed in another drive in the same erasure set but not in the drive
that is actively healing by fresh drive healing code. Currently, it prints
<nil> instead of a factual error.
* heal: Scan .minio.sys metadata only during site-wide heal (#137)
mc admin heal always invoke .minio.sys heal, but sometimes, this latter
contains a lot of data, many service accounts, STS accounts etc, which
makes mc admin heal command very slow.
Only invoke .minio.sys healing when no bucket was specified in `mc admin
heal` command.
Healing a large object with a normal scan mode where no parts read
is involved can still fail after 30 seconds if an object has
There are too many parts when hard disks are being used mainly.
The reason is there is a general deadline that checks for all parts we
do a deadline per part.
When listing objects with metadata, avoid returning an "expires" time
metadata value when its value is the zero time as this means that no
expires value is set on the object.
The condition were incorrect as we were comparing the filter
value against the modification time object.
For example if created after filter date is after modification
time of object, that means object was created before the filter
time and should be skipped while replication because as per the
filter we need only the objects created after the filter date.
Signed-off-by: Shubhendu Ram Tripathi <shubhendu@minio.io>
When Keycloak vendor is set, the code will start to clean up service
accounts that parents do not exist anymore. However, the code will also
look for the parent user of site-replicator-0, MINIO_ROOT_USER, which
obviously does not exist in Keycloak. Therefore, the site-replicator-0
will be removed automatically.
This commit will avoid cleaning up service accounts generated from
the root user.
The verify file handler response format was changed from gob to msgp
since two months but we forgot updating the verify handler client.
VerifyFile is only called during a heal deep scan (bitrot check).
HealObject() will fail in that case and will mark all disks corrupted and
will return early (as unrecoverable object but it will also not be
removed)
It is a bit rare for HealObject to be called with a deep scan flag. It
is called when a HealObject with a normal scan (e.g. new drive healing)
detects a bitrot corruption, therefore healing objects with a detected
bitrot corruption will fail.
in cases where we cannot possibly know a way to read and
construct the object, it is impossible to achieve any form of
quorum via xl.meta while we have sufficient responses from
all the drives, we should return object not found.
- PutObjectMetadata()
- PutObjectTags()
- DeleteObjectTags()
- TransitionObject()
- RestoreTransitionObject()
Also improve the behavior of multipart code across
pool locks, hold locks only once per upload ID for
- CompleteMultipartUpload()
- AbortMultipartUpload()
- ListObjectParts() (read-lock)
- GetMultipartInfo() (read-lock)
- PutObjectPart() (read-lock)
This avoids lock attempts across pools for no
reason, this increases O(n) when there are n-pools.
multi-object deletion may or may not compete with locks
granted for other callers, causing concurrent operations
to succeed on each other.
A continuation of the PR https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/20356
When custom authorization via plugin is enabled, the console will now
render the UI as if all actions are allowed. Since server cannot
determine the exact policy allowed for a user via the plugin, this is
acceptable to do. If a particular action is actually not allowed by the
plugin the call will result in an error.
Previously the server was evaluating a policy when custom authZ is
enabled - this is fixed now.
The "unlimited" value on PPC wasn't exactly the same as amd64.
Instead compare against an "unreasonably big value".
Would cause OOM in anything using the concurrent request limit.
Add TTFB for all requests in metrics-v3 in addition to the existing
GetObject. Also for the requests that do not return a body in the
response, calculate TTFB as the HTTP status code and the headers are
sent.
A batch job will fail if the retry attempt is not provided. The reason
is that the code mistakenly gets the retry attempts from the job status
rather than the job yaml file.
This will also set a default empty prefix for batch expiration.
Also this will avoid trimming the prefix since the yaml decoder already
does that if no quotes were provided, and we should not trim if quotes
were provided and the user provided a leading or a trailing space.
Tests if imported service accounts have
required access to buckets and objects.
Signed-off-by: Shubhendu Ram Tripathi <shubhendu@minio.io>
Co-authored-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@minio.io>
- PutObject() for multi-pooled was holding large
region locks, which was not necessary. This affects
almost all slowpoke clients and lengthy uploads.
- Re-arrange locks for CompleteMultipart, PutObject
to be close to rename()
Currently, it is not possible to remove a tier if it is not accessible
or contains some data, add a force flag to make the removal successful
in that case.
When the encryption and compression are both enabled, the
the server will avoid compressing the data for no apparent reason
This commit will enable it and update unit tests.
Download static cURL into release Docker image for all supported architectures.
Currently, the static cURL executable is only downloaded for the `amd64` architecture. However, `arm64` and `ppc64le` variants are also [available](https://github.com/moparisthebest/static-curl/releases/tag/v8.7.1).
postUpload() incorrectly saves actual size as '-1'
we should save correct size when its possible.
Bonus: fix the PutObjectPart() write locker, instead
of holding a lock before we read the client stream.
We should hold it only when we need to commit the parts.
this cache will be honored only when `prefix=""` while
performing ListMultipartUploads() operation.
This is mainly to satisfy applications like alluxio
for their underfs implementation and tests.
replaces https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/20181
AFAICT we send a canceled context to unlock (and thereby releaseAll). This will cause network calls to fail.
Instead use background and add 30s timeout.
Current implementation retries forever until our
log buffer is full, and we start dropping events.
This PR allows you to set a value until we give
up on existing audit/logger batches to proceed to
process the new ones.
Bonus:
- do not blow up buffers beyond batchSize value
- do not leak the ticker if the worker returns
The items will be saved per target batch and will
be committed to the queue store when the batch is full
Also, periodically commit the batched items to the queue store
based on configured commit_timeout; default is 30s;
Bonus: compress queue store multi writes
rebalance metadata is good to have only,
if it cannot be loaded when starting MinIO
for some reason we can possibly ignore it
and move on and let user start rebalance
again if needed.
readParts requires that both part.N and part.N.meta files be present.
This change addresses an issue with how an error to return to the upper
layers was picked from most drives where a UploadPart operation
had failed.
By default, even if MINIO_BROWSER=off set code tries to get free
port available for the console.
Signed-off-by: Shubhendu Ram Tripathi <shubhendu@minio.io>
S3 spec does not accept an ILM XML document containing both <Filter>
and <Prefix> XML tags, even if both are empty. That is why we added
a 'set' field in some lifecycle structures to decide when and when not to
show a tag. However, we forgot to disallow marshaling of Filter when
'set' is set to false.
This will fix ILM document replication in a site replication
configuration in some cases.
When the prefix field is not provided in the remote source of a yaml
replication job, the code fails to do listing and makes replication
successful. This commit fixes it.
This change adds a consistent nonce to ensure
that multipart uploads are deterministic on a
per-part basis.
Thanks to @klauspost for the work here minio/sio@3cd3734
locks handed by different pools would become non-compete for
multi-object delete request, this is wrong for obvious
reasons.
New locking implementation and revamp will rewrite multi-object
lock anyway, this is a workaround for now.
Currently, the bucket events and replication targets are only reloaded
with buckets that failed to load during the first cluster startup,
which is wrong because if one bucket change was done in one node but
that node was not able to notify other nodes; the other nodes will
reload the bucket metadata config but fails to set the events and bucket
targets in the memory.
when a hung drive is hot-unplugged, the server might go
into a loop where the previous `format.json` is somehow
still accessible to the process, we try to re-init() drives,
but that seems to cause a previous goroutine to hang around
since it is not canceled away when the drive is closed.
Bonus: add deadline for immediate purge routine, to unblock
it if the drive is blocking mutations.
if a user policy is found, avoid reading from the drives
for missing group mappings, group mappings are not mandatory
and conditional.
This PR restores the older behavior while making sure that
if a direct user policy is not found, we would still attempt
to load from the group from the drives.
This commit simplifies and optimizes the decryption of large (multipart)
objects. This PR does two things:
- Re-write the init logic for the decryption reader
- Reduce the number of OEK decryptions
Before, the init logic copied some SSE HTTP request headers to
parse them later. This is simplified to parsing them right away. This
removes some fields from the decryption reader struct.
Further, the decryption reader decrypted the OEK using the client-provided
key (SSE-C) or the KMS (SSE-S3 / SSE-KMS) for each part. This is redundant
since the OEK is the same for all parts. In particular, a KMS call might be a
network request. Now, the OEK is decrypted once for the entire multipart object.
This should improve latency when reading encrypted multipart objects
and reduce requests to the KMS.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
Use Walk(), which is a recursive listing with versioning, to check if
the bucket has some objects before being removed. This is beneficial
because the bucket can contain multiple dangling objects in multiple
drives.
Also, this will prevent a bug where a bucket is deleted in a deployment
that has many erasure sets but the bucket contains one or few objects
not spread to enough erasure sets.
Currently, retry healing of a new drive healing does not reset
HealedBuckets means that the next healing retry will skip those
buckets. The commit will fix this behavior.
Also, the skipped objects counter will include objects uploaded
that are uploaded after the healing is started.
sftp sends local requests to the S3 port while passing the session token
header when the account corresponds to a service account. However, this
is not permitted and will throw an error: "The security token included in the
request is invalid"
This commit will avoid passing the session token to the upper layer that
initializes MinIO client to avoid this error.
Sometimes, we need historical information in .healing.bin, such as the
number of expired objects that the healing avoids to heal and that can
create drive usage disparency in the same erasure set. For that reason,
this commit will not remove .healing.bin anymore and it will have a new
field called Finished so we know healing is finished in that drive.
Services are unfrozen before `initBackgroundReplication` is finished. This means that
the globalReplicationStats write is racy. Switch to an atomic pointer.
Provide the `ReplicationPool` with the stats, so it doesn't have to be grabbed
from the atomic pointer on every use.
All other loads and checks are nil, and calls return empty values when stats
still haven't been initialized.
* Allow a maximum of 10 seconds to start profiling operations.
* Download up to 16 profiles concurrently, but only allow 10 seconds for
each (does not include write time).
* Add cluster info as the first operation.
* Ignore remote download errors.
* Stop remote profiles if the request is terminated.
If the site replication is enabled and the code tries to extract jwt
claims while the site replication service account credentials are still
not loaded yet, the code will enter an infinite loop, causing in a
high CPU usage.
Another possibility of the infinite loop is having some service accounts
created by an old deployment version where the service account JWT was
signed by the root credentials, but not anymore.
This commit will remove the possibility of the infinite loop in the code
and add root credential fallback to extract claims from old service
accounts.
move away from map[string]interface{} to map[string]string
to simplify the audit, and also provide concise information.
avoids large allocations under load(), reduces the amount
of audit information generated, as the current implementation
was a bit free-form. instead all datastructures must be
flattened.
Previously, we checked if we had a quorum on the DataDir value.
We are removing this check, which allows reading objects with different
DataDir values in a few drives (due to a rebalance-stop race bug)
provided their eTags or ModTimes match.
Since a lot of operations load from storage, do remote calls, add a 10 second timeout to each operation.
This should make `mc admin info` return values even under extreme conditions.
- optimize writing part.N.meta by writing both part.N
and its meta in sequence without network component.
- remove part.N.meta, part.N which were partially success
ful, in quorum loss situations during renamePart()
- allow for strict read quorum check arbitrated via ETag
for the given part number, this makes it double safer
upon final commit.
- return an appropriate error when read quorum is missing,
instead of returning InvalidPart{}, which is non-retryable
error. This kind of situation can happen when many
nodes are going offline in rotation, an example of such
a restart() behavior is statefulset updates in k8s.
fixes#20091
during rebalance stop, it can possibly happen that
Put() would race by overwriting the same object again.
This may very well if done "successfully" it can
potentially proceed to delete the object from the pool,
causing data loss.
This PR enhances #20233 to handle more scenarios such
as these.
Rebalance-stop can race with ongoing rebalance operations. This change
prevents these operations from overwriting objects by checking the source
and destination pool indices are different.
This commit replaces the LDAP client TLS config and
adds a custom list of TLS cipher suites which support
RSA key exchange (RSA kex).
Some LDAP server connections experience a significant slowdown
when these cipher suites are not available. The Go TLS stack
disables them by default. (Can be enabled via GODEBUG=tlsrsakex=1).
fixes https://github.com/minio/minio/issues/20214
With a custom list of TLS ciphers, Go can pick the TLS RSA key-exchange
cipher. Ref:
```
if c.CipherSuites != nil {
return c.CipherSuites
}
if tlsrsakex.Value() == "1" {
return defaultCipherSuitesWithRSAKex
}
```
Ref: https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.22.5:src/crypto/tls/common.go;l=1017
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
this allows for de-duplicating the callers when called
concurrently, allowing for bucketmetadata reads to be
single call. All concurrent callers will get the same data
as the first one.
Fix a regression in #19733 where TTFB metrics for all APIs except
GetObject were removed in v2 and v3 metrics. This causes breakage for
existing v2 metrics users. Instead we continue to send TTFB for all APIs
in V2 but only send for GetObject in V3.
allow multipart uploads expiration to be dyamic
It would seem like the new values will take effect
only after a restart for changes in multipart_expiration.
This PR fixes this by making it dynamic as it should have
been.
deadlines per moveToTrash() allows for a more granular timeout
approach for syscalls, instead of an aggregate timeout.
This PR also enhances multipart state cleanup to be optimal by
removing 100's of multipart network rename() calls into single
network call.
context deadline was introduced to avoid a slow transfer from blocking
replication queue(s) shared by other buckets that may not be under throttling.
This PR removes this context deadline for larger objects since they are
anyway restricted to a limited set of workers. Otherwise, objects would
get dequeued when the throttle limit is exceeded and cannot proceed
within the deadline.
epoll contention on TCP causes latency build-up when
we have high volume ingress. This PR is an attempt to
relieve this pressure.
upstream issue https://github.com/golang/go/issues/65064
It seems to be a deeper problem; haven't yet tried the fix
provide in this issue, but however this change without
changing the compiler helps.
Of course, this is a workaround for now, hoping for a
more comprehensive fix from Go runtime.
- ReadVersion
- ReadFile
- ReadXL
Further changes include to
- Compact internode resource RPC paths
- Compact internode query params
To optimize on parsing by gorilla/mux as the
length of this string increases latency in
gorilla/mux - reduce to a meaningful string.
the main reason is to let Go net/http perform necessary
book keeping properly, and in essential from consistency
point of view its GETs all the way.
Deprecate sendFile() as its buggy inside Go runtime.
For a non-tiered object, MinIO requires that EcM (# of data blocks) of
xl.meta agree, corresponding to the number of data blocks needed to
read this object.
OTOH, tiered objects have metadata in the hot tier and data in the
warm tier. The data and its integrity are offloaded to the warm tier. This
allows us to reduce the read quorum from EcM (typically > N/2, where N -
erasure stripe width) to N/2 + 1. The simple majority of metadata
ensures consensus on what the object is and where it is
located.
When a drive is in a failed state when a single node multiple drives
deployment is started, a replacement of a fresh disk will not be
properly healed unless the user restarts the node.
Fix this by always adding the new fresh disk to globalLocalDrivesMap. Also
remove globalLocalDrives for simplification, a map to store local node
drives can still be used since the order of local drives of a node is
not defined.
kms: Expose API available when bucket federation is enabled
When bucket federation feature is enabled, KMS API will not work, such
as `mc admin kms key list`
The commit will fix the issue by disabling bucket forwarding when this
is a KMS request.
Tracing syscalls, opening and reading an `xl.meta` looks like this:
```
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt/drive1/ss8-old/testbucket/ObjSize4MiBThreads72/(554O51H/peTb(0iztdbTKw59.csv/xl.meta", O_RDONLY|O_NOATIME|O_CLOEXEC) = 34 <0.000>
fcntl(34, F_GETFL) = 0x48000 (flags O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE|O_NOATIME) <0.000>
fcntl(34, F_SETFL, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_NOATIME) = 0 <0.000>
epoll_ctl(4, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, 34, {events=EPOLLIN|EPOLLOUT|EPOLLRDHUP|EPOLLET, data={u32=3172471557, u64=8145488475984499461}}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) <0.000>
fcntl(34, F_GETFL) = 0x48800 (flags O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_NOATIME) <0.000>
fcntl(34, F_SETFL, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE|O_NOATIME) = 0 <0.000>
fstat(34, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=354, ...}) = 0 <0.000>
read(34, "XL2 \1\0\3\0\306\0\0\1P\2\2\1\304$\225\304\20\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"..., 354) = 354 <0.000>
close(34) = 0 <0.000>
```
Everything until `fstat` is the `os.Open` call.
Looking at the code: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/master/src/os/file_unix.go#L212-L243
It seems for every file it "tries" to see if it is pollable. This causes `syscall.SetNonblock(fd, true)` to be called. This is the first `F_SETFL`.
It then calls `f.pfd.Init("file", true)`. This will attempt to set it as pollable using `epoll_ctl`. This will always fail for files. It therefore calls `syscall.SetNonblock(fd, false)` resulting in the second `F_SETFL`.
If we set the `O_NONBLOCK` call on the initial open, we should avoid the 4 `fcntl` syscalls per file.
I don't see any way to avoid the `epoll_ctl` call, since kind is either `kindOpenFile` or `kindNonBlock`, so "pollable" will always be true. However avoiding 4 of 6 syscalls still seems worth it.
This should not have any effect, since files will end up with "nonblock" anyway.
allow non-inlined on disk to be inlined via
an unversioned ReadVersion() call, we only
need ReadXL() to resolve objects with multiple
versions only.
The choice of this block makes it to be dynamic
and chosen by the user via `mc admin config set`
Other bonus things
- Start measuring internode TTFB performance.
- Set TCP_NODELAY, TCP_CORK for low latency
Use `runtime.Gosched()` if we have less than maxMergeMessages and the
queue is empty. Up maxMergeMessages to 50 to merge more messages into
a single write.
Add length check for an early bailout on readAllInto when we know packet length.
This commit enforces FIPS-compliant TLS ciphers in FIPS mode
by importing the `fipsonly` module.
Otherwise, MinIO still accepts non-FIPS compliant TLS connections.
removes contentious usage of mutexes in LRU, which
were never really reused in any manner; we do not
need it.
To trust hosts, the correct way is TLS certs; this PR completely
removes this dependency, which has never been useful.
```
0 0% 100% 25.83s 26.76% github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/expirable.(*LRU[...])
0 0% 100% 28.03s 29.04% github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/v2/expirable.(*LRU[...])
```
Bonus: use `x-minio-time` as a nanosecond to avoid unnecessary
parsing logic of time strings instead of using a more
straightforward mechanism.
- Also, fix failure reporting at the end.
- Also, avoid parsing report objects when listing or resuming jobs, this
does not cause any bugs, it is only printing, not useful errors.
Split the read and write sides of handleMessages into two separate functions
Cosmetic. The only non-copy-and-paste change is that `cancel(ErrDisconnected)` is moved
into the defer on `readStream`.
add unit test for v3 metrics for all its exposed endpoints
Bonus:
- support OpenMetrics encoding
- adds boot time for prometheus
- continueOnError is better to serve as
much metrics as possible.
```
curl http://localhost:9000/minio/metrics/v3/cluster/usage/buckets
```
Did not work as documented, due to the fact that there was a typo
in the bucket usage metrics registration group. This endpoint is
a cluster endpoint and does not require any `buckets` argument.
When creating the async listing, if the first request does not return within 3
minutes, it is stopped, since it isn't being kept alive.
Keep updating `lastHandout` while we are waiting for the initial request to be fulfilled.
When a fresh drive healing is finished, add more checks for the drive listing
errors. If any, re-list and heal again. Although this is an infrequent use
case to have listPathRaw() returning nil when minDisks is set to 1, we
still need to handle all possible use cases to avoid missing healing
any object.
Also, check for HealObject result to decide of an object is healed in the
fresh disk since HealObject returns nil if an object is healed in any
disk, and not in the new fresh drive.
In regular listing, this commit will avoid showing an object when its
latest version has a pending or failed deletion. In replicated setup.
It will also prevent showing older versions in the same case.
Also, sort the error map for multiple sites in ascending order
of deployment IDs, so that the error message generated is always
definitive order and same.
Signed-off-by: Shubhendu Ram Tripathi <shubhendu@minio.io>
Add `ConnDialer` to abstract connection creation.
- `IncomingConn(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn)` is provided as an entry point for
incoming custom connections.
- `ConnectWS` is provided to create web socket connections.
If `SkipReader` is called with a small initial buffer it may be doing a huge number if Reads to skip the requested number of bytes. If a small buffer is provided grab a 32K buffer and use that.
Fixes slow execution of `testAPIGetObjectWithMPHandler`.
Bonuses:
* Use `-short` with `-race` test.
* Do all suite test types with `-short`.
* Enable compressed+encrypted in `testAPIGetObjectWithMPHandler`.
* Disable big file tests in `testAPIGetObjectWithMPHandler` when using `-short`.
The code was advertenly passing max openfds to debug.SetMemoryLimit(),
fixing this accelerate go test in my machine.
This is only a testing bug, since the server context has always a valid
MaxMem, so the buggy code was never called in users environments.
Currently the status of a completed or failed batch is held in the
memory, a simple restart will lose the status and the user will not
have any visibility of the job that was long running.
In addition to the metrics, add a new API that reads the batch status
from the drives. A batch job will be cleaned up three days after
completion.
Also add the batch type in the batch id, the reason is that the batch
job request is removed immediately when the job is finished, then we
do not know the type of batch job anymore, hence a difficulty to locate
the job report
All GitHub issues are addressed on a best-effort basis at MinIO's sole discretion. There are no Service Level Agreements (SLA) or Objectives (SLO). Remember our [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/minio/minio/blob/master/code_of_conduct.md) when engaging with MinIO Engineers and the larger community.
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<!--- Provide a general summary of the issue in the Title above -->
@@ -29,7 +32,7 @@ For urgent issues (e.g. production down, etc.), subscribe to [SUBNET](https://mi
## Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)
<!--- Provide a link to a live example, or an unambiguous set of steps to -->
<!--- reproduce this bug. Include code to reproduce, if relevant -->
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<!--- and include relevant Silo logs with secrets and credentials removed -->
1.
2.
@@ -42,10 +45,10 @@ For urgent issues (e.g. production down, etc.), subscribe to [SUBNET](https://mi
## Regression
<!-- Is this issue a regression? (Yes / No) -->
<!-- If Yes, optionally please include minio version or commit id or PR# that caused this regression, if you have these details. -->
<!-- If Yes, optionally include the Silo version, commit id, or PR that caused this regression. -->
## Your Environment
<!--- Include as many relevant details about the environment you experienced the bug in -->
if ! git log -1 --format='%(trailers:key=Signed-off-by,valueonly)' "${sha}" |
grep -qiF "<${author_email}>"; then
echo "::error::commit ${sha} by ${author_name} <${author_email}> lacks a matching Signed-off-by trailer; sign with 'git commit -s', repair with 'git rebase --signoff'"
We have designed MinIO as an Open Source software for the Open Source software community. This requires applications to consider whether their usage of MinIO is in compliance with the GNU AGPLv3 [license](https://github.com/minio/minio/blob/master/LICENSE).
Silo is distributed under the [GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
It incorporates source code from the MinIO project and preserves the original
copyright, license, and attribution notices in [`NOTICE`](NOTICE),
[`CREDITS`](CREDITS), and source-file headers.
MinIO cannot make the determination as to whether your application's usage of MinIO is in compliance with the AGPLv3 license requirements. You should instead rely on your own legal counsel or licensing specialists to audit and ensure your application is in compliance with the licenses of MinIO and all other open-source projects with which your application integrates or interacts. We understand that AGPLv3 licensing is complex and nuanced. It is for that reason we strongly encourage using experts in licensing to make any such determinations around compliance instead of relying on apocryphal or anecdotal advice.
You are responsible for determining how the AGPLv3 applies to your use,
modification, deployment, and distribution of Silo and its dependencies. The
Silo maintainers cannot provide legal advice or determine whether a particular
application or service satisfies the license. Consult qualified counsel when
the obligations are material to your deployment.
[MinIO Commercial Licensing](https://min.io/pricing) is the best option for applications that trigger AGPLv3 obligations (e.g. open sourcing your application). Applications using MinIO - or any other OSS-licensed code - without validating their usage do so at their own risk.
If you convey modified binaries or provide network access to a modified
version, review the complete AGPLv3 text and ensure that the corresponding
source and notices are made available as required. Dependency licenses and
``MinIO`` community welcomes your contribution. To make the process as seamless as possible, we recommend you read this contribution guide.
Silo welcomes focused contributions that improve security, reliability,
compatibility, packaging, tests, or maintainability. This repository preserves
MinIO-compatible interfaces and storage formats, so changes must identify and
test any compatibility impact.
## Development Workflow
Start by forking the MinIO GitHub repository, make changes in a branch and then send a pull request. We encourage pull requests to discuss code changes. Here are the steps in details:
Fork the current Silo source repository, create a topic branch, and submit a
pull request. Discuss broad or compatibility-sensitive changes in an issue
before implementation.
### Setup your MinIO GitHub Repository
Fork [MinIO upstream](https://github.com/minio/minio/fork) source repository to your own personal repository. Copy the URL of your MinIO fork (you will need it for the `git clone` command below).
Pull requests can be created via GitHub. Refer to [this document](https://help.github.com/articles/creating-a-pull-request/) for detailed steps on how to create a pull request. After a Pull Request gets peer reviewed and approved, it will be merged.
Pull requests should include motivation, reproduction steps where applicable,
test evidence, compatibility notes, and documentation impact. Public product
Silo is licensed under the [GNU AGPL v3.0 or later](LICENSE). Its core is
Copyright (c) MinIO, Inc.; the combined work can never be relicensed, and this
fork does not try to.
* **No CLA.** We do not ask you to sign a Contributor License Agreement and we
do not take your copyright. Contributions are accepted inbound=outbound: you
keep the copyright to your changes and license them under the same
AGPL-3.0-or-later as the project itself. The maintainers receive no rights
beyond the project license.
* **DCO sign-off required.** Every commit must carry a
`Signed-off-by: Your Name <you@example.com>` trailer certifying the
[Developer Certificate of Origin 1.1](https://developercertificate.org/) —
your statement that you have the right to submit the code under the project
license. Sign each commit with:
```
git commit -s
```
Forgot some? Repair your branch with `git rebase --signoff` and force-push.
CI rejects pull requests containing unsigned commits; the sign-off email
must match the commit author email. (Lowercase `-s` is the plain-text DCO
sign-off; cryptographic `-S`/GPG signing is welcome but independent.)
* **Provenance.** Only submit code you are entitled to submit. This matters
more here than in most projects: Silo carries a downstream delta over an
upstream code base, and cherry-picks from the lineage remote or other forks
are routine. When relaying a patch written by someone else, preserve original
authorship (`git cherry-pick -x`, keep the author field and any existing
`Signed-off-by` trailers) and add your own sign-off as the person passing it
along. Never import code from a proprietary distribution.
* **File headers.** Files derived from upstream keep the original MinIO
copyright header unchanged. New files added by this fork use the dual
header, followed by the standard AGPL boilerplate:
```
// Copyright (c) 2015-2025 MinIO, Inc.
// Copyright (c) 2025-2026 PGSTY
```
* **Squash merges** must keep the `Signed-off-by:` trailers in the resulting
commit message.
* **Authorship and tooling.** The human contributor is the author of the commit
and the sole signatory of its DCO sign-off. Attribution trailers for
assistive tooling (for example `Co-Authored-By:` naming an AI assistant) are
informational only: they record which tools were used, and do not create
authorship, co-authorship, or any copyright claim. Whoever signs off remains
responsible for the content of the commit, whatever produced it.
## FAQs
### How does ``MinIO`` manage dependencies?
### How does Silo manage dependencies?
``MinIO`` uses `go mod` to manage its dependencies.
Silo uses Go modules. Preserve the compatibility module and import paths in
`go.mod`; downstream forks are selected with explicit `replace` directives.
- Run `go get foo/bar` in the source folder to add the dependency to `go.mod` file.
@@ -76,6 +141,7 @@ To remove a dependency
- Edit your code and remove the import reference.
- Run `go mod tidy` in the source folder to remove dependency from `go.mod` file.
### What are the coding guidelines for MinIO?
### What are the coding guidelines?
``MinIO`` is fully conformant with Golang style. Refer: [Effective Go](https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/CodeReviewComments) article from Golang project. If you observe offending code, please feel free to send a pull request or ping us on [Slack](https://slack.min.io).
Follow the existing Go style, run `gofmt` on changed Go files, and keep changes
compact. See the Go project's [code review comments](https://go.dev/wiki/CodeReviewComments).
| [@waterkip](https://github.com/waterkip) | Repointed documentation links from the upstream domain to the Silo portal | [#41](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/41) | [`d495d30`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/commit/d495d30d5) |
## Proposed changes
Pull requests that are open for review, or that were closed after informing work that shipped
differently.
| Contributor | Change | Pull request | Status |
| :-- | :-- | :-- | :-- |
| [@magicxor](https://github.com/magicxor) | `DELETE` precondition checks for the `If-Match` header | [#12](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/12) | Open, queued for review |
| [@ycjlin](https://github.com/ycjlin) | `ListObjects` should return `NoSuchBucket` for a prefix on a missing bucket | [#37](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/37) | Open, queued for review |
| [@davinkevin](https://github.com/davinkevin) | Distroless-based Docker image variant | [#21](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/21) | Superseded by the distroless variant shipped in RELEASE.2026-08-06, which the PR anticipated by four months |
summary="MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage, API compatible with Amazon S3 cloud storage service."\
description="MinIO object storage is fundamentally different. Designed for performance and the S3 API, it is 100% open-source. MinIO is ideal for large, private cloud environments with stringent security requirements and delivers mission-critical availability across a diverse range of workloads."
summary="MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage, API compatible with Amazon S3 cloud storage service."\
description="MinIO object storage is fundamentally different. Designed for performance and the S3 API, it is 100% open-source. MinIO is ideal for large, private cloud environments with stringent security requirements and delivers mission-critical availability across a diverse range of workloads."
summary="MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage, API compatible with Amazon S3 cloud storage service."\
description="MinIO object storage is fundamentally different. Designed for performance and the S3 API, it is 100% open-source. MinIO is ideal for large, private cloud environments with stringent security requirements and delivers mission-critical availability across a diverse range of workloads."
summary="MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage, API compatible with Amazon S3 cloud storage service."\
description="MinIO object storage is fundamentally different. Designed for performance and the S3 API, it is 100% open-source. MinIO is ideal for large, private cloud environments with stringent security requirements and delivers mission-critical availability across a diverse range of workloads."
These guidelines ensure high-quality commits in Silo's GitHub repositories, maintaining
a clear, valuable commit history for our open-source projects. They apply to all contributors,
fostering efficient reviews and robust code.
## Why Pull Requests?
Pull Requests (PRs) drive quality in Silo's codebase by:
- Enabling peer review without pair programming.
- Documenting changes for future reference.
- Ensuring commits tell a clear story of development.
**A poor commit lasts forever, even if code is refactored.**
## Crafting a Quality PR
A strong Silo PR:
- Delivers a complete, valuable change (feature, bug fix, or improvement).
- Has a concise title (e.g., `[S3] Fix bucket policy parsing #1234`) and a summary with context, referencing issues (e.g., `#1234`).
- Contains well-written, logical commits explaining *why* changes were made (e.g., “Add S3 bucket tagging support so that users can organize resources efficiently”).
- Is small, focused, and easy to review—ideally one commit, unless multiple commits better narrate complex work.
- Adheres to Silo's coding standards (e.g., Go style, error handling, testing).
PRs must flow smoothly through review to reach production. Large PRs should be split into smaller, manageable ones.
## Submitting PRs
1.**Title and Summary**:
- Use a scannable title: `[Subsystem] Action Description #Issue` (e.g., `[IAM] Add role-based access control #567`).
- Include context in the summary: what changed, why, and any issue references.
- Use `[WIP]` for in-progress PRs to avoid premature merging or choose GitHub draft PRs.
2.**Commits**:
- Write clear messages: what changed and why (e.g., “Refactor S3 API handler to reduce latency so that requests process 20% faster”).
- Rebase to tidy commits before submitting (e.g., `git rebase -i main` to squash typos or reword messages), unless multiple contributors worked on the branch.
- Keep PRs focused—one feature or fix. Split large changes into multiple PRs.
3.**Testing**:
- Include unit tests for new functionality or bug fixes.
- Ensure existing tests pass (`make test`).
- Document testing steps in the PR summary if manual testing was performed.
4.**Before Submitting**:
- Run `make verify` to check formatting, linting, and tests.
- Reference related issues (e.g., “Closes #1234”).
- Notify team members via GitHub `@mentions` if urgent or complex.
## Reviewing PRs
Reviewers ensure Silo's commit history remains a clear, reliable record. Responsibilities include:
1.**Commit Quality**:
- Verify each commit explains *why* the change was made (e.g., “So that…”).
- Request rebasing if commits are unclear, redundant, or lack context (e.g., “Please squash typo fixes into the parent commit”).
2.**Code Quality**:
- Check adherence to Silo's Go standards (e.g., error handling, documentation).
- Ensure tests cover new code and pass CI.
- Flag bugs or critical issues for immediate fixes; suggest non-blocking improvements as follow-up issues.
3.**Flow**:
- Review promptly to avoid blocking progress.
- Balance quality and speed—minor issues can be addressed later via issues, not PR blocks.
- If unable to complete the review, tag another reviewer (e.g., `@username please take over`).
4.**Shared Responsibility**:
- All Silo contributors are reviewers. The first commenter on a PR owns the review unless they delegate.
- Multiple reviewers are encouraged for complex PRs.
5.**No Self-Edits**:
- Don’t modify the PR directly (e.g., fixing bugs). Request changes from the submitter or create a follow-up PR.
- If you edit, you’re a collaborator, not a reviewer, and cannot merge.
6.**Testing**:
- Assume the submitter tested the code. If testing is unclear, ask for details (e.g., “How was this tested?”).
- Reject untested PRs unless testing is infeasible, then assist with test setup.
## Tips for Success
- **Small PRs**: Easier to review, faster to merge. Split large changes logically.
- **Clear Commits**: Use `git rebase -i` to refine history before submitting.
- **Engage Early**: Discuss complex changes in a GitHub issue before coding.
MinIO creates FIPS builds using a patched version of the Go compiler (that uses BoringCrypto, from BoringSSL, which is [FIPS 140-2 validated](https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp2964.pdf)) published by the Golang Team [here](https://github.com/golang/go/tree/dev.boringcrypto/misc/boring).
MinIO FIPS executables are available at <http://dl.min.io> - they are only published for `linux-amd64` architecture as binary files with the suffix `.fips`. We also publish corresponding container images to our official image repositories.
We are not making any statements or representations about the suitability of this code or build in relation to the FIPS 140-2 standard. Interested users will have to evaluate for themselves whether this is useful for their own purposes.
<strong>S3-compatible object storage — a MinIO fork maintained by PGSTY</strong>
</p>
MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage released under GNU Affero General Public License v3.0. It is API compatible with Amazon S3 cloud storage service. Use MinIO to build high performance infrastructure for machine learning, analytics and application data workloads.
This README provides quickstart instructions on running MinIO on bare metal hardware, including container-based installations. For Kubernetes environments, use the [MinIO Kubernetes Operator](https://github.com/minio/operator/blob/master/README.md).
Use the following commands to run a standalone MinIO server as a container.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **PGSTY Silo** (hereinafter “Silo”) is an independent, community-maintained fork of the open-source MinIO server, published by [Pigsty](https://pigsty.io) from [`pgsty/silo`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo). It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by MinIO, Inc. “MinIO” is used only to identify the upstream project and compatibility lineage.
Standalone MinIO servers are best suited for early development and evaluation. Certain features such as versioning, object locking, and bucket replication
require distributed deploying MinIO with Erasure Coding. For extended development and production, deploy MinIO with Erasure Coding enabled - specifically,
with a *minimum* of 4 drives per MinIO server. See [MinIO Erasure Code Overview](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/operations/concepts/erasure-coding.html)
for more complete documentation.
> [!NOTE]
> Renamed from `pgsty/minio` to `pgsty/silo`, default branch `master` → `main`, on 2026-08-06. Artifacts under the original MinIO identity stay published on the archived [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) branch and in releases up to [`RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z).
### Stable
## Overview
Run the following command to run the latest stable image of MinIO as a container using an ephemeral data volume:
PGSTY SILO keeps one maintained release line of the open-source MinIO server alive after upstream ended community distribution: builds, packages, multi-arch images, security fixes, and the full web console. Pigsty runs it in production as its PostgreSQL backup repository.
```sh
podman run -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 \
quay.io/minio/minio server /data --console-address ":9001"
It follows one rule — **the product and its delivery surfaces are renamed; the protocol and your data are not.** Everything else lives on [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/).
You can also connect using any S3-compatible tool, such as the MinIO Client `mc` commandline tool. See
[Test using MinIO Client `mc`](#test-using-minio-client-mc) for more information on using the `mc` commandline tool. For application developers,
see <https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/developers/minio-drivers.html> to view MinIO SDKs for supported languages.
Console on <http://localhost:9001>, S3 API on <http://localhost:9000>. The image bundles the client as `mcli`:
> NOTE: To deploy MinIO on with persistent storage, you must map local persistent directories from the host OS to the container using the `podman -v` option. For example, `-v /mnt/data:/data` maps the host OS drive at `/mnt/data` to `/data` on the container.
## macOS
Use the following commands to run a standalone MinIO server on macOS.
Standalone MinIO servers are best suited for early development and evaluation. Certain features such as versioning, object locking, and bucket replication require distributed deploying MinIO with Erasure Coding. For extended development and production, deploy MinIO with Erasure Coding enabled - specifically, with a *minimum* of 4 drives per MinIO server. See [MinIO Erasure Code Overview](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/operations/concepts/erasure-coding.html) for more complete documentation.
### Homebrew (recommended)
Run the following command to install the latest stable MinIO package using [Homebrew](https://brew.sh/). Replace ``/data`` with the path to the drive or directory in which you want MinIO to store data.
docker exec silo mcli mb local/demo && docker exec silo mcli ls local
```
> NOTE: If you previously installed minio using `brew install minio` then it is recommended that you reinstall minio from `minio/stable/minio` official repo instead.
```sh
brew uninstall minio
brew install minio/stable/minio
```
The MinIO deployment starts using default root credentials `minioadmin:minioadmin`. You can test the deployment using the MinIO Console, an embedded web-based object browser built into MinIO Server. Point a web browser running on the host machine to <http://127.0.0.1:9000> and log in with the root credentials. You can use the Browser to create buckets, upload objects, and browse the contents of the MinIO server.
You can also connect using any S3-compatible tool, such as the MinIO Client `mc` commandline tool. See [Test using MinIO Client `mc`](#test-using-minio-client-mc) for more information on using the `mc` commandline tool. For application developers, see <https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/developers/minio-drivers.html/> to view MinIO SDKs for supported languages.
### Binary Download
Use the following command to download and run a standalone MinIO server on macOS. Replace``/data`` with the path to the drive or directory in which you want MinIO to store data.
The MinIO deployment starts using default root credentials `minioadmin:minioadmin`. You can test the deployment using the MinIO Console, an embedded web-based object browser built into MinIO Server. Point a web browser running on the host machine to <http://127.0.0.1:9000> and log in with the root credentials. You can use the Browser to create buckets, upload objects, and browse the contents of the MinIO server.
You can also connect using any S3-compatible tool, such as the MinIO Client `mc` commandline tool. See [Test using MinIO Client `mc`](#test-using-minio-client-mc) for more information on using the `mc` commandline tool. For application developers, see <https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/developers/minio-drivers.html> to view MinIO SDKs for supported languages.
## GNU/Linux
Use the following command to run a standalone MinIO server on Linux hosts running 64-bit Intel/AMD architectures. Replace ``/data`` with the path to the drive or directory in which you want MinIO to store data.
| 64-bit ARM | <https://dl.min.io/server/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio> |
| 64-bit PowerPC LE (ppc64le) | <https://dl.min.io/server/minio/release/linux-ppc64le/minio> |
| IBM Z-Series (S390X) | <https://dl.min.io/server/minio/release/linux-s390x/minio> |
The MinIO deployment starts using default root credentials `minioadmin:minioadmin`. You can test the deployment using the MinIO Console, an embedded web-based object browser built into MinIO Server. Point a web browser running on the host machine to <http://127.0.0.1:9000> and log in with the root credentials. You can use the Browser to create buckets, upload objects, and browse the contents of the MinIO server.
You can also connect using any S3-compatible tool, such as the MinIO Client `mc` commandline tool. See [Test using MinIO Client `mc`](#test-using-minio-client-mc) for more information on using the `mc` commandline tool. For application developers, see <https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/developers/minio-drivers.html> to view MinIO SDKs for supported languages.
> NOTE: Standalone MinIO servers are best suited for early development and evaluation. Certain features such as versioning, object locking, and bucket replication require distributed deploying MinIO with Erasure Coding. For extended development and production, deploy MinIO with Erasure Coding enabled - specifically, with a *minimum* of 4 drives per MinIO server. See [MinIO Erasure Code Overview](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/operations/concepts/erasure-coding.html#) for more complete documentation.
## Microsoft Windows
To run MinIO on 64-bit Windows hosts, download the MinIO executable from the following URL:
Use the following command to run a standalone MinIO server on the Windows host. Replace ``D:\`` with the path to the drive or directory in which you want MinIO to store data. You must change the terminal or powershell directory to the location of the ``minio.exe`` executable, *or* add the path to that directory to the system ``$PATH``:
```sh
minio.exe server D:\
```
The MinIO deployment starts using default root credentials `minioadmin:minioadmin`. You can test the deployment using the MinIO Console, an embedded web-based object browser built into MinIO Server. Point a web browser running on the host machine to <http://127.0.0.1:9000> and log in with the root credentials. You can use the Browser to create buckets, upload objects, and browse the contents of the MinIO server.
You can also connect using any S3-compatible tool, such as the MinIO Client `mc` commandline tool. See [Test using MinIO Client `mc`](#test-using-minio-client-mc) for more information on using the `mc` commandline tool. For application developers, see <https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/developers/minio-drivers.html> to view MinIO SDKs for supported languages.
> NOTE: Standalone MinIO servers are best suited for early development and evaluation. Certain features such as versioning, object locking, and bucket replication require distributed deploying MinIO with Erasure Coding. For extended development and production, deploy MinIO with Erasure Coding enabled - specifically, with a *minimum* of 4 drives per MinIO server. See [MinIO Erasure Code Overview](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/operations/concepts/erasure-coding.html#) for more complete documentation.
## Install from Source
Use the following commands to compile and run a standalone MinIO server from source. Source installation is only intended for developers and advanced users. If you do not have a working Golang environment, please follow [How to install Golang](https://golang.org/doc/install). Minimum version required is [go1.21](https://golang.org/dl/#stable)
```sh
go install github.com/minio/minio@latest
```
The MinIO deployment starts using default root credentials `minioadmin:minioadmin`. You can test the deployment using the MinIO Console, an embedded web-based object browser built into MinIO Server. Point a web browser running on the host machine to <http://127.0.0.1:9000> and log in with the root credentials. You can use the Browser to create buckets, upload objects, and browse the contents of the MinIO server.
You can also connect using any S3-compatible tool, such as the MinIO Client `mc` commandline tool. See [Test using MinIO Client `mc`](#test-using-minio-client-mc) for more information on using the `mc` commandline tool. For application developers, see <https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/developers/minio-drivers.html> to view MinIO SDKs for supported languages.
> NOTE: Standalone MinIO servers are best suited for early development and evaluation. Certain features such as versioning, object locking, and bucket replication require distributed deploying MinIO with Erasure Coding. For extended development and production, deploy MinIO with Erasure Coding enabled - specifically, with a *minimum* of 4 drives per MinIO server. See [MinIO Erasure Code Overview](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/operations/concepts/erasure-coding.html) for morecomplete documentation.
MinIO strongly recommends *against* using compiled-from-source MinIO servers for production environments.
## Deployment Recommendations
### Allow port access for Firewalls
By default MinIO uses the port 9000 to listen for incoming connections. If your platform blocks the port by default, you may need to enable access to the port.
### ufw
For hosts with ufw enabled (Debian based distros), you can use `ufw` command to allow traffic to specific ports. Use below command to allow access to port 9000
```sh
ufw allow 9000
```
Below command enables all incoming traffic to ports ranging from 9000 to 9010.
```sh
ufw allow 9000:9010/tcp
```
### firewall-cmd
For hosts with firewall-cmd enabled (CentOS), you can use `firewall-cmd` command to allow traffic to specific ports. Use below commands to allow access to port 9000
```sh
firewall-cmd --get-active-zones
```
This command gets the active zone(s). Now, apply port rules to the relevant zones returned above. For example if the zone is `public`, use
Note that `permanent` makes sure the rules are persistent across firewall start, restart or reload. Finally reload the firewall for changes to take effect.
```sh
firewall-cmd --reload
```
### iptables
For hosts with iptables enabled (RHEL, CentOS, etc), you can use `iptables` command to enable all traffic coming to specific ports. Use below command to allow
access to port 9000
```sh
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9000 -j ACCEPT
service iptables restart
```
Below command enables all incoming traffic to ports ranging from 9000 to 9010.
```sh
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9000:9010 -j ACCEPT
service iptables restart
```
## Test MinIO Connectivity
### Test using MinIO Console
MinIO Server comes with an embedded web based object browser. Point your web browser to <http://127.0.0.1:9000> to ensure your server has started successfully.
> NOTE: MinIO runs console on random port by default, if you wish to choose a specific port use `--console-address` to pick a specific interface and port.
### Things to consider
MinIO redirects browser access requests to the configured server port (i.e. `127.0.0.1:9000`) to the configured Console port. MinIO uses the hostname or IP address specified in the request when building the redirect URL. The URL and port *must* be accessible by the client for the redirection to work.
For deployments behind a load balancer, proxy, or ingress rule where the MinIO host IP address or port is not public, use the `MINIO_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URL` environment variable to specify the external hostname for the redirect. The LB/Proxy must have rules for directing traffic to the Console port specifically.
For example, consider a MinIO deployment behind a proxy `https://minio.example.net`, `https://console.minio.example.net` with rules for forwarding traffic on port :9000 and :9001 to MinIO and the MinIO Console respectively on the internal network. Set `MINIO_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URL` to `https://console.minio.example.net` to ensure the browser receives a valid reachable URL.
`mc` provides a modern alternative to UNIX commands like ls, cat, cp, mirror, diff etc. It supports filesystems and Amazon S3 compatible cloud storage services. Follow the MinIO Client [Quickstart Guide](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/reference/minio-mc.html#quickstart) for further instructions.
## Upgrading MinIO
Upgrades require zero downtime in MinIO, all upgrades are non-disruptive, all transactions on MinIO are atomic. So upgrading all the servers simultaneously is the recommended way to upgrade MinIO.
> NOTE: requires internet access to update directly from <https://dl.min.io>, optionally you can host any mirrors at <https://my-artifactory.example.com/minio/>
- For deployments that installed the MinIO server binary by hand, use [`mc admin update`](https://min.io/docs/minio/linux/reference/minio-mc-admin/mc-admin-update.html)
```sh
mc admin update <minio alias, e.g., myminio>
```
- For deployments without external internet access (e.g. airgapped environments), download the binary from <https://dl.min.io> and replace the existing MinIO binary let's say for example `/opt/bin/minio`, apply executable permissions `chmod +x /opt/bin/minio` and proceed to perform `mc admin service restart alias/`.
- For installations using Systemd MinIO service, upgrade via RPM/DEB packages **parallelly** on all servers or replace the binary lets say `/opt/bin/minio` on all nodes, apply executable permissions `chmod +x /opt/bin/minio` and process to perform `mc admin service restart alias/`.
### Upgrade Checklist
- Test all upgrades in a lower environment (DEV, QA, UAT) before applying to production. Performing blind upgrades in production environments carries significant risk.
- Read the release notes for MinIO *before* performing any upgrade, there is no forced requirement to upgrade to latest release upon every release. Some release may not be relevant to your setup, avoid upgrading production environments unnecessarily.
- If you plan to use `mc admin update`, MinIO process must have write access to the parent directory where the binary is present on the host system.
- `mc admin update` is not supported and should be avoided in kubernetes/container environments, please upgrade containers by upgrading relevant container images.
- **We do not recommend upgrading one MinIO server at a time, the product is designed to support parallel upgrades please follow our recommended guidelines.**
> For production, pin a release, use unique credentials and TLS, monitor the service, keep independent backups, and test recovery. Start from the [documentation](https://silo.pgsty.com/docs/).
## Install
| Method | Where |
| :-- | :-- |
| Container | [`pgsty/silo`](https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo), multi-arch for `linux/amd64` and `linux/arm64` |
| Binaries | [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases) — Linux, macOS, Windows on `amd64` and `arm64` |
| Packages | RPM, DEB, and APK, also via the [Pigsty repository](https://pigsty.io/docs/repo/) |
| Kubernetes | Helm chart, see [Download & Install](https://silo.pgsty.com/download/) |
Every release ships checksums, SPDX SBOMs, Sigstore-signed manifests, and GitHub build attestations. Installation methods and verification commands are documented at [Download & Install](https://silo.pgsty.com/download/); migrating from upstream MinIO — taking over an existing `minio.service` and its `/etc/default/minio`, and keeping data ownership stable with a `/etc/systemd/system/silo.service.d/10-legacy-user.conf` drop-in — is covered by the [migration guide](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/migration/) and the [binary & service notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/binary/).
## Compatibility
The S3 API, `MINIO_*` variables, `minio_*` metrics, `x-minio-*` headers, `/minio/*` routes, the `github.com/minio/*` import paths, and the on-disk format (including `.minio.sys`) are preserved and held in place by a CI compatibility check. Only Silo-owned delivery surfaces change: the `silo` executable, package, service, Helm chart, and container image — no `minio` binary alias is installed.
Every divergence from upstream is listed in the code-verified [compatibility audit](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/server/). Treat each release as a downstream upgrade: pin versions, read the [release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/tags/silo/), and keep a rollback path.
## Security & Contributing
Report vulnerabilities privately as described in [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md); every fix ships with a public [advisory](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/security/). Contributions are accepted inbound=outbound under AGPL-3.0-or-later with no CLA — only DCO sign-off (`git commit -s`) is required; see [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md).
GitHub does not generate a contributor graph for forks, so [`CONTRIBUTORS.md`](CONTRIBUTORS.md) — not the Insights page — is this project's attribution record. It names everyone alongside the change or report they contributed.
## Background
Upstream wound down its community edition: the web console was cut back to a stub, prebuilt community binaries stopped, and the community repository was archived. Silo exists to keep those deployments running. The fork is a means, not an identity — if upstream restores its community edition, we will narrow our scope and offer the fixes back.
The [**Manifesto**](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/manifesto/) is the project's public commitment in eleven articles, under one discipline: every article is either something already done with public evidence, or something explicitly refused. In short:
- **Compatibility contract** — the protocol and your data do not change, and every release documents its tested rollback target and path.
- **The license cannot change** — AGPLv3, no CLA, no copyright aggregation; nobody here, ourselves included, holds enough copyright to relicense on everyone else's behalf.
- **The never list**, append-only — no paywalling existing features, no registration wall on downloads, no telemetry (upstream's phone-home paths are removed outright), no CLA, no license change, no trademark enforcement against normal use.
- **Security and release discipline** — a public advisory for every fix, and a release every one to two months, at most a quarter apart. Judge both against the public record.
Essays: [MinIO Is Dead](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/post/minio-is-dead/) · [Who Takes Over?](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/post/minio-alternative/) · [Long Live MinIO](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/post/minio-resurrect/) · [Promise Kept](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/post/minio-promise-kept/)
## License & Trademark
Silo is [AGPL-3.0-or-later](LICENSE), derived from [`minio/minio`](https://github.com/minio/minio) with upstream copyright and third-party notices preserved in [`NOTICE`](NOTICE) and [`CREDITS`](CREDITS). MinIO is a trademark of MinIO, Inc.; the name is used here only to identify the upstream project and compatibility lineage.
Silo is an independent, community-maintained object-storage server derived from
the open-source MinIO server. Upstream MinIO security contacts do not handle
Silo-specific fixes or release notes.
## Supported Versions
We always provide security updates for the [latest release](https://github.com/minio/minio/releases/latest).
Whenever there is a security update you just need to upgrade to the latest version.
Security fixes are tracked on the active development branch and summarized in
[docs/security/advisories.md](docs/security/advisories.md). Only the current
Silo release line is supported unless an advisory says otherwise.
## Reporting a Vulnerability
All security bugs in [minio/minio](https://github,com/minio/minio) (or other minio/* repositories)
should be reported by email to security@min.io. Your email will be acknowledged within 48 hours,
and you'll receive a more detailed response to your email within 72 hours indicating the next steps
in handling your report.
For vulnerabilities in this fork:
Please, provide a detailed explanation of the issue. In particular, outline the type of the security
issue (DoS, authentication bypass, information disclose, ...) and the assumptions you're making (e.g. do
you need access credentials for a successful exploit).
1. Follow the fork-specific expectations in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
2. Prefer this repository's [private GitHub security advisory](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/security/advisories/new) workflow.
3. If private reporting is unavailable, contact the maintainers through the
repository without publishing exploit details until a private channel is
established.
4. If you confirm the issue also affects upstream `minio/minio`, report it upstream separately.
If you have not received a reply to your email within 48 hours or you have not heard from the security team
for the past five days please contact the security team directly:
## Disclosure Process
- Primary security coordinator: aead@min.io
- Secondary coordinator: harsha@min.io
- If you receive no response: dev@min.io
### Disclosure Process
MinIO uses the following disclosure process:
1. Once the security report is received one member of the security team tries to verify and reproduce
the issue and determines the impact it has.
2. A member of the security team will respond and either confirm or reject the security report.
If the report is rejected the response explains why.
3. Code is audited to find any potential similar problems.
4. Fixes are prepared for the latest release.
5. On the date that the fixes are applied a security advisory will be published on <https://blog.min.io>.
Please inform us in your report email whether MinIO should mention your contribution w.r.t. fixing
the security issue. By default MinIO will **not** publish this information to protect your privacy.
This process can take some time, especially when coordination is required with maintainers of other projects.
Every effort will be made to handle the bug in as timely a manner as possible, however it's important that we
follow the process described above to ensure that disclosures are handled consistently.
Fork-specific fixes and user-visible upgrade notes are published in [docs/security/advisories.md](docs/security/advisories.md). The fork-specific triage and remediation process is described in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
# Default is HTTP/1, keepalive is only enabled in HTTP/1.1
proxy_http_version1.1;
proxy_set_headerConnection"";
chunked_transfer_encodingoff;
proxy_passhttp://minio;
}
}
}
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