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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 08:49:30 +08:00

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Markdown

# KMS Guide
Silo uses a key-management-system (KMS) to support SSE-S3. If a client requests SSE-S3, or auto-encryption is enabled, the Silo server encrypts each object with a unique object key which is protected by a master key managed by the KMS.
## Quick Start
Silo supports KMS integration through a KES-compatible endpoint. Deploy and
control your own [KES](https://github.com/minio/kes) instance, create a dedicated
client identity and key, and then configure Silo with the compatibility
environment variables below. Do not use a public or shared KES instance for
real data.
### 1. Set the Silo-to-KES configuration
```sh
export MINIO_KMS_KES_ENDPOINT=https://kes.example.com:7373
export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_FILE=/etc/silo/kes/client.key
export MINIO_KMS_KES_CERT_FILE=/etc/silo/kes/client.crt
export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_NAME=silo-default-key
```
### 2. Start the Silo server
```sh
export MINIO_ROOT_USER=minio
export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
silo server ~/export
```
The certificate, private key, KES policy, and named key must be provisioned by
the administrator. Protect the client private key and use TLS verification in
every environment.
## Configuration Guides
A typical Silo deployment that uses a KMS for SSE-S3 looks like this:
```
┌────────────┐
│ ┌──────────┴─┬─────╮ ┌────────────┐
└─┤ ┌──────────┴─┬───┴──────────┤ ┌──────────┴─┬─────────────────╮
└─┤ ┌──────────┴─┬─────┬──────┴─┤ KES Server ├─────────────────┤
└─┤ Silo ├─────╯ └────────────┘ ┌────┴────┐
└────────────┘ │ KMS │
└─────────┘
```
In a given setup, there are `n` Silo instances talking to `m` KES servers but only `1` central KMS. The most simple setup consists of `1` Silo server or cluster talking to `1` KMS via `1` KES server.
The main difference between various Silo-KMS deployments is the KMS implementation. The following table helps you select the right option for your use case:
| KMS | Purpose |
|:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------|
| [Hashicorp Vault](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Hashicorp-Vault-Keystore) | Local KMS. Silo and KMS on-prem (**Recommended**) |
| [AWS-KMS + SecretsManager](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/AWS-SecretsManager) | Cloud KMS. Silo in combination with a managed KMS installation |
| [Gemalto KeySecure /Thales CipherTrust](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Gemalto-KeySecure) | Local KMS. Silo and KMS On-Premises. |
| [Google Cloud Platform SecretManager](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/GCP-SecretManager) | Cloud KMS. Silo in combination with a managed KMS installation |
| [FS](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Filesystem-Keystore) | Local testing or development (**Not recommended for production**) |
The Silo-to-KES configuration is the same regardless of the KMS implementation.
Consult the KES project documentation for the selected keystore.
### Further references
- [Run Silo with TLS / HTTPS](https://silo.pgsty.com/operations/network-encryption/)
- [Tweak the KES server configuration](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Configuration)
- [Run a load balancer in front of KES](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/TLS-Proxy)
- [Understand the KES server concepts](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Concepts)
## Auto Encryption
Auto-Encryption is useful when Silo administrator wants to ensure that all data stored on Silo is encrypted at rest.
### Using `mc encrypt` (recommended)
Silo automatically encrypts all objects on buckets if KMS is successfully configured and bucket encryption configuration is enabled for each bucket as shown below:
```
mc encrypt set sse-s3 mysilo/bucket/
```
Verify if Silo has `sse-s3` enabled
```
mc encrypt info mysilo/bucket/
Auto encryption 'sse-s3' is enabled
```
### Using environment (not-recommended)
Silo automatically encrypts all objects on buckets if KMS is successfully configured and following ENV is enabled:
```
export MINIO_KMS_AUTO_ENCRYPTION=on
```
### Verify auto-encryption
> Note that auto-encryption only affects requests without S3 encryption headers. So, if a S3 client sends
> e.g. SSE-C headers, Silo will encrypt the object with the key sent by the client and won't reach out to
> the configured KMS.
To verify auto-encryption, use the following `mc` command:
```
mc cp test.file mysilo/bucket/
test.file: 5 B / 5 B ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ 100.00% 337 B/s 0s
```
```
mc stat mysilo/bucket/test.file
Name : test.file
...
Encrypted :
X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption: AES256
```
## Encrypted Private Key
Silo supports encrypted KES client private keys. Therefore, you can use
an password-protected private keys for `MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_FILE`.
When using password-protected private keys for accessing KES you need to
provide the password via:
```
export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_PASSWORD=<your-password>
```
Note that Silo only supports encrypted private keys - not encrypted certificates.
Certificates are no secrets and sent in plaintext as part of the TLS handshake.
## Explore Further
- [Use `mc` with Silo Server](https://silo.pgsty.com/reference/minio-mc/)
- [Use `aws-cli` with Silo Server](https://silo.pgsty.com/integrations/aws-cli-with-minio/)
- [Use `minio-go` SDK with Silo Server](https://silo.pgsty.com/developers/go/minio-go/)
- [The Silo documentation website](https://silo.pgsty.com/docs/)