Merge pull request #939 from telemt/conntrack

Сonntrack recovery on absent iptables-nft chains fixes

Cargo.lock

@@ -2780,7 +2780,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "telemt"
-version = "3.5.9"
+version = "3.5.11"
 dependencies = [
  "aes",
  "anyhow",

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "telemt"
-version = "3.5.9"
+version = "3.5.11"
 edition = "2024"
 rust-version = "1.88"
 

src/cli.rs

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 //!
 //! Subcommands:
 //! - `start [OPTIONS] [config.toml]` - Start the daemon
-//! - `stop [--pid-file PATH]` - Stop a running daemon
-//! - `reload [--pid-file PATH]` - Reload configuration (SIGHUP)
-//! - `status [--pid-file PATH]` - Check daemon status
+//! - `stop [--pid-file PATH] [--strict-runtime-paths]` - Stop a running daemon
+//! - `reload [--pid-file PATH] [--strict-runtime-paths]` - Reload configuration (SIGHUP)
+//! - `status [--pid-file PATH] [--strict-runtime-paths]` - Check daemon status
 //! - `run [OPTIONS] [config.toml]` - Run in foreground (default behavior)
 //! - `healthcheck [OPTIONS] [config.toml]` - Run control-plane health probe
 
@@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ pub fn parse_command(args: &[String]) -> ParsedCommand {
     while i < args.len() {
         match args[i].as_str() {
             "start" | "stop" | "reload" | "status" | "run" | "healthcheck" => {}
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            "--strict-runtime-paths" => {
+                cmd.daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths = true;
+            }
             "--mode" => {
                 i += 1;
                 if i < args.len() {
@@ -199,9 +203,18 @@ pub fn parse_command(args: &[String]) -> ParsedCommand {
 #[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn execute_subcommand(cmd: &ParsedCommand) -> Option<i32> {
     match cmd.subcommand {
-        Subcommand::Stop => Some(daemon_commands::stop(&cmd.pid_file)),
-        Subcommand::Reload => Some(daemon_commands::reload(&cmd.pid_file)),
-        Subcommand::Status => Some(daemon_commands::status(&cmd.pid_file)),
+        Subcommand::Stop => Some(daemon_commands::stop(
+            &cmd.pid_file,
+            cmd.daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths,
+        )),
+        Subcommand::Reload => Some(daemon_commands::reload(
+            &cmd.pid_file,
+            cmd.daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths,
+        )),
+        Subcommand::Status => Some(daemon_commands::status(
+            &cmd.pid_file,
+            cmd.daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths,
+        )),
         Subcommand::Healthcheck => {
             if let Some(invalid_mode) = cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid.as_ref() {
                 if invalid_mode.is_empty() {

src/cli/daemon_commands.rs

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ pub fn parse_daemon_args(args: &[String]) -> DaemonOptions {
             "--foreground" | "-f" => {
                 opts.foreground = true;
             }
+            "--strict-runtime-paths" => {
+                opts.strict_runtime_paths = true;
+            }
             "--pid-file" => {
                 i += 1;
                 if i < args.len() {
@@ -60,19 +63,21 @@ pub fn parse_daemon_args(args: &[String]) -> DaemonOptions {
 }
 
 /// Sends SIGTERM and waits briefly for graceful PID-file cleanup.
-pub(super) fn stop(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
+pub(super) fn stop(pid_file: &Path, strict_runtime_paths: bool) -> i32 {
     use nix::sys::signal::Signal;
 
     println!("Stopping telemt daemon...");
 
-    match daemon::signal_pid_file(pid_file, Signal::SIGTERM) {
+    match daemon::signal_pid_file(pid_file, Signal::SIGTERM, strict_runtime_paths) {
         Ok(()) => {
             println!("Stop signal sent successfully");
 
             // Wait for process to exit for up to ten seconds.
             for _ in 0..20 {
                 std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(500));
-                if let daemon::DaemonStatus::NotRunning = daemon::check_status(pid_file) {
+                if let daemon::DaemonStatus::NotRunning =
+                    daemon::check_status(pid_file, strict_runtime_paths)
+                {
                     println!("Daemon stopped");
                     return 0;
                 }
@@ -88,12 +93,12 @@ pub(super) fn stop(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
 }
 
 /// Sends SIGHUP to trigger configuration reload.
-pub(super) fn reload(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
+pub(super) fn reload(pid_file: &Path, strict_runtime_paths: bool) -> i32 {
     use nix::sys::signal::Signal;
 
     println!("Reloading telemt configuration...");
 
-    match daemon::signal_pid_file(pid_file, Signal::SIGHUP) {
+    match daemon::signal_pid_file(pid_file, Signal::SIGHUP, strict_runtime_paths) {
         Ok(()) => {
             println!("Reload signal sent successfully");
             0
@@ -106,8 +111,8 @@ pub(super) fn reload(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
 }
 
 /// Reports daemon status without mutating PID lifecycle state.
-pub(super) fn status(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
-    match daemon::check_status(pid_file) {
+pub(super) fn status(pid_file: &Path, strict_runtime_paths: bool) -> i32 {
+    match daemon::check_status(pid_file, strict_runtime_paths) {
         daemon::DaemonStatus::Running(pid) => {
             println!("telemt is running (pid {})", pid);
             0
@@ -126,16 +131,168 @@ pub(super) fn status(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use std::fs;
+    use std::os::unix::fs::{PermissionsExt, symlink};
+    use std::process::{Child, Command, Stdio};
+    use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
     use super::*;
 
+    const CONTROL_PID: &str = "TELEMT_RUNTIME_PATH_TEST_PID";
+    const CONTROL_READY: &str = "TELEMT_RUNTIME_PATH_TEST_READY";
+    const CONTROL_RELOADED: &str = "TELEMT_RUNTIME_PATH_TEST_RELOADED";
+
+    struct ControlChild(Child);
+
+    impl Drop for ControlChild {
+        fn drop(&mut self) {
+            let _ = self.0.kill();
+            let _ = self.0.wait();
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn wait_for_file(path: &Path) -> bool {
+        let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
+        while Instant::now() < deadline {
+            if path.exists() {
+                return true;
+            }
+            std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10));
+        }
+        false
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn runtime_path_policy_defaults_to_compatibility_for_all_commands() {
+        for command in ["run", "start", "stop", "reload", "status"] {
+            let args = vec![command.to_string(), "config.toml".to_string()];
+            assert!(
+                !crate::cli::parse_command(&args)
+                    .daemon_opts
+                    .strict_runtime_paths
+            );
+            assert!(!parse_daemon_args(&args).strict_runtime_paths);
+
+            for position in [1, args.len()] {
+                let mut strict_args = args.clone();
+                strict_args.insert(position, "--strict-runtime-paths".to_string());
+                let parsed = crate::cli::parse_command(&strict_args);
+                assert!(parsed.daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths);
+                assert!(parse_daemon_args(&strict_args).strict_runtime_paths);
+                assert_eq!(parsed.config_path, "config.toml");
+            }
+        }
+        let args = vec![
+            "--strict-runtime-paths".to_string(),
+            "config.toml".to_string(),
+        ];
+        let parsed = crate::cli::parse_command(&args);
+        assert_eq!(parsed.subcommand, crate::cli::Subcommand::Run);
+        assert!(parsed.daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths);
+        assert_eq!(parsed.config_path, "config.toml");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
+    async fn daemon_control_subprocess() {
+        let Some(pid_path) = std::env::var_os(CONTROL_PID) else {
+            return;
+        };
+        let ready = PathBuf::from(std::env::var_os(CONTROL_READY).unwrap());
+        let reloaded = PathBuf::from(std::env::var_os(CONTROL_RELOADED).unwrap());
+        let mut terminate =
+            tokio::signal::unix::signal(tokio::signal::unix::SignalKind::terminate()).unwrap();
+        let mut reload =
+            tokio::signal::unix::signal(tokio::signal::unix::SignalKind::hangup()).unwrap();
+        let mut owner = daemon::PidFile::new(PathBuf::from(pid_path), false);
+        owner.acquire().unwrap();
+        fs::write(&ready, b"ready").unwrap();
+        let deadline = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(15));
+        tokio::pin!(deadline);
+        loop {
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = terminate.recv() => break,
+                _ = reload.recv() => fs::write(&reloaded, b"reloaded").unwrap(),
+                _ = &mut deadline => panic!("daemon control subprocess timed out"),
+            }
+        }
+        owner.release().unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn control_commands_follow_runtime_path_policy() {
+        for (mode, linked_parent, trusted_parent) in [
+            (0o777, false, false),
+            (0o777, true, false),
+            (0o755, false, true),
+        ] {
+            let root = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+            let real = root.path().join("run");
+            let linked = root.path().join("linked");
+            fs::create_dir(&real).unwrap();
+            fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(mode)).unwrap();
+            symlink(&real, &linked).unwrap();
+            let pid_path = if linked_parent { &linked } else { &real }.join("telemt.pid");
+            let ready = root.path().join("ready");
+            let reloaded = root.path().join("reloaded");
+            let mut child = ControlChild(
+                Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
+                    .args([
+                        "--exact",
+                        "cli::daemon_commands::tests::daemon_control_subprocess",
+                        "--nocapture",
+                    ])
+                    .env(CONTROL_PID, &pid_path)
+                    .env(CONTROL_READY, &ready)
+                    .env(CONTROL_RELOADED, &reloaded)
+                    .stdout(Stdio::null())
+                    .stderr(Stdio::null())
+                    .spawn()
+                    .unwrap(),
+            );
+            assert!(
+                wait_for_file(&ready),
+                "daemon control subprocess did not become ready"
+            );
+            let command = |name: &str, strict: bool| {
+                let mut args = vec![
+                    name.to_string(),
+                    "--pid-file".to_string(),
+                    pid_path.to_str().unwrap().to_string(),
+                ];
+                if strict {
+                    args.push("--strict-runtime-paths".to_string());
+                }
+                crate::cli::execute_subcommand(&crate::cli::parse_command(&args))
+            };
+
+            assert_eq!(command("status", false), Some(0));
+            if trusted_parent {
+                assert_eq!(command("status", true), Some(0));
+                assert_eq!(command("reload", true), Some(0));
+                assert!(wait_for_file(&reloaded));
+                assert_eq!(command("stop", true), Some(0));
+            } else {
+                assert_eq!(command("status", true), Some(1));
+                assert_eq!(command("reload", true), Some(1));
+                assert!(!reloaded.exists());
+                assert_eq!(command("stop", true), Some(1));
+                assert_eq!(command("status", false), Some(0));
+                assert_eq!(command("reload", false), Some(0));
+                assert!(wait_for_file(&reloaded));
+                assert_eq!(command("stop", false), Some(0));
+            }
+            assert!(child.0.wait().unwrap().success());
+            assert!(!pid_path.exists());
+            assert_eq!(command("status", false), Some(1));
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn status_does_not_remove_stale_pid_file() {
         let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
         let pid_file = directory.path().join("telemt.pid");
         fs::write(&pid_file, b"2000000000\n").unwrap();
 
-        assert_eq!(status(&pid_file), 1);
+        assert_eq!(status(&pid_file, false), 1);
         assert!(pid_file.exists());
     }
 }

src/conntrack_control/firewall/command.rs

@@ -10,14 +10,19 @@ use crate::util::trusted_command::{resolve_trusted_helper, trusted_helper_comman
 
 const COMMAND_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
 
+/// A privileged helper invocation with arguments kept separate from shell syntax.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub(super) struct CommandSpec {
+    /// Logical helper name resolved by the trusted executable policy.
     pub(super) binary: &'static str,
+    /// Arguments passed directly to the helper process.
     pub(super) args: Vec<String>,
+    /// Optional restore script supplied on standard input.
     pub(super) stdin: Option<String>,
 }
 
 impl CommandSpec {
+    /// Creates a helper invocation without an input script.
     pub(super) fn new(binary: &'static str, args: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'static str>) -> Self {
         Self {
             binary,
@@ -26,6 +31,7 @@ impl CommandSpec {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Creates a helper invocation that receives a restore script.
     pub(super) fn with_stdin(
         binary: &'static str,
         args: impl IntoIterator<Item = &'static str>,
@@ -39,22 +45,32 @@ impl CommandSpec {
     }
 }
 
+/// Distinguishes idempotent absence from transaction and execution failures.
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub(super) enum CommandErrorKind {
+    /// The trusted helper executable is unavailable.
     Missing,
+    /// The requested firewall object or rule is absent.
     NotFound,
+    /// A terminal or process cancellation interrupted the invocation.
     Cancelled,
+    /// The helper exceeded its execution deadline.
     Timeout,
+    /// A failure that must not be treated as successful cleanup.
     Failed,
 }
 
+/// A classified helper failure retaining its diagnostic for reconciliation.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub(super) struct CommandError {
+    /// Recovery semantics associated with the failure.
     pub(super) kind: CommandErrorKind,
+    /// Original helper diagnostic or an execution failure description.
     pub(super) message: String,
 }
 
 impl CommandError {
+    /// Creates the cancellation failure used by interruptible transactions.
     pub(super) fn cancelled() -> Self {
         Self {
             kind: CommandErrorKind::Cancelled,
@@ -62,6 +78,7 @@ impl CommandError {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Creates a failure that prevents idempotent cleanup from claiming success.
     pub(super) fn failed(message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
         Self {
             kind: CommandErrorKind::Failed,
@@ -76,14 +93,19 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for CommandError {
     }
 }
 
+/// Executes firewall commands through a production or deterministic test runner.
 pub(super) trait FirewallCommandRunner: Send + Sync {
+    /// Reports whether a helper can be resolved under the runner's trust policy.
     fn available(&self, binary: &str) -> bool;
 
+    /// Reports whether the process has the capability required to alter firewall rules.
     fn has_cap_net_admin(&self) -> bool;
 
+    /// Executes one invocation while preserving classified failure semantics.
     async fn run(&self, spec: CommandSpec) -> Result<(), CommandError>;
 }
 
+/// Runs trusted system helpers with bounded execution and captured diagnostics.
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Default)]
 pub(super) struct SystemCommandRunner;
 
@@ -187,18 +209,95 @@ impl FirewallCommandRunner for SystemCommandRunner {
             } else {
                 stderr
             };
-            let kind = if is_not_found_error(&message) {
-                CommandErrorKind::NotFound
-            } else {
-                CommandErrorKind::Failed
-            };
+            let kind = classify_command_error(binary, &spec.args, &message);
             Err(CommandError { kind, message })
         }
     }
 }
 
+/// Recognizes the existing legacy iptables and native nftables absence formats.
 pub(super) fn is_not_found_error(message: &str) -> bool {
     message.contains("No chain/target/match by that name")
         || message.contains("Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?)")
         || message.contains("Could not process rule: No such file or directory")
 }
+
+/// Bounds additional iptables-nft absence diagnostics to owned cleanup and checks.
+pub(super) fn classify_command_error(
+    binary: &str,
+    args: &[String],
+    message: &str,
+) -> CommandErrorKind {
+    if is_not_found_error(message) || is_missing_owned_iptables_chain(binary, args, message) {
+        CommandErrorKind::NotFound
+    } else {
+        CommandErrorKind::Failed
+    }
+}
+
+fn is_missing_owned_iptables_chain(binary: &str, args: &[String], message: &str) -> bool {
+    if !matches!(binary, "iptables" | "ip6tables") {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // An absent jump target is harmless for deletion, but not for installation.
+    let chain = match args {
+        [flag, table, operation, source, jump, target]
+            if flag == "-t"
+                && table == "raw"
+                && matches!(operation.as_str(), "-C" | "-D")
+                && source == "PREROUTING"
+                && jump == "-j"
+                && target == "TELEMT_NOTRACK" =>
+        {
+            target.as_str()
+        }
+        [flag, table, operation, target]
+            if flag == "-t"
+                && table == "raw"
+                && matches!(operation.as_str(), "-F" | "-X")
+                && matches!(
+                    target.as_str(),
+                    "TELEMT_NOTRACK" | "TELEMT_NT_A" | "TELEMT_NT_B"
+                ) =>
+        {
+            target.as_str()
+        }
+        _ => return false,
+    };
+    let mut lines = message.lines();
+    let Some(first) = lines.next() else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let diagnostic = if first.starts_with("Chain '") {
+        first
+    } else {
+        let Some((version, diagnostic)) = first
+            .strip_prefix(binary)
+            .and_then(|line| line.strip_prefix(" v"))
+            .and_then(|line| line.split_once(" (nf_tables): "))
+        else {
+            return false;
+        };
+        if version.is_empty() || version.bytes().any(|byte| byte.is_ascii_whitespace()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        diagnostic
+    };
+    if diagnostic
+        .strip_prefix("Chain '")
+        .and_then(|line| line.strip_suffix("' does not exist"))
+        != Some(chain)
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // Reject mixed diagnostics instead of hiding another failure after an absence message.
+    let Some(help) = lines.next() else {
+        return true;
+    };
+    help.strip_prefix("Try `")
+        .and_then(|line| line.strip_prefix(binary))
+        .and_then(|line| line.strip_prefix(" -h' or '"))
+        .and_then(|line| line.strip_prefix(binary))
+        == Some(" --help' for more information.")
+        && lines.next().is_none()
+}

src/conntrack_control/firewall/tests.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ use super::transaction::{InterruptibleRunner, reconcile_once};
 #[path = "tests/model_tests.rs"]
 mod model_tests;
 
+// Replays helper diagnostics through command classification and recovery.
+#[path = "tests/recovery_errors.rs"]
+mod recovery_errors;
+
 #[derive(Clone)]
 struct FailureRule {
     binary: &'static str,

src/conntrack_control/firewall/tests/recovery_errors.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+use super::super::command::classify_command_error;
+use super::super::transaction::recover_to_empty;
+use super::*;
+
+const OWNED_CHAINS: [&str; 3] = ["TELEMT_NOTRACK", "TELEMT_NT_A", "TELEMT_NT_B"];
+type ChainKey = (&'static str, String, String);
+type ChainRules = BTreeMap<ChainKey, BTreeSet<String>>;
+
+fn missing_chain(binary: &str, chain: &str) -> String {
+    format!(
+        "{binary} v1.8.10 (nf_tables): Chain '{chain}' does not exist\n\
+         Try `{binary} -h' or '{binary} --help' for more information."
+    )
+}
+
+fn classified_error(spec: &CommandSpec, message: &str) -> CommandError {
+    CommandError {
+        kind: classify_command_error(spec.binary, &spec.args, message),
+        message: message.to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct FixtureState {
+    calls: Vec<CommandSpec>,
+    chains: ChainRules,
+    nft_tables: BTreeSet<String>,
+    failure: Option<&'static str>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct FixtureRunner {
+    state: Arc<Mutex<FixtureState>>,
+}
+
+impl FixtureRunner {
+    fn new(failure: Option<&'static str>) -> Self {
+        let mut state = FixtureState {
+            failure,
+            ..FixtureState::default()
+        };
+        for binary in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] {
+            for (table, chain, rules) in [
+                ("raw", "PREROUTING", vec!["-j FOREIGN_RAW"]),
+                ("raw", "FOREIGN_RAW", vec!["-j ACCEPT"]),
+                ("filter", "INPUT", vec!["-j MTPR_SYNFIX", "-j TMT_SYN_TEST"]),
+                ("filter", "MTPR_SYNFIX", vec!["-p tcp --syn -j DROP"]),
+                ("filter", "TMT_SYN_TEST", vec!["-p tcp --syn -j DROP"]),
+            ] {
+                state.chains.insert(
+                    (binary, table.to_string(), chain.to_string()),
+                    rules.into_iter().map(str::to_string).collect(),
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        state.nft_tables.extend([
+            "mtpr_synfix".to_string(),
+            "telemt_synlimit_test".to_string(),
+            "foreign_table".to_string(),
+        ]);
+        Self {
+            state: Arc::new(Mutex::new(state)),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn calls(&self) -> Vec<CommandSpec> {
+        self.state.lock().unwrap().calls.clone()
+    }
+
+    fn foreign_snapshot(&self) -> (ChainRules, BTreeSet<String>) {
+        let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+        let mut chains = state.chains.clone();
+        chains.retain(|(_, table, chain), _| {
+            table != "raw" || !OWNED_CHAINS.contains(&chain.as_str())
+        });
+        for ((_, table, chain), rules) in &mut chains {
+            if table == "raw" && chain == "PREROUTING" {
+                rules.remove("-j TELEMT_NOTRACK");
+            }
+        }
+        (chains, state.nft_tables.clone())
+    }
+
+    fn assert_owned_policy(&self, enabled: bool) {
+        let state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+        for (binary, ip) in [("iptables", "192.0.2.10"), ("ip6tables", "2001:db8::10")] {
+            for chain in OWNED_CHAINS {
+                let key = (binary, "raw".to_string(), chain.to_string());
+                if !enabled {
+                    assert!(!state.chains.contains_key(&key));
+                    continue;
+                }
+                let expected = match chain {
+                    "TELEMT_NOTRACK" => BTreeSet::from(["-j TELEMT_NT_A".to_string()]),
+                    "TELEMT_NT_A" => {
+                        BTreeSet::from([format!("-p tcp --dport 443 -d {ip} -j CT --notrack")])
+                    }
+                    "TELEMT_NT_B" => BTreeSet::new(),
+                    _ => unreachable!(),
+                };
+                assert_eq!(state.chains.get(&key), Some(&expected));
+            }
+            let prerouting = (binary, "raw".to_string(), "PREROUTING".to_string());
+            assert_eq!(
+                state.chains[&prerouting].contains("-j TELEMT_NOTRACK"),
+                enabled
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl FirewallCommandRunner for FixtureRunner {
+    fn available(&self, _binary: &str) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+
+    fn has_cap_net_admin(&self) -> bool {
+        true
+    }
+
+    async fn run(&self, spec: CommandSpec) -> Result<(), CommandError> {
+        let mut state = self.state.lock().unwrap();
+        state.calls.push(spec.clone());
+        if spec.binary == "nft" {
+            assert_eq!(&spec.args[..3], ["delete", "table", "inet"]);
+            return if state.nft_tables.remove(&spec.args[3]) {
+                Ok(())
+            } else {
+                Err(classified_error(
+                    &spec,
+                    "Error: Could not process rule: No such file or directory",
+                ))
+            };
+        }
+        if let Some(script) = &spec.stdin {
+            let binary = match spec.binary {
+                "iptables-restore" => "iptables",
+                "ip6tables-restore" => "ip6tables",
+                _ => panic!("unexpected restore helper"),
+            };
+            assert_eq!(spec.args, ["--noflush"]);
+            for line in script.lines().filter(|line| line.starts_with('-')) {
+                let fields = line.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>();
+                let key = (binary, "raw".to_string(), fields[1].to_string());
+                let rules = state.chains.get_mut(&key).expect("restore target exists");
+                match fields[0] {
+                    "-F" => rules.clear(),
+                    "-A" => {
+                        rules.insert(fields[2..].join(" "));
+                    }
+                    _ => panic!("unexpected restore operation"),
+                }
+            }
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        assert!(matches!(spec.binary, "iptables" | "ip6tables"));
+        assert_eq!(spec.args[0], "-t");
+        let operation = spec.args[2].as_str();
+        let key = (spec.binary, spec.args[1].clone(), spec.args[3].clone());
+        match operation {
+            "-N" => {
+                if state.chains.contains_key(&key) {
+                    Err(classified_error(&spec, "iptables: Chain already exists."))
+                } else {
+                    state.chains.insert(key, BTreeSet::new());
+                    Ok(())
+                }
+            }
+            "-C" | "-D" => {
+                if operation == "-D"
+                    && let Some(message) = state.failure.take()
+                {
+                    return Err(classified_error(&spec, message));
+                }
+                let target = (spec.binary, spec.args[1].clone(), spec.args[5].clone());
+                if !state.chains.contains_key(&target) {
+                    return Err(classified_error(
+                        &spec,
+                        &missing_chain(spec.binary, &spec.args[5]),
+                    ));
+                }
+                let rules = state.chains.get_mut(&key).expect("builtin chain exists");
+                let rule = spec.args[4..].join(" ");
+                if !rules.contains(&rule) {
+                    return Err(classified_error(
+                        &spec,
+                        "Bad rule (does a matching rule exist in that chain?).",
+                    ));
+                }
+                if operation == "-D" {
+                    rules.remove(&rule);
+                }
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            "-I" => {
+                let target = (spec.binary, spec.args[1].clone(), spec.args[6].clone());
+                if !state.chains.contains_key(&target) {
+                    return Err(classified_error(
+                        &spec,
+                        &missing_chain(spec.binary, &spec.args[6]),
+                    ));
+                }
+                state
+                    .chains
+                    .get_mut(&key)
+                    .unwrap()
+                    .insert(spec.args[5..].join(" "));
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            "-F" | "-X" => {
+                let Some(rules) = state.chains.get_mut(&key) else {
+                    return Err(classified_error(
+                        &spec,
+                        "iptables: No chain/target/match by that name.",
+                    ));
+                };
+                if operation == "-F" {
+                    rules.clear();
+                } else {
+                    assert!(rules.is_empty());
+                    state.chains.remove(&key);
+                }
+                Ok(())
+            }
+            _ => panic!("unexpected iptables operation"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn quoted_missing_chains_are_scoped_to_owned_commands() {
+    for binary in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] {
+        for operation in ["-C", "-D"] {
+            let spec = CommandSpec::new(
+                binary,
+                ["-t", "raw", operation, "PREROUTING", "-j", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"],
+            );
+            let message = missing_chain(binary, "TELEMT_NOTRACK");
+            let error = classified_error(&spec, &message);
+            assert_eq!(error.kind, CommandErrorKind::NotFound, "{spec:?}");
+            assert_eq!(error.message, message);
+        }
+        for operation in ["-F", "-X"] {
+            for chain in OWNED_CHAINS {
+                let spec = CommandSpec::new(binary, ["-t", "raw", operation, chain]);
+                assert_eq!(
+                    classified_error(&spec, &missing_chain(binary, chain)).kind,
+                    CommandErrorKind::NotFound,
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        let spec = CommandSpec::new(binary, ["-t", "raw", "-F", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"]);
+        for message in [
+            "Chain 'TELEMT_NOTRACK' does not exist".to_string(),
+            format!("{binary} v1.8.11 (nf_tables): Chain 'TELEMT_NOTRACK' does not exist"),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                classified_error(&spec, &message).kind,
+                CommandErrorKind::NotFound
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn unrelated_commands_and_diagnostics_remain_failures() {
+    let message = missing_chain("iptables", "TELEMT_NOTRACK");
+    for spec in [
+        CommandSpec::new("iptables", ["-t", "raw", "-N", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"]),
+        CommandSpec::new(
+            "iptables",
+            ["-t", "raw", "-A", "PREROUTING", "-j", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"],
+        ),
+        CommandSpec::new(
+            "iptables",
+            ["-t", "raw", "-I", "PREROUTING", "1", "-j", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"],
+        ),
+        CommandSpec::new("iptables", ["-t", "filter", "-F", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"]),
+        CommandSpec::new("iptables", ["-t", "raw", "-F", "TELEMT_NT_A"]),
+        CommandSpec::new(
+            "iptables",
+            ["-t", "raw", "-D", "PREROUTING", "-j", "TELEMT_NT_A"],
+        ),
+        CommandSpec::new(
+            "iptables",
+            ["-t", "raw", "-D", "INPUT", "-j", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"],
+        ),
+        CommandSpec::new(
+            "iptables",
+            ["-t", "raw", "-D", "PREROUTING", "-g", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"],
+        ),
+        CommandSpec::new("iptables", ["-F", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"]),
+        CommandSpec::new(
+            "iptables",
+            ["-t", "raw", "-F", "TELEMT_NOTRACK", "--invalid"],
+        ),
+        CommandSpec::new("iptables-restore", ["--noflush"]),
+        CommandSpec::new("ip6tables-restore", ["--noflush"]),
+        CommandSpec::new("nft", ["delete", "table", "inet", "telemt_conntrack"]),
+        CommandSpec::new("conntrack", ["-D"]),
+    ] {
+        assert_eq!(
+            classified_error(&spec, &message).kind,
+            CommandErrorKind::Failed,
+            "{spec:?}",
+        );
+    }
+    for chain in [
+        "TELEMT_NT_C",
+        "TELEMT_NOTRACK_EXTRA",
+        "MTPR_SYNFIX",
+        "PREROUTING",
+    ] {
+        let spec = CommandSpec::new("iptables", ["-t", "raw", "-F", chain]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            classified_error(&spec, &missing_chain("iptables", chain)).kind,
+            CommandErrorKind::Failed,
+        );
+    }
+    let spec = CommandSpec::new(
+        "iptables",
+        ["-t", "raw", "-D", "PREROUTING", "-j", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"],
+    );
+    for message in [
+        "Permission denied",
+        "can't initialize iptables table `raw': Table does not exist",
+        "Another app is currently holding the xtables lock",
+        "Chain is not empty",
+        "Directory not empty",
+        "Can't delete chain with references left",
+        "unknown option --invalid",
+        "command timed out",
+    ] {
+        assert_eq!(
+            classified_error(&spec, message).kind,
+            CommandErrorKind::Failed
+        );
+    }
+    for message in [
+        format!("{message}\nPermission denied"),
+        format!("Permission denied\n{message}"),
+        "Chain 'TELEMT_NOTRACK' does not exist\nPermission denied".to_string(),
+        "Chain 'TELEMT_NOTRACK' does not exist\n\
+         Try `ip6tables -h' or 'ip6tables --help' for more information."
+            .to_string(),
+        "iptables v1.8.10 (legacy): Chain 'TELEMT_NOTRACK' does not exist".to_string(),
+        "iptables v (nf_tables): Chain 'TELEMT_NOTRACK' does not exist".to_string(),
+        missing_chain("ip6tables", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"),
+        missing_chain("iptables", "TELEMT_NT_A"),
+    ] {
+        assert_eq!(
+            classified_error(&spec, &message).kind,
+            CommandErrorKind::Failed
+        );
+    }
+    for binary in ["nft", "conntrack", "iptables-restore", "ip6tables-restore"] {
+        let spec = CommandSpec::new(binary, ["-t", "raw", "-F", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            classified_error(&spec, "Chain 'TELEMT_NOTRACK' does not exist").kind,
+            CommandErrorKind::Failed,
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn unknown_recovery_converges_without_touching_foreign_rules() {
+    for policy in [DesiredPolicy::Empty, dual_stack_policy(443)] {
+        let runner = FixtureRunner::new(None);
+        let foreign = runner.foreign_snapshot();
+        let mut applied = AppliedState::Unknown;
+        let requested = desired(1, policy);
+        reconcile_once(&runner, &runner, &mut applied, &requested)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            &applied,
+            AppliedState::Known(plan) if plan.matches_policy(&requested.policy)
+        ));
+        runner.assert_owned_policy(matches!(requested.policy, DesiredPolicy::Rules { .. }));
+        assert_eq!(runner.foreign_snapshot(), foreign);
+        for binary in ["iptables", "ip6tables"] {
+            let calls = runner.calls();
+            assert_eq!(
+                calls
+                    .iter()
+                    .filter(|call| call.binary == binary && call.args[2] == "-D")
+                    .count(),
+                1,
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                calls
+                    .iter()
+                    .filter(|call| {
+                        call.binary == binary && matches!(call.args[2].as_str(), "-F" | "-X")
+                    })
+                    .count(),
+                6,
+            );
+        }
+        let calls = runner.calls().len();
+        reconcile_once(
+            &runner,
+            &runner,
+            &mut applied,
+            &desired(2, requested.policy.clone()),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(runner.calls().len(), calls);
+        recover_to_empty(&runner).await.unwrap();
+        recover_to_empty(&runner).await.unwrap();
+        runner.assert_owned_policy(false);
+        assert_eq!(runner.foreign_snapshot(), foreign);
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn genuine_recovery_failures_leave_state_unknown_and_do_not_install() {
+    for message in [
+        "Permission denied",
+        "can't initialize iptables table `raw': Table does not exist",
+        "Another app is currently holding the xtables lock",
+        "unknown firewall failure",
+    ] {
+        let runner = FixtureRunner::new(Some(message));
+        let mut applied = AppliedState::Unknown;
+        let error = reconcile_once(
+            &runner,
+            &runner,
+            &mut applied,
+            &desired(1, dual_stack_policy(443)),
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap_err();
+        assert!(error.message.contains(message));
+        assert_eq!(applied, AppliedState::Unknown);
+        assert!(runner.calls().iter().all(|call| call.stdin.is_none()));
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test(start_paused = true)]
+async fn actor_converges_then_idles_and_preserves_foreign_rules_on_shutdown() {
+    for failure in [None, Some("Permission denied")] {
+        let runner = FixtureRunner::new(failure);
+        let observed = runner.clone();
+        let foreign = observed.foreign_snapshot();
+        let (desired_tx, desired_rx) = watch::channel(None);
+        let (status_tx, mut status_rx) = watch::channel(None);
+        let terminal = CancellationToken::new();
+        let closed = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false));
+        let completed = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false));
+        let cleanup = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false));
+        let reconciler = FirewallReconciler::new(
+            runner,
+            desired_rx,
+            status_tx,
+            terminal.clone(),
+            closed.clone(),
+            completed.clone(),
+            cleanup.clone(),
+            Arc::new(Notify::new()),
+        );
+        let task = tokio::spawn(reconciler.run(CancellationToken::new()));
+        let requested = desired(1, dual_stack_policy(443));
+        let stats = requested.stats.clone();
+        desired_tx.send_replace(Some(requested));
+        status_rx.changed().await.unwrap();
+        if failure.is_some() {
+            assert_eq!(
+                status_rx.borrow().as_ref().unwrap().outcome,
+                ReconcileOutcome::Failed,
+            );
+            assert!(!stats.get_conntrack_rule_apply_ok());
+            assert_eq!(stats.get_conntrack_rule_reconcile_error_total(), 1);
+            let calls = observed.calls().len();
+            tokio::time::advance(Duration::from_millis(999)).await;
+            tokio::task::yield_now().await;
+            assert_eq!(observed.calls().len(), calls);
+            tokio::time::advance(Duration::from_millis(1)).await;
+            status_rx.changed().await.unwrap();
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            status_rx.borrow().as_ref().unwrap().outcome,
+            ReconcileOutcome::Applied,
+        );
+        assert_eq!(status_rx.borrow().as_ref().unwrap().generation, 1);
+        assert!(stats.get_conntrack_rule_apply_ok());
+        assert_eq!(stats.get_conntrack_rule_reconcile_success_total(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(
+            stats.get_conntrack_rule_reconcile_error_total(),
+            u64::from(failure.is_some()),
+        );
+        let calls = observed.calls().len();
+        tokio::time::advance(Duration::from_secs(90)).await;
+        tokio::task::yield_now().await;
+        assert_eq!(observed.calls().len(), calls);
+        assert!(!status_rx.has_changed().unwrap());
+        observed.assert_owned_policy(true);
+        assert_eq!(observed.foreign_snapshot(), foreign);
+        terminal.cancel();
+        tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), task)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(closed.load(Ordering::Acquire));
+        assert!(completed.load(Ordering::Acquire));
+        assert!(cleanup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
+        assert!(!stats.get_conntrack_rule_apply_ok());
+        observed.assert_owned_policy(false);
+        assert_eq!(observed.foreign_snapshot(), foreign);
+    }
+}

src/daemon/mod.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 use nix::errno::Errno;
-use nix::unistd::{self, ForkResult, Gid, Uid, chdir, close, fork, getpid, setsid};
+use nix::unistd::{self, ForkResult, Gid, Uid, chdir, fork, getpid, setsid};
 use tracing::info;
 
 // PID file ownership and process-control helpers.
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ pub struct DaemonOptions {
     pub daemonize: bool,
     /// Path to PID file.
     pub pid_file: Option<PathBuf>,
+    /// Require trusted, symlink-free PID and log parents. Disabled by default for compatibility.
+    pub strict_runtime_paths: bool,
     /// User to run as after binding sockets.
     pub user: Option<String>,
     /// Group to run as after binding sockets.
@@ -174,8 +176,10 @@ fn redirect_stdio_to_devnull() -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
         }
     }
 
-    if devnull_fd > 2 {
-        let _ = close(devnull_fd);
+    // Keep stdio descriptors open; other source descriptors are closed once by File's Drop.
+    // Transfer ownership only after all dup2 calls succeed so errors retain RAII cleanup.
+    if devnull_fd <= 2 {
+        let _ = std::os::unix::io::IntoRawFd::into_raw_fd(devnull);
     }
 
     Ok(())
@@ -332,6 +336,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn test_daemon_options_default() {
         let opts = DaemonOptions::default();
         assert!(!opts.daemonize);
+        assert!(!opts.strict_runtime_paths);
         assert!(!opts.should_daemonize());
         assert_eq!(opts.pid_file_path(), Path::new(DEFAULT_PID_FILE));
     }

src/daemon/pid_file.rs

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ use crate::util::secure_fs::AnchoredPath;
 /// PID file manager backed by a persistent sibling lock file.
 pub struct PidFile {
     path: PathBuf,
+    strict_runtime_paths: bool,
     lock_path: PathBuf,
     pid_file: Option<File>,
     pid_identity: Option<FileIdentity>,
@@ -40,12 +41,13 @@ impl FileIdentity {
 }
 
 impl PidFile {
-    /// Creates a new PID file manager for the given path.
-    pub fn new<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Self {
+    /// Creates a PID manager with explicit parent-path policy; `false` allows legacy parents.
+    pub fn new<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P, strict_runtime_paths: bool) -> Self {
         let path = normalize_pid_path(path.as_ref());
         let lock_path = sibling_lock_path(&path);
         Self {
             path,
+            strict_runtime_paths,
             lock_path,
             pid_file: None,
             pid_identity: None,
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ impl PidFile {
 
     /// Checks whether the PID file names a running process without modifying either file.
     pub fn check_running(&self) -> Result<Option<i32>, DaemonError> {
-        let Some(pid) = read_pid_file_if_exists(&self.path)? else {
+        let Some(pid) = read_pid_file_if_exists(&self.path, self.strict_runtime_paths)? else {
             return Ok(None);
         };
         Ok(is_process_running(pid).then_some(pid))
@@ -67,9 +69,10 @@ impl PidFile {
     /// Fails if another owner holds the lock or the existing PID names a running process.
     pub fn acquire(&mut self) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
         let anchor =
-            AnchoredPath::open_trusted_parent_or_create(&self.path, 0o755).map_err(|error| {
+            AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(&self.path, Some(0o755), self.strict_runtime_paths)
+                .map_err(|error| {
                 DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
-                    "cannot open trusted parent for {}: {}",
+                    "cannot open PID parent for {}: {}",
                     self.path.display(),
                     error
                 ))
@@ -245,13 +248,16 @@ fn open_file_at(anchor: &AnchoredPath, name: &OsStr, flags: OFlag, mode: u32) ->
     Ok(File::from(descriptor))
 }
 
-fn read_pid_file_if_exists(path: &Path) -> Result<Option<i32>, DaemonError> {
-    let anchor = match AnchoredPath::open_trusted_parent(path) {
+fn read_pid_file_if_exists(
+    path: &Path,
+    strict_runtime_paths: bool,
+) -> Result<Option<i32>, DaemonError> {
+    let anchor = match AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(path, None, strict_runtime_paths) {
         Ok(anchor) => anchor,
         Err(error) if error.kind() == ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
         Err(error) => {
             return Err(DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
-                "cannot open trusted parent for {}: {}",
+                "cannot open PID parent for {}: {}",
                 path.display(),
                 error
             )));
@@ -352,11 +358,14 @@ fn validate_regular_single_link(file: &File, path: &Path) -> Result<fs::Metadata
     Ok(metadata)
 }
 
-/// Reads a PID from a PID file.
+/// Reads a PID using the selected parent-path policy; `false` allows legacy parents.
 #[allow(dead_code)]
-pub fn read_pid_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<i32, DaemonError> {
+pub fn read_pid_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(
+    path: P,
+    strict_runtime_paths: bool,
+) -> Result<i32, DaemonError> {
     let path = normalize_pid_path(path.as_ref());
-    read_pid_file_if_exists(&path)?.ok_or_else(|| {
+    read_pid_file_if_exists(&path, strict_runtime_paths)?.ok_or_else(|| {
         DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
             "cannot read {}: file does not exist",
             path.display()
@@ -364,17 +373,18 @@ pub fn read_pid_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<i32, DaemonError> {
     })
 }
 
-/// Sends a signal to the process specified in a PID file.
+/// Signals a lock-owning process using the same parent-path policy for PID and lock files.
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 pub fn signal_pid_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(
     path: P,
     signal: nix::sys::signal::Signal,
+    strict_runtime_paths: bool,
 ) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
     let path = normalize_pid_path(path.as_ref());
-    let pid = read_pid_file(&path)?;
+    let pid = read_pid_file(&path, strict_runtime_paths)?;
     #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
     let pidfd = open_pidfd(pid)?;
-    if !daemon_lock_is_held(&path)? {
+    if !daemon_lock_is_held(&path, strict_runtime_paths)? {
         return Err(DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
             "refusing to signal unlocked or stale PID file {}",
             path.display()
@@ -399,12 +409,15 @@ pub enum DaemonStatus {
     NotRunning,
 }
 
-/// Checks daemon status without modifying the PID or lock file.
+/// Checks daemon status read-only, applying the selected policy to both parent lookups.
 #[allow(dead_code)]
-pub fn check_status<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> DaemonStatus {
+pub fn check_status<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P, strict_runtime_paths: bool) -> DaemonStatus {
     let path = normalize_pid_path(path.as_ref());
-    match read_pid_file_if_exists(&path) {
-        Ok(Some(pid)) if daemon_lock_is_held(&path).unwrap_or(false) && is_process_running(pid) => {
+    match read_pid_file_if_exists(&path, strict_runtime_paths) {
+        Ok(Some(pid))
+            if daemon_lock_is_held(&path, strict_runtime_paths).unwrap_or(false)
+                && is_process_running(pid) =>
+        {
             DaemonStatus::Running(pid)
         }
         Ok(Some(pid)) => DaemonStatus::Stale(pid),
@@ -412,14 +425,14 @@ pub fn check_status<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> DaemonStatus {
     }
 }
 
-fn daemon_lock_is_held(path: &Path) -> Result<bool, DaemonError> {
+fn daemon_lock_is_held(path: &Path, strict_runtime_paths: bool) -> Result<bool, DaemonError> {
     let lock_path = sibling_lock_path(path);
-    let anchor = match AnchoredPath::open_trusted_parent(path) {
+    let anchor = match AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(path, None, strict_runtime_paths) {
         Ok(anchor) => anchor,
         Err(error) if error.kind() == ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(false),
         Err(error) => {
             return Err(DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
-                "cannot open trusted parent for {}: {}",
+                "cannot open PID parent for {}: {}",
                 path.display(),
                 error
             )));

src/daemon/pid_file/tests.rs

@@ -38,6 +38,107 @@ fn pid_file_remains_send_and_sync() {
     assert_send_sync::<PidFile>();
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn compatibility_pid_lifecycle_accepts_writable_parent_directories() {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+
+    for mode in [0o770, 0o777, 0o1777] {
+        let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        fs::set_permissions(directory.path(), fs::Permissions::from_mode(mode)).unwrap();
+        let pid_path = directory.path().join("telemt.pid");
+        let mut strict_owner = PidFile::new(&pid_path, true);
+        assert!(strict_owner.acquire().is_err());
+        assert!(!pid_path.exists());
+        assert!(!sibling_lock_path(&pid_path).exists());
+        let mut owner = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
+        owner.acquire().unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            read_pid_file(&pid_path, false).unwrap(),
+            std::process::id() as i32
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            owner.check_running().unwrap(),
+            Some(std::process::id() as i32)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            check_status(&pid_path, false),
+            DaemonStatus::Running(std::process::id() as i32)
+        );
+        assert!(read_pid_file(&pid_path, true).is_err());
+        assert!(strict_owner.check_running().is_err());
+        assert_eq!(check_status(&pid_path, true), DaemonStatus::NotRunning);
+
+        owner.release().unwrap();
+        assert!(!pid_path.exists());
+        assert!(sibling_lock_path(&pid_path).exists());
+        assert_eq!(check_status(&pid_path, false), DaemonStatus::NotRunning);
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn compatibility_pid_lifecycle_follows_symlinked_parents() {
+    let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let real = directory.path().join("tmp");
+    let linked = directory.path().join("var");
+    fs::create_dir(&real).unwrap();
+    symlink("tmp", &linked).unwrap();
+    let pid_path = linked.join("run/telemt.pid");
+    let mut strict_owner = PidFile::new(&pid_path, true);
+    assert!(strict_owner.acquire().is_err());
+    assert!(!real.join("run").exists());
+    let mut owner = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
+    owner.acquire().unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        read_pid_file(&pid_path, false).unwrap(),
+        std::process::id() as i32
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        check_status(&pid_path, false),
+        DaemonStatus::Running(std::process::id() as i32)
+    );
+    assert!(real.join("run/telemt.pid.lock").exists());
+    assert!(read_pid_file(&pid_path, true).is_err());
+    assert_eq!(check_status(&pid_path, true), DaemonStatus::NotRunning);
+
+    owner.release().unwrap();
+    assert!(!real.join("run/telemt.pid").exists());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn private_pid_parent_supports_both_policies() {
+    for strict_runtime_paths in [false, true] {
+        let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let pid_path = directory.path().join("nested/run/telemt.pid");
+        let mut owner = PidFile::new(&pid_path, strict_runtime_paths);
+        owner.acquire().unwrap();
+
+        for read_strict in [false, true] {
+            assert_eq!(
+                read_pid_file(&pid_path, read_strict).unwrap(),
+                std::process::id() as i32
+            );
+            assert_eq!(
+                check_status(&pid_path, read_strict),
+                DaemonStatus::Running(std::process::id() as i32)
+            );
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::metadata(pid_path.parent().unwrap()).unwrap().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o755
+        );
+        let mut contender = PidFile::new(&pid_path, strict_runtime_paths);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            contender.acquire(),
+            Err(DaemonError::AlreadyRunning(_))
+        ));
+        owner.release().unwrap();
+        contender.acquire().unwrap();
+        contender.release().unwrap();
+    }
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn system_var_run_alias_keeps_the_default_pid_path_usable() {
     let Ok(metadata) = fs::symlink_metadata("/var/run") else {
@@ -52,7 +153,7 @@ fn system_var_run_alias_keeps_the_default_pid_path_usable() {
         return;
     }
 
-    let pid_file = PidFile::new("/var/run/telemt.pid");
+    let pid_file = PidFile::new("/var/run/telemt.pid", false);
 
     assert_eq!(pid_file.path(), Path::new("/run/telemt.pid"));
 }
@@ -64,7 +165,7 @@ fn lock_holder_subprocess() {
     };
     let ready_path = PathBuf::from(std::env::var_os(HELPER_READY_PATH).unwrap());
     let stop_path = PathBuf::from(std::env::var_os(HELPER_STOP_PATH).unwrap());
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(PathBuf::from(pid_path));
+    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(PathBuf::from(pid_path), false);
     pid_file.acquire().unwrap();
     fs::write(&ready_path, b"ready").unwrap();
     assert!(wait_for_path(&stop_path, Duration::from_secs(10)));
@@ -100,7 +201,7 @@ fn persistent_sibling_lock_serializes_processes_after_pid_unlink() {
     let lock_inode = fs::metadata(&lock_path).unwrap().ino();
     fs::remove_file(&pid_path).unwrap();
 
-    let mut contender = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let mut contender = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
     assert!(contender.acquire().is_err());
 
     fs::write(&stop_path, b"stop").unwrap();
@@ -123,10 +224,13 @@ fn stale_pid_checks_are_read_only() {
     let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
     let pid_path = directory.path().join("telemt.pid");
     fs::write(&pid_path, b"2000000000\n").unwrap();
-    let pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
 
     assert_eq!(pid_file.check_running().unwrap(), None);
-    assert_eq!(check_status(&pid_path), DaemonStatus::Stale(2_000_000_000));
+    assert_eq!(
+        check_status(&pid_path, false),
+        DaemonStatus::Stale(2_000_000_000)
+    );
     assert!(pid_path.exists());
 }
 
@@ -136,15 +240,15 @@ fn status_requires_live_lock_ownership() {
     let pid_path = directory.path().join("telemt.pid");
     fs::write(&pid_path, format!("{}\n", std::process::id())).unwrap();
     assert_eq!(
-        check_status(&pid_path),
+        check_status(&pid_path, false),
         DaemonStatus::Stale(std::process::id() as i32)
     );
 
     fs::remove_file(&pid_path).unwrap();
-    let mut owner = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let mut owner = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
     owner.acquire().unwrap();
     assert_eq!(
-        check_status(&pid_path),
+        check_status(&pid_path, false),
         DaemonStatus::Running(std::process::id() as i32)
     );
     owner.release().unwrap();
@@ -155,7 +259,7 @@ fn unowned_release_does_not_remove_pid_file() {
     let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
     let pid_path = directory.path().join("telemt.pid");
     fs::write(&pid_path, b"2000000000\n").unwrap();
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
 
     pid_file.release().unwrap();
 
@@ -169,10 +273,11 @@ fn acquire_rejects_pid_symlink_without_truncating_target() {
     let target_path = directory.path().join("target");
     fs::write(&target_path, b"preserve\n").unwrap();
     symlink(&target_path, &pid_path).unwrap();
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
-
-    assert!(pid_file.acquire().is_err());
-    assert_eq!(fs::read(&target_path).unwrap(), b"preserve\n");
+    for strict_runtime_paths in [false, true] {
+        let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, strict_runtime_paths);
+        assert!(pid_file.acquire().is_err());
+        assert_eq!(fs::read(&target_path).unwrap(), b"preserve\n");
+    }
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -182,10 +287,11 @@ fn acquire_rejects_pid_hard_link_without_truncating_target() {
     let target_path = directory.path().join("target");
     fs::write(&target_path, b"preserve\n").unwrap();
     fs::hard_link(&target_path, &pid_path).unwrap();
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
-
-    assert!(pid_file.acquire().is_err());
-    assert_eq!(fs::read(&target_path).unwrap(), b"preserve\n");
+    for strict_runtime_paths in [false, true] {
+        let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, strict_runtime_paths);
+        assert!(pid_file.acquire().is_err());
+        assert_eq!(fs::read(&target_path).unwrap(), b"preserve\n");
+    }
 }
 
 #[test]
@@ -196,7 +302,7 @@ fn acquire_rejects_symlinked_parent_without_publishing_outside() {
     fs::create_dir(&real_parent).unwrap();
     symlink(&real_parent, &linked_parent).unwrap();
     let pid_path = linked_parent.join("telemt.pid");
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, true);
 
     assert!(pid_file.acquire().is_err());
     assert!(!real_parent.join("telemt.pid").exists());
@@ -210,7 +316,7 @@ fn release_remains_anchored_after_parent_path_replacement() {
     let moved_parent = directory.path().join("moved");
     fs::create_dir(&active_parent).unwrap();
     let pid_path = active_parent.join("telemt.pid");
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
     pid_file.acquire().unwrap();
 
     fs::rename(&active_parent, &moved_parent).unwrap();
@@ -231,7 +337,7 @@ fn release_does_not_remove_replacement_path() {
     let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
     let pid_path = directory.path().join("telemt.pid");
     let owned_path = directory.path().join("owned.pid");
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
     pid_file.acquire().unwrap();
     fs::rename(&pid_path, &owned_path).unwrap();
     fs::write(&pid_path, b"replacement\n").unwrap();
@@ -253,7 +359,7 @@ fn pid_parser_rejects_process_group_values() {
 
     for value in ["-1\n", "0\n", "1\n"] {
         fs::write(&pid_path, value).unwrap();
-        assert!(read_pid_file(&pid_path).is_err());
+        assert!(read_pid_file(&pid_path, false).is_err());
     }
 }
 
@@ -262,7 +368,7 @@ fn pid_file_release_keeps_lock_inode() {
     let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
     let pid_path = directory.path().join("telemt.pid");
     let lock_path = sibling_lock_path(&pid_path);
-    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path);
+    let mut pid_file = PidFile::new(&pid_path, false);
 
     pid_file.acquire().unwrap();
     assert!(
@@ -271,7 +377,10 @@ fn pid_file_release_keeps_lock_inode() {
             .into_iter()
             .all(|file| file.is_some())
     );
-    assert_eq!(read_pid_file(&pid_path).unwrap(), std::process::id() as i32);
+    assert_eq!(
+        read_pid_file(&pid_path, false).unwrap(),
+        std::process::id() as i32
+    );
     let lock_inode = fs::metadata(&lock_path).unwrap().ino();
     pid_file.release().unwrap();
 

src/logging.rs

@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ pub struct LoggingOptions {
     pub destination: LogDestination,
     /// Disable ANSI colors.
     pub disable_colors: bool,
+    /// Require trusted, symlink-free log parents on Unix. Disabled by default for compatibility.
+    pub strict_runtime_paths: bool,
 }
 
 /// Guard that must be held to keep file logging active.
@@ -125,7 +127,6 @@ pub fn init_logging(
 
         #[cfg(unix)]
         LogDestination::Syslog => {
-            // Use a custom fmt layer that writes to syslog
             let fmt_layer = fmt::Layer::default()
                 .with_ansi(false)
                 .with_target(false)
@@ -143,7 +144,8 @@ pub fn init_logging(
 
         LogDestination::File { options } => {
             let file_appender =
-                file::BoundedFileAppender::new(options.clone()).expect("Failed to open log file");
+                file::BoundedFileAppender::new(options.clone(), opts.strict_runtime_paths)
+                    .expect("Failed to open log file");
             let (non_blocking, guard) = tracing_appender::non_blocking(file_appender);
 
             let fmt_layer = fmt::Layer::default()
@@ -175,14 +177,10 @@ struct SyslogWriter {
 #[cfg(unix)]
 impl SyslogMakeWriter {
     fn new() -> Self {
-        // Open syslog connection on first use
         static INIT: std::sync::Once = std::sync::Once::new();
-        INIT.call_once(|| {
-            unsafe {
-                // Open syslog with ident "telemt", LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON facility
-                let ident = b"telemt\0".as_ptr() as *const libc::c_char;
-                libc::openlog(ident, libc::LOG_PID | libc::LOG_NDELAY, libc::LOG_DAEMON);
-            }
+        INIT.call_once(|| unsafe {
+            let ident = b"telemt\0".as_ptr() as *const libc::c_char;
+            libc::openlog(ident, libc::LOG_PID | libc::LOG_NDELAY, libc::LOG_DAEMON);
         });
         Self
     }
@@ -202,7 +200,6 @@ fn syslog_priority_for_level(level: &tracing::Level) -> libc::c_int {
 #[cfg(unix)]
 impl std::io::Write for SyslogWriter {
     fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
-        // Convert to C string, stripping newlines
         let msg = String::from_utf8_lossy(buf);
         let msg = msg.trim_end();
 
@@ -210,7 +207,6 @@ impl std::io::Write for SyslogWriter {
             return Ok(buf.len());
         }
 
-        // Write to syslog
         let c_msg = std::ffi::CString::new(msg.as_bytes())
             .unwrap_or_else(|_| std::ffi::CString::new("(invalid utf8)").unwrap());
 

src/logging/file.rs

@@ -44,13 +44,15 @@ pub(crate) struct BoundedFileAppender {
 }
 
 impl BoundedFileAppender {
-    pub(crate) fn new(options: FileLogOptions) -> io::Result<Self> {
-        Self::with_now(options, Box::new(Utc::now))
+    /// Opens the appender using the process-level Unix parent-path policy.
+    pub(crate) fn new(options: FileLogOptions, strict_runtime_paths: bool) -> io::Result<Self> {
+        Self::with_now(options, Box::new(Utc::now), strict_runtime_paths)
     }
 
     fn with_now(
         options: FileLogOptions,
         now: Box<dyn Fn() -> DateTime<Utc> + Send + Sync>,
+        strict_runtime_paths: bool,
     ) -> io::Result<Self> {
         let path = Path::new(&options.path);
         let dir = path
@@ -67,7 +69,13 @@ impl BoundedFileAppender {
         let start = now();
         let current_path = active_path_for(&dir, &base_name, options.rotation, &start);
         #[cfg(unix)]
-        let dir_fd = crate::util::secure_fs::open_trusted_dir_nofollow_or_create(&dir, 0o750)?;
+        let dir_fd = if strict_runtime_paths {
+            crate::util::secure_fs::open_trusted_dir_nofollow_or_create(&dir, 0o750)?
+        } else {
+            crate::util::secure_fs::open_compatible_dir(&dir, Some(0o750))?
+        };
+        #[cfg(not(unix))]
+        let _ = strict_runtime_paths;
         #[cfg(unix)]
         let (file, current_size) = open_append_file(&dir_fd, &current_path)?;
         #[cfg(not(unix))]

src/logging/file/tests.rs

@@ -34,6 +34,115 @@ fn matching_logs(dir: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
     files
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn compatibility_appender_accepts_writable_log_directories() {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+
+    for mode in [0o770, 0o777, 0o1777] {
+        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+        fs::set_permissions(dir.path(), fs::Permissions::from_mode(mode)).unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join("telemt.log");
+        assert!(
+            BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options(path.clone()), Box::new(fixed_now), true)
+                .is_err()
+        );
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        let mut appender =
+            BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options(path.clone()), Box::new(fixed_now), false)
+                .unwrap();
+        appender.write_all(b"compatibility\n").unwrap();
+        appender.flush().unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(fs::read(&path).unwrap(), b"compatibility\n");
+        assert_eq!(
+            fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777,
+            0o640
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn compatibility_appender_follows_symlinked_parents() {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+
+    let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+    let real = dir.path().join("real");
+    let linked = dir.path().join("linked");
+    fs::create_dir(&real).unwrap();
+    symlink(&real, &linked).unwrap();
+    let path = linked.join("nested/telemt.log");
+    assert!(
+        BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options(path.clone()), Box::new(fixed_now), true).is_err()
+    );
+    assert!(!real.join("nested").exists());
+    let mut appender =
+        BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options(path), Box::new(fixed_now), false).unwrap();
+    appender.write_all(b"compatibility\n").unwrap();
+    appender.flush().unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        fs::read(real.join("nested/telemt.log")).unwrap(),
+        b"compatibility\n"
+    );
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn appender_rejects_final_symlinks_and_hard_links_in_both_modes() {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
+
+    for strict_runtime_paths in [false, true] {
+        for hard_link in [false, true] {
+            let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
+            let target = dir.path().join("sentinel");
+            let path = dir.path().join("telemt.log");
+            fs::write(&target, b"preserve\n").unwrap();
+            if hard_link {
+                fs::hard_link(&target, &path).unwrap();
+            } else {
+                symlink(&target, &path).unwrap();
+            }
+
+            assert!(
+                BoundedFileAppender::with_now(
+                    options(path),
+                    Box::new(fixed_now),
+                    strict_runtime_paths
+                )
+                .is_err()
+            );
+            assert_eq!(fs::read(&target).unwrap(), b"preserve\n");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+#[test]
+fn time_rotation_and_retention_work_through_compatible_parent_alias() {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::{PermissionsExt, symlink};
+
+    let root = tempdir().unwrap();
+    let real = root.path().join("logs");
+    let linked = root.path().join("linked");
+    fs::create_dir(&real).unwrap();
+    fs::set_permissions(&real, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o777)).unwrap();
+    symlink(&real, &linked).unwrap();
+    let mut options = options(linked.join("telemt.log"));
+    options.rotation = LogRotation::Daily;
+    options.max_files = 1;
+    let mut appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now), false).unwrap();
+    appender.write_all(b"first\n").unwrap();
+    appender.now = Box::new(|| fixed_now() + ChronoDuration::days(1));
+    appender.write_all(b"second\n").unwrap();
+    appender.flush().unwrap();
+
+    let remaining = matching_logs(&real);
+    assert_eq!(remaining.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(fs::read(&remaining[0]).unwrap(), b"second\n");
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn size_rotation_keeps_latest_write_in_active_file() {
     let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
@@ -41,7 +150,7 @@ fn size_rotation_keeps_latest_write_in_active_file() {
     let mut options = options(path.clone());
     options.max_size_bytes = 6;
 
-    let mut appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now)).unwrap();
+    let mut appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now), false).unwrap();
     appender.write_all(b"abc\n").unwrap();
     appender.write_all(b"def\n").unwrap();
     appender.flush().unwrap();
@@ -58,7 +167,7 @@ fn max_files_retention_removes_oldest_archives() {
     options.max_size_bytes = 4;
     options.max_files = 2;
 
-    let mut appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now)).unwrap();
+    let mut appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now), false).unwrap();
     for line in [b"aa\n", b"bb\n", b"cc\n", b"dd\n"] {
         appender.write_all(line).unwrap();
     }
@@ -94,7 +203,7 @@ fn max_age_retention_removes_old_archives() {
 
     let mut options = options(path);
     options.max_age_secs = 1;
-    let _appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now)).unwrap();
+    let _appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now), false).unwrap();
 
     assert!(!old_archive.exists());
 }
@@ -112,7 +221,7 @@ fn rotation_stays_bound_to_opened_directory_after_path_replacement() {
     fs::create_dir(&redirect).unwrap();
     let mut options = options(original.join("telemt.log"));
     options.max_size_bytes = 4;
-    let mut appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now)).unwrap();
+    let mut appender = BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options, Box::new(fixed_now), false).unwrap();
     appender.write_all(b"aa\n").unwrap();
     fs::rename(&original, &moved).unwrap();
     symlink(&redirect, &original).unwrap();
@@ -137,7 +246,11 @@ fn appender_rejects_group_writable_log_directory() {
     fs::set_permissions(dir.path(), fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o770)).unwrap();
 
     assert!(
-        BoundedFileAppender::with_now(options(dir.path().join("telemt.log")), Box::new(fixed_now),)
-            .is_err()
+        BoundedFileAppender::with_now(
+            options(dir.path().join("telemt.log")),
+            Box::new(fixed_now),
+            true
+        )
+        .is_err()
     );
 }

src/logging/tests.rs

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ use super::*;
 fn test_parse_log_cli_options_default() {
     let args: Vec<String> = vec![];
     let options = parse_log_cli_options(&args).unwrap();
+    assert!(!LoggingOptions::default().strict_runtime_paths);
     assert_eq!(
         resolve_log_destination(&LoggingConfig::default(), &options).unwrap(),
         LogDestination::Stderr

src/maestro/bootstrap.rs

@@ -15,20 +15,32 @@ use super::helpers::{
 use super::runtime_tasks;
 use super::validate_synlimit_privilege_drop;
 
+/// Process-level configuration and logging resources retained across runtime generations.
 pub(super) struct BootstrapState {
+    /// Monotonic process startup time.
     pub(super) process_started_at: Instant,
+    /// Process startup time as Unix epoch seconds.
     pub(super) process_started_at_epoch_secs: u64,
+    /// Startup component progress shared with the control plane.
     pub(super) startup_tracker: Arc<StartupTracker>,
+    /// Validated initial runtime configuration.
     pub(super) config: ProxyConfig,
+    /// Resolved source path used by reload operations.
     pub(super) config_path: PathBuf,
+    /// Whether the environment owns the log filter policy.
     pub(super) has_rust_log: bool,
+    /// Initial verbosity after CLI overrides.
     pub(super) effective_log_level: LogLevel,
+    /// Process-owned dynamic tracing filter.
     pub(super) runtime_log_filter: runtime_tasks::RuntimeLogFilter,
+    /// Keeps the file logging worker alive until process shutdown.
     pub(super) logging_guard: Option<crate::logging::LoggingGuard>,
 }
 
+/// Loads configuration and initializes process logging with the startup parent-path policy.
 pub(super) async fn bootstrap(
     privilege_drop_requested: bool,
+    strict_runtime_paths: bool,
 ) -> std::result::Result<BootstrapState, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
     let process_started_at = Instant::now();
     let process_started_at_epoch_secs = SystemTime::now()
@@ -268,6 +280,7 @@ pub(super) async fn bootstrap(
             let logging_opts = crate::logging::LoggingOptions {
                 destination: log_destination,
                 disable_colors: true,
+                strict_runtime_paths,
             };
             let (_, guard) = crate::logging::init_logging(&logging_opts, &initial_filter_spec);
             logging_guard = Some(guard);
@@ -276,6 +289,7 @@ pub(super) async fn bootstrap(
             let logging_opts = crate::logging::LoggingOptions {
                 destination: log_destination,
                 disable_colors: true,
+                strict_runtime_paths,
             };
             let (_, guard) = crate::logging::init_logging(&logging_opts, &initial_filter_spec);
             logging_guard = Some(guard);

src/maestro/helpers.rs

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ pub(crate) fn print_maestro_line(message: impl AsRef<str>) {
     );
 }
 
+/// Resolves the config source against startup cwd while retaining symlink components.
 pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_config_path(
     config_path_cli: &str,
     startup_cwd: &Path,
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_config_path(
     startup_cwd.join("config.toml")
 }
 
+/// Selects the runtime directory from CLI, startup cwd, and explicit config location.
 pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_base_dir(
     config_path: &Path,
     startup_cwd: &Path,
@@ -120,14 +122,21 @@ fn normalize_runtime_dir(path: &Path, startup_cwd: &Path) -> PathBuf {
 
 /// Parsed CLI arguments.
 pub(crate) struct CliArgs {
+    /// Config source selected by positional arguments.
     pub config_path: String,
+    /// Whether the config source was explicitly provided.
     pub config_path_explicit: bool,
+    /// Runtime directory override from CLI.
     pub data_path: Option<PathBuf>,
+    /// Whether CLI requests minimal logging output.
     pub silent: bool,
+    /// Verbosity override from CLI.
     pub log_level: Option<String>,
+    /// Logging destination, rotation, and retention overrides.
     pub log_cli_options: LogCliOptions,
 }
 
+/// Parses runtime arguments after early daemon and control-command handling.
 pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> CliArgs {
     let mut config_path = "config.toml".to_string();
     let mut config_path_explicit = false;
@@ -222,6 +231,8 @@ pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> CliArgs {
             }
             // Skip daemon-related flags (already parsed)
             "--daemon" | "-d" | "--foreground" | "-f" => {}
+            #[cfg(unix)]
+            "--strict-runtime-paths" => {}
             s if s.starts_with("--pid-file") => {
                 if !s.contains('=') {
                     // Skip the pid-file value consumed by daemon argument parsing.
@@ -300,6 +311,15 @@ fn print_help() {
         eprintln!("  --daemon, -d            Fork to background (daemonize)");
         eprintln!("  --foreground, -f        Explicit foreground mode (for systemd)");
         eprintln!("  --pid-file <PATH>       PID file path (default: /var/run/telemt.pid)");
+        eprintln!(
+            "  --strict-runtime-paths  Require trusted, symlink-free PID/log parents (default: off)"
+        );
+        eprintln!(
+            "                          Applies to run/start/stop/reload/status; parent symlinks and"
+        );
+        eprintln!(
+            "                          writable directories are allowed when this flag is absent"
+        );
         eprintln!("  --run-as-user <USER>    Drop privileges to this user after binding");
         eprintln!("  --run-as-group <GROUP>  Drop privileges to this group after binding");
         eprintln!("  --working-dir <DIR>     Working directory for daemon mode");

src/maestro/mod.rs

@@ -96,7 +96,10 @@ async fn run_inner(
     // Acquire PID file if daemonizing or if explicitly requested.
     // Keep it alive until shutdown for RAII cleanup.
     let _pid_file = if daemon_opts.daemonize || daemon_opts.pid_file.is_some() {
-        let mut pf = PidFile::new(daemon_opts.pid_file_path());
+        let mut pf = PidFile::new(
+            daemon_opts.pid_file_path(),
+            daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths,
+        );
         if let Err(e) = pf.acquire() {
             eprintln!("[telemt] {}", e);
             std::process::exit(1);
@@ -109,20 +112,25 @@ async fn run_inner(
     let user = daemon_opts.user.clone();
     let group = daemon_opts.group.clone();
 
-    orchestrator::run_telemt_core(user.is_some() || group.is_some(), || {
-        if (user.is_some() || group.is_some())
-            && let Err(e) = drop_privileges(user.as_deref(), group.as_deref(), _pid_file.as_ref())
-        {
-            error!(error = %e, "Failed to drop privileges");
-            std::process::exit(1);
-        }
-    })
+    orchestrator::run_telemt_core(
+        user.is_some() || group.is_some(),
+        daemon_opts.strict_runtime_paths,
+        || {
+            if (user.is_some() || group.is_some())
+                && let Err(e) =
+                    drop_privileges(user.as_deref(), group.as_deref(), _pid_file.as_ref())
+            {
+                error!(error = %e, "Failed to drop privileges");
+                std::process::exit(1);
+            }
+        },
+    )
     .await
 }
 
 #[cfg(not(unix))]
 async fn run_inner() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
-    orchestrator::run_telemt_core(false, || {}).await
+    orchestrator::run_telemt_core(false, false, || {}).await
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]

src/maestro/orchestrator.rs

@@ -30,10 +30,11 @@ use super::{
     runtime_tasks, shutdown, tls_bootstrap,
 };
 
-// Shared maestro startup and main loop. `drop_after_bind` runs on Unix after listeners are bound
-// and privileged firewall setup completes; it is a no-op on other platforms.
+/// Runs startup and the main loop with explicit runtime-path policy.
+/// `drop_after_bind` runs after listeners and privileged firewall setup are ready.
 pub(super) async fn run_telemt_core(
     privilege_drop_requested: bool,
+    strict_runtime_paths: bool,
     drop_after_bind: impl FnOnce(),
 ) -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
     let bootstrap::BootstrapState {
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ pub(super) async fn run_telemt_core(
         effective_log_level,
         runtime_log_filter,
         logging_guard: _logging_guard,
-    } = bootstrap::bootstrap(privilege_drop_requested).await?;
+    } = bootstrap::bootstrap(privilege_drop_requested, strict_runtime_paths).await?;
 
     if privilege_drop_requested && config.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control {
         warn!("Inline conntrack control is disabled when process privileges are dropped");

src/util/secure_fs/mod.rs

@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 //! Descriptor-anchored filesystem operations for privileged runtime paths.
 //!
 //! Submodules:
-//! - `path`: symlink-free directory traversal and anchored path ownership
+//! - `path`: strict or compatible directory traversal and anchored path ownership
 //! - `write`: regular-file opening and durable atomic replacement
 
 mod path;
 mod write;
 
 pub(crate) use path::{
-    AnchoredPath, chdir_nofollow_or_create, open_dir_nofollow, open_trusted_dir_nofollow_or_create,
+    AnchoredPath, chdir_nofollow_or_create, open_compatible_dir, open_dir_nofollow,
+    open_trusted_dir_nofollow_or_create,
 };
 pub(crate) use write::{
     atomic_replace, atomic_replace_async, open_append_regular, open_append_regular_at,

src/util/secure_fs/path.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::ffi::{OsStr, OsString};
 use std::io;
 use std::os::fd::OwnedFd;
-use std::os::unix::fs::{MetadataExt, PermissionsExt};
+use std::os::unix::fs::{DirBuilderExt, MetadataExt, PermissionsExt};
 use std::path::{Component, Path};
 
 use nix::fcntl::{OFlag, open, openat};
@@ -53,6 +53,28 @@ impl AnchoredPath {
         Ok(Self { parent, name })
     }
 
+    /// Anchors a runtime parent, applying trusted traversal only when explicitly requested.
+    pub(crate) fn open_runtime_parent(
+        path: &Path,
+        create_mode: Option<u32>,
+        strict_runtime_paths: bool,
+    ) -> io::Result<Self> {
+        if strict_runtime_paths {
+            return match create_mode {
+                Some(mode) => Self::open_trusted_parent_or_create(path, mode),
+                None => Self::open_trusted_parent(path),
+            };
+        }
+        let name = path
+            .file_name()
+            .filter(|name| !name.is_empty())
+            .ok_or_else(|| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "path has no file name"))?
+            .to_os_string();
+        let parent =
+            open_compatible_dir(path.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new(".")), create_mode)?;
+        Ok(Self { parent, name })
+    }
+
     fn open_with_parent_creation(path: &Path, create_mode: Option<u32>) -> io::Result<Self> {
         let name = path
             .file_name()
@@ -97,6 +119,23 @@ pub(crate) fn open_trusted_dir_nofollow_or_create(path: &Path, mode: u32) -> io:
     open_dir_components(path, Some(mode), true)
 }
 
+/// Follows parent-directory symlinks without imposing ownership or permission policy.
+pub(crate) fn open_compatible_dir(path: &Path, create_mode: Option<u32>) -> io::Result<OwnedFd> {
+    let path = if path.as_os_str().is_empty() {
+        Path::new(".")
+    } else {
+        path
+    };
+    if let Some(mode) = create_mode {
+        std::fs::DirBuilder::new()
+            .recursive(true)
+            .mode(mode)
+            .create(path)?;
+    }
+    // Retain the resolved directory inode so subsequent file operations do not rewalk the path.
+    open(path, DIRECTORY_FLAGS & !OFlag::O_NOFOLLOW, Mode::empty()).map_err(errno_to_io)
+}
+
 /// Opens a directory only when its entire path is owned by root or the effective user.
 fn open_trusted_dir_nofollow(path: &Path) -> io::Result<OwnedFd> {
     open_dir_components(path, None, true)

src/util/secure_fs/tests.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 use std::os::unix::fs::{PermissionsExt, symlink};
+use std::path::Path;
 
 use super::path::AnchoredPath;
 use super::write::atomic_replace_after_anchor;
@@ -15,6 +16,50 @@ fn directory_walk_rejects_intermediate_symlink() {
     assert!(open_dir_nofollow(&link).is_err());
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn runtime_parent_policy_creates_and_reads_relative_paths() {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
+
+    let current = std::env::current_dir().unwrap();
+    let directory = tempfile::tempdir_in(&current).unwrap();
+    let relative = directory.path().strip_prefix(&current).unwrap();
+    for strict_runtime_paths in [false, true] {
+        let mode = if strict_runtime_paths {
+            "strict"
+        } else {
+            "compatible"
+        };
+        let path = relative.join(mode).join("nested/telemt.pid");
+        let created =
+            AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(&path, Some(0o750), strict_runtime_paths).unwrap();
+        let opened = AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(&path, None, strict_runtime_paths).unwrap();
+        let created = std::fs::File::from(created.parent().try_clone().unwrap())
+            .metadata()
+            .unwrap();
+        let opened = std::fs::File::from(opened.parent().try_clone().unwrap())
+            .metadata()
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((created.dev(), created.ino()), (opened.dev(), opened.ino()));
+        assert_eq!(created.permissions().mode() & 0o777, 0o750);
+    }
+    assert!(AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(Path::new("telemt.pid"), None, false).is_ok());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn runtime_parent_policy_only_requires_trusted_ownership_when_strict() {
+    if !nix::unistd::Uid::effective().is_root() {
+        return;
+    }
+    let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let parent = directory.path().join("foreign-owner");
+    std::fs::create_dir(&parent).unwrap();
+    nix::unistd::chown(&parent, Some(nix::unistd::Uid::from_raw(65534)), None).unwrap();
+    let path = parent.join("telemt.pid");
+
+    assert!(AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(&path, None, false).is_ok());
+    assert!(AnchoredPath::open_runtime_parent(&path, None, true).is_err());
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn atomic_replace_does_not_follow_final_symlink() {
     let directory = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();