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5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Feng Ruohang 770ccfc6ef chore: refresh delete authorization compatibility snapshot
Accept the additional DeleteObjects route literal introduced by the issue #58 regression matrix.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-02 02:48:11 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 14d89a9735 fix: preserve multi-delete authentication and audit context
Authenticate DeleteObjects before validating entry count, remove the obsolete per-version auth helper, and pin the marker-only request to the ordinary authorization path.\n\nRefs: #58

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-02 02:32:43 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 65090cfb59 test: verify least-privilege delete replication
Document that replication targets retain the DeleteObject plus ReplicateDelete contract and extend the existing two-site test with a target user that lacks DeleteObjectVersion. Use mc for explicit version deletion so the gate no longer depends on AWS CLI.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-02 02:32:43 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 67c5b5c49f fix: authorize explicit version deletes with DeleteObjectVersion
Select DeleteObject or DeleteObjectVersion from each request's effective version ID for single and multi-delete. Authenticate multi-delete once, bind version conditions to each XML entry, and keep the established DeleteObject plus ReplicateDelete target contract with explicit version denies honored only on trusted replication.\n\nRefs: #58

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-02 02:32:43 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9c50c34c44 test: reproduce explicit-version delete authorization mismatch
Prove that DeleteObjectVersion-only principals cannot delete named UUID or null versions while DeleteObject-only principals can, contrary to the S3 action mapping in issue #58.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-02 02:32:43 +08:00
597 changed files with 16034 additions and 89075 deletions
+54
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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
---
name: Bug report
about: Create a report to help us improve
title: ''
labels: community, triage
assignees: ''
---
## NOTE
Silo issues are handled by community maintainers on a best-effort basis. There
is no SLA, SLO, or emergency production-support channel. Follow the local
[Code of Conduct](../code_of_conduct.md) when participating. Report suspected
vulnerabilities through the private process in [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md),
not in a public issue.
<!--- Provide a general summary of the issue in the Title above -->
## Expected Behavior
<!--- If you're describing a bug, tell us what should happen -->
<!--- If you're suggesting a change/improvement, tell us how it should work -->
## Current Behavior
<!--- If describing a bug, tell us what happens instead of the expected behavior -->
<!--- If suggesting a change/improvement, explain the difference from current behavior -->
## Possible Solution
<!--- Not obligatory, but suggest a fix/reason for the bug, -->
<!--- or ideas how to implement the addition or change -->
## Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)
<!--- Provide a link to a live example, or an unambiguous set of steps to -->
<!--- reproduce this bug. Include code to reproduce, if relevant -->
<!--- and include relevant Silo logs with secrets and credentials removed -->
1.
2.
3.
4.
## Context
<!--- How has this issue affected you? What are you trying to accomplish? -->
<!--- Providing context helps us come up with a solution that is most useful in the real world -->
## Regression
<!-- Is this issue a regression? (Yes / No) -->
<!-- If Yes, optionally include the Silo version, commit id, or PR that caused this regression. -->
## Your Environment
<!--- Include as many relevant details about the environment you experienced the bug in -->
* Version used (`silo --version`):
* Server setup and configuration:
* Operating System and version (`uname -a`):
-8
View File
@@ -7,14 +7,6 @@ assignees: ''
---
Report bugs in the PGSTY SILO server (`pgsty/silo`) here. Community maintainers
handle reports on a best-effort basis. There is no SLA, SLO, or emergency
production-support channel. Follow the
[Code of Conduct](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/main/code_of_conduct.md).
Report suspected vulnerabilities privately through
[SECURITY.md](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
For patches, see the [contribution guide](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md).
<!--- Provide a general summary of the issue in the Title above -->
## Expected Behavior
@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ assignees: ''
---
Suggest improvements to the PGSTY SILO server (`pgsty/silo`) here.
For patches, see the [contribution guide](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md).
**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.**
A clear and concise description of what the problem is. Ex. I'm always frustrated when [...]
+3 -7
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
## Contribution Licensing (no CLA, inbound=outbound, DCO required)
This pull request contributes to PGSTY SILO (`pgsty/silo`). Code contributions
are accepted under AGPL-3.0-or-later, the same license as the server.
This project does not use a CLA or require a separate Apache-2.0 license grant.
This project does not use a CLA; contributions are accepted inbound=outbound.
By submitting this pull request I represent that I have the right to contribute
the code changes under this repository's
the changes, which are licensed under this repository's
[GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 or later](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl-3.0.html)
and retain copyright in my original work. Existing copyright and license
notices remain intact; separately licensed material keeps its applicable terms.
Every commit must carry a DCO `Signed-off-by` trailer
and remain my copyright. Every commit must carry a DCO `Signed-off-by` trailer
(`git commit -s`) certifying the
[Developer Certificate of Origin](https://developercertificate.org/) — see
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md).
-12
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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
version: 2
updates:
# Dockerfile.goreleaser and Dockerfile.distroless pin their bases by digest
# so a release tag rebuilds from the same bytes. Without this the pins would
# silently rot and stop receiving base-image CVE fixes.
- package-ecosystem: docker
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
commit-message:
prefix: build
-4
View File
@@ -27,10 +27,6 @@ archives:
ids:
- silo
name_template: "silo_{{ .Env.PKG_VERSION }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
formats: ["tar.gz"]
format_overrides:
- goos: windows
formats: ["zip"]
# Explicit so the license materials cannot silently drop out of the
# binary archives: GoReleaser's default file globs would miss NOTICE.
# CREDITS stays out deliberately -- at 1.8MB it would dominate the
+3 -60
View File
@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ on:
description: "Published RELEASE.* tag to package as pgsty/silo"
required: true
type: string
recovery:
description: "Run the current main workflow against an already-published tag"
required: false
default: false
type: boolean
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -80,18 +75,12 @@ jobs:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Verify workflow identity matches release source
env:
DEFAULT_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}
RECOVERY: ${{ inputs.recovery }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
CHECKED_OUT_REVISION="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
if [ "${CHECKED_OUT_REVISION}" != "${GITHUB_SHA}" ]; then
if [ "${RECOVERY}" != "true" ] || [ "${GITHUB_REF}" != "refs/heads/${DEFAULT_BRANCH}" ]; then
echo "Checked out ${CHECKED_OUT_REVISION}, but workflow identity is ${GITHUB_SHA}. Dispatch from ${RELEASE_TAG}, or use recovery from ${DEFAULT_BRANCH}." >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Recovery workflow ${GITHUB_SHA} is packaging published source ${CHECKED_OUT_REVISION}."
echo "Checked out ${CHECKED_OUT_REVISION}, but workflow identity is ${GITHUB_SHA}. Dispatch this workflow from ${RELEASE_TAG}." >&2
exit 1
fi
- name: Prepare verified Docker contexts
@@ -140,50 +129,10 @@ jobs:
mkdir -p "${context}/dockerscripts"
tar -xzf "${archive}" -C "${context}" silo
cp Dockerfile.goreleaser Dockerfile.distroless LICENSE NOTICE CREDITS "${context}/"
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh \
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh \
"${context}/dockerscripts/"
done
# The classic image bundles mcli. Resolve its two archive digests
# from the immutable published release instead of trusting defaults
# copied into an older Server tag. This also gives a recovery run a
# narrow override when a tag selected the right mcli release but
# accidentally retained stale archive pins.
MC_REPO="$(awk -F= '/^ARG MC_REPO=/{print $2; exit}' Dockerfile.goreleaser)"
MC_VERSION="$(awk -F= '/^ARG MC_VERSION=/{print $2; exit}' Dockerfile.goreleaser)"
test -n "${MC_REPO}"
test -n "${MC_VERSION}"
MC_VERSION_HYPHEN="${MC_VERSION#RELEASE.}"
MC_PKG_VERSION="$(echo "${MC_VERSION_HYPHEN}" | sed -E 's/^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})T([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})Z$/\1\2\3\4\5\6.0.0/')"
if [ "${MC_PKG_VERSION}" = "${MC_VERSION_HYPHEN}" ]; then
echo "Invalid bundled mcli tag: ${MC_VERSION}" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ "$(gh release view "${MC_VERSION}" --repo "${MC_REPO}" --json isDraft --jq .isDraft)" != false ] || \
[ "$(gh release view "${MC_VERSION}" --repo "${MC_REPO}" --json isPrerelease --jq .isPrerelease)" != false ] || \
[ "$(gh release view "${MC_VERSION}" --repo "${MC_REPO}" --json isImmutable --jq .isImmutable)" != true ]; then
echo "Bundled mcli ${MC_REPO}@${MC_VERSION} must be a published immutable release" >&2
exit 1
fi
mc_checksums="mcli_${MC_PKG_VERSION}_checksums.txt"
gh release download "${MC_VERSION}" --repo "${MC_REPO}" \
--dir "${assets_dir}" --pattern "${mc_checksums}"
gh attestation verify "${assets_dir}/${mc_checksums}" \
--repo "${MC_REPO}" \
--signer-workflow "${MC_REPO}/.github/workflows/release.yml" \
--source-ref "refs/tags/${MC_VERSION}" >/dev/null
MC_AMD64_SHA256="$(awk -v name="mcli_${MC_PKG_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" '$2 == name {print $1}' "${assets_dir}/${mc_checksums}")"
MC_ARM64_SHA256="$(awk -v name="mcli_${MC_PKG_VERSION}_linux_arm64.tar.gz" '$2 == name {print $1}' "${assets_dir}/${mc_checksums}")"
[[ "${MC_AMD64_SHA256}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]
[[ "${MC_ARM64_SHA256}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{64}$ ]]
{
echo "MC_AMD64_SHA256=${MC_AMD64_SHA256}"
echo "MC_ARM64_SHA256=${MC_ARM64_SHA256}"
} >> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
echo "RELEASE_REVISION=$(git rev-parse HEAD)" >> "${GITHUB_ENV}"
- name: Set up QEMU
@@ -213,9 +162,6 @@ jobs:
file: docker-release/amd64/Dockerfile.goreleaser
platforms: linux/amd64
push: true
build-args: |
MC_AMD64_SHA256=${{ env.MC_AMD64_SHA256 }}
MC_ARM64_SHA256=${{ env.MC_ARM64_SHA256 }}
tags: |
pgsty/silo:${{ env.RELEASE_TAG }}-amd64
pgsty/silo:latest-amd64
@@ -232,9 +178,6 @@ jobs:
file: docker-release/arm64/Dockerfile.goreleaser
platforms: linux/arm64
push: true
build-args: |
MC_AMD64_SHA256=${{ env.MC_AMD64_SHA256 }}
MC_ARM64_SHA256=${{ env.MC_ARM64_SHA256 }}
tags: |
pgsty/silo:${{ env.RELEASE_TAG }}-arm64
pgsty/silo:latest-arm64
+1 -3
View File
@@ -148,9 +148,7 @@ jobs:
for rpm_file in finalize/packages/*.rpm; do
signature_output="$(sudo rpmkeys --checksig --verbose "${rpm_file}")"
printf '%s\n' "${signature_output}"
normalized_signature="$(printf '%s\n' "${signature_output}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
full_fingerprint="$(printf '%s' "${expected_fingerprint}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
if ! printf '%s\n' "${normalized_signature}" | grep -Eq "key id ${key_id}: ok|key fingerprint: ${full_fingerprint}: ok"; then
if ! printf '%s\n' "${signature_output}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' | grep -q "key id ${key_id}: ok"; then
echo "Signature verification failed for ${rpm_file}" >&2
exit 1
fi
-50
View File
@@ -90,56 +90,6 @@ jobs:
- name: Run S3 Select tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./internal/s3select/... -count=1
- name: Run conditional PUT and multipart tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(PoolsConditionalPut|SinglePoolConditionalPutHTTP|PoolsMultipartCondition)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run multi-pool delete consistency tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(Pools(Delete|BulkDelete|RetiringCopyPreservesSharedTierObject)|BulkDeleteQuorumEvidence)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
# Build tags: kqueue selects the kqueue backend of rjeczalik/notify on
# BSD and macOS and changes nothing on Linux. dev came with upstream's
# 2024-06 Makefile change for development builds; no file in this
# repository or its dependencies carries a dev build constraint, so it
# selects nothing and is kept only so that the documented command
# lines (make test, make install-race) stay valid.
- name: Run lifecycle expiry and native restore tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(PoolsLifecycle|PoolsMigrationLifecycle|ExpireRestored|NativeRestore)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run multipart listing, cancellation and cleanup tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(ObjectCompleteMultipartUpload|Multipart|PaginateMultipartUploads|ListMultipartUploads|CleanupStaleUploads|ExtractModTime)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run listing metadata recovery, pagination and cancellation tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(ListFallback|ListingCache|ListingMerge|ListingRecovery|ListingPending|ListingEntry|ListingSecondLock|StreamMetadataParts|LocalLockerListing|DistributedListing|MergeXLV2LatestNullCrossParity|CountXLV2MixedECGroups|ListCrossParity|ListObjectVersionsCrossParityNull|MigrationCrossParity)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run lock cancellation and late-grant cleanup tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./internal/dsync ./internal/lsync -run '^Test(DRWMutex|LRWMutex)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run CPU metrics tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^TestLoadCPUMetrics' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run tag replication tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^TestAPITagging' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run Object Lock authorization and overwrite tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run maintenance storage timeout and compatibility tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd ./internal/grid ./internal/ioutil -run '^Test(StorageTimeout|StorageRollback|StoragePrerelease|MaintenancePartialFailedOverwriteAvailability|SingleRequest|WithDeadline)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run logger target lifecycle tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^TestDynamicWebhookOutlivesConfigContext' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Compile deferred consistency diagnostics
run: go test -tags kqueue,dev,consistency_strict ./cmd -run '^$'
crosscompile:
name: Cross Compile
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+3 -9
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@@ -70,12 +70,6 @@ jobs:
buildscripts/verify-rebrand.sh
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh
# Keep this gate aligned with the Object Lock race regression in go.yml.
- name: Gate release on Object Lock authorization and overwrite tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Compute release variables
env:
# Passed through the environment, never interpolated into the script
@@ -138,9 +132,9 @@ jobs:
cosign-release: v3.1.2
- name: Build Draft release with GoReleaser
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
with:
version: v2.18.3
version: "~> v2"
args: release --clean --skip=validate --config .github/goreleaser.yml
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -156,7 +150,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Install nFPM
run: |
set -euo pipefail
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.48.0
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.47.0
echo "$(go env GOPATH)/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Build nFPM packages
-102
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@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
name: Repository Cards
on:
schedule:
# 00:00 UTC = 08:00 Asia/Shanghai. GitHub may queue scheduled runs.
- cron: "0 0 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches: [main]
paths:
- .github/workflows/repository-cards.yml
- .github/silo.svg
- buildscripts/repository-cards/**
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths:
- .github/workflows/repository-cards.yml
- .github/silo.svg
- buildscripts/repository-cards/**
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: repository-cards-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || 'publish' }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
check:
name: Validate repository cards
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Use the runner's Python in an isolated environment
run: |
python3 -m venv "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv"
"$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin/python" -m pip install -r buildscripts/repository-cards/requirements.txt
echo "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- run: python -m unittest discover -s buildscripts/repository-cards -p 'test_*.py' -v
publish:
name: Update README images
needs: check
if: github.repository == 'pgsty/silo' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event_name != 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
contents: write
issues: read
pull-requests: read
env:
OUTPUT_BRANCH: codex/repository-cards
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Use the runner's Python in an isolated environment
run: |
python3 -m venv "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv"
"$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin/python" -m pip install -r buildscripts/repository-cards/requirements.txt
echo "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Load the generated-assets branch
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
artifacts="$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards"
if git ls-remote --exit-code --heads origin "$OUTPUT_BRANCH"; then
git fetch --depth=1 origin "$OUTPUT_BRANCH"
git worktree add --detach "$artifacts" FETCH_HEAD
else
status=$?
# Exit 2 means no matching ref; transport/auth failures must stop.
if [ "$status" -ne 2 ]; then exit "$status"; fi
git worktree add --detach "$artifacts" HEAD
git -C "$artifacts" checkout --orphan "$OUTPUT_BRANCH"
git -C "$artifacts" rm -rf .
fi
- name: Refresh contributor and star cards
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: python buildscripts/repository-cards/update.py --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards"
- name: Publish changed assets
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
cd "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards"
git add README.md history.json curated.json contributors.json \
contributors-light.svg contributors-dark.svg \
star-history-light.svg star-history-dark.svg
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
echo "Repository cards are already current."
exit 0
fi
git config user.name 'github-actions[bot]'
git config user.email '41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com'
git commit -s -m "chore: update repository cards $(date -u +%F)"
# A normal push preserves history and refuses concurrent overwrites.
git push origin "HEAD:refs/heads/$OUTPUT_BRANCH"
+10 -66
View File
@@ -4,15 +4,13 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
pull_request:
paths:
- "go.mod"
- "go.sum"
- ".github/goreleaser.yml"
- ".github/nfpm.yml"
- "Dockerfile.goreleaser"
- "Dockerfile.distroless"
- "cmd/healthcheck-main.go"
- "cmd/main.go"
- "dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh"
- "dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh"
- "dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh"
- "dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh"
- "silo.service"
@@ -43,28 +41,6 @@ permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
curl:
name: Static curl (${{ matrix.arch }})
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
strategy:
matrix:
include:
- arch: amd64
runner: ubuntu-latest
- arch: arm64
runner: ubuntu-24.04-arm
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Build and exercise curl in an empty runtime
run: |
docker build --build-arg TARGETARCH=${{ matrix.arch }} \
--target curl-runtime -f Dockerfile.goreleaser -t silo-curl-test .
docker run --rm silo-curl-test --version | tee curl-version.txt
grep -F 'curl 8.23.0 ' curl-version.txt
grep -F 'HTTP2' curl-version.txt
docker run --rm silo-curl-test --fail --silent --show-error \
--connect-timeout 15 --max-time 60 https://curl.se/robots.txt
validate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
@@ -95,9 +71,9 @@ jobs:
echo "LDFLAGS: ${LDFLAGS}"
- name: GoReleaser config check
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
with:
version: v2.18.3
version: "~> v2"
args: check --config .github/goreleaser.yml
- name: Validate Helm chart and legacy upgrade identity
@@ -109,9 +85,9 @@ jobs:
syft-version: v1.50.0
- name: Build snapshot artifacts
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
with:
version: v2.18.3
version: "~> v2"
# A pull-request snapshot has no trusted release identity. Exercise
# the SBOM/checksum pipeline here, and reserve keyless signing for
# the tag-triggered release workflow with GitHub OIDC.
@@ -120,34 +96,13 @@ jobs:
LDFLAGS: ${{ env.LDFLAGS }}
PKG_VERSION: ${{ env.PKG_VERSION }}
- name: Verify archive formats, documentation, SBOMs, and checksums
- name: Verify archive SBOM and checksum coverage
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mapfile -t archives < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -name 'silo_*.tar.gz' -o -name 'silo_*.zip' \) | sort)
mapfile -t sboms < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -name 'silo_*.tar.gz.sbom.json' -o -name 'silo_*.zip.sbom.json' \) | sort)
mapfile -t archives < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'silo_*.tar.gz' | sort)
mapfile -t sboms < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'silo_*.tar.gz.sbom.json' | sort)
test "${#archives[@]}" -eq 6
test "${#sboms[@]}" -eq 6
for os in linux darwin windows; do
format=tar.gz
binary=silo
if [ "${os}" = windows ]; then
format=zip
binary=silo.exe
fi
for arch in amd64 arm64; do
archive="dist/silo_${PKG_VERSION}_${os}_${arch}.${format}"
test -s "${archive}"
jq -e '.spdxVersion | startswith("SPDX-")' "${archive}.sbom.json" >/dev/null
if [ "${format}" = zip ]; then
listing="$(unzip -Z1 "${archive}")"
else
listing="$(tar -tzf "${archive}")"
fi
for member in "${binary}" LICENSE NOTICE README.md; do
grep -Fx "${member}" <<< "${listing}"
done
done
done
manifest="dist/silo_${PKG_VERSION}_checksums.txt"
test -s "${manifest}"
(
@@ -164,7 +119,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Install package validation tools
run: |
set -euo pipefail
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.48.0
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.47.0
echo "$(go env GOPATH)/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install --yes rpm binutils
@@ -482,17 +437,6 @@ jobs:
fi
done
# Both variants must trust the same roots: the UBI bundle with the
# RHSB-2026-012 blocklist applied, not Debian's bundle.
tar -xOf "${ctx}/rootfs.tar" etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt > "${ctx}/ca.pem"
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile "${ctx}/ca.pem" \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout > "${ctx}/ca-subjects.txt"
test "$(grep -c '^subject=' "${ctx}/ca-subjects.txt")" -gt 100
if grep -E '^subject=.*(AAA Certificate Services|emSign ECC Root CA - G3)' "${ctx}/ca-subjects.txt"; then
echo "distroless CA bundle still trusts a blocklisted root"
exit 1
fi
# The baked-in healthcheck must drive Docker's health state on its
# own, the probe binary must be directly exec-able without any
# shell, and SIGTERM must still reach PID 1 (the server binary is
@@ -546,7 +490,7 @@ jobs:
bash -n buildscripts/package/lifecycle_test.sh
buildscripts/package/lifecycle_test.sh
bash -n dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh
bash -n dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh
bash -n dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh
go run ./buildscripts/rebrand-guard
buildscripts/verify-rebrand.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Install govulncheck
run: |
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.9.0
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.7.0
echo "$(go env GOPATH)/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Run govulncheck
+2 -2
View File
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ dist/
.claude/
.codex/
AGENTS.md
CLAUDE.md
_bmad/
_bmad-output/
# Investigation and editorial working files belong outside this repository.
docs/investigations/
docs/security/
docs/rebranding.md
.release-sign/
+4 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ linters:
- durationcheck
- forcetypeassert
- gocritic
- gomodguard_v2
- gomodguard
- govet
- ineffassign
- misspell
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ formatters:
exclusions:
generated: lax
paths:
# gofumpt v0.11.0 and Go 1.27's gofmt disagree on the indentation of
# multiple composite literals returned from a single statement.
- internal/ioutil/wait_pipe\.go$
- third_party$
- builtin$
- examples$
-34
View File
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# Copyright 2026 PGSTY contributors.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
FROM golang:1.27.3-bookworm
ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
GOTOOLCHAIN=local \
CGO_ENABLED=0 \
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX=10000
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates curl git jq openssl python3 procps \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Cache dependencies in the final image: subsequent analysis runs offline.
# Honor go.mod's PGSTY replacements and leave the module files unchanged.
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download && go mod verify
COPY . /src
# Keep normal Go debug information; the release Makefile strips it.
RUN go build -tags kqueue -o /usr/local/bin/silo . \
&& silo --version
# Compile test packages while online, including the server and internal code.
# Retain both the module and build caches so new reproducers work offline.
RUN go test -tags kqueue,dev -run '^$' -timeout=10m ./cmd ./internal/...
ENV GOPROXY=off \
GOSUMDB=off
CMD ["bash"]
-43
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@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# Override the release .dockerignore: keep source, CI files and all test fixtures.
# The scanner adds Git history separately after building the image.
.git
.bin
.claude
.codex
.idea
.release-sign
.vscode
_bmad
_bmad-output
dist
vendor
**/node_modules
**/*.test
**/.DS_Store
default.etcd
docs/investigations
docs/security
docs/rebranding.md
# Local server and debugging binaries.
minio
silo
hash-set
healing-bin
inspect
pprofgoparser
reorder-disks
s3-check-md5
s3-verify
xattr
xl-meta
docs/debugging/s3-verify/s3-verify
docs/debugging/xl-meta/xl-meta
docs/debugging/s3-check-md5/s3-check-md5
docs/debugging/hash-set/hash-set
docs/debugging/healing-bin/healing-bin
docs/debugging/inspect/inspect
docs/debugging/pprofgoparser/pprofgoparser
docs/debugging/reorder-disks/reorder-disks
docs/debugging/populate-hard-links/populate-hardlinks
docs/debugging/xattr/xattr
-131
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@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
# PGSTY Silo security scope
Silo is PGSTY's independently maintained S3-compatible object-storage server,
derived from MinIO. It serves untrusted network requests and stores user data,
including PostgreSQL backups. Scan the current `pgsty/silo` `main` branch.
Read `/src/SECURITY.md`, `/src/VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md`, and `/src/CHANGELOG.md`.
## Repository boundaries and lineage
The Go module intentionally remains `github.com/minio/minio`. Historical
`MINIO_*` environment variables, S3 headers, `/minio/*` routes, and `.minio.sys`
storage names are compatibility interfaces, not evidence that upstream MinIO
is the target. Use this checkout's code and dependency versions for reproducers.
This enrollment covers the server code, including inherited code still present
in the supported branch and its PGSTY changes. The maintained Console, client,
and shared packages appear as dependencies in `go.mod`. Do not replace them
with upstream releases. They are not additional independent scan targets under
this enrollment. A server-side integration defect is in scope; clearly identify
a dependency-only root cause rather than attributing it to this repository.
## Attackers and important surfaces
- Unauthenticated S3/HTTP clients, including hostile object names, headers,
query parameters, XML/JSON bodies, signatures, and multipart data.
- Authenticated users, service accounts, and temporary STS credentials whose
authority must remain bounded by the effective IAM and bucket policies.
- Bucket owners and delegated administrators with explicitly limited actions;
distinguish them from the unrestricted deployment/root administrator.
- Inputs from configured identity providers, replication/tiering targets, and
webhooks where the configuration and permissions make an attack reachable.
Prioritize authentication/signature verification, IAM/STS and policy
composition, administrative API authorization, object/version isolation,
Object Lock retention and legal holds, multipart operations, replication,
lifecycle/tiering, and multi-pool deletion/migration. Include archive, XML,
JSON and S3 Select parsing when remotely reachable. Investigate credential
exposure, path traversal, unauthorized object access, SSRF across a meaningful
boundary, and attacks that corrupt or irreversibly delete other users' data.
The deployment administrator controls root credentials, storage directories,
trusted peers, and identity/KMS/replication endpoint configuration. Host root
access, stolen root credentials, or a malicious replacement of the server
binary do not by themselves demonstrate a vulnerability. An unprivileged
account gaining those capabilities does. An administrator's documented ability
to configure an outbound endpoint is not sufficient evidence of SSRF; show
an unauthorized actor, forbidden destination, or confused-deputy effect.
Object Lock has explicit retention semantics. Do not discard a retention bypass
just because the caller has some administrative permission: describe the mode,
version, legal hold, and exact IAM actions, and compare with the intended rules.
Likewise, do not assume bucket access implies access to other buckets or users.
Known consistency limitations are described in `CONTRIBUTING.md` and the
changelog. Tests tagged `consistency_strict` exercise stronger guarantees
outside the current maintenance contract and can fail. A failing diagnostic
alone is not a new vulnerability; demonstrate a reachable security impact.
These limitations do not excuse an authorization or retention bypass.
## Offline environment
Source is in `/src`; the unstripped server is `/usr/local/bin/silo`. Go, the
module cache, and the test build cache are retained. The scanner adds Git
history to `/src/.git` after building this image; a plain Docker build omits it.
The Dockerfile compiles the server and tests with the selected PGSTY dependency
replacements. `GOTOOLCHAIN=local` and `GOPROXY=off` prevent surprise downloads.
CGO is disabled as in the normal server/unit-test CI; enable it explicitly for
race tests when needed (the Go base image includes a C compiler).
Useful offline checks:
```sh
cd /src
silo --version
go test -tags kqueue,dev ./internal/auth ./internal/config/identity/... ./internal/s3select/... -count=1 -timeout=10m
go test -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^(TestGetRequestAuthType|TestS3SupportedAuthType|TestIsReqAuthenticated|TestCheckAdminRequestAuthType|TestValidateAdminSignature|TestDoesPolicySignatureMatch|TestDoesPresignedSignatureMatch|TestDoesPresignedV2SignatureMatch|TestSTSLDAPLogin.*|TestGetSTSLDAPLoginSourceIP.*)$' -count=1 -timeout=10m
```
For HTTP reproducers, start a disposable loopback server with synthetic
credentials and a fresh data directory:
```sh
MINIO_ROOT_USER=scanneradmin MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=scanner-local-test-only \
silo server /tmp/silo-scanner-data \
--address 127.0.0.1:9000 --console-address 127.0.0.1:9001
```
The broader suites are `go test -tags kqueue,dev ./internal/... -timeout=15m`
and `go test -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -timeout=30m`. Some integration suites need
LDAP, OIDC, etcd, KMS, multiple servers, or IPv6; those services are not started
by this Dockerfile. Do not treat a missing external service as a security
finding. The focused commands above do not require those providers.
## Reports and severity
Include the commit, exact attacker privileges/policy, relevant deployment
settings, API requests or a standalone test, observed impact, and affected
versions where established. For data-loss or cross-pool reports, include the
object/version state and a deterministic sequence. Deduplicate by root cause
and distinguish a new flaw from an already documented limitation or fixed bug.
Unauthenticated code execution or broad credential/authorization compromise
can be critical. Cross-user object access, unauthorized destructive operations,
and retention bypass can be high or critical according to their demonstrated
reach. Rate availability issues by practical cost, scope and recovery; a
single malformed request and an authorized full-disk upload are different
threats. Do not claim exploitability solely from a static pattern.
Prefer minimal patches and regression tests that preserve S3/storage format
compatibility. Use only synthetic data and local test instances; do not test
against public Silo/MinIO deployments or real backup repositories.
## Maintaining the scanner image
Build from the repository root, then run the checks above without networking:
```sh
docker build -f .oss-scanner/Dockerfile -t silo-scanner:local .
docker run --rm -it --network=none silo-scanner:local bash
```
Keep the Go image version aligned with `go.mod`. The adjacent
`Dockerfile.dockerignore` preserves compressed test fixtures that the release
image's root `.dockerignore` excludes. Local build outputs, editor state, and
private working directories are excluded from the scanner context.
Enrollment lives in `anthropics/oss-scanner`, under `projects/silo/project.yaml`.
Once these files are published on `main`, that configuration can use
`dockerfile: .oss-scanner/Dockerfile` and
`threat_model: .oss-scanner/threat_model.md`; remove its adjacent copies in the
same update. Do not switch the enrollment paths before the files are public.
-84
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@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
# SILO Repository Guide
## Project map
- Server: `pgsty/silo` (this checkout, default branch `main`)
- Console: `pgsty/silo-console` (usual sibling checkout `../silo-console`)
- Client: `pgsty/mc`, shipped as `mcli` (usual sibling checkout `../mc`)
- Shared packages: `pgsty/silo-pkg` (usual sibling checkout `../silo-pkg`)
- Documentation: `pgsty/silo.pgsty.com` (usual sibling checkout `../silo.pgsty.com`),
published at <https://silo.pgsty.com/>
The server executable, package, systemd service, and container image use `silo`;
the public Docker image is `docker.io/pgsty/silo`. The server module remains
`github.com/minio/minio`. Consult the current `go.mod` and release configuration
for selected component versions and compatibility replacements.
## Supported stack and compatibility policy
The maintained, release-gating product graph is the coordinated PGSTY stack:
`silo` + `silo-console` + `mc` + `silo-pkg`.
Keep compatibility with upstream MinIO/MC on a best-effort basis. Preserve
inexpensive wire, configuration, CLI, migration, and import compatibility when
it helps users, and document known differences. Do not infer from source
lineage, MinIO-compatible protocols, retained `MINIO_*`/`MC_*` names, or an
inherited upstream test that unmodified upstream MinIO is a supported release
target.
Upstream-only compatibility checks may remain as advisory evidence, but they
must not force a downgrade of a maintained SILO component, a fork-only API
workaround, or a release block. Make upstream compatibility a hard gate only
when the user explicitly requests that scope.
## Dependency selection
- When PGSTY maintains a component, import and require it directly under its own
module path. In particular, prefer `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3` over
`github.com/minio/pkg/v3` in maintained SILO source.
- Do not use an upstream package merely to make unmodified upstream MinIO or MC
compile. Unavoidable transitive upstream modules should be documented and
kept separate from the maintained product dependency.
- `github.com/minio/minio-go/v7` is the explicit exception: use the verified
upstream module/commit while it contains the required fixes; do not recreate
a SILO fork without a concrete functional divergence.
- Check the current `go.mod` before changing versions. Coordinate breaking
import-path changes across package, client, Console, and server releases.
## Documentation and delivery
The companion site owns product, operations, migration, security-advisory,
design, and release documentation. Maintain English and Chinese content in
that repository and link to its canonical URLs from this one. The site's
`content/docs/` is the documentation entry point; detailed pages live under
`content/operations/`, `administration/`, `reference/`, `compatibility/`,
`about/`, and `blog/`, following the existing structure.
Keep repository entry points and contributor instructions here. Retained
upstream documents, examples, and test fixtures under `docs/` may be updated
when a code or tooling change requires it; do not build a second documentation
site in this tree.
Investigation plans, prompts, AI session transcripts, execution logs, temporary
reports, and private security material belong outside the checkout, for example
in a task-specific directory under `~/tmp/`. Do not recreate
`docs/investigations/`, `docs/security/`, or `docs/rebranding.md`, or move their
working material to another repository directory. Extract reusable, verified
knowledge into the companion site; keep private evidence outside public Git.
Compatibility pages may continue to describe similarities with upstream, but
must label that compatibility as best effort. The supported and tested server
for Console and mcli administration is `pgsty/silo`.
Before removing or moving documentation, check repository links and scripts,
the companion site's links and anchors, and references from this guide. Use
fixed commit URLs for historical evidence that should survive deletion from
the current tree. Run the site's `make check` for site changes and this
repository's `make rebrand-guard` for documentation cleanup that changes the
identifier inventory. When new public URLs are involved, publish the site
before publishing source changes that depend on those URLs.
Keep changes in the repository that owns the affected surface. Treat every
repository commit, tag, release, image, documentation update, and deployment as
a separate deliverable. Follow `CONTRIBUTING.md`, including DCO sign-off
(`git commit -s`). `CLAUDE.md` imports this guide so both agents use one policy.
-174
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@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
# Changelog
## RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
Package version: `20261026000000.0.0`; published from source `c3ad836aed0d`.
Artifacts are listed in the [GitHub release](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z).
The coordinated [English release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261026/)
and [Chinese release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261026/)
cover all components, upgrade guidance, and validation scope.
- Fix LDAP login for long normalized DNs without hiding unreadable IAM
revocation records. Only length errors for valid keys with an ASCII path
component over 255 bytes are treated as absent; long-DN writes still fail.
Thanks to [@910patin](https://github.com/910patin) for the original fix and
reproduction in [#250](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/250).
- Build the server and standalone debugging tools with Go 1.27.3 and refresh
Go dependencies, including silo-pkg v3.15.2, mcli 20261026
and upstream minio-go `320af050c445` for multipart, read/seek,
batch-delete and bucket-replication removal fixes. Retain output-format and NetBSD compatibility selections.
- Embed Console v2.5.1 source `fff1618d9abb`, including its GUI update,
diagnostic WebSocket closing handshake, complete health-report decoding,
group-membership preservation, OIDC group permissions, TLS-proxy session
cookies, credential exports and accessibility fixes.
- Bundle mcli 20261026 in container builds, the verified client installer and
Helm client jobs. Include client identity isolation, resync status and rate
fixes, and bounded batch-status fallback. Scripts must handle the additive
batch `pending` state and nonzero exits for partial resync mutations.
- Read current bucket inventory in account-info responses so Console refreshes
immediately reflect successful creation and deletion. This management endpoint
now performs a live list instead of returning a cached inventory.
- Restore the native built-in policy immediately after resetting an override.
Peer and etcd notifications reload committed state, so delayed delete events
preserve subsequent edits. Keep deletion revisions, policy-in-use checks and
custom-policy deletion behavior; storage failures retain the previous policy.
- Reload policies without holding the authentication-cache lock, retain IAM
write ordering and publish replacements only after a complete successful load.
Propagate cancellation through IAM/KMS and SSE-S3 decryption without shortening
the caller's policy-query deadline.
- Preserve authoritative copies when a multi-pool delete or bulk cleanup fails,
choose an available pool for a new delete marker, and keep tier data referenced
by surviving copies. This does not introduce strict cross-pool read recovery.
- Preserve remote tier data when lifecycle expiry only adds a delete marker,
including non-null versions in suspended buckets. Forward `FULL_OBJECT`
checksum type for multipart replicas. Thanks to
[@botdeniska](https://github.com/botdeniska) for these lifecycle, replication
and multi-pool deletion contributions.
- Preserve Kafka's default broker protocol 2.1 and terminal-width behavior;
fix legacy DARE v1 key unsealing and verify DARE v1/v2 and MinKMS TLS compatibility.
- Forward storage RPC delete options, including the previous data directory
needed by overwrite rollback. Preserve existing drive/RPC timeouts, request
cancellation, object locking, read-quorum and healing behavior.
- Update bundled curl to 8.23.0 and require patched static libraries. Apply
[Red Hat's compromised-CA mitigation](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012);
the root blocklist also rejects legitimate chains under the affected roots.
- Ship Windows platform archives as ZIP; Linux and macOS retain tar.gz.
Storage timeouts retain their existing meaning: a returned timeout does not
prove that the underlying disk operation stopped or that a write did not
commit. Late commits or delayed rollback can affect newer writes; stale reads
remain possible after partial failures, lease loss or network partitions. This
release does not provide distributed fencing or repair previously inconsistent
objects.
These source changes are not included in the published 20261018 artifacts.
## RELEASE.2026-10-18T00-00-00Z
Package version: `20261018000000.0.0`; published on 2026-10-18 from source
`0cd388c666f8211f552604ae73448a066e9c25ce`. This section covers the changes
after the public 20260916 source, `2a4d51406b7ed87af5fe6fe0f801f3290f96eb3c`.
Full [English release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261018/)
and [Chinese release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261018/)
cover the upgrade contract, evidence and remaining limits.
- **Object Lock (#234, #235):** require `s3:PutObjectRetention` with request-body
conditions before object lookup; weakening active GOVERNANCE additionally
requires bypass intent and permission. Protect caller-addressed write versions,
directory null versions and persisted multipart targets under the write lock;
fail closed on unreadable lock state. See SN-2026-015/016 in the
[advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/).
- **IAM Admin authorization (#242, `995439260`):** enforce explicit self denies,
session restrictions and plugin decisions; prevent restricted delegation and
non-root mutation of root-derived credentials under built-in authorization.
Preserve empty-policy inheritance and damaged-key cleanup. Normalize bulk
self-list aliases and allow ordinary policyless self inspection. See
[SN-2026-017](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/security/20261018-release-hardening/#sn-2026-017).
- **Scoped STS revocation (`0cd388c66`):** enumerate durable parent/type-selected
tokens, propagate each committed tombstone to sibling nodes and sites, and
recover missed notifications through existing refresh/healing. Tokens issued
only at an isolated site are outside the requesting cluster's snapshot;
propagation is eventual and newly issued keys remain valid.
- **Pool migration (#248, `60c7179dd`, `1748f62c7`):** prevent stale moved
payloads from overwriting newer copies, preserve null/UUID delete markers,
recheck source versions and clean only confirmed moved versions under the
object lock. Added per-pool reads and per-version cleanup have maintenance
costs; earlier data loss is not reconstructed.
- **LIST recovery (#239, `3dd53eb81`, `2080b3d03`):** confirm eligible uncertain
latest-object groups under the appropriate read locks, distinguish absence
from failure, preserve directory/common-prefix entries and terminal pagination
errors, and make lock backoff cancelable. Resolved entries keep their fast path;
version history, quorum and disk formats retain their contracts. The strict
sub-5% performance target remains unconfirmed in the recorded comparison.
- **Multipart listing (`4733e1423`):** withdraw #243's default persistent scan.
Public listing uses node-local cache or exact-key lookup; restart omissions,
prefix and cache-pagination limits remain. The retired strict switch is ignored
with a startup warning. **Former strict users lose durable listing and strict
cancellation.** Keep identity metadata, path/wrong-target safety, default
best-effort Abort and peer notification. Diagnostic `multipart-preflight`
reports `mode=legacy`; its budgets do not gate public operations. #79 remains
open, including delayed creation after cancellation.
- **Multipart cleanup (#236, `0f9199e0c`):** parse native timestamps before the
Base64 fallback and remove empty hash parents without a second expiry wait.
Keep active/unreadable uploads; default expiry/check intervals stay 24h/6h.
- **Commit errors (#232):** missing staged `xl.meta` at final commit becomes
HTTP 503 `SlowDownWrite`; preserve this classification across storage RPC and
healing. Real incomplete bodies retain their existing errors.
- **Reused metadata (#233):** clear absent legacy `EcM`/`Signature` and locally
reset mutually exclusive scanner response fields without changing disk/RPC formats.
- **Checksum and Console errors (#225, #229, #238):** align Content-MD5 and
algorithm-specific messages, retaining the generic unknown-algorithm message;
embed Console's wrapped-error and `InvalidBucketState` handling.
- **Lambda and erasure documentation (#220, `2fde3cf53`):** fix inverted
`TargetIDSet.IsEmpty`; document parity/quorum per object and erasure set.
- **Coordinated dependencies:** Console v2.4.2 (`ef2dd2c41d21`), mcli 20261018
(`fa3b8bf72458`), silo-pkg v3.14.3, upstream minio-go v7.4.1 and Go 1.27.2.
Standalone Console/mcli still declare pkg v3.14.2. The Server package update
speeds admin-action classification without changing policy behavior. Refresh
Go x/*, go-jose v4.1.6, LDAP v3.4.15, compress v1.20.3, msgp v1.6.5, etcd v3.7.2,
fwd v1.2.1 and cpuid v2.4.1. OIDC RSA JWKs above 4096 bits are rejected.
Keep the NetBSD go-systemd v22.6.0 replacement; parallel SDK GET/Compose remain opt-in.
- **Build and delivery:** gate releases on Object Lock regressions; use
Git for rebrand scanning without a ripgrep dependency (`7007c164a`). Refresh UBI 9 pins,
GoReleaser v2.18.3, nFPM v2.48.0, golangci-lint v2.15.0 and govulncheck v1.9.0.
Update bundled client hashes/helper and the Helm client image to mcli 20261018.
The chart's Server default stays at the public 20260916 image until publication.
Upgrade every writer and replication site; follow the
[IAM recovery guide](https://silo.pgsty.com/operations/replication/iam-upgrade/).
Old strict multipart users must review the capability loss before upgrading.
#217's multi-site delete-marker late creation and crash residue remain unresolved.
Source tests, draft artifacts, public images and production rollout are separate
acceptance boundaries; historical 20261015 test counts do not certify this source.
## RELEASE.2026-09-16T00-00-00Z
Package version: `20260916000000.0.0`; published source:
`2a4d51406b7ed87af5fe6fe0f801f3290f96eb3c`.
This release includes signed-header and payload-policy hardening (SN-2026-011/012),
durable IAM revocations (SN-2026-013), the bounded Console sharing proxy
(SN-2026-014), password-permission separation, multi-pool conditions/deletion/tag
repairs, encrypted/federated copy repairs, delete-marker retry fixes, opt-in strict
multipart discovery, Go-default TLS key exchange, absolute HTTP/1 header deadlines
and synchronized CPU metrics. It embeds Console v2.4.1, mcli 20260916 and pkg v3.14.1.
The complete release, contributor credits, historical artifact acceptance and
upgrade requirements are preserved in the canonical
[English](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20260916/) and
[Chinese](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20260916/) release records.
## RELEASE.2026-09-03T13-18-01Z
Published source: `9b11dc9469e650815b775cb47b039610644f5da4`.
[Complete release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20260903/) ·
[GitHub release](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-09-03T13-18-01Z)
This release ships Go 1.27.1, silo-pkg v3.13.2, upstream minio-go `0e78d3f18efe`,
mcli 20260903 and embedded Console source `464a59d73ada` (v2.3.0 version identity).
Installing the newer standalone mcli or Console does not replace components
inside this existing Server binary or image.
Earlier releases: [release archive](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases).
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
@AGENTS.md
+8 -42
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@@ -44,29 +44,11 @@ Before opening a pull request:
- Add or update tests for changed behavior.
- Run `make verifiers`.
- If `make rebrand-guard` reports a changed compatibility set, review the
listed identifiers; when the change is intended, refresh the baseline with
`go run ./buildscripts/rebrand-guard --write` and commit
`buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json`.
- Run the smallest relevant package tests, then `make test` when practical.
- Run `make build` and confirm the generated executable is `silo`.
- Explain any preserved `MINIO_*`, `minio_*`, `x-minio-*`, `/minio/*`,
`.minio.sys`, ARN, module/import-path, or serialized compatibility name.
The maintenance branch retains existing storage timeouts, cancellation,
object locking, read-quorum and healing behavior. The normal suite checks local
and RPC timeout/cancellation, remote rollback options, and readability after a
failed partial overwrite. A timeout does not prove that a disk worker stopped
or that a write did not commit.
Stronger mutation lifetime, rollback ownership, generation ordering, strict-read
and cross-pool recovery diagnostics are preserved behind `consistency_strict`.
Compile them with `go test -tags kqueue,dev,consistency_strict ./cmd -run '^$'`
and run individual scenarios explicitly. They describe guarantees outside the
maintenance contract and may fail; report their results separately from the
normal suite. They must not be used to claim distributed fencing or repair of
previously inconsistent objects.
### Commit changes
After verification, commit your changes with a concise message and a DCO
@@ -91,22 +73,11 @@ test evidence, compatibility notes, and documentation impact. Public product
documentation is owned by the separate
[`pgsty/silo.pgsty.com`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com) repository.
## Contributor recognition
Every human issue or pull-request author is recognized in [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md),
including open issues, draft PRs, and PRs closed without merging. Merged fixes,
adopted proposals, and reports that lead to fixes receive greater prominence;
first participation guides the remaining order. Work incorporated through a
later PR retains credit without changing the original PR's recorded status.
Security disclosures are credited with the reporter's agreement. DCO sign-off
applies to code commits, not to opening an issue.
## Licensing of Contributions
Code contributions to PGSTY SILO (`pgsty/silo`) are accepted under the
[GNU AGPL v3.0 or later](LICENSE), the same license as the server. Submit issues
and pull requests to this repository's maintainers. No separate Apache-2.0
license grant to SILO or upstream MinIO maintainers is required.
Silo is licensed under the [GNU AGPL v3.0 or later](LICENSE). Its core is
Copyright (c) MinIO, Inc.; the combined work can never be relicensed, and this
fork does not try to.
* **No CLA.** We do not ask you to sign a Contributor License Agreement and we
do not take your copyright. Contributions are accepted inbound=outbound: you
@@ -137,20 +108,15 @@ license grant to SILO or upstream MinIO maintainers is required.
`Signed-off-by` trailers) and add your own sign-off as the person passing it
along. Never import code from a proprietary distribution.
* **File headers.** Preserve existing copyright and license notices in inherited
and third-party files. New original files name their actual copyright holders
and use AGPL-3.0-or-later. Use a header such as the following, then append the
standard AGPL boilerplate:
* **File headers.** Files derived from upstream keep the original MinIO
copyright header unchanged. New files added by this fork use the dual
header, followed by the standard AGPL boilerplate:
```
// Copyright (c) 2026 Your Name
// Copyright (c) 2015-2025 MinIO, Inc.
// Copyright (c) 2025-2026 PGSTY
```
* **Separately licensed material.** Documentation contributions in `docs/`
follow its existing [CC BY 4.0 license](docs/LICENSE). Third-party components
and earlier Apache-2.0 contributions retain their original licenses and
attribution; this policy does not relicense earlier work.
* **Squash merges** must keep the `Signed-off-by:` trailers in the resulting
commit message.
+62 -199
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+724 -2130
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+2 -24
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@@ -8,30 +8,10 @@
# seeds fresh volumes from the image-layer mountpoint, no entrypoint
# exists to repair ownership at runtime, and 0777 is what keeps every
# privilege mode working, --user included.
FROM busybox:1.37.0@sha256:a7dbc319b1438115a207e11930dc4bb3e643dcb3ec0bdd694bb36cd8fad289ec AS prep
FROM busybox:1.37.0 AS prep
RUN mkdir -p /prep/data && chmod 0777 /prep/data
# Debian's bundle in distroless still trusts the roots the classic image
# blocklists. Build the same bundle as Dockerfile.goreleaser so both variants
# trust the same roots; it is architecture-neutral, so build it natively.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:16e9e43d99e181463513cc84a514859b1abb9460f1c4d9e208da4b4e51cd5cc3 AS certs
# Native root blocklist mitigation: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012
RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
if [ -d /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist ]; then \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist; \
else \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blacklist; \
fi && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=Comodo%20AAA%20Services%20root;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/Comodo_AAA_Services_root.pem" && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=emSign%20ECC%20Root%20CA%20-%20G3;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3.pem" && \
update-ca-trust && \
cp /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem /tmp/ca-certificates.crt
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:latest@sha256:d75cdd72874d4790092fcb1b058493ecf6bb5bf2b2b897045b00ff01d91843f2
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:latest
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="Silo" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="S3-Interface Libre Object Storage (distroless)" \
@@ -48,8 +28,6 @@ ENV MINIO_ACCESS_KEY_FILE=access_key \
MINIO_CONFIG_ENV_FILE=config.env \
HOME=/tmp
# The only file under /etc/ssl/certs, so replacing it is sufficient.
COPY --from=certs /tmp/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
COPY --chmod=0755 silo /usr/bin/silo
# COPY of a directory copies its contents, not the directory entry, so an
# empty /prep/data would arrive as a default root:0755 /data and non-root
+12 -36
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,4 @@
FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:d530cf60723abf1ffae0cd16bb546b379ec0550d2f3815e5b16ed69dbc00fba4 AS curl-build
ARG TARGETARCH
COPY dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh /build/build-static-curl
RUN /bin/sh /build/build-static-curl
# Exercise the exact shipped curl without a dynamic loader or shared libraries.
FROM scratch AS curl-runtime
COPY --from=curl-build /go/bin/curl /curl
COPY --from=curl-build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
ENTRYPOINT ["/curl"]
FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:d530cf60723abf1ffae0cd16bb546b379ec0550d2f3815e5b16ed69dbc00fba4 AS build
FROM golang:1.27.0-alpine AS build
ARG TARGETARCH
@@ -17,9 +6,9 @@ ENV GOPATH=/go
ENV CGO_ENABLED=0
ARG MC_REPO=pgsty/mc
ARG MC_VERSION=RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
ARG MC_AMD64_SHA256=e86295bb11ed59369c0560f030d59abd42fb64a376b1d7e9799ec2e8596ebf64
ARG MC_ARM64_SHA256=47b1a558f766f26bef5beeedd5300e082bcdec07a5e7d4a16f5f9d168f5275d1
ARG MC_VERSION=RELEASE.2026-08-06T00-00-00Z
ARG MC_AMD64_SHA256=4b488bd30af54ad4214e5b654746677c79cd93dc6cad4be3aa2d09dbb48370ff
ARG MC_ARM64_SHA256=83f6fedb16ed9c1e8efa8aea6776203dff132bc474214543d5c0767ed2066c2f
RUN apk add -U --no-cache \
ca-certificates \
@@ -65,30 +54,20 @@ RUN apk add -U --no-cache \
echo "No mc or mcli binary found in archive:"; ls -la /tmp/mcli-extract/; exit 1; \
fi && \
chmod +x /go/bin/mcli && \
ln -sf mcli /go/bin/mc && \
mkdir -p /go/share/mcli && \
cp /tmp/mcli-extract/LICENSE /tmp/mcli-extract/NOTICE /tmp/mcli-extract/CREDITS /go/share/mcli/
ln -sf mcli /go/bin/mc
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:16e9e43d99e181463513cc84a514859b1abb9460f1c4d9e208da4b4e51cd5cc3 AS certs
# Native root blocklist mitigation: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012
COPY dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh /build/download-static-curl
RUN chmod +x /build/download-static-curl && \
/build/download-static-curl
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest AS certs
RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
if [ -d /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist ]; then \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist; \
else \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blacklist; \
fi && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=Comodo%20AAA%20Services%20root;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/Comodo_AAA_Services_root.pem" && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=emSign%20ECC%20Root%20CA%20-%20G3;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3.pem" && \
update-ca-trust && \
cp /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem /tmp/ca-certificates.crt && \
dnf clean all && \
rm -rf /var/cache/dnf
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi-micro:latest@sha256:5be877a2a280ae36eb9ab80ca4efb28bbf77c57abbba38137cdc37a03b8465e6
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi-micro:latest
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="Silo" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="S3-Interface Libre Object Storage" \
@@ -109,10 +88,7 @@ ENV MINIO_ACCESS_KEY_FILE=access_key \
COPY --from=certs /tmp/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
COPY silo /usr/bin/silo
COPY --from=build /go/bin/mcli /usr/bin/mcli
# mcli's own legal files, from the same verified archive as the binary.
COPY --from=build /go/share/mcli /licenses/mcli
COPY --from=curl-build /go/bin/curl /usr/bin/curl
COPY --from=curl-build /go/share/curl /licenses/curl
COPY --from=build /go/bin/curl* /usr/bin/
COPY dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
COPY LICENSE /licenses/LICENSE
COPY NOTICE /licenses/NOTICE
+2 -7
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ LDFLAGS := $(shell go run buildscripts/gen-ldflags.go)
GOOS ?= $(shell go env GOOS)
GOARCH ?= $(shell go env GOARCH)
GOLANGCI_VERSION ?= v2.15.0
GOLANGCI_VERSION ?= v2.13.1
VERSION ?= $(shell git describe --tags)
REPO ?= docker.io/pgsty
@@ -73,11 +73,6 @@ lint-fix: getdeps ## runs golangci-lint suite of linters with automatic fixes
@$(GOLANGCI) run --build-tags kqueue --timeout=10m --config ./.golangci.yml --fix
check: test
# -tags kqueue,dev: kqueue selects the kqueue backend of rjeczalik/notify on
# BSD and macOS (no-op on Linux); dev came with upstream's 2024-06 change for
# development builds and no file in this repository or its dependencies
# carries a dev build constraint, so it selects nothing. Kept for the
# documented command lines; .github/workflows/go.yml carries the same note.
test: verifiers build ## builds Silo, runs linters, tests
@echo "Running unit tests"
@MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX=10000 CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -v -tags kqueue,dev ./...
@@ -221,7 +216,7 @@ docker: checks build-debugging ## builds the local Linux Silo container image
--ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o "$$context/silo"; \
mkdir -p "$$context/dockerscripts"; \
cp Dockerfile.goreleaser LICENSE NOTICE CREDITS "$$context/"; \
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh \
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh \
"$$context/dockerscripts/"; \
docker build -q --no-cache --platform linux/$(GOARCH) -t $(TAG) --build-arg TARGETARCH=$(GOARCH) \
-f "$$context/Dockerfile.goreleaser" "$$context"
+47 -61
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="https://silo.pgsty.com/"><img alt="Website" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Website-silo.pgsty.com-1d588c"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases"><img alt="GitHub Release" src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/pgsty/silo?include_prereleases&label=release&logo=github"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/silo?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/minio?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="go.mod"><img alt="Go Version" src="https://img.shields.io/github/go-mod/go-version/pgsty/silo?logo=go"></a>
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="License" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-AGPLv3-blue"></a>
</p>
@@ -35,14 +35,6 @@
> [!NOTE]
> Renamed from `pgsty/minio` to `pgsty/silo`, default branch `master` → `main`, on 2026-08-06. Artifacts under the original MinIO identity stay published on the archived [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) branch and in releases up to [`RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z).
## SILO 20261026000000
[SILO 20261026000000](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z) is available as platform archives, Linux packages, and standard or distroless Docker images for amd64 and arm64. The release tag is `RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z`; the package version is `20261026000000.0.0`, built from source `c3ad836aed0d`.
This release fixes LDAP long-DN login, IAM policy refresh, multi-pool deletion safety, tiered-object expiry, multipart replication checksums, and remote rollback-option propagation. It embeds Console v2.5.1 (`fff1618d9abb`) and uses silo-pkg v3.15.2, Go 1.27.3, and upstream minio-go `v7.4.2-0.20261025165926-320af050c445`. Use mcli 20261026 for administration; the container images bundle it as `mcli`.
The Server IAM cache repair enables Console's **Reset to default** action. Existing storage timeouts and cancellation behavior remain: a timeout does not prove that a disk operation stopped or a write did not commit. Read the [coordinated release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261026/) and [remaining storage limits](CHANGELOG.md#release2026-10-26t00-00-00z) before upgrading. See [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md) for the people behind the code, reports, and documentation.
## Overview
PGSTY SILO keeps one maintained release line of the open-source MinIO server alive after upstream ended community distribution: builds, packages, multi-arch images, security fixes, and the full web console. Pigsty runs it in production as its PostgreSQL backup repository.
@@ -62,7 +54,7 @@ docker run -d --name silo -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 \
-e MINIO_ROOT_USER=minioadmin \
-e MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-long-password \
-v "$PWD/data:/data" \
docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
docker.io/pgsty/silo:latest server /data --console-address ":9001"
```
<p align="center">
@@ -93,67 +85,61 @@ Every release ships checksums, SPDX SBOMs, Sigstore-signed manifests, and GitHub
## Compatibility
Silo preserves S3 and storage-format compatibility, including existing `MINIO_*` variables, `minio_*` metrics, `x-minio-*` headers, `/minio/*` routes, and `.minio.sys` data. CI guards selected compatibility identifiers; release notes document intentional security and behavior changes. Silo-owned delivery surfaces use the `silo` executable, package, service, Helm chart, and container image; no `minio` server binary alias is installed.
The supported release stack is `pgsty/silo` + `pgsty/silo-console` + `pgsty/mc` + `pgsty/silo-pkg`; compatibility with unmodified upstream MinIO/MC is best effort. The Server, Console, and client retain their historical module paths where needed, while maintained code imports `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3` directly. The SDK `github.com/minio/minio-go/v7` is an explicit upstream dependency. See the current [go.mod](go.mod) for versions and replacements.
The S3 API, `MINIO_*` variables, `minio_*` metrics, `x-minio-*` headers, `/minio/*` routes, the `github.com/minio/*` import paths, and the on-disk format (including `.minio.sys`) are preserved and held in place by a CI compatibility check. Only Silo-owned delivery surfaces change: the `silo` executable, package, service, Helm chart, and container image — no `minio` binary alias is installed.
Every divergence from upstream is listed in the code-verified [compatibility audit](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/server/). Treat each release as a downstream upgrade: pin versions, read the [release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/tags/silo/), and keep a rollback path.
### TLS and Go upgrades
Server 20260916 restored Go's default key exchange; Server 20261018 retains it with Go 1.27.2.
TLS key exchange follows Go's defaults across the S3 listener, node links,
replication, identity providers, etcd, and external HTTP services. If an endpoint
cannot accept ML-KEM, `GODEBUG=tlsmlkem=0` disables the default hybrid exchanges
for the process; certificate verification remains enabled. This option does not
disable ML-DSA signatures or resolve every TLS reset. Prefer updating the
incompatible endpoint before removing the temporary setting.
If only the new SecP hybrids cause problems, `GODEBUG=tlssecpmlkem=0` disables
those groups while retaining X25519MLKEM768.
For builds targeting Go 1.27, setting either `SSL_CERT_FILE` or `SSL_CERT_DIR`
on macOS replaces Keychain trust with on-disk roots and Go's verifier. Stale or
incomplete CA paths can break previously trusted connections; unset inherited
values to restore Keychain trust. Explicit certificates in the configured `CAs`
directory remain additive to the selected root pool.
Go 1.27 binaries require macOS 13 or later. See the
[Go release notes](https://go.dev/doc/go1.27) and the
[Go 1.27 TLS and OIDC discovery guide](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/design/go127-tls-oidc-discovery/).
## Documentation ownership
User documentation is maintained at [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/docs/),
with source in [pgsty/silo.pgsty.com](https://github.com/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com).
The remaining `docs/` tree contains inherited references, examples, and tooling
fixtures. Investigation logs, AI work records, and temporary reports are kept
outside this repository; reusable findings belong in the companion site.
See [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) for repository ownership and maintenance rules.
## Security & Contributing
Report vulnerabilities privately as described in [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md); every fix ships with a public [advisory](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/security/). Contributions are accepted inbound=outbound under AGPL-3.0-or-later with no CLA — only DCO sign-off (`git commit -s`) is required; see [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md).
## Contributors
<!-- Generated by silo.pgsty.com/bin/contributors.py. -->
<table>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/ZouhairCharef"><img src="https://github.com/ZouhairCharef.png?size=100" width="72" alt="ZouhairCharef"><br><sub><b>@ZouhairCharef</b></sub></a><br><sub>CVE-2026-34986</sub>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/mfredenhagen"><img src="https://github.com/mfredenhagen.png?size=100" width="72" alt="mfredenhagen"><br><sub><b>@mfredenhagen</b></sub></a><br><sub>CVE-2026-39883</sub>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/pinginfo"><img src="https://github.com/pinginfo.png?size=100" width="72" alt="pinginfo"><br><sub><b>@pinginfo</b></sub></a><br><sub>Notification streaming</sub>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/waterkip"><img src="https://github.com/waterkip.png?size=100" width="72" alt="waterkip"><br><sub><b>@waterkip</b></sub></a><br><sub>Documentation links</sub>
</td>
</tr>
</table>
<p>
<a href="https://github.com/magicxor"><img src="https://github.com/magicxor.png?size=64" width="44" alt="magicxor" title="@magicxor"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/ycjlin"><img src="https://github.com/ycjlin.png?size=64" width="44" alt="ycjlin" title="@ycjlin"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/davinkevin"><img src="https://github.com/davinkevin.png?size=64" width="44" alt="davinkevin" title="@davinkevin"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/lem21h"><img src="https://github.com/lem21h.png?size=64" width="44" alt="lem21h" title="@lem21h"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/sulin37392"><img src="https://github.com/sulin37392.png?size=64" width="44" alt="sulin37392" title="@sulin37392"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mosesdd"><img src="https://github.com/mosesdd.png?size=64" width="44" alt="mosesdd" title="@mosesdd"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Xavier-777"><img src="https://github.com/Xavier-777.png?size=64" width="44" alt="Xavier-777" title="@Xavier-777"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jiadzh"><img src="https://github.com/jiadzh.png?size=64" width="44" alt="jiadzh" title="@jiadzh"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/TLINDEN"><img src="https://github.com/TLINDEN.png?size=64" width="44" alt="TLINDEN" title="@TLINDEN"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/AntonOfTheWoods"><img src="https://github.com/AntonOfTheWoods.png?size=64" width="44" alt="AntonOfTheWoods" title="@AntonOfTheWoods"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/zylpsrs"><img src="https://github.com/zylpsrs.png?size=64" width="44" alt="zylpsrs" title="@zylpsrs"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/nsanitate"><img src="https://github.com/nsanitate.png?size=64" width="44" alt="nsanitate" title="@nsanitate"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/makinikm"><img src="https://github.com/makinikm.png?size=64" width="44" alt="makinikm" title="@makinikm"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/spaceg00se-r"><img src="https://github.com/spaceg00se-r.png?size=64" width="44" alt="spaceg00se-r" title="@spaceg00se-r"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/heroes1412"><img src="https://github.com/heroes1412.png?size=64" width="44" alt="heroes1412" title="@heroes1412"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/vampywiz17"><img src="https://github.com/vampywiz17.png?size=64" width="44" alt="vampywiz17" title="@vampywiz17"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/chalukyaj"><img src="https://github.com/chalukyaj.png?size=64" width="44" alt="chalukyaj" title="@chalukyaj"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/cbornet"><img src="https://github.com/cbornet.png?size=64" width="44" alt="cbornet" title="@cbornet"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jvasile"><img src="https://github.com/jvasile.png?size=64" width="44" alt="jvasile" title="@jvasile"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Kesavaambati"><img src="https://github.com/Kesavaambati.png?size=64" width="44" alt="Kesavaambati" title="@Kesavaambati"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/redfoxfox"><img src="https://github.com/redfoxfox.png?size=64" width="44" alt="redfoxfox" title="@redfoxfox"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kuldeep-link11"><img src="https://github.com/kuldeep-link11.png?size=64" width="44" alt="kuldeep-link11" title="@kuldeep-link11"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/meesudzu"><img src="https://github.com/meesudzu.png?size=64" width="44" alt="meesudzu" title="@meesudzu"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pmezhuev"><img src="https://github.com/pmezhuev.png?size=64" width="44" alt="pmezhuev" title="@pmezhuev"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kh0mka"><img src="https://github.com/kh0mka.png?size=64" width="44" alt="kh0mka" title="@kh0mka"></a>
</p>
Every human issue or pull-request author is part of the SILO community, including open and unmerged work. We also recognize security reports, including reports sent by email, with the reporter's permission. Merged fixes, adopted proposals, and actionable reports receive priority, with first participation guiding the remaining order. Gold rings highlight reviewed significant contributions.
<a href="CONTRIBUTORS.md">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-light.svg" alt="SILO community contributors">
</picture>
</a>
[View contribution notes and actual PR status](CONTRIBUTORS.md).
## Star History
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-light.svg" alt="SILO GitHub star history">
</picture>
GitHub does not generate a contributor graph for forks, so [`CONTRIBUTORS.md`](CONTRIBUTORS.md) — not the Insights page — is this project's attribution record. It names everyone alongside the change or report they contributed.
## Background
+47 -44
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/"><img alt="官网" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/%E5%AE%98%E7%BD%91-silo.pgsty.com%2Fzh-1d588c"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases"><img alt="GitHub Release" src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/pgsty/silo?include_prereleases&label=release&logo=github"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/silo?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/minio?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="go.mod"><img alt="Go Version" src="https://img.shields.io/github/go-mod/go-version/pgsty/silo?logo=go"></a>
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="License" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-AGPLv3-blue"></a>
</p>
@@ -35,14 +35,6 @@
> [!NOTE]
> 2026-08-06,本仓库由 `pgsty/minio` 更名为 `pgsty/silo`,默认分支由 `master` 更名为 `main`。以原 MinIO 形态维持的归档构件仍位于归档的 [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) 分支,以及截止 [`RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z) 的历次发布中。
## SILO 20261026000000
[SILO 20261026000000](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z) 已正式发布,提供各平台归档包、Linux 软件包,以及 amd64/arm64 标准版和 distroless Docker 镜像。版本标签为 `RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z`,包版本为 `20261026000000.0.0`,构建源码为 `c3ad836aed0d`。
本版修复 LDAP 长 DN 登录、IAM 策略刷新、多池删除安全、分层对象过期、分片复制校验和及远端回滚参数透传。内置 Console v2.5.1(`fff1618d9abb`),使用 silo-pkg v3.15.2、Go 1.27.3 与上游 minio-go `v7.4.2-0.20261025165926-320af050c445`。配套管理客户端为 mcli 20261026,容器镜像内置该版本的 `mcli`。
Server IAM 缓存修复使 Console **Reset to default(恢复默认)** 操作即时生效。存储超时与取消行为保持既有语义:超时不代表底层磁盘操作已停止,也不代表写入未提交。升级前请阅读[联合发布说明](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261026/)与[仍存的存储限制](CHANGELOG.md#release2026-10-26t00-00-00z)。代码、问题报告和文档贡献者见 [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md)。
## 概述
上游停止社区发行后,Silo 为开源 MinIO 服务端维护一条持续可用的版本线:构建、软件包、多架构镜像、安全修复与完整 Web 控制台。Pigsty 在生产环境中用它承载 PostgreSQL 备份存储。
@@ -62,7 +54,7 @@ docker run -d --name silo -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 \
-e MINIO_ROOT_USER=minioadmin \
-e MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-long-password \
-v "$PWD/data:/data" \
docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
docker.io/pgsty/silo:latest server /data --console-address ":9001"
```
<p align="center">
@@ -93,50 +85,61 @@ docker exec silo mcli mb local/demo && docker exec silo mcli ls local
## 兼容性
Silo 保留 S3 与存储格式兼容性,包括既有 `MINIO_*` 环境变量、`minio_*` 指标、`x-minio-*` 头、`/minio/*` 路由与 `.minio.sys` 数据。CI 守卫检查选定的兼容性标识,有意的安全与行为变化在发布说明中记录。Silo 自有交付面使用 `silo` 可执行文件、软件包、服务、Helm Chart 与容器镜像;原生交付物不会安装 `minio` 服务端二进制别名。
正式支持和发布验收的组合为 `pgsty/silo` + `pgsty/silo-console` + `pgsty/mc` + `pgsty/silo-pkg`,对未修改的上游 MinIO/MC 尽最大努力保持兼容。Server、Console 与客户端按需保留历史模块路径,维护源码直接导入 `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3`;SDK `github.com/minio/minio-go/v7` 是明确保留的上游依赖。具体版本与 replace 以当前 [go.mod](go.mod) 为准。
S3 API、`MINIO_*` 环境变量、`minio_*` 指标、`x-minio-*` 头、`/minio/*` 路由、`github.com/minio/*` 导入路径与磁盘格式(含 `.minio.sys`)原样保留,并由 CI 兼容性门禁冻结。只有 Silo 自有交付面改名:`silo` 可执行文件、软件包、服务、Helm Chart 与容器镜像 —— 原生交付物不会安装 `minio` 二进制别名。
与上游的全部分歧,以逐项核验代码的[兼容性审计](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/compatibility/server/)形式维护。每个版本仍应视为下游升级:锁定版本,阅读[版本说明](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/tags/silo/),并保留回滚路径。
### TLS 与 Go 升级
Server 20260916 已恢复 Go 默认密钥交换策略,20261018 在 Go 1.27.2 下保留该行为。
`GODEBUG=tlsmlkem=0`、`tlssecpmlkem=0` 的适用范围、macOS 根证书来源变化,
以及 OIDC discovery 的诊断方法见 [Go 1.27 TLS 与 OIDC 指南](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/design/go127-tls-oidc-discovery/)。
## 文档归属
用户文档统一维护在 [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/docs/),源码位于
[pgsty/silo.pgsty.com](https://github.com/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com)。本仓库保留的 `docs/`
主要是继承的参考材料、示例和工具测试夹具。调查日志、AI 工作记录与临时报告放在仓库外;
可复用的结论应整理进伴生文档站。仓库职责与维护规则见 [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md)。
## 安全与贡献
请按照 [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) 私密报告漏洞;每项修复都会发布公开[安全公告](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/security/)。本项目不要求签署 CLA:贡献按 AGPL-3.0-or-later(inbound=outbound)接收,只需 DCO 签署(`git commit -s`),详见 [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md)。
## 贡献者
<!-- Generated by silo.pgsty.com/bin/contributors.py. -->
<table>
<tr>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/ZouhairCharef"><img src="https://github.com/ZouhairCharef.png?size=100" width="72" alt="ZouhairCharef"><br><sub><b>@ZouhairCharef</b></sub></a><br><sub>CVE-2026-34986</sub>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/mfredenhagen"><img src="https://github.com/mfredenhagen.png?size=100" width="72" alt="mfredenhagen"><br><sub><b>@mfredenhagen</b></sub></a><br><sub>CVE-2026-39883</sub>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/pinginfo"><img src="https://github.com/pinginfo.png?size=100" width="72" alt="pinginfo"><br><sub><b>@pinginfo</b></sub></a><br><sub>桶通知流式输出</sub>
</td>
<td align="center" width="150">
<a href="https://github.com/waterkip"><img src="https://github.com/waterkip.png?size=100" width="72" alt="waterkip"><br><sub><b>@waterkip</b></sub></a><br><sub>文档链接修正</sub>
</td>
</tr>
</table>
<p>
<a href="https://github.com/magicxor"><img src="https://github.com/magicxor.png?size=64" width="44" alt="magicxor" title="@magicxor"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/ycjlin"><img src="https://github.com/ycjlin.png?size=64" width="44" alt="ycjlin" title="@ycjlin"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/davinkevin"><img src="https://github.com/davinkevin.png?size=64" width="44" alt="davinkevin" title="@davinkevin"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/lem21h"><img src="https://github.com/lem21h.png?size=64" width="44" alt="lem21h" title="@lem21h"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/sulin37392"><img src="https://github.com/sulin37392.png?size=64" width="44" alt="sulin37392" title="@sulin37392"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mosesdd"><img src="https://github.com/mosesdd.png?size=64" width="44" alt="mosesdd" title="@mosesdd"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Xavier-777"><img src="https://github.com/Xavier-777.png?size=64" width="44" alt="Xavier-777" title="@Xavier-777"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jiadzh"><img src="https://github.com/jiadzh.png?size=64" width="44" alt="jiadzh" title="@jiadzh"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/TLINDEN"><img src="https://github.com/TLINDEN.png?size=64" width="44" alt="TLINDEN" title="@TLINDEN"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/AntonOfTheWoods"><img src="https://github.com/AntonOfTheWoods.png?size=64" width="44" alt="AntonOfTheWoods" title="@AntonOfTheWoods"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/zylpsrs"><img src="https://github.com/zylpsrs.png?size=64" width="44" alt="zylpsrs" title="@zylpsrs"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/nsanitate"><img src="https://github.com/nsanitate.png?size=64" width="44" alt="nsanitate" title="@nsanitate"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/makinikm"><img src="https://github.com/makinikm.png?size=64" width="44" alt="makinikm" title="@makinikm"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/spaceg00se-r"><img src="https://github.com/spaceg00se-r.png?size=64" width="44" alt="spaceg00se-r" title="@spaceg00se-r"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/heroes1412"><img src="https://github.com/heroes1412.png?size=64" width="44" alt="heroes1412" title="@heroes1412"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/vampywiz17"><img src="https://github.com/vampywiz17.png?size=64" width="44" alt="vampywiz17" title="@vampywiz17"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/chalukyaj"><img src="https://github.com/chalukyaj.png?size=64" width="44" alt="chalukyaj" title="@chalukyaj"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/cbornet"><img src="https://github.com/cbornet.png?size=64" width="44" alt="cbornet" title="@cbornet"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jvasile"><img src="https://github.com/jvasile.png?size=64" width="44" alt="jvasile" title="@jvasile"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Kesavaambati"><img src="https://github.com/Kesavaambati.png?size=64" width="44" alt="Kesavaambati" title="@Kesavaambati"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/redfoxfox"><img src="https://github.com/redfoxfox.png?size=64" width="44" alt="redfoxfox" title="@redfoxfox"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kuldeep-link11"><img src="https://github.com/kuldeep-link11.png?size=64" width="44" alt="kuldeep-link11" title="@kuldeep-link11"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/meesudzu"><img src="https://github.com/meesudzu.png?size=64" width="44" alt="meesudzu" title="@meesudzu"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pmezhuev"><img src="https://github.com/pmezhuev.png?size=64" width="44" alt="pmezhuev" title="@pmezhuev"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kh0mka"><img src="https://github.com/kh0mka.png?size=64" width="44" alt="kh0mka" title="@kh0mka"></a>
</p>
每位 issue 或 PR 的作者,以及同意公开署名的安全报告者,都是 SILO 社区的一员,包括尚未合并的工作。已合并的修复、被采纳的方案和有效报告优先展示,其余参考首次参与时间;金色圆环突出经过审核的显著贡献。
<a href="CONTRIBUTORS.md">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-light.svg" alt="SILO 社区贡献者">
</picture>
</a>
[查看贡献记录与实际 PR 状态](CONTRIBUTORS.md)。
## Star History
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-light.svg" alt="SILO GitHub 星标历史">
</picture>
GitHub 不为 fork 仓库生成贡献者图表,因此 [`CONTRIBUTORS.md`](CONTRIBUTORS.md)(而非 Insights 页面)才是本项目的署名记录,其中逐一记录了每个人对应的改动或报告。
## 背景
+6 -15
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Silo-specific fixes or release notes.
## Supported Versions
Security fixes are tracked on the active development branch and summarized in
[the security advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/). Only the current
[docs/security/advisories.md](docs/security/advisories.md). Only the current
Silo release line is supported unless an advisory says otherwise.
## Inherited Fix Evidence
@@ -26,29 +26,20 @@ separately even when the fork preserves the original commit object and SHA.
The inherited [service-account](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/c1a49490c78e9c3ebcad86ba0662319138ace190/cmd/admin-handlers-users_test.go#L211-L212)
and [STS](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/c1a49490c78e9c3ebcad86ba0662319138ace190/cmd/sts-handlers_test.go#L45-L46)
regression groups remain part of `go test ./cmd`; see the
[canonical ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/#inherited)
[canonical ledger](docs/security/advisories.md#inherited-upstream-advisory-baseline)
for the operator-facing record.
## Reporting a Vulnerability
The security contact for Silo is [ron@pgsty.com](mailto:ron@pgsty.com).
This address also receives automated security reports for this repository.
For vulnerabilities in this fork:
1. Follow the fork-specific expectations in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
2. Prefer this repository's [private GitHub security advisory](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/security/advisories/new) workflow.
3. If you cannot use GitHub private reporting, email [ron@pgsty.com](mailto:ron@pgsty.com)
directly. Do not publish vulnerability details or exploit code in public
issues or pull requests.
3. If private reporting is unavailable, contact the maintainers through the
repository without publishing exploit details until a private channel is
established.
4. If you confirm the issue also affects upstream `minio/minio`, report it upstream separately.
## Scanner Configuration
The [OSS Scanner build environment](.oss-scanner/Dockerfile) and
[scan scope and offline checks](.oss-scanner/threat_model.md) are maintained
with the source. Update them when dependencies or security boundaries change.
## Disclosure Process
Fork-specific fixes and user-visible upgrade notes are published in [the security advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/). The fork-specific triage and remediation process is described in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
Fork-specific fixes and user-visible upgrade notes are published in [docs/security/advisories.md](docs/security/advisories.md). The fork-specific triage and remediation process is described in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
+1 -1
View File
@@ -34,4 +34,4 @@ Based on the report, the Silo maintainers investigate:
If the vulnerability exists in this fork itself, the maintainers will, when
feasible, fix the issue or implement reasonable countermeasures such that the
vulnerability can no longer be exploited. Fork-specific upgrade notes and
security advisories are published in [the security advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/).
security advisories are published in `docs/security/advisories.md`.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ _init() {
## Minimum required versions for build dependencies
GIT_VERSION="1.0"
GO_VERSION="1.27.3"
GO_VERSION="1.27.0"
OSX_VERSION="10.8"
KNAME=$(uname -s)
ARCH=$(uname -m)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ function start_silo_4drive() {
start_port=$1
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=silo
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo1234
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo1234@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo123@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
unset MINIO_KMS_AUTO_ENCRYPTION # do not auto-encrypt objects
export MINIO_CI_CD=1
+2 -2
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ if [ -n "${MCLI_BIN:-}" ]; then
exit 0
fi
release=${MCLI_RELEASE:-RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z}
release=${MCLI_RELEASE:-RELEASE.2026-08-06T00-00-00Z}
version_hyphen=${release#RELEASE.}
package_version=$(printf '%s\n' "${version_hyphen}" | sed -E 's/^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})T([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})Z$/\1\2\3\4\5\6.0.0/')
if [ "${package_version}" = "${version_hyphen}" ]; then
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ expected=$(awk -v asset="${archive}" '
{
name=$2
sub(/^\*/, "", name)
if (name == asset && length($1) == 64 && $1 ~ /^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/) print tolower($1)
if (name == asset && $1 ~ /^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/) print tolower($1)
}
' "${tmp_dir}/${checksums}")
if ! printf '%s\n' "${expected}" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{64}$'; then
+3 -3
View File
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@ function start_silo_10drive() {
start_port=$1
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=silo
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo1234
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo1234@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo123@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
unset MINIO_KMS_AUTO_ENCRYPTION # do not auto-encrypt objects
export MINIO_CI_CD=1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ function start_silo_10drive() {
"${PWD}/mc" mb --with-versioning silo/bucket
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=silo
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=silo1234
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=silo123
aws --endpoint-url http://localhost:"$start_port" s3api create-multipart-upload --bucket bucket --key obj-1 >upload-id.json
uploadId=$(jq -r '.UploadId' upload-id.json)
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+121 -46
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ import (
"strings"
)
const manifestVersion = 4
const manifestVersion = 3
var (
minioImportRE = regexp.MustCompile(`github\.com/minio/[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+`)
@@ -44,18 +44,19 @@ var (
)
type manifest struct {
Version int `json:"version"`
ModulePath string `json:"module_path"`
MinioImports []string `json:"minio_imports"`
Environment []string `json:"environment"`
Metrics []string `json:"metrics"`
Headers []string `json:"headers"`
Routes []string `json:"routes"`
RouteRoots []string `json:"route_roots"`
GridRoutes []string `json:"grid_routes"`
StorageMarkers []string `json:"storage_markers"`
PolicyValues []string `json:"policy_values"`
BrandAllowlist []string `json:"brand_allowlist"`
Version int `json:"version"`
ModulePath string `json:"module_path"`
MinioImports []string `json:"minio_imports"`
Environment []string `json:"environment"`
Metrics []string `json:"metrics"`
Headers []string `json:"headers"`
Routes []string `json:"routes"`
RouteRoots []string `json:"route_roots"`
GridRoutes []string `json:"grid_routes"`
StorageMarkers []string `json:"storage_markers"`
PolicyValues []string `json:"policy_values"`
ExportedSymbols []string `json:"exported_symbols"`
BrandAllowlist []string `json:"brand_allowlist"`
}
func main() {
@@ -100,22 +101,22 @@ func collect(repo string) (manifest, error) {
}
sets := map[string]map[string]struct{}{
"imports": {},
"env": {},
"metrics": {},
"headers": {},
"routes": {},
"roots": {},
"grid": {},
"storage": {},
"policy": {},
"brand": {},
"imports": {},
"env": {},
"metrics": {},
"headers": {},
"routes": {},
"roots": {},
"grid": {},
"storage": {},
"policy": {},
"exported": {},
"brand": {},
}
modulePath := ""
fset := token.NewFileSet()
for _, rel := range files {
// Migration notes and guard fixtures contain archived identifiers.
if rel == "SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md" ||
strings.HasPrefix(rel, "buildscripts/rebrand-guard/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(rel, "buildscripts/helm-migration-guard/") {
@@ -162,17 +163,17 @@ func collect(repo string) (manifest, error) {
sets["imports"][value] = struct{}{}
}
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(rel, "_test.go") {
// Test files hold request paths for fixtures, not served routes.
collectStringMatches(sets["routes"], routeRE, file)
if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "cmd/") || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "internal/") {
collectBrandStrings(sets["brand"], rel, file)
}
}
collectStringMatches(sets["routes"], routeRE, file)
collectNamedStringValues(sets["roots"], rel, file, "minioReservedBucket")
if rel == "internal/grid/manager.go" {
collectStringMatches(sets["grid"], routeRE, file)
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(rel, "_test.go") {
collectExported(sets["exported"], filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Dir(rel)), file)
if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "cmd/") || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "internal/") {
collectBrandStrings(sets["brand"], rel, file)
}
}
}
}
// This was a shell-local PID variable in the generated inspect script,
@@ -183,18 +184,19 @@ func collect(repo string) (manifest, error) {
return manifest{}, errors.New("go.mod module path was not found")
}
return manifest{
Version: manifestVersion,
ModulePath: modulePath,
MinioImports: sorted(sets["imports"]),
Environment: sorted(sets["env"]),
Metrics: sorted(sets["metrics"]),
Headers: sorted(sets["headers"]),
Routes: sorted(sets["routes"]),
RouteRoots: sorted(sets["roots"]),
GridRoutes: sorted(sets["grid"]),
StorageMarkers: sorted(sets["storage"]),
PolicyValues: sorted(sets["policy"]),
BrandAllowlist: sorted(sets["brand"]),
Version: manifestVersion,
ModulePath: modulePath,
MinioImports: sorted(sets["imports"]),
Environment: sorted(sets["env"]),
Metrics: sorted(sets["metrics"]),
Headers: sorted(sets["headers"]),
Routes: sorted(sets["routes"]),
RouteRoots: sorted(sets["roots"]),
GridRoutes: sorted(sets["grid"]),
StorageMarkers: sorted(sets["storage"]),
PolicyValues: sorted(sets["policy"]),
ExportedSymbols: sorted(sets["exported"]),
BrandAllowlist: sorted(sets["brand"]),
}, nil
}
@@ -260,7 +262,7 @@ func collectStringMatches(dst map[string]struct{}, re *regexp.Regexp, file *ast.
}
func trackedFiles(repo string) ([]string, error) {
cmd := exec.Command("git", "-C", repo, "ls-files", "--cached", "-z")
cmd := exec.Command("git", "-C", repo, "ls-files", "--cached", "--others", "--exclude-standard", "-z")
out, err := cmd.Output()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("git ls-files: %w", err)
@@ -284,6 +286,78 @@ func addMatches(dst map[string]struct{}, re *regexp.Regexp, text string, lower b
}
}
func collectExported(dst map[string]struct{}, dir string, file *ast.File) {
prefix := dir + ":" + file.Name.Name + ":"
for _, decl := range file.Decls {
switch decl := decl.(type) {
case *ast.FuncDecl:
if !ast.IsExported(decl.Name.Name) {
continue
}
if decl.Recv == nil {
dst[prefix+"func:"+decl.Name.Name] = struct{}{}
continue
}
receiver := receiverName(decl.Recv.List[0].Type)
dst[prefix+"method:"+receiver+"."+decl.Name.Name] = struct{}{}
case *ast.GenDecl:
for _, spec := range decl.Specs {
switch spec := spec.(type) {
case *ast.TypeSpec:
if !ast.IsExported(spec.Name.Name) {
continue
}
dst[prefix+"type:"+spec.Name.Name] = struct{}{}
collectExportedFields(dst, prefix, spec.Name.Name, spec.Type)
case *ast.ValueSpec:
kind := strings.ToLower(decl.Tok.String())
for _, name := range spec.Names {
if ast.IsExported(name.Name) {
dst[prefix+kind+":"+name.Name] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
func collectExportedFields(dst map[string]struct{}, prefix, typeName string, expr ast.Expr) {
var fields *ast.FieldList
switch typed := expr.(type) {
case *ast.StructType:
fields = typed.Fields
case *ast.InterfaceType:
fields = typed.Methods
default:
return
}
for _, field := range fields.List {
for _, name := range field.Names {
if ast.IsExported(name.Name) {
dst[prefix+"field:"+typeName+"."+name.Name] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
}
func receiverName(expr ast.Expr) string {
switch expr := expr.(type) {
case *ast.Ident:
return expr.Name
case *ast.StarExpr:
return receiverName(expr.X)
case *ast.IndexExpr:
return receiverName(expr.X)
case *ast.IndexListExpr:
return receiverName(expr.X)
case *ast.SelectorExpr:
return receiverName(expr.X) + "." + expr.Sel.Name
default:
return fmt.Sprintf("%T", expr)
}
}
func sorted(set map[string]struct{}) []string {
values := make([]string, 0, len(set))
for value := range set {
@@ -335,6 +409,7 @@ func compare(want, got manifest) error {
{"grid_routes", want.GridRoutes, got.GridRoutes},
{"storage_markers", want.StorageMarkers, got.StorageMarkers},
{"policy_values", want.PolicyValues, got.PolicyValues},
{"exported_symbols", want.ExportedSymbols, got.ExportedSymbols},
{"brand_allowlist", want.BrandAllowlist, got.BrandAllowlist},
}
for _, check := range checks {
@@ -379,10 +454,10 @@ func setDiff(want, got []string) (missing, added []string) {
}
func printSummary(value manifest) {
fmt.Printf("compatibility manifest: imports=%d env=%d metrics=%d headers=%d routes=%d roots=%d grid=%d storage=%d policy=%d brand=%d sha256=%s\n",
fmt.Printf("compatibility manifest: imports=%d env=%d metrics=%d headers=%d routes=%d roots=%d grid=%d storage=%d policy=%d exported=%d brand=%d sha256=%s\n",
len(value.MinioImports), len(value.Environment), len(value.Metrics), len(value.Headers),
len(value.Routes), len(value.RouteRoots), len(value.GridRoutes), len(value.StorageMarkers), len(value.PolicyValues),
len(value.BrandAllowlist), manifestDigest(value))
len(value.ExportedSymbols), len(value.BrandAllowlist), manifestDigest(value))
}
func manifestDigest(value manifest) string {
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
__pycache__/
-163
View File
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
"""Pure, self-contained SVG rendering for SILO's README cards."""
from datetime import date, timedelta
from html import escape
import math
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
themes = {
'light': dict(bg='#ffffff', wash='#f2f7fc', edge='#d9e3ee', ink='#16222e',
muted='#62758a', blue='#1d588c', copper='#b4762e', grid='#e5edf5',
line='#2b6ca3', ring='#dce5ef', field='#f7f9fc', label='#3d4e61'),
'dark': dict(bg='#101923', wash='#152738', edge='#2b3c50', ink='#e8eef6',
muted='#93a3b8', blue='#7fb8e8', copper='#e0a35c', grid='#263749',
line='#5da2dd', ring='#3a4e63', field='#0b1119', label='#b6c2d2'),
}
def read_emblem(path):
emblem = ET.parse(path).getroot()
body = ''.join(ET.tostring(child, encoding='unicode') for child in emblem
if child.tag.rsplit('}', 1)[-1] in ('defs', 'g'))
return '\n'.join(line.rstrip() for line in body.splitlines()).strip()
def txt(x, y, value, size=14, color=None, weight=400, anchor='start', mono=False, spacing=None):
family = 'Menlo,Consolas,monospace' if mono else 'Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif'
extra = f' letter-spacing="{spacing}"' if spacing is not None else ''
return (f'<text x="{x}" y="{y}" font-family="{family}" font-size="{size}" '
f'font-weight="{weight}" fill="{color}" text-anchor="{anchor}"{extra}>'
f'{escape(str(value))}</text>')
def start(height, theme, title, description, emblem_body):
t = themes[theme]
return [f'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1000" height="{height}" '
f'viewBox="0 0 1000 {height}" role="img" aria-labelledby="title desc">',
f'<title id="title">{escape(title)}</title><desc id="desc">{escape(description)}</desc>',
'<defs><linearGradient id="surface" x1="0" y1="1" x2="1" y2="0">'
f'<stop offset="0" stop-color="{t["bg"]}"/>'
f'<stop offset="1" stop-color="{t["wash"]}"/></linearGradient>'
'<linearGradient id="accent" x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="0">'
f'<stop offset="0" stop-color="{t["blue"]}"/>'
f'<stop offset="1" stop-color="{t["copper"]}"/></linearGradient>'
'<linearGradient id="area" x1="0" y1="0" x2="0" y2="1">'
f'<stop offset="0" stop-color="{t["line"]}" stop-opacity=".22"/>'
f'<stop offset="1" stop-color="{t["line"]}" stop-opacity=".015"/>'
'</linearGradient></defs>',
f'<rect x=".75" y=".75" width="998.5" height="{height-1.5}" rx="22" '
f'fill="url(#surface)" stroke="{t["edge"]}" stroke-width="1.5"/>',
f'<svg x="40" y="25" width="25" height="25" viewBox="230 213 570 570">{emblem_body}</svg>']
def heading(parts, t, eyebrow, title, subtitle, value, value_label):
parts.extend([
txt(76, 43, eyebrow, 11, t['muted'], 600, mono=True, spacing=1.7),
txt(40, 94, title, 32, t['ink'], 700),
txt(41, 123, subtitle, 14, t['muted']),
txt(958, 89, f'{value:,}', 45, t['ink'], 700, anchor='end'),
txt(957, 114, value_label, 10, t['muted'], 600, anchor='end', mono=True, spacing=1.5),
f'<path d="M40 146 H960" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
])
def contributors(theme, people, snapshot, emblem_body):
height = 206 + 76 * math.ceil(len(people) / 10)
t = themes[theme]
parts = start(height, theme, f'SILO community — {len(people)} contributors',
f'The existing SILO community roll, including code, proposals and reports across related projects. '
f'Gold rings retain the existing significant-contribution designation. Snapshot {snapshot}.', emblem_body)
heading(parts, t, 'SILO / COMMUNITY', 'Contributors',
'Code, proposals & reports across SILO and related projects', len(people), 'COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTORS')
for row in range(math.ceil(len(people) / 10)):
group = people[row * 10:(row + 1) * 10]
row_width = len(group) * 91
for col, person in enumerate(group):
x = (1000 - row_width) / 2 + col * 91 + 45.5
y = 199 + row * 76
identifier = f'avatar-{row}-{col}'
featured = bool(person.get('featured'))
parts.append(f'<g><title>@{escape(person["handle"])} — {escape(person["what"])}</title>')
parts.append(f'<defs><clipPath id="{identifier}"><circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="29"/></clipPath></defs>')
if featured:
parts.append(f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="34" fill="{t["copper"]}" opacity=".09"/>')
if person.get('avatarDataUrl'):
parts.append(f'<image x="{x-29}" y="{y-29}" width="58" height="58" '
f'clip-path="url(#{identifier})" href="{escape(person["avatarDataUrl"])}"/>')
else:
parts.append(f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="29" fill="{t["ring"]}"/>')
parts.append(txt(x, y + 9, person['handle'][0].upper(), 26, t['ink'], 700, 'middle'))
parts.append(f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="30.5" fill="none" '
f'stroke="{t["copper"] if featured else t["ring"]}" stroke-width="{2 if featured else 1.25}"/></g>')
parts.extend([
f'<path d="M40 {height-42} H960" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
f'<circle cx="47" cy="{height-21}" r="4" fill="none" stroke="{t["copper"]}" stroke-width="1.5"/>',
txt(61, height-17, 'Gold rings mark significant contributions', 12, t['muted']),
txt(959, height-17, f'AS OF {snapshot}', 10, t['muted'], 500, 'end', mono=True, spacing=.6),
'</svg>',
])
return ''.join(parts)
def stars(theme, history, snapshot, emblem_body):
points = history['points']
star_count = points[-1]['stars']
t = themes[theme]
provenance = ('Initial history reconstructed · Daily totals since ' + history['bootstrap']['through'] + ' · UTC'
if history['bootstrap']['reconstructed'] else 'Observed daily star totals · UTC')
parts = start(558, theme, f'SILO star history — {star_count:,} stars',
f'GitHub repository pgsty/silo. {star_count:,} stars as of {snapshot}. ' +
provenance, emblem_body)
heading(parts, t, 'SILO / GITHUB', 'Star History', 'pgsty/silo', star_count, 'GITHUB STARS')
left, right, top, bottom = 76, 958, 177, 440
begin = date.fromisoformat(points[0]['date'])
end = date.fromisoformat(points[-1]['date'])
days = max(1, (end - begin).days)
maximum = max(500, math.ceil(max(p['stars'] for p in points) / 500) * 500)
tick_step = 10 ** max(0, int(math.log10(maximum)))
xy = lambda day, n: (left + (right-left)*(date.fromisoformat(day)-begin).days / days,
bottom-(bottom-top)*n/maximum)
for value in range(0, maximum+1, tick_step):
y = xy(points[0]['date'], value)[1]
parts.append(f'<path d="M{left} {y:.2f} H{right}" stroke="{t["grid"]}" stroke-dasharray="4 6"/>')
parts.append(txt(left-16, round(y+4, 2), f'{value / 1000:g}k' if value >= 1000 else str(value), 12, t['muted'], anchor='end'))
dates = sorted({begin + timedelta(days=round((end-begin).days*i/5)) for i in range(6)})
ticks = [(d.isoformat(), d.strftime('%b %Y') if days > 90 else d.strftime('%b %d')) for d in dates]
for day, label in ticks:
x = xy(day, 0)[0]
parts.append(f'<path d="M{x:.2f} {top} V{bottom}" stroke="{t["grid"]}" stroke-opacity=".65"/>')
anchor = 'start' if day == points[0]['date'] else 'end' if day == snapshot else 'middle'
parts.append(txt(round(x, 2), 466, label, 12, t['muted'], anchor=anchor))
coords = [xy(p['date'], p['stars']) for p in points]
line = 'M' + ' L'.join(f'{x:.2f} {y:.2f}' for x, y in coords)
area = line + f' L{coords[-1][0]:.2f} {bottom} L{left} {bottom} Z'
parts.extend([
f'<path d="{area}" fill="url(#area)"/>',
f'<path d="{line}" fill="none" stroke="url(#accent)" stroke-width="3" '
'stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"/>',
f'<path d="M{left} {bottom} H{right}" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
])
x, y = coords[-1]
parts.extend([
f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="10" fill="{t["copper"]}" opacity=".12"/>',
f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="5" fill="{t["copper"]}" stroke="{t["bg"]}" stroke-width="2"/>',
f'<path d="M40 491 H960" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
txt(40, 516, f'{begin:%b %Y} — {end:%b %Y}'.upper(), 10, t['muted'], 500, mono=True, spacing=.7),
txt(959, 516, f'SNAPSHOT {snapshot}', 10, t['muted'], 500, 'end', mono=True, spacing=.6),
txt(40, 539, provenance, 11, t['muted']),
'</svg>',
])
return ''.join(parts)
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
PyYAML==6.0.3
-178
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@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
"""Regression checks for historical accuracy, contributor scope and SVG safety."""
import base64
import json
from pathlib import Path
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
from urllib.error import URLError
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
import render
import update
NS = {'s': 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'}
PNG = base64.b64decode('iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mP8/x8AAwMCAO+a7mgAAAAASUVORK5CYII=')
def person(handle='Alice', group='reports', featured=False):
return {'handle': handle, 'group': group, 'featured': featured,
'what': 'A reviewed contribution', 'firstContribution': '2026-09-01'}
def history():
return {'repository': 'pgsty/silo',
'bootstrap': {'through': '2026-09-15', 'reconstructed': True},
'points': [{'date': '2026-09-14', 'stars': 100}, {'date': '2026-09-15', 'stars': 105}]}
class HistoryTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_new_day_preserves_old_counts_and_unstars(self):
before = history()
after = update.update_history(before, '2026-09-16', 103)
self.assertEqual(after['points'][:-1], before['points'])
self.assertEqual(after['points'][-1], {'date': '2026-09-16', 'stars': 103})
self.assertEqual(before, history())
def test_same_day_rerun_replaces_instead_of_appending(self):
first = update.update_history(history(), '2026-09-15', 107)
self.assertEqual(len(first['points']), 2)
self.assertEqual(first, update.update_history(first, '2026-09-15', 107))
def test_missing_days_are_not_invented(self):
result = update.update_history(history(), '2026-09-18', 106)
self.assertEqual([p['date'] for p in result['points']], ['2026-09-14', '2026-09-15', '2026-09-18'])
def test_rejects_wrong_repository_and_corrupt_history(self):
cases = []
wrong = history(); wrong['repository'] = 'someone/else'; cases.append(wrong)
duplicate = history(); duplicate['points'].append(duplicate['points'][-1]); cases.append(duplicate)
unordered = history(); unordered['points'].reverse(); cases.append(unordered)
negative = history(); negative['points'][0]['stars'] = -1; cases.append(negative)
future = history(); future['points'][-1]['date'] = '2026-09-20'; cases.append(future)
for case in cases:
with self.subTest(case=case), self.assertRaises(ValueError):
update.update_history(case, '2026-09-16', 100)
def test_first_run_has_no_fabricated_history(self):
result = update.update_history(None, '2026-09-16', 10)
self.assertFalse(result['bootstrap']['reconstructed'])
self.assertEqual(result['points'], [{'date': '2026-09-16', 'stars': 10}])
class ContributorTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_retries_truncated_json_before_using_it(self):
with patch('update.request', side_effect=[b'{"partial":', b'{"ok":true}']), patch('update.time.sleep'):
self.assertEqual(update.GitHub('').get('repos/pgsty/silo'), {'ok': True})
def test_paginates_past_one_full_page(self):
class API(update.GitHub):
def __init__(self): self.calls = []
def get(self, path):
self.calls.append(path)
return list(range(100)) if 'page=1&' in path else [100]
api = API()
self.assertEqual(len(list(api.issues('pgsty/silo'))), 101)
self.assertIn('state=all', api.calls[0])
self.assertIn('page=2&', api.calls[1])
def test_bots_deduplication_unmerged_work_and_reviewed_credit(self):
def issue(login, kind='issue', user_type='User'):
item = {'user': {'login': login, 'type': user_type, 'avatar_url': ''}, 'created_at': '2026-09-02T00:00:00Z'}
if kind != 'issue': item['pull_request'] = {'merged_at': None if kind == 'open' else '2026-09-03T00:00:00Z'}
return item
class API:
def issues(self, _repo):
return [issue('alice'), issue('Bob', 'open'), issue('Bob', 'merged'),
issue('Carol', 'open'), issue('Copilot'), issue('robot', user_type='Bot')]
curated = {'repositories': ['pgsty/silo', 'pgsty/mc'], 'bots': ['Copilot'],
'people': [person('Alice', featured=True), person('Reporter'), person('Copilot')]}
result = update.collect_people(API(), curated)
self.assertEqual({p['handle'] for p in result}, {'Alice', 'Bob', 'Carol', 'Reporter'})
self.assertEqual(result[0]['handle'], 'Bob')
self.assertEqual(result[1]['handle'], 'Carol')
self.assertTrue(next(p for p in result if p['handle'] == 'Alice')['featured'])
self.assertEqual(next(p for p in result if p['handle'] == 'Bob')['group'], 'code')
self.assertFalse(next(p for p in result if p['handle'] == 'Carol')['featured'])
def test_newer_reviewed_preview_survives_until_site_catches_up(self):
remote = {'updated': '2026-09-16T03:00:00+00:00'}
cached = {'updated': '2026-09-16T04:00:00+00:00'}
self.assertIs(update.select_curated(remote, cached), cached)
newer = {'updated': '2026-09-17T03:00:00+00:00'}
self.assertIs(update.select_curated(newer, cached), newer)
def test_avatar_failure_reuses_raster_cache(self):
previous = {**person(), 'avatarDataUrl': update.raster_data_url(PNG)}
with patch('update.request', side_effect=URLError('unavailable')):
result = update.add_avatars(None, [{**person(), 'avatarUrl': 'https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/1'}], [previous])
self.assertEqual(result[0]['avatarDataUrl'], previous['avatarDataUrl'])
with self.assertRaises(ValueError): update.raster_data_url(b'<svg onload="bad()"/>')
with self.assertRaises(ValueError): update.cached_avatar({'avatarDataUrl': ''})
def test_fetch_failure_leaves_published_assets_untouched(self):
class API:
def get(self, path):
if path == 'repos/pgsty/silo': return {'full_name': 'pgsty/silo', 'stargazers_count': 106}
raise URLError('roster unavailable')
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
out = Path(directory)
original = json.dumps(history())
(out / 'history.json').write_text(original)
(out / 'contributors-light.svg').write_text('previous image')
with self.assertRaises(URLError): update.refresh(out, API(), Path('.'))
self.assertEqual((out / 'history.json').read_text(), original)
self.assertEqual((out / 'contributors-light.svg').read_text(), 'previous image')
class RenderTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_real_emblem_generates_clean_xml(self):
emblem = render.read_emblem(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / '.github/silo.svg')
svg = render.contributors('light', [person()], '2026-09-16', emblem)
ET.fromstring(svg)
self.assertTrue(all(line == line.rstrip() for line in svg.splitlines()))
def test_all_avatars_fit_when_the_roster_grows(self):
people = [{**person(f'person-{i}'), 'avatarDataUrl': update.raster_data_url(PNG)} for i in range(151)]
for theme in ('light', 'dark'):
root = ET.fromstring(render.contributors(theme, people, '2026-09-16', ''))
images = root.findall('.//s:image', NS)
self.assertEqual(len(images), 151)
footer = float(root.attrib['height']) - 42
self.assertTrue(all(float(i.attrib['y']) + float(i.attrib['height']) < footer for i in images))
self.assertTrue(all(i.attrib['href'].startswith('data:image/png;base64,') for i in images))
def test_untrusted_text_is_escaped(self):
data = [{**person(), 'what': '<script>alert("x")</script> & contributions'}]
svg = render.contributors('light', data, '2026-09-16', '')
root = ET.fromstring(svg)
self.assertEqual(root.findall('.//s:script', NS), [])
self.assertIn('&lt;script&gt;', svg)
def test_single_point_and_decreasing_star_history_render(self):
for data in (update.update_history(None, '2026-09-16', 0), update.update_history(history(), '2026-09-16', 90)):
for theme in ('light', 'dark'):
svg = render.stars(theme, data, '2026-09-16', '')
ET.fromstring(svg)
self.assertNotIn('nan', svg.lower())
self.assertNotIn('inf', svg.lower())
if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main()
-295
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@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
"""Refresh the generated-asset checkout; publishing is handled by the workflow."""
import argparse
import base64
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
from datetime import date, datetime, timezone
import json
from http.client import IncompleteRead
import os
from pathlib import Path
import re
import sys
import time
from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
import yaml
import render
REPOSITORY = 'pgsty/silo'
SOURCE = 'repos/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com/contents/data/home/contributors.yaml?ref=main'
GROUPS = ('code', 'proposed', 'reports')
HANDLE = re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9-]{0,38}\Z')
def request(url, token='', limit=8 * 1024 * 1024):
headers = {'User-Agent': 'silo-repository-cards', 'Accept': 'application/vnd.github+json'}
if urlparse(url).netloc == 'api.github.com':
headers['X-GitHub-Api-Version'] = '2022-11-28'
if token:
headers['Authorization'] = f'Bearer {token}'
for attempt in range(3):
try:
with urlopen(Request(url, headers=headers), timeout=25) as response:
data = response.read(limit + 1)
if len(data) > limit:
raise ValueError('Response exceeds the size limit')
expected = response.headers.get('Content-Length')
if expected is not None and len(data) != int(expected):
raise URLError('Incomplete response body')
return data
except HTTPError as exc:
if exc.code < 500 or attempt == 2:
raise
except (URLError, TimeoutError, IncompleteRead):
if attempt == 2:
raise
time.sleep(attempt + 1)
class GitHub:
def __init__(self, token):
self.token = token
def get(self, path):
for attempt in range(3):
try:
return json.loads(request('https://api.github.com/' + path, self.token))
except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
if attempt == 2:
raise ValueError(f'Incomplete or invalid GitHub JSON: {path}') from exc
time.sleep(attempt + 1)
def issues(self, repository):
page = 1
while True:
batch = self.get(f'repos/{repository}/issues?state=all&per_page=100&page={page}&sort=created&direction=asc')
if not isinstance(batch, list):
raise ValueError(f'Invalid issues response for {repository}')
yield from batch
if len(batch) < 100:
return
page += 1
def curated_snapshot(data, revision):
updated = str(data['updated'])
datetime.fromisoformat(updated)
repositories = [item['repo'] for item in data['repositories']]
if not repositories or any(not re.fullmatch(r'pgsty/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+', repo) for repo in repositories):
raise ValueError('Invalid contributor repository scope')
people = []
for group in GROUPS:
for entry in data[group]:
if not HANDLE.fullmatch(entry['handle']):
raise ValueError('Invalid GitHub contributor handle')
people.append({
'handle': entry['handle'], 'group': group,
'featured': bool(entry.get('featured')), 'what': entry['what'],
'firstContribution': str(entry.get('firstContribution', '9999-12-31')),
})
if not people or len({p['handle'].lower() for p in people}) != len(people):
raise ValueError('Empty or duplicate contributor roster')
return {'updated': updated, 'revision': revision, 'repositories': repositories,
'bots': data.get('bots', ['Copilot', 'dependabot[bot]']), 'people': people}
def select_curated(remote, cached):
# The initial, approved preview can contain reviewed credit not published by
# the companion site yet. Keep that newer snapshot until the site catches up.
if cached and datetime.fromisoformat(cached['updated']) > datetime.fromisoformat(remote['updated']):
return cached
return remote
def collect_people(api, curated):
bots = {name.lower() for name in curated['bots']}
people = {p['handle'].lower(): dict(p) for p in curated['people']
if p['handle'].lower() not in bots and not p['handle'].lower().endswith('[bot]')}
order = {p['handle'].lower(): index for index, p in enumerate(curated['people'])}
for repository in curated['repositories']:
print(f'Reading issue and PR authors: {repository}', flush=True)
for issue in api.issues(repository):
user = issue.get('user') or {}
handle = user.get('login', '')
key = handle.lower()
if user.get('type') != 'User' or key in bots or key.endswith('[bot]'):
continue
if not HANDLE.fullmatch(handle):
raise ValueError('Invalid issue author')
pr = issue.get('pull_request')
group = 'code' if pr and pr.get('merged_at') else 'proposed' if pr else 'reports'
first = issue['created_at'][:10]
date.fromisoformat(first)
person = people.setdefault(key, {
'handle': handle, 'group': group, 'featured': False,
'what': 'Contributed an issue or pull request to SILO and related projects',
'firstContribution': first,
})
person['avatarUrl'] = user.get('avatar_url', '')
person['firstContribution'] = min(person['firstContribution'], first)
if GROUPS.index(group) < GROUPS.index(person['group']):
person['group'] = group
if not people:
raise ValueError('No human contributors were collected')
return sorted(people.values(), key=lambda p: (
GROUPS.index(p['group']), not p['featured'],
order.get(p['handle'].lower(), len(order)), p['firstContribution'], p['handle'].lower()))
def raster_data_url(data):
if data.startswith(b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n'):
mime = 'image/png'
elif data.startswith(b'\xff\xd8\xff'):
mime = 'image/jpeg'
elif data.startswith((b'GIF87a', b'GIF89a')):
mime = 'image/gif'
elif data[:4] == b'RIFF' and data[8:12] == b'WEBP':
mime = 'image/webp'
else:
raise ValueError('Avatar is not a raster image')
return f'data:{mime};base64,' + base64.b64encode(data).decode('ascii')
def cached_avatar(person):
value = person.get('avatarDataUrl', '')
if not value:
return ''
prefix, encoded = value.split(',', 1)
if prefix not in ('data:image/png;base64', 'data:image/jpeg;base64', 'data:image/gif;base64', 'data:image/webp;base64'):
raise ValueError('Invalid cached avatar format')
raw = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
if len(raw) > 512 * 1024 or raster_data_url(raw) != value:
raise ValueError('Invalid cached avatar')
return value
def add_avatars(api, people, previous):
cached = {p['handle'].lower(): cached_avatar(p) for p in previous}
def update(person):
person = dict(person)
try:
url = person.pop('avatarUrl', '') or api.get('users/' + person['handle'])['avatar_url']
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme != 'https' or parsed.netloc != 'avatars.githubusercontent.com':
raise ValueError('Unexpected avatar host')
data = request(url + ('&' if '?' in url else '?') + 's=96', limit=512 * 1024)
person['avatarDataUrl'] = raster_data_url(data)
except (HTTPError, URLError, TimeoutError, IncompleteRead, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
person.pop('avatarUrl', None)
person['avatarDataUrl'] = cached.get(person['handle'].lower(), '')
print(f'Avatar fallback for @{person["handle"]}: {type(exc).__name__}', file=sys.stderr)
return person
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=6) as pool:
return list(pool.map(update, people))
def update_history(history, day, stars):
date.fromisoformat(day)
if type(stars) is not int or stars < 0:
raise ValueError('Invalid repository star count')
if history is None:
history = {'repository': REPOSITORY, 'bootstrap': {'through': day, 'reconstructed': False}, 'points': []}
if history['repository'] != REPOSITORY:
raise ValueError('Star history belongs to a different repository')
date.fromisoformat(history['bootstrap']['through'])
dates = []
for point in history['points']:
date.fromisoformat(point['date'])
if type(point['stars']) is not int or point['stars'] < 0:
raise ValueError('Invalid historical star count')
dates.append(point['date'])
if dates != sorted(set(dates)) or any(d > day for d in dates):
raise ValueError('History contains duplicate, unordered, or future dates')
# Replace today's observation, preserve previous days, and allow unstars.
points = [dict(p) for p in history['points'] if p['date'] != day]
points.append({'date': day, 'stars': stars})
return {**history, 'points': points}
def read_json(path, default=None):
return json.loads(path.read_text()) if path.exists() else default
def refresh(output, api, source_root):
day = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date().isoformat()
metadata = api.get('repos/' + REPOSITORY)
if metadata['full_name'].lower() != REPOSITORY:
raise ValueError('Unexpected repository metadata')
history = update_history(read_json(output / 'history.json'), day, metadata['stargazers_count'])
source = api.get(SOURCE)
reviewed = yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode(source['content'], validate=False))
curated = select_curated(curated_snapshot(reviewed, source['sha']), read_json(output / 'curated.json'))
people = collect_people(api, curated)
previous = read_json(output / 'contributors.json', {}).get('people', [])
people = add_avatars(api, people, previous)
emblem = render.read_emblem(source_root / '.github/silo.svg')
payloads = {}
for theme in ('light', 'dark'):
payloads[f'contributors-{theme}.svg'] = render.contributors(theme, people, day, emblem) + '\n'
payloads[f'star-history-{theme}.svg'] = render.stars(theme, history, day, emblem) + '\n'
for svg in payloads.values():
ET.fromstring(svg)
for name, data in {
'history.json': history,
'curated.json': curated,
'contributors.json': {'repository': REPOSITORY, 'updated': day, 'people': people},
}.items():
payloads[name] = json.dumps(data, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + '\n'
payloads['README.md'] = f'''# SILO repository cards
Generated by [Repository Cards](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/actions/workflows/repository-cards.yml)
at 00:00 UTC daily (08:00 Asia/Shanghai). GitHub may queue scheduled runs.
Snapshot: {day}. {metadata['stargazers_count']:,} stars; {len(people)} community contributors.
- `contributors-light.svg` / `contributors-dark.svg`: human issue and PR authors across the SILO project scope, plus reviewed acknowledgements. Bots are excluded. Gold rings follow the reviewed companion-site roster; new authors are collected automatically.
- `star-history-light.svg` / `star-history-dark.svg`: initial history reconstructed from the then-current stargazers; later points are daily observed totals, including decreases. Missing days are not fabricated.
- `curated.json`: a cache of reviewed contributor credit from `pgsty/silo.pgsty.com/data/home/contributors.yaml`. The approved initial preview may be newer than the published site; a newer reviewed snapshot is retained until the site catches up.
- `contributors.json`: generated contributor data and embedded raster avatars. Failed avatar refreshes use the previous image, or an initial when no image is available.
- `history.json`: persistent daily totals. Keep this file when regenerating images.
The SVGs are self-contained. Source and instructions live on the default branch;
this branch contains generated assets only. Do not merge it into `main`.
'''
# Collect and validate everything before touching the publication checkout.
output.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
for filename, text in payloads.items():
(output / filename).write_text(text)
print(f'{day}: {len(people)} contributors; {metadata["stargazers_count"]:,} stars; {len(history["points"])} history points')
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument('--output', type=Path, required=True)
args = parser.parse_args()
configured = os.environ.get('GITHUB_REPOSITORY', REPOSITORY)
if configured.lower() != REPOSITORY:
raise SystemExit('This workflow is scoped to pgsty/silo')
refresh(args.output, GitHub(os.environ.get('GH_TOKEN', '')), Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2])
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
+2 -2
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ function start_silo_5drive() {
start_port=$1
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=silo
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo1234
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo1234@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo123@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
unset MINIO_KMS_AUTO_ENCRYPTION # do not auto-encrypt objects
export MINIO_CI_CD=1
+5 -5
View File
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ function verify_rewrite() {
start_port=$1
export MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=silo
export MINIO_SECRET_KEY=silo1234
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo1234@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
export MINIO_SECRET_KEY=silo123
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo123@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
unset MINIO_KMS_AUTO_ENCRYPTION # do not auto-encrypt objects
export MINIO_CI_CD=1
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ function verify_rewrite() {
-debug \
-versions \
-access-key silo \
-secret-key silo1234 \
-secret-key silo123 \
-endpoint "http://127.0.0.1:${start_port}/" 2>&1 | grep INTACT; then
echo "server1 log:"
cat "${WORK_DIR}/server1.log"
@@ -105,14 +105,14 @@ function verify_rewrite() {
exit 1
fi
go run ./buildscripts/heal-manual.go "127.0.0.1:${start_port}" "silo" "silo1234"
go run ./buildscripts/heal-manual.go "127.0.0.1:${start_port}" "silo" "silo123"
sleep 1
if ! ./s3-check-md5 \
-debug \
-versions \
-access-key silo \
-secret-key silo1234 \
-secret-key silo123 \
-endpoint http://127.0.0.1:${start_port}/ 2>&1 | grep INTACT; then
echo "server1 log:"
cat "${WORK_DIR}/server1.log"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ function test_silo_with_timeout() {
start_port=$1
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=silo
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo1234
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo1234@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
export MC_HOST_silo="http://silo:silo123@127.0.0.1:${start_port}/"
export MINIO_CI_CD=1
mkdir ${WORK_DIR}
+8 -7
View File
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ WORK_DIR="$PWD/.verify-$RANDOM"
export MINT_MODE=core
export MINT_DATA_DIR="$WORK_DIR/data"
export SERVER_ENDPOINT="127.0.0.1:9000"
export MC_HOST_verify="http://silo:silo1234@${SERVER_ENDPOINT}/"
export MC_HOST_verify_ipv6="http://silo:silo1234@[::1]:9000/"
export MC_HOST_verify="http://silo:silo123@${SERVER_ENDPOINT}/"
export MC_HOST_verify_ipv6="http://silo:silo123@[::1]:9000/"
export ACCESS_KEY="silo"
export SECRET_KEY="silo1234"
export SECRET_KEY="silo123"
export ENABLE_HTTPS=0
export GO111MODULE=on
export GOGC=25
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ function __init__() {
shred -n 1 -s 65M - 1>"$FILE_65_MB" 2>/dev/null
## version is purposefully set to '3' for minio to migrate configuration file
echo '{"version": "3", "credential": {"accessKey": "silo", "secretKey": "silo1234"}, "region": "us-east-1"}' >"$SILO_CONFIG_DIR/config.json"
echo '{"version": "3", "credential": {"accessKey": "silo", "secretKey": "silo123"}, "region": "us-east-1"}' >"$SILO_CONFIG_DIR/config.json"
"$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/buildscripts/install-verified-fixture.sh" \
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/mc/4c4dcc4b55baf238cd0c81030d77945b3828f157/functional-tests.sh \
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ function main() {
purge "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap 'purge "$WORK_DIR"' EXIT
__init__ "$@"
main "$@"
(__init__ "$@" && main "$@")
rv=$?
purge "$WORK_DIR"
exit "$rv"
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ SILO=("$PWD/silo" --config-dir "$SILO_CONFIG_DIR" server)
function start_silo_3_node() {
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=silo
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo1234
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
export MINIO_ERASURE_SET_DRIVE_COUNT=6
export MINIO_CI_CD=1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ function start_silo_3_node() {
pid3=$!
disown $pid3
export MC_HOST_mysilo="http://silo:silo1234@127.0.0.1:$((start_port + 1))"
export MC_HOST_mysilo="http://silo:silo123@127.0.0.1:$((start_port + 1))"
timeout 15m /tmp/mc ready mysilo || fail
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ function __init__() {
mkdir -p "$SILO_CONFIG_DIR"
## version is purposefully set to '3' for minio to migrate configuration file
echo '{"version": "3", "credential": {"accessKey": "silo", "secretKey": "silo1234"}, "region": "us-east-1"}' >"$SILO_CONFIG_DIR/config.json"
echo '{"version": "3", "credential": {"accessKey": "silo", "secretKey": "silo123"}, "region": "us-east-1"}' >"$SILO_CONFIG_DIR/config.json"
if [ ! -f /tmp/mc ]; then
"$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/buildscripts/install-mcli.sh" /tmp/mc
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ function start_silo() {
start_port=$1
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=silo
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo1234
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
unset MINIO_KMS_AUTO_ENCRYPTION # do not auto-encrypt objects
unset MINIO_CI_CD
unset CI
+3 -3
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ function start_silo_3_node() {
done
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=silo
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo1234
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
export MINIO_ERASURE_SET_DRIVE_COUNT=6
export MINIO_CI_CD=1
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ function start_silo_3_node() {
pid3=$!
disown $pid3
export MC_HOST_mysilo="http://silo:silo1234@127.0.0.1:$((start_port + 1))"
export MC_HOST_mysilo="http://silo:silo123@127.0.0.1:$((start_port + 1))"
timeout 15m /tmp/mc ready mysilo || fail
[ ${first_time} -eq 0 ] && upload_objects
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ function __init__() {
mkdir -p "$SILO_CONFIG_DIR"
## version is purposefully set to '3' for minio to migrate configuration file
echo '{"version": "3", "credential": {"accessKey": "silo", "secretKey": "silo1234"}, "region": "us-east-1"}' >"$SILO_CONFIG_DIR/config.json"
echo '{"version": "3", "credential": {"accessKey": "silo", "secretKey": "silo123"}, "region": "us-east-1"}' >"$SILO_CONFIG_DIR/config.json"
if [ ! -f /tmp/mc ]; then
"$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)/buildscripts/install-mcli.sh" /tmp/mc
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ helm_run template my-release "${new_chart}" \
go run ./buildscripts/helm-migration-guard "${old_render}" "${new_render}"
helm_run package "${new_chart}" --destination "${output_dir}" >/dev/null
test -s "${work_dir}/silo-7.0.3.tgz"
test -s "${work_dir}/silo-7.0.1.tgz"
if find "${work_dir}" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'minio-*.tgz' | grep -q .; then
echo "Helm packaging emitted a legacy MinIO chart name" >&2
exit 1
+21 -54
View File
@@ -11,33 +11,6 @@ fail() {
exit 1
}
# Git is already a build prerequisite. --no-index also scans untracked files
# and exported source trees. As before, honor .gitignore only in a worktree.
search_ignore=--no-exclude-standard
if git rev-parse --show-toplevel >/dev/null 2>&1; then
search_ignore=--exclude-standard
fi
search_errors="$(mktemp)"
trap 'rm -f "${search_errors}"' EXIT
search_text() {
local status=0
git --no-pager grep --no-index "${search_ignore}" --no-color -nIHE "$@" 2>"${search_errors}" || status=$?
# Git can return 1 for both no matches and a file read error. Check stderr
# as well, before callers filter matches through their allowlists.
if [ "${status}" -gt 1 ] || [ -s "${search_errors}" ]; then
cat "${search_errors}" >&2
fail "could not scan source files"
fi
}
# Keep hidden files and build output out of the repository-wide scans.
source_excludes=(
':(exclude,glob)**/.*'
':(exclude,glob)**/.*/**'
':(exclude)dist/**'
)
require_file() {
[ -f "$1" ] || fail "missing required file: $1"
}
@@ -63,7 +36,7 @@ for file in \
buildscripts/verify-helm-migration.sh \
Dockerfile.goreleaser \
Dockerfile.distroless \
dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh \
dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh \
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh \
helm/silo/Chart.yaml \
helm/silo/values.yaml \
@@ -128,7 +101,7 @@ require_text Dockerfile.goreleaser "Published checksum drift"
require_text Dockerfile.distroless 'COPY --chmod=0755 silo /usr/bin/silo'
require_text Dockerfile.distroless 'ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/silo"]'
require_text Dockerfile.distroless '"/usr/bin/silo", "healthcheck", "ready"'
require_text dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh "sha256sum -c"
require_text dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh "sha256sum -c"
require_text helm/silo/Chart.yaml "name: silo"
require_text helm/silo/values.yaml "repository: pgsty/silo"
require_text helm/silo/templates/deployment.yaml "/usr/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh silo server"
@@ -179,27 +152,21 @@ if grep -Ev '^[[:space:]]*(#|$)' silo.env | grep -q '='; then
fail "silo.env must not contain active assignments that shadow /etc/default/minio"
fi
delivery_hits="$(search_text 'pgsty/minio:' -- .github/workflows Dockerfile.goreleaser helm/silo \
':(exclude,glob).github/workflows/**/.*' ':(exclude,glob).github/workflows/**/.*/**' \
':(exclude,glob)helm/silo/**/.*' ':(exclude,glob)helm/silo/**/.*/**')"
if [ -n "${delivery_hits}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${delivery_hits}" >&2
if rg -n 'pgsty/minio:' .github/workflows Dockerfile.goreleaser helm/silo; then
fail "an active delivery surface still publishes the frozen pgsty/minio image"
fi
# The repository and its default branch are pgsty/silo and main. The invariant
# is that the old name is never a live target, not that it is never spoken: the
# READMEs have to name it to explain the rename and to point at the archived
# artifacts, which is the opposite of stranding a reader on it. CONTRIBUTORS.md
# also quotes historical issue titles.
# artifacts, which is the opposite of stranding a reader on it.
#
# So two rules. First, no live URL may resolve to the old repository anywhere,
# READMEs and CONTRIBUTORS.md included.
old_repo_pattern='pgsty/minio(\.git)?([^[:alnum:]_.-]|$)'
stale_repo_url="$(search_text -e "github\.com/${old_repo_pattern}" -e "hub\.docker\.com/r/${old_repo_pattern}" -- . \
"${source_excludes[@]}" ':(exclude)SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' \
':(exclude)buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json')"
stale_repo_url="$(printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo_url}" |
# READMEs included.
stale_repo_url="$(rg -n -e 'github\.com/pgsty/minio' -e 'hub\.docker\.com/r/pgsty/minio' \
--glob '!.git/**' --glob '!dist/**' \
--glob '!SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' \
--glob '!buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json' . |
sed 's#^\./##' | grep -v '^buildscripts/verify-rebrand\.sh:' || true)"
if [ -n "${stale_repo_url}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo_url}" >&2
@@ -208,35 +175,35 @@ fi
# Second, the bare name may only appear where it is deliberate: the pinned
# pre-rebrand image digest in the upgrade test, the two guards that refuse a
# legacy image, the two READMEs that document the rename and the archived
# minio branch, and historical issue titles in CONTRIBUTORS.md.
repo_guard_allowlist='^(buildscripts/minio-upgrade\.sh|buildscripts/verify-rebrand\.sh|buildscripts/helm-migration-guard/main\.go|README\.md|README_ZH\.md|CONTRIBUTORS\.md):'
stale_repo="$(search_text "${old_repo_pattern}" -- . "${source_excludes[@]}" \
':(exclude)SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' ':(exclude)buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json')"
stale_repo="$(printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo}" |
# legacy image, and the two READMEs that document the rename and the archived
# minio branch.
repo_guard_allowlist='^(buildscripts/minio-upgrade\.sh|buildscripts/verify-rebrand\.sh|buildscripts/helm-migration-guard/main\.go|README\.md|README_ZH\.md):'
stale_repo="$(rg -n 'pgsty/minio' --glob '!.git/**' --glob '!dist/**' \
--glob '!SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' \
--glob '!buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json' . |
sed 's#^\./##' | grep -Ev "${repo_guard_allowlist}" || true)"
if [ -n "${stale_repo}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo}" >&2
fail "a source reference still names the pre-rename pgsty/minio repository"
fi
stale_branch="$(search_text 'pgsty/silo/(blob/|tree/|raw/)?master' -- . "${source_excludes[@]}")"
stale_branch="$(rg -n 'pgsty/silo/(blob/|tree/|raw/)?master' \
--glob '!.git/**' --glob '!dist/**' . || true)"
if [ -n "${stale_branch}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${stale_branch}" >&2
fail "a link still targets the retired master branch; raw and Actions URLs do not follow a branch rename"
fi
for workflow in .github/workflows/go.yml .github/workflows/vulncheck.yml; do
stale_filter="$(search_text '^[[:space:]]+- master$' -- "${workflow}")"
if [ -n "${stale_filter}" ]; then
if rg -q '^\s+- master$' "${workflow}"; then
fail "${workflow} still filters on master and would go silently dormant on main"
fi
require_text "${workflow}" " - main"
done
network_hits="$(search_text \
'https?://[^"`[:space:]]*(dl\.min\.io|subnet\.min\.io|api\.min\.io|slack\.min\.io|play\.min\.io)' -- \
':(glob)cmd/**/*.go' ':(glob)internal/**/*.go' ':(exclude,glob)**/*_test.go' "${source_excludes[@]}")"
network_hits="$(rg -n --glob '*.go' --glob '!**/*_test.go' \
'https?://[^"`[:space:]]*(dl\.min\.io|subnet\.min\.io|api\.min\.io|slack\.min\.io|play\.min\.io)' \
cmd internal || true)"
network_hits="$(printf '%s\n' "${network_hits}" | grep -Ev '^[^:]+:[0-9]+:[[:space:]]*//' || true)"
if [ -n "${network_hits}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${network_hits}" >&2
-184
View File
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
//go:build consistency_strict
// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
type abandonedCleanupCommitDisk struct {
StorageAPI
entered chan<- struct{}
release <-chan struct{}
}
func (d abandonedCleanupCommitDisk) RenameData(ctx context.Context, sv, sp string, fi FileInfo, dv, dp string, o RenameOptions) (RenameDataResp, error) {
var success int64
gate := &scopeStagedContext{
Context: ctx, meta: filepath.Join(d.Endpoint().Path, dv, dp, fi.DataDir, "part.1"),
entered: d.entered, release: d.release,
tracker: healthDiskCtxValue{lastSuccess: &success},
}
return d.StorageAPI.RenameData(gate, sv, sp, fi, dv, dp, o)
}
// A lost namespace lease can admit cleanup while a disk transaction is between
// moving its external shards and replacing xl.meta. Those shards are live work,
// even though the old metadata does not refer to them yet. Cleanup must wait.
func TestMutationAbandonedCleanupWaitsForCommit(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := mutationPools(t)
const object = "cleanup-during-commit"
body := strings.Repeat("new payload", 200000)
mutationPut(t, z, bucket, object, 0, strings.Repeat("old payload", 200000), time.Now().Add(-time.Minute))
set := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(object)
disks, swap := installListingDiskSwitch(set)
defer swap(disks)
entered, release := make(chan struct{}, len(disks)), make(chan struct{})
unblock := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
defer unblock()
wrapped := append([]StorageAPI(nil), disks...)
for i, d := range disks {
wrapped[i] = abandonedCleanupCommitDisk{d, entered, release}
}
swap(wrapped)
committed := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := z.serverPools[0].PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader(body), int64(len(body)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{NoLock: true})
committed <- err
}()
for range disks {
select {
case <-entered:
case err := <-committed:
t.Fatalf("PUT returned before shard barrier: %v", err)
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("PUT did not move all external shards")
}
}
t.Log("All eight new external shard directories exist; old xl.meta is still active")
cleaned := make(chan error, len(disks))
for _, d := range disks {
go func(d StorageAPI) { cleaned <- d.CleanAbandonedData(context.Background(), bucket, object) }(d)
}
early := 0
timer := time.NewTimer(150 * time.Millisecond)
wait:
for {
select {
case err := <-cleaned:
early++
t.Errorf("abandoned-data cleanup overtook unfinished commit: %v", err)
if early == len(disks) {
break wait
}
case <-timer.C:
break wait
}
}
timer.Stop()
unblock()
select {
case err := <-committed:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PUT failed: %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("PUT did not finish")
}
for i := early; i < len(disks); i++ {
select {
case err := <-cleaned:
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("cleanup did not finish")
}
}
swap(disks)
r, err := z.GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("acknowledged PUT unreadable after abandoned-data cleanup: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil || string(data) != body {
t.Fatalf("acknowledged external shards lost: bytes=%d err=%v", len(data), err)
}
}
// Cleanup can also arrive after a disk has committed but before its delayed
// reply lets the coordinator decide to undo a failed quorum. The previous
// generation's backup is still owned by that unfinished transaction.
func TestMutationAbandonedCleanupPreservesUndoBackup(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := mutationPools(t)
const object = "cleanup-before-undo"
body := strings.Repeat("last acknowledged", 150000)
base := time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)
mutationPut(t, z, bucket, object, 0, body, base)
set := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(object)
disks, swap := installListingDiskSwitch(set)
defer swap(disks)
entered, release := make(chan struct{}, 4), make(chan struct{})
unblock := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
defer unblock()
wrapped := append([]StorageAPI(nil), disks...)
for i, d := range disks {
wrapped[i] = delayedRenameResult{d, i >= 4, entered, release}
}
swap(wrapped)
committed := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
next := strings.Repeat("failed update", 180000)
_, err := z.serverPools[0].PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader(next), int64(len(next)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{NoLock: true, MTime: base.Add(time.Second)})
committed <- err
}()
for range 4 {
select {
case <-entered:
case err := <-committed:
t.Fatalf("PUT returned before reply barrier: %v", err)
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("disk commit did not reach reply barrier")
}
}
for _, d := range disks[:4] {
if err := d.CleanAbandonedData(t.Context(), bucket, object); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
unblock()
select {
case err := <-committed:
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("four-of-eight commit unexpectedly reached write quorum")
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("failed PUT did not finish undo")
}
swap(disks)
for i, d := range disks {
fi, err := d.ReadVersion(t.Context(), "", bucket, object, "", ReadOptions{})
if err != nil || !fi.ModTime.Equal(base) {
t.Errorf("disk%d lost last acknowledged generation after failed PUT: mtime=%v err=%v", i, fi.ModTime, err)
}
}
r, err := z.GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("last acknowledged value unreadable after cleanup and undo: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil || string(data) != body {
t.Fatalf("last acknowledged value lost after cleanup and undo: bytes=%d err=%v", len(data), err)
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import (
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
// Data types used for returning dummy access control
-80
View File
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/cachevalue"
)
func TestAccountInfoReflectsBucketMutations(t *testing.T) {
ctx := t.Context()
bed, err := prepareAdminErasureTestBed(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer bed.TearDown()
previousCache := listBucketsCache
defer func() { listBucketsCache = previousCache }()
// Hold a real pre-mutation snapshot past the assertions so the regression
// cannot disappear merely because a slow test outlasted the cache TTL.
freezeListing := func() {
t.Helper()
buckets, err := bed.objLayer.ListBuckets(ctx, BucketOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
listBucketsCache = cachevalue.NewFromFunc(time.Hour, cachevalue.Opts{}, func(context.Context) ([]BucketInfo, error) {
return buckets, nil
})
if _, err := listBucketsCache.GetWithCtx(ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
const bucket = "account-info-freshness"
assertPresent := func(want bool) {
t.Helper()
req, err := buildAdminRequest(nil, http.MethodGet, "/accountinfo", 0, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
bed.router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("account info: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var info madmin.AccountInfo
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &info); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
found := false
for _, item := range info.Buckets {
if item.Name == bucket {
found = true
}
}
if found != want {
t.Errorf("account info bucket present = %v, want %v", found, want)
}
}
freezeListing()
if err := bed.objLayer.MakeBucket(ctx, bucket, MakeBucketOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assertPresent(true)
freezeListing()
if err := bed.objLayer.DeleteBucket(ctx, bucket, DeleteBucketOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assertPresent(false)
}
-348
View File
@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/mux"
)
func corsAdminRequest(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, path string, body []byte) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
router := mux.NewRouter()
registerAdminRouter(router, true)
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(method, adminPathPrefix+adminAPIVersionPrefix+path,
int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("admin %s: %d: %s", path, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
return rec
}
func corsImportReport(t *testing.T, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) madmin.BucketMetaImportErrs {
t.Helper()
var rpt madmin.BucketMetaImportErrs
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &rpt); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("import report %q: %v", rec.Body.String(), err)
}
return rpt
}
func corsZip(t *testing.T, entries map[string][]byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
zw := zip.NewWriter(&buf)
for name, data := range entries {
w, err := zw.Create(name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = w.Write(data); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := zw.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return buf.Bytes()
}
// corsCorruptedZip builds an archive holding a stored (uncompressed) cors.xml
// whose payload is altered after the checksum is computed, plus the given
// companion entries. The altered document stays well formed, so only the zip
// checksum tells the two apart.
func corsCorruptedZip(t *testing.T, name string, doc []byte, others map[string][]byte) []byte {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
zw := zip.NewWriter(&buf)
w, err := zw.CreateHeader(&zip.FileHeader{Name: name, Method: zip.Store})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = w.Write(doc); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for other, data := range others {
ow, err := zw.Create(other)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = ow.Write(data); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err = zw.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
raw := buf.Bytes()
at := bytes.Index(raw, []byte("app.example.com"))
if at < 0 {
t.Fatalf("stored CORS payload not found in archive")
}
raw[at] = 'A'
return raw
}
// TestAdminBucketMetadataCORSRoundTrip covers the export/import round trip for
// per-bucket CORS, per-file error reporting for an invalid document, and that
// an archive without cors.xml leaves an existing configuration alone.
func TestAdminBucketMetadataCORSRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{t: t, objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, _ http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
corsXML := []byte(testSiteReplicationCORSDoc)
if _, err := updateLocalBucketCORSMetadata(t.Context(), obj, bucket, corsXML); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Export must carry the stored document verbatim.
rec := corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodGet, "/export-bucket-metadata?bucket="+bucket, nil)
archive := rec.Body.Bytes()
zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(archive), int64(len(archive)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var exported []byte
for _, f := range zr.File {
if f.Name != bucket+"/"+bucketCorsConfig {
continue
}
r, err := f.Open()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
exported, err = io.ReadAll(r)
r.Close()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if !bytes.Equal(exported, corsXML) {
t.Fatalf("%s: exported CORS = %q, want %q", instanceType, exported, corsXML)
}
// Drop the configuration: the archive must then omit the entry.
if _, err = updateLocalBucketCORSMetadata(t.Context(), obj, bucket, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, _, err = globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: CORS still present before restore", instanceType)
}
rec = corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodGet, "/export-bucket-metadata?bucket="+bucket, nil)
empty := rec.Body.Bytes()
zr, err = zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(empty), int64(len(empty)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, f := range zr.File {
if f.Name == bucket+"/"+bucketCorsConfig {
t.Fatalf("%s: export emitted %s for a bucket without CORS", instanceType, f.Name)
}
}
rec = corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodPut, "/import-bucket-metadata", archive)
if st := corsImportReport(t, rec).Buckets[bucket]; !st.Cors.IsSet || st.Cors.Err != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s: import report cors = %+v", instanceType, st.Cors)
}
stored, storedAt, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(stored, corsXML) {
t.Fatalf("%s: restored CORS = %q, err = %v", instanceType, stored, err)
}
created, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.CreatedAt(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !storedAt.After(created) {
t.Fatalf("%s: restored CORS timestamp %v is not after bucket creation %v", instanceType, storedAt, created)
}
// An archive without cors.xml must not remove the configuration.
corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodPut, "/import-bucket-metadata",
corsZip(t, map[string][]byte{bucket + "/quota.json": []byte(`{"quota":0}`)}))
if stored, _, err = globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(stored, corsXML) {
t.Fatalf("%s: import without cors.xml changed CORS: %q, err = %v", instanceType, stored, err)
}
// A bucket the import itself creates must still land above its own
// creation time, otherwise CORS replication would drop the restore.
fresh := "cors-import-created-bucket"
rec = corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodPut, "/import-bucket-metadata",
corsZip(t, map[string][]byte{fresh + "/" + bucketCorsConfig: corsXML}))
if st := corsImportReport(t, rec).Buckets[fresh]; !st.Cors.IsSet || st.Cors.Err != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s: fresh bucket import report cors = %+v", instanceType, st.Cors)
}
freshStored, freshAt, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(fresh)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(freshStored, corsXML) {
t.Fatalf("%s: fresh bucket CORS = %q, err = %v", instanceType, freshStored, err)
}
freshCreated, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.CreatedAt(fresh)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !freshAt.After(freshCreated) {
t.Fatalf("%s: fresh bucket CORS timestamp %v is not after creation %v", instanceType, freshAt, freshCreated)
}
// An invalid document must fail loudly for that bucket and change nothing.
rec = corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodPut, "/import-bucket-metadata",
corsZip(t, map[string][]byte{bucket + "/" + bucketCorsConfig: []byte("<CORSConfiguration><CORSRule>")}))
if st := corsImportReport(t, rec).Buckets[bucket]; st.Cors.Err == "" {
t.Fatalf("%s: invalid CORS import reported no error: %+v", instanceType, st)
}
if stored, _, err = globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(stored, corsXML) {
t.Fatalf("%s: invalid CORS import changed stored config: %q, err = %v", instanceType, stored, err)
}
// A well formed document carried by a corrupt zip entry must be
// rejected too, leaving the stored document and its timestamp alone
// while the other configs in the same archive still apply.
_, corsAt, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec = corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodPut, "/import-bucket-metadata",
corsCorruptedZip(t, bucket+"/"+bucketCorsConfig, corsXML,
map[string][]byte{bucket + "/quota.json": []byte(`{"quota":4096,"quotatype":"hard"}`)}))
st := corsImportReport(t, rec).Buckets[bucket]
if st.Cors.Err == "" {
t.Fatalf("%s: corrupt CORS entry reported no error: %+v", instanceType, st)
}
if !st.Quota.IsSet || st.Quota.Err != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s: corrupt CORS entry blocked the neighboring quota: %+v", instanceType, st.Quota)
}
stored, storedAt, err = globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(stored, corsXML) || !storedAt.Equal(corsAt) {
t.Fatalf("%s: corrupt CORS entry changed stored config: %q at %v (was %v), err = %v", instanceType, stored, storedAt, corsAt, err)
}
quota, _, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetQuotaConfig(t.Context(), bucket)
if err != nil || quota == nil || quota.Quota != 4096 {
t.Fatalf("%s: neighboring quota not applied: %+v, err = %v", instanceType, quota, err)
}
}})
}
// corsPeerStub is a stand-in site-replication peer. It records every
// SRBucketMeta it is asked to apply and answers with status.
func corsPeerStub(t *testing.T, applied chan<- madmin.SRBucketMeta, status int) *httptest.Server {
t.Helper()
return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method == http.MethodPut && applied != nil {
var item madmin.SRBucketMeta
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&item); err != nil {
t.Errorf("decode peer apply: %v", err)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
applied <- item
}
w.WriteHeader(status)
}))
}
// TestAdminBucketMetadataCORSImportReplicatesPastPeerFailure pins that an
// imported CORS document reaches the reachable peers even when the shared
// bucket metadata hook failed against an unreachable one, and that both
// failures are still reported for the bucket.
func TestAdminBucketMetadataCORSImportReplicatesPastPeerFailure(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{t: t, objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucket string, _ http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
ctx := t.Context()
corsXML := []byte(testSiteReplicationCORSDoc)
healthyApplies := make(chan madmin.SRBucketMeta, 4)
healthy := corsPeerStub(t, healthyApplies, http.StatusOK)
defer healthy.Close()
broken := corsPeerStub(t, nil, http.StatusBadRequest)
defer broken.Close()
// With site replication on, admin requests resolve their token signing
// key through the site replicator account, so it has to exist.
serviceCred, err := auth.CreateCredentials(siteReplicatorSvcAcc, "cors-import-service-secret")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
serviceCred.ParentUser = cred.AccessKey
if _, err = globalIAMSys.store.AddServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred.AccessKey, false)
globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(serviceCred.SecretKey)
defer globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set("")
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
oldEnabled, oldState := globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled, globalSiteReplicationSys.state
globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = true
globalSiteReplicationSys.state = srState{
Name: "cors-import-test",
ServiceAccountAccessKey: serviceCred.AccessKey,
Peers: map[string]madmin.PeerInfo{
globalDeploymentID(): {Name: "local", DeploymentID: globalDeploymentID()},
"peer-healthy": {Name: "healthy", DeploymentID: "peer-healthy", Endpoint: healthy.URL},
"peer-broken": {Name: "broken", DeploymentID: "peer-broken", Endpoint: broken.URL},
},
}
globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
defer func() {
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled, globalSiteReplicationSys.state = oldEnabled, oldState
globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
}()
rec := corsAdminRequest(t, cred, http.MethodPut, "/import-bucket-metadata",
corsZip(t, map[string][]byte{
bucket + "/" + bucketCorsConfig: corsXML,
bucket + "/quota.json": []byte(`{"quota":8192,"quotatype":"hard"}`),
}))
st := corsImportReport(t, rec).Buckets[bucket]
if !st.Cors.IsSet || st.Cors.Err != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s: import report cors = %+v", instanceType, st.Cors)
}
stored, storedAt, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket)
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(stored, corsXML) {
t.Fatalf("%s: stored CORS = %q, err = %v", instanceType, stored, err)
}
// The reachable peer must have been told about the CORS document,
// carrying exactly the timestamp that was saved locally.
var corsSeen, sharedSeen bool
for range 2 {
select {
case item := <-healthyApplies:
if item.Type != madmin.SRBucketMetaTypeCorsConfig {
sharedSeen = item.Bucket == bucket && item.Quota != nil
continue
}
if item.Bucket != bucket || item.Cors == nil || !item.UpdatedAt.Equal(storedAt) {
t.Fatalf("%s: peer CORS event = %#v, want %s at %v", instanceType, item, bucket, storedAt)
}
payload, decErr := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(*item.Cors)
if decErr != nil || !bytes.Equal(payload, corsXML) {
t.Fatalf("%s: peer CORS payload = %q, err = %v", instanceType, payload, decErr)
}
corsSeen = true
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("%s: healthy peer received no further events (shared=%v cors=%v)", instanceType, sharedSeen, corsSeen)
}
}
if !sharedSeen || !corsSeen {
t.Fatalf("%s: healthy peer events shared=%v cors=%v, want both", instanceType, sharedSeen, corsSeen)
}
// Both hook failures against the unreachable peer stay reported.
if got := strings.Count(st.Err, "->broken:"); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("%s: bucket error mentions the broken peer %d times, want 2: %q", instanceType, got, st.Err)
}
}})
}
+19 -205
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ import (
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
const (
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) PutBucketQuotaConfigHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
return
}
_, err = parseBucketQuota(bucket, data)
quotaConfig, err := parseBucketQuota(bucket, data)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) PutBucketQuotaConfigHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
Quota: data,
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}
if quotaConfig.Size == 0 && quotaConfig.Quota == 0 {
bucketMeta.Quota = nil
}
// Call site replication hook.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.BucketMetaHook(ctx, bucketMeta))
@@ -414,7 +417,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ExportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketLifecycleConfig,
bucketSSEConfig,
bucketTaggingConfig,
bucketCorsConfig,
bucketQuotaConfigFile,
objectLockConfig,
bucketVersioningConfig,
@@ -435,7 +437,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ExportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, exportError(ctx, err, cfgFile, bucket), r.URL)
return
}
configData, err := canonicalBucketPolicy(config)
configData, err := json.Marshal(config)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, exportError(ctx, err, cfgFile, bucket), r.URL)
return
@@ -515,19 +517,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ExportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
return
}
rawDataFn(bytes.NewReader(configData), cfgPath, len(configData))
case bucketCorsConfig:
// Export the stored document verbatim: GetBucketCors returns
// the bytes exactly as they were PUT, so the archive must
// round-trip them unchanged.
configData, _, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetCorsConfigXML(bucket)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errConfigNotFound) {
continue
}
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, exportError(ctx, err, cfgFile, bucket), r.URL)
return
}
rawDataFn(bytes.NewReader(configData), cfgPath, len(configData))
case objectLockConfig:
config, _, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetObjectLockConfig(bucket)
if err != nil {
@@ -600,50 +589,6 @@ type importMetaReport struct {
madmin.BucketMetaImportErrs
}
type importMetadataFields map[string]struct{}
func (f importMetadataFields) add(configFile string) {
f[configFile] = struct{}{}
}
func applyImportedBucketMetadata(dst *BucketMetadata, src BucketMetadata, fields importMetadataFields) {
for configFile := range fields {
switch configFile {
case bucketPolicyConfig:
dst.PolicyConfigJSON = bytes.Clone(src.PolicyConfigJSON)
dst.PolicyConfigUpdatedAt = src.PolicyConfigUpdatedAt
case bucketNotificationConfig:
dst.NotificationConfigXML = bytes.Clone(src.NotificationConfigXML)
dst.NotificationConfigUpdatedAt = src.NotificationConfigUpdatedAt
case bucketLifecycleConfig:
dst.LifecycleConfigXML = bytes.Clone(src.LifecycleConfigXML)
dst.LifecycleConfigUpdatedAt = src.LifecycleConfigUpdatedAt
case bucketSSEConfig:
dst.EncryptionConfigXML = bytes.Clone(src.EncryptionConfigXML)
dst.EncryptionConfigUpdatedAt = src.EncryptionConfigUpdatedAt
case bucketTaggingConfig:
dst.TaggingConfigXML = bytes.Clone(src.TaggingConfigXML)
dst.TaggingConfigUpdatedAt = src.TaggingConfigUpdatedAt
case bucketQuotaConfigFile:
dst.QuotaConfigJSON = bytes.Clone(src.QuotaConfigJSON)
dst.QuotaConfigUpdatedAt = src.QuotaConfigUpdatedAt
case bucketCorsConfig:
// The import stamps its fields before creating any missing bucket,
// and a CORS event stamped before bucket creation is discarded as
// belonging to an older incarnation, so the imported document takes
// the same monotonic timestamp a local PutBucketCors would assign.
dst.CorsConfigUpdatedAt = localCORSUpdatedAt(*dst, src.CorsConfigUpdatedAt)
dst.CorsConfigXML = bytes.Clone(src.CorsConfigXML)
case objectLockConfig:
dst.ObjectLockConfigXML = bytes.Clone(src.ObjectLockConfigXML)
dst.ObjectLockConfigUpdatedAt = src.ObjectLockConfigUpdatedAt
case bucketVersioningConfig:
dst.VersioningConfigXML = bytes.Clone(src.VersioningConfigXML)
dst.VersioningConfigUpdatedAt = src.VersioningConfigUpdatedAt
}
}
}
func (i *importMetaReport) SetStatus(bucket, fname string, err error) {
st := i.Buckets[bucket]
var errMsg string
@@ -663,8 +608,6 @@ func (i *importMetaReport) SetStatus(bucket, fname string, err error) {
st.Tagging = madmin.MetaStatus{IsSet: true, Err: errMsg}
case bucketQuotaConfigFile:
st.Quota = madmin.MetaStatus{IsSet: true, Err: errMsg}
case bucketCorsConfig:
st.Cors = madmin.MetaStatus{IsSet: true, Err: errMsg}
case objectLockConfig:
st.ObjectLock = madmin.MetaStatus{IsSet: true, Err: errMsg}
case bucketVersioningConfig:
@@ -706,16 +649,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
}
bucketMap := make(map[string]*BucketMetadata, len(zr.File))
importedFields := make(map[string]importMetadataFields, len(zr.File))
blockedBuckets := make(map[string]struct{})
markImported := func(bucket, configFile string) {
fields := importedFields[bucket]
if fields == nil {
fields = make(importMetadataFields)
importedFields[bucket] = fields
}
fields.add(configFile)
}
updatedAt := UTCNow()
@@ -731,7 +664,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket] = &meta
} else if err != errConfigNotFound {
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, "", err)
blockedBuckets[bucket] = struct{}{}
}
}
@@ -743,9 +675,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
continue
}
bucket, fileName := slc[0], slc[1]
if _, blocked := blockedBuckets[bucket]; blocked {
continue
}
if fileName == objectLockConfig {
reader, err := file.Open()
if err != nil {
@@ -779,7 +708,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].ObjectLockConfigXML = configData
bucketMap[bucket].ObjectLockConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
}
}
@@ -792,9 +720,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
continue
}
bucket, fileName := slc[0], slc[1]
if _, blocked := blockedBuckets[bucket]; blocked {
continue
}
if fileName == bucketVersioningConfig {
reader, err := file.Open()
if err != nil {
@@ -839,7 +764,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].VersioningConfigXML = configData
bucketMap[bucket].VersioningConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
}
}
@@ -857,9 +781,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
continue
}
bucket, fileName := slc[0], slc[1]
if _, blocked := blockedBuckets[bucket]; blocked {
continue
}
// create bucket if it does not exist yet.
if _, ok := bucketMap[bucket]; !ok {
@@ -892,7 +813,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].NotificationConfigXML = configData
bucketMap[bucket].NotificationConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
case bucketPolicyConfig:
// Error out if Content-Length is beyond allowed size.
@@ -919,7 +839,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
continue
}
configData, err := canonicalBucketPolicy(bucketPolicy)
configData, err := json.Marshal(bucketPolicy)
if err != nil {
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)
continue
@@ -927,7 +847,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].PolicyConfigJSON = configData
bucketMap[bucket].PolicyConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
case bucketLifecycleConfig:
bucketLifecycle, err := lifecycle.ParseLifecycleConfig(io.LimitReader(reader, sz))
@@ -960,7 +879,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].LifecycleConfigXML = configData
bucketMap[bucket].LifecycleConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
case bucketSSEConfig:
// Parse bucket encryption xml
@@ -999,7 +917,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].EncryptionConfigXML = configData
bucketMap[bucket].EncryptionConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
case bucketTaggingConfig:
tags, err := tags.ParseBucketXML(io.LimitReader(reader, sz))
@@ -1016,7 +933,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].TaggingConfigXML = configData
bucketMap[bucket].TaggingConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
case bucketQuotaConfigFile:
data, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
@@ -1033,33 +949,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
bucketMap[bucket].QuotaConfigJSON = data
bucketMap[bucket].QuotaConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
case bucketCorsConfig:
if sz > maxBucketCorsSize {
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, errors.New(ErrEntityTooLarge.String()))
continue
}
// Read one byte past the declared size: stopping exactly at sz
// leaves archive/zip short of EOF, so it never verifies the entry
// checksum and a corrupt entry carrying well formed XML would be
// stored as a valid document. The extra byte also lets the reader
// reject an entry longer than it declares.
corsData, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(reader, sz+1))
if err != nil {
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, err)
continue
}
if err = validateCORSReplicationPayload(corsData); err != nil {
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, fmt.Errorf("%s (%s)", errorCodes[ErrMalformedXML].Description, err))
continue
}
bucketMap[bucket].CorsConfigXML = corsData
bucketMap[bucket].CorsConfigUpdatedAt = updatedAt
markImported(bucket, fileName)
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, fileName, nil)
}
}
@@ -1073,97 +962,22 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ImportBucketMetadataHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *
}
for bucket, meta := range bucketMap {
fields := importedFields[bucket]
if len(fields) == 0 {
continue
}
var merged BucketMetadata
var commitAt time.Time
err := func() error {
lockCtx, unlock, err := lockBucketMetadata(ctx, objectAPI, bucket)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer unlock()
merged, err = loadBucketMetadataParse(lockCtx, objectAPI, bucket, false)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := ensureBucketMetadataCreated(lockCtx, objectAPI, &merged); err != nil {
return err
}
commitAt = UTCNow()
for _, file := range replicatedBucketConfigs {
if _, ok := fields[file]; ok {
commitAt = localBucketConfigUpdatedAt(merged, file, commitAt)
}
}
applyImportedBucketMetadata(&merged, *meta, fields)
for _, file := range replicatedBucketConfigs {
if _, ok := fields[file]; !ok {
continue
}
data, at := replicatedBucketConfig(&merged, file)
payload, _, err := bucketConfigPayload(bucket, file, *data, len(merged.ObjectLockConfigXML) != 0)
if err != nil {
return err
}
*data, *at = payload, commitAt
}
return globalBucketMetadataSys.saveMetadata(lockCtx, objectAPI, &merged)
}()
err := globalBucketMetadataSys.save(ctx, *meta)
if err != nil {
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, "", err)
continue
}
*meta = merged
globalNotificationSys.LoadBucketMetadata(bgContext(ctx), bucket)
hook := madmin.SRBucketMeta{Bucket: bucket, UpdatedAt: commitAt}
var hookNeeded bool
if _, ok := fields[bucketQuotaConfigFile]; ok {
hook.Quota = meta.QuotaConfigJSON
hookNeeded = true
}
if _, ok := fields[bucketPolicyConfig]; ok {
hook.Policy = meta.PolicyConfigJSON
hookNeeded = hookNeeded || len(hook.Policy) != 0
}
if _, ok := fields[bucketVersioningConfig]; ok {
hook.Versioning = enc(meta.VersioningConfigXML)
hookNeeded = true
}
if _, ok := fields[bucketTaggingConfig]; ok {
hook.Tags = enc(meta.TaggingConfigXML)
hookNeeded = true
}
if _, ok := fields[objectLockConfig]; ok {
hook.ObjectLockConfig = enc(meta.ObjectLockConfigXML)
hookNeeded = true
}
if _, ok := fields[bucketSSEConfig]; ok {
hook.SSEConfig = enc(meta.EncryptionConfigXML)
hookNeeded = true
}
if hookNeeded {
err = globalSiteReplicationSys.BucketMetaHook(ctx, hook)
}
if _, ok := fields[bucketPolicyConfig]; ok && len(meta.PolicyConfigJSON) == 0 {
// An omitted bulk Policy cannot express deletion.
err = errors.Join(err, globalSiteReplicationSys.BucketMetaHook(ctx, madmin.SRBucketMeta{
Type: madmin.SRBucketMetaTypePolicy, Bucket: bucket, UpdatedAt: commitAt,
}))
}
if _, ok := fields[bucketCorsConfig]; ok {
// CORS carries its own timestamp, so it replicates through the
// dedicated event rather than the shared bucket metadata hook. It
// is announced even when the shared hook failed: the document is
// already committed locally, and a peer that is unreachable for
// one config must not withhold CORS from the reachable ones.
if corsEvent, live := newBucketCORSReplicationEvent(bucket, *meta); live {
err = errors.Join(err, globalSiteReplicationSys.BucketMetaHook(ctx, corsEvent))
}
}
if err != nil {
// Call site replication hook.
if err = globalSiteReplicationSys.BucketMetaHook(ctx, madmin.SRBucketMeta{
Bucket: bucket,
Quota: meta.QuotaConfigJSON,
Policy: meta.PolicyConfigJSON,
Versioning: enc(meta.VersioningConfigXML),
Tags: enc(meta.TaggingConfigXML),
ObjectLockConfig: enc(meta.ObjectLockConfigXML),
SSEConfig: enc(meta.EncryptionConfigXML),
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}); err != nil {
rpt.SetStatus(bucket, "", err)
continue
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
// validateAdminReq will validate request against and return whether it is allowed.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/subnet"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
// DelConfigKVHandler - DELETE /minio/admin/v3/del-config-kv
+2 -2
View File
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ import (
cfgldap "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/identity/ldap"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/identity/openid"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/ldap"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/ldap"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
func addOrUpdateIDPHandler(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, isUpdate bool) {
+3 -5
View File
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/mux"
xldap "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/ldap"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
xldap "github.com/minio/pkg/v3/ldap"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
// ListLDAPPolicyMappingEntities lists users/groups mapped to given/all policies.
@@ -249,10 +249,8 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccountLDAP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
for k, v := range cred.Claims {
switch k {
case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
if k == expClaim {
continue
}
opts.claims[k] = v
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/set"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
const dummyRoleARN = "dummy-internal"
+3 -5
View File
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
var (
@@ -373,9 +373,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) RebalanceStop(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
// Cancel any ongoing rebalance operation
globalNotificationSys.StopRebalance(r.Context())
writeSuccessResponseHeadersOnly(w)
if err := pools.saveRebalanceStats(GlobalContext, 0, rebalSaveStoppedAt); !errors.Is(err, errRebalanceNotStarted) {
adminLogIf(ctx, err)
}
adminLogIf(ctx, pools.saveRebalanceStats(GlobalContext, 0, rebalSaveStoppedAt))
globalNotificationSys.LoadRebalanceMeta(ctx, false)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
xioutil "github.com/minio/minio/internal/ioutil"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
// SiteReplicationAdd - PUT /minio/admin/v3/site-replication/add
-556
View File
@@ -1,556 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
"github.com/minio/mux"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
func iamAdminFixture(t *testing.T) (context.Context, *IAMSys) {
t.Helper()
ctx, sys, obj := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
globalObjLayerMutex.Lock()
globalObjectAPI = obj
globalObjLayerMutex.Unlock()
return ctx, sys
}
func iamAdminUser(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, name, policyName string) auth.Credentials {
t.Helper()
cred := auth.Credentials{AccessKey: name, SecretKey: "review-user-valid-secret"}
_, err := sys.CreateUser(ctx, name, madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq{SecretKey: cred.SecretKey, Status: madmin.AccountEnabled})
mustIAM(t, err)
if policyName != "" {
_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, name, policyName, regUser, false)
mustIAM(t, err)
}
return cred
}
func iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, parent, key, document string) auth.Credentials {
t.Helper()
var sp *policy.Policy
var err error
if document != "" {
sp, err = policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
mustIAM(t, err)
}
cred, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: key, secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", sessionPolicy: sp})
mustIAM(t, err)
return cred
}
func iamAdminRequest(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any) *http.Request {
t.Helper()
var body []byte
if payload != nil {
raw, err := json.Marshal(payload)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err = madmin.EncryptData(cred.SecretKey, raw)
mustIAM(t, err)
}
headers := map[string]string{}
if cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
headers["X-Amz-Security-Token"] = cred.SessionToken
}
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(method, "http://localhost"+target, int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, headers)
mustIAM(t, err)
mustIAM(t, req.ParseForm())
return req
}
func iamAdminCall(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any, vars map[string]string, handler http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
req := iamAdminRequest(t, cred, method, target, payload)
req = mux.SetURLVars(req, vars)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "IAMAdminAuthorization"))
handler(rec, req)
return rec
}
func assertIAMAdminStatus(t *testing.T, operation string, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, want int) {
t.Helper()
if rec.Code != want {
t.Errorf("%s status=%d want=%d body=%s", operation, rec.Code, want, rec.Body.String())
return
}
if want == http.StatusForbidden || want == http.StatusNotFound {
var response APIErrorResponse
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response))
wantCode := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied).Code
if want == http.StatusNotFound {
wantCode = errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound).Code
}
if response.Code != wantCode {
t.Errorf("%s error code=%s want=%s", operation, response.Code, wantCode)
}
}
}
func iamAdminPlugin(t *testing.T, allow bool) {
t.Helper()
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"result": allow})
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
u, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(server.URL)
mustIAM(t, err)
previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{URL: u, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { r.Close() }}))
t.Cleanup(func() { setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous) })
}
func TestIAMAdminRootEmptyPolicy(t *testing.T) {
for _, doc := range []string{"", "null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
t.Run("policy="+doc, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-empty", doc)
sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-sibling", "")
req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
if code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
}
active, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(policy.Args{Claims: checked.Claims})
t.Logf("owner=%v parsed_active_session_policy=%v", owner, active)
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-root-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "review"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminEmptyPolicyDelegation(t *testing.T) {
for _, parentType := range []string{"root", "user"} {
for _, document := range []string{"null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
t.Run(parentType+"/"+document, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := globalActiveCred
if parentType == "user" {
parent = iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "empty-policy-parent", "readwrite")
}
sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
mustIAM(t, err)
caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
accessKey: "empty-policy-caller", secretKey: "empty-policy-caller-secret", sessionPolicy: sp,
claims: map[string]any{"identity-attribute": "preserved"},
})
mustIAM(t, err)
const limitedPolicy = `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts"]}]}`
for _, tc := range []struct {
policy string
listStatus int
allowObject bool
}{
{"", http.StatusOK, true},
{"null", http.StatusOK, true},
{"{}", http.StatusOK, true},
{`{"Statement":null}`, http.StatusOK, true},
{limitedPolicy, http.StatusOK, false},
{`{"Version":"2012-10-17"}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
{`{"Statement":[]}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
} {
expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
req := madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Expiration: &expires}
if tc.policy != "" {
req.Policy = json.RawMessage(tc.policy)
}
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", req, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create expiring child", rec, http.StatusOK)
data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var response madmin.AddServiceAccountResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
child, ok := sys.store.GetUser(response.Credentials.AccessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("new service account missing")
}
// Exercise the issued key through authentication and authorization.
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "use expiring child policy="+tc.policy, iamAdminCall(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), tc.listStatus)
signed := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/example/object", nil)
checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(signed, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
if code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("child authentication: %v", code)
}
if checked.Claims["identity-attribute"] != "preserved" {
t.Fatal("creation lost the caller's identity context")
}
allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: checked.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: "example", ObjectName: "object"})
if allowed != tc.allowObject {
t.Errorf("GetObject allowed=%v with requested policy=%s", allowed, tc.policy)
}
}
})
}
}
}
func TestIAMAdminCorruptServiceCleanup(t *testing.T) {
for _, status := range []string{auth.AccountOn, auth.AccountOff, "expired"} {
t.Run(status, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-admin", "consoleAdmin")
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-parent", "readwrite")
svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-corrupt", "")
if status == auth.AccountOff {
_, err := sys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: status})
mustIAM(t, err)
}
cache := sys.store.lock()
u := cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey]
u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
if status == "expired" {
u.Credentials.Expiration = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute)
}
cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey] = u
sys.store.unlock()
_, _, err := sys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("fault injection failed")
}
raw, exists := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey)
_, loginOK := sys.GetUser(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
t.Logf("metadata_exists=%v parent_known=%v GetUser_ok=%v", exists, raw.Credentials.ParentUser == parent.AccessKey, loginOK)
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
outsider := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-outsider", "readwrite")
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "unauthorized cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, outsider, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "admin cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey); ok {
t.Fatal("deleted service account remains in the IAM cache")
}
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminPolicylessSelf(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-policyless", "")
svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, caller.AccessKey, "rv-policyless-child", "")
other := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "bulk-other", "readwrite")
_ = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, other.AccessKey, "bulk-other-child", "")
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 200)
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-access-keys-bulk?listType=all", nil, nil, api.ListAccessKeysBulk)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list bulk self", rec, 200)
data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var listed map[string]madmin.ListAccessKeysResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &listed))
entry, ok := listed[caller.AccessKey]
if len(listed) != 1 || !ok || len(entry.ServiceAccounts) != 1 || entry.ServiceAccounts[0].AccessKey != svc.AccessKey || len(entry.STSKeys) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("policyless bulk self returned unexpected identities: %+v", listed)
}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 200)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 200)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
}
func TestIAMAdminExpiringInheritedPolicy(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-legacy-parent", "consoleAdmin")
document := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
// Model a credential persisted by the old handler: it copied its caller's
// policy claims but set the newly created service's type to inherited.
expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
accessKey: "rv-exp-inherited", secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", expiration: &expires,
claims: map[string]any{policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(document))},
})
mustIAM(t, err)
req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
if code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
}
args := policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.CreateServiceAccountAdminAction, DenyOnly: true}
if !sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("fixture cannot create")
}
args.Action = policy.CreateUserAdminAction
args.DenyOnly = false
if sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("fixture not constrained")
}
t.Logf("service=%v temp=%v inherited=%v; create allowed, create-user denied", checked.IsServiceAccount(), checked.IsTemp(), checked.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType)
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-escaped", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
if rec.Code == 200 {
child, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, "review-escaped")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("new key missing")
}
childReq := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
childChecked, childOwner, childCode := checkKeyValid(childReq, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
if childCode != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("child auth=%v", childCode)
}
allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: childChecked.AccessKey, Claims: childChecked.Claims, IsOwner: childOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
t.Errorf("constrained inherited service created a new key; new key CreateUser allowed=%v", allowed)
} else {
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject derived creation", rec, 403)
}
updated := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+caller.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "metadata-only"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": caller.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount)
if updated.Code == 204 {
after, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("updated key missing")
}
afterReq := iamAdminRequest(t, after.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
afterChecked, afterOwner, afterCode := checkKeyValid(afterReq, caller.AccessKey)
if afterCode != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("updated auth=%v", afterCode)
}
allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: afterChecked.Claims, IsOwner: afterOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
t.Errorf("constrained inherited service updated itself; CreateUser allowed after update=%v", allowed)
} else {
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject inherited self update", updated, 403)
}
}
func TestIAMAdminSessionPolicyCannotDelegate(t *testing.T) {
for _, temp := range []bool{false, true} {
t.Run(map[bool]string{false: "service", true: "sts"}[temp], func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-parent", "consoleAdmin")
doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
var caller auth.Credentials
if !temp {
caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "review-restricted", doc)
} else {
var err error
caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(doc))}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
}
sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-sibling", "")
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict LDAP create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/idp/ldap/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccountLDAP), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser("review-bad-new"); ok {
t.Fatal("denied creation persisted a credential")
}
u, ok := sys.store.GetUser(sibling.AccessKey)
if !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != sibling.SecretKey {
t.Fatal("denied update changed the target credential")
}
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminSelfDenials(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{"parent_deny", "group_deny", "session_implicit_deny", "session_explicit_deny", "plugin_deny"} {
t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-self-parent", "readwrite")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-target", "")
caller := parent
doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts","admin:RemoveServiceAccount"]}]}`
switch mode {
case "parent_deny", "group_deny":
p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(doc))
mustIAM(t, err)
_, err = sys.SetPolicy(ctx, "review-self-deny", *p)
mustIAM(t, err)
if mode == "group_deny" {
_, err = sys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, "self-deny-group", []string{parent.AccessKey})
mustIAM(t, err)
_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, "self-deny-group", "review-self-deny", regUser, true)
} else {
_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, parent.AccessKey, "readwrite,review-self-deny", regUser, false)
}
mustIAM(t, err)
case "session_implicit_deny":
caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::example/*"]}]}`)
case "session_explicit_deny":
caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", doc)
case "plugin_deny":
iamAdminPlugin(t, false)
}
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list bulk self", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-access-keys-bulk?listType=all", nil, nil, api.ListAccessKeysBulk), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminNonRootCannotManageRoot(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-console-admin", "consoleAdmin")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "rv-root-target", "")
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "rv-new-root", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", TargetUser: globalActiveCred.AccessKey}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
// Restricted root-derived credentials and the site replicator are not root
// administrators, even when their effective policy allows these actions.
limited := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "limited-root", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:*"]}]}`)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root delete", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root revoke", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
replicator, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: siteReplicatorSvcAcc, secretKey: "replicator-valid-secret", allowSiteReplicatorAccount: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicator create root", iamAdminCall(t, replicator, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
// An external plugin remains authoritative, including for root targets.
iamAdminPlugin(t, true)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin update root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "plugin-authorized"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin create root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
}
func TestIAMAdminDeleteCorruptServiceReplicates(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-admin", "consoleAdmin")
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-parent", "readwrite")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "cleanup-target", "")
cache := sys.store.lock()
u := cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey]
u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
u.Credentials.Status = auth.AccountOff
cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey] = u
sys.store.unlock()
var deletions atomic.Int32
peer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/minio/health/live" {
return
}
var batch iamRevisionBatch
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&batch); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(batch.Items) != 1 || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete.AccessKey != target.AccessKey {
t.Error("replication did not carry the service account deletion")
} else {
deletions.Add(1)
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(iamRevisionResponse{iamRevisionStatus: iamRevisionStatus{Version: iamRevisionProtocol, Node: "peer", Instance: "peer-boot", Digest: "deleted"}})
}))
t.Cleanup(peer.Close)
globalSiteReplicatorCred.RLock()
previousSecret := globalSiteReplicatorCred.secretKey
globalSiteReplicatorCred.RUnlock()
globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(caller.SecretKey)
t.Cleanup(func() { globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(previousSecret) })
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = true
globalSiteReplicationSys.state = srState{ServiceAccountAccessKey: caller.AccessKey, Peers: map[string]madmin.PeerInfo{
globalDeploymentID(): {DeploymentID: globalDeploymentID(), Name: "local"},
"peer": {DeploymentID: "peer", Name: "peer", Endpoint: peer.URL},
}}
globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
t.Cleanup(func() {
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = false
globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
})
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicated cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
if deletions.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one immediate deletion notification, got %d", deletions.Load())
}
}
func TestIAMAdminListSelfAliases(t *testing.T) {
for _, kind := range []string{"service", "sts"} {
t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "alias-parent", "readwrite")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-target", "")
serviceCaller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-caller", "")
caller := serviceCaller
other := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "alias-other", "readwrite")
_ = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, other.AccessKey, "alias-other-child", "")
if kind == "sts" {
var err error
caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
}
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
for _, alias := range []string{"", caller.AccessKey, parent.AccessKey} {
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+alias, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list self alias", rec, 200)
data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var response madmin.ListServiceAccountsResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
found := false
for _, account := range response.Accounts {
found = found || account.AccessKey == target.AccessKey
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("self alias %q did not list the parent's service accounts", alias)
}
query := url.Values{"listType": {madmin.AccessKeyListAll}}
if alias != "" {
query.Set("users", alias)
}
bulk := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-access-keys-bulk?"+query.Encode(), nil, nil, api.ListAccessKeysBulk)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list bulk self alias", bulk, 200)
data, err = madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, bulk.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var listed map[string]madmin.ListAccessKeysResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &listed))
entry, ok := listed[parent.AccessKey]
if len(listed) != 1 || !ok || len(entry.ServiceAccounts) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("bulk self alias %q returned unexpected identities: %+v", alias, listed)
}
want := map[string]bool{target.AccessKey: true, serviceCaller.AccessKey: true}
for _, account := range entry.ServiceAccounts {
if !want[account.AccessKey] {
t.Fatalf("bulk self alias %q returned unexpected or duplicate service account %s", alias, account.AccessKey)
}
delete(want, account.AccessKey)
}
if kind == "sts" {
if len(entry.STSKeys) != 1 || entry.STSKeys[0].AccessKey != caller.AccessKey {
t.Fatalf("bulk self alias %q returned unexpected STS accounts: %+v", alias, entry.STSKeys)
}
} else if len(entry.STSKeys) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("service caller returned unexpected STS accounts: %+v", entry.STSKeys)
}
if bytes.Contains(data, []byte(serviceCaller.SecretKey)) || bytes.Contains(data, []byte(`"secretKey"`)) || bytes.Contains(data, []byte(`"sessionToken"`)) {
t.Fatal("bulk listing returned credential secrets")
}
}
})
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
minio "github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/sync/errgroup"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/sync/errgroup"
)
func runAllIAMConcurrencyTests(suite *TestSuiteIAM, c *check) {
+95 -184
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/dns"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/mux"
xldap "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/ldap"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
xldap "github.com/minio/pkg/v3/ldap"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3"
)
@@ -502,15 +502,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
checkDenyOnly := accessKey == cred.AccessKey
action := policy.Action(policy.CreateUserAdminAction)
if checkDenyOnly {
action = policy.ChangeMyPasswordAdminAction
}
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: action,
Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
@@ -622,11 +618,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) TemporaryAccountInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
policiesNames = policySet.ToSlice()
}
stsAccountPolicy, err = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
stsAccountPolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
}
policyJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(stsAccountPolicy, "", " ")
@@ -718,10 +710,8 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
for k, v := range cred.Claims {
switch k {
case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
if k == expClaim {
continue
}
opts.claims[k] = v
@@ -861,9 +851,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
// Permission checks:
//
// 1. Updating requires policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction. Under built-in
// IAM, session-limited callers cannot update credentials, and only unrestricted
// root credentials can manage root's service accounts.
// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service
// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the
// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service
// account.
//
// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it
// is currently blocked pending a re-design. Users are still able to delete
@@ -879,11 +870,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
(svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
var sp *policy.Policy
if len(updateReq.NewPolicy) > 0 {
@@ -961,21 +947,23 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return
}
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: requestUser == svcAccount.ParentUser,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if requestUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
}
// if session policy is nil or empty, then it is implied policy
@@ -991,11 +979,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccountPolicy, err = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccountPolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
}
policyJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(svcAccountPolicy, "", " ")
@@ -1051,27 +1035,29 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListServiceAccounts(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
return
}
selfUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
selfUser = cred.ParentUser
}
var targetAccount string
// If listing is requested for a specific user (who is not the request
// sender), check that the user has permissions.
user := r.Form.Get("user")
selfOnly := user == "" || user == cred.AccessKey || user == selfUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: selfOnly,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
targetAccount := user
if selfOnly {
targetAccount = selfUser
if user != "" && user != cred.AccessKey {
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
targetAccount = user
} else {
targetAccount = cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
targetAccount = cred.ParentUser
}
}
serviceAccounts, err := globalIAMSys.ListServiceAccounts(ctx, targetAccount)
@@ -1120,7 +1106,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
// Get current object layer instance.
objectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()
if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil || !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)
return
}
@@ -1141,41 +1127,35 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidArgument), r.URL)
return
}
// Deletion needs the stored identity, not a valid token or session policy.
// Keep disabled, expired and damaged service accounts removable, and retain
// their parent for authorization and the site replication hook below.
u, ok := globalIAMSys.store.GetUser(serviceAccount)
if !ok || !u.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
// We do not care if service account is readable or not at this point,
// since this is a delete call we shall allow it to be deleted if possible.
svcAccount, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount)
if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccount := u.Credentials
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
isSelf := parentUser == svcAccount.ParentUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: isSelf,
}) {
if !isSelf {
// Hide the existence of another user's service account.
})
if !adminPrivilege {
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if svcAccount.ParentUser != "" && parentUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
// The service account belongs to another user but return not
// found error to mitigate brute force attacks. or the
// serviceAccount doesn't exist.
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
return
}
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
return
}
if err := globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount, true); err != nil {
@@ -1245,7 +1225,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListAccessKeysBulk(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
}
}
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
@@ -1258,12 +1238,12 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListAccessKeysBulk(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return
}
if selfOnly {
if selfOnly && len(users) == 0 {
selfUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
selfUser = cred.ParentUser
}
users = []string{selfUser}
users = append(users, selfUser)
}
var checkedUserList []string
@@ -1455,10 +1435,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return buckets[i].Name < buckets[j].Name
})
} else {
// Console refreshes this inventory immediately after bucket mutations.
// A stale cached list can otherwise hide a creation or retain a deletion
// indefinitely in the client's snapshot.
buckets, err = objectAPI.ListBuckets(ctx, BucketOptions{})
buckets, err = objectAPI.ListBuckets(ctx, BucketOptions{Cached: true})
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
@@ -1474,7 +1451,6 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
roleArn := policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}.GetRoleArn()
policySetFromClaims, hasPolicyClaim := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(cred.Claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
var effectivePolicy policy.Policy
var policyErr error
var buf []byte
switch {
@@ -1498,10 +1474,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return
}
policySlice := newMappedPolicy(policy).toSlice()
effectivePolicy, policyErr = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySlice...)
effectivePolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySlice...)
case hasPolicyClaim:
effectivePolicy, policyErr = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySetFromClaims.ToSlice()...)
effectivePolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySetFromClaims.ToSlice()...)
default:
policies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(accountName, cred.Groups...)
@@ -1510,11 +1486,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
effectivePolicy, policyErr = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...)
}
if policyErr != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, policyErr), r.URL)
return
effectivePolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...)
}
buf, err = json.MarshalIndent(effectivePolicy, "", " ")
@@ -2070,30 +2042,26 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) RevokeTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
isSelfTarget := isTokenSelfRevoke || user == parentUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: isSelfTarget,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
if isSelfTarget {
})
if !adminPrivilege || isTokenSelfRevoke {
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if !isTokenSelfRevoke && user != parentUser {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
user = parentUser
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && user == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
// Infer token revoke type from the request if requestor is STS.
if isTokenSelfRevoke && tokenRevokeType == "" && !fullRevoke {
@@ -2140,22 +2108,29 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoAccessKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
u, ok := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)
targetCred := u.Credentials
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
isSelf := ok && targetCred.ParentUser != "" && requestUser == targetCred.ParentUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: isSelf,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
// If requested user does not exist and requestor is not allowed to list service accounts, return access denied.
if !ok {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if requestUser != targetCred.ParentUser {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
}
if !ok {
@@ -2202,11 +2177,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoAccessKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccountPolicy, err = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccountPolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
}
policyJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(svcAccountPolicy, "", " ")
@@ -2933,52 +2904,6 @@ func addExpirationToCondValues(exp *time.Time, condValues map[string][]string) e
return nil
}
// hasActiveSessionPolicy follows the same credential dispatch as IAMSys.IsAllowed.
// Expiring service accounts also satisfy IsTemp and are evaluated as STS there.
// Callers use this only after authorization under built-in IAM.
func hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
args := policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}
if cred.IsTemp() {
hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicy(args)
return hasSP
}
if cred.IsServiceAccount() {
if cred.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
return false
}
hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(args)
return hasSP
}
return false
}
// canManageRootCredentials is an additional guard after built-in IAM authorization.
// The signature's owner flag is insufficient: historical empty session policies
// clear it even though the service account still inherits root's permissions.
func canManageRootCredentials(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
return cred.AccessKey == globalActiveCred.AccessKey ||
(cred.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && cred.AccessKey != siteReplicatorSvcAcc && !hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred))
}
// isAllowedServiceAccountAction preserves regular users' self inspection and
// cleanup even without a policy attachment, while enforcing explicit denies.
// Derived credentials and external authorization plugins use full IAM evaluation.
func isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred auth.Credentials, args policy.Args) bool {
if args.DenyOnly && !args.IsOwner && !cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() && newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
policies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(args.AccountName, args.Groups...)
if err != nil {
return false
}
combined, err := globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...)
if err != nil {
iamLogIf(GlobalContext, err)
return false
}
return combined.IsAllowed(args)
}
return globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(args)
}
func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.Credentials, newServiceAccountOpts, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq, string, APIError) {
ctx := r.Context()
@@ -3067,14 +2992,6 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
}) {
return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
}
effectiveTarget := targetUser
if (targetUser == cred.AccessKey || targetUser == cred.ParentUser) && cred.ParentUser != "" {
effectiveTarget = cred.ParentUser
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
(effectiveTarget == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
}
var sp *policy.Policy
if len(createReq.Policy) > 0 {
@@ -3082,12 +2999,6 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
if err != nil {
return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err)
}
// Empty service policies mean inheritance, including for expiring keys.
// Normalize the replication request as well as the local credential.
if sp.Version == "" && sp.Statements == nil && sp.ID == "" {
sp = nil
createReq.Policy = nil
}
}
opts.sessionPolicy = sp
+2 -104
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/set"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/signer"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
const (
@@ -243,7 +243,6 @@ func TestIAMInternalIDPServerSuite(t *testing.T) {
suite.SetUpSuite(c)
suite.TestUserCreate(c)
suite.TestUserPasswordActionAuthorization(c)
suite.TestUserStatusActionAuthorization(c)
suite.TestGroupStatusActionAuthorization(c)
suite.TestUserPolicyEscalationBug(c)
@@ -357,106 +356,6 @@ func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestUserCreate(c *check) {
}
}
func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestUserPasswordActionAuthorization(c *check) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
statements string
self bool
other bool
}{
{"readonly", "", true, false},
{"consolereadonly", "", true, false},
{"password grant", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":"admin:ChangeMyPassword"}`, true, false},
{"legacy CreateUser deny", `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"admin:CreateUser","Resource":"arn:aws:s3:::*"}`, true, false},
{"password deny", `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"admin:ChangeMyPassword"}`, false, false},
{"user admin", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":"admin:CreateUser"}`, true, true},
{"user admin with password deny", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":"admin:CreateUser"},{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"admin:ChangeMyPassword"}`, false, true},
{"password deny overrides grant", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":"admin:ChangeMyPassword"},{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"admin:ChangeMyPassword"}`, false, false},
{"wildcard deny", `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":"admin:*"}`, false, false},
} {
c.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
c := &check{t, s.serverType}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), testDefaultTimeout)
defer cancel()
var users []string
policyName := tt.name
defer func() {
for _, user := range users {
if err := s.adm.RemoveUser(ctx, user); err != nil {
c.Errorf("remove test user: %v", err)
}
}
if tt.statements != "" {
if err := s.adm.RemoveCannedPolicy(ctx, policyName); err != nil {
c.Errorf("remove test policy: %v", err)
}
}
}()
createUser := func() (string, string) {
accessKey, secretKey := mustGenerateCredentials(c)
if err := s.adm.SetUser(ctx, accessKey, secretKey, madmin.AccountEnabled); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("create test user: %v", err)
}
users = append(users, accessKey)
return accessKey, secretKey
}
client := func(accessKey, secretKey string) *madmin.AdminClient {
adm, err := madmin.New(s.endpoint, accessKey, secretKey, s.secure)
if err != nil {
c.Fatal(err)
}
adm.SetCustomTransport(s.TestSuiteCommon.client.Transport)
return adm
}
if tt.statements != "" {
policyName = getRandomBucketName()
doc := []byte(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[` + tt.statements + `]}`)
if err := s.adm.AddCannedPolicy(ctx, policyName, doc); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("save test policy: %v", err)
}
}
accessKey, secretKey := createUser()
if _, err := s.adm.AttachPolicy(ctx, madmin.PolicyAssociationReq{
User: accessKey, Policies: []string{policyName},
}); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("attach test policy: %v", err)
}
adm := client(accessKey, secretKey)
_, newSecretKey := mustGenerateCredentials(c)
err := adm.SetUser(ctx, accessKey, newSecretKey, madmin.AccountEnabled)
if tt.self {
if err != nil {
c.Fatalf("change own password: %v", err)
}
if _, err = adm.AccountInfo(ctx, madmin.AccountOpts{}); err == nil {
c.Fatal("old password still authenticates")
}
adm = client(accessKey, newSecretKey)
} else if err == nil || madmin.ToErrorResponse(err).Code != "AccessDenied" {
c.Fatalf("self password change: expected AccessDenied, got %v", err)
}
if _, err := adm.AccountInfo(ctx, madmin.AccountOpts{}); err != nil {
c.Fatalf("current password no longer authenticates: %v", err)
}
target, _ := createUser()
newUser, newUserSecret := mustGenerateCredentials(c)
for _, key := range []string{target, newUser} {
err := adm.SetUser(ctx, key, newUserSecret, madmin.AccountEnabled)
if tt.other {
if err != nil {
c.Fatalf("create or update another user: %v", err)
}
if key == newUser {
users = append(users, newUser)
}
} else if err == nil || madmin.ToErrorResponse(err).Code != "AccessDenied" {
c.Fatalf("create or update another user: expected AccessDenied, got %v", err)
}
}
})
}
}
func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestUserStatusActionAuthorization(c *check) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), testDefaultTimeout)
defer cancel()
@@ -1047,7 +946,6 @@ func (s *TestSuiteIAM) TestCannedPolicies(c *check) {
defaultPolicies := []string{
"readwrite",
"readonly",
"consolereadonly",
"writeonly",
"diagnostics",
"consoleAdmin",
+2 -2
View File
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/mux"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
xnet "github.com/minio/pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/secure-io/sio-go"
"github.com/zeebo/xxh3"
)
-2
View File
@@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ func registerAdminRouter(router *mux.Router, enableConfigOps bool) {
// StorageInfo operations
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/storageinfo").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.StorageInfoHandler, traceAllFlag))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/multipart-preflight").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.MultipartPreflightHandler, traceAllFlag))
// DataUsageInfo operations
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/datausageinfo").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.DataUsageInfoHandler, traceAllFlag))
// Metrics operation
@@ -389,7 +388,6 @@ func registerAdminRouter(router *mux.Router, enableConfigOps bool) {
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/join").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerJoin))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion+"/site-replication/peer/bucket-ops").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerBucketOps)).Queries("bucket", "{bucket:.*}").Queries("operation", "{operation:.*}")
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/iam-item").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerReplicateIAMItem))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet, http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/iam-revisions").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerIAMRevisions))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/bucket-meta").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerReplicateBucketItem))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/idp-settings").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerGetIDPSettings))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/edit").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SiteReplicationEdit))
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
xnet "github.com/minio/pkg/v3/net"
)
// getLocalServerProperty - returns madmin.ServerProperties for only the
-45
View File
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
//
// This file is part of SILO Object Storage.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"testing"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
)
func TestChecksumMismatchAPIMessage(t *testing.T) {
for _, algorithm := range []string{"CRC32", "CRC32C", "SHA1", "SHA256", "CRC64NVME", ""} {
t.Run(algorithm, func(t *testing.T) {
mismatch := hash.ChecksumMismatch{Algorithm: algorithm, Want: "expected", Got: "actual"}
want := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrContentChecksumMismatch).Description
if algorithm != "" {
want = fmt.Sprintf("The %s you specified did not match the calculated checksum.", algorithm)
}
for _, err := range []error{mismatch, fmt.Errorf("upload: %w", mismatch)} {
got := toAPIError(t.Context(), err)
if got.HTTPStatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest || got.Code != "XAmzContentChecksumMismatch" || got.Description != want {
t.Fatalf("toAPIError(%v) = %+v, want 400 XAmzContentChecksumMismatch: %s", err, got, want)
}
}
})
}
}
+3 -37
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ import (
levent "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/lambda/event"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/event"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
// APIError structure
@@ -450,9 +450,6 @@ const (
ErrAdminNoSecretKey
ErrIAMNotInitialized
ErrMultipartListingLegacy // Reserved: legacy uploads no longer block listing.
ErrMultipartListingIdentity
ErrSlowDown
apiErrCodeEnd // This is used only for the testing code
)
@@ -550,7 +547,7 @@ var errorCodes = errorCodeMap{
},
ErrBadDigest: {
Code: "BadDigest",
Description: "The Content-MD5 you specified did not match what we received.",
Description: "The Content-Md5 you specified did not match what we received.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
ErrEntityTooSmall: {
@@ -1339,21 +1336,6 @@ var errorCodes = errorCodeMap{
Description: "IAM sub-system not initialized yet, please try again.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrMultipartListingLegacy: {
Code: "MultipartListingNotReady",
Description: "Legacy multipart uploads prevent a complete listing. Upgrade all writers, drain old uploads and run the multipart preflight check.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrMultipartListingIdentity: {
Code: "MultipartListingMetadataInvalid",
Description: "Multipart upload metadata is inconsistent. Run the multipart preflight check to locate the affected storage set.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrSlowDown: {
Code: "SlowDown",
Description: "Please reduce your request rate",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrBucketMetadataNotInitialized: {
Code: "XMinioBucketMetadataNotInitialized",
Description: "Bucket metadata not initialized yet, please try again.",
@@ -1541,14 +1523,10 @@ var errorCodes = errorCodeMap{
Description: "Your Host header is malformed.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
// The stored object cannot be served: a server-side data condition, not a
// successful partial read. Upstream maps it to http.StatusPartialContent
// (since ca6b4773e, 2017), which lets SDKs accept the XML error document
// as object content; SILO deliberately diverges and returns 500.
ErrObjectTampered: {
Code: "XMinioObjectTampered",
Description: errObjectTampered.Error(),
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusInternalServerError,
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusPartialContent,
},
ErrSiteReplicationInvalidRequest: {
@@ -2191,8 +2169,6 @@ func toAPIErrorCode(ctx context.Context, err error) (apiErr APIErrorCode) {
err = unwrapAll(err)
switch err {
case errMultipartListingIdentity:
apiErr = ErrMultipartListingIdentity
case errCompleteMultipartChecksumMismatch, errCompleteMultipartChecksumTypeMismatch:
apiErr = ErrBadDigest
case errMissingPartChecksum:
@@ -2323,8 +2299,6 @@ func toAPIErrorCode(ctx context.Context, err error) (apiErr APIErrorCode) {
}
switch err.(type) {
case SlowDown:
apiErr = ErrSlowDown
case StorageFull:
apiErr = ErrStorageFull
case hash.BadDigest:
@@ -2503,14 +2477,6 @@ func toAPIError(ctx context.Context, err error) APIError {
case errors.Is(err, errMissingPartChecksum):
apiErr.Description = strings.TrimPrefix(err.Error(), errMissingPartChecksum.Error()+": ")
}
// PutObject/UploadPart checksum mismatches name the algorithm in the
// message, matching S3 (e.g. "The CRC32 you specified did not match the
// calculated checksum."). Falls through to the generic table description
// when the algorithm is unknown.
var checksumMismatch hash.ChecksumMismatch
if errors.As(err, &checksumMismatch) && checksumMismatch.Algorithm != "" {
apiErr.Description = fmt.Sprintf("The %s you specified did not match the calculated checksum.", checksumMismatch.Algorithm)
}
switch apiErr.Code {
case "NotImplemented":
apiErr = APIError{
+1 -4
View File
@@ -212,10 +212,7 @@ func setObjectHeaders(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, objInfo Object
}
if rs == nil && opts.PartNumber > 0 {
rs, err = partNumberToRangeSpec(objInfo, opts.PartNumber)
if err != nil {
return err
}
rs = partNumberToRangeSpec(objInfo, opts.PartNumber)
}
// For providing ranged content
+2 -2
View File
@@ -34,14 +34,14 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
xxml "github.com/minio/xxml"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
const (
maxObjectList = 1000 // Limit number of objects in a listObjectsResponse/listObjectsVersionsResponse.
maxDeleteList = 1000 // Limit number of objects deleted in a delete call.
maxUploadsList = 1000 // Limit number of uploads in a listUploadsResponse.
maxUploadsList = 10000 // Limit number of uploads in a listUploadsResponse.
maxPartsList = 10000 // Limit number of parts in a listPartsResponse.
)
+13 -11
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import (
bktcors "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/cors"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/wildcard"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/wildcard"
"github.com/rs/cors"
)
@@ -461,15 +461,15 @@ func registerAPIRouter(router *mux.Router) {
router.Methods(http.MethodPut).
HandlerFunc(s3APIMiddleware(api.PutBucketACLHandler)).
Queries("acl", "")
// GetBucketCors
// GetBucketCors - this is a dummy call.
router.Methods(http.MethodGet).
HandlerFunc(s3APIMiddleware(api.GetBucketCorsHandler)).
Queries("cors", "")
// PutBucketCors
// PutBucketCors - this is a dummy call.
router.Methods(http.MethodPut).
HandlerFunc(s3APIMiddleware(api.PutBucketCorsHandler)).
Queries("cors", "")
// DeleteBucketCors
// DeleteBucketCors - this is a dummy call.
router.Methods(http.MethodDelete).
HandlerFunc(s3APIMiddleware(api.DeleteBucketCorsHandler)).
Queries("cors", "")
@@ -787,13 +787,15 @@ func corsHandler(handler http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Origin") != "" {
if bucket, _ := request2BucketObjectName(r); bucket != "" && globalBucketMetadataSys != nil {
// Resident-only lookup: this runs before authentication with a
// client-supplied path segment as the bucket name, so it must
// never load or cache metadata. While startup loading is still
// running, for a real bucket whose metadata failed to load, and
// for a bucket whose stored CORS document failed to parse, the
// request gets no CORS headers; any other non-resident name falls
// back to the global policy below.
// Resident-only lookup: this runs pre-auth for every
// Origin-bearing request using a client-supplied path segment as
// the bucket name. It must never load or cache metadata for
// arbitrary names (see GetResidentCorsConfig). GetResidentCorsConfig
// is the single decision point: it returns errInvalidArgument for
// the internal .minio.sys namespace (fail closed), a config for a
// resident bucket, errBucketMetadataNotInitialized for a real but
// unloaded bucket (fail closed), and errConfigNotFound otherwise
// (fall back to the global policy below).
cfg, _, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.GetResidentCorsConfig(bucket)
if err == nil && cfg != nil {
if applyBucketCors(w, r, cfg) {
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+57 -5
View File
@@ -28,17 +28,20 @@ import (
"mime"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/etag"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
xjwt "github.com/minio/minio/internal/jwt"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/mcontext"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
// Verify if request has JWT.
@@ -629,11 +632,18 @@ func isReqAuthenticated(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, region string, sty
return ErrInvalidDigest
}
// Honor the selected header/query checksum, including the header fallback
// for a presigned request. STS separately hashes its body for its signature.
// Extract either 'X-Amz-Content-Sha256' header or 'X-Amz-Content-Sha256' query parameter (if V4 presigned)
// Do not verify 'X-Amz-Content-Sha256' if skipSHA256.
var contentSHA256 []byte
if !skipContentSha256Cksum(r) {
contentSHA256, err = hex.DecodeString(getContentSha256Cksum(r, serviceS3))
if skipSHA256 := skipContentSha256Cksum(r); !skipSHA256 && isRequestPresignedSignatureV4(r) {
if sha256Sum, ok := r.Form[xhttp.AmzContentSha256]; ok && len(sha256Sum) > 0 {
contentSHA256, err = hex.DecodeString(sha256Sum[0])
if err != nil {
return ErrContentSHA256Mismatch
}
}
} else if _, ok := r.Header[xhttp.AmzContentSha256]; !skipSHA256 && ok {
contentSHA256, err = hex.DecodeString(r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzContentSha256))
if err != nil || len(contentSHA256) == 0 {
return ErrContentSHA256Mismatch
}
@@ -730,6 +740,48 @@ func setAuthMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
})
}
func isPutRetentionAllowed(bucketName, objectName string, retDays int, retDate time.Time, retMode objectlock.RetMode, byPassSet bool, r *http.Request, cred auth.Credentials, owner bool) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
var retSet bool
if cred.AccessKey == "" {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
conditions := getConditionValues(r, "", cred)
conditions["object-lock-mode"] = []string{string(retMode)}
conditions["object-lock-retain-until-date"] = []string{retDate.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}
if retDays > 0 {
conditions["object-lock-remaining-retention-days"] = []string{strconv.Itoa(retDays)}
}
if retMode == objectlock.RetGovernance && byPassSet {
byPassSet = globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.BypassGovernanceRetentionAction,
BucketName: bucketName,
ObjectName: objectName,
ConditionValues: conditions,
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
})
}
if globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.PutObjectRetentionAction,
BucketName: bucketName,
ConditionValues: conditions,
ObjectName: objectName,
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
}) {
retSet = true
}
if byPassSet || retSet {
return ErrNone
}
return ErrAccessDenied
}
// isPutActionAllowed - check if PUT operation is allowed on the resource, this
// call verifies bucket policies and IAM policies, supports multi user
// checks etc.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/policy"
)
type nullReader struct{}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/env"
)
// healTask represents what to heal along with options
+1 -1
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/set"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/env"
)
const (
-356
View File
@@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A pull into a suspended bucket replaces the null version. Its policy
// decision must name that version even when the source is unversioned S3.
func TestBatchReviewPullImplicitNullVersionAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(f.ctx, f.bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, []byte(`<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>`))
mustIAM(t, err)
data := []byte("original null version")
before, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/null", mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{VersionSuspended: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "null-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":"null"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "null-deny-user", "null-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := batchPullJob(f.bucket)
job.Source.Type = BatchJobReplicateResourceS3
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "replacement"), ObjectInfo{
Name: before.Name, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("null version policy must refuse the write, got %v", err)
}
after, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, before.Name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
if gerr != nil || before.ETag != after.ETag {
t.Errorf("denied null version must remain unchanged: read=%v unchanged=%v", gerr, before.ETag == after.ETag)
}
}
type batchReviewPrefixWalkFailure struct{ ObjectLayer }
func (a batchReviewPrefixWalkFailure) Walk(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], opts WalkOptions) error {
if prefix != "a/" {
return a.ObjectLayer.Walk(ctx, bucket, prefix, results, opts)
}
go func() {
defer close(results)
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errors.New("test: incomplete first prefix")}
}()
return nil
}
type batchReviewWalkCutoff struct {
ObjectLayer
cutoff string
}
func (a batchReviewWalkCutoff) Walk(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], opts WalkOptions) error {
inner := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], 1)
if err := a.ObjectLayer.Walk(ctx, bucket, prefix, inner, opts); err != nil {
close(results)
return err
}
go func() {
defer close(results)
stopped := false
for result := range inner {
if stopped {
continue
}
if result.Err == nil && result.Item.Name >= a.cutoff {
stopped = true
result = itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errors.New("test: listing stopped before remaining child keys")}
}
select {
case results <- result:
case <-ctx.Done():
stopped = true
}
}
}()
return nil
}
// Listing a directory prefix returns the directory object before its child
// keys. A durable cursor for that directory must preserve unfinished children.
func TestBatchReviewDirectoryCursorKeepsChildrenPending(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
for range 12 {
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "a/", nil)
}
var pending string
for i := 0; i < 13; i++ {
older := f.putVersions(t, fmt.Sprintf("a/key-%02d", i))
if i == 11 {
pending = older
}
}
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: ["a/"]
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 1
`, f.bucket))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
_ = job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchReviewWalkCutoff{ObjectLayer: f.obj, cutoff: "a/key-11"}, *job)
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if ri.Object != "a/" {
t.Fatalf("control: the completed directory batch must be the cursor, got %q", ri.Object)
}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
if f.versionExists(t, "a/key-11", pending) {
t.Error("a directory cursor must not suppress the unvisited child key on resume")
}
}
// Later prefixes must not advance the completion cursor past an earlier
// prefix whose listing failed. This state is produced by Start itself.
func TestBatchReviewExpireFailedPrefixKeepsWorkPending(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "a/todo")
for i := 0; i < 13; i++ {
f.putVersions(t, fmt.Sprintf("z/key-%02d", i))
}
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: ["z/", "a/"]
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 1
`, f.bucket))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
_ = job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchReviewPrefixWalkFailure{f.obj}, *job)
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if ri.Object >= "a/todo" {
t.Errorf("cursor must not cross an incomplete prefix, got %q", ri.Object)
}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
if f.versionExists(t, "a/todo", older) {
t.Error("a fresh Start must revisit the key omitted by the failed listing")
}
}
// A repeated marker replication error must remain a failure on the second
// attempt, including after the retry loop resets its counters.
func TestBatchReviewMarkerRetryRemainsFailed(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "marker", nil)
_, err := f.obj.DeleteObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "marker", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
oldTransport := globalRemoteTargetTransport
globalRemoteTargetTransport = batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
code, body := http.StatusForbidden, `<Error><Code>AccessDenied</Code><Message>test refusal</Message></Error>`
if r.URL.Query().Has("location") {
code, body = http.StatusOK, `<LocationConstraint xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">us-east-1</LocationConstraint>`
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: code, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)), Request: r}, nil
})
t.Cleanup(func() { globalRemoteTargetTransport = oldTransport })
job := BatchJobRequest{
ID: "replicate-marker-retry" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://target.invalid", Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{AccessKey: "test-access", SecretKey: "test-secret"}},
},
}
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Attempts = 2
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Delay = time.Millisecond
mustIAM(t, job.Replicate.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, job))
ri := f.jobInfo(t, &job)
if ri.Complete || !ri.Failed || ri.DeleteMarkersFailed != 1 {
t.Errorf("both marker attempts failed: complete=%v failed=%v markerFailures=%d attempts=%d", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.DeleteMarkersFailed, ri.RetryAttempts)
}
}
// A current parent mapping suppresses the OpenID policy-name fallback.
// Background-condition validation must inspect the same effective policies.
func TestBatchReviewMappedPolicySuppressesClaimFallback(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "unused-claim-policy", `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"Bool":{"aws:SecureTransport":"false"}}}`)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-parent", "mapped-full")
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID(): "unused-claim-policy",
}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
p, err := sub.principal(f.ctx)
mustIAM(t, err)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "mapped/key", versionID: mustGetUUID()}
if !f.sys.isAllowedLocally(policy.Args{AccountName: p.accessKey, Claims: p.claims, Action: req.action, BucketName: req.bucket, ObjectName: req.object, ConditionValues: p.conditionValues(req)}) {
t.Fatal("control: the current mapped policy must allow this read")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Errorf("an unused fallback policy must not refuse a mapped-policy grant: %v", err)
}
}
func TestBatchReviewBindingAndExpiringServiceControls(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
root := batchRootSubmitter(t)
priorRoot := globalActiveCred
globalActiveCred.SecretKey = "different-test-root-secret"
_, err := root.principal(f.ctx)
globalActiveCred = priorRoot
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("root-secret change must invalidate the binding: %v", err)
}
missing := *root
missing.Binding = nil
if _, err := missing.principal(f.ctx); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("missing fingerprint must refuse the principal: %v", err)
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "service-parent-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "service-parent", "service-parent-full")
sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}]}`))
mustIAM(t, err)
expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
cred, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: sp, expiration: &expires})
mustIAM(t, err)
stored, ok := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("created service account must resolve")
}
cred = stored.Credentials
if !cred.IsTemp() || !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
t.Fatal("fixture must be an expiring service account")
}
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "allowed"}); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expiring service account must retain its allowed read: %v", err)
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.DeleteObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "allowed"}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("expiring service account must remain session-policy restricted: %v", err)
}
}
// An interrupted cross-pool copy can leave the same version in both pools.
// A newer legal-hold field in either copy must prevent key rotation.
func TestBatchReviewRotationUsesAuthoritativePoolHold(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
const name = "rotation/split-hold"
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("batch-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
dek, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(t.Context(), &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{AssociatedData: kms.Context{bucket: bucket + "/" + name}})
mustIAM(t, err)
objectKey := crypto.GenerateKey(dek.Plaintext, nil)
sealed := objectKey.Seal(dek.Plaintext, crypto.GenerateIV(nil), crypto.S3.String(), bucket, name)
first := crypto.S3.CreateMetadata(nil, dek.KeyID, dek.Ciphertext, sealed)
first[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = "OFF"
first[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
second := maps.Clone(first)
second[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = "ON"
second[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("protected payload"), objectKey))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if !enforceRetentionForDeletion(t.Context(), logical) {
t.Fatal("control: the authoritative logical version must be held")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
err = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, before, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !isErrObjectLocked(err) {
t.Errorf("rotation must refuse the authoritative legal hold, got %v", err)
}
after, gerr := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, gerr)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("held logical version must not have its key rewritten")
}
}
// An encryption condition must describe what rotation actually commits,
// even when the requested encryption type differs from the existing type.
func TestBatchReviewRotationEncryptionConditionMatchesResult(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("required-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
const name = "rotation/encryption-condition"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3, "", nil, f.bucket, name, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("encrypted payload"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, name, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(body), int64(len(body)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
mustIAM(t, err)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "kms-write-only", `
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]},
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption":"aws:kms","s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id":"required-key"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "kms-write-user", "kms-write-only")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: f.bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "required-key"}}
err = r.KeyRotate(f.ctx, f.obj, before, sub)
after, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, gerr)
if err == nil && !crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(after.UserDefined) {
t.Error("rotation allowed by an aws:kms-only write policy must produce SSE-KMS or refuse the operation")
}
if err != nil && before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("a refused rotation must leave the version unchanged")
}
}
// An explicit null marker collision must retain a held null data version.
func TestBatchReviewPullMarkerNullLock(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
meta := batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD")
before, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/null", mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader("held null"), 9, "", ""), ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID, Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
mustIAM(t, err)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
}
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, nil, ObjectInfo{
Name: before.Name, VersionID: nullVersionID, ModTime: UTCNow(), DeleteMarker: true,
}, false, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !isErrObjectLocked(err) {
t.Errorf("marker collision with protected null data must return ObjectLocked, got %v", err)
}
if !batchVersionExists(t, f.obj, f.bucket, before.Name, nullVersionID) {
t.Fatal("protected null data must remain present")
}
}
-140
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@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A read policy must use the newest tag state of the logical version even
// when an interrupted movement left an older copy in the preferred pool.
func TestBatchReviewPushUsesAuthoritativePoolTags(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const name = "push/tagged"
first := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "classification=public",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
second := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "classification=private",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification=private" {
t.Fatal("control: logical version must have the newer private tag")
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pooled-push", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pooled-push-user", "pooled-push")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: bucket, object: name, versionID: before.VersionID, tags: logical.UserTags}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: authoritative tags must deny the read")
}
writes := 0
target, err := minio.NewCore("target.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
_ = r.Body.Close()
}
if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
writes++
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{"Etag": {"\"test-etag\""}}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
err = r.ReplicateToTarget(f.ctx, z, target, before, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || writes != 0 {
t.Errorf("newer authoritative tags must deny push: err=%v writes=%d", err, writes)
}
}
// Verified token claims must not replace the actual version being authorized.
func TestBatchReviewVersionConditionResistsClaimCollision(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
deniedVersion := mustGetUUID()
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "version-claims", batchAuthzFullAccess+fmt.Sprintf(`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":"%s"}}}`, deniedVersion))
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "version-claims-parent", "version-claims")
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), "versionid": "an-unrelated-claim-value",
}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "data", versionID: deniedVersion}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("a token claim must not replace the actual denied version: %v", err)
}
}
// Retry totals describe a pass, including markers already successful before
// another item caused that pass to retry.
func TestBatchReviewMarkerSuccessCountResetsOnRetry(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "marker", nil)
_, err := f.obj.DeleteObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "marker", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
oldTransport := remoteInstanceTransport
remoteInstanceTransport = atomic.Value{}
setRemoteInstanceTransport(batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
code, body := http.StatusForbidden, `<Error><Code>AccessDenied</Code><Message>test refusal</Message></Error>`
h := make(http.Header)
switch {
case r.URL.Query().Has("location"):
code, body = http.StatusOK, `<LocationConstraint xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">us-east-1</LocationConstraint>`
case r.Method == http.MethodDelete:
code, body = http.StatusNoContent, ""
case r.Method == http.MethodHead && r.URL.Query().Get("versionId") != "":
code, body = http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, ""
h.Set("X-Amz-Delete-Marker", "true")
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: code, Header: h, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)), Request: r}, nil
}))
t.Cleanup(func() { remoteInstanceTransport = oldTransport })
job := BatchJobRequest{
ID: "marker-success-retry" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://target.invalid", Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{AccessKey: "test-access", SecretKey: "test-secret"}},
},
}
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Attempts = 2
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Delay = time.Millisecond
mustIAM(t, job.Replicate.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, job))
ri := f.jobInfo(t, &job)
if !ri.Failed || ri.RetryAttempts != 2 {
t.Fatalf("control: data failure must cause two attempts: failed=%v attempts=%d", ri.Failed, ri.RetryAttempts)
}
if ri.DeleteMarkers != 1 {
t.Errorf("one successful marker must be counted once in the final attempt, got %d", ri.DeleteMarkers)
}
}
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@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A tag removal in a newer copy must govern both the authorization and the
// metadata sent by a push. The submitter can read data but cannot read tags.
func TestBatchReviewPushSendsOnlyAuthorizedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const name = "push/removed-tags"
first := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "classification=private",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
second := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "" {
t.Fatal("control: the authoritative version must have no tags")
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "data-without-tags", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObjectTagging","s3:GetObjectVersionTagging"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "data-without-tags-user", "data-without-tags")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, bucket: bucket, object: name, versionID: before.VersionID}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: reading tags must be denied")
}
writes := 0
var sentTags string
target, err := minio.NewCore("target.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
_ = r.Body.Close()
}
if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
writes++
sentTags = r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzObjectTagging)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{"Etag": {"\"test-etag\""}}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
err = r.ReplicateToTarget(f.ctx, z, target, before, false, sub)
if err != nil && !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected replication failure: %v", err)
}
if writes > 0 && sentTags != logical.UserTags {
t.Errorf("push must send only metadata covered by authorization: writes=%d sentTags=%q authorizedTags=%q err=%v", writes, sentTags, logical.UserTags, err)
}
}
// LDAP's short username and its parent DN are distinct identities. The
// background merge must not turn a deny for the verified short name into
// a non-matching statement by replacing it with the parent DN.
func TestBatchReviewLDAPUsernameDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "ldap-short-name-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"ldap:username":"alice"}}}`)
const dn = "uid=alice,ou=people,dc=example,dc=org"
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
"exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), ldapUser: dn, ldapActualUser: dn, ldapUserN: "alice",
}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = dn
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "ldap-short-name-deny")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
p, err := sub.principal(f.ctx)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.Claims = p.claims
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "https://localhost/batch-authz/data", nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
args := policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Claims: p.claims, Action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction,
BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "data", ConditionValues: getConditionValues(req, "", cred),
}
if args.ConditionValues["username"][0] != "alice" || f.sys.isAllowedLocally(args) {
t.Fatal("control: the request evaluator must deny the verified LDAP short username")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "data", versionID: mustGetUUID()}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("batch authorization must preserve the LDAP username deny or fail closed, got %v", err)
}
}
// Failure to read authoritative metadata is incomplete work, even if one
// pool's copy can still be opened. In particular, skipErrs=false must not
// turn an unreadable entry into a successful archive.
func TestBatchReviewSnowballAuthoritativeReadFailure(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
const name = "archive/unreadable-copy"
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
set := z.serverPools[1].sets[0]
getDisks := set.getDisks
disks := append([]StorageAPI(nil), getDisks()...)
for i := range disks {
disks[i] = consistencyReadFaultDisk{StorageAPI: disks[i], bucket: bucket, object: name}
}
set.getDisks = func() []StorageAPI { return disks }
defer func() { set.getDisks = getDisks }()
gr, err := z.GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, name, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
_, logicalErr := batchAuthoritativeRead(t.Context(), z, bucket, name, gr.ObjInfo)
gr.Close()
if logicalErr == nil {
t.Fatal("control: the authoritative read must fail")
}
remote, err := minio.New("archive.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
r.Source.Snowball.InMemory = ptr(true)
r.Source.Snowball.Compress = ptr(false)
r.Source.Snowball.SkipErrs = ptr(false)
if err := r.writeAsArchive(t.Context(), z, remote, []ObjectInfo{before}, "", batchRootSubmitter(t)); err == nil {
t.Error("archive with an unreadable authoritative version must not report success")
}
}
-142
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@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
)
// A suspended destination does not keep a source version ID. Authorization
// must therefore describe the null destination version that the write really
// replaces, and must not let a source ID escape that model.
func TestBatchReviewPullSuspendedVersionBinding(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(f.ctx, f.bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, []byte(`<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>`))
mustIAM(t, err)
sourceVersion := mustGetUUID()
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-source-version-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+fmt.Sprintf(`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":"%s"}}}`, sourceVersion))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-source-version-user", "pull-source-version-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
}
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "replacement"), ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/suspended-version", VersionID: sourceVersion, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag",
UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("a source version ID must not evade the destination deny: %v", err)
}
if _, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/suspended-version", ObjectOptions{VersionID: sourceVersion}); gerr == nil {
t.Fatal("a denied suspended-destination write created the source version")
}
}
// A failed source open in a non-skipping snowball must be reported to the
// batch rather than silently omitted from a successful archive.
type batchReviewOpenFailure struct {
ObjectLayer
name string
}
func (a batchReviewOpenFailure) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, rs *HTTPRangeSpec, h http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
if object == a.name {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("test: source open failed")
}
return a.ObjectLayer.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, object, rs, h, opts)
}
func TestBatchReviewSnowballSourceOpenFailure(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
name := "archive/open-failure"
entry := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, name, nil)
remote, err := minio.New("archive.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
r.Source.Snowball.InMemory = ptr(true)
r.Source.Snowball.Compress = ptr(false)
r.Source.Snowball.SkipErrs = ptr(false)
api := batchReviewOpenFailure{ObjectLayer: f.obj, name: name}
if err := r.writeAsArchive(t.Context(), api, remote, []ObjectInfo{entry}, "", batchRootSubmitter(t)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a source open failure must not be reported as a successful archive")
}
}
// Rotation must apply tag conditions to the logical version, including
// a more recent tag update stored in a pool other than the selected copy.
func TestBatchReviewRotationAuthoritativeTags(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("batch-round5-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "round5-rotation-tags", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "round5-rotation-user", "round5-rotation-tags")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
for _, classification := range []string{"private", "public"} {
t.Run(classification, func(t *testing.T) {
name := "rotation/authoritative-" + classification
first := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, name, first, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
first[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
first[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
second := maps.Clone(first)
second[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=" + classification
second[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("test encrypted payload"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification="+classification {
t.Fatal("control: the second pool must govern the logical tags")
}
job := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
err = job.KeyRotate(f.ctx, z, before, sub)
after, readErr := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, readErr)
changed := after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3]
if classification == "private" {
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || changed {
t.Fatalf("authoritative tag deny must prevent rewrapping: err=%v changed=%v", err, changed)
}
} else if err != nil || !changed {
t.Fatalf("authorized unlocked version must rotate: err=%v changed=%v", err, changed)
}
})
}
}
-538
View File
@@ -1,538 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
)
// Rotation and listing cases found in review.
// Rotation rewrites the copy GetObjectInfo returns, which can carry another
// tag revision than the merged version of all pools: both are authorized.
func TestBatchReviewRotationAuthorizesWrittenCopy(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review6-rotation-copy-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-rotation-copy-deny", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-rotation-copy-user", "review6-rotation-copy-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
const name = "rotation/written-copy"
first := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, name, first, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
first[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
first[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
second := maps.Clone(first)
second[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
second[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("review6 rotation payload"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification=public" {
t.Fatalf("control: merged tags=%q, want public", logical.UserTags)
}
job := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
if err = job.KeyRotate(f.ctx, z, before, sub); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("rotation of a copy the submitter may not read returned %v", err)
}
after, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Fatal("a refused rotation rewrote the copy")
}
}
// batchWalkError fails every listing before it returns a result.
type batchWalkError struct {
ObjectLayer
err error
}
func (w batchWalkError) Walk(context.Context, string, string, chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], WalkOptions) error {
return w.err
}
// A listing outage pauses the run, as a streamed listing error does.
func TestBatchReviewExpireWalkErrorPausesRun(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, f.expireYAML("data/"))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
listErr := errors.New("review6: listing failed")
if err := job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchWalkError{ObjectLayer: f.obj, err: listErr}, *job); !errors.Is(err, listErr) {
t.Fatalf("start returned %v, want %v", err, listErr)
}
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.PausedReason == "" {
t.Fatalf("failed listing: complete=%v failed=%v", ri.Complete, ri.Failed)
}
}
// Two pools hold different writes of the null version, and a newer version
// of the key is in the second one. Rotation rewrites the copy it read and
// authorized, in the first pool, not the copy the latest version of the key
// would route a write to; the other write keeps its key and stays readable.
func TestBatchReviewRotationRewritesTheCopyItRead(t *testing.T) {
for _, otherLatest := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "addressed-version-is-latest"
if otherLatest {
name = "another-version-is-latest"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review7-rotation-copies"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, versionErr := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, versionErr)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review7-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/null-copy"
const payload = "rotation must preserve this data"
readCopy := func(pool int) ([]byte, error) {
gr, err := z.serverPools[pool].GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer gr.Close()
return io.ReadAll(gr)
}
var before [2]ObjectInfo
var keys [2]crypto.ObjectKey
kinds := []crypto.Type{crypto.S3, crypto.S3KMS}
for pool, kind := range kinds {
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), kind, "review7-rotation-key", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
keys[pool] = key
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
if pool == 1 {
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
}
meta[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Duration(pool+2) * time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader(payload), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, pool, string(body), ObjectOptions{
Versioned: true, VersionID: nullVersionID, UserDefined: meta,
MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Duration(pool+2) * time.Hour),
})
// As a read returns it, without the write's internal fields.
before[pool], err = z.serverPools[pool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
data, err := readCopy(pool)
if err != nil || string(data) != payload {
t.Fatalf("control: pool %d was not readable before rotation: %v", pool, err)
}
}
if otherLatest {
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 1, "later version", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
}
selected, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID, Versioned: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
if selected.VersionID != nullVersionID || !selected.ModTime.Equal(before[0].ModTime) || !crypto.S3.IsEncrypted(selected.UserDefined) {
t.Fatal("control: the addressed null version must select the SSE-S3 write in pool zero")
}
logical, err := batchAuthoritativeVersion(t.Context(), z, bucket, object, selected)
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification=public" || selected.UserTags != logical.UserTags {
t.Fatal("control: both current authorization inputs must have public tags")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "review7-rotation-key"}}
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
if otherLatest {
batchAuthzPolicy(t.Context(), t, globalIAMSys, "review7-rotate-public", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(t.Context(), t, globalIAMSys, "review7-rotate-user", "review7-rotate-public")
sub, err = newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(t.Context(), r.rotateAuthzRequests(before[1])...); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: the older write in pool one must be denied")
}
}
err = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, selected, sub)
if err != nil {
t.Logf("rotation refused: %v", err)
}
for pool, want := range keys {
after, readErr := z.serverPools[pool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
mustIAM(t, readErr)
if otherLatest && pool == 1 && (!maps.Equal(after.UserDefined, before[pool].UserDefined) || !after.ModTime.Equal(before[pool].ModTime) || after.UserTags != before[pool].UserTags) {
t.Error("rotation rewrote a copy denied by the submitter's tag-conditioned policy")
}
kind, _ := crypto.IsEncrypted(after.UserDefined)
var got crypto.ObjectKey
switch kind {
case crypto.S3:
got, readErr = crypto.S3.UnsealObjectKey(GlobalKMS, after.UserDefined, bucket, object)
case crypto.S3KMS:
got, readErr = crypto.S3KMS.UnsealObjectKey(GlobalKMS, after.UserDefined, bucket, object)
default:
t.Fatalf("pool %d: rotation lost encryption metadata", pool)
}
mustIAM(t, readErr)
if got != want {
t.Errorf("pool %d: rotation changed the data key without reencrypting its ciphertext (rotation error: %v)", pool, err)
}
data, readErr := readCopy(pool)
if readErr != nil || string(data) != payload {
t.Errorf("pool %d: rotation left unreadable ciphertext: %v", pool, readErr)
}
}
})
}
}
// A version in a pool that a decommission or a rebalance is moving is not
// rewritten there: only the source holds it, so the rotation is left to a
// later run.
func TestBatchReviewRotationLeavesMovingSource(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review8-rotation-draining"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review8-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/draining"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "review8-rotation-key", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("draining rotation"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
beforeInfo, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
z.poolMeta.Pools[0].Decommission = &PoolDecommissionInfo{}
z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "review8-rotation-key"}}
err = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, beforeInfo, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !errors.Is(err, errBatchRotateMoving) {
t.Errorf("rotation of a version only a draining pool holds returned %v", err)
}
after, readErr := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, readErr)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != beforeInfo.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Fatal("rotation rewrote a draining pool")
}
// The job pauses and resumes in-process once the selected pool stops moving.
job := BatchJobRequest{ID: "rotation-moving-resume", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t), KeyRotate: &r}
batchTestJobPool(t.Context(), t, z)
if err := r.Start(t.Context(), z, job); !isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
t.Fatalf("moving job did not pause: %v", err)
}
ri := &batchJobInfo{}
mustIAM(t, ri.load(t.Context(), z, job))
if ri.PausedReason == "" || ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.Object != "" || ri.ObjectsFailed != 0 {
t.Fatalf("moving job report: %+v", ri)
}
z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
z.poolMeta.Pools[0].Decommission = nil
z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
mustIAM(t, r.Start(t.Context(), z, job))
mustIAM(t, ri.load(t.Context(), z, job))
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.PausedReason != "" || ri.Objects != 1 {
t.Fatalf("resumed rotation: %+v", ri)
}
}
// Once a move copied a version, the rotation leaves it to a later run, so the
// source stays as the move's cleanup expects it.
func TestBatchReviewRotationKeepsMigrationCleanup(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
kind string
rotate bool
}{{"decommission", false}, {"decommission", true}, {"rebalance", false}, {"rebalance", true}} {
name := tc.kind + "/without-rotation"
if tc.rotate {
name = tc.kind + "/with-rotation"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := migrationTestPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review8-rotation-migration"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review8-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/migration"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("rotation and migration"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
beforeInfo, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
move := migrationTestMover(t, z, 0, tc.kind)
mustIAM(t, move(t.Context(), 0, bucket, migrationTestReader(t, z, 0, beforeInfo)))
if _, err := z.serverPools[1].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("control: migration did not copy the version: %v", err)
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "review8-rotation-key"}}
var rotationErr error
if tc.rotate {
moved, err := z.serverPools[1].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
rotationErr = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, beforeInfo, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !errors.Is(rotationErr, errBatchRotateMoving) {
t.Errorf("rotation during a move returned %v", rotationErr)
}
after, err := z.serverPools[1].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if !maps.Equal(after.UserDefined, moved.UserDefined) || after.UserTags != moved.UserTags {
t.Error("rotation during a move rewrote the moved copy")
}
}
after, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if !after.ModTime.Equal(beforeInfo.ModTime) || !maps.Equal(after.UserDefined, beforeInfo.UserDefined) {
t.Errorf("rotation changed a draining source after its version was copied (rotation error: %v)", rotationErr)
}
snapshot := []FileInfo{{VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: beforeInfo.ModTime}}
if err := z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), bucket, object, 0, snapshot, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rotation prevented migration cleanup: %v", err)
}
if _, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID}); !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
t.Fatalf("migration left a source version behind: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// The rewrite keeps the tags and the expiry of the version, which a read
// returns apart from its metadata.
func TestBatchReviewRotationKeepsTagsAndExpiry(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{"single-pool", "multiple-pools"} {
t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
var z *erasureServerPools
if mode == "single-pool" {
z = purgeSinglePool(t, 4)
} else {
z, _ = consistencyPools(t)
}
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review8-rotation-metadata"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review8-rotation-metadata-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/tagged"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
meta[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
meta["expires"] = UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Format(http.TimeFormat)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("metadata preservation"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
written := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
before, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: written.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if before.UserTags == "" || before.Expires.IsZero() {
t.Fatal("control: stored version is missing the metadata to preserve")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
mustIAM(t, r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, before, batchRootSubmitter(t)))
after, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] == before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("control: rotation did not rewrap the key")
}
if after.UserTags != before.UserTags {
t.Errorf("rotation changed stored tags: got %q, want %q", after.UserTags, before.UserTags)
}
if !after.Expires.Equal(before.Expires) {
t.Errorf("rotation changed Expires: got %v, want %v", after.Expires, before.Expires)
}
})
}
}
// Two pools hold the same write with different tags, with or without
// tagging timestamps. A rotation, also during a move, leaves the tags that
// the merged version has.
func TestBatchReviewRotationKeepsMergedTags(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
ordered, moving bool
}{{false, false}, {false, true}, {true, false}, {true, true}} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("timestamp=%t/moving=%t", tc.ordered, tc.moving), func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review9-rotation-tag-tie"
const object = "rotation/tag-tie"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review9-tag-tie-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
if tc.ordered {
meta[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
}
other := maps.Clone(meta)
other[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("same write"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 1, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: other})
prior, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if prior.UserTags != "classification=private" {
t.Fatalf("control: logical tags=%q", prior.UserTags)
}
if tc.moving {
migrationTestMover(t, z, 0, "decommission")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
rotationErr := r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, before, batchRootSubmitter(t))
after, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserTags != prior.UserTags {
t.Fatalf("rotation changed logical tags from %q to %q (rotation error: %v)", prior.UserTags, after.UserTags, rotationErr)
}
})
}
}
// batchRotateFlipDisk starts a decommission of pool 0 at the flipAt-th
// version read, after the rotation's first read of the version.
type batchRotateFlipDisk struct {
StorageAPI
z *erasureServerPools
reads *atomic.Int32
flipAt int32
flipped *atomic.Bool
}
func (d batchRotateFlipDisk) ReadVersion(ctx context.Context, origvolume, volume, path, versionID string, opts ReadOptions) (FileInfo, error) {
n := d.reads.Add(1)
if n == d.flipAt && d.flipped.CompareAndSwap(false, true) {
d.z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
d.z.poolMeta.Pools[0].Decommission = &PoolDecommissionInfo{}
d.z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
}
return d.StorageAPI.ReadVersion(ctx, origvolume, volume, path, versionID, opts)
}
// A move that starts while the rotation authorizes and rewraps the version
// defers it: the state is checked again right before the write, where the
// pools layer checks it.
func TestBatchReviewRotationRechecksPoolBeforeWrite(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review11-rotation-window"
const object = "rotation/window"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review11-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("rotation window"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{
Versioned: true,
UserDefined: meta,
MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour),
})
beforeInfo, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
var reads atomic.Int32
var flipped atomic.Bool
firstPass := int32(0)
for _, pool := range z.serverPools {
firstPass += int32(pool.SetDriveCount())
}
var restore []func()
for _, pool := range z.serverPools {
restore = append(restore, conditionalPutSwapDisks(pool, object, func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
return batchRotateFlipDisk{
StorageAPI: d,
z: z,
reads: &reads,
flipAt: firstPass + 1,
flipped: &flipped,
}
}))
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
for _, fn := range restore {
fn()
}
})
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
gotErr := r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, beforeInfo, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !flipped.Load() {
t.Fatal("fault injection did not occur after the initial rotation read")
}
if !errors.Is(gotErr, errBatchRotateMoving) {
t.Errorf("rotation did not defer after the pool became moving during pre-work: %v", gotErr)
}
after, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != beforeInfo.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("rotation rewrote the pool after it became moving during pre-work")
}
}
-287
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@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
func batchPullJob(bucket string) BatchJobReplicateV1 {
return BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
}
}
// A pull does not read the destination version it may replace, so a policy
// that conditions the write on that version's tags refuses it; a version
// condition sees the version the pull writes.
func TestBatchPullDestinationConditions(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
action policy.Action
marker bool
condition func(versionID string) string
}{
{"tags-put", policy.ReplicateObjectAction, false, func(string) string {
return `{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/class":"protected"}}`
}},
{"tags-marker", policy.ReplicateDeleteAction, true, func(string) string {
return `{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/class":"protected"}}`
}},
{"version-put", policy.PutObjectAction, false, func(v string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":%q}}`, v)
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
before := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "pull/guarded", map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "class=protected"})
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-guard", batchAuthzFullAccess+fmt.Sprintf(`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":[%q],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":%s}`, tc.action, tc.condition(before.VersionID)))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-guard-user", "pull-guard")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := batchPullJob(f.bucket)
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "replacement"), ObjectInfo{
Name: before.Name, VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag",
DeleteMarker: tc.marker, UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("pull returned %v, want a refusal", err)
}
after, err := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, before.Name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
if err != nil || after.ETag != before.ETag {
t.Errorf("refused pull changed the destination version: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// A pull does not encrypt what it writes; encryption headers reported by the
// source do not satisfy a destination policy that requires encryption.
func TestBatchPullEncryptionCondition(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-encryption", `
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ReplicateObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]},
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption":"aws:kms","s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id":"required-key"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-encryption-user", "pull-encryption")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := batchPullJob(f.bucket)
version := mustGetUUID()
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "content"), ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/encrypted", VersionID: version, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag",
UserDefined: map[string]string{xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption: "aws:kms", xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID: "required-key"},
}, false, sub)
if err == nil {
oi, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/encrypted", ObjectOptions{VersionID: version})
mustIAM(t, gerr)
if !crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(oi.UserDefined) {
t.Fatal("a pull was allowed by an encryption condition it did not meet")
}
}
}
// A conditional Deny on an S3 Tables action covers the S3 data actions it
// implies, under the tables resource form; the job refuses rather than skip it.
func TestBatchJobTableConditionalDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "table-context", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3tables:GetTableData"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3tables:::bucket/batch-authz/table/table-id"],"Condition":{"Bool":{"aws:SecureTransport":"false"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "table-context-user", "table-context")
if f.sys.isAllowedLocally(policy.Args{AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "table-id/data", ConditionValues: map[string][]string{"SecureTransport": {"false"}}}) {
t.Fatal("control: with the request context the Deny applies")
}
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "table-id/data"}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("authorize returned %v, want a refusal", err)
}
}
type batchArchiveRevocation struct {
ObjectLayer
revoke func()
}
func (a *batchArchiveRevocation) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, rs *HTTPRangeSpec, h http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
if object == "archive/second" {
a.revoke()
}
return a.ObjectLayer.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, object, rs, h, opts)
}
// Each snowball entry is authorized for the submitter as it is then.
func TestBatchPushSnowballEntryRevalidation(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "archive-user", "")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
pluginURL, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL("https://authz.invalid/")
mustIAM(t, err)
previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{
URL: pluginURL, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { _ = r.Close() },
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"result":true}`)), Request: r}, nil
}),
}))
t.Cleanup(func() { setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous) })
entries := []ObjectInfo{
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "archive/first", nil),
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "archive/second", nil),
}
remote, err := minio.New("archive.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("batch-access", "batch-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Bucket: f.bucket}, Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Bucket: "remote"}}
job.Source.Snowball.InMemory = ptr(true)
job.Source.Snowball.Compress = ptr(false)
job.Source.Snowball.SkipErrs = ptr(false)
api := &batchArchiveRevocation{ObjectLayer: f.obj, revoke: func() { mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, false)) }}
if err = job.writeAsArchive(f.ctx, api, remote, entries, "", sub); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("archive with a revoked submitter returned %v, want a refusal", err)
}
}
// A definition holds one job type; one with several is refused, so that what
// is authorized is what runs.
func TestBatchJobSeveralSections(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
job := f.expireYAML("") + `keyrotate:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: other
encryption:
type: sse-s3
`
rec, queued := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, job)
if queued != nil {
f.run(t, queued)
}
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("submission status %d, want 400: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a definition with two job types ran")
}
}
// Prefixes are walked once each in one order: a cursor in a later prefix is
// after every key of the earlier ones, and an overlapping prefix is not
// walked twice.
func TestBatchExpirePrefixes(t *testing.T) {
if got := batchCanonicalPrefixes([]string{"z/", "a/", "a/b/", "z/", ""}); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "" {
t.Fatalf("canonical prefixes %q", got)
}
if got := batchCanonicalPrefixes([]string{"z/", "a/b/", "a/"}); strings.Join(got, ",") != "a/,z/" {
t.Fatalf("canonical prefixes %q", got)
}
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
done := f.putVersions(t, "a/done")
todo := f.putVersions(t, "z/todo")
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "x/data", batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD"))
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "x/data", nil)
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: ["z/", "x/", "a/", "x/"]
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 1
`, f.bucket))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// A run that completed a/ and stopped.
ri := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type()), StartTime: job.Started, Bucket: f.bucket, Object: "a/done"}
mustIAM(t, ri.updateAfter(f.ctx, f.obj, 0, *job))
f.run(t, job)
if !f.versionExists(t, "a/done", done) {
t.Error("resume did again a key before the cursor")
}
if f.versionExists(t, "z/todo", todo) {
t.Error("resume skipped a later prefix")
}
if got := f.jobInfo(t, job).VersionsSkippedLocked; got != 1 {
t.Errorf("a locked version under two equal prefixes was counted %d times", got)
}
}
type batchPartialWalk struct {
ObjectLayer
version ObjectInfo
cancel context.CancelFunc
read chan struct{}
}
func (a *batchPartialWalk) Walk(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], _ WalkOptions) error {
go func() {
defer close(results)
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: a.version}
if a.cancel != nil {
<-a.read
a.cancel()
return
}
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errors.New("test: listing failed within a key")}
}()
return nil
}
func (a *batchPartialWalk) GetObjectInfo(context.Context, string, string, ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
if a.read != nil {
close(a.read)
}
return a.version, nil
}
// A rotation whose walk fails or is canceled within a key keeps that key
// after its cursor and does not report completion.
func TestBatchKeyRotationIncompleteWalk(t *testing.T) {
for _, canceled := range []bool{false, true} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("canceled=%v", canceled), func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(f.ctx)
defer cancel()
meta := batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD")
meta[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] = "test-sealed-key"
api := &batchPartialWalk{ObjectLayer: f.obj, version: ObjectInfo{Bucket: f.bucket, Name: "rotation/key", VersionID: mustGetUUID(), UserDefined: meta}}
if canceled {
api.cancel, api.read = cancel, make(chan struct{})
}
job := BatchJobRequest{
ID: "keyrotate-partial" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
KeyRotate: &BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: f.bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}},
}
_ = job.KeyRotate.Start(ctx, api, job)
ri := f.jobInfo(t, &job)
if ri.Complete || ri.Object == api.version.Name || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 0 {
t.Fatalf("incomplete key committed: complete=%v cursor=%q skips=%d", ri.Complete, ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
})
}
}
-205
View File
@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3"
)
// batchBlockedIAMStore holds the lazy load of one user's policy mapping, or
// of one policy document, until released or until the load's context ends.
type batchBlockedIAMStore struct {
IAMStorageAPI
mapping string // access key whose mapping load blocks
doc string // policy whose document load blocks
started chan struct{}
release chan struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (s *batchBlockedIAMStore) block(ctx context.Context) error {
s.once.Do(func() { close(s.started) })
select {
case <-s.release:
return nil
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
}
}
func (s *batchBlockedIAMStore) loadMappedPolicy(ctx context.Context, name string, userType IAMUserType, isGroup bool, m *xsync.MapOf[string, MappedPolicy]) error {
if name == s.mapping && !isGroup {
if err := s.block(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return s.IAMStorageAPI.loadMappedPolicy(ctx, name, userType, isGroup, m)
}
func (s *batchBlockedIAMStore) loadPolicyDoc(ctx context.Context, name string, out map[string]PolicyDoc) error {
if name == s.doc {
if err := s.block(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return s.IAMStorageAPI.loadPolicyDoc(ctx, name, out)
}
// The batch path and the request path share one IAM cache. A lazy load that
// batch authorization needs, of a mapping that is never cached (a user whose
// policies come from a group) or of an evicted policy document, must not
// hold request authentication and cached authorization while storage is
// slow, and must end at the deadline of the job's context.
func TestBatchAuthorizeSlowLoadKeepsCachedAuthorizationAvailable(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// submitter returns the submitter whose authorization lazily loads,
// and arranges for blocked to hold that load.
submitter func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, blocked *batchBlockedIAMStore) *batchJobSubmitter
}{
{"mapping", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, blocked *batchBlockedIAMStore) *batchJobSubmitter {
// No mapping of the user itself is stored, so every lookup of
// its policies reads storage before it falls back to the group.
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-group-user", "")
_, err := f.sys.AddUsersToGroup(f.ctx, "snapshot-group", []string{cred.AccessKey})
mustIAM(t, err)
_, err = f.sys.PolicyDBSet(f.ctx, "snapshot-group", "snapshot-full", regUser, true)
mustIAM(t, err)
blocked.mapping = cred.AccessKey
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
return sub
}},
{"document", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, blocked *batchBlockedIAMStore) *batchJobSubmitter {
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-evicted", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-doc-user", "snapshot-evicted")
cache := f.sys.store.lock()
delete(cache.iamPolicyDocsMap, "snapshot-evicted")
f.sys.store.unlock()
blocked.doc = "snapshot-evicted"
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
return sub
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cached := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-cached-user", "snapshot-full")
store := f.sys.store
original := store.IAMStorageAPI
blocked := &batchBlockedIAMStore{IAMStorageAPI: original, started: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
sub := tc.submitter(t, f, blocked)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "key", versionID: mustGetUUID()}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("control: %v", err)
}
store.IAMStorageAPI = blocked
var wg sync.WaitGroup
var once sync.Once
unblock := func() { once.Do(func() { close(blocked.release) }) }
t.Cleanup(func() { unblock(); wg.Wait(); store.IAMStorageAPI = original })
slowDone := make(chan error, 1)
wg.Go(func() { slowDone <- sub.authorize(f.ctx, req) })
select {
case <-blocked.started:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("the lazy load did not start")
}
cachedDone := make(chan bool, 2)
wg.Go(func() {
_, ok := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, cached.AccessKey)
cachedDone <- ok
})
wg.Go(func() {
cachedDone <- f.sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: cached.AccessKey, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "key"})
})
for range 2 {
select {
case ok := <-cachedDone:
if !ok {
t.Fatal("cached authentication or authorization was rejected")
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("a slow IAM load during batch authorization blocked cached authentication")
}
}
unblock()
if err := <-slowDone; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("authorization after the load completed: %v", err)
}
// A load that does not return ends with the job's context, as an
// unavailable dependency, not with the storage layer's patience.
blocked.release = make(chan struct{})
once = sync.Once{}
unblock = func() { once.Do(func() { close(blocked.release) }) }
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(f.ctx, 200*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
deadlineDone := make(chan error, 1)
wg.Go(func() { deadlineDone <- sub.authorize(ctx, req) })
select {
case err := <-deadlineDone:
if !isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
t.Fatalf("a load that ended with the job's context: %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("a lazy load outlived the job's context")
}
})
}
}
// A policy that a mapping still names after it was deleted takes no part in
// the decision, for a batch job as for a request: the remaining mapped
// policies decide. An STS parent user's mapping can name a deleted policy,
// because deleting a policy checks only user and group mappings for use.
func TestBatchAuthorizeSkipsDeletedMappedPolicy(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-deleted", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}`)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-parent", "")
_, err := f.sys.PolicyDBSet(f.ctx, parent.AccessKey, "mapped-full,mapped-deleted", stsUser, false)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "key", versionID: mustGetUUID()}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("control: %v", err)
}
p, err := sub.principal(f.ctx)
mustIAM(t, err)
args := policy.Args{AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Action: req.action, BucketName: req.bucket, ObjectName: req.object, Claims: p.claims, ConditionValues: p.conditionValues(req)}
mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeletePolicy(f.ctx, "mapped-deleted", true))
if !f.sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("the request path denied the remaining mapped policy")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("batch authorization diverged from the request after a mapped policy was deleted: %v", err)
}
// With every mapped policy deleted, both deny; the job is refused, not
// paused, as nothing is unavailable.
mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeletePolicy(f.ctx, "mapped-full", true))
if f.sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("the request path allowed without any mapped policy")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("batch authorization without any mapped policy: %v", err)
}
}
-919
View File
@@ -1,919 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/arn"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy/condition"
"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3"
)
// A batch job acts on objects long after the request that submitted it has
// gone. It therefore records who submitted it and acts only as that
// principal:
//
// - StartBatchJob binds the authenticated credential to the job
// (batchJobSubmitter). Nothing in the submitted definition names it.
// - Every start of the job, and every object it touches, resolves the
// binding against IAM again. A credential that is gone, disabled,
// expired, revoked or edited since submission fails the job; a reused
// access key does not match the binding.
// - Each action is evaluated with the submitter's policies and session
// policy but without a request. A policy statement that would need
// request context the job does not have (source address, transport,
// headers and so on) refuses the action instead of being skipped.
//
// A job without a binding was queued by an earlier release. It is never
// authorized, whoever submitted it, and has to be submitted again.
//go:generate msgp -file $GOFILE -unexported
// batchJobSubmitter is the server-assigned identity of the credential that
// submitted a batch job.
type batchJobSubmitter struct {
Version int `msg:"v"`
Type string `msg:"t"`
AccessKey string `msg:"ak"`
// ParentUser is the parent of a derived credential.
ParentUser string `msg:"pu"`
// UpdatedAt and RevokedBefore are the revision of the identity record;
// any edit of the identity changes them. They are unset for root.
UpdatedAt time.Time `msg:"ua"`
RevokedBefore time.Time `msg:"rb"`
// Binding is a keyed fingerprint of the credential itself, see
// batchSubmitterBinding.
Binding []byte `msg:"bd"`
}
const batchJobSubmitterVersion = 1
// Submitter types. A credential is classified in the order IsAllowed
// evaluates it.
const (
batchSubmitterRoot = "root"
batchSubmitterUser = "user"
batchSubmitterTemporary = "temporary"
batchSubmitterService = "service-account"
)
//msgp:ignore batchJobAuthzError
// batchJobAuthzError refuses a batch job, or one of its actions, for its
// submitter. It ends the job: it is persisted as the job's failure and is
// never retried.
type batchJobAuthzError struct {
reason string
}
func (e batchJobAuthzError) Error() string {
return e.reason
}
func isBatchJobAuthzError(err error) bool {
var e batchJobAuthzError
return errors.As(err, &e)
}
var (
errBatchJobResubmit = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the batch job does not record who submitted it; submit it again"}
errBatchJobChanged = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the credential that submitted the batch job has changed since submission; submit it again"}
errBatchJobInvalid = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the credential that submitted the batch job is no longer valid"}
)
func batchSubmitterType(cred auth.Credentials) string {
switch {
case cred.IsTemp():
return batchSubmitterTemporary
case cred.IsServiceAccount():
return batchSubmitterService
default:
return batchSubmitterUser
}
}
// batchSubmitterBinding is a fingerprint of one credential keyed with its own
// secret. It changes when the secret, the session token or the parent
// changes, and a new credential that reuses the access key does not have it.
func batchSubmitterBinding(typ string, cred auth.Credentials) []byte {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(cred.SecretKey))
for _, s := range []string{"silo batch-job submitter v1", typ, cred.AccessKey, cred.ParentUser, cred.SessionToken} {
var n [8]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(n[:], uint64(len(s)))
mac.Write(n[:])
mac.Write([]byte(s))
}
return mac.Sum(nil)
}
// identityRecord returns the stored identity of a non-root access key.
func (sys *IAMSys) identityRecord(accessKey string) (UserIdentity, bool, error) {
if !sys.Initialized() {
return UserIdentity{}, false, errServerNotInitialized
}
u, ok := sys.store.GetUser(accessKey)
return u, ok, nil
}
// newBatchJobSubmitter binds the credential that authenticated a
// StartBatchJob request.
func newBatchJobSubmitter(cred auth.Credentials) (*batchJobSubmitter, error) {
root := globalActiveCred
if cred.AccessKey == "" {
return nil, errBatchJobInvalid
}
if cred.AccessKey == root.AccessKey {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cred.SecretKey), []byte(root.SecretKey)) != 1 {
return nil, errBatchJobChanged
}
return &batchJobSubmitter{
Version: batchJobSubmitterVersion,
Type: batchSubmitterRoot,
AccessKey: root.AccessKey,
Binding: batchSubmitterBinding(batchSubmitterRoot, root),
}, nil
}
u, ok, err := globalIAMSys.identityRecord(cred.AccessKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, batchUnavailable("IAM identity lookup", err)
}
// The record must be the one the request was authenticated with.
if !ok || u.Credentials.AccessKey != cred.AccessKey || u.Credentials.ParentUser != cred.ParentUser ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(u.Credentials.SecretKey), []byte(cred.SecretKey)) != 1 ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(u.Credentials.SessionToken), []byte(cred.SessionToken)) != 1 {
return nil, errBatchJobChanged
}
typ := batchSubmitterType(u.Credentials)
return &batchJobSubmitter{
Version: batchJobSubmitterVersion,
Type: typ,
AccessKey: u.Credentials.AccessKey,
ParentUser: u.Credentials.ParentUser,
UpdatedAt: u.UpdatedAt,
RevokedBefore: u.RevokedBefore,
Binding: batchSubmitterBinding(typ, u.Credentials),
}, nil
}
//msgp:ignore batchJobPrincipal batchAuthzRequest
// batchJobPrincipal is a submitter resolved against current IAM state.
type batchJobPrincipal struct {
ctx context.Context
typ string
accessKey string
parentUser string
groups []string
claims map[string]any
owner bool
temp bool // evaluated as a temporary credential
service bool // evaluated as a service account
}
// principal resolves the binding against current IAM state. It fails if the
// credential no longer exists, is no longer valid, or is no longer the one
// that was bound.
func (s *batchJobSubmitter) principal(ctx context.Context) (batchJobPrincipal, error) {
if s == nil || s.AccessKey == "" {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobResubmit
}
if s.Version != batchJobSubmitterVersion {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchJobAuthzError{reason: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported batch job submitter version %d; submit the job again", s.Version)}
}
if !batchIAMReady() {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchUnavailable("IAM is not initialized", errServerNotInitialized)
}
root := globalActiveCred
if s.Type == batchSubmitterRoot {
if s.AccessKey != root.AccessKey || !hmac.Equal(s.Binding, batchSubmitterBinding(batchSubmitterRoot, root)) {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobChanged
}
if !globalAPIConfig.permitRootAccess() {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
return batchJobPrincipal{ctx: ctx, typ: batchSubmitterRoot, accessKey: root.AccessKey, owner: true}, nil
}
switch s.Type {
case batchSubmitterUser, batchSubmitterTemporary, batchSubmitterService:
default:
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobResubmit
}
if s.AccessKey == root.AccessKey {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobChanged
}
u, ok, err := globalIAMSys.CheckKey(ctx, s.AccessKey)
if err != nil {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchUnavailable("IAM credential lookup", err)
}
if !ok {
// Deleted, disabled, expired or revoked.
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
cred := u.Credentials
typ := batchSubmitterType(cred)
if typ != s.Type || cred.AccessKey != s.AccessKey || cred.ParentUser != s.ParentUser ||
!u.UpdatedAt.Equal(s.UpdatedAt) || !u.RevokedBefore.Equal(s.RevokedBefore) ||
!hmac.Equal(s.Binding, batchSubmitterBinding(typ, cred)) {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobChanged
}
if cred.IsExpired() || cred.Status == auth.AccountOff {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
p := batchJobPrincipal{
ctx: ctx,
typ: typ,
accessKey: cred.AccessKey,
parentUser: cred.ParentUser,
groups: cred.Groups,
claims: map[string]any{},
temp: cred.IsTemp(),
service: !cred.IsTemp() && cred.IsServiceAccount(),
}
if typ != batchSubmitterUser {
// Verify the token as a request would, with the current signing keys.
jwtClaims, err := extractJWTClaims(u)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errTokenSigningKeyUnavailable) {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchUnavailable("token signing key", err)
}
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
p.claims = jwtClaims.Map()
if err := decodeBatchSessionPolicy(p.claims); err != nil {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
}
p.owner = cred.ParentUser == root.AccessKey && cred.AccessKey != siteReplicatorSvcAcc
if p.owner && !globalAPIConfig.permitRootAccess() {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
if _, ok := p.claims[policy.SessionPolicyName]; ok {
p.owner = false
}
return p, nil
}
// decodeBatchSessionPolicy decodes a session policy claim for evaluation.
// A request decodes it while verifying its token, except when an
// authorization plugin is configured; a batch job decodes it always, so the
// session policy also limits what the plugin allows.
func decodeBatchSessionPolicy(claims map[string]any) error {
sp, ok := claims[policy.SessionPolicyName]
if !ok {
return nil
}
s, ok := sp.(string)
if !ok {
return errAuthentication
}
b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
if err != nil {
return errAuthentication
}
claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted] = string(b)
return nil
}
// batchAuthzRequest is one action a batch job is about to take.
type batchAuthzRequest struct {
action policy.Action
bucket string
object string // empty for a bucket action
// versionID is the version an object version action addresses.
versionID string
// tags are the current tags of the object version acted on.
tags string
// tagsUnknown is set when the job does not read the version it acts
// on, so s3:ExistingObjectTag is context it does not have.
tagsUnknown bool
// values are request values the job supplies itself, such as the
// listing prefix or the encryption and retention it writes, keyed by
// condition key name.
values map[string][]string
}
// batchAuthzMarker marks the condition values of a batch job for an
// authorization plugin. Requests cannot set s3:authType.
const batchAuthzMarker = "batch-job"
// Condition keys a batch job always provides, as a request would: identity,
// time, the addressed version and the stored tags. Keys a request takes from
// itself are provided only when the job sets them (see batchAuthzRequest
// values); every other key is request context the job does not have.
var batchServerConditionKeys = map[string]bool{
condition.AWSCurrentTime.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSEpochTime.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSPrincipalType.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSUserID.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSUsername.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSGroups.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.S3VersionID.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.ExistingObjectTag.ToKey().String(): true,
}
// Request keys a job may supply, by the name they have in condition values.
var batchRequestConditionKeys = map[string]condition.KeyName{
condition.S3Prefix.Name(): condition.S3Prefix,
condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryption.Name(): condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryption,
condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyID.Name(): condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyID,
condition.S3ObjectLockMode.Name(): condition.S3ObjectLockMode,
condition.S3ObjectLockRetainUntilDate.Name(): condition.S3ObjectLockRetainUntilDate,
condition.S3ObjectLockLegalHold.Name(): condition.S3ObjectLockLegalHold,
condition.RequestObjectTagKeys.Name(): condition.RequestObjectTagKeys,
}
// suppliedConditionKeys returns the condition keys whose values req provides.
func (req batchAuthzRequest) suppliedConditionKeys() map[string]bool {
supplied := make(map[string]bool, len(batchServerConditionKeys)+len(req.values))
for k := range batchServerConditionKeys {
supplied[k] = true
}
if req.tagsUnknown {
delete(supplied, condition.ExistingObjectTag.ToKey().String())
}
for name := range req.values {
if key, ok := batchRequestConditionKeys[name]; ok {
supplied[key.ToKey().String()] = true
}
if strings.HasPrefix(name, condition.RequestObjectTag.Name()+"/") {
supplied[condition.RequestObjectTag.ToKey().String()] = true
}
}
return supplied
}
func batchKeySupplied(supplied map[string]bool, name string) bool {
if i := strings.IndexByte(name, '/'); i >= 0 {
name = name[:i]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(name, "jwt:") || strings.HasPrefix(name, "ldap:") {
// Claims of the verified token, as a request has them.
return true
}
return supplied[name]
}
// conditionValues are the values a request with the same identity would
// carry, without any value taken from the request itself.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) conditionValues(req batchAuthzRequest) map[string][]string {
now := UTCNow()
username := p.accessKey
if p.temp || p.service {
username = p.parentUser
}
principalType := "User"
if len(p.claims) > 0 {
principalType = "AssumedRole"
}
if username == globalActiveCred.AccessKey {
principalType = "Account"
}
// Identity and time, then the claims over them, as a request has them
// (an LDAP session's short username replaces its parent DN).
values := map[string][]string{
"CurrentTime": {now.Format(time.RFC3339)},
"EpochTime": {strconv.FormatInt(now.Unix(), 10)},
"principaltype": {principalType},
"userid": {username},
"username": {username},
}
for k, v := range p.claims {
if s, ok := v.(string); ok {
values[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimPrefix(k, "ldap"))] = []string{s}
}
}
// No claim stands for a value of the object or of the job, which
// follow and always win.
for k := range values {
if k == "versionid" || k == "prefix" || k == "authtype" ||
strings.HasPrefix(k, "existingobjecttag/") || strings.HasPrefix(k, "requestobjecttag") ||
strings.HasPrefix(k, "x-amz-") || strings.HasPrefix(k, "object-lock-") {
delete(values, k)
}
}
// For an authorization plugin: this is a batch job, not a request.
values["authType"] = []string{batchAuthzMarker}
if req.versionID != "" {
values["versionid"] = []string{req.versionID}
}
if req.tags != "" {
if t, err := tags.ParseObjectTags(req.tags); err == nil {
for k, v := range t.ToMap() {
values[pathJoin("ExistingObjectTag", k)] = []string{v}
}
}
}
for k, v := range req.values {
values[k] = v
}
if grpsVal, ok := p.claims["groups"]; ok {
if grpsIs, ok := grpsVal.([]any); ok {
grps := []string{}
for _, gI := range grpsIs {
if g, ok := gI.(string); ok {
grps = append(grps, g)
}
}
if len(grps) > 0 {
values["groups"] = grps
}
}
}
if _, ok := values["groups"]; !ok && len(p.groups) > 0 {
values["groups"] = p.groups
}
return values
}
// authorize evaluates one action of the job as its submitter.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorize(req batchAuthzRequest) error {
args := policy.Args{
AccountName: p.accessKey,
Groups: p.groups,
Action: req.action,
BucketName: req.bucket,
ObjectName: req.object,
ConditionValues: p.conditionValues(req),
IsOwner: p.owner,
Claims: p.claims,
}
return p.authorizeArgs(args, &req)
}
// authorizeArgs uses the same policy snapshot for request-context checks and
// the decision. No boolean IAM evaluator re-reads and silently drops policies.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorizeArgs(args policy.Args, req *batchAuthzRequest) error {
denied := batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the batch job submitter is not allowed " + string(args.Action)}
if req != nil {
denied.reason = batchDeniedReason(*req)
}
ctx := p.ctx
if ctx == nil {
ctx = GlobalContext
}
plugin := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
var snap *batchPolicySnapshot
if plugin == nil && !args.IsOwner {
snap = globalIAMSys.store.batchSnapshot(ctx)
defer snap.release()
}
policies, err := globalIAMSys.batchLocalPolicies(p, args, plugin == nil, snap)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchPolicy) || errors.Is(err, errAuthentication) || errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) || errors.Is(err, errNoSuchGroup) {
return denied
}
return batchUnavailable("IAM policy lookup", err)
}
if req != nil {
supplied := req.suppliedConditionKeys()
for _, pol := range policies {
for _, st := range pol.Statements {
if batchStatementNeedsRequest(st, args, supplied) {
return batchJobAuthzError{reason: denied.reason + ": a policy statement depends on request context that a batch job does not have"}
}
}
}
}
if plugin != nil {
ok, err := plugin.IsAllowedContext(ctx, args)
if err != nil {
return batchUnavailable("authorization plugin", err)
}
if !ok {
return denied
}
// The plugin does not see a session policy; it only limits further.
if has, allowed := p.sessionPolicyDecision(args); has && !allowed {
return denied
}
return nil
}
if args.IsOwner {
return nil
}
if p.service {
if p.claims[parentClaim] != p.parentUser {
return denied
}
if _, ok := p.claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()].(string); !ok {
return denied
}
}
if has, allowed := p.sessionPolicyDecision(args); has && !allowed {
return denied
}
ownerDerived := (p.temp || p.service) && p.parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey
if !ownerDerived {
if p.service {
args.AccountName = p.parentUser
}
if len(policies) == 0 || !policies[0].IsAllowed(args) {
return denied
}
}
return nil
}
func batchDeniedReason(req batchAuthzRequest) string {
resource := req.bucket
if req.object != "" {
resource = pathJoin(req.bucket, req.object)
}
if req.versionID != "" {
resource += " (versionId " + req.versionID + ")"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("the batch job submitter is not allowed %s on %s", req.action, resource)
}
// sessionPolicyDecision evaluates the session policy the way IsAllowed would
// for this credential.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) sessionPolicyDecision(args policy.Args) (bool, bool) {
switch {
case p.temp:
return isAllowedBySessionPolicy(args)
case p.service:
if p.claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
return false, false
}
return isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(args)
}
return false, false
}
// batchIAMLoadTimeout bounds one storage read of a lazy IAM load during
// batch authorization, as MergePolicies bounds a policy document load.
const batchIAMLoadTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// batchPolicySnapshot reads the mappings and policy documents of a submitter
// at one cache revision while cached authentication and authorization
// proceed.
//
// It holds the store's writer mutex, so no writer changes the cache between
// its reads, and the cache read lock, which it releases around each storage
// read: a lazy mapping load or a policy document load. Request
// authentication then neither waits for storage nor queues behind a writer
// waiting for the cache lock, which taking the write lock back after each
// read would cause. It writes nothing to the cache but the lazily loaded
// mappings, which the request path stores under the read lock as well.
//
//msgp:ignore batchPolicySnapshot
type batchPolicySnapshot struct {
*IAMStoreSys
ctx context.Context
cache *iamCache
mu sync.Mutex
reads int // storage reads in progress; the read lock is released while any
}
// batchSnapshot takes the snapshot; release it with release. rlock and
// runlock are the cache's read lock (IAMStorageAPI), not IAMStoreSys.lock,
// which also takes writeMu.
func (store *IAMStoreSys) batchSnapshot(ctx context.Context) *batchPolicySnapshot {
store.writeMu.Lock()
return &batchPolicySnapshot{IAMStoreSys: store, ctx: ctx, cache: store.rlock()}
}
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) release() {
s.runlock()
s.writeMu.Unlock()
}
// read runs one storage read without the cache lock, bounded by the job's
// context and batchIAMLoadTimeout. Concurrent reads (the group fallback of
// policyDBGetGroups) release the lock before the first and take it back
// after the last.
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) read(fn func(ctx context.Context) error) error {
s.mu.Lock()
if s.reads == 0 {
s.runlock()
}
s.reads++
s.mu.Unlock()
defer func() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.reads--
if s.reads == 0 {
s.rlock()
}
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(s.ctx, batchIAMLoadTimeout)
defer cancel()
return fn(ctx)
}
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) loadMappedPolicy(_ context.Context, name string, userType IAMUserType, isGroup bool, m *xsync.MapOf[string, MappedPolicy]) error {
return s.read(func(ctx context.Context) error {
return s.IAMStoreSys.loadMappedPolicy(ctx, name, userType, isGroup, m)
})
}
// loadGroup would write the cache under the read lock. The snapshot resolves
// the policies of users, which never loads a group.
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) loadGroup(context.Context, string, map[string]GroupInfo) error {
return errors.New("batch authorization does not load groups")
}
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) loadPolicyDoc(name string, out map[string]PolicyDoc) error {
return s.read(func(ctx context.Context) error { return s.IAMStoreSys.loadPolicyDoc(ctx, name, out) })
}
// batchLocalPolicies returns every local policy that can take part in the
// decision on args: the mapped policies that IsAllowed would merge when
// withMapped is set (no authorization plugin), and the session policy.
func (sys *IAMSys) batchLocalPolicies(p batchJobPrincipal, args policy.Args, withMapped bool, snap *batchPolicySnapshot) ([]policy.Policy, error) {
var out []policy.Policy
if withMapped && args.IsOwner {
// IsAllowed does not evaluate any policy for the owner.
return nil, nil
}
if withMapped {
// The caller holds snap through evaluation. Lazy mapping loads and
// selected documents therefore belong to one cache revision.
cache := snap.cache
mappedPolicies := func(name string) ([]string, error) {
names, _, err := cache.policyDBGet(snap, name, false, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
groups, err := cache.policyDBGetGroups(snap, len(names) > 0, args.Groups...)
return append(names, groups...), err
}
var names []string
ownerDerived := (p.temp || p.service) && p.parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey
switch {
case p.typ == batchSubmitterRoot || ownerDerived:
case p.temp || p.service:
if roleArn := args.GetRoleArn(); roleArn != "" {
a, err := arn.Parse(roleArn)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
names = append(names, newMappedPolicy(sys.rolesMap[a]).toSlice()...)
} else {
mapped, err := mappedPolicies(p.parentUser)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
names = append(names, mapped...)
// The claimed policies apply only when nothing is mapped.
if len(mapped) == 0 {
if claimed, ok := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(args.Claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()); ok {
names = append(names, claimed.ToSlice()...)
}
}
}
default:
mapped, err := mappedPolicies(p.accessKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
names = append(names, mapped...)
}
var selected []policy.Policy
for _, name := range names {
doc, ok := cache.iamPolicyDocsMap[name]
if !ok {
loaded := make(map[string]PolicyDoc)
err := snap.loadPolicyDoc(name, loaded)
if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchPolicy) {
// Confirmed absent, as when a mapping still names a
// deleted policy: it takes no part in the decision, as
// in MergePolicies. Any other failure could hide a Deny.
continue
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
doc, ok = loaded[name]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load IAM policy %q returned no document", name)
}
}
selected = append(selected, doc.Policy)
}
out = append(out, policy.MergePolicies(selected...))
}
if p.temp || p.service {
if p.service && p.claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
return out, nil
}
if sp, ok := p.claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
s, ok := sp.(string)
if !ok {
return nil, errAuthentication
}
parsed, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(s))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, *parsed)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// batchStatementNeedsRequest reports whether a statement that applies to
// args depends on a condition key that the job does not supply. Applying
// such a statement without its value could grant (Allow) or drop (Deny)
// what a request with that context would not, so the job refuses the action.
// Resources are matched without conditions; a statement is taken to apply
// whenever it might.
func batchStatementNeedsRequest(st policy.Statement, args policy.Args, supplied map[string]bool) bool {
if (!st.Actions.Match(args.Action) && !st.Actions.IsEmpty()) || st.NotActions.Match(args.Action) {
return false
}
// Policy variables in resources or condition values.
if data, err := json.Marshal(st); err == nil {
s := string(data)
for {
i := strings.Index(s, "${")
if i < 0 {
break
}
s = s[i+2:]
j := strings.IndexByte(s, '}')
if j < 0 {
break
}
if !batchKeySupplied(supplied, s[:j]) {
return true
}
s = s[j+1:]
}
}
if !batchStatementMayApply(st, args) {
return false
}
for key := range st.Conditions.Keys() {
if !batchKeySupplied(supplied, key.String()) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// batchStatementMayApply matches the resources of a statement, in both forms
// a bucket request can take. A statement whose resources the evaluator
// translates (S3 Tables and vectors actions cover S3 data actions) is taken
// to apply.
func batchStatementMayApply(st policy.Statement, args policy.Args) bool {
for _, actions := range []policy.ActionSet{st.Actions, st.NotActions} {
for action := range actions {
if policy.TableAction(action).IsValid() || policy.VectorsAction(action).IsValid() {
return true
}
}
}
for _, resources := range []policy.ResourceSet{st.Resources, st.NotResources} {
for r := range resources {
if r.Type != policy.ResourceARNS3 && r.Type != policy.ResourceARNAll {
return true
}
}
}
resources := []string{args.BucketName + "/" + strings.TrimPrefix(args.ObjectName, "/")}
if args.ObjectName == "" {
resources = []string{args.BucketName, args.BucketName + "/"}
}
for _, resource := range resources {
if len(st.Resources) > 0 && !st.Resources.Match(resource, args.ConditionValues) {
continue
}
if len(st.NotResources) > 0 && st.NotResources.Match(resource, args.ConditionValues) {
continue
}
return true
}
return false
}
// authorize resolves the submitter and evaluates each request.
func (s *batchJobSubmitter) authorize(ctx context.Context, reqs ...batchAuthzRequest) error {
p, err := s.principal(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, req := range reqs {
if err := p.authorize(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// startAuthzRequests are the bucket actions a job needs before it acts on any
// object: the listings it walks. Object actions are authorized per object.
func (j BatchJobRequest) startAuthzRequests() []batchAuthzRequest {
list := func(bucket string, prefixes []string) []batchAuthzRequest {
if len(prefixes) == 0 {
prefixes = []string{""}
}
var reqs []batchAuthzRequest
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
values := map[string][]string{condition.S3Prefix.Name(): {prefix}}
reqs = append(reqs,
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.ListBucketAction, bucket: bucket, values: values},
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.ListBucketVersionsAction, bucket: bucket, values: values},
)
}
return reqs
}
// The same order as Type() and the job pool.
switch {
case j.Replicate != nil:
if !j.Replicate.RemoteToLocal() {
return list(j.Replicate.Source.Bucket, j.Replicate.Source.Prefix.F())
}
case j.KeyRotate != nil:
return list(j.KeyRotate.Bucket, []string{j.KeyRotate.Prefix})
case j.Expire != nil:
return list(j.Expire.Bucket, batchCanonicalPrefixes(j.Expire.Prefix.F()))
}
return nil
}
// jobSections counts the job types a definition holds. A job is one of them.
func (j BatchJobRequest) jobSections() int {
n := 0
for _, set := range []bool{j.Replicate != nil, j.KeyRotate != nil, j.Expire != nil} {
if set {
n++
}
}
return n
}
var errBatchJobSections = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "a batch job must define exactly one job type"}
// refuse ends the job for its submitter.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) refuse(err error) {
ri.mu.Lock()
defer ri.mu.Unlock()
if ri.FailureReason == "" {
ri.FailureReason = err.Error()
}
ri.Complete = false
ri.Failed = true
ri.PausedReason = ""
}
func (ri *batchJobInfo) refused() bool {
ri.mu.RLock()
defer ri.mu.RUnlock()
return ri.FailureReason != ""
}
// startAuthorized checks the submitter of a job that is about to run. It
// returns done for a job that must not run now: one refused before, which
// stays refused, or one refused now, which is persisted as failed first.
// An error that is not a decision leaves the job to a later start.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) startAuthorized(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest) (done bool, err error) {
if !ri.refused() {
err := job.Submitter.authorize(ctx, job.startAuthzRequests()...)
if err == nil && job.jobSections() != 1 {
err = errBatchJobSections
}
if err == nil {
ri.mu.Lock()
ri.PausedReason = ""
ri.mu.Unlock()
// Persist the report version before acting. Older binaries must not
// resume an authorization-bearing job with server authority.
if err := ri.updateAfter(ctx, api, 0, job); err != nil {
return true, batchUnavailable("saving job progress", err)
}
return false, nil
}
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
return true, ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, err)
}
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
return true, err
}
ri.refuse(err)
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("batch job %s refused: %w", job.ID, err))
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
if err := ri.updateAfter(ctx, api, 0, job); err != nil {
return true, batchUnavailable("saving job refusal", err)
}
return true, nil
}
-260
View File
@@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
// Code generated by github.com/tinylib/msgp DO NOT EDIT.
package cmd
import (
"github.com/tinylib/msgp/msgp"
)
// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, err = dc.ReadMapKeyPtr()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "v":
z.Version, err = dc.ReadInt()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Version")
return
}
case "t":
z.Type, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Type")
return
}
case "ak":
z.AccessKey, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AccessKey")
return
}
case "pu":
z.ParentUser, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ParentUser")
return
}
case "ua":
z.UpdatedAt, err = dc.ReadTime()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "UpdatedAt")
return
}
case "rb":
z.RevokedBefore, err = dc.ReadTime()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "RevokedBefore")
return
}
case "bd":
z.Binding, err = dc.ReadBytes(z.Binding)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Binding")
return
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
return
}
// EncodeMsg implements msgp.Encodable
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
// map header, size 7
// write "v"
err = en.Append(0x87, 0xa1, 0x76)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteInt(z.Version)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Version")
return
}
// write "t"
err = en.Append(0xa1, 0x74)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.Type)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Type")
return
}
// write "ak"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x61, 0x6b)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.AccessKey)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AccessKey")
return
}
// write "pu"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x70, 0x75)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.ParentUser)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ParentUser")
return
}
// write "ua"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x75, 0x61)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteTime(z.UpdatedAt)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "UpdatedAt")
return
}
// write "rb"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x72, 0x62)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteTime(z.RevokedBefore)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "RevokedBefore")
return
}
// write "bd"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x62, 0x64)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteBytes(z.Binding)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Binding")
return
}
return
}
// MarshalMsg implements msgp.Marshaler
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
o = msgp.Require(b, z.Msgsize())
// map header, size 7
// string "v"
o = append(o, 0x87, 0xa1, 0x76)
o = msgp.AppendInt(o, z.Version)
// string "t"
o = append(o, 0xa1, 0x74)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.Type)
// string "ak"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x61, 0x6b)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.AccessKey)
// string "pu"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x70, 0x75)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.ParentUser)
// string "ua"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x75, 0x61)
o = msgp.AppendTime(o, z.UpdatedAt)
// string "rb"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x62)
o = msgp.AppendTime(o, z.RevokedBefore)
// string "bd"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x62, 0x64)
o = msgp.AppendBytes(o, z.Binding)
return
}
// UnmarshalMsg implements msgp.Unmarshaler
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapKeyZC(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "v":
z.Version, bts, err = msgp.ReadIntBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Version")
return
}
case "t":
z.Type, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Type")
return
}
case "ak":
z.AccessKey, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AccessKey")
return
}
case "pu":
z.ParentUser, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ParentUser")
return
}
case "ua":
z.UpdatedAt, bts, err = msgp.ReadTimeBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "UpdatedAt")
return
}
case "rb":
z.RevokedBefore, bts, err = msgp.ReadTimeBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "RevokedBefore")
return
}
case "bd":
z.Binding, bts, err = msgp.ReadBytesBytes(bts, z.Binding)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Binding")
return
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
o = bts
return
}
// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) Msgsize() (s int) {
s = 1 + 2 + msgp.IntSize + 2 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Type) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.AccessKey) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.ParentUser) + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.BytesPrefixSize + len(z.Binding)
return
}
-123
View File
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
// Code generated by github.com/tinylib/msgp DO NOT EDIT.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"testing"
"github.com/tinylib/msgp/msgp"
)
func TestMarshalUnmarshalbatchJobSubmitter(t *testing.T) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
bts, err := v.MarshalMsg(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
left, err := v.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(left) > 0 {
t.Errorf("%d bytes left over after UnmarshalMsg(): %q", len(left), left)
}
left, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(left) > 0 {
t.Errorf("%d bytes left over after Skip(): %q", len(left), left)
}
}
func BenchmarkMarshalMsgbatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
v.MarshalMsg(nil)
}
}
func BenchmarkAppendMsgbatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
bts := make([]byte, 0, v.Msgsize())
bts, _ = v.MarshalMsg(bts[0:0])
b.SetBytes(int64(len(bts)))
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
bts, _ = v.MarshalMsg(bts[0:0])
}
}
func BenchmarkUnmarshalbatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
bts, _ := v.MarshalMsg(nil)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(bts)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_, err := v.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func TestEncodeDecodebatchJobSubmitter(t *testing.T) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
var buf bytes.Buffer
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
m := v.Msgsize()
if buf.Len() > m {
t.Log("WARNING: TestEncodeDecodebatchJobSubmitter Msgsize() is inaccurate")
}
vn := batchJobSubmitter{}
err := msgp.Decode(&buf, &vn)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
buf.Reset()
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
err = msgp.NewReader(&buf).Skip()
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
func BenchmarkEncodebatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
var buf bytes.Buffer
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
b.SetBytes(int64(buf.Len()))
en := msgp.NewWriter(msgp.Nowhere)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
v.EncodeMsg(en)
}
en.Flush()
}
func BenchmarkDecodebatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
var buf bytes.Buffer
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
b.SetBytes(int64(buf.Len()))
rd := msgp.NewEndlessReader(buf.Bytes(), b)
dc := msgp.NewReader(rd)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
err := v.DecodeMsg(dc)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
-248
View File
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"net/http"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
)
type batchDiscoveryLayer struct {
ObjectLayer
walk func(context.Context, chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error
read func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error)
}
func (a batchDiscoveryLayer) Walk(ctx context.Context, _, _ string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], _ WalkOptions) error {
return a.walk(ctx, results)
}
func (a batchDiscoveryLayer) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, _, object string, _ *HTTPRangeSpec, _ http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
data, err := a.read(ctx, object)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return NewGetObjectReaderFromReader(bytes.NewReader(data), ObjectInfo{Name: object}, opts)
}
// A partially successful startup scan must retry the missing work without
// re-admitting work that finished while the scan was waiting to retry.
func TestBatchDiscoveryRecoversInProcess(t *testing.T) {
for _, failure := range []string{"walk-start", "walk-stream", "manifest-read"} {
t.Run(failure, func(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: ctx, jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 10)}
attempts := 0
pool.objLayer = batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(_ context.Context, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 && failure == "walk-start" {
return errErasureReadQuorum
}
defer close(results)
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: "finished"}}
if attempts == 1 && failure == "walk-stream" {
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errErasureReadQuorum}
} else {
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: "pending"}}
}
return nil
},
read: func(_ context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
if attempts == 1 && failure == "manifest-read" && name == "pending" {
return nil, errErasureReadQuorum
}
job := BatchJobRequest{ID: name}
return job.MarshalMsg(nil)
},
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
synctest.Wait()
if failure != "walk-start" {
select {
case job := <-pool.jobCh:
if job.ID != "finished" || !pool.beginJob(job) {
t.Fatal("first scan did not admit the healthy manifest")
}
pool.finishJob(job, nil)
default:
t.Fatal("first scan lost the healthy manifest")
}
}
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(20 * time.Minute):
t.Fatal("discovery failed to finish after storage recovered")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Fatalf("discovery attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
want := 1
if failure == "walk-start" {
want = 2
}
if len(pool.jobCh) != want {
t.Fatalf("queued %d jobs, want %d; completed work was re-admitted or pending work was lost", len(pool.jobCh), want)
}
for len(pool.jobCh) > 0 {
job := <-pool.jobCh
if failure != "walk-start" && job.ID != "pending" {
t.Fatalf("re-admitted %q", job.ID)
}
if !pool.beginJob(job) {
t.Fatal("recovered job has no owner")
}
pool.finishJob(job, nil)
}
})
})
}
}
func TestBatchDiscoverySkipsUnusableManifests(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: t.Context(), jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 1)}
attempts := 0
pool.objLayer = batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(_ context.Context, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
defer close(results)
for _, name := range []string{"canceled", "deleted", "malformed", "future", "empty-id"} {
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: name}}
}
return nil
},
read: func(_ context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
switch name {
case "deleted":
return nil, errConfigNotFound
case "malformed":
return []byte("bad manifest"), nil
case "future":
return []byte("SILO-BATCH-V999\n"), nil
case "empty-id":
return (&BatchJobRequest{}).MarshalMsg(nil)
}
// The administrator cancels after Walk, during manifest load.
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler(name, true))
job := BatchJobRequest{ID: name}
return job.MarshalMsg(nil)
},
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Hour):
t.Fatal("unusable manifests kept discovery retrying")
}
if len(pool.jobCh) != 0 || attempts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("canceled work was queued or retried: queue=%d scans=%d", len(pool.jobCh), attempts)
}
})
}
func TestBatchDiscoveryShutdownDuringBackoff(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
attempts := 0
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: ctx, objLayer: batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(context.Context, chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
return errErasureReadQuorum
},
}}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
synctest.Wait()
select {
case <-done:
t.Fatal("discovery abandoned a transient startup error")
default:
}
cancel()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("discovery did not stop on shutdown")
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("discovery scanned after shutdown: %d", attempts)
}
})
}
func TestBatchDiscoveryKeepsNewlyFinishedJobsTerminal(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: t.Context(), jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 1)}
attempts := 0
pool.objLayer = batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(_ context.Context, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
// This job was submitted and failed while startup discovery
// had not yet read any manifests. The retry must not rerun it.
job := &BatchJobRequest{ID: "new-job"}
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(job))
if !pool.beginJob(<-pool.jobCh) {
t.Fatal("submitted job has no owner")
}
pool.finishJob(job, errErasureWriteQuorum)
return errErasureReadQuorum
}
defer close(results)
if owner := pool.jobOwners["new-job"]; owner == nil || owner.state != "terminal" || owner.req != nil || owner.cancel != nil {
t.Fatalf("terminal marker lost or retained the job payload: %+v", owner)
}
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: "new-job"}}
return nil
},
read: func(_ context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
return (&BatchJobRequest{ID: name}).MarshalMsg(nil)
},
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Hour):
t.Fatal("discovery did not recover")
}
if attempts != 2 || len(pool.jobCh) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("discovery re-admitted a failed job: scans=%d queue=%d", attempts, len(pool.jobCh))
}
if !pool.discoveryDone || len(pool.jobOwners) != 0 {
t.Fatal("completed discovery retained terminal job markers")
}
job := &BatchJobRequest{ID: "after-discovery"}
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(job))
if !pool.beginJob(<-pool.jobCh) {
t.Fatal("new submission after discovery has no owner")
}
pool.finishJob(job, nil)
if len(pool.jobOwners) != 0 {
t.Fatal("normal completion after discovery leaked an owner")
}
})
}
-103
View File
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"go.yaml.in/yaml/v3"
)
// A completed expire job is not run again when the server restarts, as
// replication and key rotation jobs are not: in particular it is not checked
// against its submitter again, which could turn it into a failed job.
// An expire job that completed before the upgrade records no submitter.
func TestBatchExpireCompletedLegacyStaysComplete(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
job := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(f.expireYAML("")), job))
job.ID = "expire-legacydone" + getKeySeparator() + "0"
job.User = globalActiveCred.AccessKey
job.Started = time.Now()
mustIAM(t, job.save(f.ctx, f.obj))
ri := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type()), StartTime: job.Started, Complete: true, Objects: 3}
mustIAM(t, ri.updateAfter(f.ctx, f.obj, 0, *job))
loaded := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
f.run(t, loaded) // resumed after a restart
got := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if !got.Complete || got.Failed || got.FailureReason != "" {
t.Fatalf("complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q, want the completed state kept", got.Complete, got.Failed, got.FailureReason)
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Error("a completed job ran again")
}
}
// A new expire job completed with a temporary credential that has expired
// since.
func TestBatchExpireCompletedAfterCredentialExpiry(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-parent", "batch-full")
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(3 * time.Second).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
f.run(t, job)
if f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("the job did not expire the older version")
}
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); !ri.Complete {
t.Fatalf("complete=%v failed=%v", ri.Complete, ri.Failed)
}
time.Sleep(time.Until(cred.Expiration) + time.Second)
loaded := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
f.run(t, loaded) // resumed after a restart
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.FailureReason != "" {
t.Errorf("complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q after a restart, want the completed state kept", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
// Control: a job that did not complete is still refused once its
// credential has expired.
f.putVersions(t, "data/b")
pending := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(f.expireYAML("")), pending))
pending.ID = "expire-pending" + getKeySeparator() + "0"
pending.User = cred.AccessKey
pending.Started = time.Now()
pending.Submitter = loaded.Submitter
mustIAM(t, pending.save(f.ctx, f.obj))
f.run(t, pending)
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, pending); ri.Complete || !ri.Failed || ri.FailureReason == "" {
t.Errorf("pending job with an expired submitter: complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q, want refused", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
}
-560
View File
@@ -1,560 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/storageclass"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A batch expiration that keeps no versions purges each key it matched under
// the purge's lock. What it authorizes for the submitter, and checks for
// Object Lock, are the versions the purge deletes then, not the versions the
// walk saw before.
// batchPurgeHook runs change once, after the walk of a job and before its
// first purge of all versions.
type batchPurgeHook struct {
ObjectLayer
once sync.Once
change func()
}
func (h *batchPurgeHook) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
if opts.DeleteAllVersions {
h.once.Do(h.change)
}
return h.ObjectLayer.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
}
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) purgeYAML(prefix string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: %q
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 0
`, f.bucket, prefix)
}
// runChanged submits a purge of prefix as cred and runs it, with change made
// between its walk and its purge, and returns the job's final state.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) runChanged(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, prefix string, change func()) *batchJobInfo {
t.Helper()
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.purgeYAML(prefix))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
hook := &batchPurgeHook{ObjectLayer: f.obj, change: change}
if err := job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, hook, *job); err != nil {
t.Logf("start: %v", err)
}
return f.jobInfo(t, job)
}
// putOlder writes a version of key older than every version it has, as a
// replicated or pulled version can be, with metadata meta.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) putOlder(t *testing.T, key, versionID string, meta map[string]string) {
t.Helper()
data := []byte("older " + key)
_, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""),
ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: versionID, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour), UserDefined: meta})
mustIAM(t, err)
}
func batchPurgeVersionIDs(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key string) []string {
t.Helper()
var ids []string
marker, vmarker := "", ""
for {
res, err := f.obj.ListObjectVersions(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, marker, vmarker, "", 1000)
mustIAM(t, err)
for _, o := range res.Objects {
if o.Name == key {
ids = append(ids, o.VersionID)
}
}
if !res.IsTruncated {
return ids
}
marker, vmarker = res.NextMarker, res.NextVersionIDMarker
}
}
// A version that the submitter may not expire, because of its tags or its
// version ID, is refused although the walk did not see it so: the job fails
// and the key keeps all its versions.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeAuthorizesCurrentVersions(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
action string // the action a conditional Deny denies
deny string // its condition
// change returns the version IDs that change made.
change func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key, older string) []string
}{
{
name: "tagged-after-walk",
action: "s3:GetObjectVersion",
deny: `{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/keep":["yes"]}}`,
change: func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key, older string) []string {
_, err := f.obj.PutObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: older})
mustIAM(t, err)
return nil
},
},
{
name: "version-after-walk",
action: "s3:DeleteObjectVersion",
deny: `{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":["%s"]}}`,
change: func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key, older string) []string {
f.putOlder(t, key, batchPurgeDeniedVersion, nil)
return []string{batchPurgeDeniedVersion}
},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
deny := tc.deny
if strings.Contains(deny, "%s") {
deny = fmt.Sprintf(deny, batchPurgeDeniedVersion)
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-purge", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["`+tc.action+`"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":`+deny+`}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-purge-user", "batch-purge")
const key = "purge/key"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
want := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key)
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {
want = append(want, tc.change(t, f, key, older)...)
})
for _, id := range want {
if !f.versionExists(t, key, id) {
t.Errorf("version %s was purged although the submitter may not delete it", id)
}
}
if !ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.FailureReason == "" {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q, want a refused job", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
if ri.Objects != 0 || ri.KeysRefused != 0 {
t.Errorf("job counts objects=%d refused=%d", ri.Objects, ri.KeysRefused)
}
})
}
}
const batchPurgeDeniedVersion = "6c4b2f8e-1d3a-4e5b-9c7d-0a1b2c3d4e5f"
// A version that Object Lock protects refuses the whole key, also when it
// was added after the walk. The job completes with the key counted as
// refused, not failed.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeRefusesLockedAfterWalk(t *testing.T) {
for _, kind := range batchLockKinds {
t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
enableBucketObjectLock(t, f.bucket)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
const key = "purge/locked"
f.putVersions(t, key)
want := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key)
locked := mustGetUUID()
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {
f.putOlder(t, key, locked, batchLockMeta(kind))
want = append(want, locked)
})
for _, id := range want {
if !f.versionExists(t, key, id) {
t.Errorf("version %s of a key with a locked version was purged", id)
}
}
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.KeysRefused != 1 || ri.ObjectsFailed != 0 || ri.Objects != 0 {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v refused=%d failed objects=%d objects=%d, want complete with 1 refused key",
ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.KeysRefused, ri.ObjectsFailed, ri.Objects)
}
})
}
}
// transition marks version versionID of key as transitioned to a remote
// tier, as a lifecycle transition leaves it.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) transition(t *testing.T, key, versionID string) {
t.Helper()
set := f.obj.(*erasureServerPools).serverPools[0]
infos, errs := readAllFileInfo(f.ctx, set.getHashedSet(key).getDisks(), "", f.bucket, key, versionID, false, false)
mustIAM(t, errs[0])
fi := infos[0]
fi.TransitionStatus, fi.TransitionTier, fi.TransitionedObjName = lifecycle.TransitionComplete, "WARM", "remote/"+key+"/"+versionID
mustIAM(t, set.DecomTieredObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, fi, ObjectOptions{}))
}
// A key with a transitioned version is refused as a whole, as a key with a
// locked version is: the job completes with the key counted as refused, not
// failed, and the key keeps every version.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeRefusesTieredKey(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
const key = "purge/tiered"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
f.transition(t, key, older)
want := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key)
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {})
for _, id := range want {
if !f.versionExists(t, key, id) {
t.Errorf("version %s of a key with a transitioned version was purged", id)
}
}
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.KeysRefused != 1 || ri.ObjectsFailed != 0 || ri.Objects != 0 {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v refused=%d failed objects=%d objects=%d, want complete with 1 refused key",
ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.KeysRefused, ri.ObjectsFailed, ri.Objects)
}
}
// Controls: a purge by root and by an authorized user removes every version,
// including one added after the walk.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeAuthorizedControls(t *testing.T) {
for _, root := range []bool{true, false} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("root=%v", root), func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
cred := globalActiveCred
if !root {
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred = iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
}
const key = "purge/key"
f.putVersions(t, key)
added := mustGetUUID()
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {
f.putOlder(t, key, added, map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "keep=yes"})
})
if ids := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key); len(ids) != 0 {
t.Errorf("an authorized purge kept %v", ids)
}
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.Objects != 3 || ri.KeysRefused != 0 {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v objects=%d refused=%d, want complete with 3 objects",
ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.Objects, ri.KeysRefused)
}
})
}
}
// Cases found in the sixth review round.
// batchPurgeBudgetChange runs change once the first purge stopped at its
// budget after removing versions.
type batchPurgeBudgetChange struct {
ObjectLayer
change func()
calls int
}
func (h *batchPurgeBudgetChange) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
oi, err := h.ObjectLayer.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
if opts.DeleteAllVersions {
h.calls++
if h.calls == 1 && errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllBudget) && opts.DeleteAllResult.Removed > 0 {
h.change()
}
}
return oi, err
}
// A purge that continues after its budget authorizes the versions again, as
// they are then; the refusal and the versions already removed persist
// across another start.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeBudgetReauthorizes(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const key = "purge/budget"
oldest := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, key, nil)
middle := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, key, nil)
latest := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, key, nil)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-budget-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/keep":"yes"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-budget-user", "review6-budget-deny")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.purgeYAML("purge/"))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
oldBudget := deleteAllBudget
deleteAllBudget.versions = 1
t.Cleanup(func() { deleteAllBudget = oldBudget })
hook := &batchPurgeBudgetChange{ObjectLayer: f.obj, change: func() {
_, err := f.obj.PutObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: middle.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
}}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, hook, *job))
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if hook.calls != 2 || !ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.FailureReason == "" || ri.Objects != 1 || ri.KeysRefused != 0 {
t.Fatalf("continuation: calls=%d complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q objects=%d refused=%d", hook.calls, ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason, ri.Objects, ri.KeysRefused)
}
if f.versionExists(t, key, oldest.VersionID) || !f.versionExists(t, key, middle.VersionID) || !f.versionExists(t, key, latest.VersionID) {
t.Fatal("only the first authorized version may be removed")
}
_, err := f.obj.DeleteObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: middle.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, hook, *job))
after := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if hook.calls != 2 || after.FailureReason != ri.FailureReason || after.Objects != 1 || after.Complete {
t.Fatal("persisted refusal must prevent a fresh purge after the tags change")
}
}
// The purge's lock excludes tag writers from its authorization through its
// last delete, for a directory key in a lock domain of its own on one pool
// and for a key in a second pool.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeExcludesTagWriter(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{ldDsync, "two-pools"} {
t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
var z *erasureServerPools
var bucket string
pool, key := 0, "purge/tags/"
if mode == "two-pools" {
z, bucket = consistencyPools(t)
pool = 1
} else {
z, bucket = ldPool(t, mode)
for i := 0; ; i++ {
key = fmt.Sprintf("purge/tags-%d/", i)
if z.serverPools[0].getHashedSetIndex(encodeDirObject(key)) == 1 {
break
}
}
}
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, encodeDirObject(key), pool, "", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
entered, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
var released atomic.Bool
unblock := func() {
if released.CompareAndSwap(false, true) {
close(release)
}
}
defer unblock()
purged := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := z.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{
DeleteAllVersions: true,
DeleteAllLatest: &deleteAllMatch{VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: before.ModTime},
deleteAllAuthorize: func(versions []ObjectInfo) error {
close(entered)
select {
case <-release:
return nil
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
}
},
})
purged <- err
}()
select {
case <-entered:
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatal("purge never reached authorization")
}
written := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := z.PutObjectTags(ctx, bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
written <- err
}()
select {
case err := <-written:
t.Errorf("tag writer crossed the purge's authorization lock: %v", err)
case <-time.After(ldWait):
unblock()
err := <-written
if !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("writer must observe the completed purge: %v", err)
}
}
unblock()
mustIAM(t, <-purged)
})
}
}
// batchTagWriteFault fails metadata updates of one key, so that a tag write
// reaches only the drives it does not wrap.
type batchTagWriteFault struct {
StorageAPI
bucket, object string
}
func (d batchTagWriteFault) UpdateMetadata(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, fi FileInfo, opts UpdateMetadataOpts) error {
if bucket == d.bucket && object == d.object {
return errDiskNotFound
}
return d.StorageAPI.UpdateMetadata(ctx, bucket, object, fi, opts)
}
// A failed tag write can leave a revision that the submitter may not expire
// on a minority of drives. The purge removes it with the version, so it is
// authorized too.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeAuthorizesDriveRevisions(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
// One drive of sixteen holds the failed tag write, so the read quorum of
// the metadata must stay below sixteen. Earlier tests can leave a
// storage class of parity 0 behind (newTestConfig on a single drive).
previous := globalStorageClass
globalStorageClass.Update(storageclass.Config{Standard: storageclass.StorageClass{Parity: 4}})
t.Cleanup(func() { globalStorageClass.Update(previous) })
z := purgeSinglePool(t, 16)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
f := &batchAuthzFixture{ctx: t.Context(), sys: globalIAMSys, obj: z, bucket: "review6-batch-authz"}
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(f.ctx, f.bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
batchTestJobPool(f.ctx, t, z)
const key = "purge/minority-tags"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-minority-deny", strings.ReplaceAll(batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/keep":"yes"}}}`, "batch-authz", f.bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-minority-user", "review6-minority-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectVersionAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: key, versionID: older, tags: "keep=yes"}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: this tag revision must deny the read needed for expiration")
}
set := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(key)
original := set.getDisks
disks := append([]StorageAPI(nil), original()...)
wrapped := append([]StorageAPI(nil), disks...)
for i := 1; i < len(wrapped); i++ {
wrapped[i] = batchTagWriteFault{StorageAPI: wrapped[i], bucket: f.bucket, object: key}
}
set.getDisks = func() []StorageAPI { return wrapped }
_, err = f.obj.PutObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: older, UserDefined: map[string]string{
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}})
set.getDisks = original
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("control: the tag write must fail its quorum")
}
fi, err := disks[0].ReadVersion(f.ctx, "", f.bucket, key, older, ReadOptions{})
mustIAM(t, err)
if fi.Metadata[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] != "keep=yes" {
t.Fatal("control: the successful drive must hold the denied tag revision")
}
history, err := z.deleteAllHistory(f.ctx, f.bucket, key)
mustIAM(t, err)
for _, v := range history {
for _, c := range v.copies {
if c.fi.Metadata[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] != "" {
t.Fatal("control: the quorum history must still have the original tags")
}
}
}
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {})
if !ri.Failed || ri.Complete || !strings.Contains(ri.FailureReason, "is not allowed") {
t.Errorf("denied physical revision must refuse the job: complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
if _, err := disks[0].ReadVersion(f.ctx, "", f.bucket, key, older, ReadOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Errorf("denied physical revision was removed: %v", err)
}
if got := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key); len(got) != 2 {
t.Errorf("denial must keep the whole key; remaining versions=%v", got)
}
}
// Cases found in the seventh review round.
// The time the authorization takes counts against the purge's budget: a
// late allow and a deny both delete nothing.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeBudgetIncludesAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
z := purgeSinglePool(t, 16)
p := newPurgeTest(t, z, "review7-purge-auth-time", MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}, "")
const key = "purge/key"
p.version(0, key, "older", 2)
p.version(0, key, "latest", 1)
exp := p.matched(key)
oldBudget := deleteAllBudget
deleteAllBudget.duration = 10 * time.Millisecond
t.Cleanup(func() { deleteAllBudget = oldBudget })
denied := errors.New("review7: revision denied")
for _, decision := range []error{nil, denied} {
called := false
var res deleteAllResult
_, err := z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), p.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{
DeleteAllVersions: true,
DeleteAllLatest: &deleteAllMatch{VersionID: exp.VersionID, ModTime: exp.ModTime},
DeleteAllResult: &res,
deleteAllAuthorize: func(versions []ObjectInfo) error {
called = true
if len(versions) < 2 {
t.Error("authorization did not receive both approved versions")
}
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
return decision
},
})
want := decision
if want == nil {
want = errDeleteAllBudget
}
if !called || !errors.Is(err, want) || res.Started || res.Complete || res.Removed != 0 {
t.Errorf("late authorization: called=%v err=%v result=%+v", called, err, res)
}
if got := p.held(0, key); len(got) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("purge removed versions after late authorization: %v", got)
}
}
}
// A listing outage pauses without moving the cursor or refusing the job;
// a later run completes it in both modes.
func TestBatchExpireWalkFailureResumes(t *testing.T) {
for _, purgeAll := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "retain-one"
if purgeAll {
name = "retain-zero"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const key = "data/key"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
definition := f.expireYAML("data/")
if purgeAll {
definition = f.purgeYAML("data/")
}
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, definition)
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
listErr := errors.New("review7: transient listing failure")
err := job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchWalkError{ObjectLayer: f.obj, err: listErr}, *job)
if !errors.Is(err, listErr) {
t.Fatalf("listing error: %v", err)
}
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.PausedReason == "" || ri.FailureReason != "" || ri.Object != "" || !f.versionExists(t, key, older) {
t.Fatalf("listing failure changed progress or became terminal: failed=%v complete=%v reason=%q cursor=%q", ri.Failed, ri.Complete, ri.FailureReason, ri.Object)
}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
ri = f.jobInfo(t, job)
wantRemoved := int64(1)
if purgeAll {
wantRemoved = 2
}
if ri.Failed || !ri.Complete || ri.FailureReason != "" || ri.Objects != wantRemoved || f.versionExists(t, key, older) {
t.Fatalf("resume did not complete: failed=%v complete=%v reason=%q removed=%d", ri.Failed, ri.Complete, ri.FailureReason, ri.Objects)
}
})
}
}
+178 -342
View File
@@ -27,18 +27,16 @@ import (
"net/http"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/versioning"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
xioutil "github.com/minio/minio/internal/ioutil"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/wildcard"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/workers"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/xtime"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/wildcard"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/workers"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/xtime"
"go.yaml.in/yaml/v3"
)
@@ -291,6 +289,16 @@ type BatchJobExpire struct {
var _ yaml.Unmarshaler = &BatchJobExpire{}
// RedactSensitive will redact any sensitive information in b.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) RedactSensitive() {
if r == nil {
return
}
if r.NotificationCfg.Token != "" {
r.NotificationCfg.Token = redactedText
}
}
// UnmarshalYAML - BatchJobExpire extends default unmarshal to extract line, col information.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) UnmarshalYAML(val *yaml.Node) error {
type expireJob BatchJobExpire
@@ -337,6 +345,32 @@ func (r BatchJobExpire) Notify(ctx context.Context, body io.Reader) error {
return nil
}
// Expire expires object versions which have already matched supplied filter conditions
func (r *BatchJobExpire) Expire(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, vc *versioning.Versioning, objsToDel []ObjectToDelete) []error {
opts := ObjectOptions{
PrefixEnabledFn: vc.PrefixEnabled,
VersionSuspended: vc.Suspended(),
}
allErrs := make([]error, 0, len(objsToDel))
for {
count := len(objsToDel)
if count == 0 {
break
}
if count > maxDeleteList {
count = maxDeleteList
}
_, errs := api.DeleteObjects(ctx, r.Bucket, objsToDel[:count], opts)
allErrs = append(allErrs, errs...)
// Next batch of deletion
objsToDel = objsToDel[count:]
}
return allErrs
}
const (
batchExpireName = "batch-expire.bin"
batchExpireFormat = 1
@@ -347,230 +381,22 @@ const (
batchExpireJobDefaultRetryDelay = 250 * time.Millisecond
)
type expireObjInfo struct {
ObjectInfo
ExpireAll bool
DeleteMarkerCount int64
type objInfoCache map[string]*ObjectInfo
func newObjInfoCache() objInfoCache {
return objInfoCache(make(map[string]*ObjectInfo))
}
// isErrObjectLocked reports a version that Object Lock protects.
func isErrObjectLocked(err error) bool {
var locked ObjectLocked
return errors.As(err, &locked)
func (oiCache objInfoCache) Add(toDel ObjectToDelete, oi *ObjectInfo) {
oiCache[fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", toDel.ObjectName, toDel.VersionID)] = oi
}
func (r *BatchJobExpire) tagsFiltered() bool {
for _, rule := range r.Rules {
if len(rule.Tags) > 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
func (oiCache objInfoCache) Get(toDel ObjectToDelete) (*ObjectInfo, bool) {
oi, ok := oiCache[fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", toDel.ObjectName, toDel.VersionID)]
return oi, ok
}
// expireAuthzRequests are the actions the job takes on one version: it reads
// the version, and its tags when a rule filters by them, and deletes it.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireAuthzRequests(name, versionID, userTags string) []batchAuthzRequest {
if versionID == "" {
versionID = nullVersionID
}
reqs := []batchAuthzRequest{
{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
{action: policy.GetObjectVersionAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
{action: policy.DeleteObjectAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
{action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
}
if r.tagsFiltered() {
reqs = append(reqs,
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectVersionTaggingAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
)
}
return reqs
}
// expireVersion deletes one version that is older than the versions the rule
// retains. Under the object's write lock, with the version as it is then, it
// leaves a version that Object Lock protects (ObjectLocked) and refuses one
// that the submitter may not delete (batchJobAuthzError). An unreadable
// version is not deleted.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireVersion(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, vc *versioning.Versioning, job BatchJobRequest, exp expireObjInfo) error {
p, err := job.Submitter.principal(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
versionID := exp.VersionID
if versionID == "" {
// An empty version ID would add a delete marker instead.
versionID = nullVersionID
}
opts := ObjectOptions{
VersionID: versionID,
Versioned: vc.PrefixEnabled(exp.Name),
VersionSuspended: vc.Suspended(),
}
opts.SetEvalRetentionBypassFn(func(goi ObjectInfo, gerr error) error {
// A delete marker reads as MethodNotAllowed; any other error,
// including a missing version, stops the delete.
marker := isErrMethodNotAllowed(gerr) && (goi.DeleteMarker || !goi.VersionPurgeStatus.Empty())
if gerr != nil && !marker {
return gerr
}
if enforceRetentionForDeletion(ctx, goi) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: r.Bucket, Object: exp.Name, VersionID: versionID}
}
for _, req := range r.expireAuthzRequests(exp.Name, versionID, goi.UserTags) {
if err := p.authorize(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
})
_, err = api.DeleteObject(ctx, r.Bucket, exp.Name, opts)
return err
}
// expireVersions deletes the versions of one batch entry and records the
// outcome in res. It returns an error that ends the job.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireVersions(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, vc *versioning.Versioning, job BatchJobRequest, ri *batchJobInfo, exp expireObjInfo, retryAttempts int, delay time.Duration, res *batchCounts) error {
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return err
}
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
err := r.expireVersion(ctx, api, vc, job, exp)
stopFn(exp, err)
switch {
case err == nil:
if exp.DeleteMarker {
ri.countRemoved(r.Bucket, 0, 1)
} else {
ri.countRemoved(r.Bucket, 1, 0)
}
return nil
case isBatchJobStopped(err):
return err
case isErrObjectLocked(err):
// Left in place, not retried and not a failure.
res.versionsSkipped++
return nil
case isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isErrObjectNotFound(err):
// Removed concurrently.
return nil
}
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s versionID=%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", r.Bucket, exp.Name, exp.VersionID, err, attempts))
if attempts < retryAttempts {
time.Sleep(delay)
}
}
if exp.DeleteMarker {
res.deleteMarkersFailed++
} else {
res.objectsFailed++
}
return nil
}
// expireAllVersions purges every version of a key whose rule retains none,
// with the purge of exactly that key (erasureServerPools.deleteAllVersions),
// while the version the walk matched is still its latest. Under its lock,
// before it deletes anything, the purge refuses the key when a version is
// transitioned or Object Lock protects one, and has every write it would
// delete, each copy and each revision a drive holds, authorized for the
// submitter, with the version ID and tags it has then.
//
// What the purge removed is counted at once; a refused key is counted in res
// as refused, and the versions a failed purge left in res as failures. A
// failed purge is retried up to retryAttempts times, each time with the
// version the walk matched; a purge that stopped at its budget after
// removing versions continues without spending an attempt. A key whose
// latest version changed since the walk is not expired. It returns an error
// that ends the job: an authorization failure or the end of ctx.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireAllVersions(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest, ri *batchJobInfo, exp expireObjInfo, retryAttempts int, res *batchCounts) error {
var objects, markers int64
matched := deleteAllMatch{VersionID: exp.VersionID, ModTime: exp.ModTime}
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return err
}
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
latest := matched
var purge deleteAllResult
p, err := job.Submitter.principal(ctx)
if err == nil {
_, err = api.DeleteObject(ctx, exp.Bucket, encodeDirObject(exp.Name), ObjectOptions{
DeleteAllVersions: true,
DeleteAllLatest: &latest,
DeleteAllResult: &purge,
deleteAllAuthorize: r.expireAllAuthorize(p, exp.Name),
})
}
// Removed versions are gone for any later run: count them now.
if purge.Removed > 0 {
ri.countRemoved(r.Bucket, int64(purge.Removed-purge.Markers), int64(purge.Markers))
objects += int64(purge.Removed - purge.Markers)
markers += int64(purge.Markers)
}
stopFn(exp, err)
switch {
case err == nil:
return nil
case isBatchJobStopped(err):
return err
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllChanged):
// Changed since the walk matched it: not expired.
return nil
case isErrObjectLocked(err), errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllTiered):
// Refused as a whole: nothing removed, not retried and not a
// failure. A later run of the job checks the key again.
res.keysRefused++
return nil
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllBudget) && purge.Removed > 0:
attempts-- // progress
continue
}
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return err
}
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", exp.Bucket, exp.Name, err, attempts))
}
res.expireAllFailed(exp, objects, markers)
return nil
}
// expireAllAuthorize returns the authorization of a purge of all versions of
// name for p: each version the purge would delete, as it holds it, needs the
// actions of expiring it (expireAuthzRequests).
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireAllAuthorize(p batchJobPrincipal, name string) func([]ObjectInfo) error {
return func(versions []ObjectInfo) error {
for _, v := range versions {
for _, req := range r.expireAuthzRequests(name, v.VersionID, v.UserTags) {
if err := p.authorize(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
}
// expireAllFailed counts the versions of info, as the walk saw them, that a
// failed purge of all its versions did not remove: those beyond the objects
// and markers it removed, at least one.
func (c *batchCounts) expireAllFailed(info expireObjInfo, objects, markers int64) {
failedObjects := max(int64(info.NumVersions)-info.DeleteMarkerCount-objects, 0)
failedMarkers := max(info.DeleteMarkerCount-markers, 0)
if failedObjects+failedMarkers == 0 {
failedObjects = 1
}
c.objectsFailed += failedObjects
c.deleteMarkersFailed += failedMarkers
}
// batchObjsForDelete expires the batches of expireCh. walkDone reports, once
// expireCh is closed, whether the walk reached its end: only then is its last
// key known to be complete.
func batchObjsForDelete(ctx context.Context, refuse func(error), walkDone func() bool, r *BatchJobExpire, ri *batchJobInfo, job BatchJobRequest, api ObjectLayer, wk *workers.Workers, expireCh <-chan []expireObjInfo) {
func batchObjsForDelete(ctx context.Context, r *BatchJobExpire, ri *batchJobInfo, job BatchJobRequest, api ObjectLayer, wk *workers.Workers, expireCh <-chan []expireObjInfo) {
vc, _ := globalBucketVersioningSys.Get(r.Bucket)
retryAttempts := job.Expire.Retry.Attempts
if retryAttempts <= 0 {
@@ -581,53 +407,130 @@ func batchObjsForDelete(ctx context.Context, refuse func(error), walkDone func()
delay = batchExpireJobDefaultRetryDelay
}
progress := newBatchProgress(ri, r.Bucket)
defer func() {
wk.Wait()
if walkDone() {
progress.finish()
}
}()
var i int
for toExpire := range expireCh {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
seq := progress.begin()
if seq > 0 {
if i > 0 {
if wait := globalBatchConfig.ExpirationWait(); wait > 0 {
time.Sleep(wait)
}
}
i++
wk.Take()
go func(seq uint64, toExpire []expireObjInfo) {
go func(toExpire []expireObjInfo) {
defer wk.Give()
var res batchCounts
toExpireAll := make([]expireObjInfo, 0, len(toExpire))
toDel := make([]ObjectToDelete, 0, len(toExpire))
oiCache := newObjInfoCache()
for _, exp := range toExpire {
var err error
if exp.ExpireAll {
err = r.expireAllVersions(ctx, api, job, ri, exp, retryAttempts, &res)
} else {
err = r.expireVersions(ctx, api, vc, job, ri, exp, retryAttempts, delay, &res)
toExpireAll = append(toExpireAll, exp)
continue
}
if err != nil {
// The batch is not done; a later run does it again.
if isBatchJobStopped(err) {
refuse(err)
// Cache ObjectInfo value via pointers for
// subsequent use to track objects which
// couldn't be deleted.
od := ObjectToDelete{
ObjectV: ObjectV{
ObjectName: exp.Name,
VersionID: exp.VersionID,
},
}
toDel = append(toDel, od)
oiCache.Add(od, &exp.ObjectInfo)
}
// DeleteObject(deletePrefix: true) to expire all versions of an object
for _, exp := range toExpireAll {
var success bool
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
ri.trackMultipleObjectVersions(exp, success)
return
default:
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(ri.JobID, ri)
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
_, err := api.DeleteObject(ctx, exp.Bucket, encodeDirObject(exp.Name), ObjectOptions{
DeletePrefix: true,
DeletePrefixObject: true, // use prefix delete on exact object (this is an optimization to avoid fan-out calls)
})
if err != nil {
stopFn(exp, err)
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", exp.Bucket, exp.Name, err, attempts))
} else {
stopFn(exp, err)
success = true
break
}
}
ri.trackMultipleObjectVersions(exp, success)
}
// DeleteMultiple objects
toDelCopy := make([]ObjectToDelete, len(toDel))
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
// Copying toDel to select from objects whose
// deletion failed
copy(toDelCopy, toDel)
var failed int
errs := r.Expire(ctx, api, vc, toDel)
// reslice toDel in preparation for next retry attempt
toDel = toDel[:0]
for i, err := range errs {
if err != nil {
stopFn(toDelCopy[i], err)
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s versionID=%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", ri.Bucket, toDelCopy[i].ObjectName, toDelCopy[i].VersionID,
err, attempts))
failed++
if oi, ok := oiCache.Get(toDelCopy[i]); ok {
ri.trackCurrentBucketObject(r.Bucket, *oi, false, attempts)
}
if attempts != retryAttempts {
// retry
toDel = append(toDel, toDelCopy[i])
}
} else {
stopFn(toDelCopy[i], nil)
if oi, ok := oiCache.Get(toDelCopy[i]); ok {
ri.trackCurrentBucketObject(r.Bucket, *oi, true, attempts)
}
}
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(ri.JobID, ri)
if failed == 0 {
break
}
// Add a delay between retry attempts
if attempts < retryAttempts {
time.Sleep(delay)
}
}
if n := len(toExpire); n > 0 {
progress.done(seq, toExpire[n-1].Name, res)
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(ri.JobID, ri)
}(seq, toExpire)
}(toExpire)
}
}
type expireObjInfo struct {
ObjectInfo
ExpireAll bool
DeleteMarkerCount int64
}
// Start the batch expiration job, resumes if there was a pending job via "job.ID"
func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest) error {
ri := &batchJobInfo{
@@ -636,15 +539,6 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
StartTime: job.Started,
}
if err := ri.loadOrInit(ctx, api, job); err != nil {
return batchUnavailable("loading job progress", err)
}
// A completed job is not run again, as replication and key rotation
// jobs are not: its submitter is not checked again either, so a
// credential that expired since cannot turn it into a failed job.
if ri.Complete {
return nil
}
if done, err := ri.startAuthorized(ctx, api, job); done || err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -666,47 +560,27 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
ctx, cancelCause := context.WithCancelCause(ctx)
defer cancelCause(nil)
// refuse ends the job for its submitter: record why before stopping.
refuse := func(err error) {
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
ri.pause(err)
} else {
ri.refuse(err)
}
cancelCause(err)
}
// The walk stops at a listing failure: work after it is left to a later
// run, so the cursor cannot move past what was not listed.
walkCtx, stopWalk := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer stopWalk()
results := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], workerSize)
go func() {
// One ascending walk over disjoint prefixes, which the cursor
// describes.
for _, prefix := range batchCanonicalPrefixes(r.Prefix.F()) {
if walkCtx.Err() != nil {
break
}
prefixes := r.Prefix.F()
if len(prefixes) == 0 {
prefixes = []string{""}
}
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
prefixResultCh := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], workerSize)
err := api.Walk(walkCtx, r.Bucket, prefix, prefixResultCh, WalkOptions{
err := api.Walk(ctx, r.Bucket, prefix, prefixResultCh, WalkOptions{
Marker: lastObject,
LatestOnly: false, // we need to visit all versions of the object to implement purge: retainVersions
VersionsSort: WalkVersionsSortDesc,
})
if err != nil {
if walkCtx.Err() == nil {
cancelCause(batchListingError(err))
}
cancelCause(err)
xioutil.SafeClose(results)
return
}
for result := range prefixResultCh {
select {
case results <- result:
case <-walkCtx.Done():
// Stopped: let the walk end without a reader.
}
results <- result
}
}
xioutil.SafeClose(results)
@@ -714,9 +588,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
// Goroutine to periodically save batch-expire job's in-memory state
saverQuitCh := make(chan struct{})
saverDoneCh := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(saverDoneCh)
saveTicker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Second)
defer saveTicker.Stop()
quit := false
@@ -743,10 +615,9 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
expireCh := make(chan []expireObjInfo, workerSize)
expireDoneCh := make(chan struct{})
var walkDone atomic.Bool
go func() {
defer close(expireDoneCh)
batchObjsForDelete(ctx, refuse, walkDone.Load, r, ri, job, api, wk, expireCh)
batchObjsForDelete(ctx, r, ri, job, api, wk, expireCh)
}()
var (
@@ -758,8 +629,6 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
done bool
)
deleteMarkerCountMap := map[string]int64{}
// pushToExpire is called between keys only, so that a batch holds all
// the versions of its keys and its last key is done with it.
pushToExpire := func() {
// set preObject deleteMarkerCount
if len(toDel) > 0 {
@@ -784,7 +653,6 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
}
}
}
var listingErr error
for {
select {
case result, ok := <-results:
@@ -794,14 +662,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
}
if result.Err != nil {
failed = true
listingErr = batchListingError(result.Err)
batchLogIf(ctx, result.Err)
stopWalk()
done = true
break
}
if !batchResumeAfter(lastObject, result.Item.Name) {
// Completed by the run that set the cursor.
continue
}
if result.Item.DeleteMarker {
@@ -859,6 +720,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
toDel = append(toDel, expireObjInfo{
ObjectInfo: result.Item,
})
pushToExpire()
case <-ctx.Done():
done = true
}
@@ -867,15 +729,16 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
}
}
if context.Cause(ctx) == nil {
walkDone.Store(!failed)
pushToExpire()
// Send any remaining objects downstream
if len(toDel) > 0 {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case expireCh <- toDel:
}
if context.Cause(ctx) != nil {
xioutil.SafeClose(expireCh)
return context.Cause(ctx)
}
pushToExpire()
// Send any remaining objects downstream
if len(toDel) > 0 {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case expireCh <- toDel:
}
}
xioutil.SafeClose(expireCh)
@@ -883,40 +746,13 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
<-expireDoneCh // waits for the expire goroutine to complete
wk.Wait() // waits for all expire workers to retire
// Persist the final state once the saver has stopped, so that its last
// save cannot overwrite it.
xioutil.SafeClose(saverQuitCh)
<-saverDoneCh
refused := ri.refused()
cause := context.Cause(ctx)
if cause == nil {
cause = listingErr
}
if cause != nil && !refused {
if isBatchJobUnavailable(cause) {
return ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, cause)
}
if isErrBucketNotFound(cause) {
ri.mu.Lock()
ri.Failed = true
ri.mu.Unlock()
}
saveCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(GlobalContext, 30*time.Second)
batchLogIf(saveCtx, ri.updateAfter(saveCtx, api, 0, job))
cancel()
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
return cause
}
ri.mu.Lock()
itemsFailed := ri.expireFailures()
ri.Complete = !refused && !failed && !itemsFailed
ri.Failed = refused || failed || itemsFailed
ri.mu.Unlock()
ri.Complete = !failed && ri.ObjectsFailed == 0
ri.Failed = failed || ri.ObjectsFailed > 0
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
saveCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(GlobalContext, 30*time.Second)
batchLogIf(saveCtx, ri.updateAfter(saveCtx, api, 0, job))
cancel()
// Close the saverQuitCh - this also triggers saving in-memory state
// immediately one last time before we exit this method.
xioutil.SafeClose(saverQuitCh)
// Notify expire jobs final status to the configured endpoint
buf, _ := json.Marshal(ri)
+186 -637
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+9 -178
View File
@@ -179,24 +179,6 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
return
}
}
case "Submitter":
if dc.IsNil() {
err = dc.ReadNil()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
z.Submitter = nil
} else {
if z.Submitter == nil {
z.Submitter = new(batchJobSubmitter)
}
err = z.Submitter.DecodeMsg(dc)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
@@ -210,9 +192,9 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
// EncodeMsg implements msgp.Encodable
func (z *BatchJobRequest) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
// map header, size 7
// map header, size 6
// write "ID"
err = en.Append(0x87, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
err = en.Append(0x86, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
if err != nil {
return
}
@@ -292,32 +274,15 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
return
}
}
// write "Submitter"
err = en.Append(0xa9, 0x53, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
if z.Submitter == nil {
err = en.WriteNil()
if err != nil {
return
}
} else {
err = z.Submitter.EncodeMsg(en)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
return
}
// MarshalMsg implements msgp.Marshaler
func (z *BatchJobRequest) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
o = msgp.Require(b, z.Msgsize())
// map header, size 7
// map header, size 6
// string "ID"
o = append(o, 0x87, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
o = append(o, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.ID)
// string "User"
o = append(o, 0xa4, 0x55, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72)
@@ -358,17 +323,6 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
return
}
}
// string "Submitter"
o = append(o, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72)
if z.Submitter == nil {
o = msgp.AppendNil(o)
} else {
o, err = z.Submitter.MarshalMsg(o)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
return
}
@@ -459,23 +413,6 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
return
}
}
case "Submitter":
if msgp.IsNil(bts) {
bts, err = msgp.ReadNilBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
return
}
z.Submitter = nil
} else {
if z.Submitter == nil {
z.Submitter = new(batchJobSubmitter)
}
bts, err = z.Submitter.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
@@ -508,12 +445,6 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) Msgsize() (s int) {
} else {
s += z.Expire.Msgsize()
}
s += 10
if z.Submitter == nil {
s += msgp.NilSize
} else {
s += z.Submitter.Msgsize()
}
return
}
@@ -637,30 +568,6 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "BytesFailed")
return
}
case "vsl":
z.VersionsSkippedLocked, err = dc.ReadInt64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "VersionsSkippedLocked")
return
}
case "kr":
z.KeysRefused, err = dc.ReadInt64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "KeysRefused")
return
}
case "fr":
z.FailureReason, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "FailureReason")
return
}
case "pr":
z.PausedReason, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "PausedReason")
return
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
@@ -674,9 +581,9 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
// EncodeMsg implements msgp.Encodable
func (z *batchJobInfo) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
// map header, size 21
// map header, size 17
// write "v"
err = en.Append(0xde, 0x0, 0x15, 0xa1, 0x76)
err = en.Append(0xde, 0x0, 0x11, 0xa1, 0x76)
if err != nil {
return
}
@@ -845,55 +752,15 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "BytesFailed")
return
}
// write "vsl"
err = en.Append(0xa3, 0x76, 0x73, 0x6c)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteInt64(z.VersionsSkippedLocked)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "VersionsSkippedLocked")
return
}
// write "kr"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x6b, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteInt64(z.KeysRefused)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "KeysRefused")
return
}
// write "fr"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x66, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.FailureReason)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "FailureReason")
return
}
// write "pr"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x70, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.PausedReason)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "PausedReason")
return
}
return
}
// MarshalMsg implements msgp.Marshaler
func (z *batchJobInfo) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
o = msgp.Require(b, z.Msgsize())
// map header, size 21
// map header, size 17
// string "v"
o = append(o, 0xde, 0x0, 0x15, 0xa1, 0x76)
o = append(o, 0xde, 0x0, 0x11, 0xa1, 0x76)
o = msgp.AppendInt(o, z.Version)
// string "jid"
o = append(o, 0xa3, 0x6a, 0x69, 0x64)
@@ -943,18 +810,6 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
// string "bf"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x62, 0x66)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.BytesFailed)
// string "vsl"
o = append(o, 0xa3, 0x76, 0x73, 0x6c)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.VersionsSkippedLocked)
// string "kr"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x6b, 0x72)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.KeysRefused)
// string "fr"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x66, 0x72)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.FailureReason)
// string "pr"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x70, 0x72)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.PausedReason)
return
}
@@ -1078,30 +933,6 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "BytesFailed")
return
}
case "vsl":
z.VersionsSkippedLocked, bts, err = msgp.ReadInt64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "VersionsSkippedLocked")
return
}
case "kr":
z.KeysRefused, bts, err = msgp.ReadInt64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "KeysRefused")
return
}
case "fr":
z.FailureReason, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "FailureReason")
return
}
case "pr":
z.PausedReason, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "PausedReason")
return
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
@@ -1116,6 +947,6 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *batchJobInfo) Msgsize() (s int) {
s = 3 + 2 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobID) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobType) + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Bucket) + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Object) + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.FailureReason) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.PausedReason)
s = 3 + 2 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobID) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobType) + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Bucket) + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Object) + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size
return
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/wildcard"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/wildcard"
"go.yaml.in/yaml/v3"
)
-479
View File
@@ -1,479 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/amztime"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
var batchLockKinds = []string{"COMPLIANCE", "GOVERNANCE", "LEGALHOLD"}
func batchLockMeta(kind string) map[string]string {
m := map[string]string{}
switch kind {
case "COMPLIANCE", "GOVERNANCE":
m[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode)] = kind
m[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate)] = amztime.ISO8601Format(UTCNow().Add(24 * time.Hour))
case "LEGALHOLD":
m[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = "ON"
}
return m
}
func batchPutVersion(t *testing.T, obj ObjectLayer, bucket, key string, meta map[string]string) ObjectInfo {
t.Helper()
data := []byte("batch lock " + key)
oi, err := obj.PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""),
ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return oi
}
func batchVersionExists(t *testing.T, obj ObjectLayer, bucket, key, versionID string) bool {
t.Helper()
_, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID})
switch {
case err == nil:
return true
case isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isErrObjectNotFound(err):
return false
}
t.Fatal(err)
return false
}
// batchJobStatusJSON returns the status response of a job as decoded JSON.
func batchJobStatusJSON(t *testing.T, jobID string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
cred := globalActiveCred
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/minio/admin/v3/status-job?jobId="+jobID, 0, nil, cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err = req.ParseForm(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "BatchJobStatus"))
adminAPIHandlers{}.BatchJobStatus(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var out struct{ LastMetric map[string]any }
if err = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return out.LastMetric
}
// Batch expiration keeps versions under retention or legal hold, on both
// purge paths, and reports them; unlocked versions are still expired.
func TestBatchExpireObjectLock(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
f := &batchAuthzFixture{ctx: t.Context(), obj: obj, bucket: bucket}
batchTestJobPool(t.Context(), t, obj)
type version struct{ key, id string }
var locked, unlocked []version
for _, retain := range []int{0, 1} {
for _, kind := range batchLockKinds {
key := fmt.Sprintf("r%d/%s", retain, kind)
older := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, batchLockMeta(kind))
batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, nil)
locked = append(locked, version{key, older.VersionID})
}
key := fmt.Sprintf("r%d/plain", retain)
older := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, nil)
batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, nil)
unlocked = append(unlocked, version{key, older.VersionID})
}
var jobs []*BatchJobRequest
for _, retain := range []int{0, 1} {
job := fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: r%d/
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: %d
`, bucket, retain, retain)
rec, queued := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, job)
if queued == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: submission status %d: %s", instance, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// Running a job again, as a resumed job does, must not count
// the versions it left a second time.
f.run(t, queued)
f.run(t, queued)
jobs = append(jobs, queued)
}
for _, v := range locked {
if !batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, v.key, v.id) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: locked version %s was expired", instance, v.key, v.id)
}
}
for _, v := range unlocked {
if batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, v.key, v.id) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: control: unlocked version %s was not expired", instance, v.key, v.id)
}
}
for i, field := range []string{"keysRefused", "versionsSkippedLocked"} {
m := batchJobStatusJSON(t, jobs[i].ID)
if got, _ := m[field].(float64); got != float64(len(batchLockKinds)) {
t.Errorf("%s: retain %d: %s = %v, want %d", instance, i, field, m[field], len(batchLockKinds))
}
if m["complete"] != true || m["failed"] != false {
t.Errorf("%s: retain %d: complete=%v failed=%v", instance, i, m["complete"], m["failed"])
}
}
},
})
}
type batchLockTransport func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f batchLockTransport) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return f(r) }
// batchLockRemote is a source that serves replacement for every read.
func batchLockRemote(t *testing.T, replacement string) *minio.Core {
t.Helper()
core, err := minio.NewCore("source.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("batch-access", "batch-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{
"Content-Length": []string{strconv.Itoa(len(replacement))},
"Last-Modified": []string{UTCNow().Format(http.TimeFormat)},
"Etag": []string{"\"batchetag\""},
}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(replacement)), ContentLength: int64(len(replacement)), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return core
}
func batchRootSubmitter(t *testing.T) *batchJobSubmitter {
t.Helper()
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(globalActiveCred)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return sub
}
// A pull leaves a destination version under Object Lock as it is, whether a
// single PUT, a multipart completion or a delete marker would replace it.
func TestBatchPullObjectLock(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
const replacement = "replacement from remote"
core := batchLockRemote(t, replacement)
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote-bucket"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
}
for _, kind := range batchLockKinds {
for _, path := range []string{"put", "multipart", "marker", "directory"} {
key := "pull/" + kind + "/" + path
if path == "directory" {
key += "/"
}
before := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, batchLockMeta(kind))
src := ObjectInfo{Name: key, VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: map[string]string{}}
switch path {
case "multipart":
src.ETag = "batchetag-1"
case "marker":
src.DeleteMarker = true
}
err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, src, false, sub)
if !isErrObjectLocked(err) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: pull returned %v, want ObjectLocked", instance, key, err)
}
after, gerr := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
if gerr != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: locked version lost: %v", instance, key, gerr)
continue
}
if !enforceRetentionForDeletion(t.Context(), after) || after.ETag != before.ETag {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: locked version was replaced", instance, key)
}
}
}
// Controls: a new version, and a new delete marker that hides a
// locked version without replacing it.
locked := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, "pull/new", batchLockMeta("COMPLIANCE"))
newVersion := mustGetUUID()
if err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/new", VersionID: newVersion, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: new version: %v", instance, err)
}
if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, obj, bucket, "pull/new", ObjectOptions{VersionID: newVersion}); string(got) != replacement {
t.Errorf("%s: new version content %q", instance, got)
}
marker := mustGetUUID()
if err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/new", VersionID: marker, ModTime: UTCNow(), DeleteMarker: true,
}, false, sub); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: new marker: %v", instance, err)
}
if !batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, "pull/new", locked.VersionID) {
t.Errorf("%s: a new marker removed a locked version", instance)
}
},
})
}
// A pull applies retention as a PUT to the destination would: copied
// retention is validated, and a version without one gets the bucket default.
func TestBatchPullRetentionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
meta.ObjectLockConfigXML = []byte(`<ObjectLockConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><ObjectLockEnabled>Enabled</ObjectLockEnabled><Rule><DefaultRetention><Mode>GOVERNANCE</Mode><Days>1</Days></DefaultRetention></Rule></ObjectLockConfiguration>`)
meta.VersioningConfigXML = enabledBucketVersioningConfig
if err = meta.parseAllConfigs(t.Context(), obj); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, meta)
core := batchLockRemote(t, "retention content")
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote-bucket"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
}
pull := func(key string, meta map[string]string) (ObjectInfo, error) {
vid := mustGetUUID()
err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, ObjectInfo{Name: key, VersionID: vid, ModTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: meta}, false, sub)
if err != nil {
return ObjectInfo{}, err
}
return obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: vid})
}
oi, err := pull("retention/default", map[string]string{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ret := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(oi.UserDefined)
if ret.Mode != objectlock.RetGovernance || !ret.RetainUntilDate.After(UTCNow().Add(23*time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("%s: default retention not applied with the destination's time: %+v", instance, ret)
}
until := UTCNow().Add(48 * time.Hour)
oi, err = pull("retention/copied", map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode: "COMPLIANCE", xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate: amztime.ISO8601Format(until),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ret = objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(oi.UserDefined); ret.Mode != objectlock.RetCompliance || !ret.RetainUntilDate.Equal(until.Truncate(time.Millisecond)) {
t.Errorf("%s: copied retention: %+v", instance, ret)
}
if _, err = pull("retention/invalid", map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode: "FOREVER", xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate: amztime.ISO8601Format(until)}); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: invalid copied retention was accepted", instance)
}
},
})
}
// Key rotation does not rewrite a version under Object Lock.
func TestBatchKeyRotationObjectLock(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject", "GetObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("batch-lock-key")
defer func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS }()
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
job := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
for _, kind := range append([]string{"none"}, batchLockKinds...) {
key := "rotate/" + kind
headers := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption: xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES}
switch kind {
case "COMPLIANCE", "GOVERNANCE":
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode] = kind
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate] = UTCNow().Add(24 * time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339)
case "LEGALHOLD":
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold] = "ON"
}
putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, key, []byte("rotate "+kind), headers)
before, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil || !crypto.S3.IsEncrypted(before.UserDefined) {
t.Fatalf("%s: %s: encrypted control: %v", instance, key, err)
}
err = job.KeyRotate(t.Context(), obj, before, sub)
after, gerr := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
if gerr != nil {
t.Fatal(gerr)
}
if kind == "none" {
if err != nil || after.ModTime.Equal(before.ModTime) {
t.Errorf("%s: control: unlocked version not rotated: %v", instance, err)
}
continue
}
var locked ObjectLocked
if !errors.As(err, &locked) || !after.ModTime.Equal(before.ModTime) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: rotation of a locked version returned %v; rewritten=%v", instance, key, err, !after.ModTime.Equal(before.ModTime))
}
}
},
})
}
// A push reads locked versions as any authorized read does, and a submitter
// that may not read a version does not send it.
func TestBatchPushReads(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
var puts []string
target, err := minio.NewCore("target.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("batch-access", "batch-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
r.Body.Close()
}
if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
puts = append(puts, r.URL.Path)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{"Etag": []string{"\"pushetag\""}}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote-bucket"},
}
src := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, "push/locked", batchLockMeta("COMPLIANCE"))
if err := job.ReplicateToTarget(t.Context(), obj, target, src, false, batchRootSubmitter(t)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: authorized push of a locked version: %v", instance, err)
}
if len(puts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s: authorized push sent %d writes", instance, len(puts))
}
// A user that may list but not read.
p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:StartBatchJob"]},{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ListBucket","s3:ListBucketVersions"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::` + bucket + `"]}]}`))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = globalIAMSys.SetPolicy(t.Context(), "batch-list-only", *p); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
user := auth.Credentials{AccessKey: "batch-list-user", SecretKey: "batch-list-user-secret"}
if _, err = globalIAMSys.CreateUser(t.Context(), user.AccessKey, madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq{SecretKey: user.SecretKey, Status: madmin.AccountEnabled}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = globalIAMSys.PolicyDBSet(t.Context(), user.AccessKey, "batch-list-only", regUser, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(globalIAMSysUser(t, user.AccessKey))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = job.ReplicateToTarget(t.Context(), obj, target, src, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || len(puts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s: unauthorized push returned %v and sent %d writes", instance, err, len(puts)-1)
}
},
})
}
// globalIAMSysUser returns the stored credential of accessKey, as a request
// authenticated with it has.
func globalIAMSysUser(t *testing.T, accessKey string) auth.Credentials {
t.Helper()
u, ok := globalIAMSys.store.GetUser(accessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("no user %s", accessKey)
}
return u.Credentials
}
// The cursor of a walk done out of order moves only past keys whose items
// are all done, and counts each item once.
func TestBatchProgressCursor(t *testing.T) {
ri := &batchJobInfo{}
p := newBatchProgress(ri, "bucket")
items := []string{"a", "a", "b", "c", "c"}
seqs := make([]uint64, len(items))
for i := range items {
seqs[i] = p.begin()
}
skip := batchCounts{versionsSkipped: 1}
p.done(seqs[1], "a", skip)
p.done(seqs[3], "c", skip)
if ri.Object != "" || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 0 {
t.Fatalf("cursor moved before the first item: %q %d", ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
p.done(seqs[0], "a", skip)
p.done(seqs[2], "b", skip)
// a is done; b is done but c may still have items.
if ri.Object != "b" && ri.Object != "a" {
t.Fatalf("cursor %q", ri.Object)
}
if ri.Object == "a" && ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 2 {
t.Fatalf("counts %d at cursor a", ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
// c's last item never finishes, as when a run stops: the cursor stays
// before c and c is not counted.
p.finish()
if ri.Object != "b" || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 3 {
t.Fatalf("interrupted: cursor %q counts %d, want b 3", ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
p.done(seqs[4], "c", skip)
p.finish()
if ri.Object != "c" || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 5 {
t.Fatalf("finished: cursor %q counts %d, want c 5", ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
}
-189
View File
@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
)
// batchCounts are outcomes of a batch job that a later run of the job would
// see again, and so must be persisted together with the cursor of the walk.
type batchCounts struct {
objects int64
objectsFailed int64
deleteMarkersFailed int64
versionsSkipped int64
keysRefused int64
}
func (c *batchCounts) add(o batchCounts) {
c.objects += o.objects
c.objectsFailed += o.objectsFailed
c.deleteMarkersFailed += o.deleteMarkersFailed
c.versionsSkipped += o.versionsSkipped
c.keysRefused += o.keysRefused
}
//msgp:ignore batchProgress batchProgressItem batchCounts
// batchProgress is the cursor of a walk whose items are done concurrently.
//
// The items of a walk are numbered in walk order. A key is done when every
// item of it, and every item before it, is done; only then does the cursor
// move past it and its counts become part of the job's counts. The cursor and
// the counts are persisted together, so a job resumed after the cursor
// neither skips an item that was not done nor counts an item twice.
type batchProgress struct {
mu sync.Mutex
ri *batchJobInfo
bucket string
issued uint64
next uint64
pending map[uint64]batchProgressItem
// key is the key of the item last committed, and held are the counts of
// its items so far.
key string
held batchCounts
}
type batchProgressItem struct {
key string
counts batchCounts
}
func newBatchProgress(ri *batchJobInfo, bucket string) *batchProgress {
return &batchProgress{ri: ri, bucket: bucket, pending: make(map[uint64]batchProgressItem)}
}
// begin numbers the next item of the walk.
func (p *batchProgress) begin() uint64 {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
seq := p.issued
p.issued++
return seq
}
// done records item seq, of key, as done with counts.
func (p *batchProgress) done(seq uint64, key string, counts batchCounts) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.pending[seq] = batchProgressItem{key: key, counts: counts}
for {
item, ok := p.pending[p.next]
if !ok {
return
}
delete(p.pending, p.next)
p.next++
if item.key != p.key {
p.commitLocked()
p.key = item.key
}
p.held.add(item.counts)
}
}
// finish commits the last key if every item of the walk is done. Call it
// once no item is in progress.
func (p *batchProgress) finish() {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if p.next == p.issued {
p.commitLocked()
}
}
func (p *batchProgress) commitLocked() {
if p.key == "" {
return
}
ri := p.ri
ri.mu.Lock()
ri.Bucket = p.bucket
ri.Object = p.key
ri.Objects += p.held.objects
ri.ObjectsFailed += p.held.objectsFailed
ri.DeleteMarkersFailed += p.held.deleteMarkersFailed
ri.VersionsSkippedLocked += p.held.versionsSkipped
ri.KeysRefused += p.held.keysRefused
ri.mu.Unlock()
p.held = batchCounts{}
}
// countRemoved counts versions a job removed. A removed version is gone for
// any later run, so it is counted at once, not at the cursor.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) countRemoved(bucket string, objects, markers int64) {
ri.mu.Lock()
defer ri.mu.Unlock()
ri.Bucket = bucket
ri.Objects += objects
ri.DeleteMarkers += markers
}
// countSkipped counts a version a job left in place because Object Lock
// protects it, for a job that is counted per run rather than at a cursor.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) countSkipped() {
ri.mu.Lock()
defer ri.mu.Unlock()
ri.VersionsSkippedLocked++
}
// batchCanonicalPrefixes orders the prefixes of a walk and drops a prefix
// that another one covers. The keys of the walk are then visited once each,
// in one ascending order, which a single cursor can describe.
func batchCanonicalPrefixes(prefixes []string) []string {
if len(prefixes) == 0 {
return []string{""}
}
sorted := slices.Clone(prefixes)
slices.Sort(sorted)
out := sorted[:0]
for _, p := range sorted {
if len(out) > 0 && strings.HasPrefix(p, out[len(out)-1]) {
continue
}
out = append(out, p)
}
return out
}
// batchResumeAfter reports whether a resumed walk returned a key after the
// cursor. The cursor key is done; the walk forwards conservatively and
// returns it again. Keys compare as the walk orders them, by name, so a
// directory object comes before the keys under it.
func batchResumeAfter(cursor, name string) bool {
return cursor == "" || name > cursor
}
// batchJobStatus is the status response: madmin.BatchJobStatus with the
// fields this server adds. The added fields are additive; a client that does
// not know them ignores them.
type batchJobStatus struct {
LastMetric batchJobStatusMetric
}
type batchJobStatusMetric struct {
madmin.JobMetric
VersionsSkippedLocked int64 `json:"versionsSkippedLocked,omitempty"`
KeysRefused int64 `json:"keysRefused,omitempty"`
FailureReason string `json:"failureReason,omitempty"`
PausedReason string `json:"pausedReason,omitempty"`
}
func (ri *batchJobInfo) statusMetric() batchJobStatusMetric {
ri.mu.RLock()
defer ri.mu.RUnlock()
return batchJobStatusMetric{
JobMetric: ri.metric(),
VersionsSkippedLocked: ri.VersionsSkippedLocked,
KeysRefused: ri.KeysRefused,
FailureReason: ri.FailureReason,
PausedReason: ri.PausedReason,
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import (
miniogo "github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/xtime"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/xtime"
)
//go:generate msgp -file $GOFILE

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