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README, README_ZH, SECURITY, COMPLIANCE, CONTRIBUTING, NOTICE, code_of_conduct, the vulnerability and PR-etiquette documents, the GitHub issue and pull request templates, and the docs/ tree all present Silo as the product. The Grafana dashboards under docs/metrics/prometheus/grafana/ have their panel titles and descriptions rebranded while every minio_* query, label and expression is left alone, so existing alerts and recording rules keep matching. The distinction the review demanded is applied per hit rather than by search-and-replace: - Product and command text becomes Silo and silo: install and run instructions, systemd examples, compose services, download links, badges. - Protocol and interface text keeps MinIO: MINIO_* variables, minio_* metrics, x-minio-* headers, /minio/* routes, .minio.sys, arn:minio, and API field and error names. - Attribution keeps MinIO and gains the fork's own: the AGPL obligations, original copyright, CREDITS and NOTICE stay, with the modification notice added alongside rather than replacing them. - Historical and third-party references are left as facts, not rewritten for brand tidiness. README and README_ZH each carry an explicit non-affiliation notice, document the side-by-side package migration including the /etc/systemd/system/silo.service.d/10-legacy-user.conf drop-in for keeping a legacy UID/GID, and state that recursive chown is never performed. The trademark attribution uses the policy's approved "based on MinIO technology" wording, not the shortened form the policy rejects. github.com/pgsty/minio links are left in place and labelled transitional. The repository has not been renamed, and rewriting them now would produce documented URLs that 404 until the cutover; they change in the cutover commit together with the goreleaser release target, the OCI source label and the raw-content branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
139 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
139 lines
6.4 KiB
Markdown
# KMS Guide
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Silo uses a key-management-system (KMS) to support SSE-S3. If a client requests SSE-S3, or auto-encryption is enabled, the Silo server encrypts each object with a unique object key which is protected by a master key managed by the KMS.
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## Quick Start
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Silo supports KMS integration through a KES-compatible endpoint. Deploy and
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control your own [KES](https://github.com/minio/kes) instance, create a dedicated
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client identity and key, and then configure Silo with the compatibility
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environment variables below. Do not use a public or shared KES instance for
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real data.
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### 1. Set the Silo-to-KES configuration
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```sh
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export MINIO_KMS_KES_ENDPOINT=https://kes.example.com:7373
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export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_FILE=/etc/silo/kes/client.key
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export MINIO_KMS_KES_CERT_FILE=/etc/silo/kes/client.crt
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export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_NAME=silo-default-key
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```
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### 2. Start the Silo server
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```sh
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export MINIO_ROOT_USER=minio
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export MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=silo123
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silo server ~/export
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```
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The certificate, private key, KES policy, and named key must be provisioned by
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the administrator. Protect the client private key and use TLS verification in
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every environment.
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## Configuration Guides
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A typical Silo deployment that uses a KMS for SSE-S3 looks like this:
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```
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┌────────────┐
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│ ┌──────────┴─┬─────╮ ┌────────────┐
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└─┤ ┌──────────┴─┬───┴──────────┤ ┌──────────┴─┬─────────────────╮
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└─┤ ┌──────────┴─┬─────┬──────┴─┤ KES Server ├─────────────────┤
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└─┤ Silo ├─────╯ └────────────┘ ┌────┴────┐
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└────────────┘ │ KMS │
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└─────────┘
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```
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In a given setup, there are `n` Silo instances talking to `m` KES servers but only `1` central KMS. The most simple setup consists of `1` Silo server or cluster talking to `1` KMS via `1` KES server.
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The main difference between various Silo-KMS deployments is the KMS implementation. The following table helps you select the right option for your use case:
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| KMS | Purpose |
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| [Hashicorp Vault](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Hashicorp-Vault-Keystore) | Local KMS. Silo and KMS on-prem (**Recommended**) |
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| [AWS-KMS + SecretsManager](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/AWS-SecretsManager) | Cloud KMS. Silo in combination with a managed KMS installation |
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| [Gemalto KeySecure /Thales CipherTrust](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Gemalto-KeySecure) | Local KMS. Silo and KMS On-Premises. |
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| [Google Cloud Platform SecretManager](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/GCP-SecretManager) | Cloud KMS. Silo in combination with a managed KMS installation |
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| [FS](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Filesystem-Keystore) | Local testing or development (**Not recommended for production**) |
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The Silo-to-KES configuration is the same regardless of the KMS implementation.
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Consult the KES project documentation for the selected keystore.
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### Further references
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- [Run Silo with TLS / HTTPS](https://silo.pgsty.com/operations/network-encryption/)
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- [Tweak the KES server configuration](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Configuration)
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- [Run a load balancer in front of KES](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/TLS-Proxy)
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- [Understand the KES server concepts](https://github.com/minio/kes/wiki/Concepts)
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## Auto Encryption
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Auto-Encryption is useful when Silo administrator wants to ensure that all data stored on Silo is encrypted at rest.
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### Using `mc encrypt` (recommended)
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Silo automatically encrypts all objects on buckets if KMS is successfully configured and bucket encryption configuration is enabled for each bucket as shown below:
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```
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mc encrypt set sse-s3 mysilo/bucket/
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```
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Verify if Silo has `sse-s3` enabled
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```
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mc encrypt info mysilo/bucket/
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Auto encryption 'sse-s3' is enabled
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```
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### Using environment (not-recommended)
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Silo automatically encrypts all objects on buckets if KMS is successfully configured and following ENV is enabled:
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```
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export MINIO_KMS_AUTO_ENCRYPTION=on
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```
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### Verify auto-encryption
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> Note that auto-encryption only affects requests without S3 encryption headers. So, if a S3 client sends
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> e.g. SSE-C headers, Silo will encrypt the object with the key sent by the client and won't reach out to
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> the configured KMS.
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To verify auto-encryption, use the following `mc` command:
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```
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mc cp test.file mysilo/bucket/
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test.file: 5 B / 5 B ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ 100.00% 337 B/s 0s
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```
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```
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mc stat mysilo/bucket/test.file
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Name : test.file
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...
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Encrypted :
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X-Amz-Server-Side-Encryption: AES256
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```
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## Encrypted Private Key
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Silo supports encrypted KES client private keys. Therefore, you can use
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an password-protected private keys for `MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_FILE`.
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When using password-protected private keys for accessing KES you need to
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provide the password via:
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```
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export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_PASSWORD=<your-password>
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```
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Note that Silo only supports encrypted private keys - not encrypted certificates.
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Certificates are no secrets and sent in plaintext as part of the TLS handshake.
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## Explore Further
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- [Use `mc` with Silo Server](https://silo.pgsty.com/reference/minio-mc/)
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- [Use `aws-cli` with Silo Server](https://silo.pgsty.com/integrations/aws-cli-with-minio/)
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- [Use `minio-go` SDK with Silo Server](https://silo.pgsty.com/developers/go/minio-go/)
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- [The Silo documentation website](https://silo.pgsty.com/docs/)
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