mirror of https://github.com/telemt/telemt.git
287 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
287 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Telemt - MTProxy on Rust + Tokio
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***Löst Probleme, bevor andere überhaupt wissen, dass sie existieren*** / ***It solves problems before others even realize they exist***
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**Telemt** is a fast, secure, and feature-rich server written in Rust: it fully implements the official Telegram proxy algo and adds many production-ready improvements such as:
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- [ME Pool + Reader/Writer + Registry + Refill + Adaptive Floor + Trio-State + Generation Lifecycle](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/model/MODEL.en.md)
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- [Full-covered API w/ management](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/API.md)
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- Anti-Replay on Sliding Window
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- Prometheus-format Metrics
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- TLS-Fronting and TCP-Splicing for masking from "prying" eyes
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[**Telemt Chat in Telegram**](https://t.me/telemtrs)
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## NEWS and EMERGENCY
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### ✈️ Telemt 3 is released!
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<table>
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<tr>
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<td width="50%" valign="top">
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### 🇷🇺 RU
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#### О релизах
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[3.3.27](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/releases/tag/3.3.27) даёт баланс стабильности и передового функционала, а так же последние исправления по безопасности и багам
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Будем рады вашему фидбеку и предложениям по улучшению — особенно в части **API**, **статистики**, **UX**
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---
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Если у вас есть компетенции в:
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- Асинхронных сетевых приложениях
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- Анализе трафика
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- Реверс-инжиниринге
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- Сетевых расследованиях
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Мы открыты к архитектурным предложениям, идеям и pull requests
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</td>
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<td width="50%" valign="top">
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### 🇬🇧 EN
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#### About releases
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[3.3.27](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/releases/tag/3.3.27) provides a balance of stability and advanced functionality, as well as the latest security and bug fixes
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We are looking forward to your feedback and improvement proposals — especially regarding **API**, **statistics**, **UX**
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---
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If you have expertise in:
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- Asynchronous network applications
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- Traffic analysis
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- Reverse engineering
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- Network forensics
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We welcome ideas, architectural feedback, and pull requests.
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</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
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# Features
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💥 The configuration structure has changed since version 1.1.0.0. change it in your environment!
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⚓ Our implementation of **TLS-fronting** is one of the most deeply debugged, focused, advanced and *almost* **"behaviorally consistent to real"**: we are confident we have it right - [see evidence on our validation and traces](#recognizability-for-dpi-and-crawler)
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⚓ Our ***Middle-End Pool*** is fastest by design in standard scenarios, compared to other implementations of connecting to the Middle-End Proxy: non dramatically, but usual
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- Full support for all official MTProto proxy modes:
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- Classic
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- Secure - with `dd` prefix
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- Fake TLS - with `ee` prefix + SNI fronting
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- Replay attack protection
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- Optional traffic masking: forward unrecognized connections to a real web server, e.g. GitHub 🤪
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- Configurable keepalives + timeouts + IPv6 and "Fast Mode"
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- Graceful shutdown on Ctrl+C
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- Extensive logging via `trace` and `debug` with `RUST_LOG` method
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# GOTO
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- [Quick Start Guide](#quick-start-guide)
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- [FAQ](#faq)
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- [Recognizability for DPI and crawler](#recognizability-for-dpi-and-crawler)
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- [Client WITH secret-key accesses the MTProxy resource:](#client-with-secret-key-accesses-the-mtproxy-resource)
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- [Client WITHOUT secret-key gets transparent access to the specified resource:](#client-without-secret-key-gets-transparent-access-to-the-specified-resource)
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- [Telegram Calls via MTProxy](#telegram-calls-via-mtproxy)
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- [How does DPI see MTProxy TLS?](#how-does-dpi-see-mtproxy-tls)
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- [Whitelist on IP](#whitelist-on-ip)
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- [Too many open files](#too-many-open-files)
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- [Build](#build)
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- [Why Rust?](#why-rust)
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- [Issues](#issues)
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- [Roadmap](#roadmap)
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## Quick Start Guide
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- [Quick Start Guide RU](docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md)
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- [Quick Start Guide EN](docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md)
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## FAQ
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- [FAQ RU](docs/FAQ.ru.md)
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- [FAQ EN](docs/FAQ.en.md)
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### Recognizability for DPI and crawler
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Since version 1.1.0.0, we have debugged masking perfectly: for all clients without "presenting" a key,
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we transparently direct traffic to the target host!
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- We consider this a breakthrough aspect, which has no stable analogues today
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- Based on this: if `telemt` configured correctly, **TLS mode is completely identical to real-life handshake + communication** with a specified host
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- Here is our evidence:
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- 212.220.88.77 - "dummy" host, running `telemt`
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- `petrovich.ru` - `tls` + `masking` host, in HEX: `706574726f766963682e7275`
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- **No MITM + No Fake Certificates/Crypto** = pure transparent *TCP Splice* to "best" upstream: MTProxy or tls/mask-host:
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- DPI see legitimate HTTPS to `tls_host`, including *valid chain-of-trust* and entropy
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- Crawlers completely satisfied receiving responses from `mask_host`
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#### Client WITH secret-key accesses the MTProxy resource:
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<img width="360" height="439" alt="telemt" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/39352afb-4a11-4ecc-9d91-9e8cfb20607d" />
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#### Client WITHOUT secret-key gets transparent access to the specified resource:
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- with trusted certificate
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- with original handshake
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- with full request-response way
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- with low-latency overhead
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```bash
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root@debian:~/telemt# curl -v -I --resolve petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 https://petrovich.ru/
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* Added petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 to DNS cache
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* Hostname petrovich.ru was found in DNS cache
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* Trying 212.220.88.77:443...
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* Connected to petrovich.ru (212.220.88.77) port 443 (#0)
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* ALPN: offers h2,http/1.1
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* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
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* CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
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* CApath: /etc/ssl/certs
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* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):
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* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):
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* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
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* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):
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* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
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* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):
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* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
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* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
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* ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default.
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* Server certificate:
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* subject: C=RU; ST=Saint Petersburg; L=Saint Petersburg; O=STD Petrovich; CN=*.petrovich.ru
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* start date: Jan 28 11:21:01 2025 GMT
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* expire date: Mar 1 11:21:00 2026 GMT
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* subjectAltName: host "petrovich.ru" matched cert's "petrovich.ru"
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* issuer: C=BE; O=GlobalSign nv-sa; CN=GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018
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* SSL certificate verify ok.
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* using HTTP/1.x
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> HEAD / HTTP/1.1
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> Host: petrovich.ru
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> User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
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> Accept: */*
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>
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* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
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* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
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* old SSL session ID is stale, removing
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< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
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< Server: Variti/0.9.3a
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Server: Variti/0.9.3a
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< Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
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Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
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< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
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Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
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< Content-Type: text/html
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Content-Type: text/html
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< Cache-Control: no-store
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Cache-Control: no-store
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< Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
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Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
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< Pragma: no-cache
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Pragma: no-cache
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< Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
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Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
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< Content-Type: text/html
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Content-Type: text/html
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< Content-Length: 31253
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Content-Length: 31253
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< Connection: keep-alive
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Connection: keep-alive
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< Keep-Alive: timeout=60
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Keep-Alive: timeout=60
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<
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* Connection #0 to host petrovich.ru left intact
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```
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- We challenged ourselves, we kept trying and we didn't only *beat the air*: now, we have something to show you
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- Do not just take our word for it? - This is great and we respect that: you can build your own `telemt` or download a build and check it right now
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### Telegram Calls via MTProxy
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- Telegram architecture **does NOT allow calls via MTProxy**, but only via SOCKS5, which cannot be obfuscated
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### How does DPI see MTProxy TLS?
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- DPI sees MTProxy in Fake TLS (ee) mode as TLS 1.3
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- the SNI you specify sends both the client and the server;
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- ALPN is similar to HTTP 1.1/2;
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- high entropy, which is normal for AES-encrypted traffic;
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### Whitelist on IP
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- MTProxy cannot work when there is:
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- no IP connectivity to the target host: Russian Whitelist on Mobile Networks - "Белый список"
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- OR all TCP traffic is blocked
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- OR high entropy/encrypted traffic is blocked: content filters at universities and critical infrastructure
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- OR all TLS traffic is blocked
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- OR specified port is blocked: use 443 to make it "like real"
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- OR provided SNI is blocked: use "officially approved"/innocuous name
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- like most protocols on the Internet;
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- these situations are observed:
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- in China behind the Great Firewall
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- in Russia on mobile networks, less in wired networks
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- in Iran during "activity"
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### Too many open files
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- On a fresh Linux install the default open file limit is low; under load `telemt` may fail with `Accept error: Too many open files`
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- **Systemd**: add `LimitNOFILE=65536` to the `[Service]` section (already included in the example above)
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- **Docker**: add `--ulimit nofile=65536:65536` to your `docker run` command, or in `docker-compose.yml`:
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```yaml
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ulimits:
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nofile:
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soft: 65536
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hard: 65536
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```
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- **System-wide** (optional): add to `/etc/security/limits.conf`:
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```
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* soft nofile 1048576
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* hard nofile 1048576
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root soft nofile 1048576
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root hard nofile 1048576
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```
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## Build
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```bash
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# Cloning repo
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git clone https://github.com/telemt/telemt
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# Changing Directory to telemt
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cd telemt
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# Starting Release Build
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cargo build --release
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# Low-RAM devices (1 GB, e.g. NanoPi Neo3 / Raspberry Pi Zero 2):
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# release profile uses lto = "thin" to reduce peak linker memory.
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# If your custom toolchain overrides profiles, avoid enabling fat LTO.
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# Move to /bin
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mv ./target/release/telemt /bin
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# Make executable
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chmod +x /bin/telemt
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# Lets go!
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telemt config.toml
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```
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### OpenBSD
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- Build and service setup guide: [OpenBSD Guide (EN)](docs/OPENBSD.en.md)
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- Example rc.d script: [contrib/openbsd/telemt.rcd](contrib/openbsd/telemt.rcd)
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- Status: OpenBSD sandbox hardening with `pledge(2)` and `unveil(2)` is not implemented yet.
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## Why Rust?
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- Long-running reliability and idempotent behavior
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- Rust's deterministic resource management - RAII
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- No garbage collector
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- Memory safety and reduced attack surface
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- Tokio's asynchronous architecture
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## Issues
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- ✅ [SOCKS5 as Upstream](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/issues/1) -> added Upstream Management
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- ✅ [iOS - Media Upload Hanging-in-Loop](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/issues/2)
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## Roadmap
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- Public IP in links
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- Config Reload-on-fly
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- Bind to device or IP for outbound/inbound connections
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- Adtag Support per SNI / Secret
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- Fail-fast on start + Fail-soft on runtime (only WARN/ERROR)
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- Zero-copy, minimal allocs on hotpath
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- DC Healthchecks + global fallback
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- No global mutable state
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- Client isolation + Fair Bandwidth
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- Backpressure-aware IO
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- "Secret Policy" - SNI / Secret Routing :D
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- Multi-upstream Balancer and Failover
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- Strict FSM per handshake
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- Session-based Antireplay with Sliding window, non-broking reconnects
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- Web Control: statistic, state of health, latency, client experience...
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