fix(iam): enforce admin credential authorization boundaries

Honor self-service authorization denials, prevent session-limited credential delegation and updates, and protect root credential mutations under built-in IAM. Preserve empty-policy inheritance and damaged-account cleanup, normalize new service policy claims at issuance, and add signed Admin API and LDAP regressions.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>

cmd/admin-handlers-idp-ldap.go

@@ -249,8 +249,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccountLDAP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
 
 		// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
 		// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
+		// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
 		for k, v := range cred.Claims {
-			if k == expClaim {
+			switch k {
+			case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
 				continue
 			}
 			opts.claims[k] = v

cmd/admin-handlers-users-authz_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
+	polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
+	"github.com/minio/mux"
+	xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
+)
+
+func iamAdminFixture(t *testing.T) (context.Context, *IAMSys) {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctx, sys, obj := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
+	globalObjLayerMutex.Lock()
+	globalObjectAPI = obj
+	globalObjLayerMutex.Unlock()
+	return ctx, sys
+}
+
+func iamAdminUser(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, name, policyName string) auth.Credentials {
+	t.Helper()
+	cred := auth.Credentials{AccessKey: name, SecretKey: "review-user-valid-secret"}
+	_, err := sys.CreateUser(ctx, name, madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq{SecretKey: cred.SecretKey, Status: madmin.AccountEnabled})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	if policyName != "" {
+		_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, name, policyName, regUser, false)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	return cred
+}
+
+func iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, parent, key, document string) auth.Credentials {
+	t.Helper()
+	var sp *policy.Policy
+	var err error
+	if document != "" {
+		sp, err = policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	cred, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: key, secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", sessionPolicy: sp})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	return cred
+}
+
+func iamAdminRequest(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any) *http.Request {
+	t.Helper()
+	var body []byte
+	if payload != nil {
+		raw, err := json.Marshal(payload)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+		body, err = madmin.EncryptData(cred.SecretKey, raw)
+		mustIAM(t, err)
+	}
+	headers := map[string]string{}
+	if cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
+		headers["X-Amz-Security-Token"] = cred.SessionToken
+	}
+	req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(method, "http://localhost"+target, int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, headers)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	mustIAM(t, req.ParseForm())
+	return req
+}
+
+func iamAdminCall(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any, vars map[string]string, handler http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+	t.Helper()
+	req := iamAdminRequest(t, cred, method, target, payload)
+	req = mux.SetURLVars(req, vars)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "IAMAdminAuthorization"))
+	handler(rec, req)
+	return rec
+}
+
+func assertIAMAdminStatus(t *testing.T, operation string, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, want int) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if rec.Code != want {
+		t.Errorf("%s status=%d want=%d body=%s", operation, rec.Code, want, rec.Body.String())
+		return
+	}
+	if want == http.StatusForbidden || want == http.StatusNotFound {
+		var response APIErrorResponse
+		mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response))
+		wantCode := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied).Code
+		if want == http.StatusNotFound {
+			wantCode = errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound).Code
+		}
+		if response.Code != wantCode {
+			t.Errorf("%s error code=%s want=%s", operation, response.Code, wantCode)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func iamAdminPlugin(t *testing.T, allow bool) {
+	t.Helper()
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"result": allow})
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
+	u, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(server.URL)
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
+	setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{URL: u, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { r.Close() }}))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous) })
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminRootEmptyPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, doc := range []string{"", "null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
+		t.Run("policy="+doc, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			caller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-empty", doc)
+			sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-sibling", "")
+			req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+			checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
+			if code != ErrNone {
+				t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
+			}
+			active, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(policy.Args{Claims: checked.Claims})
+			t.Logf("owner=%v parsed_active_session_policy=%v", owner, active)
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-root-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "review"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminEmptyPolicyDelegation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, parentType := range []string{"root", "user"} {
+		for _, document := range []string{"null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
+			t.Run(parentType+"/"+document, func(t *testing.T) {
+				ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+				parent := globalActiveCred
+				if parentType == "user" {
+					parent = iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "empty-policy-parent", "readwrite")
+				}
+				sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+					accessKey: "empty-policy-caller", secretKey: "empty-policy-caller-secret", sessionPolicy: sp,
+					claims: map[string]any{"identity-attribute": "preserved"},
+				})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				const limitedPolicy = `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts"]}]}`
+				for _, tc := range []struct {
+					policy      string
+					listStatus  int
+					allowObject bool
+				}{
+					{"", http.StatusOK, true},
+					{"null", http.StatusOK, true},
+					{"{}", http.StatusOK, true},
+					{`{"Statement":null}`, http.StatusOK, true},
+					{limitedPolicy, http.StatusOK, false},
+					{`{"Version":"2012-10-17"}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
+					{`{"Statement":[]}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
+				} {
+					expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+					req := madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Expiration: &expires}
+					if tc.policy != "" {
+						req.Policy = json.RawMessage(tc.policy)
+					}
+					api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+					rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", req, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
+					assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create expiring child", rec, http.StatusOK)
+					data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
+					mustIAM(t, err)
+					var response madmin.AddServiceAccountResp
+					mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
+					child, ok := sys.store.GetUser(response.Credentials.AccessKey)
+					if !ok {
+						t.Fatal("new service account missing")
+					}
+					// Exercise the issued key through authentication and authorization.
+					assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "use expiring child policy="+tc.policy, iamAdminCall(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), tc.listStatus)
+					signed := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/example/object", nil)
+					checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(signed, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
+					if code != ErrNone {
+						t.Fatalf("child authentication: %v", code)
+					}
+					if checked.Claims["identity-attribute"] != "preserved" {
+						t.Fatal("creation lost the caller's identity context")
+					}
+					allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: checked.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: "example", ObjectName: "object"})
+					if allowed != tc.allowObject {
+						t.Errorf("GetObject allowed=%v with requested policy=%s", allowed, tc.policy)
+					}
+				}
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminCorruptServiceCleanup(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, status := range []string{auth.AccountOn, auth.AccountOff, "expired"} {
+		t.Run(status, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-admin", "consoleAdmin")
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-parent", "readwrite")
+			svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-corrupt", "")
+			if status == auth.AccountOff {
+				_, err := sys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: status})
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			cache := sys.store.lock()
+			u := cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey]
+			u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
+			if status == "expired" {
+				u.Credentials.Expiration = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute)
+			}
+			cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey] = u
+			sys.store.unlock()
+			_, _, err := sys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("fault injection failed")
+			}
+			raw, exists := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey)
+			_, loginOK := sys.GetUser(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
+			t.Logf("metadata_exists=%v parent_known=%v GetUser_ok=%v", exists, raw.Credentials.ParentUser == parent.AccessKey, loginOK)
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			outsider := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-outsider", "readwrite")
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "unauthorized cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, outsider, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "admin cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+			if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey); ok {
+				t.Fatal("deleted service account remains in the IAM cache")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminPolicylessSelf(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-policyless", "")
+	svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, caller.AccessKey, "rv-policyless-child", "")
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 200)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 200)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 200)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminExpiringInheritedPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-legacy-parent", "consoleAdmin")
+	document := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
+	// Model a credential persisted by the old handler: it copied its caller's
+	// policy claims but set the newly created service's type to inherited.
+	expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+	caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
+		accessKey: "rv-exp-inherited", secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", expiration: &expires,
+		claims: map[string]any{policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(document))},
+	})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+	checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
+	if code != ErrNone {
+		t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
+	}
+	args := policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.CreateServiceAccountAdminAction, DenyOnly: true}
+	if !sys.IsAllowed(args) {
+		t.Fatal("fixture cannot create")
+	}
+	args.Action = policy.CreateUserAdminAction
+	args.DenyOnly = false
+	if sys.IsAllowed(args) {
+		t.Fatal("fixture not constrained")
+	}
+	t.Logf("service=%v temp=%v inherited=%v; create allowed, create-user denied", checked.IsServiceAccount(), checked.IsTemp(), checked.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType)
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-escaped", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
+	if rec.Code == 200 {
+		child, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, "review-escaped")
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("new key missing")
+		}
+		childReq := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+		childChecked, childOwner, childCode := checkKeyValid(childReq, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
+		if childCode != ErrNone {
+			t.Fatalf("child auth=%v", childCode)
+		}
+		allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: childChecked.AccessKey, Claims: childChecked.Claims, IsOwner: childOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
+		t.Errorf("constrained inherited service created a new key; new key CreateUser allowed=%v", allowed)
+	} else {
+		assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject derived creation", rec, 403)
+	}
+	updated := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+caller.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "metadata-only"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": caller.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount)
+	if updated.Code == 204 {
+		after, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey)
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatal("updated key missing")
+		}
+		afterReq := iamAdminRequest(t, after.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
+		afterChecked, afterOwner, afterCode := checkKeyValid(afterReq, caller.AccessKey)
+		if afterCode != ErrNone {
+			t.Fatalf("updated auth=%v", afterCode)
+		}
+		allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: afterChecked.Claims, IsOwner: afterOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
+		t.Errorf("constrained inherited service updated itself; CreateUser allowed after update=%v", allowed)
+	} else {
+		assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject inherited self update", updated, 403)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminSessionPolicyCannotDelegate(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, temp := range []bool{false, true} {
+		t.Run(map[bool]string{false: "service", true: "sts"}[temp], func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-parent", "consoleAdmin")
+			doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
+			var caller auth.Credentials
+			if !temp {
+				caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "review-restricted", doc)
+			} else {
+				var err error
+				caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(doc))}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
+				_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-sibling", "")
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict LDAP create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/idp/ldap/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccountLDAP), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
+			if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser("review-bad-new"); ok {
+				t.Fatal("denied creation persisted a credential")
+			}
+			u, ok := sys.store.GetUser(sibling.AccessKey)
+			if !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != sibling.SecretKey {
+				t.Fatal("denied update changed the target credential")
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminSelfDenials(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, mode := range []string{"parent_deny", "group_deny", "session_implicit_deny", "session_explicit_deny", "plugin_deny"} {
+		t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-self-parent", "readwrite")
+			target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-target", "")
+			caller := parent
+			doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts","admin:RemoveServiceAccount"]}]}`
+			switch mode {
+			case "parent_deny", "group_deny":
+				p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(doc))
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				_, err = sys.SetPolicy(ctx, "review-self-deny", *p)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				if mode == "group_deny" {
+					_, err = sys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, "self-deny-group", []string{parent.AccessKey})
+					mustIAM(t, err)
+					_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, "self-deny-group", "review-self-deny", regUser, true)
+				} else {
+					_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, parent.AccessKey, "readwrite,review-self-deny", regUser, false)
+				}
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			case "session_implicit_deny":
+				caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::example/*"]}]}`)
+			case "session_explicit_deny":
+				caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", doc)
+			case "plugin_deny":
+				iamAdminPlugin(t, false)
+			}
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 403)
+			assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminNonRootCannotManageRoot(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-console-admin", "consoleAdmin")
+	target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "rv-root-target", "")
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "rv-new-root", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", TargetUser: globalActiveCred.AccessKey}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+	// Restricted root-derived credentials and the site replicator are not root
+	// administrators, even when their effective policy allows these actions.
+	limited := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "limited-root", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:*"]}]}`)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root delete", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root revoke", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
+	replicator, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: siteReplicatorSvcAcc, secretKey: "replicator-valid-secret", allowSiteReplicatorAccount: true})
+	mustIAM(t, err)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicator create root", iamAdminCall(t, replicator, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
+
+	// An external plugin remains authoritative, including for root targets.
+	iamAdminPlugin(t, true)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin update root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "plugin-authorized"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin create root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminDeleteCorruptServiceReplicates(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+	caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-admin", "consoleAdmin")
+	parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-parent", "readwrite")
+	target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "cleanup-target", "")
+	cache := sys.store.lock()
+	u := cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey]
+	u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
+	u.Credentials.Status = auth.AccountOff
+	cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey] = u
+	sys.store.unlock()
+
+	var deletions atomic.Int32
+	peer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if r.URL.Path == "/minio/health/live" {
+			return
+		}
+		var batch iamRevisionBatch
+		if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&batch); err != nil {
+			t.Error(err)
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		if len(batch.Items) != 1 || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete.AccessKey != target.AccessKey {
+			t.Error("replication did not carry the service account deletion")
+		} else {
+			deletions.Add(1)
+		}
+		_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(iamRevisionResponse{iamRevisionStatus: iamRevisionStatus{Version: iamRevisionProtocol, Node: "peer", Instance: "peer-boot", Digest: "deleted"}})
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(peer.Close)
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.RLock()
+	previousSecret := globalSiteReplicatorCred.secretKey
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.RUnlock()
+	globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(caller.SecretKey)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(previousSecret) })
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = true
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.state = srState{ServiceAccountAccessKey: caller.AccessKey, Peers: map[string]madmin.PeerInfo{
+		globalDeploymentID(): {DeploymentID: globalDeploymentID(), Name: "local"},
+		"peer":               {DeploymentID: "peer", Name: "peer", Endpoint: peer.URL},
+	}}
+	globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = false
+		globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
+	})
+	api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+	assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicated cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
+	if deletions.Load() != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected one immediate deletion notification, got %d", deletions.Load())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIAMAdminListSelfAliases(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, kind := range []string{"service", "sts"} {
+		t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
+			parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "alias-parent", "readwrite")
+			target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-target", "")
+			caller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-caller", "")
+			if kind == "sts" {
+				var err error
+				caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
+				_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+			}
+			api := adminAPIHandlers{}
+			for _, alias := range []string{"", caller.AccessKey, parent.AccessKey} {
+				rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+alias, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts)
+				assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list self alias", rec, 200)
+				data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
+				mustIAM(t, err)
+				var response madmin.ListServiceAccountsResp
+				mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
+				found := false
+				for _, account := range response.Accounts {
+					found = found || account.AccessKey == target.AccessKey
+				}
+				if !found {
+					t.Fatalf("self alias %q did not list the parent's service accounts", alias)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/admin-handlers-users.go

@@ -714,8 +714,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 
 		// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
 		// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
+		// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
 		for k, v := range cred.Claims {
-			if k == expClaim {
+			switch k {
+			case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
 				continue
 			}
 			opts.claims[k] = v
@@ -855,10 +857,9 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	// Permission checks:
 	//
-	// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service
-	// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the
-	// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service
-	// account.
+	// 1. Updating requires policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction. Under built-in
+	// IAM, session-limited callers cannot update credentials, and only unrestricted
+	// root credentials can manage root's service accounts.
 	//
 	// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it
 	// is currently blocked pending a re-design. Users are still able to delete
@@ -874,6 +875,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
+		(svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
 
 	var sp *policy.Policy
 	if len(updateReq.NewPolicy) > 0 {
@@ -951,23 +957,21 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
 		return
 	}
 
-	if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	requestUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		requestUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
+		DenyOnly:        requestUser == svcAccount.ParentUser,
 	}) {
-		requestUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			requestUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-
-		if requestUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
 	}
 
 	// if session policy is nil or empty, then it is implied policy
@@ -1039,29 +1043,27 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListServiceAccounts(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
 		return
 	}
 
-	var targetAccount string
-
-	// If listing is requested for a specific user (who is not the request
-	// sender), check that the user has permissions.
+	selfUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		selfUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
 	user := r.Form.Get("user")
-	if user != "" && user != cred.AccessKey {
-		if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
-			AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
-			Groups:          cred.Groups,
-			Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
-			ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
-			IsOwner:         owner,
-			Claims:          cred.Claims,
-		}) {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
-		targetAccount = user
-	} else {
-		targetAccount = cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			targetAccount = cred.ParentUser
-		}
+	selfOnly := user == "" || user == cred.AccessKey || user == selfUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
+		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
+		Groups:          cred.Groups,
+		Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
+		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
+		IsOwner:         owner,
+		Claims:          cred.Claims,
+		DenyOnly:        selfOnly,
+	}) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+	targetAccount := user
+	if selfOnly {
+		targetAccount = selfUser
 	}
 
 	serviceAccounts, err := globalIAMSys.ListServiceAccounts(ctx, targetAccount)
@@ -1110,7 +1112,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 
 	// Get current object layer instance.
 	objectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()
-	if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {
+	if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil || !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
@@ -1131,35 +1133,41 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidArgument), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
-	// We do not care if service account is readable or not at this point,
-	// since this is a delete call we shall allow it to be deleted if possible.
-	svcAccount, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount)
-	if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
+	// Deletion needs the stored identity, not a valid token or session policy.
+	// Keep disabled, expired and damaged service accounts removable, and retain
+	// their parent for authorization and the site replication hook below.
+	u, ok := globalIAMSys.store.GetUser(serviceAccount)
+	if !ok || !u.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
 		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
 		return
 	}
+	svcAccount := u.Credentials
 
-	adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	parentUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		parentUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	isSelf := parentUser == svcAccount.ParentUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
-	})
-
-	if !adminPrivilege {
-		parentUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			parentUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-		if svcAccount.ParentUser != "" && parentUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
-			// The service account belongs to another user but return not
-			// found error to mitigate brute force attacks. or the
-			// serviceAccount doesn't exist.
+		DenyOnly:        isSelf,
+	}) {
+		if !isSelf {
+			// Hide the existence of another user's service account.
 			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
 			return
 		}
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
+		return
 	}
 
 	if err := globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount, true); err != nil {
@@ -2046,26 +2054,30 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) RevokeTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	parentUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		parentUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	isSelfTarget := isTokenSelfRevoke || user == parentUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
-	})
-
-	if !adminPrivilege || isTokenSelfRevoke {
-		parentUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			parentUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-		if !isTokenSelfRevoke && user != parentUser {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
+		DenyOnly:        isSelfTarget,
+	}) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
+	if isSelfTarget {
 		user = parentUser
 	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && user == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
+	}
 
 	// Infer token revoke type from the request if requestor is STS.
 	if isTokenSelfRevoke && tokenRevokeType == "" && !fullRevoke {
@@ -2112,29 +2124,22 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoAccessKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 	u, ok := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)
 	targetCred := u.Credentials
 
-	if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
+	requestUser := cred.AccessKey
+	if cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		requestUser = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	isSelf := ok && targetCred.ParentUser != "" && requestUser == targetCred.ParentUser
+	if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
 		AccountName:     cred.AccessKey,
 		Groups:          cred.Groups,
 		Action:          policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
 		ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
 		IsOwner:         owner,
 		Claims:          cred.Claims,
+		DenyOnly:        isSelf,
 	}) {
-		// If requested user does not exist and requestor is not allowed to list service accounts, return access denied.
-		if !ok {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
-
-		requestUser := cred.AccessKey
-		if cred.ParentUser != "" {
-			requestUser = cred.ParentUser
-		}
-
-		if requestUser != targetCred.ParentUser {
-			writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
-			return
-		}
+		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
+		return
 	}
 
 	if !ok {
@@ -2908,6 +2913,44 @@ func addExpirationToCondValues(exp *time.Time, condValues map[string][]string) e
 	return nil
 }
 
+// hasActiveSessionPolicy follows the same credential dispatch as IAMSys.IsAllowed.
+// Expiring service accounts also satisfy IsTemp and are evaluated as STS there.
+// Callers use this only after authorization under built-in IAM.
+func hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
+	args := policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}
+	if cred.IsTemp() {
+		hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicy(args)
+		return hasSP
+	}
+	if cred.IsServiceAccount() {
+		if cred.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
+			return false
+		}
+		hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(args)
+		return hasSP
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// canManageRootCredentials is an additional guard after built-in IAM authorization.
+// The signature's owner flag is insufficient: historical empty session policies
+// clear it even though the service account still inherits root's permissions.
+func canManageRootCredentials(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
+	return cred.AccessKey == globalActiveCred.AccessKey ||
+		(cred.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && cred.AccessKey != siteReplicatorSvcAcc && !hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred))
+}
+
+// isAllowedServiceAccountAction preserves regular users' self inspection and
+// cleanup even without a policy attachment, while enforcing explicit denies.
+// Derived credentials and external authorization plugins use full IAM evaluation.
+func isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred auth.Credentials, args policy.Args) bool {
+	if args.DenyOnly && !args.IsOwner && !cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() && newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
+		policies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(args.AccountName, args.Groups...)
+		return err == nil && globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...).IsAllowed(args)
+	}
+	return globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(args)
+}
+
 func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.Credentials, newServiceAccountOpts, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq, string, APIError) {
 	ctx := r.Context()
 
@@ -2996,6 +3039,14 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
 	}) {
 		return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
 	}
+	effectiveTarget := targetUser
+	if (targetUser == cred.AccessKey || targetUser == cred.ParentUser) && cred.ParentUser != "" {
+		effectiveTarget = cred.ParentUser
+	}
+	if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
+		(effectiveTarget == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
+		return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
+	}
 
 	var sp *policy.Policy
 	if len(createReq.Policy) > 0 {
@@ -3003,6 +3054,12 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
 		if err != nil {
 			return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err)
 		}
+		// Empty service policies mean inheritance, including for expiring keys.
+		// Normalize the replication request as well as the local credential.
+		if sp.Version == "" && sp.Statements == nil && sp.ID == "" {
+			sp = nil
+			createReq.Policy = nil
+		}
 	}
 
 	opts.sessionPolicy = sp

cmd/api-errors-checksum_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+//
+// This file is part of SILO Object Storage.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
+)
+
+func TestChecksumMismatchAPIMessage(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, algorithm := range []string{"CRC32", "CRC32C", "SHA1", "SHA256", "CRC64NVME", ""} {
+		t.Run(algorithm, func(t *testing.T) {
+			mismatch := hash.ChecksumMismatch{Algorithm: algorithm, Want: "expected", Got: "actual"}
+			want := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrContentChecksumMismatch).Description
+			if algorithm != "" {
+				want = fmt.Sprintf("The %s you specified did not match the calculated checksum.", algorithm)
+			}
+			for _, err := range []error{mismatch, fmt.Errorf("upload: %w", mismatch)} {
+				got := toAPIError(t.Context(), err)
+				if got.HTTPStatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest || got.Code != "XAmzContentChecksumMismatch" || got.Description != want {
+					t.Fatalf("toAPIError(%v) = %+v, want 400 XAmzContentChecksumMismatch: %s", err, got, want)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/api-errors.go

@@ -2505,6 +2505,14 @@ func toAPIError(ctx context.Context, err error) APIError {
 	case errors.Is(err, errMissingPartChecksum):
 		apiErr.Description = strings.TrimPrefix(err.Error(), errMissingPartChecksum.Error()+": ")
 	}
+	// PutObject/UploadPart checksum mismatches name the algorithm in the
+	// message, matching S3 (e.g. "The CRC32 you specified did not match the
+	// calculated checksum."). Falls through to the generic table description
+	// when the algorithm is unknown.
+	var checksumMismatch hash.ChecksumMismatch
+	if errors.As(err, &checksumMismatch) && checksumMismatch.Algorithm != "" {
+		apiErr.Description = fmt.Sprintf("The %s you specified did not match the calculated checksum.", checksumMismatch.Algorithm)
+	}
 	switch apiErr.Code {
 	case "NotImplemented":
 		apiErr = APIError{

cmd/erasure-metadata-utils_test.go

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"math/rand"
 	"reflect"
@@ -110,6 +111,96 @@ func TestReduceErrs(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestReduceWriteQuorumErrsCommitMetaMissing verifies that an in-quorum
+// errCommitMetaMissing reduces to the sentinel, which renameData() converts
+// to errErasureWriteQuorum, while below-quorum reduces directly to
+// errErasureWriteQuorum.
+func TestReduceWriteQuorumErrsCommitMetaMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	errs := make([]error, 16)
+	for i := range 9 {
+		errs[i] = errCommitMetaMissing
+	}
+	if err := reduceWriteQuorumErrs(t.Context(), errs, objectOpIgnoredErrs, 9); !errors.Is(err, errCommitMetaMissing) {
+		t.Errorf("expected %s, got %s", errCommitMetaMissing, err)
+	}
+	// The sentinel must be distinguishable from errFileNotFound so that
+	// commit failures are never mapped to ObjectNotFound (404).
+	if errors.Is(errCommitMetaMissing, errFileNotFound) {
+		t.Error("errCommitMetaMissing must not match errFileNotFound")
+	}
+
+	// Below quorum the reduction must yield a write-quorum failure (503);
+	// eight sentinels against eight committed drives is not a quorum.
+	belowQuorum := make([]error, 16)
+	for i := range 8 {
+		belowQuorum[i] = errCommitMetaMissing
+	}
+	if err := reduceWriteQuorumErrs(t.Context(), belowQuorum, objectOpIgnoredErrs, 9); !errors.Is(err, errErasureWriteQuorum) {
+		t.Errorf("expected %s, got %s", errErasureWriteQuorum, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// renameDataFailingDisk is a StorageAPI stub returning a fixed error
+// from RenameData, enough to drive renameData() in unit tests.
+type renameDataFailingDisk struct {
+	StorageAPI
+	err       error
+	undoWrite bool
+}
+
+func (d *renameDataFailingDisk) RenameData(context.Context, string, string, FileInfo, string, string, RenameOptions) (RenameDataResp, error) {
+	return RenameDataResp{}, d.err
+}
+
+func (d *renameDataFailingDisk) DeleteVersion(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ FileInfo, _ bool, opts DeleteOptions) error {
+	d.undoWrite = opts.UndoWrite
+	return nil
+}
+
+// TestRenameDataCommitMetaMissing verifies that renameData() converts an
+// in-quorum errCommitMetaMissing into errErasureWriteQuorum (HTTP 503),
+// while an in-quorum errFileNotFound keeps its meaning so that
+// PutObject() still reports IncompleteBody for client disconnects.
+func TestRenameDataCommitMetaMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name     string
+		failures int
+		diskErr  error
+		wantErr  error
+	}{
+		{"all_commit_metadata_missing", 16, errCommitMetaMissing, errErasureWriteQuorum},
+		{"quorum_commit_metadata_missing", 9, errCommitMetaMissing, errErasureWriteQuorum},
+		{"neither_side_has_quorum", 8, errCommitMetaMissing, errErasureWriteQuorum},
+		{"successful_write_quorum", 7, errCommitMetaMissing, nil},
+		{"staging_failure", 16, errFileNotFound, errFileNotFound},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			metadata := make([]FileInfo, 16)
+			disks := make([]StorageAPI, 16)
+			for i := range disks {
+				metadata[i] = FileInfo{Deleted: true} // valid without erasure info
+				disk := &renameDataFailingDisk{}
+				if i < tc.failures {
+					disk.err = tc.diskErr
+				}
+				disks[i] = disk
+			}
+			_, _, _, err := renameData(t.Context(), disks, minioMetaTmpBucket, "tmp", metadata, "bucket", "object", 9)
+			if !errors.Is(err, tc.wantErr) {
+				t.Fatalf("expected %v, got %v", tc.wantErr, err)
+			}
+			for i, disk := range disks {
+				// Failed writes undo only the drives that committed. A
+				// successful quorum must never be rolled back.
+				wantUndo := tc.wantErr != nil && i >= tc.failures
+				if got := disk.(*renameDataFailingDisk).undoWrite; got != wantUndo {
+					t.Errorf("disk %d: UndoWrite = %v, want %v", i, got, wantUndo)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 // TestHashOrder - test order of ints in array
 func TestHashOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	testCases := []struct {

cmd/erasure-multipart-cleanup_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 clown15
+//
+// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestExtractModTimeFromUploadIDDir(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Unix(1792056747, 123456789).UTC()
+	nano := now.UnixNano()
+	uuid := "d16ad42a-6fe5-4a3b-8092-69983142238f"
+
+	testCases := []struct {
+		name        string
+		dirName     string
+		expectedMod time.Time
+		wantZero    bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "Modern Plaintext Format (<UUID>x<UnixNano>)",
+			dirName:     fmt.Sprintf("%sx%d", uuid, nano),
+			expectedMod: time.Unix(0, nano),
+			wantZero:    false,
+		},
+		{
+			// This valid UUID decodes to bytes containing 'x'. Checking
+			// for that byte before parsing plaintext loses the timestamp.
+			name:        "Plaintext Also Decodes To Base64 Containing x",
+			dirName:     fmt.Sprintf("4eacd477-e733-4851-b821-6fd42785ff87x%d", nano),
+			expectedMod: now,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "Legacy Format Without Timestamp (<UUID>)",
+			dirName:     uuid,
+			expectedMod: time.Time{},
+			wantZero:    true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "Base64 Encoded Format",
+			dirName:     base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%sx%d", uuid, nano))),
+			expectedMod: time.Unix(0, nano),
+			wantZero:    false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "Encoded Format With Deployment Prefix",
+			dirName:     base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s.%sx%d", uuid, uuid, nano))),
+			expectedMod: now,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "Malformed Suffix (<UUID>xinvalid)",
+			dirName:     fmt.Sprintf("%sxnotanumber", uuid),
+			expectedMod: time.Time{},
+			wantZero:    true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "Timestamp Overflow",
+			dirName:  uuid + "x9223372036854775808",
+			wantZero: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "Malformed Plaintext UUID",
+			dirName:  fmt.Sprintf("not-a-uuidx%d", nano),
+			wantZero: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "Empty Directory Name",
+			dirName:     "",
+			expectedMod: time.Time{},
+			wantZero:    true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range testCases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := extractModTimeFromUploadIDDir(tc.dirName)
+			if tc.wantZero {
+				if !got.IsZero() {
+					t.Fatalf("expected zero time for %q, got %v", tc.dirName, got)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if !got.Equal(tc.expectedMod) {
+				t.Fatalf("extractModTimeFromUploadIDDir(%q) = %v; want %v", tc.dirName, got, tc.expectedMod)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+type multipartCleanupDisk struct {
+	StorageAPI
+	root    string
+	modTime time.Time
+	readErr error
+	reads   int
+}
+
+func (d *multipartCleanupDisk) Endpoint() Endpoint {
+	return Endpoint{URL: &url.URL{Path: d.root}}
+}
+
+func (d *multipartCleanupDisk) ReadVersion(context.Context, string, string, string, string, ReadOptions) (FileInfo, error) {
+	d.reads++
+	return FileInfo{ModTime: d.modTime}, d.readErr
+}
+
+func (d *multipartCleanupDisk) StatVol(context.Context, string) (VolInfo, error) {
+	return VolInfo{Created: time.Now()}, nil
+}
+
+func TestCleanupStaleUploadsOnDisk(t *testing.T) {
+	const uuid = "d16ad42a-6fe5-4a3b-8092-69983142238f"
+	expiry := globalAPIConfig.getStaleUploadsExpiry()
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name, prefix string
+		age          time.Duration
+		legacy       bool
+		readErr      error
+		wantReads    int
+		wantDeleted  bool
+	}{
+		{name: "recent", prefix: uuid, age: expiry / 2, readErr: errFileNotFound},
+		{name: "plaintext_base64_collision", prefix: "4eacd477-e733-4851-b821-6fd42785ff87", age: expiry / 2, readErr: errFileNotFound},
+		{name: "expired", prefix: uuid, age: 2 * expiry, readErr: errFileNotFound, wantDeleted: true},
+		{name: "legacy_recent", prefix: uuid, age: expiry / 2, legacy: true, wantReads: 1},
+		{name: "legacy_expired", prefix: uuid, age: 2 * expiry, legacy: true, wantReads: 1, wantDeleted: true},
+		{name: "legacy_metadata_missing", prefix: uuid, age: 2 * expiry, legacy: true, readErr: errFileNotFound, wantReads: 1},
+		{name: "malformed_metadata_missing", prefix: "not-a-uuid", age: 2 * expiry, readErr: errFileNotFound, wantReads: 1},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			modTime := time.Now().Add(-tc.age)
+			id := tc.prefix
+			if !tc.legacy {
+				id = fmt.Sprintf("%sx%d", tc.prefix, modTime.UnixNano())
+			}
+			disk := &multipartCleanupDisk{root: t.TempDir(), modTime: modTime, readErr: tc.readErr}
+			uploadDir := filepath.Join(disk.root, minioMetaMultipartBucket, "sha", id)
+			if err := os.MkdirAll(uploadDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			erasureObjects{}.cleanupStaleUploadsOnDisk(t.Context(), disk)
+			if disk.reads != tc.wantReads {
+				t.Errorf("ReadVersion calls = %d, want %d", disk.reads, tc.wantReads)
+			}
+			_, err := os.Stat(uploadDir)
+			if tc.wantDeleted {
+				if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+					t.Errorf("expired upload must be removed: %v", err)
+				}
+			} else if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("upload must be preserved: %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/erasure-multipart.go

@@ -174,6 +174,24 @@ func (er erasureObjects) deleteAll(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix string) {
 	wg.Wait()
 }
 
+// extractModTimeFromUploadIDDir extracts creation time from the upload ID directory on disk.
+// On-disk directory names are of the form <UUID>x<UnixNano>.
+// Parse the native format first: plaintext UUIDs can also be valid Base64.
+// Preserve the previous encoded-format parser for compatibility.
+func extractModTimeFromUploadIDDir(uploadIDDir string) time.Time {
+	if modTime, ok := multipartUploadTime(uploadIDDir); ok {
+		return modTime
+	}
+	if b64, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(uploadIDDir); err == nil {
+		if split := strings.Split(string(b64), "x"); len(split) == 2 {
+			if t, err := strconv.ParseInt(split[1], 10, 64); err == nil {
+				return time.Unix(0, t)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return time.Time{}
+}
+
 // Remove the old multipart uploads on the given disk.
 func (er erasureObjects) cleanupStaleUploadsOnDisk(ctx context.Context, disk StorageAPI) {
 	drivePath := disk.Endpoint().Path
@@ -181,16 +199,7 @@ func (er erasureObjects) cleanupStaleUploadsOnDisk(ctx context.Context, disk Sto
 	readDirFn(pathJoin(drivePath, minioMetaMultipartBucket), func(shaDir string, typ os.FileMode) error {
 		readDirFn(pathJoin(drivePath, minioMetaMultipartBucket, shaDir), func(uploadIDDir string, typ os.FileMode) error {
 			uploadIDPath := pathJoin(shaDir, uploadIDDir)
-			var modTime time.Time
-			// Upload IDs are of the form base64_url(<UUID>x<UnixNano>), we can extract the time from the UUID.
-			if b64, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(uploadIDDir); err == nil {
-				if split := strings.Split(string(b64), "x"); len(split) == 2 {
-					t, err := strconv.ParseInt(split[1], 10, 64)
-					if err == nil {
-						modTime = time.Unix(0, t)
-					}
-				}
-			}
+			modTime := extractModTimeFromUploadIDDir(uploadIDDir)
 			// Fallback for older uploads without time in the ID.
 			if modTime.IsZero() {
 				wait := deleteMultipartCleanupSleeper.Timer(ctx)

cmd/erasure-object.go

@@ -1083,6 +1083,12 @@ func renameData(ctx context.Context, disks []StorageAPI, srcBucket, srcEntry str
 	errs := g.Wait()
 
 	err := reduceWriteQuorumErrs(ctx, errs, objectOpIgnoredErrs, writeQuorum)
+	if errors.Is(err, errCommitMetaMissing) {
+		// Commit metadata went missing on a quorum of drives; the write
+		// did not commit. Return a 503 class error so clients retry
+		// instead of treating the object as absent (404).
+		err = errErasureWriteQuorum
+	}
 	if err != nil {
 		dg := errgroup.WithNErrs(len(disks))
 		for index, nerr := range errs {

cmd/iam-peer-reload_test.go

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ func TestIAMPeerDeleteNotificationReloadsCommittedState(t *testing.T) {
 			resetTestGlobals()
 			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 			defer cancel()
+			// Both caches use object storage, independent of earlier etcd suites.
+			globalEtcdClient = nil
 			obj, disk, err := prepareFS(ctx)
 			if err != nil {
 				t.Fatal(err)

cmd/object-api-errors.go

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ func toObjectErr(oerr error, params ...string) error {
 			apiErr.Type = v.Type
 		}
 		return apiErr
-	case errErasureWriteQuorum.Error():
+	case errErasureWriteQuorum.Error(), errCommitMetaMissing.Error():
 		apiErr := InsufficientWriteQuorum{}
 		if len(params) >= 1 {
 			apiErr.Bucket = params[0]

cmd/object-handlers-chunked-checksum_test.go

@@ -62,12 +62,13 @@ func testAPIPutObjectChunkedChecksum(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucketName s
 	// A well-formed 4-byte value that does not match the content.
 	wrongCRC := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04})
 
-	apiCode := func(rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) string {
+	apiErrOf := func(rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) APIErrorResponse {
 		var apiErr APIErrorResponse
 		b, _ := io.ReadAll(rec.Body)
 		_ = xml.Unmarshal(b, &apiErr)
-		return apiErr.Code
+		return apiErr
 	}
+	apiCode := func(rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) string { return apiErrOf(rec).Code }
 
 	// newChunkedJavaForm builds a non-trailer signed chunked PutObject request that
 	// mirrors the AWS Java SDK v2 wire form: the checksum value sits in the header
@@ -131,8 +132,12 @@ func testAPIPutObjectChunkedChecksum(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucketName s
 		if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
 			t.Fatalf("%s: chunked+wrong CRC32: expected 400, got %d", instanceType, rec.Code)
 		}
-		if code := apiCode(rec); code != "XAmzContentChecksumMismatch" {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: chunked+wrong CRC32: want XAmzContentChecksumMismatch, got %q", instanceType, code)
+		gotErr := apiErrOf(rec)
+		if gotErr.Code != "XAmzContentChecksumMismatch" {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: chunked+wrong CRC32: want XAmzContentChecksumMismatch, got %q", instanceType, gotErr.Code)
+		}
+		if gotErr.Message != "The CRC32 you specified did not match the calculated checksum." {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: chunked+wrong CRC32: message = %q, want S3 algorithm-specific wording", instanceType, gotErr.Message)
 		}
 	}
 }

cmd/storage-errors.go

@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ var errDiskAccessDenied = StorageErr("drive access denied")
 // errFileNotFound - cannot find the file.
 var errFileNotFound = StorageErr("file not found")
 
+// errCommitMetaMissing - the staged xl.meta disappeared between the
+// data rename and the meta-file commit; a write-quorum failure, not
+// a missing object.
+var errCommitMetaMissing = StorageErr("commit metadata is missing")
+
 // errFileNotFound - cannot find requested file version.
 var errFileVersionNotFound = StorageErr("file version not found")
 

cmd/storage-rest-client.go

@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ func toStorageErr(err error) error {
 		return errVolumeExists
 	case errFileNotFound.Error():
 		return errFileNotFound
+	case errCommitMetaMissing.Error():
+		return errCommitMetaMissing
 	case errFileVersionNotFound.Error():
 		return errFileVersionNotFound
 	case errFileNameTooLong.Error():

cmd/sts-handlers_test.go

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
 	xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
 	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/ldap"
+	"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
 )
 
 func runAllIAMSTSTests(suite *TestSuiteIAM, c *check) {
@@ -2384,8 +2385,10 @@ func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestIAMImport(c *check, exportedContent []byte, caseNum i
 	if err != nil {
 		c.Fatalf("import %d: Unable to list policies: %v", caseNum, err)
 	}
-	defaultCannedPolicies := set.CreateStringSet("consoleAdmin", "readwrite", "readonly",
-		"diagnostics", "writeonly")
+	defaultCannedPolicies := set.CreateStringSet()
+	for _, p := range policy.DefaultPolicies {
+		defaultCannedPolicies.Add(p.Name)
+	}
 	for policy, policyBytes := range policyContentMap {
 		if defaultCannedPolicies.Contains(policy) {
 			continue
@@ -2991,6 +2994,21 @@ func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestLDAPSTSServiceAccounts(c *check) {
 	// 6. Check that service account cannot be created for some other user.
 	c.mustNotCreateSvcAccount(ctx, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, userAdmClient)
 
+	// An empty policy must not contaminate an expiring LDAP child credential.
+	emptyPolicyCred, err := userAdmClient.AddServiceAccountLDAP(ctx, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Policy: []byte("null")})
+	if err != nil {
+		c.Fatalf("Unable to create empty-policy LDAP service account: %v", err)
+	}
+	emptyPolicyAdmin := s.getAdminClient(c, emptyPolicyCred.AccessKey, emptyPolicyCred.SecretKey, "")
+	expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
+	for _, childPolicy := range [][]byte{nil, []byte("null")} {
+		child, err := emptyPolicyAdmin.AddServiceAccountLDAP(ctx, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Expiration: &expires, Policy: childPolicy})
+		if err != nil {
+			c.Fatalf("Unable to create expiring LDAP child: %v", err)
+		}
+		c.assertSvcAccS3Access(ctx, s, child, bucket)
+	}
+
 	// Detach the policy from the user
 	if _, err = s.adm.DetachPolicyLDAP(ctx, userReq); err != nil {
 		c.Fatalf("Unable to detach user policy: %v", err)

cmd/xl-storage-errors_test.go

@@ -18,10 +18,16 @@
 package cmd
 
 import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"runtime"
+	"sync"
 	"syscall"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 )
 
 func TestSysErrors(t *testing.T) {
@@ -56,3 +62,120 @@ func TestSysErrors(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// TestCommitMetaMissingMapping verifies the RPC and object-layer mapping
+// of errCommitMetaMissing, returned when the staged xl.meta disappears
+// between the data rename and the meta-file commit in RenameData().
+func TestCommitMetaMissingMapping(t *testing.T) {
+	// The sentinel must survive a storage REST/grid round-trip; errors
+	// cross the wire as strings and are remapped by toStorageErr().
+	if got := toStorageErr(errors.New(errCommitMetaMissing.Error())); !errors.Is(got, errCommitMetaMissing) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected %s, got %s", errCommitMetaMissing, got)
+	}
+	if got := toStorageErr(errCommitMetaMissing); got != errCommitMetaMissing {
+		t.Fatalf("expected %s, got %s", errCommitMetaMissing, got)
+	}
+
+	// toObjectErr() must map the sentinel to InsufficientWriteQuorum
+	// (503), never to ObjectNotFound (404).
+	err := toObjectErr(errCommitMetaMissing, "bucket", "object")
+	qerr, ok := err.(InsufficientWriteQuorum)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("expected InsufficientWriteQuorum, got %s (%T)", err, err)
+	}
+	if qerr.Bucket != "bucket" || qerr.Object != "object" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected bucket/object %s/%s", qerr.Bucket, qerr.Object)
+	}
+	apiErr := toAPIError(t.Context(), err)
+	if apiErr.Code != "SlowDownWrite" || apiErr.HTTPStatusCode != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+		t.Fatalf("expected SlowDownWrite/503, got %+v", apiErr)
+	}
+}
+
+// missingCommitMetaContext removes staged metadata at an existing cancellation
+// check, after WriteAll and (for non-inline objects) the data rename succeeded.
+// This deterministically models concurrent cleanup without changing production
+// code or relying on a filesystem race. The context itself remains live.
+type missingCommitMetaContext struct {
+	context.Context
+	mu             sync.Mutex
+	meta, dataDest string
+	removed        bool
+	removeErr      error
+}
+
+func (c *missingCommitMetaContext) Done() <-chan struct{} {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	if !c.removed {
+		if _, err := os.Stat(c.meta); err == nil {
+			dataMoved := c.dataDest == ""
+			if !dataMoved {
+				_, err = os.Stat(c.dataDest)
+				dataMoved = err == nil
+			}
+			if dataMoved {
+				c.removeErr = os.Remove(c.meta)
+				c.removed = c.removeErr == nil
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return c.Context.Done()
+}
+
+func TestXLStorageRenameDataCommitMetaMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name     string
+		dataFile bool
+	}{
+		{"empty_object", false},
+		{"data_directory", true},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			disk, root, err := newXLStorageTestSetup(t)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			defer disk.Close()
+			s := disk.storage
+			if err := s.MakeVol(t.Context(), "bucket"); err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			fi := newFileInfo("object", 2, 2)
+			fi.DataDir, fi.VersionID = mustGetUUID(), mustGetUUID()
+			fi.Erasure.Index = 1
+			fi.ModTime = time.Now().UTC()
+			fi.Fresh = true
+			ctx := &missingCommitMetaContext{
+				Context: t.Context(),
+				meta:    filepath.Join(root, minioMetaTmpBucket, "staged", xlStorageFormatFile),
+			}
+			if tc.dataFile {
+				fi.Size = 1
+				fi.AddObjectPart(1, "", 1, 1, fi.ModTime, nil, nil)
+				part := filepath.Join(root, minioMetaTmpBucket, "staged", fi.DataDir, "part.1")
+				if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(part), 0o755); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				if err := os.WriteFile(part, []byte("a"), 0o644); err != nil {
+					t.Fatal(err)
+				}
+				ctx.dataDest = filepath.Join(root, "bucket", "object", fi.DataDir)
+			}
+			_, err = s.RenameData(ctx, minioMetaTmpBucket, "staged", fi, "bucket", "object", RenameOptions{})
+			if !ctx.removed {
+				t.Fatalf("metadata removal did not execute: removal error = %v, RenameData error = %v", ctx.removeErr, err)
+			}
+			if !errors.Is(err, errCommitMetaMissing) {
+				t.Fatalf("expected commit metadata missing, got %v", err)
+			}
+			apiErr := toAPIError(t.Context(), toObjectErr(err, "bucket", "object"))
+			if apiErr.Code != "SlowDownWrite" || apiErr.HTTPStatusCode != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
+				t.Fatalf("expected SlowDownWrite/503, got %+v", apiErr)
+			}
+			if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "bucket", "object", xlStorageFormatFile)); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+				t.Fatalf("failed commit must not produce destination metadata: %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

cmd/xl-storage.go

@@ -2925,7 +2925,15 @@ func (s *xlStorage) RenameData(ctx context.Context, srcVolume, srcPath string, f
 		// if its a partial rename() do not attempt to delete recursively.
 		// this can be healed since all parts are available.
 		s.deleteFile(dstVolumeDir, dstDataPath, false, false)
-		return res, osErrToFileErr(err)
+		err = osErrToFileErr(err)
+		if errors.Is(err, errFileNotFound) {
+			// The staged xl.meta disappeared between staging and commit.
+			// This is a write-quorum failure, not a missing object; use a
+			// dedicated error so the object layer returns 503 instead of
+			// mapping it to ObjectNotFound (404).
+			err = errCommitMetaMissing
+		}
+		return res, err
 	}
 
 	if srcVolume != minioMetaMultipartBucket {

go.mod

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ go 1.27.2
 
 // Console and MC retain their historical module paths for best-effort upstream
 // compatibility. Pin the maintained PGSTY implementations used by SILO.
-replace github.com/minio/console => github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260916075814-1360e26d976d
+replace github.com/minio/console => github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20261015132217-e5b165e4c0ee
 
 replace github.com/minio/mc => github.com/pgsty/mc v0.0.0-20260916070421-e952aa78f10a
 

go.sum

@@ -547,8 +547,8 @@ github.com/pborman/getopt v0.0.0-20170112200414-7148bc3a4c30/go.mod h1:85jBQOZwp
 github.com/pelletier/go-toml v1.2.0/go.mod h1:5z9KED0ma1S8pY6P1sdut58dfprrGBbd/94hg7ilaic=
 github.com/pgsty/mc v0.0.0-20260916070421-e952aa78f10a h1:FY1vcTQT67HGBe23ozlhOiQnWCzUCGmeSN5x6DT/kFs=
 github.com/pgsty/mc v0.0.0-20260916070421-e952aa78f10a/go.mod h1:6z9lX8kOvaWz2vLlP7BjjF3JWHnIH86XDA2HwcmpZH8=
-github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260916075814-1360e26d976d h1:A9ou1GkUckGZd3BOgEXeZ393nbYST967SKcI4Lgr/Vs=
-github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20260916075814-1360e26d976d/go.mod h1:JS165CF2yoTBIx1X8k1IQ6vunJcZFG3pRZlWHJ8UT8o=
+github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20261015132217-e5b165e4c0ee h1:e51AnrGe0Zq+nHTYaGfv/GkehQMO9Mekuw/ew6zYwOM=
+github.com/pgsty/silo-console v0.0.0-20261015132217-e5b165e4c0ee/go.mod h1:jpt39bx4wjhXoFB+BTOa/bx/pmU3pXzp2cT7PnT21Lo=
 github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3 v3.14.1 h1:8MONT3Hky9EOnsuPk29590pEBE6MILaOnJtaejPPi7M=
 github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3 v3.14.1/go.mod h1:jxKWxi52jSsDaDhXXPqjOyPDYdxx2iqdBXyLfM/xSIw=
 github.com/philhofer/fwd v1.2.0 h1:e6DnBTl7vGY+Gz322/ASL4Gyp1FspeMvx1RNDoToZuM=

internal/hash/checksum-errors_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
+//
+// This file is part of SILO Object Storage.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
+// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+// (at your option) any later version.
+//
+// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
+// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+//
+// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+package hash
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestChecksumMismatchAlgorithm(t *testing.T) {
+	content := []byte("actual content")
+	for _, typ := range []ChecksumType{ChecksumCRC32, ChecksumCRC32C, ChecksumSHA1, ChecksumSHA256, ChecksumCRC64NVME} {
+		t.Run(typ.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
+			wrong := NewChecksumFromData(typ, []byte("wrong content"))
+			check := func(t *testing.T, err error) {
+				t.Helper()
+				var mismatch ChecksumMismatch
+				if !errors.As(err, &mismatch) || mismatch.Algorithm != typ.String() {
+					t.Fatalf("error=%+v, want %s checksum mismatch", err, typ)
+				}
+			}
+			check(t, wrong.Matches(content, 0))
+			parts := NewChecksumFromData(typ, content)
+			parts.WantParts = 2
+			check(t, parts.Matches(content, 1))
+			for _, mode := range []string{"header", "trailer", "malformed-trailer"} {
+				t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
+					reader, err := NewReader(t.Context(), bytes.NewReader(content), int64(len(content)), "", "", int64(len(content)))
+					if err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "http://localhost/bucket/object", nil)
+					if mode == "header" {
+						req.Header.Set(typ.Key(), wrong.Encoded)
+					} else {
+						req.Header.Set("x-amz-trailer", typ.Key())
+						req.Trailer = make(http.Header)
+						value := wrong.Encoded
+						if mode == "malformed-trailer" {
+							value = "!invalid-base64!"
+						}
+						req.Trailer.Set(typ.Key(), value)
+					}
+					if err = reader.AddChecksum(req, false); err != nil {
+						t.Fatal(err)
+					}
+					_, err = io.ReadAll(reader)
+					check(t, err)
+				})
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/hash/checksum.go

@@ -584,15 +584,17 @@ func (c Checksum) Matches(content []byte, parts int) error {
 	sum := hasher.Sum(nil)
 	if c.WantParts > 0 && c.WantParts != parts {
 		return ChecksumMismatch{
-			Want: fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", c.Encoded, c.WantParts),
-			Got:  fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum), parts),
+			Algorithm: c.Type.String(),
+			Want:      fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", c.Encoded, c.WantParts),
+			Got:       fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum), parts),
 		}
 	}
 
 	if !bytes.Equal(sum, c.Raw) {
 		return ChecksumMismatch{
-			Want: c.Encoded,
-			Got:  base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum),
+			Algorithm: c.Type.String(),
+			Want:      c.Encoded,
+			Got:       base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum),
 		}
 	}
 	return nil

internal/hash/errors.go

@@ -74,8 +74,11 @@ func (e SizeMismatch) Error() string {
 
 // ChecksumMismatch - when content checksum does not match with what was sent from client.
 type ChecksumMismatch struct {
-	Want string
-	Got  string
+	// Algorithm carries the requested checksum type (e.g. "CRC32") so API
+	// error rendering can name it, matching S3's wording.
+	Algorithm string
+	Want      string
+	Got       string
 }
 
 func (e ChecksumMismatch) Error() string {

internal/hash/reader.go

@@ -302,13 +302,14 @@ func (r *Reader) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
 				r.contentHash.Encoded = r.trailer.Get(r.contentHash.Type.Key())
 				r.contentHash.Raw, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(r.contentHash.Encoded)
 				if err != nil || len(r.contentHash.Raw) == 0 {
-					return 0, ChecksumMismatch{Got: r.contentHash.Encoded}
+					return 0, ChecksumMismatch{Algorithm: r.contentHash.Type.String(), Got: r.contentHash.Encoded}
 				}
 			}
 			if sum := r.contentHasher.Sum(nil); !bytes.Equal(r.contentHash.Raw, sum) {
 				err := ChecksumMismatch{
-					Want: r.contentHash.Encoded,
-					Got:  base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum),
+					Algorithm: r.contentHash.Type.String(),
+					Want:      r.contentHash.Encoded,
+					Got:       base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum),
 				}
 				return n, err
 			}