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310 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexey 486e439ae6 Update Cargo.toml + Cargo.lock 2026-04-05 12:19:24 +03:00
Alexey 8e7b27a16d Deleting Kilocode 2026-04-04 18:10:09 +03:00
Alexey 7f0057acd7 Conntrack Control Method
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-04 11:28:32 +03:00
Alexey 7fe38f1b9f Merge pull request #627 from DavidOsipov/flow
Фазы 1 и 2 полностью выполнены
2026-04-04 18:40:03 +03:00
David Osipov 6ea867ce36 Phase 2 implemented with additional guards 2026-04-03 02:08:59 +04:00
David Osipov a9f695623d Implementation plan + Phase 1 finished 2026-04-02 20:08:47 +04:00
David Osipov 5c29870632 Update dependencies in Cargo.lock to latest versions 2026-04-02 13:21:56 +04:00
Alexey 8ac1a0017d Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-31 23:17:30 +03:00
Alexey 3df274caa6 Rustfmt 2026-03-31 19:42:07 +03:00
Alexey 780546a680 Memory Consumption in Stats and Metrics
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 19:37:29 +03:00
Alexey 729ffa0fcd Shrink Session Vec
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 19:29:47 +03:00
Alexey e594d6f079 Buffer Pool Trim
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 19:22:36 +03:00
Alexey ecd6a19246 Cleanup Methods for Memory Consistency
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 18:40:04 +03:00
Alexey 2df6b8704d BSD Support + Active IP in API + Timeouts tuning + Apple/XNU Connectivity fixes + Admission-timeouts + Global Each TCP Connections: merge pull request #611 from telemt/flow
BSD Support + Active IP in API + Timeouts tuning + Apple/XNU Connectivity fixes + Admission-timeouts + Global Each TCP Connections
2026-03-31 13:10:31 +03:00
Alexey 5f5a046710 Update Cargo.toml + Cargo.lock 2026-03-31 13:04:24 +03:00
Alexey 2dc81ad0e0 API Consistency fixes
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 13:03:05 +03:00
Alexey d8d8534cf8 Update masking_ab_envelope_blur_integration_security_tests.rs 2026-03-31 12:30:43 +03:00
Alexey 6c850e4150 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-31 11:15:31 +03:00
Alexey b8cf596e7d Admission-timeouts + Global Each TCP Connections
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 11:14:55 +03:00
Alexey 5bf56b6dd8 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-30 23:36:45 +03:00
Alexey 65da1f91ec Drafting fixes for Apple/XNU Darwin Connectivity issues
Co-Authored-By: Aleksandr Kalashnikov <33665156+sleep3r@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-30 23:35:41 +03:00
Alexey f3e9d00132 Merge pull request #605 from telemt/readme
Readme
2026-03-29 11:52:44 +03:00
Alexey dee6e13fef Update CONTRIBUTING.md 2026-03-29 01:51:51 +03:00
Alexey 07d774a82a Merge pull request #595 from xaosproxy/fix/apply-tg-connect-timeout-upstream
Apply [timeouts] tg_connect to upstream DC TCP connect attempts
2026-03-28 21:14:51 +03:00
Roman Martynov 618bc7e0b6 Merge branch 'flow' into fix/apply-tg-connect-timeout-upstream 2026-03-28 14:27:47 +03:00
sintanial d06ac222d6 fix: move tg_connect to general, rustfmt upstream, fix UpstreamManager::new tests
- Relocate tg_connect from [timeouts] to [general] with validation and docs updates.
- Apply rustfmt to per-attempt upstream connect timeout expression in upstream.rs.
- Pass tg_connect_timeout_secs in all UpstreamManager::new test call sites.
- Wire hot reload and runtime snapshot to general.tg_connect.
2026-03-28 14:25:18 +03:00
Alexey 567453e0f8 Merge pull request #596 from xaosproxy/fix/listen_backlog
feat(server): configurable TCP listen_backlog
2026-03-28 12:28:19 +03:00
Alexey cba837745b Merge pull request #599 from Dimasssss/main
Update FAQ
2026-03-28 12:28:04 +03:00
Dimasssss 876c8f1612 Update FAQ.en.md 2026-03-27 22:26:21 +03:00
Dimasssss ac8ad864be Update FAQ.ru.md 2026-03-27 22:26:07 +03:00
Alexey fe56dc7c1a Update README.md 2026-03-27 14:13:08 +03:00
sintanial 96ae01078c feat(server): configurable TCP listen_backlog
Add [server].listen_backlog (default 1024) for client-facing listen(2)
queue size; use the same value for metrics HTTP listeners. Hot reload
logs restart-required when this field changes.
2026-03-27 12:49:53 +03:00
sintanial 3b9919fa4d Apply [timeouts] tg_connect to upstream DC TCP connect attempts
Wire config.timeouts.tg_connect into UpstreamManager; per-attempt timeout uses
the same .max(1) pattern as connect_budget_ms.

Reject timeouts.tg_connect = 0 at config load (consistent with
general.upstream_connect_budget_ms and related checks). Default when the key
is omitted remains default_connect_timeout() via serde.

Fixes telemt/telemt#439
2026-03-27 12:45:19 +03:00
Alexey 6c4a3b59f9 Merge pull request #515 from vkrivopalov/daemonize
Support running TeleMT as a background system service
2026-03-27 11:36:02 +03:00
Alexey 01c3d0a707 Merge branch 'flow' into daemonize 2026-03-27 11:35:52 +03:00
Alexey fbee4631d6 Merge pull request #588 from amirotin/feat/active-ips-endpoint
feat(api): add GET /v1/stats/users/active-ips endpoint
2026-03-26 11:12:43 +03:00
Mirotin Artem d0b52ea299 Merge branch 'main' into feat/active-ips-endpoint 2026-03-26 10:00:47 +03:00
Mirotin Artem 677195e587 feat(api): add GET /v1/stats/users/active-ips endpoint
Lightweight endpoint that returns only users with active TCP connections
and their IP addresses. Calls only get_active_ips_for_users() without
collecting recent IPs or building full UserInfo, significantly reducing
CPU and memory overhead compared to /v1/stats/users.
2026-03-26 10:00:29 +03:00
Alexey a383efcb21 Bounded Hybrid Loop + Watch + Family ArcSwap Snapshots + Health in Parallel + ArcSwap Writers + Registry Split + Endpoint on ArcSwap + New Backpressure Model + ME Decomposition: merge pull request #586 from telemt/flow
Bounded Hybrid Loop + Watch + Family ArcSwap Snapshots + Health in Parallel + ArcSwap Writers + Registry Split + Endpoint on ArcSwap + New Backpressure Model + ME Decomposition
2026-03-26 02:31:18 +03:00
Alexey cb5753f77c Update admission.rs
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-26 02:19:35 +03:00
Alexey 7a075b2ffe Middle Relay fixes
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-26 02:18:39 +03:00
Alexey 7de822dd15 RPC Proxy-req fixes
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 22:51:00 +03:00
Alexey 1bbf4584a6 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-25 22:25:58 +03:00
Alexey 70479c4094 Unexpected-only Quarantine
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 22:25:39 +03:00
Alexey b94746a6e0 Dashmap-driven Routing + Health Parallel + Family Runtime State
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 21:26:20 +03:00
Alexey ceae1564af Floor Runtime + Writer Selection Policy + Reconnect/Warmup + TransportPolicy + NAT Runtime Cores
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 20:55:20 +03:00
Alexey 7ce5fc66db ME Reinit Core advancing + Binding Policy Core
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 20:35:57 +03:00
Alexey 41493462a1 Drain + Single-Endpoint Runtime Cores
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 20:29:22 +03:00
Alexey 6ee4d4648c ME Health Core
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 20:01:44 +03:00
Alexey 97f6649584 ME Route Runtime Core
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 19:56:25 +03:00
Alexey dc6b6d3f9d ME Writer Lifecycle Core
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 19:47:41 +03:00
Alexey 1c3e0d4e46 ME Reinit Core
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 19:43:02 +03:00
Alexey 0b78583cf5 ME Routing Core
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 18:18:06 +03:00
Alexey 28d318d724 ME Writer Task Consolidation
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 17:59:54 +03:00
Alexey 70c2f0f045 RoutingTable + BindingState
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 17:50:44 +03:00
Alexey b9b1271f14 Merge pull request #584 from Dimasssss/patch-3
Update CONFIG_PARAMS, QUICK_START_GUIDE and FAQ
2026-03-25 17:44:59 +03:00
Dimasssss 3c734bd811 Update FAQ.en.md 2026-03-25 17:42:16 +03:00
Dimasssss 6391df0583 Update FAQ.ru.md 2026-03-25 17:42:07 +03:00
Dimasssss 6a781c8bc3 Update QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md 2026-03-25 17:40:45 +03:00
Dimasssss 138652af8e Update QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md 2026-03-25 17:40:16 +03:00
Dimasssss 59157d31a6 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md 2026-03-25 17:37:01 +03:00
Alexey 8bab3f70e1 WritersState on ArcSwao + Preferred Endpoint on ArcSwap + Two-map Rotation for Desync Dedup
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 17:25:35 +03:00
Alexey 41d786cc11 Safety Gates Invariants + HybridAsyncPersistent + Watch + Runtime Snapshots + ME Writer Ping Tracker + Parallel Recovery + Backpressure Guardrails
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 16:29:35 +03:00
Alexey c43de1bd2a Update release.yml 2026-03-24 22:36:25 +03:00
Alexey 101efe45b7 Update Dockerfile 2026-03-24 22:36:20 +03:00
Alexey 11df61c6ac Update release.yml 2026-03-24 22:18:34 +03:00
Alexey 08684bcbd2 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-24 22:03:12 +03:00
Alexey 744fb4425f TLS Validator: Unknown SNI as WARN in Log: merge pull request #579 from telemt/flow
TLS Validator: Unknown SNI as WARN in Log
2026-03-24 22:01:09 +03:00
Alexey 80cb1bc221 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-24 22:00:51 +03:00
Alexey 8461556b02 Update release.yml 2026-03-24 22:00:32 +03:00
Alexey cfd516edf3 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-24 21:41:14 +03:00
Alexey 803c2c0492 Update release.yml 2026-03-24 21:40:53 +03:00
Alexey b762bd029f Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-24 21:18:54 +03:00
Alexey 761679d306 Update test.yml 2026-03-24 21:18:13 +03:00
Alexey 41668b153d Update test.yml 2026-03-24 21:14:12 +03:00
Alexey 1d2f88ad29 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-24 21:11:11 +03:00
Alexey 80917f5abc Update test.yml 2026-03-24 21:10:56 +03:00
Alexey dc61d300ab Bump 2026-03-24 21:02:43 +03:00
Alexey ae16080de5 TLS Validator: Unknown SNI as WARN in Log 2026-03-24 21:01:41 +03:00
Alexey b8ca1fc166 Update Dockerfile 2026-03-24 20:55:32 +03:00
Alexey f9986944df Update release.yml 2026-03-24 20:53:56 +03:00
Alexey cb877c2bc3 Update release profile settings for better optimization: merge pull request #574 from vladon/main
Update release profile settings for better optimization
2026-03-24 14:10:04 +03:00
Vladislav Yaroslavlev 4426082c17 Update release profile settings for better optimization 2026-03-24 14:01:49 +03:00
Alexey 22097f8c7c Update Dockerfile 2026-03-24 11:46:49 +03:00
Alexey 1450af60a0 Update Dockerfile 2026-03-24 11:41:53 +03:00
Alexey f1cc8d65f2 Update release.yml 2026-03-24 11:12:03 +03:00
Alexey ec7e808daf Update release.yml 2026-03-24 11:05:50 +03:00
Alexey e4b7e23e76 New TLS-Fetcher + TLS SNI Validator + Upstream-driver getProxySecret/Config + Workflow Tunings + Redesign Quotas on Atomics + Tests Swap: merge pull request #569 from telemt/flow
New TLS-Fetcher + TLS SNI Validator + Upstream-driver getProxySecret/Config + Workflow Tunings + Redesign Quotas on Atomics + Tests Swap
2026-03-24 10:56:15 +03:00
Alexey 8b92b80b4a Rustks CryptoProvider fixes + Rustfmt 2026-03-24 10:33:06 +03:00
Alexey f7868aa00f Advanced TLS Fetcher
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-24 09:58:24 +03:00
Alexey 655a08fa5c TLS Fetcher fixes 2026-03-23 23:12:50 +03:00
Alexey 8bc432db49 Rustfmt 2026-03-23 23:00:46 +03:00
Alexey a40d6929e5 Upstream-driver getProxyConfig and getProxyConfig
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 22:41:17 +03:00
Alexey 8db566dbe9 TLS Validator
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 21:58:39 +03:00
Alexey bb71de0230 Missing proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs as trust-
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 20:54:58 +03:00
Alexey 62a258f8e3 Update test.yml 2026-03-23 20:49:17 +03:00
Alexey c868eaae74 Update test.yml 2026-03-23 20:36:25 +03:00
Alexey 8e1860f912 Update test.yml 2026-03-23 20:34:59 +03:00
Alexey 814bef9d99 Rustfmt 2026-03-23 20:32:55 +03:00
Alexey 3ceda15073 Update relay_quota_model_adversarial_tests.rs
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 20:18:18 +03:00
Alexey a3a6ea2880 Update relay_quota_overflow_regression_tests.rs
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 20:06:11 +03:00
Alexey 24156b5067 Workflow for Docker and correct binary naming
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 17:42:18 +03:00
Alexey a1dfa5b11d Merge branch 'flow' of https://github.com/telemt/telemt into flow 2026-03-23 17:05:26 +03:00
Alexey 800356c751 Rewiring tests
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 17:04:47 +03:00
Alexey 1546b012a6 Merge pull request #568 from avbor/main
DOCS: Update VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.*.md - AmneziaWG 2.0
2026-03-23 16:49:57 +03:00
Alexey e6b77af931 Workflows Swap
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 16:49:23 +03:00
Alexey 8cfaab9320 Fixes in tests
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 16:39:49 +03:00
Alexey 2d69b9d0ae New wave of tests
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 16:39:23 +03:00
Alexander 41c2b4de65 Update VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.en.md
Added S3-S4 parameters for AWG and update AWG generator.
2026-03-23 16:30:37 +03:00
Alexander 0a5e8a09fd Update VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.ru.md
Added S3-S4 parameters for AWG and update AWG generator.
2026-03-23 16:29:08 +03:00
Alexey 2f9fddfa6f Old Test Deletion 2026-03-23 16:21:53 +03:00
Alexey 6f4356f72a Redesign Quotas on Atomics 2026-03-23 15:53:44 +03:00
Alexey 0c3c9009a9 Merge pull request #538 from DavidOsipov/flow
Cross-mode Quota Locks, Masking Prefetch & Tiny-Frame Debt Protection
2026-03-23 11:35:57 +03:00
Alexey 0475844701 Merge branch 'flow' into flow 2026-03-23 11:35:44 +03:00
David Osipov 1abf9bd05c Refactor CI workflows: rename build job and streamline stress testing setup 2026-03-23 12:27:57 +04:00
David Osipov 6f17d4d231 Add comprehensive security tests for quota management and relay functionality
- Introduced `relay_dual_lock_race_harness_security_tests.rs` to validate user liveness during lock hold and release cycles.
- Added `relay_quota_extended_attack_surface_security_tests.rs` to cover various quota scenarios including positive, negative, edge cases, and adversarial conditions.
- Implemented `relay_quota_lock_eviction_lifecycle_tdd_tests.rs` to ensure proper eviction of stale entries and lifecycle management of quota locks.
- Created `relay_quota_lock_eviction_stress_security_tests.rs` to stress test the eviction mechanism under high churn conditions.
- Enhanced `relay_quota_lock_pressure_adversarial_tests.rs` to verify reclaiming of unreferenced entries after explicit eviction.
- Developed `relay_quota_retry_allocation_latency_security_tests.rs` to benchmark and validate latency and allocation behavior under contention.
2026-03-23 12:04:41 +04:00
Alexey bf30e93284 Merge pull request #545 from Dimasssss/patch-1
Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md and FAQ
2026-03-23 11:00:08 +03:00
David Osipov 91be148b72 Security hardening, concurrency fixes, and expanded test coverage
This commit introduces a comprehensive set of improvements to enhance
the security, reliability, and configurability of the proxy server,
specifically targeting adversarial resilience and high-load concurrency.

Security & Cryptography:
- Zeroize MTProto cryptographic key material (`dec_key`, `enc_key`)
  immediately after use to prevent memory leakage on early returns.
- Move TLS handshake replay tracking after full policy/ALPN validation
  to prevent cache poisoning by unauthenticated probes.
- Add `proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs` configuration to restrict PROXY
  protocol headers to trusted networks, rejecting spoofed IPs.

Adversarial Resilience & DoS Mitigation:
- Implement "Tiny Frame Debt" tracking in the middle-relay to prevent
  CPU exhaustion from malicious 0-byte or 1-byte frame floods.
- Add `mask_relay_max_bytes` to strictly bound unauthenticated fallback
  connections, preventing the proxy from being abused as an open relay.
- Add a 5ms prefetch window (`mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms`) to
  correctly assemble and classify fragmented HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 probes
  (e.g., `PRI * HTTP/2.0`) before routing them to masking heuristics.
- Prevent recursive masking loops (FD exhaustion) by verifying the mask
  target is not the proxy's own listener via local interface enumeration.

Concurrency & Reliability:
- Eliminate executor waker storms during quota lock contention by replacing
  the spin-waker task with inline `Sleep` and exponential backoff.
- Roll back user quota reservations (`rollback_me2c_quota_reservation`)
  if a network write fails, preventing Head-of-Line (HoL) blocking from
  permanently burning data quotas.
- Recover gracefully from idle-registry `Mutex` poisoning instead of
  panicking, ensuring isolated thread failures do not break the proxy.
- Fix `auth_probe_scan_start_offset` modulo logic to ensure bounds safety.

Testing:
- Add extensive adversarial, timing, fuzzing, and invariant test suites
  for both the client and handshake modules.
2026-03-22 23:09:49 +04:00
Alexander e46d2cfc52 Update VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.ru.md
Fix typo
2026-03-22 21:59:20 +03:00
Dimasssss d4cda6d546 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md 2026-03-22 21:56:21 +03:00
Alexey e35d69c61f Merge pull request #544 from avbor/main
DOCS: VPS doube hop manual Ru\En
2026-03-22 21:45:13 +03:00
Dimasssss a353a94175 Update FAQ.en.md 2026-03-22 21:35:39 +03:00
Dimasssss b856250b2c Update FAQ.ru.md 2026-03-22 21:30:17 +03:00
Alexander 97d1476ded Merge branch 'flow' into main 2026-03-22 20:52:58 +03:00
Alexander cde14fc1bf Create VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.en.md
Added VPS double hop with AmneziaWG manual
2026-03-22 20:35:09 +03:00
Alexander 5723d50d0b Create VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.ru.md
Added VPS double hop with AmneziaWG manual
2026-03-22 20:04:14 +03:00
Alexey 3eb384e02a Update middle_relay.rs 2026-03-22 17:53:32 +03:00
Dimasssss c960e0e245 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md 2026-03-22 17:44:52 +03:00
David Osipov 6fc188f0c4 Update src/proxy/tests/handshake_more_clever_tests.rs
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-22 17:08:23 +04:00
David Osipov 5c9fea5850 Update src/proxy/tests/client_security_tests.rs
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-22 17:08:16 +04:00
Alexey 3011a9ef6d Merge branch 'flow' into flow 2026-03-22 15:50:21 +03:00
Alexey 7b570be5b3 DC -> Client Runtime in Metrics and API 2026-03-22 15:28:55 +03:00
Alexey 0461bc65c6 DC -> Client Optimizations 2026-03-22 15:00:15 +03:00
David Osipov ead23608f0 Add stress and manual benchmark tests for handshake protocols
- Introduced `handshake_real_bug_stress_tests.rs` to validate TLS and MTProto handshake behaviors under various conditions, including ALPN rejection and session ID handling.
- Implemented tests to ensure replay cache integrity and proper handling of malicious input without panicking.
- Added `handshake_timing_manual_bench_tests.rs` for performance benchmarking of user authentication paths, comparing preferred user handling against full user scans in both MTProto and TLS contexts.
- Included timing-sensitive tests to measure the impact of SNI on handshake performance.
2026-03-22 15:39:57 +04:00
Alexey cf82b637d2 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 12:38:37 +03:00
Alexey 2e8bfa1101 Update codeql-config.yml 2026-03-22 12:38:15 +03:00
Alexey d091b0b251 Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-03-22 11:48:06 +03:00
Alexey 56fc6c4896 Update Dockerfile 2026-03-22 11:16:09 +03:00
Alexey 042d4fd612 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 11:06:03 +03:00
Alexey bbc69f945e Update release.yml 2026-03-22 11:04:09 +03:00
Alexey 03c9a2588f Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 10:37:13 +03:00
Alexey 9de8b2f0bf Update release.yml 2026-03-22 10:36:54 +03:00
Alexey 76eb8634a4 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 10:29:01 +03:00
Alexey 4e5b67bae8 Update release.yml 2026-03-22 10:28:06 +03:00
Alexey bb2f3b24ac Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 00:28:04 +03:00
Alexey 73f218b62a Update release.yml 2026-03-22 00:27:16 +03:00
Alexey 9cbc625b9b Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 00:19:07 +03:00
Alexey 13ff3af1db Update release.yml 2026-03-22 00:18:54 +03:00
Alexey d3f32b5568 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 00:16:28 +03:00
Alexey 77f717e3d1 Merge pull request #534 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-22 00:16:11 +03:00
Alexey db3e246390 Update release.yml 2026-03-22 00:15:56 +03:00
Alexey 388e14d01f Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-22 00:10:57 +03:00
Alexey b74ba38d40 Merge pull request #533 from telemt/workflow
Workflow
2026-03-22 00:10:38 +03:00
Alexey 269fce839f Update Dockerfile 2026-03-22 00:10:19 +03:00
Alexey 5a4072c964 Update release.yml 2026-03-22 00:08:16 +03:00
Vladimir Krivopalov 95685adba7 Add multi-destination logging: syslog and file support
Implement logging infrastructure for non-systemd platforms:

- Add src/logging.rs with syslog and file logging support
- New CLI flags: --syslog, --log-file, --log-file-daily
- Syslog uses libc directly with LOG_DAEMON facility
- File logging via tracing-appender with optional daily rotation

Update service scripts:
- OpenRC and FreeBSD rc.d now use --syslog by default
- Ensures logs are captured on platforms without journald

Default (stderr) behavior unchanged for systemd compatibility.
Log destination is selected at startup based on CLI flags.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Krivopalov <argenet@yandex.ru>
2026-03-21 21:09:29 +02:00
Vladimir Krivopalov 909714af31 Add multi-platform service manager integration
Implement automatic init system detection and service file generation
for systemd, OpenRC (Alpine/Gentoo), and FreeBSD rc.d:

- Add src/service module with init system detection and generators
- Auto-detect init system via filesystem probes
- Generate platform-appropriate service files during --init

systemd enhancements:
- ExecReload for SIGHUP config reload
- PIDFile directive
- Comprehensive security hardening (ProtectKernelTunables,
  RestrictAddressFamilies, MemoryDenyWriteExecute, etc.)
- CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE for privileged ports

OpenRC support:
- Standard openrc-run script with depend/reload functions
- Directory setup in start_pre

FreeBSD rc.d support:
- rc.subr integration with rc.conf variables
- reload extra command

The --init command now detects the init system and runs the
appropriate enable/start commands (systemctl, rc-update, sysrc).

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Krivopalov <argenet@yandex.ru>
2026-03-21 21:09:29 +02:00
Vladimir Krivopalov dc2b4395bd Add daemon lifecycle subcommands: start, stop, reload, status
Implement CLI subcommands for managing telemt as a daemon:

- `start [config.toml]` - Start as background daemon (implies --daemon)
- `stop` - Stop running daemon by sending SIGTERM
- `reload` - Reload configuration by sending SIGHUP
- `status` - Check if daemon is running via PID file

Subcommands use the PID file (default /var/run/telemt.pid) to locate
the running daemon. Stop command waits up to 10 seconds for graceful
shutdown. Status cleans up stale PID files automatically.

Updated help text with subcommand documentation and usage examples.
Exit codes follow Unix convention: 0 for success, 1 for not running
or error.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Krivopalov <argenet@yandex.ru>
2026-03-21 21:09:29 +02:00
Vladimir Krivopalov 39875afbff Add comprehensive Unix signal handling for daemon mode
Enhance signal handling to support proper daemon operation:

- SIGTERM: Graceful shutdown (same behavior as SIGINT)
- SIGQUIT: Graceful shutdown with full statistics dump
- SIGUSR1: Log rotation acknowledgment for external tools
- SIGUSR2: Dump runtime status to log without stopping

Statistics dump includes connection counts, ME keepalive metrics,
and relay adaptive tuning counters. SIGHUP config reload unchanged
(handled in hot_reload.rs).

Signals are handled via tokio::signal::unix with async select!
to avoid blocking the runtime. Non-shutdown signals (USR1/USR2)
run in a background task spawned at startup.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Krivopalov <argenet@yandex.ru>
2026-03-21 21:09:29 +02:00
Vladimir Krivopalov 2ea7813ed4 Add Unix daemon mode with PID file and privilege dropping
Implement core daemon infrastructure for running telemt as a background
  service on Unix platforms (Linux, FreeBSD, etc.):

  - Add src/daemon module with classic double-fork daemonization
  - Implement flock-based PID file management to prevent duplicate instances
  - Add privilege dropping (setuid/setgid) after socket binding
  - New CLI flags: --daemon, --foreground, --pid-file, --run-as-user,
    --run-as-group, --working-dir

  Daemonization occurs before tokio runtime starts to ensure clean fork.
  PID file uses exclusive locking to detect already-running instances.
  Privilege dropping happens after bind_listeners() to allow binding
  to privileged ports (< 1024) before switching to unprivileged user.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Krivopalov <argenet@yandex.ru>
2026-03-21 21:09:29 +02:00
Alexey 2d3c2807ab Merge pull request #531 from DavidOsipov/flow
Small brittle test fix
2026-03-21 21:51:33 +03:00
David Osipov 50ae16ddf7 Add interval_gap_usize function and enhance integration test assertions for class separability 2026-03-21 22:49:39 +04:00
Alexey de5c26b7d7 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-21 21:46:45 +03:00
Alexey a95678988a Merge pull request #530 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-21 21:45:23 +03:00
Alexey b17482ede3 Update release.yml 2026-03-21 21:45:01 +03:00
Alexey a059de9191 Merge pull request #529 from DavidOsipov/flow
Усиление обхода DPI (Shape/Timing Hardening), защита от тайминг-атак и масштабное покрытие тестами
2026-03-21 21:31:05 +03:00
David Osipov e7e763888b Implement aggressive shape hardening mode and related tests 2026-03-21 22:25:29 +04:00
David Osipov c0a3e43aa8 Add comprehensive security tests for proxy functionality
- Introduced client TLS record wrapping tests to ensure correct handling of empty and oversized payloads.
- Added integration tests for middle relay to validate quota saturation behavior under concurrent pressure.
- Implemented high-risk security tests covering various payload scenarios, including alignment checks and boundary conditions.
- Developed length cast hardening tests to verify proper handling of wire lengths and overflow conditions.
- Created quota overflow lock tests to ensure stable behavior under saturation and reclaim scenarios.
- Refactored existing middle relay security tests for improved clarity and consistency in lock handling.
2026-03-21 20:54:13 +04:00
David Osipov 4c32370b25 Refactor proxy and transport modules for improved safety and performance
- Enhanced linting rules in `src/proxy/mod.rs` to enforce stricter code quality checks in production.
- Updated hash functions in `src/proxy/middle_relay.rs` for better efficiency.
- Added new security tests in `src/proxy/tests/middle_relay_stub_completion_security_tests.rs` to validate desynchronization behavior.
- Removed ignored test stubs in `src/proxy/tests/middle_relay_security_tests.rs` to clean up the test suite.
- Improved error handling and code readability in various transport modules, including `src/transport/middle_proxy/config_updater.rs` and `src/transport/middle_proxy/pool.rs`.
- Introduced new padding functions in `src/stream/frame_stream_padding_security_tests.rs` to ensure consistent behavior across different implementations.
- Adjusted TLS stream validation in `src/stream/tls_stream.rs` for better boundary checking.
- General code cleanup and dead code elimination across multiple files to enhance maintainability.
2026-03-21 20:05:07 +04:00
Alexey a6c298b633 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-21 16:54:47 +03:00
Alexey e7a1d26e6e Merge pull request #526 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-21 16:48:53 +03:00
Alexey b91c6cb339 Update release.yml 2026-03-21 16:48:42 +03:00
Alexey e676633dcd Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-21 16:32:24 +03:00
Alexey c4e7f54cbe Merge pull request #524 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-21 16:31:15 +03:00
Alexey f85205d48d Update release.yml 2026-03-21 16:31:05 +03:00
Alexey d767ec02ee Update release.yml 2026-03-21 16:24:06 +03:00
Alexey 51835c33f2 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-21 16:19:02 +03:00
Alexey 88a4c652b6 Merge pull request #523 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-21 16:18:48 +03:00
Alexey ea2d964502 Update release.yml 2026-03-21 16:18:24 +03:00
Alexey bd7218c39c Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-21 16:06:03 +03:00
Alexey 3055637571 Merge pull request #522 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-21 16:04:56 +03:00
Alexey 19b84b9d73 Update release.yml 2026-03-21 16:03:54 +03:00
Alexey 165a1ede57 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-21 15:58:53 +03:00
Alexey 6ead8b1922 Merge pull request #521 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-21 15:58:36 +03:00
Alexey 63aa1038c0 Update release.yml 2026-03-21 15:58:25 +03:00
Alexey 4473826303 Update crypto_bench.rs 2026-03-21 15:48:28 +03:00
Alexey d7bbb376c9 Format 2026-03-21 15:45:29 +03:00
Alexey 7a8f946029 Update Cargo.lock 2026-03-21 15:35:03 +03:00
Alexey f2e6dc1774 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-21 15:27:21 +03:00
Alexey 54d65dd124 Merge branch 'main' into flow 2026-03-21 15:22:49 +03:00
Alexey 24594e648e Merge pull request #519 from telemt/workflow
Update release.yml
2026-03-21 15:21:47 +03:00
Alexey e8b38ea860 Update release.yml 2026-03-21 15:21:25 +03:00
Alexey b14c2b0a9b Merge pull request #517 from DavidOsipov/test/main-into-flow-sec
Усиление обхода DPI (Shape/Timing Hardening), защита от тайминг-атак и масштабное покрытие тестами
2026-03-21 15:03:05 +03:00
David Osipov c1ee43fbac Add stress testing for quota-lock and refactor test guard usage 2026-03-21 15:54:14 +04:00
David Osipov c8632de5b6 Update dependencies and refactor random number generation
- Bump versions of several dependencies in Cargo.toml for improved functionality and security, including:
  - socket2 to 0.6
  - nix to 0.31
  - toml to 1.0
  - x509-parser to 0.18
  - dashmap to 6.1
  - rand to 0.10
  - reqwest to 0.13
  - notify to 8.2
  - ipnetwork to 0.21
  - webpki-roots to 1.0
  - criterion to 0.8
- Introduce `OnceLock` for secure random number generation in multiple modules to ensure thread safety and reduce overhead.
- Refactor random number generation calls to use the new `RngExt` trait methods for consistency and clarity.
- Add new PNG files for architectural documentation.
2026-03-21 15:43:07 +04:00
David Osipov b930ea1ec5 Add regression and security tests for relay quota and TLS stream handling
- Introduced regression tests for relay quota wake liveness to ensure proper handling of contention and wake events.
- Added adversarial tests to validate the behavior of the quota system under stress and contention scenarios.
- Implemented security tests for the TLS stream to verify the preservation of pending plaintext during state transitions.
- Enhanced the pool writer tests to ensure proper quarantine behavior and validate the removal of writers from the registry.
- Included fuzz testing to assess the robustness of the quota and TLS handling mechanisms against unexpected inputs and states.
2026-03-21 15:16:20 +04:00
David Osipov 3b86a883b9 Add comprehensive tests for relay quota management and adversarial scenarios
- Introduced `relay_quota_boundary_blackhat_tests.rs` to validate behavior under quota limits, including edge cases and adversarial conditions.
- Added `relay_quota_model_adversarial_tests.rs` to ensure quota management maintains integrity during bidirectional communication and various load scenarios.
- Created `relay_quota_overflow_regression_tests.rs` to address overflow issues and ensure that quota limits are respected during aggressive data transmission.
- Implemented `route_mode_coherence_adversarial_tests.rs` to verify the consistency of route mode transitions and timestamp management across different relay modes.
2026-03-21 14:14:58 +04:00
David Osipov 5933b5e821 Refactor and enhance tests for proxy and relay functionality
- Renamed test functions in `client_tls_clienthello_truncation_adversarial_tests.rs` to remove "but_leaks" suffix for clarity.
- Added new tests in `direct_relay_business_logic_tests.rs` to validate business logic for data center resolution and scope hints.
- Introduced tests in `direct_relay_common_mistakes_tests.rs` to cover common mistakes in direct relay configurations.
- Added security tests in `direct_relay_security_tests.rs` to ensure proper handling of symlink and parent swap scenarios.
- Created `direct_relay_subtle_adversarial_tests.rs` to stress test concurrent logging and validate scope hint behavior.
- Implemented `relay_quota_lock_pressure_adversarial_tests.rs` to test quota lock behavior under high contention and stress.
- Updated `relay_security_tests.rs` to include quota lock contention tests ensuring proper behavior under concurrent access.
- Introduced `ip_tracker_hotpath_adversarial_tests.rs` to validate the performance and correctness of the IP tracking logic under various scenarios.
2026-03-21 13:38:17 +04:00
David Osipov 8188fedf6a Add masking shape classifier and guard tests for adversarial resistance
- Implemented tests for masking shape classifier resistance against threshold attacks, ensuring that blurring reduces accuracy and increases overlap between classes.
- Added tests for masking shape guard functionality, verifying that it maintains expected behavior under various conditions, including timeout paths and clean EOF scenarios.
- Introduced helper functions for calculating accuracy and handling timing samples to support the new tests.
- Ensured that the masking shape hardening configuration is properly utilized in tests to validate its effectiveness.
2026-03-21 12:43:25 +04:00
Alexey f3598cf309 Merge pull request #514 from M1h4n1k/patch-1
docs: fix typo in ru QUICK_START
2026-03-21 10:22:52 +03:00
David Osipov f2335c211c Version change before PR 2026-03-21 11:19:51 +04:00
David Osipov 246ca11b88 Crates update 2026-03-21 11:18:43 +04:00
David Osipov bb355e916f Add comprehensive security tests for masking and shape hardening features
- Introduced red-team expected-fail tests for client masking shape hardening.
- Added integration tests for masking AB envelope blur to improve obfuscation.
- Implemented masking security tests to validate the behavior of masking under various conditions.
- Created tests for masking shape above-cap blur to ensure proper functionality.
- Developed adversarial tests for masking shape hardening to evaluate robustness against attacks.
- Added timing normalization security tests to assess the effectiveness of timing obfuscation.
- Implemented red-team expected-fail tests for timing side-channel vulnerabilities.
2026-03-21 00:30:51 +04:00
Michael Karpov 777b15b1da Update section title for Docker usage
Изменено название раздела с 'Запуск в Docker Compose' на 'Запуск без Docker Compose'.
2026-03-20 22:23:36 +02:00
David Osipov 8814854ae4 actually, it's a better one 2026-03-20 23:27:56 +04:00
David Osipov 44c65f9c60 changed version 2026-03-20 23:27:29 +04:00
David Osipov 1260217be9 Normalize Cargo.lock after upstream merge 2026-03-20 23:22:29 +04:00
David Osipov ebd37932c5 Merge latest upstream/main into test/main-into-flow-sec 2026-03-20 23:21:22 +04:00
David Osipov 43d7e6e991 moved tests to subdirs 2026-03-20 22:55:19 +04:00
David Osipov 0eca535955 Refactor TLS fallback tests to remove unnecessary client hello assertions
- Removed assertions for expected client hello messages in multiple TLS fallback tests to streamline the test logic.
- Updated the tests to focus on verifying the trailing TLS records received after the fallback.
- Enhanced the masking functionality by adding shape hardening features, including dynamic padding based on sent data size.
- Modified the relay_to_mask function to accommodate new parameters for shape hardening.
- Updated masking security tests to reflect changes in the relay_to_mask function signature.
2026-03-20 22:44:39 +04:00
David Osipov 3abde52de8 refactor: update TLS record size constants and related validations
- Rename MAX_TLS_RECORD_SIZE to MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE for clarity.
- Rename MAX_TLS_CHUNK_SIZE to MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE to reflect its purpose.
- Deprecate old constants in favor of new ones.
- Update various parts of the codebase to use the new constants, including validation checks and tests.
- Add new tests to ensure compliance with RFC 8446 regarding TLS record sizes.
2026-03-20 21:00:36 +04:00
David Osipov 801f670827 Add comprehensive TLS ClientHello size validation and adversarial tests
- Refactor existing tests to improve clarity and specificity in naming.
- Introduce new tests for minimum and maximum TLS ClientHello sizes, ensuring proper masking behavior for malformed probes.
- Implement differential timing tests to compare latency between malformed TLS and plain web requests, ensuring similar performance characteristics.
- Add adversarial tests for truncated TLS ClientHello probes, verifying that even malformed traffic is masked as legitimate responses.
- Enhance the overall test suite for robustness against probing attacks, focusing on edge cases and potential vulnerabilities in TLS handling.
2026-03-20 20:30:02 +04:00
Alexey 99ba2f7bbc Add Shadowsocks upstream support: merge pull request #430 from hunmar/feat/shadowsocks-upstream
Add Shadowsocks upstream support
2026-03-20 18:35:28 +03:00
David Osipov 1689b8a5dc Changed version 2026-03-20 18:49:17 +04:00
David Osipov babd902d95 Add adversarial tests for MTProto handshake and enhance masking functionality
- Introduced multiple adversarial tests for MTProto handshake to ensure robustness against replay attacks, invalid mutations, and concurrent flooding.
- Implemented a function to build proxy headers based on the specified version, improving the handling of masking protocols.
- Added tests to validate the behavior of the masking functionality under various conditions, including unknown proxy protocol versions and oversized payloads.
- Enhanced relay tests to ensure stability and performance under high load and half-close scenarios.
2026-03-20 18:48:19 +04:00
Maxim Myalin e14dd07220 Merge branch 'main' into feat/shadowsocks-upstream 2026-03-20 17:08:47 +03:00
Maxim Myalin d93a4fbd53 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into feat/shadowsocks-upstream
# Conflicts:
#	src/tls_front/fetcher.rs
2026-03-20 17:07:47 +03:00
Alexey 2798039ab8 Merge pull request #507 from dzhus/patch-2
Fix typo in systemd service metadata
2026-03-20 17:04:41 +03:00
David Osipov 9dce748679 changed version 2026-03-20 18:04:37 +04:00
David Osipov 79093679ab Merge latest upstream/main into test/main-into-flow-sec 2026-03-20 18:00:20 +04:00
David Osipov 35a8f5b2e5 Add method to retrieve inner reader with pending plaintext
This commit introduces the `into_inner_with_pending_plaintext` method to the `FakeTlsReader` struct. This method allows users to extract the underlying reader along with any pending plaintext data that may have been buffered during the TLS reading process. The method handles the state transition and ensures that any buffered data is returned as a vector, facilitating easier management of plaintext data in TLS streams.
2026-03-20 17:56:37 +04:00
David Osipov 456c433875 Обновил версию 2026-03-20 17:34:09 +04:00
David Osipov 8f1ffe8c25 fix(proxy): исправление wire-transparency при fallback и усиление безопасности
Исправлена критическая логическая ошибка в цепочке Fake TLS -> MTProto.
Ранее при валидном TLS-хендшейке, но неверном MTProto-пакете, прокси
ошибочно передавал в маскирующий релей обернутый (FakeTls) поток.
Теперь транспорт корректно разворачивается (unwrap) до сырого сокета
через .into_inner(), обеспечивая полную прозрачность (wire-transparency)
для DPI и маскирующего бэкенда.

Security & Hardening:
- Логика приведена в соответствие с требованиями OWASP ASVS L2 (V5: Validation, Sanitization and Encoding).
- Реализовано поведение "fail-closed": при любой ошибке верификации прокси мимикрирует под обычный веб-сервер, не раскрывая своей роли.
- Улучшена диагностика и логирование состояний аутентификации для защиты от активного пробинга.

Adversarial Testing (Black-hat mindset):
- Добавлен отдельный пакет `client_tls_mtproto_fallback_security_tests.rs` (18+ тестов).
- Покрыты сценарии: хаос-фрагментация (побайтовая нарезка TLS-записей), record-splitting,
  half-close состояния, сбросы бэкенда и replay-pressure.
- В `client_adversarial_tests.rs` добавлено 10+ тестов на "злые" гонки (race conditions),
  утечки лимитов по IP и проверку изоляции состояний параллельных сессий.
- Все 832 теста проходят (passed) в locked-режиме.
2026-03-20 17:33:46 +04:00
Alexey 342b0119dd Merge pull request #509 from telemt/bump
Update Cargo.toml
2026-03-20 16:27:39 +03:00
Alexey 2605929b93 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-20 16:26:57 +03:00
Alexey 36814b6355 ME Draining on Dual-Stack + TLS Fetcher Upstream Selection: merge pull request #508 from telemt/flow
ME Draining on Dual-Stack + TLS Fetcher Upstream Selection
2026-03-20 16:24:17 +03:00
Alexey 269ba537ad ME Draining on Dual-Stack
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 16:07:12 +03:00
Alexey 5c0eb6dbe8 TLS Fetcher Upstream Selection
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 16:05:24 +03:00
David Osipov a78c3e3ebd One more small test fix 2026-03-20 16:48:14 +04:00
David Osipov a4b70405b8 Add adversarial tests module for client security testing 2026-03-20 16:47:26 +04:00
David Osipov 3afc3e1775 Changed version 2026-03-20 16:46:09 +04:00
David Osipov 512bee6a8d Add security tests for middle relay idle policy and enhance stats tracking
- Introduced a new test module for middle relay idle policy security tests, covering various scenarios including soft mark, hard close, and grace periods.
- Implemented functions to create crypto readers and encrypt data for testing.
- Enhanced the Stats struct to include counters for relay idle soft marks, hard closes, pressure evictions, and protocol desync closes.
- Added corresponding increment and retrieval methods for the new stats fields.
2026-03-20 16:43:50 +04:00
Maxim Myalin 66867d3f5b Merge branch 'main' into feat/shadowsocks-upstream
# Conflicts:
#	Cargo.lock
#	src/api/runtime_stats.rs
2026-03-20 15:22:36 +03:00
Dmitry Dzhus db36945293 Fix typo in systemd service metadata 2026-03-20 12:00:41 +00:00
David Osipov 5c5fdcb124 Updated cargo 2026-03-20 15:03:42 +04:00
David Osipov 0ded366199 Changed version 2026-03-20 14:29:45 +04:00
David Osipov 84a34cea3d Merge latest upstream/main into test/main-into-flow-sec 2026-03-20 14:26:49 +04:00
David Osipov 7dc3c3666d Merge upstream/main into test/main-into-flow-sec 2026-03-20 14:20:20 +04:00
Alexey dd07fa9453 Merge pull request #505 from telemt/flow-me
Teardown Monitoring in API and Metrics
2026-03-20 12:59:39 +03:00
Alexey bb1a372ac4 Merge branch 'main' into flow-me 2026-03-20 12:59:32 +03:00
Alexey 6661401a34 Merge pull request #506 from telemt/about-releases
Update README.md
2026-03-20 12:59:09 +03:00
Alexey cd65fb432b Update README.md 2026-03-20 12:58:55 +03:00
Alexey caf0717789 Merge branch 'main' into flow-me 2026-03-20 12:57:27 +03:00
Alexey 4a610d83a3 Update Cargo.toml
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 12:56:13 +03:00
Alexey aba4205dcc Teardown Monitoring in Metrics
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 12:46:35 +03:00
Alexey ef9b7b1492 Teardown Monitoring in API
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 12:45:53 +03:00
Alexey d112f15b90 ME Writers Anti-stuck + Quarantine fixes + ME Writers Advanced Cleanup + Authoritative Teardown + Orphan Watchdog + Force-Close Safery Policy: merge pull request #504 from telemt/flow-me
ME Writers Anti-stuck + Quarantine fixes + ME Writers Advanced Cleanup + Authoritative Teardown + Orphan Watchdog + Force-Close Safery Policy
2026-03-20 12:41:45 +03:00
Alexey b55b264345 Merge branch 'main' into flow-me 2026-03-20 12:20:51 +03:00
Alexey f61d25ebe0 Authoritative Teardown + Orphan Watchdog + Force-Close Safery Policy
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 12:11:47 +03:00
Alexey ed4d1167dd ME Writers Advanced Cleanup
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 12:09:23 +03:00
Alexey dc6948cf39 Merge pull request #502 from telemt/about-releases
Update README.md
2026-03-20 11:25:19 +03:00
Alexey 4f11aa0772 Update README.md 2026-03-20 11:25:07 +03:00
David Osipov 6ea8ba25c4 Refactor OpenBSD build workflow for clarity 2026-03-20 02:27:21 +04:00
Alexey e40361b171 Cargo.toml + Cargo.lock
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 00:45:04 +03:00
Alexey 1c6c73beda ME Writers Anti-stuck and Quarantine fixes
Co-Authored-By: Nook Scheel <nook@live.ru>
2026-03-20 00:41:40 +03:00
David Osipov 3f3bf5bbd2 Update build-openbsd.yml 2026-03-20 01:27:11 +04:00
David Osipov ec793f3065 Added cargo.toml 2026-03-20 01:06:00 +04:00
David Osipov e83d366518 Fixed issues with an action 2026-03-20 00:58:11 +04:00
David Osipov 5a4209fe00 Changed version 2026-03-20 00:53:32 +04:00
David Osipov e7daf51193 Added runner for Openbsd 2026-03-20 00:43:05 +04:00
David Osipov 754e4db8a9 Add security tests for pool writer and pool refill functionality 2026-03-20 00:07:41 +04:00
David Osipov 7416829e89 Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/main' into test/main-into-flow-sec
# Conflicts:
#	Cargo.toml
#	src/api/model.rs
#	src/api/runtime_stats.rs
#	src/transport/middle_proxy/health.rs
#	src/transport/middle_proxy/health_regression_tests.rs
#	src/transport/middle_proxy/pool_status.rs
2026-03-19 23:48:40 +04:00
David Osipov c07b600acb Integration hardening: reconcile main+flow-sec API drift and restore green suite 2026-03-19 20:24:44 +04:00
David Osipov 7b44496706 Integration test merge: upstream/main into flow-sec security branch (prefer flow-sec on conflicts) 2026-03-19 19:42:04 +04:00
Alexey 67dc1e8d18 Merge pull request #498 from telemt/bump
Update Cargo.toml
2026-03-19 18:25:14 +03:00
Alexey ad8ada33c9 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-19 18:24:01 +03:00
Alexey bbb201b433 Instadrain + Hard-remove for long draining-state: merge pull request #497 from telemt/flow-stuck-writer
Instadrain + Hard-remove for long draining-state
2026-03-19 18:23:38 +03:00
Alexey 8d1faece60 Instadrain + Hard-remove for long draining-state
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-19 17:45:17 +03:00
Alexey a603505f90 Merge pull request #492 from temandroid/main
fix(docker): expose port 9091 and allow external API access
2026-03-19 17:32:49 +03:00
Alexey f8c42c324f Merge pull request #494 from Dimasssss/patch-1
Update install.sh
2026-03-19 17:32:05 +03:00
Alexey dd8ef4d996 Merge branch 'main' into feat/shadowsocks-upstream 2026-03-19 17:19:01 +03:00
Dimasssss dc3363aa0d Update install.sh 2026-03-19 16:23:32 +03:00
Alexey f655924323 Update health.rs
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-19 16:15:00 +03:00
TEMAndroid 05c066c676 fix(docker): expose port 9091 and allow external API access
Add 9091 port mapping to compose.yml to make the REST API reachable
from outside the container. Previously only port 9090 (metrics) was
published, making the documented curl commands non-functional.

fixes #434
2026-03-19 15:54:01 +03:00
Alexey 1e000c2e7e ME Writer stuck-up in draining-state fixes: merge pull request #491 from telemt/flow-stuck-writer
ME Writer stuck-up in draining-state fixes
2026-03-19 14:44:43 +03:00
Alexey fa17e719f6 Merge pull request #490 from telemt/bump
Update Cargo.toml
2026-03-19 14:43:15 +03:00
Alexey ae3ced8e7c Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-19 14:42:59 +03:00
Alexey 3279f6d46a Cleanup-path as non-blocking
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-19 14:07:20 +03:00
Alexey 6f9aef7bb4 ME Writer stuck-up in draining-state fixes
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-19 13:08:35 +03:00
Alexey 049db1196f Merge pull request #487 from telemt/code-of-conduct
Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
2026-03-19 01:18:14 +03:00
Alexey c8ffc23cf7 Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-03-19 01:18:02 +03:00
Alexey f230f2ce0e Merge pull request #486 from telemt/code-of-conduct
Create CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md
2026-03-19 00:59:50 +03:00
Alexey bdac6e3480 Create CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-03-19 00:59:37 +03:00
Alexey a4e9746dc7 Merge pull request #485 from Dimasssss/patch-3
Update install.sh
2026-03-19 00:43:14 +03:00
Dimasssss c47495d671 Update install.sh
Вернул старый функционал + добавил новый:
- Вернул автоматическое создание конфига с секретом
- Вернул автоматическое создание службы
- Добавил удаление службы и telemt через `install.sh uninstall`
- Полное удаление вместе с конфигом через `install.sh --purge`
- Добавил установку нужной версии `install.sh 3.3.15`
2026-03-19 00:36:02 +03:00
Alexey 5ae3a90d5e Merge pull request #483 from Dimasssss/patch-1
Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md
2026-03-18 23:02:33 +03:00
Alexey 901a0b7c23 Runtime guardrails: merge pull request #484 from telemt/flow-runtime
Runtime guardrails
2026-03-18 22:37:17 +03:00
Alexey 03891db0c9 Update Cargo.toml
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-18 22:36:33 +03:00
Alexey 89e5668c7e Runtime guardrails
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-18 22:33:41 +03:00
Dimasssss 1935455256 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md 2026-03-18 18:20:23 +03:00
Alexey 1544e3fcff Merge pull request #481 from telemt/bump
Update Cargo.toml
2026-03-18 13:58:39 +03:00
Alexey 85295a9961 Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-18 13:58:27 +03:00
Alexey a54f807a45 Hot-Reload fixes: merge pull request #480 from telemt/flow-user
Hot-Reload fixes
2026-03-18 13:57:58 +03:00
Alexey 31f6258c47 Hot-Reload fixes
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-18 13:54:59 +03:00
Maxim Myalin 062464175e Merge branch 'main' into feat/shadowsocks-upstream 2026-03-18 12:38:23 +03:00
Maxim Myalin a5983c17d3 Add Docker build context ignore file 2026-03-18 12:36:48 +03:00
Maxim Myalin def42f0baa Add Shadowsocks upstream support 2026-03-18 12:36:44 +03:00
Alexey 30ba41eb47 Merge pull request #479 from telemt/bump
Update Cargo.toml
2026-03-18 11:57:25 +03:00
Alexey 42f946f29e Update Cargo.toml 2026-03-18 11:57:09 +03:00
Alexey c53d7951b5 Merge pull request #468 from temandroid/main
feat: add Telemt Control API Python simple client with CLI
2026-03-18 11:56:32 +03:00
Alexey f36e264093 Merge pull request #477 from Dimasssss/CONFIG_PARAMS.md
Create CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md
2026-03-18 11:56:17 +03:00
Alexey a3bdf64353 ME Coverage Ratio in API + as Draining Factor: merge pull request #478 from telemt/flow-api
ME Coverage Ratio in API + as Draining Factor
2026-03-18 11:56:01 +03:00
Alexey 2aa7ea5137 ME Coverage Ratio in API + as Draining Factor 2026-03-18 11:46:13 +03:00
Dimasssss 462c927da6 Create CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md 2026-03-18 10:53:09 +03:00
Alexey cb87b2eac3 Adaptive Buffers + Session Eviction Method: merge pull request #475 from telemt/flow-buffers
Adaptive Buffers + Session Eviction Method
2026-03-18 10:52:22 +03:00
Alexey 3739f38440 Adaptive Buffers + Session Eviction Method 2026-03-18 10:49:02 +03:00
TEMAndroid 8e96039a1c Merge branch 'telemt:main' into main 2026-03-17 20:09:50 +03:00
TEMAndroid 36b360dfb6 feat: add Telemt Control API Python simple client with CLI
Stdlib-only HTTP client covering all /v1 endpoints with argparse CLI.
Supports If-Match concurrency, typed errors, user CRUD, and all runtime/stats routes.

Usage: ./telemt_api.py help

AI-Generated from API.md. 
Partially tested. 
Use with caution...
2026-03-17 20:09:36 +03:00
Alexey 5dd0c47f14 Merge pull request #464 from temandroid/patch-1
feat(zabbix): add graphs to Telemt template
2026-03-17 18:53:07 +03:00
TEMAndroid 4739083f57 feat(zabbix): add graphs to Telemt template
- Add per-user graph prototypes (Connections, IPs, Traffic, Messages)
- Add server-level graphs (Connections, Uptime, ME Keepalive, ME Reconnects,
  ME Route Drops, ME Writer Pool/Removals, Desync, Upstream, Refill)
2026-03-17 18:24:57 +03:00
277 changed files with 59821 additions and 11191 deletions
+8
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@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
.git
.github
target
.kilocode
cache
tlsfront
*.tar
*.tar.gz
+9
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@@ -7,7 +7,16 @@ queries:
- uses: security-and-quality
- uses: ./.github/codeql/queries
paths-ignore:
- "**/tests/**"
- "**/test/**"
- "**/*_test.rs"
- "**/*/tests.rs"
query-filters:
- exclude:
tags:
- test
- exclude:
id:
- rust/unwrap-on-option
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
# Architecture Directives
> Companion to `Agents.md`. These are **activation directives**, not tutorials.
> You already know these patterns — apply them. When making any structural or
> design decision, run the relevant section below as a checklist.
---
## 1. Active Principles (always on)
Apply these on every non-trivial change. No exceptions.
- **SRP** — one reason to change per component. If you can't name the responsibility in one noun phrase, split it.
- **OCP** — extend by adding, not by modifying. New variants/impls over patching existing logic.
- **ISP** — traits stay minimal. More than ~5 methods is a split signal.
- **DIP** — high-level modules depend on traits, not concrete types. Infrastructure implements domain traits; it does not own domain logic.
- **DRY** — one authoritative source per piece of knowledge. Copies are bugs that haven't diverged yet.
- **YAGNI** — generic parameters, extension hooks, and pluggable strategies require an *existing* concrete use case, not a hypothetical one.
- **KISS** — two equivalent designs: choose the one with fewer concepts. Justify complexity; never assume it.
---
## 2. Layered Architecture
Dependencies point **inward only**: `Presentation → Application → Domain ← Infrastructure`.
- Domain layer: zero I/O. No network, no filesystem, no async runtime imports.
- Infrastructure: implements domain traits at the boundary. Never leaks SDK/wire types inward.
- Anti-Corruption Layer (ACL): all third-party and external-protocol types are translated here. If the external format changes, only the ACL changes.
- Presentation: translates wire/HTTP representations to domain types and back. Nothing else.
---
## 3. Design Pattern Selection
Apply the right pattern. Do not invent a new abstraction when a named pattern fits.
| Situation | Pattern to apply |
|---|---|
| Struct with 3+ optional/dependent fields | **Builder**`build()` returns `Result`, never panics |
| Cross-cutting behavior (logging, retry, metrics) on a trait impl | **Decorator** — implements same trait, delegates all calls |
| Subsystem with multiple internal components | **Façade** — single public entry point, internals are `pub(crate)` |
| Swappable algorithm or policy | **Strategy** — trait injection; generics for compile-time, `dyn` for runtime |
| Component notifying decoupled consumers | **Observer** — typed channels (`broadcast`, `watch`), not callback `Vec<Box<dyn Fn>>` |
| Exclusive mutable state serving concurrent callers | **Actor**`mpsc` command channel + `oneshot` reply; no lock needed on state |
| Finite state with invalid transition prevention | **Typestate** — distinct types per state; invalid ops are compile errors |
| Fixed process skeleton with overridable steps | **Template Method** — defaulted trait method calls required hooks |
| Request pipeline with independent handlers | **Chain/Middleware** — generic compile-time chain for hot paths, `dyn` for runtime assembly |
| Hiding a concrete type behind a trait | **Factory Function** — returns `Box<dyn Trait>` or `impl Trait` |
---
## 4. Data Modeling Rules
- **Make illegal states unrepresentable.** Type system enforces invariants; runtime validation is a second line, not the first.
- **Newtype every primitive** that carries domain meaning. `SessionId(u64)``UserId(u64)` — the compiler enforces it.
- **Enums over booleans** for any parameter or field with two or more named states.
- **Typed error enums** with named variants carrying full diagnostic context. `anyhow` is application-layer only; never in library code.
- **Domain types carry no I/O concerns.** No `serde`, no codec, no DB derives on domain structs. Conversions via `From`/`TryFrom` at layer boundaries.
---
## 5. Concurrency Rules
- Prefer message-passing over shared memory. Shared state is a fallback.
- All channels must be **bounded**. Document the bound's rationale inline.
- Never hold a lock across an `await` unless atomicity explicitly requires it — document why.
- Document lock acquisition order wherever two locks are taken together.
- Every `async fn` is cancellation-safe unless explicitly documented otherwise. Mutate shared state *after* the `await` that may be cancelled, not before.
- High-read/low-write state: use `arc-swap` or `watch` for lock-free reads.
---
## 6. Error Handling Rules
- Errors translated at every layer boundary — low-level errors never surface unmodified.
- Add context at the propagation site: what operation failed and where.
- No `unwrap()`/`expect()` in production paths without a comment proving `None`/`Err` is impossible.
- Panics are only permitted in: tests, startup/init unrecoverable failure, and `unreachable!()` with an invariant comment.
---
## 7. API Design Rules
- **CQS**: functions that return data must not mutate; functions that mutate return only `Result`.
- **Least surprise**: a function does exactly what its name implies. Side effects are documented.
- **Idempotency**: `close()`, `shutdown()`, `unregister()` called twice must not panic or error.
- **Fallibility at the type level**: failure → `Result<T, E>`. No sentinel values.
- **Minimal public surface**: default to `pub(crate)`. Mark `pub` only deliberate API. Re-export through a single surface in `mod.rs`.
---
## 8. Performance Rules (hot paths)
- Annotate hot-path functions with `// HOT PATH: <throughput requirement>`.
- Zero allocations per operation in hot paths after initialization. Preallocate in constructors, reuse buffers.
- Pass `&[u8]` / `Bytes` slices — not `Vec<u8>`. Use `BytesMut` for reusable mutable buffers.
- No `String` formatting in hot paths. No logging without a rate-limit or sampling gate.
- Any allocation in a hot path gets a comment: `// ALLOC: <reason and size>`.
---
## 9. Testing Rules
- Bug fixes require a regression test that is **red before the fix, green after**. Name it after the bug.
- Property tests for: codec round-trips, state machine invariants, cryptographic protocol correctness.
- No shared mutable state between tests. Each test constructs its own environment.
- Test doubles hierarchy (simplest first): Fake → Stub → Spy → Mock. Mocks couple to implementation, not behavior — use sparingly.
---
## 10. Pre-Change Checklist
Run this before proposing or implementing any structural decision:
- [ ] Responsibility nameable in one noun phrase?
- [ ] Layer dependencies point inward only?
- [ ] Invalid states unrepresentable in the type system?
- [ ] State transitions gated through a single interface?
- [ ] All channels bounded?
- [ ] No locks held across `await` (or documented)?
- [ ] Errors typed and translated at layer boundaries?
- [ ] No panics in production paths without invariant proof?
- [ ] Hot paths annotated and allocation-free?
- [ ] Public surface minimal — only deliberate API marked `pub`?
- [ ] Correct pattern chosen from Section 3 table?
+39
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
name: Build
on:
push:
branches: [ "*" ]
pull_request:
branches: [ "*" ]
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
jobs:
build:
name: Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install latest stable Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
- name: Cache cargo registry & build artifacts
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-
- name: Build Release
run: cargo build --release --verbose
+340 -74
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@@ -5,37 +5,87 @@ on:
tags:
- '[0-9]+.[0-9]+.[0-9]+'
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
tag:
description: 'Release tag (example: 3.3.15)'
required: true
type: string
concurrency:
group: release-${{ github.ref_name }}-${{ github.event.inputs.tag || 'auto' }}
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
BINARY_NAME: telemt
jobs:
build:
name: Build ${{ matrix.target }}
prepare:
name: Prepare
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
outputs:
version: ${{ steps.vars.outputs.version }}
prerelease: ${{ steps.vars.outputs.prerelease }}
steps:
- name: Resolve version
id: vars
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${GITHUB_EVENT_NAME}" = "workflow_dispatch" ]; then
VERSION="${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}"
else
VERSION="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/}"
fi
VERSION="${VERSION#refs/tags/}"
if [ -z "${VERSION}" ]; then
echo "Release version is empty" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "${VERSION}" == *-* ]]; then
PRERELEASE=true
else
PRERELEASE=false
fi
echo "version=${VERSION}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
echo "prerelease=${PRERELEASE}" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
# ==========================
# GNU / glibc
# ==========================
build-gnu:
name: GNU ${{ matrix.asset }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: prepare
container:
image: rust:slim-bookworm
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
artifact_name: telemt
asset_name: telemt-x86_64-linux-gnu
asset: telemt-x86_64-linux-gnu
cpu: baseline
- target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
asset: telemt-x86_64-v3-linux-gnu
cpu: v3
- target: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
artifact_name: telemt
asset_name: telemt-aarch64-linux-gnu
- target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
artifact_name: telemt
asset_name: telemt-x86_64-linux-musl
- target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
artifact_name: telemt
asset_name: telemt-aarch64-linux-musl
asset: telemt-aarch64-linux-gnu
cpu: generic
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -43,47 +93,245 @@ jobs:
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@v1
with:
toolchain: stable
targets: ${{ matrix.target }}
targets: |
x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
- name: Install cross-compilation tools
- name: Install deps
run: |
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
apt-get update
apt-get install -y \
build-essential \
clang \
lld \
pkg-config \
gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu \
g++-aarch64-linux-gnu
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
/usr/local/cargo/registry
/usr/local/cargo/git
target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-${{ matrix.target }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
key: gnu-${{ matrix.asset }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-${{ matrix.target }}-cargo-
gnu-${{ matrix.asset }}-
gnu-
- name: Install cross
run: cargo install cross --git https://github.com/cross-rs/cross
- name: Build Release
env:
RUSTFLAGS: ${{ contains(matrix.target, 'musl') && '-C target-feature=+crt-static' || '' }}
run: cross build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }}
- name: Package binary
- name: Build
shell: bash
run: |
cd target/${{ matrix.target }}/release
tar -czvf ${{ matrix.asset_name }}.tar.gz ${{ matrix.artifact_name }}
sha256sum ${{ matrix.asset_name }}.tar.gz > ${{ matrix.asset_name }}.sha256
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${{ matrix.target }}" = "aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu" ]; then
export CC=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc
export CXX=aarch64-linux-gnu-g++
export RUSTFLAGS="-C linker=aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc -C lto=fat -C panic=abort"
else
export CC=clang
export CXX=clang++
if [ "${{ matrix.cpu }}" = "v3" ]; then
CPU_FLAGS="-C target-cpu=x86-64-v3"
else
CPU_FLAGS="-C target-cpu=x86-64"
fi
export RUSTFLAGS="-C linker=clang -C link-arg=-fuse-ld=lld -C lto=fat -C panic=abort ${CPU_FLAGS}"
fi
cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} -j "$(nproc)"
- name: Package
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p dist
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${{ env.BINARY_NAME }}" dist/telemt
cd dist
tar -czf "${{ matrix.asset }}.tar.gz" \
--owner=0 --group=0 --numeric-owner \
telemt
sha256sum "${{ matrix.asset }}.tar.gz" > "${{ matrix.asset }}.tar.gz.sha256"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ${{ matrix.asset_name }}
path: |
target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${{ matrix.asset_name }}.tar.gz
target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${{ matrix.asset_name }}.sha256
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
path: dist/*
build-docker-image:
needs: build
# ==========================
# MUSL
# ==========================
build-musl:
name: MUSL ${{ matrix.asset }}
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: prepare
container:
image: rust:slim-bookworm
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
- target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: telemt-x86_64-linux-musl
cpu: baseline
- target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: telemt-x86_64-v3-linux-musl
cpu: v3
- target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
asset: telemt-aarch64-linux-musl
cpu: generic
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install deps
run: |
apt-get update
apt-get install -y \
musl-tools \
pkg-config \
curl
- uses: actions/cache@v4
if: matrix.target == 'aarch64-unknown-linux-musl'
with:
path: ~/.musl-aarch64
key: musl-toolchain-aarch64-v1
- name: Install aarch64 musl toolchain
if: matrix.target == 'aarch64-unknown-linux-musl'
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
TOOLCHAIN_DIR="$HOME/.musl-aarch64"
ARCHIVE="aarch64-linux-musl-cross.tgz"
URL="https://github.com/telemt/telemt/releases/download/toolchains/${ARCHIVE}"
if [ -x "${TOOLCHAIN_DIR}/bin/aarch64-linux-musl-gcc" ]; then
echo "MUSL toolchain cached"
else
curl -fL \
--retry 5 \
--retry-delay 3 \
--connect-timeout 10 \
--max-time 120 \
-o "${ARCHIVE}" "${URL}"
mkdir -p "${TOOLCHAIN_DIR}"
tar -xzf "${ARCHIVE}" --strip-components=1 -C "${TOOLCHAIN_DIR}"
fi
echo "${TOOLCHAIN_DIR}/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Add rust target
run: rustup target add ${{ matrix.target }}
- uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
/usr/local/cargo/registry
/usr/local/cargo/git
target
key: musl-${{ matrix.asset }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
musl-${{ matrix.asset }}-
musl-
- name: Build
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
if [ "${{ matrix.target }}" = "aarch64-unknown-linux-musl" ]; then
export CC=aarch64-linux-musl-gcc
export CC_aarch64_unknown_linux_musl=aarch64-linux-musl-gcc
export RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static -C linker=aarch64-linux-musl-gcc -C lto=fat -C panic=abort"
else
export CC=musl-gcc
export CC_x86_64_unknown_linux_musl=musl-gcc
if [ "${{ matrix.cpu }}" = "v3" ]; then
CPU_FLAGS="-C target-cpu=x86-64-v3"
else
CPU_FLAGS="-C target-cpu=x86-64"
fi
export RUSTFLAGS="-C target-feature=+crt-static -C lto=fat -C panic=abort ${CPU_FLAGS}"
fi
cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} -j "$(nproc)"
- name: Package
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p dist
cp "target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/${{ env.BINARY_NAME }}" dist/telemt
cd dist
tar -czf "${{ matrix.asset }}.tar.gz" \
--owner=0 --group=0 --numeric-owner \
telemt
sha256sum "${{ matrix.asset }}.tar.gz" > "${{ matrix.asset }}.tar.gz.sha256"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: ${{ matrix.asset }}
path: dist/*
# ==========================
# Release
# ==========================
release:
name: Release
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [prepare, build-gnu, build-musl]
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
path: artifacts
- name: Flatten artifacts
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir -p dist
find artifacts -type f -exec cp {} dist/ \;
- name: Create GitHub Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
tag_name: ${{ needs.prepare.outputs.version }}
target_commitish: ${{ github.sha }}
files: dist/*
generate_release_notes: true
prerelease: ${{ needs.prepare.outputs.prerelease == 'true' }}
overwrite_files: true
# ==========================
# Docker
# ==========================
docker:
name: Docker
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [prepare, release]
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
@@ -92,48 +340,66 @@ jobs:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- name: Login to GHCR
uses: docker/login-action@v3
- uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Extract version
id: vars
run: echo "VERSION=${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/}" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Probe release assets
shell: bash
env:
VERSION: ${{ needs.prepare.outputs.version }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
- name: Build and push
for asset in \
telemt-x86_64-linux-musl.tar.gz \
telemt-x86_64-linux-musl.tar.gz.sha256 \
telemt-aarch64-linux-musl.tar.gz \
telemt-aarch64-linux-musl.tar.gz.sha256
do
curl -fsIL \
--retry 10 \
--retry-delay 3 \
"https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${VERSION}/${asset}" \
> /dev/null
done
- name: Compute image tags
id: meta
shell: bash
env:
VERSION: ${{ needs.prepare.outputs.version }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
IMAGE="$(echo "ghcr.io/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
TAGS="${IMAGE}:${VERSION}"
if [[ "${VERSION}" != *-* ]]; then
TAGS="${TAGS}"$'\n'"${IMAGE}:latest"
fi
{
echo "tags<<EOF"
printf '%s\n' "${TAGS}"
echo "EOF"
} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
- name: Build & Push
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
with:
context: .
push: true
tags: |
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ steps.vars.outputs.VERSION }}
ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:latest
release:
name: Create Release
needs: build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
with:
path: artifacts
- name: Create Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
files: artifacts/**/*
generate_release_notes: true
draft: false
prerelease: ${{ contains(github.ref, '-rc') || contains(github.ref, '-beta') || contains(github.ref, '-alpha') }}
pull: true
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
build-args: |
TELEMT_REPOSITORY=${{ github.repository }}
TELEMT_VERSION=${{ needs.prepare.outputs.version }}
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
-54
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@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
name: Rust
on:
push:
branches: [ "*" ]
pull_request:
branches: [ "*" ]
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
jobs:
build:
name: Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
actions: write
checks: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install latest stable Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
components: rustfmt, clippy
- name: Cache cargo registry & build artifacts
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-
- name: Build Release
run: cargo build --release --verbose
- name: Run tests
run: cargo test --verbose
# clippy dont fail on warnings because of active development of telemt
# and many warnings
- name: Run clippy
run: cargo clippy -- --cap-lints warn
- name: Check for unused dependencies
run: cargo udeps || true
+139
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@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
name: Check
on:
push:
branches: [ "*" ]
pull_request:
branches: [ "*" ]
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
concurrency:
group: test-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
# ==========================
# Formatting
# ==========================
fmt:
name: Fmt
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
components: rustfmt
- run: cargo fmt -- --check
# ==========================
# Tests
# ==========================
test:
name: Test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
actions: write
checks: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
- name: Cache cargo
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/bin
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-nextest-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-nextest-
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-
- name: Install cargo-nextest
run: cargo install --locked cargo-nextest || true
- name: Run tests with nextest
run: cargo nextest run -j "$(nproc)"
# ==========================
# Clippy
# ==========================
clippy:
name: Clippy
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
checks: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
components: clippy
- name: Cache cargo
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-clippy-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-clippy-
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-
- name: Run clippy
run: cargo clippy -j "$(nproc)" -- --cap-lints warn
# ==========================
# Udeps
# ==========================
udeps:
name: Udeps
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
components: rust-src
- name: Cache cargo
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/bin
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
target
key: ${{ runner.os }}-cargo-udeps-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-udeps-
${{ runner.os }}-cargo-
- name: Install cargo-udeps
run: cargo install --locked cargo-udeps || true
- name: Run udeps
run: cargo udeps -j "$(nproc)" || true
-58
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@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
# Architect Mode Rules for Telemt
## Architecture Overview
```mermaid
graph TB
subgraph Entry
Client[Clients] --> Listener[TCP/Unix Listener]
end
subgraph Proxy Layer
Listener --> ClientHandler[ClientHandler]
ClientHandler --> Handshake[Handshake Validator]
Handshake --> |Valid| Relay[Relay Layer]
Handshake --> |Invalid| Masking[Masking/TLS Fronting]
end
subgraph Transport
Relay --> MiddleProxy[Middle-End Proxy Pool]
Relay --> DirectRelay[Direct DC Relay]
MiddleProxy --> TelegramDC[Telegram DCs]
DirectRelay --> TelegramDC
end
```
## Module Dependencies
- [`src/main.rs`](src/main.rs) - Entry point, spawns all async tasks
- [`src/config/`](src/config/) - Configuration loading with auto-migration
- [`src/error.rs`](src/error.rs) - Error types, must be used by all modules
- [`src/crypto/`](src/crypto/) - AES, SHA, random number generation
- [`src/protocol/`](src/protocol/) - MTProto constants, frame encoding, obfuscation
- [`src/stream/`](src/stream/) - Stream wrappers, buffer pool, frame codecs
- [`src/proxy/`](src/proxy/) - Client handling, handshake, relay logic
- [`src/transport/`](src/transport/) - Upstream management, middle-proxy, SOCKS support
- [`src/stats/`](src/stats/) - Statistics and replay protection
- [`src/ip_tracker.rs`](src/ip_tracker.rs) - Per-user IP tracking
## Key Architectural Constraints
### Middle-End Proxy Mode
- Requires public IP on interface OR 1:1 NAT with STUN probing
- Uses separate `proxy-secret` from Telegram (NOT user secrets)
- Falls back to direct mode automatically on STUN mismatch
### TLS Fronting
- Invalid handshakes are transparently proxied to `mask_host`
- This is critical for DPI evasion - do not change this behavior
- `mask_unix_sock` and `mask_host` are mutually exclusive
### Stream Architecture
- Buffer pool is shared globally via Arc - prevents allocation storms
- Frame codecs implement tokio-util Encoder/Decoder traits
- State machine in [`src/stream/state.rs`](src/stream/state.rs) manages stream transitions
### Configuration Migration
- [`ProxyConfig::load()`](src/config/mod.rs:641) mutates config in-place
- New fields must have sensible defaults
- DC203 override is auto-injected for CDN/media support
-23
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@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
# Code Mode Rules for Telemt
## Error Handling
- Always use [`ProxyError`](src/error.rs:168) from [`src/error.rs`](src/error.rs) for proxy operations
- [`HandshakeResult<T,R,W>`](src/error.rs:292) returns streams on bad client - these MUST be returned for masking, never dropped
- Use [`Recoverable`](src/error.rs:110) trait to check if errors are retryable
## Configuration Changes
- [`ProxyConfig::load()`](src/config/mod.rs:641) auto-mutates config - new fields should have defaults
- DC203 override is auto-injected if missing - do not remove this behavior
- When adding config fields, add migration logic in [`ProxyConfig::load()`](src/config/mod.rs:641)
## Crypto Code
- [`SecureRandom`](src/crypto/random.rs) from [`src/crypto/random.rs`](src/crypto/random.rs) must be used for all crypto operations
- Never use `rand::thread_rng()` directly - use the shared `Arc<SecureRandom>`
## Stream Handling
- Buffer pool [`BufferPool`](src/stream/buffer_pool.rs) is shared via Arc - always use it instead of allocating
- Frame codecs in [`src/stream/frame_codec.rs`](src/stream/frame_codec.rs) implement tokio-util's Encoder/Decoder traits
## Testing
- Tests are inline in modules using `#[cfg(test)]`
- Use `cargo test --lib <module_name>` to run tests for specific modules
-27
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@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
# Debug Mode Rules for Telemt
## Logging
- `RUST_LOG` environment variable takes absolute priority over all config log levels
- Log levels: `trace`, `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error`
- Use `RUST_LOG=debug cargo run` for detailed operational logs
- Use `RUST_LOG=trace cargo run` for full protocol-level debugging
## Middle-End Proxy Debugging
- Set `ME_DIAG=1` environment variable for high-precision cryptography diagnostics
- STUN probe results are logged at startup - check for mismatch between local and reflected IP
- If Middle-End fails, check `proxy_secret_path` points to valid file from https://core.telegram.org/getProxySecret
## Connection Issues
- DC connectivity is logged at startup with RTT measurements
- If DC ping fails, check `dc_overrides` for custom addresses
- Use `prefer_ipv6=false` in config if IPv6 is unreliable
## TLS Fronting Issues
- Invalid handshakes are proxied to `mask_host` - check this host is reachable
- `mask_unix_sock` and `mask_host` are mutually exclusive - only one can be set
- If `mask_unix_sock` is set, socket must exist before connections arrive
## Common Errors
- `ReplayAttack` - client replayed a handshake nonce, potential attack
- `TimeSkew` - client clock is off, can disable with `ignore_time_skew=true`
- `TgHandshakeTimeout` - upstream DC connection failed, check network
+212
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@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
# Code of Conduct
## Purpose
**Telemt exists to solve technical problems.**
Telemt is open to contributors who want to learn, improve and build meaningful systems together.
It is a place for building, testing, reasoning, documenting, and improving systems.
Discussions that advance this work are in scope. Discussions that divert it are not.
Technology has consequences. Responsibility is inherent.
> **Zweck bestimmt die Form.**
> Purpose defines form.
---
## Principles
* **Technical over emotional**
Arguments are grounded in data, logs, reproducible cases, or clear reasoning.
* **Clarity over noise**
Communication is structured, concise, and relevant.
* **Openness with standards**
Participation is open. The work remains disciplined.
* **Independence of judgment**
Claims are evaluated on technical merit, not affiliation or posture.
* **Responsibility over capability**
Capability does not justify careless use.
* **Cooperation over friction**
Progress depends on coordination, mutual support, and honest review.
* **Good intent, rigorous method**
Assume good intent, but require rigor.
> **Aussagen gelten nach ihrer Begründung.**
> Claims are weighed by evidence.
---
## Expected Behavior
Participants are expected to:
* Communicate directly and respectfully
* Support claims with evidence
* Stay within technical scope
* Accept critique and provide it constructively
* Reduce noise, duplication, and ambiguity
* Help others reach correct and reproducible outcomes
* Act in a way that improves the system as a whole
Precision is learned.
New contributors are welcome. They are expected to grow into these standards. Existing contributors are expected to make that growth possible.
> **Wer behauptet, belegt.**
> Whoever claims, proves.
---
## Unacceptable Behavior
The following is not allowed:
* Personal attacks, insults, harassment, or intimidation
* Repeatedly derailing discussion away from Telemts purpose
* Spam, flooding, or repeated low-quality input
* Misinformation presented as fact
* Attempts to degrade, destabilize, or exhaust Telemt or its participants
* Use of Telemt or its spaces to enable harm
Telemt is not a venue for disputes that displace technical work.
Such discussions may be closed, removed, or redirected.
> **Störung ist kein Beitrag.**
> Disruption is not contribution.
---
## Security and Misuse
Telemt is intended for responsible use.
* Do not use it to plan, coordinate, or execute harm
* Do not publish vulnerabilities without responsible disclosure
* Report security issues privately where possible
Security is both technical and behavioral.
> **Verantwortung endet nicht am Code.**
> Responsibility does not end at the code.
---
## 6. Openness
Telemt is open to contributors of different backgrounds, experience levels, and working styles.
- Standards are public, legible, and applied to the work itself.
- Questions are welcome. Careful disagreement is welcome. Honest correction is welcome.
- Gatekeeping by obscurity, status signaling, or hostility is not.
---
## Scope
This Code of Conduct applies to all official spaces:
* Source repositories (issues, pull requests, discussions)
* Documentation
* Communication channels associated with Telemt
---
## Maintainer Stewardship
Maintainers are responsible for final decisions in matters of conduct, scope, and direction.
This responsibility is stewardship:
- preserving continuity,
- protecting signal,
- maintaining standards,
- keeping Telemt workable for others.
Judgment should be exercised with restraint, consistency, and institutional responsibility.
- Not every decision requires extended debate.
- Not every intervention requires public explanation.
All decisions are expected to serve the durability, clarity, and integrity of Telemt.
> **Ordnung ist Voraussetzung der Funktion.**
> Order is the precondition of function.
---
## Enforcement
Maintainers may act to preserve the integrity of Telemt, including by:
* Removing content
* Locking discussions
* Rejecting contributions
* Restricting or banning participants
Actions are taken to maintain function, continuity, and signal quality.
- Where possible, correction is preferred to exclusion.
- Where necessary, exclusion is preferred to decay.
---
## Final
Telemt is built on discipline, structure, and shared intent.
- Signal over noise.
- Facts over opinion.
- Systems over rhetoric.
- Work is collective.
- Outcomes are shared.
- Responsibility is distributed.
- Precision is learned.
- Rigor is expected.
- Help is part of the work.
> **Ordnung ist Voraussetzung der Freiheit.**
- If you contribute — contribute with care.
- If you speak — speak with substance.
- If you engage — engage constructively.
---
## After All
Systems outlive intentions.
- What is built will be used.
- What is released will propagate.
- What is maintained will define the future state.
There is no neutral infrastructure, only infrastructure shaped well or poorly.
> **Jedes System trägt Verantwortung.**
> Every system carries responsibility.
- Stability requires discipline.
- Freedom requires structure.
- Trust requires honesty.
In the end: the system reflects its contributors.
+72 -9
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,82 @@
# Issues - Rules
# Issues
## Warnung
Before opening Issue, if it is more question than problem or bug - ask about that [in our chat](https://t.me/telemtrs)
## What it is not
- NOT Question and Answer
- NOT Helpdesk
# Pull Requests - Rules
***Each of your Issues triggers attempts to reproduce problems and analyze them, which are done manually by people***
---
# Pull Requests
## General
- ONLY signed and verified commits
- ONLY from your name
- DO NOT commit with `codex` or `claude` as author/commiter
- DO NOT commit with `codex`, `claude`, or other AI tools as author/committer
- PREFER `flow` branch for development, not `main`
## AI
We are not against modern tools, like AI, where you act as a principal or architect, but we consider it important:
---
- you really understand what you're doing
- you understand the relationships and dependencies of the components being modified
- you understand the architecture of Telegram MTProto, MTProxy, Middle-End KDF at least generically
- you DO NOT commit for the sake of commits, but to help the community, core-developers and ordinary users
## Definition of Ready (MANDATORY)
A Pull Request WILL be ignored or closed if:
- it does NOT build
- it does NOT pass tests
- it does NOT follow formatting rules
- it contains unrelated or excessive changes
- the author cannot clearly explain the change
---
## Blessed Principles
- PR must build
- PR must pass tests
- PR must be understood by author
---
## AI Usage Policy
AI tools (Claude, ChatGPT, Codex, DeepSeek, etc.) are allowed as **assistants**, NOT as decision-makers.
By submitting a PR, you confirm that:
- you fully understand the code you submit
- you verified correctness manually
- you reviewed architecture and dependencies
- you take full responsibility for the change
AI-generated code is treated as **draft** and must be validated like any other external contribution.
PRs that look like unverified AI dumps WILL be closed
---
## Maintainer Policy
Maintainers reserve the right to:
- close PRs that do not meet basic quality requirements
- request explanations before review
- ignore low-effort contributions
Respect the reviewers time
---
## Enforcement
Pull Requests that violate project standards may be closed without review.
This includes (but is not limited to):
- non-building code
- failing tests
- unverified or low-effort changes
- inability to explain the change
These actions follow the Code of Conduct and are intended to preserve signal, quality, and Telemt's integrity
Generated
+1164 -421
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+35 -15
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@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
[package]
name = "telemt"
version = "3.3.20"
version = "3.3.37"
edition = "2024"
[features]
redteam_offline_expected_fail = []
[dependencies]
# C
libc = "0.2"
@@ -26,24 +29,33 @@ subtle = "2.6"
static_assertions = "1.1"
# Network
socket2 = { version = "0.5", features = ["all"] }
nix = { version = "0.28", default-features = false, features = ["net"] }
socket2 = { version = "0.6", features = ["all"] }
nix = { version = "0.31", default-features = false, features = [
"net",
"user",
"process",
"fs",
"signal",
] }
shadowsocks = { version = "1.24", features = ["aead-cipher-2022"] }
# Serialization
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1.0"
toml = "0.8"
x509-parser = "0.15"
toml = "1.0"
x509-parser = "0.18"
# Utils
bytes = "1.9"
thiserror = "2.0"
tracing = "0.1"
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
tracing-appender = "0.2"
parking_lot = "0.12"
dashmap = "5.5"
dashmap = "6.1"
arc-swap = "1.7"
lru = "0.16"
rand = "0.9"
rand = "0.10"
chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
hex = "0.4"
base64 = "0.22"
@@ -56,20 +68,26 @@ x25519-dalek = "2"
anyhow = "1.0"
# HTTP
reqwest = { version = "0.12", features = ["rustls-tls"], default-features = false }
notify = { version = "6", features = ["macos_fsevent"] }
ipnetwork = "0.20"
reqwest = { version = "0.13", features = ["rustls"], default-features = false }
notify = "8.2"
ipnetwork = { version = "0.21", features = ["serde"] }
hyper = { version = "1", features = ["server", "http1"] }
hyper-util = { version = "0.1", features = ["tokio", "server-auto"] }
http-body-util = "0.1"
httpdate = "1.0"
tokio-rustls = { version = "0.26", default-features = false, features = ["tls12"] }
rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = ["std", "tls12", "ring"] }
webpki-roots = "0.26"
tokio-rustls = { version = "0.26", default-features = false, features = [
"tls12",
] }
rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = [
"std",
"tls12",
"ring",
] }
webpki-roots = "1.0"
[dev-dependencies]
tokio-test = "0.4"
criterion = "0.5"
criterion = "0.8"
proptest = "1.4"
futures = "0.3"
@@ -78,4 +96,6 @@ name = "crypto_bench"
harness = false
[profile.release]
lto = "thin"
lto = "fat"
codegen-units = 1
+84 -29
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@@ -1,43 +1,98 @@
# ==========================
# Stage 1: Build
# ==========================
FROM rust:1.88-slim-bookworm AS builder
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
pkg-config \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /build
COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock* ./
RUN mkdir src && echo 'fn main() {}' > src/main.rs && \
cargo build --release 2>/dev/null || true && \
rm -rf src
COPY . .
RUN cargo build --release && strip target/release/telemt
ARG TELEMT_REPOSITORY=telemt/telemt
ARG TELEMT_VERSION=latest
# ==========================
# Stage 2: Runtime
# Minimal Image
# ==========================
FROM debian:bookworm-slim
FROM debian:12-slim AS minimal
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
ARG TARGETARCH
ARG TELEMT_REPOSITORY
ARG TELEMT_VERSION
RUN useradd -r -s /usr/sbin/nologin telemt
RUN set -eux; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
binutils \
ca-certificates \
curl \
tar; \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN set -eux; \
case "${TARGETARCH}" in \
amd64) ASSET="telemt-x86_64-linux-musl.tar.gz" ;; \
arm64) ASSET="telemt-aarch64-linux-musl.tar.gz" ;; \
*) echo "Unsupported TARGETARCH: ${TARGETARCH}" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
esac; \
VERSION="${TELEMT_VERSION#refs/tags/}"; \
if [ -z "${VERSION}" ] || [ "${VERSION}" = "latest" ]; then \
BASE_URL="https://github.com/${TELEMT_REPOSITORY}/releases/latest/download"; \
else \
BASE_URL="https://github.com/${TELEMT_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${VERSION}"; \
fi; \
curl -fL \
--retry 5 \
--retry-delay 3 \
--connect-timeout 10 \
--max-time 120 \
-o "/tmp/${ASSET}" \
"${BASE_URL}/${ASSET}"; \
curl -fL \
--retry 5 \
--retry-delay 3 \
--connect-timeout 10 \
--max-time 120 \
-o "/tmp/${ASSET}.sha256" \
"${BASE_URL}/${ASSET}.sha256"; \
cd /tmp; \
sha256sum -c "${ASSET}.sha256"; \
tar -xzf "${ASSET}" -C /tmp; \
test -f /tmp/telemt; \
install -m 0755 /tmp/telemt /telemt; \
strip --strip-unneeded /telemt || true; \
rm -f "/tmp/${ASSET}" "/tmp/${ASSET}.sha256" /tmp/telemt
# ==========================
# Debug Image
# ==========================
FROM debian:12-slim AS debug
RUN set -eux; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
tzdata \
curl \
iproute2 \
busybox; \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder /build/target/release/telemt /app/telemt
COPY --from=minimal /telemt /app/telemt
COPY config.toml /app/config.toml
RUN chown -R telemt:telemt /app
USER telemt
EXPOSE 443
EXPOSE 9090
EXPOSE 443 9090 9091
ENTRYPOINT ["/app/telemt"]
CMD ["config.toml"]
# ==========================
# Production Distroless on MUSL
# ==========================
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12 AS prod
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=minimal /telemt /app/telemt
COPY config.toml /app/config.toml
USER nonroot:nonroot
EXPOSE 443 9090 9091
ENTRYPOINT ["/app/telemt"]
CMD ["config.toml"]
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+2 -54
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@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
***Löst Probleme, bevor andere überhaupt wissen, dass sie existieren*** / ***It solves problems before others even realize they exist***
[**Telemt Chat in Telegram**](https://t.me/telemtrs)
**Telemt** is a fast, secure, and feature-rich server written in Rust: it fully implements the official Telegram proxy algo and adds many production-ready improvements such as:
- [ME Pool + Reader/Writer + Registry + Refill + Adaptive Floor + Trio-State + Generation Lifecycle](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/model/MODEL.en.md)
- [Full-covered API w/ management](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/API.md)
@@ -9,60 +11,6 @@
- Prometheus-format Metrics
- TLS-Fronting and TCP-Splicing for masking from "prying" eyes
[**Telemt Chat in Telegram**](https://t.me/telemtrs)
## NEWS and EMERGENCY
### ✈️ Telemt 3 is released!
<table>
<tr>
<td width="50%" valign="top">
### 🇷🇺 RU
#### Релиз 3.3.15 Semistable
[3.3.15](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/releases/tag/3.3.15) по итогам работы в продакшн признан одним из самых стабильных и рекомендуется к использованию, когда cutting-edge фичи некритичны!
Будем рады вашему фидбеку и предложениям по улучшению — особенно в части **API**, **статистики**, **UX**
---
Если у вас есть компетенции в:
- Асинхронных сетевых приложениях
- Анализе трафика
- Реверс-инжиниринге
- Сетевых расследованиях
Мы открыты к архитектурным предложениям, идеям и pull requests
</td>
<td width="50%" valign="top">
### 🇬🇧 EN
#### Release 3.3.15 Semistable
[3.3.15](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/releases/tag/3.3.15) is, based on the results of his work in production, recognized as one of the most stable and recommended for use when cutting-edge features are not so necessary!
We are looking forward to your feedback and improvement proposals — especially regarding **API**, **statistics**, **UX**
---
If you have expertise in:
- Asynchronous network applications
- Traffic analysis
- Reverse engineering
- Network forensics
We welcome ideas, architectural feedback, and pull requests.
</td>
</tr>
</table>
# Features
💥 The configuration structure has changed since version 1.1.0.0. change it in your environment!
⚓ Our implementation of **TLS-fronting** is one of the most deeply debugged, focused, advanced and *almost* **"behaviorally consistent to real"**: we are confident we have it right - [see evidence on our validation and traces](#recognizability-for-dpi-and-crawler)
⚓ Our ***Middle-End Pool*** is fastest by design in standard scenarios, compared to other implementations of connecting to the Middle-End Proxy: non dramatically, but usual
+2 -2
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
// Cryptobench
use criterion::{black_box, criterion_group, Criterion};
use criterion::{Criterion, black_box, criterion_group};
fn bench_aes_ctr(c: &mut Criterion) {
c.bench_function("aes_ctr_encrypt_64kb", |b| {
@@ -9,4 +9,4 @@ fn bench_aes_ctr(c: &mut Criterion) {
black_box(enc.encrypt(&data))
})
});
}
}
+1 -1
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ port = 443
[server.api]
enabled = true
listen = "0.0.0.0:9091"
whitelist = ["127.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12"]
whitelist = ["127.0.0.0/8"]
minimal_runtime_enabled = false
minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms = 1000
+2 -7
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@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ services:
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- "443:443"
- "127.0.0.1:9090:9090" # Metrics
- "127.0.0.1:9091:9091" # API
- "127.0.0.1:9090:9090"
- "127.0.0.1:9091:9091"
# Allow caching 'proxy-secret' in read-only container
working_dir: /run/telemt
volumes:
@@ -29,8 +29,3 @@ services:
nofile:
soft: 65536
hard: 65536
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
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@@ -497,13 +497,14 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `direct_total` | `usize` | Direct-route upstream entries. |
| `socks4_total` | `usize` | SOCKS4 upstream entries. |
| `socks5_total` | `usize` | SOCKS5 upstream entries. |
| `shadowsocks_total` | `usize` | Shadowsocks upstream entries. |
#### `RuntimeUpstreamQualityUpstreamData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `upstream_id` | `usize` | Runtime upstream index. |
| `route_kind` | `string` | `direct`, `socks4`, `socks5`. |
| `address` | `string` | Upstream address (`direct` literal for direct route kind). |
| `route_kind` | `string` | `direct`, `socks4`, `socks5`, `shadowsocks`. |
| `address` | `string` | Upstream address (`direct` literal for direct route kind, `host:port` only for proxied upstreams). |
| `weight` | `u16` | Selection weight. |
| `scopes` | `string` | Configured scope selector. |
| `healthy` | `bool` | Current health flag. |
@@ -757,13 +758,14 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `direct_total` | `usize` | Number of direct upstream entries. |
| `socks4_total` | `usize` | Number of SOCKS4 upstream entries. |
| `socks5_total` | `usize` | Number of SOCKS5 upstream entries. |
| `shadowsocks_total` | `usize` | Number of Shadowsocks upstream entries. |
#### `UpstreamStatus`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `upstream_id` | `usize` | Runtime upstream index. |
| `route_kind` | `string` | Upstream route kind: `direct`, `socks4`, `socks5`. |
| `address` | `string` | Upstream address (`direct` for direct route kind). Authentication fields are intentionally omitted. |
| `route_kind` | `string` | Upstream route kind: `direct`, `socks4`, `socks5`, `shadowsocks`. |
| `address` | `string` | Upstream address (`direct` for direct route kind, `host:port` for Shadowsocks). Authentication fields are intentionally omitted. |
| `weight` | `u16` | Selection weight. |
| `scopes` | `string` | Configured scope selector string. |
| `healthy` | `bool` | Current health flag. |
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@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
# Telemt Config Parameters Reference
This document lists all configuration keys accepted by `config.toml`.
> [!WARNING]
>
> The configuration parameters detailed in this document are intended for advanced users and fine-tuning purposes. Modifying these settings without a clear understanding of their function may lead to application instability or other unexpected behavior. Please proceed with caution and at your own risk.
## Top-level keys
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| include | `String` (special directive) | `null` | — | Includes another TOML file with `include = "relative/or/absolute/path.toml"`; includes are processed recursively before parsing. |
| show_link | `"*" \| String[]` | `[]` (`ShowLink::None`) | — | Legacy top-level link visibility selector (`"*"` for all users or explicit usernames list). |
| dc_overrides | `Map<String, String[]>` | `{}` | — | Overrides DC endpoints for non-standard DCs; key is DC id string, value is `ip:port` list. |
| default_dc | `u8 \| null` | `null` (effective fallback: `2` in ME routing) | — | Default DC index used for unmapped non-standard DCs. |
## [general]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| data_path | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Optional runtime data directory path. |
| prefer_ipv6 | `bool` | `false` | Deprecated. Use `network.prefer`. | Deprecated legacy IPv6 preference flag migrated to `network.prefer`. |
| fast_mode | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables fast-path optimizations for traffic processing. |
| use_middle_proxy | `bool` | `true` | none | Enables ME transport mode; if `false`, runtime falls back to direct DC routing. |
| proxy_secret_path | `String \| null` | `"proxy-secret"` | Path may be `null`. | Path to Telegram infrastructure proxy-secret file used by ME handshake logic. |
| proxy_config_v4_cache_path | `String \| null` | `"cache/proxy-config-v4.txt"` | — | Optional cache path for raw `getProxyConfig` (IPv4) snapshot. |
| proxy_config_v6_cache_path | `String \| null` | `"cache/proxy-config-v6.txt"` | — | Optional cache path for raw `getProxyConfigV6` (IPv6) snapshot. |
| ad_tag | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Global fallback ad tag (32 hex characters). |
| middle_proxy_nat_ip | `IpAddr \| null` | `null` | Must be a valid IP when set. | Manual public NAT IP override used as ME address material when set. |
| middle_proxy_nat_probe | `bool` | `true` | Auto-forced to `true` when `use_middle_proxy = true`. | Enables ME NAT probing; runtime may force it on when ME mode is active. |
| middle_proxy_nat_stun | `String \| null` | `null` | Deprecated. Use `network.stun_servers`. | Deprecated legacy single STUN server for NAT probing. |
| middle_proxy_nat_stun_servers | `String[]` | `[]` | Deprecated. Use `network.stun_servers`. | Deprecated legacy STUN list for NAT probing fallback. |
| stun_nat_probe_concurrency | `usize` | `8` | Must be `> 0`. | Maximum number of parallel STUN probes during NAT/public endpoint discovery. |
| middle_proxy_pool_size | `usize` | `8` | none | Target size of active ME writer pool. |
| middle_proxy_warm_standby | `usize` | `16` | none | Reserved compatibility field in current runtime revision. |
| me_init_retry_attempts | `u32` | `0` | `0..=1_000_000`. | Startup retries for ME pool initialization (`0` means unlimited). |
| me2dc_fallback | `bool` | `true` | — | Allows fallback from ME mode to direct DC when ME startup fails. |
| me_keepalive_enabled | `bool` | `true` | none | Enables periodic ME keepalive/ping traffic. |
| me_keepalive_interval_secs | `u64` | `8` | none | Base ME keepalive interval in seconds. |
| me_keepalive_jitter_secs | `u64` | `2` | none | Keepalive jitter in seconds to reduce synchronized bursts. |
| me_keepalive_payload_random | `bool` | `true` | none | Randomizes keepalive payload bytes instead of fixed zero payload. |
| rpc_proxy_req_every | `u64` | `0` | `0` or `10..=300`. | Interval for service `RPC_PROXY_REQ` activity signals (`0` disables). |
| me_writer_cmd_channel_capacity | `usize` | `4096` | Must be `> 0`. | Capacity of per-writer command channel. |
| me_route_channel_capacity | `usize` | `768` | Must be `> 0`. | Capacity of per-connection ME response route channel. |
| me_c2me_channel_capacity | `usize` | `1024` | Must be `> 0`. | Capacity of per-client command queue (client reader -> ME sender). |
| me_c2me_send_timeout_ms | `u64` | `4000` | `0..=60000`. | Maximum wait for enqueueing client->ME commands when the per-client queue is full (`0` keeps legacy unbounded wait). |
| me_reader_route_data_wait_ms | `u64` | `2` | `0..=20`. | Bounded wait for routing ME DATA to per-connection queue (`0` = no wait). |
| me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames | `usize` | `32` | `1..=512`. | Max ME->client frames coalesced before flush. |
| me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes | `usize` | `131072` | `4096..=2_097_152`. | Max ME->client payload bytes coalesced before flush. |
| me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us | `u64` | `500` | `0..=5000`. | Max microsecond wait for coalescing more ME->client frames (`0` disables timed coalescing). |
| me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate | `bool` | `true` | — | Flushes client writer immediately after quick-ack write. |
| me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes | `u64` | `65536` | `0..=16_777_216`. | Extra per-route quota allowance (bytes) tolerated before writer-side quota enforcement drops route data. |
| me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes | `usize` | `262144` | `4096..=16_777_216`. | Threshold for shrinking oversized ME->client frame-aggregation buffers after flush. |
| direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes | `usize` | `65536` | `4096..=1_048_576`. | Copy buffer size for client->DC direction in direct relay. |
| direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes | `usize` | `262144` | `8192..=2_097_152`. | Copy buffer size for DC->client direction in direct relay. |
| crypto_pending_buffer | `usize` | `262144` | — | Max pending ciphertext buffer per client writer (bytes). |
| max_client_frame | `usize` | `16777216` | — | Maximum allowed client MTProto frame size (bytes). |
| desync_all_full | `bool` | `false` | — | Emits full crypto-desync forensic logs for every event. |
| beobachten | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables per-IP forensic observation buckets. |
| beobachten_minutes | `u64` | `10` | Must be `> 0`. | Retention window (minutes) for per-IP observation buckets. |
| beobachten_flush_secs | `u64` | `15` | Must be `> 0`. | Snapshot flush interval (seconds) for observation output file. |
| beobachten_file | `String` | `"cache/beobachten.txt"` | — | Observation snapshot output file path. |
| hardswap | `bool` | `true` | none | Enables generation-based ME hardswap strategy. |
| me_warmup_stagger_enabled | `bool` | `true` | none | Staggers extra ME warmup dials to avoid connection spikes. |
| me_warmup_step_delay_ms | `u64` | `500` | none | Base delay in milliseconds between warmup dial steps. |
| me_warmup_step_jitter_ms | `u64` | `300` | none | Additional random delay in milliseconds for warmup steps. |
| me_reconnect_max_concurrent_per_dc | `u32` | `8` | none | Limits concurrent reconnect workers per DC during health recovery. |
| me_reconnect_backoff_base_ms | `u64` | `500` | none | Initial reconnect backoff in milliseconds. |
| me_reconnect_backoff_cap_ms | `u64` | `30000` | none | Maximum reconnect backoff cap in milliseconds. |
| me_reconnect_fast_retry_count | `u32` | `16` | none | Immediate retry budget before long backoff behavior applies. |
| me_single_endpoint_shadow_writers | `u8` | `2` | `0..=32`. | Additional reserve writers for one-endpoint DC groups. |
| me_single_endpoint_outage_mode_enabled | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables aggressive outage recovery for one-endpoint DC groups. |
| me_single_endpoint_outage_disable_quarantine | `bool` | `true` | — | Ignores endpoint quarantine in one-endpoint outage mode. |
| me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_min_ms | `u64` | `250` | Must be `> 0`; also `<= me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_max_ms`. | Minimum reconnect backoff in outage mode (ms). |
| me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_max_ms | `u64` | `3000` | Must be `> 0`; also `>= me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_min_ms`. | Maximum reconnect backoff in outage mode (ms). |
| me_single_endpoint_shadow_rotate_every_secs | `u64` | `900` | — | Periodic shadow writer rotation interval (`0` disables). |
| me_floor_mode | `"static" \| "adaptive"` | `"adaptive"` | — | Writer floor policy mode. |
| me_adaptive_floor_idle_secs | `u64` | `90` | — | Idle time before adaptive floor may reduce one-endpoint target. |
| me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint | `u8` | `1` | `1..=32`. | Minimum adaptive writer target for one-endpoint DC groups. |
| me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint | `u8` | `1` | `1..=32`. | Minimum adaptive writer target for multi-endpoint DC groups. |
| me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs | `u64` | `180` | — | Grace period to hold static floor after activity. |
| me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total | `u16` | `48` | Must be `> 0`. | Global writer budget per logical CPU core in adaptive mode. |
| me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override | `u16` | `0` | — | Manual CPU core count override (`0` uses auto-detection). |
| me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core | `u16` | `1` | — | Per-core max extra writers above base floor for one-endpoint DCs. |
| me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core | `u16` | `2` | — | Per-core max extra writers above base floor for multi-endpoint DCs. |
| me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core | `u16` | `64` | Must be `> 0`. | Hard cap for active ME writers per logical CPU core. |
| me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core | `u16` | `64` | Must be `> 0`. | Hard cap for warm ME writers per logical CPU core. |
| me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global | `u32` | `256` | Must be `> 0`. | Hard global cap for active ME writers. |
| me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global | `u32` | `256` | Must be `> 0`. | Hard global cap for warm ME writers. |
| upstream_connect_retry_attempts | `u32` | `2` | Must be `> 0`. | Connect attempts for selected upstream before error/fallback. |
| upstream_connect_retry_backoff_ms | `u64` | `100` | — | Delay between upstream connect attempts (ms). |
| upstream_connect_budget_ms | `u64` | `3000` | Must be `> 0`. | Total wall-clock budget for one upstream connect request (ms). |
| tg_connect | `u64` | `10` | Must be `> 0`. | Per-attempt upstream TCP connect timeout to Telegram DC (seconds). |
| upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold | `u32` | `5` | Must be `> 0`. | Consecutive failed requests before upstream is marked unhealthy. |
| upstream_connect_failfast_hard_errors | `bool` | `false` | — | Skips additional retries for hard non-transient connect errors. |
| stun_iface_mismatch_ignore | `bool` | `false` | none | Reserved compatibility flag in current runtime revision. |
| unknown_dc_log_path | `String \| null` | `"unknown-dc.txt"` | — | File path for unknown-DC request logging (`null` disables file path). |
| unknown_dc_file_log_enabled | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables unknown-DC file logging. |
| log_level | `"debug" \| "verbose" \| "normal" \| "silent"` | `"normal"` | — | Runtime logging verbosity. |
| disable_colors | `bool` | `false` | — | Disables ANSI colors in logs. |
| me_socks_kdf_policy | `"strict" \| "compat"` | `"strict"` | — | SOCKS-bound KDF fallback policy for ME handshake. |
| me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms | `u64` | `25` | Must be `> 0`. | Base backpressure timeout for route-channel send (ms). |
| me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms | `u64` | `120` | Must be `>= me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms`. | High backpressure timeout when queue occupancy exceeds watermark (ms). |
| me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct | `u8` | `80` | `1..=100`. | Queue occupancy threshold (%) for high timeout mode. |
| me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy | `u64` | `1000` | Must be `> 0`. | Health monitor interval while writer coverage is degraded (ms). |
| me_health_interval_ms_healthy | `u64` | `3000` | Must be `> 0`. | Health monitor interval while writer coverage is healthy (ms). |
| me_admission_poll_ms | `u64` | `1000` | Must be `> 0`. | Poll interval for conditional-admission checks (ms). |
| me_warn_rate_limit_ms | `u64` | `5000` | Must be `> 0`. | Cooldown for repetitive ME warning logs (ms). |
| me_route_no_writer_mode | `"async_recovery_failfast" \| "inline_recovery_legacy" \| "hybrid_async_persistent"` | `"hybrid_async_persistent"` | — | Route behavior when no writer is immediately available. |
| me_route_no_writer_wait_ms | `u64` | `250` | `10..=5000`. | Max wait in async-recovery failfast mode (ms). |
| me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms | `u64` | `3000` | `50..=60000`. | Maximum cumulative wait in hybrid no-writer mode before failfast fallback (ms). |
| me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms | `u64` | `250` | `0..=5000`. | Maximum wait for blocking route-channel send fallback (`0` keeps legacy unbounded wait). |
| me_route_inline_recovery_attempts | `u32` | `3` | Must be `> 0`. | Inline recovery attempts in legacy mode. |
| me_route_inline_recovery_wait_ms | `u64` | `3000` | `10..=30000`. | Max inline recovery wait in legacy mode (ms). |
| fast_mode_min_tls_record | `usize` | `0` | — | Minimum TLS record size when fast-mode coalescing is enabled (`0` disables). |
| update_every | `u64 \| null` | `300` | If set: must be `> 0`; if `null`: legacy fallback path is used. | Unified refresh interval for ME config and proxy-secret updater tasks. |
| me_reinit_every_secs | `u64` | `900` | Must be `> 0`. | Periodic interval for zero-downtime ME reinit cycle. |
| me_hardswap_warmup_delay_min_ms | `u64` | `1000` | Must be `<= me_hardswap_warmup_delay_max_ms`. | Lower bound for hardswap warmup dial spacing. |
| me_hardswap_warmup_delay_max_ms | `u64` | `2000` | Must be `> 0`. | Upper bound for hardswap warmup dial spacing. |
| me_hardswap_warmup_extra_passes | `u8` | `3` | Must be within `[0, 10]`. | Additional warmup passes after the base pass in one hardswap cycle. |
| me_hardswap_warmup_pass_backoff_base_ms | `u64` | `500` | Must be `> 0`. | Base backoff between extra hardswap warmup passes. |
| me_config_stable_snapshots | `u8` | `2` | Must be `> 0`. | Number of identical ME config snapshots required before apply. |
| me_config_apply_cooldown_secs | `u64` | `300` | none | Cooldown between applied ME endpoint-map updates. |
| me_snapshot_require_http_2xx | `bool` | `true` | — | Requires 2xx HTTP responses for applying config snapshots. |
| me_snapshot_reject_empty_map | `bool` | `true` | — | Rejects empty config snapshots. |
| me_snapshot_min_proxy_for_lines | `u32` | `1` | Must be `> 0`. | Minimum parsed `proxy_for` rows required to accept snapshot. |
| proxy_secret_stable_snapshots | `u8` | `2` | Must be `> 0`. | Number of identical proxy-secret snapshots required before rotation. |
| proxy_secret_rotate_runtime | `bool` | `true` | none | Enables runtime proxy-secret rotation from updater snapshots. |
| me_secret_atomic_snapshot | `bool` | `true` | — | Keeps selector and secret bytes from the same snapshot atomically. |
| proxy_secret_len_max | `usize` | `256` | Must be within `[32, 4096]`. | Upper length limit for accepted proxy-secret bytes. |
| me_pool_drain_ttl_secs | `u64` | `90` | none | Time window where stale writers remain fallback-eligible after map change. |
| me_instadrain | `bool` | `false` | — | Forces draining stale writers to be removed on the next cleanup tick, bypassing TTL/deadline waiting. |
| me_pool_drain_threshold | `u64` | `128` | — | Max draining stale writers before batch force-close (`0` disables threshold cleanup). |
| me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables gradual soft-eviction of stale writers during drain/reinit instead of immediate hard close. |
| me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs | `u64` | `30` | `0..=3600`. | Grace period before stale writers become soft-evict candidates. |
| me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer | `u8` | `1` | `1..=16`. | Maximum stale routes soft-evicted per writer in one eviction pass. |
| me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core | `u16` | `8` | `1..=64`. | Per-core budget limiting aggregate soft-eviction work per pass. |
| me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms | `u64` | `5000` | Must be `> 0`. | Cooldown between consecutive soft-eviction passes (ms). |
| me_bind_stale_mode | `"never" \| "ttl" \| "always"` | `"ttl"` | — | Policy for new binds on stale draining writers. |
| me_bind_stale_ttl_secs | `u64` | `90` | — | TTL for stale bind allowance when stale mode is `ttl`. |
| me_pool_min_fresh_ratio | `f32` | `0.8` | Must be within `[0.0, 1.0]`. | Minimum fresh desired-DC coverage ratio before stale writers are drained. |
| me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs | `u64` | `120` | `0` disables force-close; if `> 0` and `< me_pool_drain_ttl_secs`, runtime bumps it to TTL. | Force-close timeout for draining stale writers (`0` keeps indefinite draining). |
| proxy_secret_auto_reload_secs | `u64` | `3600` | Deprecated. Use `general.update_every`. | Deprecated legacy secret reload interval (fallback when `update_every` is not set). |
| proxy_config_auto_reload_secs | `u64` | `3600` | Deprecated. Use `general.update_every`. | Deprecated legacy config reload interval (fallback when `update_every` is not set). |
| me_reinit_singleflight | `bool` | `true` | — | Serializes ME reinit cycles across trigger sources. |
| me_reinit_trigger_channel | `usize` | `64` | Must be `> 0`. | Trigger queue capacity for reinit scheduler. |
| me_reinit_coalesce_window_ms | `u64` | `200` | — | Trigger coalescing window before starting reinit (ms). |
| me_deterministic_writer_sort | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables deterministic candidate sort for writer binding path. |
| me_writer_pick_mode | `"sorted_rr" \| "p2c"` | `"p2c"` | — | Writer selection mode for route bind path. |
| me_writer_pick_sample_size | `u8` | `3` | `2..=4`. | Number of candidates sampled by picker in `p2c` mode. |
| ntp_check | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables NTP drift check at startup. |
| ntp_servers | `String[]` | `["pool.ntp.org"]` | — | NTP servers used for drift check. |
| auto_degradation_enabled | `bool` | `true` | none | Reserved compatibility flag in current runtime revision. |
| degradation_min_unavailable_dc_groups | `u8` | `2` | none | Reserved compatibility threshold in current runtime revision. |
## [general.modes]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| classic | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables classic MTProxy mode. |
| secure | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables secure mode. |
| tls | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables TLS mode. |
## [general.links]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| show | `"*" \| String[]` | `"*"` | — | Selects users whose tg:// links are shown at startup. |
| public_host | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Public hostname/IP override for generated tg:// links. |
| public_port | `u16 \| null` | `null` | — | Public port override for generated tg:// links. |
## [general.telemetry]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| core_enabled | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables core hot-path telemetry counters. |
| user_enabled | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables per-user telemetry counters. |
| me_level | `"silent" \| "normal" \| "debug"` | `"normal"` | — | Middle-End telemetry verbosity level. |
## [network]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ipv4 | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables IPv4 networking. |
| ipv6 | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables/disables IPv6 when set |
| prefer | `u8` | `4` | Must be `4` or `6`. | Preferred IP family for selection (`4` or `6`). |
| multipath | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables multipath behavior where supported. |
| stun_use | `bool` | `true` | none | Global STUN switch; when `false`, STUN probing path is disabled. |
| stun_servers | `String[]` | Built-in STUN list (13 hosts) | Deduplicated; empty values are removed. | Primary STUN server list for NAT/public endpoint discovery. |
| stun_tcp_fallback | `bool` | `true` | none | Enables TCP fallback for STUN when UDP path is blocked. |
| http_ip_detect_urls | `String[]` | `["https://ifconfig.me/ip", "https://api.ipify.org"]` | none | HTTP fallback endpoints for public IP detection when STUN is unavailable. |
| cache_public_ip_path | `String` | `"cache/public_ip.txt"` | — | File path for caching detected public IP. |
| dns_overrides | `String[]` | `[]` | Must match `host:port:ip`; IPv6 must be bracketed. | Runtime DNS overrides in `host:port:ip` format. |
## [server]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| port | `u16` | `443` | — | Main proxy listen port. |
| listen_addr_ipv4 | `String \| null` | `"0.0.0.0"` | — | IPv4 bind address for TCP listener. |
| listen_addr_ipv6 | `String \| null` | `"::"` | — | IPv6 bind address for TCP listener. |
| listen_unix_sock | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Unix socket path for listener. |
| listen_unix_sock_perm | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Unix socket permissions in octal string (e.g., `"0666"`). |
| listen_tcp | `bool \| null` | `null` (auto) | — | Explicit TCP listener enable/disable override. |
| proxy_protocol | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables HAProxy PROXY protocol parsing on incoming client connections. |
| proxy_protocol_header_timeout_ms | `u64` | `500` | Must be `> 0`. | Timeout for PROXY protocol header read/parse (ms). |
| proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs | `IpNetwork[]` | `[]` | — | When non-empty, only connections from these proxy source CIDRs are allowed to provide PROXY protocol headers. If empty, PROXY headers are rejected by default (security hardening). |
| metrics_port | `u16 \| null` | `null` | — | Metrics endpoint port (enables metrics listener). |
| metrics_listen | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Full metrics bind address (`IP:PORT`), overrides `metrics_port`. |
| metrics_whitelist | `IpNetwork[]` | `["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"]` | — | CIDR whitelist for metrics endpoint access. |
| max_connections | `u32` | `10000` | — | Max concurrent client connections (`0` = unlimited). |
| accept_permit_timeout_ms | `u64` | `250` | `0..=60000`. | Maximum wait for acquiring a connection-slot permit before the accepted connection is dropped (`0` keeps legacy unbounded wait). |
Note: When `server.proxy_protocol` is enabled, incoming PROXY protocol headers are parsed from the first bytes of the connection and the client source address is replaced with `src_addr` from the header. For security, the peer source IP (the direct connection address) is verified against `server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs`; if this list is empty, PROXY headers are rejected and the connection is considered untrusted.
## [server.api]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| enabled | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables control-plane REST API. |
| listen | `String` | `"0.0.0.0:9091"` | Must be valid `IP:PORT`. | API bind address in `IP:PORT` format. |
| whitelist | `IpNetwork[]` | `["127.0.0.0/8"]` | — | CIDR whitelist allowed to access API. |
| auth_header | `String` | `""` | — | Exact expected `Authorization` header value (empty = disabled). |
| request_body_limit_bytes | `usize` | `65536` | Must be `> 0`. | Maximum accepted HTTP request body size. |
| minimal_runtime_enabled | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables minimal runtime snapshots endpoint logic. |
| minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms | `u64` | `1000` | `0..=60000`. | Cache TTL for minimal runtime snapshots (ms; `0` disables cache). |
| runtime_edge_enabled | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables runtime edge endpoints. |
| runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms | `u64` | `1000` | `0..=60000`. | Cache TTL for runtime edge aggregation payloads (ms). |
| runtime_edge_top_n | `usize` | `10` | `1..=1000`. | Top-N size for edge connection leaderboard. |
| runtime_edge_events_capacity | `usize` | `256` | `16..=4096`. | Ring-buffer capacity for runtime edge events. |
| read_only | `bool` | `false` | — | Rejects mutating API endpoints when enabled. |
## [[server.listeners]]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip | `IpAddr` | — | — | Listener bind IP. |
| announce | `String \| null` | — | — | Public IP/domain announced in proxy links (priority over `announce_ip`). |
| announce_ip | `IpAddr \| null` | — | Deprecated. Use `announce`. | Deprecated legacy announce IP (migrated to `announce` if needed). |
| proxy_protocol | `bool \| null` | `null` | — | Per-listener override for PROXY protocol enable flag. |
| reuse_allow | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables `SO_REUSEPORT` for multi-instance bind sharing. |
## [timeouts]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| client_handshake | `u64` | `30` | — | Client handshake timeout. |
| relay_idle_policy_v2_enabled | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables soft/hard middle-relay client idle policy. |
| relay_client_idle_soft_secs | `u64` | `120` | Must be `> 0`; must be `<= relay_client_idle_hard_secs`. | Soft idle threshold for middle-relay client uplink inactivity (seconds). |
| relay_client_idle_hard_secs | `u64` | `360` | Must be `> 0`; must be `>= relay_client_idle_soft_secs`. | Hard idle threshold for middle-relay client uplink inactivity (seconds). |
| relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs | `u64` | `30` | Must be `<= relay_client_idle_hard_secs`. | Extra hard-idle grace after recent downstream activity (seconds). |
| client_keepalive | `u64` | `15` | — | Client keepalive timeout. |
| client_ack | `u64` | `90` | — | Client ACK timeout. |
| me_one_retry | `u8` | `12` | none | Fast reconnect attempts budget for single-endpoint DC scenarios. |
| me_one_timeout_ms | `u64` | `1200` | none | Timeout in milliseconds for each quick single-endpoint reconnect attempt. |
## [censorship]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tls_domain | `String` | `"petrovich.ru"` | — | Primary TLS domain used in fake TLS handshake profile. |
| tls_domains | `String[]` | `[]` | — | Additional TLS domains for generating multiple links. |
| unknown_sni_action | `"drop" \| "mask"` | `"drop"` | — | Action for TLS ClientHello with unknown/non-configured SNI. |
| tls_fetch_scope | `String` | `""` | Value is trimmed during load; empty keeps default upstream routing behavior. | Upstream scope tag used for TLS-front metadata fetches. |
| tls_fetch | `Table` | built-in defaults | See `[censorship.tls_fetch]` section below. | TLS-front metadata fetch strategy settings. |
| mask | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables masking/fronting relay mode. |
| mask_host | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Upstream mask host for TLS fronting relay. |
| mask_port | `u16` | `443` | — | Upstream mask port for TLS fronting relay. |
| mask_unix_sock | `String \| null` | `null` | — | Unix socket path for mask backend instead of TCP host/port. |
| fake_cert_len | `usize` | `2048` | — | Length of synthetic certificate payload when emulation data is unavailable. |
| tls_emulation | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables certificate/TLS behavior emulation from cached real fronts. |
| tls_front_dir | `String` | `"tlsfront"` | — | Directory path for TLS front cache storage. |
| server_hello_delay_min_ms | `u64` | `0` | — | Minimum server_hello delay for anti-fingerprint behavior (ms). |
| server_hello_delay_max_ms | `u64` | `0` | — | Maximum server_hello delay for anti-fingerprint behavior (ms). |
| tls_new_session_tickets | `u8` | `0` | — | Number of `NewSessionTicket` messages to emit after handshake. |
| tls_full_cert_ttl_secs | `u64` | `90` | — | TTL for sending full cert payload per (domain, client IP) tuple. |
| alpn_enforce | `bool` | `true` | — | Enforces ALPN echo behavior based on client preference. |
| mask_proxy_protocol | `u8` | `0` | — | PROXY protocol mode for mask backend (`0` disabled, `1` v1, `2` v2). |
| mask_shape_hardening | `bool` | `true` | — | Enables client->mask shape-channel hardening by applying controlled tail padding to bucket boundaries on mask relay shutdown. |
| mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode | `bool` | `false` | Requires `mask_shape_hardening = true`. | Opt-in aggressive shaping profile: allows shaping on backend-silent non-EOF paths and switches above-cap blur to strictly positive random tail. |
| mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes | `usize` | `512` | Must be `> 0`; should be `<= mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes`. | Minimum bucket size used by shape-channel hardening. |
| mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes | `usize` | `4096` | Must be `>= mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes`. | Maximum bucket size used by shape-channel hardening; traffic above cap is not padded further. |
| mask_shape_above_cap_blur | `bool` | `false` | Requires `mask_shape_hardening = true`; requires `mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes > 0`. | Adds bounded randomized tail bytes even when forwarded size already exceeds cap. |
| mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes | `usize` | `512` | Must be `<= 1048576`; must be `> 0` when `mask_shape_above_cap_blur = true`. | Maximum randomized extra bytes appended above cap. |
| mask_relay_max_bytes | `usize` | `5242880` | Must be `> 0`; must be `<= 67108864`. | Maximum relayed bytes per direction on unauthenticated masking fallback path. |
| mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms | `u64` | `5` | Must be within `[5, 50]`. | Timeout budget (ms) for extending fragmented initial classifier window on masking fallback. |
| mask_timing_normalization_enabled | `bool` | `false` | Requires `mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms > 0`; requires `ceiling >= floor`. | Enables timing envelope normalization on masking outcomes. |
| mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms | `u64` | `0` | Must be `> 0` when timing normalization is enabled; must be `<= ceiling`. | Lower bound (ms) for masking outcome normalization target. |
| mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms | `u64` | `0` | Must be `>= floor`; must be `<= 60000`. | Upper bound (ms) for masking outcome normalization target. |
## [censorship.tls_fetch]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| profiles | `("modern_chrome_like" \| "modern_firefox_like" \| "compat_tls12" \| "legacy_minimal")[]` | `["modern_chrome_like", "modern_firefox_like", "compat_tls12", "legacy_minimal"]` | Empty list falls back to defaults; values are deduplicated preserving order. | Ordered ClientHello profile fallback chain for TLS-front metadata fetch. |
| strict_route | `bool` | `true` | — | Fails closed on upstream-route connect errors instead of falling back to direct TCP when route is configured. |
| attempt_timeout_ms | `u64` | `5000` | Must be `> 0`. | Timeout budget per one TLS-fetch profile attempt (ms). |
| total_budget_ms | `u64` | `15000` | Must be `> 0`. | Total wall-clock budget across all TLS-fetch attempts (ms). |
| grease_enabled | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables GREASE-style random values in selected ClientHello extensions for fetch traffic. |
| deterministic | `bool` | `false` | — | Enables deterministic ClientHello randomness for debugging/tests. |
| profile_cache_ttl_secs | `u64` | `600` | `0` disables cache. | TTL for winner-profile cache entries used by TLS fetch path. |
### Shape-channel hardening notes (`[censorship]`)
These parameters are designed to reduce one specific fingerprint source during masking: the exact number of bytes sent from proxy to `mask_host` for invalid or probing traffic.
Without hardening, a censor can often correlate probe input length with backend-observed length very precisely (for example: `5 + body_sent` on early TLS reject paths). That creates a length-based classifier signal.
When `mask_shape_hardening = true`, Telemt pads the **client->mask** stream tail to a bucket boundary at relay shutdown:
- Total bytes sent to mask are first measured.
- A bucket is selected using powers of two starting from `mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes`.
- Padding is added only if total bytes are below `mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes`.
- If bytes already exceed cap, no extra padding is added.
This means multiple nearby probe sizes collapse into the same backend-observed size class, making active classification harder.
What each parameter changes in practice:
- `mask_shape_hardening`
Enables or disables this entire length-shaping stage on the fallback path.
When `false`, backend-observed length stays close to the real forwarded probe length.
When `true`, clean relay shutdown can append random padding bytes to move the total into a bucket.
- `mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes`
Sets the first bucket boundary used for small probes.
Example: with floor `512`, a malformed probe that would otherwise forward `37` bytes can be expanded to `512` bytes on clean EOF.
Larger floor values hide very small probes better, but increase egress cost.
- `mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes`
Sets the largest bucket Telemt will pad up to with bucket logic.
Example: with cap `4096`, a forwarded total of `1800` bytes may be padded to `2048` or `4096` depending on the bucket ladder, but a total already above `4096` will not be bucket-padded further.
Larger cap values increase the range over which size classes are collapsed, but also increase worst-case overhead.
- Clean EOF matters in conservative mode
In the default profile, shape padding is intentionally conservative: it is applied on clean relay shutdown, not on every timeout/drip path.
This avoids introducing new timeout-tail artifacts that some backends or tests interpret as a separate fingerprint.
Practical trade-offs:
- Better anti-fingerprinting on size/shape channel.
- Slightly higher egress overhead for small probes due to padding.
- Behavior is intentionally conservative and enabled by default.
Recommended starting profile:
- `mask_shape_hardening = true` (default)
- `mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes = 512`
- `mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes = 4096`
### Aggressive mode notes (`[censorship]`)
`mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode` is an opt-in profile for higher anti-classifier pressure.
- Default is `false` to preserve conservative timeout/no-tail behavior.
- Requires `mask_shape_hardening = true`.
- When enabled, backend-silent non-EOF masking paths may be shaped.
- When enabled together with above-cap blur, the random extra tail uses `[1, max]` instead of `[0, max]`.
What changes when aggressive mode is enabled:
- Backend-silent timeout paths can be shaped
In default mode, a client that keeps the socket half-open and times out will usually not receive shape padding on that path.
In aggressive mode, Telemt may still shape that backend-silent session if no backend bytes were returned.
This is specifically aimed at active probes that try to avoid EOF in order to preserve an exact backend-observed length.
- Above-cap blur always adds at least one byte
In default mode, above-cap blur may choose `0`, so some oversized probes still land on their exact base forwarded length.
In aggressive mode, that exact-base sample is removed by construction.
- Tradeoff
Aggressive mode improves resistance to active length classifiers, but it is more opinionated and less conservative.
If your deployment prioritizes strict compatibility with timeout/no-tail semantics, leave it disabled.
If your threat model includes repeated active probing by a censor, this mode is the stronger profile.
Use this mode only when your threat model prioritizes classifier resistance over strict compatibility with conservative masking semantics.
### Above-cap blur notes (`[censorship]`)
`mask_shape_above_cap_blur` adds a second-stage blur for very large probes that are already above `mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes`.
- A random tail in `[0, mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes]` is appended in default mode.
- In aggressive mode, the random tail becomes strictly positive: `[1, mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes]`.
- This reduces exact-size leakage above cap at bounded overhead.
- Keep `mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes` conservative to avoid unnecessary egress growth.
Operational meaning:
- Without above-cap blur
A probe that forwards `5005` bytes will still look like `5005` bytes to the backend if it is already above cap.
- With above-cap blur enabled
That same probe may look like any value in a bounded window above its base length.
Example with `mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes = 64`:
backend-observed size becomes `5005..5069` in default mode, or `5006..5069` in aggressive mode.
- Choosing `mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes`
Small values reduce cost but preserve more separability between far-apart oversized classes.
Larger values blur oversized classes more aggressively, but add more egress overhead and more output variance.
### Timing normalization envelope notes (`[censorship]`)
`mask_timing_normalization_enabled` smooths timing differences between masking outcomes by applying a target duration envelope.
- A random target is selected in `[mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms, mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms]`.
- Fast paths are delayed up to the selected target.
- Slow paths are not forced to finish by the ceiling (the envelope is best-effort shaping, not truncation).
Recommended starting profile for timing shaping:
- `mask_timing_normalization_enabled = true`
- `mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms = 180`
- `mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms = 320`
If your backend or network is very bandwidth-constrained, reduce cap first. If probes are still too distinguishable in your environment, increase floor gradually.
## [access]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | TOML shape example | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| users | `Map<String, String>` | `{"default": "000…000"}` | Secret must be 32 hex characters. | `[access.users]`<br>`user = "32-hex secret"`<br>`user2 = "32-hex secret"` | User credentials map used for client authentication. |
| user_ad_tags | `Map<String, String>` | `{}` | Every value must be exactly 32 hex characters. | `[access.user_ad_tags]`<br>`user = "32-hex ad_tag"` | Per-user ad tags used as override over `general.ad_tag`. |
| user_max_tcp_conns | `Map<String, usize>` | `{}` | — | `[access.user_max_tcp_conns]`<br>`user = 500` | Per-user maximum concurrent TCP connections. |
| user_expirations | `Map<String, DateTime<Utc>>` | `{}` | Timestamp must be valid RFC3339/ISO-8601 datetime. | `[access.user_expirations]`<br>`user = "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z"` | Per-user account expiration timestamps. |
| user_data_quota | `Map<String, u64>` | `{}` | — | `[access.user_data_quota]`<br>`user = 1073741824` | Per-user traffic quota in bytes. |
| user_max_unique_ips | `Map<String, usize>` | `{}` | — | `[access.user_max_unique_ips]`<br>`user = 16` | Per-user unique source IP limits. |
| user_max_unique_ips_global_each | `usize` | `0` | — | `user_max_unique_ips_global_each = 0` | Global fallback used when `[access.user_max_unique_ips]` has no per-user override. |
| user_max_unique_ips_mode | `"active_window" \| "time_window" \| "combined"` | `"active_window"` | — | `user_max_unique_ips_mode = "active_window"` | Unique source IP limit accounting mode. |
| user_max_unique_ips_window_secs | `u64` | `30` | Must be `> 0`. | `user_max_unique_ips_window_secs = 30` | Window size (seconds) used by unique-IP accounting modes that use time windows. |
| replay_check_len | `usize` | `65536` | — | `replay_check_len = 65536` | Replay-protection storage length. |
| replay_window_secs | `u64` | `1800` | — | `replay_window_secs = 1800` | Replay-protection window in seconds. |
| ignore_time_skew | `bool` | `false` | — | `ignore_time_skew = false` | Disables client/server timestamp skew checks in replay validation when enabled. |
## [[upstreams]]
| Parameter | Type | Default | Constraints / validation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| type | `"direct" \| "socks4" \| "socks5"` | — | Required field. | Upstream transport type selector. |
| weight | `u16` | `1` | none | Base weight used by weighted-random upstream selection. |
| enabled | `bool` | `true` | none | Disabled entries are excluded from upstream selection at runtime. |
| scopes | `String` | `""` | none | Comma-separated scope tags used for request-level upstream filtering. |
| interface | `String \| null` | `null` | Optional; type-specific runtime rules apply. | Optional outbound interface/local bind hint (supported with type-specific rules). |
| bind_addresses | `String[] \| null` | `null` | Applies to `type = "direct"`. | Optional explicit local source bind addresses for `type = "direct"`. |
| address | `String` | — | Required for `type = "socks4"` and `type = "socks5"`. | SOCKS server endpoint (`host:port` or `ip:port`) for SOCKS upstream types. |
| user_id | `String \| null` | `null` | Only for `type = "socks4"`. | SOCKS4 CONNECT user ID (`type = "socks4"` only). |
| username | `String \| null` | `null` | Only for `type = "socks5"`. | SOCKS5 username (`type = "socks5"` only). |
| password | `String \| null` | `null` | Only for `type = "socks5"`. | SOCKS5 password (`type = "socks5"` only). |
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## How to set up "proxy sponsor" channel and statistics via @MTProxybot bot
## How to set up a "proxy sponsor" channel and statistics via the @MTProxybot
1. Go to @MTProxybot bot.
2. Enter the command `/newproxy`
3. Send the server IP and port. For example: 1.2.3.4:443
4. Open the config `nano /etc/telemt.toml`.
5. Copy and send the user secret from the [access.users] section to the bot.
6. Copy the tag received from the bot. For example 1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef.
1. Go to the @MTProxybot.
2. Enter the `/newproxy` command.
3. Send your server's IP address and port. For example: `1.2.3.4:443`.
4. Open the configuration file: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
5. Copy and send the user secret from the `[access.users]` section to the bot.
6. Copy the tag provided by the bot. For example: `1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef`.
> [!WARNING]
> The link provided by the bot will not work. Do not copy or use it!
7. Uncomment the ad_tag parameter and enter the tag received from the bot.
8. Uncomment/add the parameter `use_middle_proxy = true`.
7. Uncomment the `ad_tag` parameter and enter the tag received from the bot.
8. Uncomment or add the `use_middle_proxy = true` parameter.
Config example:
Configuration example:
```toml
[general]
ad_tag = "1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef"
use_middle_proxy = true
```
9. Save the config. Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X.
10. Restart telemt `systemctl restart telemt`.
11. In the bot, send the command /myproxies and select the added server.
9. Save the changes (in nano: Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X).
10. Restart the telemt service: `systemctl restart telemt`.
11. Send the `/myproxies` command to the bot and select the added server.
12. Click the "Set promotion" button.
13. Send a **public link** to the channel. Private channels cannot be added!
14. Wait approximately 1 hour for the information to update on Telegram servers.
14. Wait for about 1 hour for the information to update on Telegram servers.
> [!WARNING]
> You will not see the "proxy sponsor" if you are already subscribed to the channel.
> The sponsored channel will not be displayed to you if you are already subscribed to it.
**You can also set up different channels for different users.**
**You can also configure different sponsored channels for different users:**
```toml
[access.user_ad_tags]
hello = "ad_tag"
hello2 = "ad_tag2"
```
## How many people can use 1 link
## Why do you need a middle proxy (ME)
https://github.com/telemt/telemt/discussions/167
By default, 1 link can be used by any number of people.
You can limit the number of IPs using the proxy.
## How many people can use one link
By default, an unlimited number of people can use a single link.
However, you can limit the number of unique IP addresses for each user:
```toml
[access.user_max_unique_ips]
hello = 1
```
This parameter limits how many unique IPs can use 1 link simultaneously. If one user disconnects, a second user can connect. Also, multiple users can sit behind the same IP.
This parameter sets the maximum number of unique IP addresses from which a single link can be used simultaneously. If the first user disconnects, a second one can connect. At the same time, multiple users can connect from a single IP address simultaneously (for example, devices on the same Wi-Fi network).
## How to create multiple different links
1. Generate the required number of secrets `openssl rand -hex 16`
2. Open the config `nano /etc/telemt.toml`
3. Add new users.
1. Generate the required number of secrets using the command: `openssl rand -hex 16`.
2. Open the configuration file: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
3. Add new users to the `[access.users]` section:
```toml
[access.users]
user1 = "00000000000000000000000000000001"
user2 = "00000000000000000000000000000002"
user3 = "00000000000000000000000000000003"
```
4. Save the config. Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X. You don't need to restart telemt.
5. Get the links via
4. Save the configuration (Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X). There is no need to restart the telemt service.
5. Get the ready-to-use links using the command:
```bash
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9091/v1/users | jq
```
## "Unknown TLS SNI" error
Usually, this error occurs if you have changed the `tls_domain` parameter, but users continue to connect using old links with the previous domain.
If you need to allow connections with any domains (ignoring SNI mismatches), add the following parameters:
```toml
[censorship]
unknown_sni_action = "mask"
```
## How to view metrics
1. Open the config `nano /etc/telemt.toml`
2. Add the following parameters
1. Open the configuration file: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
2. Add the following parameters:
```toml
[server]
metrics_port = 9090
metrics_whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128", "0.0.0.0/0"]
```
3. Save the config. Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X.
4. Metrics are available at SERVER_IP:9090/metrics.
3. Save the changes (Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X).
4. After that, metrics will be available at: `SERVER_IP:9090/metrics`.
> [!WARNING]
> "0.0.0.0/0" in metrics_whitelist opens access from any IP. Replace with your own IP. For example "1.2.3.4"
> The value `"0.0.0.0/0"` in `metrics_whitelist` opens access to metrics from any IP address. It is recommended to replace it with your personal IP, for example: `"1.2.3.4/32"`.
## Additional parameters
### Domain in link instead of IP
To specify a domain in the links, add to the `[general.links]` section of the config file.
### Domain in the link instead of IP
To display a domain instead of an IP address in the connection links, add the following lines to the configuration file:
```toml
[general.links]
public_host = "proxy.example.com"
```
### Server connection limit
Limits the total number of open connections to the server:
### Total server connection limit
This parameter limits the total number of active connections to the server:
```toml
[server]
max_connections = 10000 # 0 - unlimited, 10000 - default
```
### Upstream Manager
To specify an upstream, add to the `[[upstreams]]` section of the config.toml file:
#### Binding to IP
To configure outbound connections (upstreams), add the corresponding parameters to the `[[upstreams]]` section of the configuration file:
#### Binding to an outbound IP address
```toml
[[upstreams]]
type = "direct"
weight = 1
enabled = true
interface = "192.168.1.100" # Change to your outgoing IP
interface = "192.168.1.100" # Replace with your outbound IP
```
#### SOCKS4/5 as Upstream
- Without authentication:
#### Using SOCKS4/5 as an Upstream
- Without authorization:
```toml
[[upstreams]]
type = "socks5" # Specify SOCKS4 or SOCKS5
@@ -110,7 +125,7 @@ weight = 1 # Set Weight for Scenarios
enabled = true
```
- With authentication:
- With authorization:
```toml
[[upstreams]]
type = "socks5" # Specify SOCKS4 or SOCKS5
@@ -120,3 +135,17 @@ password = "pass" # Password for Auth on SOCKS-server
weight = 1 # Set Weight for Scenarios
enabled = true
```
#### Using Shadowsocks as an Upstream
For this method to work, the `use_middle_proxy = false` parameter must be set.
```toml
[general]
use_middle_proxy = false
[[upstreams]]
type = "shadowsocks"
url = "ss://2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm:BASE64_KEY@1.2.3.4:8388"
weight = 1
enabled = true
```
+68 -40
View File
@@ -1,106 +1,121 @@
## Как настроить канал "спонсор прокси" и статистику через бота @MTProxybot
1. Зайти в бота @MTProxybot.
2. Ввести команду `/newproxy`
3. Отправить IP и порт сервера. Например: 1.2.3.4:443
4. Открыть конфиг `nano /etc/telemt.toml`.
5. Скопировать и отправить боту секрет пользователя из раздела [access.users].
6. Скопировать полученный tag у бота. Например 1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef.
1. Зайдите в бота @MTProxybot.
2. Введите команду `/newproxy`.
3. Отправьте IP-адрес и порт сервера. Например: `1.2.3.4:443`.
4. Откройте файл конфигурации: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
5. Скопируйте и отправьте боту секрет пользователя из раздела `[access.users]`.
6. Скопируйте тег (tag), который выдаст бот. Например: `1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef`.
> [!WARNING]
> Ссылка, которую выдает бот, не будет работать. Не копируйте и не используйте её!
7. Раскомментировать параметр ad_tag и вписать tag, полученный у бота.
8. Раскомментировать/добавить параметр use_middle_proxy = true.
> Ссылка, которую выдает бот, работать не будет. Не копируйте и не используйте её!
7. Раскомментируйте параметр `ad_tag` и впишите тег, полученный от бота.
8. Раскомментируйте или добавьте параметр `use_middle_proxy = true`.
Пример конфига:
Пример конфигурации:
```toml
[general]
ad_tag = "1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef"
use_middle_proxy = true
```
9. Сохранить конфиг. Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X.
10. Перезапустить telemt `systemctl restart telemt`.
11. В боте отправить команду /myproxies и выбрать добавленный сервер.
12. Нажать кнопку "Set promotion".
13. Отправить **публичную ссылку** на канал. Приватный канал добавить нельзя!
14. Подождать примерно 1 час, пока информация обновится на серверах Telegram.
9. Сохраните изменения (в nano: Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X).
10. Перезапустите службу telemt: `systemctl restart telemt`.
11. В боте отправьте команду `/myproxies` и выберите добавленный сервер.
12. Нажмите кнопку «Set promotion».
13. Отправьте **публичную ссылку** на канал. Приватные каналы добавлять нельзя!
14. Подождите примерно 1 час, пока информация обновится на серверах Telegram.
> [!WARNING]
> У вас не будет отображаться "спонсор прокси" если вы уже подписаны на канал.
> Спонсорский канал не будет у вас отображаться, если вы уже на него подписаны.
**Также вы можете настроить разные каналы для разных пользователей.**
**Вы также можете настроить разные спонсорские каналы для разных пользователей:**
```toml
[access.user_ad_tags]
hello = "ad_tag"
hello2 = "ad_tag2"
```
## Сколько человек может пользоваться 1 ссылкой
## Зачем нужен middle proxy (ME)
https://github.com/telemt/telemt/discussions/167
По умолчанию 1 ссылкой может пользоваться сколько угодно человек.
Вы можете ограничить число IP, использующих прокси.
## Сколько человек может пользоваться одной ссылкой
По умолчанию одной ссылкой может пользоваться неограниченное число людей.
Однако вы можете ограничить количество уникальных IP-адресов для каждого пользователя:
```toml
[access.user_max_unique_ips]
hello = 1
```
Этот параметр ограничивает, сколько уникальных IP может использовать 1 ссылку одновременно. Если один пользователь отключится, второй сможет подключиться. Также с одного IP может сидеть несколько пользователей.
Этот параметр задает максимальное количество уникальных IP-адресов, с которых можно одновременно использовать одну ссылку. Если первый пользователь отключится, второй сможет подключиться. При этом с одного IP-адреса могут подключаться несколько пользователей одновременно (например, устройства в одной Wi-Fi сети).
## Как сделать несколько разных ссылок
## Как создать несколько разных ссылок
1. Сгенерируйте нужное число секретов `openssl rand -hex 16`
2. Открыть конфиг `nano /etc/telemt.toml`
3. Добавить новых пользователей.
1. Сгенерируйте необходимое количество секретов с помощью команды: `openssl rand -hex 16`.
2. Откройте файл конфигурации: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
3. Добавьте новых пользователей в секцию `[access.users]`:
```toml
[access.users]
user1 = "00000000000000000000000000000001"
user2 = "00000000000000000000000000000002"
user3 = "00000000000000000000000000000003"
```
4. Сохранить конфиг. Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X. Перезапускать telemt не нужно.
5. Получить ссылки через
4. Сохраните конфигурацию (Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X). Перезапускать службу telemt не нужно.
5. Получите готовые ссылки с помощью команды:
```bash
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9091/v1/users | jq
```
## Ошибка "Unknown TLS SNI"
Обычно эта ошибка возникает, если вы изменили параметр `tls_domain`, но пользователи продолжают подключаться по старым ссылкам с прежним доменом.
Если необходимо разрешить подключение с любыми доменами (игнорируя несовпадения SNI), добавьте следующие параметры:
```toml
[censorship]
unknown_sni_action = "mask"
```
## Как посмотреть метрики
1. Открыть конфиг `nano /etc/telemt.toml`
2. Добавить следующие параметры
1. Откройте файл конфигурации: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
2. Добавьте следующие параметры:
```toml
[server]
metrics_port = 9090
metrics_whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128", "0.0.0.0/0"]
```
3. Сохранить конфиг. Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X.
4. Метрики доступны по адресу SERVER_IP:9090/metrics.
3. Сохраните изменения (Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X).
4. После этого метрики будут доступны по адресу: `SERVER_IP:9090/metrics`.
> [!WARNING]
> "0.0.0.0/0" в metrics_whitelist открывает доступ с любого IP. Замените на свой ip. Например "1.2.3.4"
> Значение `"0.0.0.0/0"` в `metrics_whitelist` открывает доступ к метрикам с любого IP-адреса. Рекомендуется заменить его на ваш личный IP, например: `"1.2.3.4/32"`.
## Дополнительные параметры
### Домен в ссылке вместо IP
Чтобы указать домен в ссылках, добавьте в секцию `[general.links]` файла config.
Чтобы в ссылках для подключения отображался домен вместо IP-адреса, добавьте следующие строки в файл конфигурации:
```toml
[general.links]
public_host = "proxy.example.com"
```
### Общий лимит подключений к серверу
Ограничивает общее число открытых подключений к серверу:
Этот параметр ограничивает общее количество активных подключений к серверу:
```toml
[server]
max_connections = 10000 # 0 - unlimited, 10000 - default
max_connections = 10000 # 0 - без ограничений, 10000 - по умолчанию
```
### Upstream Manager
Чтобы указать апстрим, добавьте в секцию `[[upstreams]]` файла config.toml:
#### Привязка к IP
Для настройки исходящих подключений (апстримов) добавьте соответствующие параметры в секцию `[[upstreams]]` файла конфигурации:
#### Привязка к исходящему IP-адресу
```toml
[[upstreams]]
type = "direct"
weight = 1
enabled = true
interface = "192.168.1.100" # Change to your outgoing IP
interface = "192.168.1.100" # Замените на ваш исходящий IP
```
#### SOCKS4/5 как Upstream
#### Использование SOCKS4/5 в качестве Upstream
- Без авторизации:
```toml
[[upstreams]]
@@ -121,3 +136,16 @@ weight = 1 # Set Weight for Scenarios
enabled = true
```
#### Использование Shadowsocks в качестве Upstream
Для работы этого метода требуется установить параметр `use_middle_proxy = false`.
```toml
[general]
use_middle_proxy = false
[[upstreams]]
type = "shadowsocks"
url = "ss://2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm:BASE64_KEY@1.2.3.4:8388"
weight = 1
enabled = true
```
+15 -9
View File
@@ -27,12 +27,12 @@ chmod +x /bin/telemt
**0. Check port and generate secrets**
The port you have selected for use should be MISSING from the list, when:
The port you have selected for use should not be in the list:
```bash
netstat -lnp
```
Generate 16 bytes/32 characters HEX with OpenSSL or another way:
Generate 16 bytes/32 characters in HEX format with OpenSSL or another way:
```bash
openssl rand -hex 16
```
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Save the obtained result somewhere. You will need it later!
**1. Place your config to /etc/telemt/telemt.toml**
Create config directory:
Create the config directory:
```bash
mkdir /etc/telemt
```
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Open nano
```bash
nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml
```
paste your config
Insert your configuration:
```toml
# === General Settings ===
@@ -93,8 +93,9 @@ hello = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
then Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X to save
> [!WARNING]
> Replace the value of the hello parameter with the value you obtained in step 0.
> Replace the value of the tls_domain parameter with another website.
> Replace the value of the hello parameter with the value you obtained in step 0.
> Additionally, change the value of the tls_domain parameter to a different website.
> Changing the tls_domain parameter will break all links that use the old domain!
---
@@ -105,14 +106,14 @@ useradd -d /opt/telemt -m -r -U telemt
chown -R telemt:telemt /etc/telemt
```
**3. Create service on /etc/systemd/system/telemt.service**
**3. Create service in /etc/systemd/system/telemt.service**
Open nano
```bash
nano /etc/systemd/system/telemt.service
```
paste this Systemd Module
Insert this Systemd module:
```bash
[Unit]
Description=Telemt
@@ -147,13 +148,16 @@ systemctl daemon-reload
**6.** For automatic startup at system boot, enter `systemctl enable telemt`
**7.** To get the link(s), enter
**7.** To get the link(s), enter:
```bash
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9091/v1/users | jq
```
> Any number of people can use one link.
> [!WARNING]
> Only the command from step 7 can provide a working link. Do not try to create it yourself or copy it from anywhere if you are not sure what you are doing!
---
# Telemt via Docker Compose
@@ -181,6 +185,8 @@ docker compose down
docker build -t telemt:local .
docker run --name telemt --restart unless-stopped \
-p 443:443 \
-p 9090:9090 \
-p 9091:9091 \
-e RUST_LOG=info \
-v "$PWD/config.toml:/app/config.toml:ro" \
--read-only \
+4 -1
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ hello = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
> [!WARNING]
> Замените значение параметра hello на значение, которое вы получили в пункте 0.
> Так же замените значение параметра tls_domain на другой сайт.
> Изменение параметра tls_domain сделает нерабочими все ссылки, использующие старый домен!
---
@@ -178,11 +179,13 @@ docker compose down
> - По умолчанию публикуются порты 443:443, а контейнер запускается со сброшенными привилегиями (добавлена только `NET_BIND_SERVICE`)
> - Если вам действительно нужна сеть хоста (обычно это требуется только для некоторых конфигураций IPv6), раскомментируйте `network_mode: host`
**Запуск в Docker Compose**
**Запуск без Docker Compose**
```bash
docker build -t telemt:local .
docker run --name telemt --restart unless-stopped \
-p 443:443 \
-p 9090:9090 \
-p 9091:9091 \
-e RUST_LOG=info \
-v "$PWD/config.toml:/app/config.toml:ro" \
--read-only \
+18 -2
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Die unten angegebenen `Default`-Werte sind Code-Defaults (bei fehlendem Schlüss
| Feld | Gilt für | Typ | Pflicht | Default | Bedeutung |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `[[upstreams]].type` | alle Upstreams | `"direct" \| "socks4" \| "socks5"` | ja | n/a | Upstream-Transporttyp. |
| `[[upstreams]].type` | alle Upstreams | `"direct" \| "socks4" \| "socks5" \| "shadowsocks"` | ja | n/a | Upstream-Transporttyp. |
| `[[upstreams]].weight` | alle Upstreams | `u16` | nein | `1` | Basisgewicht für weighted-random Auswahl. |
| `[[upstreams]].enabled` | alle Upstreams | `bool` | nein | `true` | Deaktivierte Einträge werden beim Start ignoriert. |
| `[[upstreams]].scopes` | alle Upstreams | `String` | nein | `""` | Komma-separierte Scope-Tags für Request-Routing. |
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ Die unten angegebenen `Default`-Werte sind Code-Defaults (bei fehlendem Schlüss
| `interface` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | nein | `null` | Wird nur genutzt, wenn `address` als `ip:port` angegeben ist. |
| `username` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | nein | `null` | SOCKS5 Benutzername. |
| `password` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | nein | `null` | SOCKS5 Passwort. |
| `url` | `shadowsocks` | `String` | ja | n/a | Shadowsocks-SIP002-URL (`ss://...`). In Runtime-APIs wird nur `host:port` offengelegt. |
| `interface` | `shadowsocks` | `Option<String>` | nein | `null` | Optionales ausgehendes Bind-Interface oder lokale Literal-IP. |
### Runtime-Regeln (wichtig)
@@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ Die unten angegebenen `Default`-Werte sind Code-Defaults (bei fehlendem Schlüss
8. Im ME-Modus wird der gewählte Upstream auch für den ME-TCP-Dial-Pfad verwendet.
9. Im ME-Modus ist bei `direct` mit bind/interface die STUN-Reflection bind-aware für KDF-Adressmaterial.
10. Im ME-Modus werden bei SOCKS-Upstream `BND.ADDR/BND.PORT` für KDF verwendet, wenn gültig/öffentlich und gleiche IP-Familie.
11. `shadowsocks`-Upstreams erfordern `general.use_middle_proxy = false`. Mit aktiviertem ME-Modus schlägt das Laden der Config sofort fehl.
## Upstream-Konfigurationsbeispiele
@@ -150,7 +153,20 @@ weight = 2
enabled = true
```
### Beispiel 4: Gemischte Upstreams mit Scopes
### Beispiel 4: Shadowsocks-Upstream
```toml
[general]
use_middle_proxy = false
[[upstreams]]
type = "shadowsocks"
url = "ss://2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm:BASE64_KEY@198.51.100.50:8388"
weight = 2
enabled = true
```
### Beispiel 5: Gemischte Upstreams mit Scopes
```toml
[[upstreams]]
+18 -2
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ Defaults below are code defaults (used when a key is omitted), not necessarily v
| Field | Applies to | Type | Required | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `[[upstreams]].type` | all upstreams | `"direct" \| "socks4" \| "socks5"` | yes | n/a | Upstream transport type. |
| `[[upstreams]].type` | all upstreams | `"direct" \| "socks4" \| "socks5" \| "shadowsocks"` | yes | n/a | Upstream transport type. |
| `[[upstreams]].weight` | all upstreams | `u16` | no | `1` | Base weight for weighted-random selection. |
| `[[upstreams]].enabled` | all upstreams | `bool` | no | `true` | Disabled entries are ignored at startup. |
| `[[upstreams]].scopes` | all upstreams | `String` | no | `""` | Comma-separated scope tags for request-level routing. |
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ Defaults below are code defaults (used when a key is omitted), not necessarily v
| `interface` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | no | `null` | Used only for SOCKS server `ip:port` dial path. |
| `username` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | no | `null` | SOCKS5 username auth. |
| `password` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | no | `null` | SOCKS5 password auth. |
| `url` | `shadowsocks` | `String` | yes | n/a | Shadowsocks SIP002 URL (`ss://...`). Only `host:port` is exposed in runtime APIs. |
| `interface` | `shadowsocks` | `Option<String>` | no | `null` | Optional outgoing bind interface or literal local IP. |
### Runtime rules (important)
@@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ Defaults below are code defaults (used when a key is omitted), not necessarily v
8. In ME mode, the selected upstream is also used for ME TCP dial path.
9. In ME mode for `direct` upstream with bind/interface, STUN reflection logic is bind-aware for KDF source material.
10. In ME mode for SOCKS upstream, SOCKS `BND.ADDR/BND.PORT` is used for KDF when it is valid/public for the same family.
11. `shadowsocks` upstreams require `general.use_middle_proxy = false`. Config load fails fast if ME mode is enabled.
## Upstream Configuration Examples
@@ -150,7 +153,20 @@ weight = 2
enabled = true
```
### Example 4: Mixed upstreams with scopes
### Example 4: Shadowsocks upstream
```toml
[general]
use_middle_proxy = false
[[upstreams]]
type = "shadowsocks"
url = "ss://2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm:BASE64_KEY@198.51.100.50:8388"
weight = 2
enabled = true
```
### Example 5: Mixed upstreams with scopes
```toml
[[upstreams]]
+18 -2
View File
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
| Поле | Применимость | Тип | Обязательно | Default | Назначение |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `[[upstreams]].type` | все upstream | `"direct" \| "socks4" \| "socks5"` | да | n/a | Тип upstream транспорта. |
| `[[upstreams]].type` | все upstream | `"direct" \| "socks4" \| "socks5" \| "shadowsocks"` | да | n/a | Тип upstream транспорта. |
| `[[upstreams]].weight` | все upstream | `u16` | нет | `1` | Базовый вес в weighted-random выборе. |
| `[[upstreams]].enabled` | все upstream | `bool` | нет | `true` | Выключенные записи игнорируются на старте. |
| `[[upstreams]].scopes` | все upstream | `String` | нет | `""` | Список scope-токенов через запятую для маршрутизации. |
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@
| `interface` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | нет | `null` | Используется только если `address` задан как `ip:port`. |
| `username` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | нет | `null` | Логин SOCKS5 auth. |
| `password` | `socks5` | `Option<String>` | нет | `null` | Пароль SOCKS5 auth. |
| `url` | `shadowsocks` | `String` | да | n/a | Shadowsocks SIP002 URL (`ss://...`). В runtime API раскрывается только `host:port`. |
| `interface` | `shadowsocks` | `Option<String>` | нет | `null` | Необязательный исходящий bind-интерфейс или literal локальный IP. |
### Runtime-правила
@@ -115,6 +117,7 @@
8. В ME-режиме выбранный upstream также используется для ME TCP dial path.
9. В ME-режиме для `direct` upstream с bind/interface STUN-рефлексия выполняется bind-aware для KDF материала.
10. В ME-режиме для SOCKS upstream используются `BND.ADDR/BND.PORT` для KDF, если адрес валиден/публичен и соответствует IP family.
11. `shadowsocks` upstream требует `general.use_middle_proxy = false`. При включенном ME-режиме конфиг отклоняется при загрузке.
## Примеры конфигурации Upstreams
@@ -150,7 +153,20 @@ weight = 2
enabled = true
```
### Пример 4: смешанные upstream с scopes
### Пример 4: Shadowsocks upstream
```toml
[general]
use_middle_proxy = false
[[upstreams]]
type = "shadowsocks"
url = "ss://2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm:BASE64_KEY@198.51.100.50:8388"
weight = 2
enabled = true
```
### Пример 5: смешанные upstream с scopes
```toml
[[upstreams]]
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@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
<img src="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/avbor/1f8a128e628f47249aae6e058a57610b/raw/19013276c035e91058e0a9799ab145f8e70e3ff5/scheme.svg">
## Concept
- **Server A** (__conditionally Russian Federation_):\
Entry point, receives Telegram proxy user traffic via **HAProxy** (port `443`)\
and sends it to the tunnel to Server **B**.\
Internal IP in the tunnel — `10.10.10.2`\
Port for HAProxy clients — `443\tcp`
- **Server B** (_conditionally Netherlands_):\
Exit point, runs **telemt** and accepts client connections through Server **A**.\
The server must have unrestricted access to Telegram servers.\
Internal IP in the tunnel — `10.10.10.1`\
AmneziaWG port — `8443\udp`\
Port for telemt clients — `443\tcp`
---
## Step 1. Setting up the AmneziaWG tunnel (A <-> B)
[AmneziaWG](https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-linux-kernel-module) must be installed on all servers.\
All following commands are given for **Ubuntu 24.04**.\
For RHEL-based distributions, installation instructions are available at the link above.
### Installing AmneziaWG (Servers A and B)
The following steps must be performed on each server:
#### 1. Adding the AmneziaWG repository and installing required packages:
```bash
sudo apt install -y software-properties-common python3-launchpadlib gnupg2 linux-headers-$(uname -r) && \
sudo add-apt-repository ppa:amnezia/ppa && \
sudo apt-get install -y amneziawg
```
#### 2. Generating a unique key pair:
```bash
cd /etc/amnezia/amneziawg && \
awg genkey | tee private.key | awg pubkey > public.key
```
As a result, you will get two files in the `/etc/amnezia/amneziawg` folder:\
`private.key` - private, and\
`public.key` - public server keys
#### 3. Configuring network interfaces:
Obfuscation parameters `S1`, `S2`, `H1`, `H2`, `H3`, `H4` must be strictly identical on both servers.\
Parameters `Jc`, `Jmin` and `Jmax` can differ.\
Parameters `I1-I5` ([Custom Protocol Signature](https://docs.amnezia.org/documentation/amnezia-wg/)) must be specified on the client side (Server **A**).
Recommendations for choosing values:
```text
Jc — 1 ≤ Jc ≤ 128; from 4 to 12 inclusive
Jmin — Jmax > Jmin < 1280*; recommended 8
Jmax — Jmin < Jmax ≤ 1280*; recommended 80
S1 — S1 ≤ 1132* (1280* - 148 = 1132); S1 + 56 ≠ S2;
recommended range from 15 to 150 inclusive
S2 — S2 ≤ 1188* (1280* - 92 = 1188);
recommended range from 15 to 150 inclusive
H1/H2/H3/H4 — must be unique and differ from each other;
recommended range from 5 to 2147483647 inclusive
* It is assumed that the Internet connection has an MTU of 1280.
```
> [!IMPORTANT]
> It is recommended to use your own, unique values.\
> You can use the [generator](https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://gist.githubusercontent.com/avbor/955782b5c37b06240b243aa375baeac5/raw/13f5517ca473b47c412b9a99407066de973732bd/awg-gen.html) to select parameters.
#### Server B Configuration (Netherlands):
Create the interface configuration file (`awg0`)
```bash
nano /etc/amnezia/amneziawg/awg0.conf
```
File content
```ini
[Interface]
Address = 10.10.10.1/24
ListenPort = 8443
PrivateKey = <PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_B>
SaveConfig = true
Jc = 4
Jmin = 8
Jmax = 80
S1 = 29
S2 = 15
S3 = 18
S4 = 0
H1 = 2087563914
H2 = 188817757
H3 = 101784570
H4 = 432174303
[Peer]
PublicKey = <PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_A>
AllowedIPs = 10.10.10.2/32
```
`ListenPort` - the port on which the server will wait for connections, you can choose any free one.\
`<PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_B>` - the content of the `private.key` file from Server **B**.\
`<PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_A>` - the content of the `public.key` file from Server **A**.
Open the port on the firewall (if enabled):
```bash
sudo ufw allow from <PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_A> to any port 8443 proto udp
```
`<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_A>` - the external IP address of Server **A**.
#### Server A Configuration (Russian Federation):
Create the interface configuration file (awg0)
```bash
nano /etc/amnezia/amneziawg/awg0.conf
```
File content
```ini
[Interface]
Address = 10.10.10.2/24
PrivateKey = <PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_A>
Jc = 4
Jmin = 8
Jmax = 80
S1 = 29
S2 = 15
S3 = 18
S4 = 0
H1 = 2087563914
H2 = 188817757
H3 = 101784570
H4 = 432174303
I1 = <b 0xc10000000108981eba846e21f74e00>
I2 = <b 0xc20000000108981eba846e21f74e00>
I3 = <b 0xc30000000108981eba846e21f74e00>
I4 = <b 0x43981eba846e21f74e>
I5 = <b 0x43981eba846e21f74e>
[Peer]
PublicKey = <PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_B>
Endpoint = <PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>:8443
AllowedIPs = 10.10.10.1/32
PersistentKeepalive = 25
```
`<PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_A>` - the content of the `private.key` file from Server **A**.\
`<PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_B>` - the content of the `public.key` file from Server **B**.\
`<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>` - the public IP address of Server **B**.
Enable the tunnel on both servers:
```bash
sudo systemctl enable --now awg-quick@awg0
```
Make sure Server B is accessible from Server A through the tunnel.
```bash
ping 10.10.10.1
PING 10.10.10.1 (10.10.10.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.10.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=35.1 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.10.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=35.0 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.10.1: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=35.1 ms
^C
```
---
## Step 2. Installing telemt on Server B (conditionally Netherlands)
Installation and configuration are described [here](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md) or [here](https://gitlab.com/An0nX/telemt-docker#-quick-start-docker-compose).\
It is assumed that telemt expects connections on port `443\tcp`.
In the telemt config, you must enable the `Proxy` protocol and restrict connections to it only through the tunnel.
```toml
[server]
port = 443
listen_addr_ipv4 = "10.10.10.1"
proxy_protocol = true
```
Also, for correct link generation, specify the FQDN or IP address and port of Server `A`
```toml
[general.links]
show = "*"
public_host = "<FQDN_OR_IP_SERVER_A>"
public_port = 443
```
Open the port on the firewall (if enabled):
```bash
sudo ufw allow from 10.10.10.2 to any port 443 proto tcp
```
---
## Step 3. Configuring HAProxy on Server A (Russian Federation)
Since the version in the standard Ubuntu repository is relatively old, it makes sense to use the official Docker image.\
[Instructions](https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/ubuntu/) for installing Docker on Ubuntu.
> [!WARNING]
> By default, regular users do not have rights to use ports < 1024.
> Attempts to run HAProxy on port 443 can lead to errors:
> ```
> [ALERT] (8) : Binding [/usr/local/etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg:17] for frontend tcp_in_443:
> protocol tcpv4: cannot bind socket (Permission denied) for [0.0.0.0:443].
> ```
> There are two simple ways to bypass this restriction, choose one:
> 1. At the OS level, change the net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start setting to allow users to use all ports:
> ```
> echo "net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start = 0" | sudo tee -a /etc/sysctl.conf && sudo sysctl -p
> ```
> or
>
> 2. Run HAProxy as root:
> Uncomment the `user: "root"` parameter in docker-compose.yaml.
#### Create a folder for HAProxy:
```bash
mkdir -p /opt/docker-compose/haproxy && cd $_
```
#### Create the docker-compose.yaml file
`nano docker-compose.yaml`
File content
```yaml
services:
haproxy:
image: haproxy:latest
container_name: haproxy
restart: unless-stopped
# user: "root"
network_mode: "host"
volumes:
- ./haproxy.cfg:/usr/local/etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg:ro
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "1m"
max-file: "1"
```
#### Create the haproxy.cfg config file
Accept connections on port 443\tcp and send them through the tunnel to Server `B` 10.10.10.1:443
`nano haproxy.cfg`
File content
```haproxy
global
log stdout format raw local0
maxconn 10000
defaults
log global
mode tcp
option tcplog
option clitcpka
option srvtcpka
timeout connect 5s
timeout client 2h
timeout server 2h
timeout check 5s
frontend tcp_in_443
bind *:443
maxconn 8000
option tcp-smart-accept
default_backend telemt_nodes
backend telemt_nodes
option tcp-smart-connect
server server_a 10.10.10.1:443 check inter 5s rise 2 fall 3 send-proxy-v2
```
> [!WARNING]
> **The file must end with an empty line, otherwise HAProxy will not start!**
#### Allow port 443\tcp in the firewall (if enabled)
```bash
sudo ufw allow 443/tcp
```
#### Start the HAProxy container
```bash
docker compose up -d
```
If everything is configured correctly, you can now try connecting Telegram clients using links from the telemt log\api.
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<img src="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/avbor/1f8a128e628f47249aae6e058a57610b/raw/19013276c035e91058e0a9799ab145f8e70e3ff5/scheme.svg">
## Концепция
- **Сервер A** (_РФ_):\
Точка входа, принимает трафик пользователей Telegram-прокси через **HAProxy** (порт `443`)\
и отправляет в туннель на Сервер **B**.\
Внутренний IP в туннеле — `10.10.10.2`\
Порт для клиентов HAProxy — `443\tcp`
- **Сервер B** (_условно Нидерланды_):\
Точка выхода, на нем работает **telemt** и принимает подключения клиентов через Сервер **A**.\
На сервере должен быть неограниченный доступ до серверов Telegram.\
Внутренний IP в туннеле — `10.10.10.1`\
Порт AmneziaWG — `8443\udp`\
Порт для клиентов telemt — `443\tcp`
---
## Шаг 1. Настройка туннеля AmneziaWG (A <-> B)
На всех серверах необходимо установить [amneziawg](https://github.com/amnezia-vpn/amneziawg-linux-kernel-module).\
Далее все команды даны для **Ununtu 24.04**.\
Для RHEL-based дистрибутивов инструкция по установке есть по ссылке выше.
### Установка AmneziaWG (Сервера A и B)
На каждом из серверов необходимо выполнить следующие шаги:
#### 1. Добавление репозитория AmneziaWG и установка необходимых пакетов:
```bash
sudo apt install -y software-properties-common python3-launchpadlib gnupg2 linux-headers-$(uname -r) && \
sudo add-apt-repository ppa:amnezia/ppa && \
sudo apt-get install -y amneziawg
```
#### 2. Генерация уникальной пары ключей:
```bash
cd /etc/amnezia/amneziawg && \
awg genkey | tee private.key | awg pubkey > public.key
```
В результате вы получите в папке `/etc/amnezia/amneziawg` два файла:\
`private.key` - приватный и\
`public.key` - публичный ключи сервера
#### 3. Настройка сетевых интерфейсов:
Параметры обфускации `S1`, `S2`, `H1`, `H2`, `H3`, `H4` должны быть строго идентичными на обоих серверах.\
Параметры `Jc`, `Jmin` и `Jmax` могут отличатся.\
Параметры `I1-I5` ([Custom Protocol Signature](https://docs.amnezia.org/documentation/amnezia-wg/)) нужно указывать на стороне _клиента_ (Сервер **А**).
Рекомендации по выбору значений:
```text
Jc — 1 ≤ Jc ≤ 128; от 4 до 12 включительно
Jmin — Jmax > Jmin < 1280*; рекомендовано 8
Jmax — Jmin < Jmax ≤ 1280*; рекомендовано 80
S1 — S1 ≤ 1132* (1280* - 148 = 1132); S1 + 56 ≠ S2;
рекомендованный диапазон от 15 до 150 включительно
S2 — S2 ≤ 1188* (1280* - 92 = 1188);
рекомендованный диапазон от 15 до 150 включительно
H1/H2/H3/H4 — должны быть уникальны и отличаться друг от друга;
рекомендованный диапазон от 5 до 2147483647 включительно
* Предполагается, что подключение к Интернету имеет MTU 1280.
```
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Рекомендуется использовать собственные, уникальные значения.\
> Для выбора параметров можете воспользоваться [генератором](https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://gist.githubusercontent.com/avbor/955782b5c37b06240b243aa375baeac5/raw/13f5517ca473b47c412b9a99407066de973732bd/awg-gen.html).
#### Конфигурация Сервера B (_Нидерланды_):
Создаем файл конфигурации интерфейса (`awg0`)
```bash
nano /etc/amnezia/amneziawg/awg0.conf
```
Содержимое файла
```ini
[Interface]
Address = 10.10.10.1/24
ListenPort = 8443
PrivateKey = <PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_B>
SaveConfig = true
Jc = 4
Jmin = 8
Jmax = 80
S1 = 29
S2 = 15
S3 = 18
S4 = 0
H1 = 2087563914
H2 = 188817757
H3 = 101784570
H4 = 432174303
[Peer]
PublicKey = <PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_A>
AllowedIPs = 10.10.10.2/32
```
`ListenPort` - порт, на котором сервер будет ждать подключения, можете выбрать любой свободный.\
`<PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_B>` - содержимое файла `private.key` с сервера **B**.\
`<PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_A>` - содержимое файла `public.key` с сервера **A**.
Открываем порт на фаерволе (если включен):
```bash
sudo ufw allow from <PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_A> to any port 8443 proto udp
```
`<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_A>` - внешний IP адрес Сервера **A**.
#### Конфигурация Сервера A (_РФ_):
Создаем файл конфигурации интерфейса (`awg0`)
```bash
nano /etc/amnezia/amneziawg/awg0.conf
```
Содержимое файла
```ini
[Interface]
Address = 10.10.10.2/24
PrivateKey = <PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_A>
Jc = 4
Jmin = 8
Jmax = 80
S1 = 29
S2 = 15
S3 = 18
S4 = 0
H1 = 2087563914
H2 = 188817757
H3 = 101784570
H4 = 432174303
I1 = <b 0xc10000000108981eba846e21f74e00>
I2 = <b 0xc20000000108981eba846e21f74e00>
I3 = <b 0xc30000000108981eba846e21f74e00>
I4 = <b 0x43981eba846e21f74e>
I5 = <b 0x43981eba846e21f74e>
[Peer]
PublicKey = <PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_B>
Endpoint = <PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>:8443
AllowedIPs = 10.10.10.1/32
PersistentKeepalive = 25
```
`<PRIVATE_KEY_SERVER_A>` - содержимое файла `private.key` с сервера **A**.\
`<PUBLIC_KEY_SERVER_B>` - содержимое файла `public.key` с сервера **B**.\
`<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>` - публичный IP адресс сервера **B**.
#### Включаем туннель на обоих серверах:
```bash
sudo systemctl enable --now awg-quick@awg0
```
Убедитесь, что с Сервера `A` доступен Сервер `B` через туннель.
```bash
ping 10.10.10.1
PING 10.10.10.1 (10.10.10.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.10.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=35.1 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.10.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=35.0 ms
64 bytes from 10.10.10.1: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=35.1 ms
^C
```
---
## Шаг 2. Установка telemt на Сервере B (_условно Нидерланды_)
Установка и настройка описаны [здесь](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md) или [здесь](https://gitlab.com/An0nX/telemt-docker#-quick-start-docker-compose).\
Подразумевается что telemt ожидает подключения на порту `443\tcp`.
В конфиге telemt необходимо включить протокол `Proxy` и ограничить подключения к нему только через туннель.
```toml
[server]
port = 443
listen_addr_ipv4 = "10.10.10.1"
proxy_protocol = true
```
А также, для правильной генерации ссылок, указать FQDN или IP адрес и порт Сервера `A`
```toml
[general.links]
show = "*"
public_host = "<FQDN_OR_IP_SERVER_A>"
public_port = 443
```
Открываем порт на фаерволе (если включен):
```bash
sudo ufw allow from 10.10.10.2 to any port 443 proto tcp
```
---
### Шаг 3. Настройка HAProxy на Сервере A (_РФ_)
Т.к. в стандартном репозитории Ubuntu версия относительно старая, имеет смысл воспользоваться официальным образом Docker.\
[Инструкция](https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/ubuntu/) по установке Docker на Ubuntu.
> [!WARNING]
> По умолчанию у обычных пользователей нет прав на использование портов < 1024.\
> Попытки запустить HAProxy на 443 порту могут приводить к ошибкам:
> ```
> [ALERT] (8) : Binding [/usr/local/etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg:17] for frontend tcp_in_443:
> protocol tcpv4: cannot bind socket (Permission denied) for [0.0.0.0:443].
> ```
> Есть два простых способа обойти это ограничение, выберите что-то одно:
> 1. На уровне ОС изменить настройку net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start, разрешив пользователям использовать все порты:
> ```
> echo "net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start = 0" | sudo tee -a /etc/sysctl.conf && sudo sysctl -p
> ```
> или
>
> 2. Запустить HAProxy под root:\
> Раскомментируйте в docker-compose.yaml параметр `user: "root"`.
#### Создаем папку для HAProxy:
```bash
mkdir -p /opt/docker-compose/haproxy && cd $_
```
#### Создаем файл docker-compose.yaml
`nano docker-compose.yaml`
Содержимое файла
```yaml
services:
haproxy:
image: haproxy:latest
container_name: haproxy
restart: unless-stopped
# user: "root"
network_mode: "host"
volumes:
- ./haproxy.cfg:/usr/local/etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg:ro
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "1m"
max-file: "1"
```
#### Создаем файл конфига haproxy.cfg
Принимаем подключения на порту 443\tcp и отправляем их через туннель на Сервер `B` 10.10.10.1:443
`nano haproxy.cfg`
Содержимое файла
```haproxy
global
log stdout format raw local0
maxconn 10000
defaults
log global
mode tcp
option tcplog
option clitcpka
option srvtcpka
timeout connect 5s
timeout client 2h
timeout server 2h
timeout check 5s
frontend tcp_in_443
bind *:443
maxconn 8000
option tcp-smart-accept
default_backend telemt_nodes
backend telemt_nodes
option tcp-smart-connect
server server_a 10.10.10.1:443 check inter 5s rise 2 fall 3 send-proxy-v2
```
>[!WARNING]
>**Файл должен заканчиваться пустой строкой, иначе HAProxy не запустится!**
#### Разрешаем порт 443\tcp в фаерволе (если включен)
```bash
sudo ufw allow 443/tcp
```
#### Запускаем контейнер HAProxy
```bash
docker compose up -d
```
Если все настроено верно, то теперь можно пробовать подключить клиентов Telegram с использованием ссылок из лога\api telemt.
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@@ -3,113 +3,554 @@ set -eu
REPO="${REPO:-telemt/telemt}"
BIN_NAME="${BIN_NAME:-telemt}"
VERSION="${1:-${VERSION:-latest}}"
INSTALL_DIR="${INSTALL_DIR:-/usr/local/bin}"
INSTALL_DIR="${INSTALL_DIR:-/bin}"
CONFIG_DIR="${CONFIG_DIR:-/etc/telemt}"
CONFIG_FILE="${CONFIG_FILE:-${CONFIG_DIR}/telemt.toml}"
WORK_DIR="${WORK_DIR:-/opt/telemt}"
TLS_DOMAIN="${TLS_DOMAIN:-petrovich.ru}"
SERVICE_NAME="telemt"
TEMP_DIR=""
SUDO=""
CONFIG_PARENT_DIR=""
SERVICE_START_FAILED=0
ACTION="install"
TARGET_VERSION="${VERSION:-latest}"
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
-h|--help) ACTION="help"; shift ;;
uninstall|--uninstall)
if [ "$ACTION" != "purge" ]; then ACTION="uninstall"; fi
shift ;;
purge|--purge) ACTION="purge"; shift ;;
install|--install) ACTION="install"; shift ;;
-*) printf '[ERROR] Unknown option: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
*)
if [ "$ACTION" = "install" ]; then TARGET_VERSION="$1"
else printf '[WARNING] Ignoring extra argument: %s\n' "$1" >&2; fi
shift ;;
esac
done
say() {
printf '%s\n' "$*"
if [ "$#" -eq 0 ] || [ -z "${1:-}" ]; then
printf '\n'
else
printf '[INFO] %s\n' "$*"
fi
}
die() { printf '[ERROR] %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
write_root() { $SUDO sh -c 'cat > "$1"' _ "$1"; }
cleanup() {
if [ -n "${TEMP_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$TEMP_DIR" ]; then
rm -rf -- "$TEMP_DIR"
fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
show_help() {
say "Usage: $0 [ <version> | install | uninstall | purge | --help ]"
say " <version> Install specific version (e.g. 3.3.15, default: latest)"
say " install Install the latest version"
say " uninstall Remove the binary and service (keeps config and user)"
say " purge Remove everything including configuration, data, and user"
exit 0
}
die() {
printf 'Error: %s\n' "$*" >&2
exit 1
check_os_entity() {
if command -v getent >/dev/null 2>&1; then getent "$1" "$2" >/dev/null 2>&1
else grep -q "^${2}:" "/etc/$1" 2>/dev/null; fi
}
need_cmd() {
command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "required command not found: $1"
normalize_path() {
printf '%s\n' "$1" | tr -s '/' | sed 's|/$||; s|^$|/|'
}
detect_os() {
os="$(uname -s)"
case "$os" in
Linux) printf 'linux\n' ;;
OpenBSD) printf 'openbsd\n' ;;
*) printf '%s\n' "$os" ;;
get_realpath() {
path_in="$1"
case "$path_in" in /*) ;; *) path_in="$(pwd)/$path_in" ;; esac
if command -v realpath >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if realpath_out="$(realpath -m "$path_in" 2>/dev/null)"; then
printf '%s\n' "$realpath_out"
return
fi
fi
if command -v readlink >/dev/null 2>&1; then
resolved_path="$(readlink -f "$path_in" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$resolved_path" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$resolved_path"
return
fi
fi
d="${path_in%/*}"; b="${path_in##*/}"
if [ -z "$d" ]; then d="/"; fi
if [ "$d" = "$path_in" ]; then d="/"; b="$path_in"; fi
if [ -d "$d" ]; then
abs_d="$(cd "$d" >/dev/null 2>&1 && pwd || true)"
if [ -n "$abs_d" ]; then
if [ "$b" = "." ] || [ -z "$b" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$abs_d"
elif [ "$abs_d" = "/" ]; then printf '/%s\n' "$b"
else printf '%s/%s\n' "$abs_d" "$b"; fi
else
normalize_path "$path_in"
fi
else
normalize_path "$path_in"
fi
}
get_svc_mgr() {
if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then echo "systemd"
elif command -v rc-service >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "openrc"
else echo "none"; fi
}
verify_common() {
[ -n "$BIN_NAME" ] || die "BIN_NAME cannot be empty."
[ -n "$INSTALL_DIR" ] || die "INSTALL_DIR cannot be empty."
[ -n "$CONFIG_DIR" ] || die "CONFIG_DIR cannot be empty."
[ -n "$CONFIG_FILE" ] || die "CONFIG_FILE cannot be empty."
case "${INSTALL_DIR}${CONFIG_DIR}${WORK_DIR}${CONFIG_FILE}" in
*[!a-zA-Z0-9_./-]*) die "Invalid characters in paths. Only alphanumeric, _, ., -, and / allowed." ;;
esac
case "$TARGET_VERSION" in *[!a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*) die "Invalid characters in version." ;; esac
case "$BIN_NAME" in *[!a-zA-Z0-9_-]*) die "Invalid characters in BIN_NAME." ;; esac
INSTALL_DIR="$(get_realpath "$INSTALL_DIR")"
CONFIG_DIR="$(get_realpath "$CONFIG_DIR")"
WORK_DIR="$(get_realpath "$WORK_DIR")"
CONFIG_FILE="$(get_realpath "$CONFIG_FILE")"
CONFIG_PARENT_DIR="${CONFIG_FILE%/*}"
if [ -z "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" ]; then CONFIG_PARENT_DIR="/"; fi
if [ "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" = "$CONFIG_FILE" ]; then CONFIG_PARENT_DIR="."; fi
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
SUDO=""
else
command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "This script requires root or sudo. Neither found."
SUDO="sudo"
if ! sudo -n true 2>/dev/null; then
if ! [ -t 0 ]; then
die "sudo requires a password, but no TTY detected. Aborting to prevent hang."
fi
fi
fi
if [ -n "$SUDO" ]; then
if $SUDO sh -c '[ -d "$1" ]' _ "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
die "Safety check failed: CONFIG_FILE '$CONFIG_FILE' is a directory."
fi
elif [ -d "$CONFIG_FILE" ]; then
die "Safety check failed: CONFIG_FILE '$CONFIG_FILE' is a directory."
fi
for path in "$CONFIG_DIR" "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" "$WORK_DIR"; do
check_path="$(get_realpath "$path")"
case "$check_path" in
/|/bin|/sbin|/usr|/usr/bin|/usr/sbin|/usr/local|/usr/local/bin|/usr/local/sbin|/usr/local/etc|/usr/local/share|/etc|/var|/var/lib|/var/log|/var/run|/home|/root|/tmp|/lib|/lib64|/opt|/run|/boot|/dev|/sys|/proc)
die "Safety check failed: '$path' (resolved to '$check_path') is a critical system directory." ;;
esac
done
check_install_dir="$(get_realpath "$INSTALL_DIR")"
case "$check_install_dir" in
/|/etc|/var|/home|/root|/tmp|/usr|/usr/local|/opt|/boot|/dev|/sys|/proc|/run)
die "Safety check failed: INSTALL_DIR '$INSTALL_DIR' is a critical system directory." ;;
esac
for cmd in id uname grep find rm chown chmod mv mktemp mkdir tr dd sed ps head sleep cat tar gzip rmdir; do
command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Required command not found: $cmd"
done
}
verify_install_deps() {
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Neither curl nor wget is installed."
command -v cp >/dev/null 2>&1 || command -v install >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Need cp or install"
if ! command -v setcap >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if command -v apk >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO apk add --no-cache libcap-utils >/dev/null 2>&1 || $SUDO apk add --no-cache libcap >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO apt-get update -q >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
$SUDO apt-get install -y -q libcap2-bin >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO dnf install -y -q libcap >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
elif command -v yum >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO yum install -y -q libcap >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
fi
}
detect_arch() {
arch="$(uname -m)"
case "$arch" in
x86_64|amd64) printf 'x86_64\n' ;;
aarch64|arm64) printf 'aarch64\n' ;;
*) die "unsupported architecture: $arch" ;;
sys_arch="$(uname -m)"
case "$sys_arch" in
x86_64|amd64) echo "x86_64" ;;
aarch64|arm64) echo "aarch64" ;;
*) die "Unsupported architecture: $sys_arch" ;;
esac
}
detect_libc() {
case "$(ldd --version 2>&1 || true)" in
*musl*) printf 'musl\n' ;;
*) printf 'gnu\n' ;;
esac
for f in /lib/ld-musl-*.so.* /lib64/ld-musl-*.so.*; do
if [ -e "$f" ]; then echo "musl"; return 0; fi
done
if grep -qE '^ID="?alpine"?' /etc/os-release 2>/dev/null; then echo "musl"; return 0; fi
if command -v ldd >/dev/null 2>&1 && (ldd --version 2>&1 || true) | grep -qi musl; then echo "musl"; return 0; fi
echo "gnu"
}
fetch_to_stdout() {
url="$1"
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
curl -fsSL "$url"
elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then
wget -qO- "$url"
else
die "neither curl nor wget is installed"
fetch_file() {
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then curl -fsSL "$1" -o "$2"
else wget -q -O "$2" "$1"; fi
}
ensure_user_group() {
nologin_bin="$(command -v nologin 2>/dev/null || command -v false 2>/dev/null || echo /bin/false)"
if ! check_os_entity group telemt; then
if command -v groupadd >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO groupadd -r telemt
elif command -v addgroup >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO addgroup -S telemt
else die "Cannot create group"; fi
fi
if ! check_os_entity passwd telemt; then
if command -v useradd >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO useradd -r -g telemt -d "$WORK_DIR" -s "$nologin_bin" -c "Telemt Proxy" telemt
elif command -v adduser >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if adduser --help 2>&1 | grep -q -- '-S'; then
$SUDO adduser -S -D -H -h "$WORK_DIR" -s "$nologin_bin" -G telemt telemt
else
$SUDO adduser --system --home "$WORK_DIR" --shell "$nologin_bin" --no-create-home --ingroup telemt --disabled-password telemt
fi
else die "Cannot create user"; fi
fi
}
setup_dirs() {
$SUDO mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR" "$CONFIG_DIR" "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" || die "Failed to create directories"
$SUDO chown telemt:telemt "$WORK_DIR" && $SUDO chmod 750 "$WORK_DIR"
$SUDO chown root:telemt "$CONFIG_DIR" && $SUDO chmod 750 "$CONFIG_DIR"
if [ "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" != "$CONFIG_DIR" ] && [ "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" != "." ] && [ "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" != "/" ]; then
$SUDO chown root:telemt "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" && $SUDO chmod 750 "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR"
fi
}
stop_service() {
svc="$(get_svc_mgr)"
if [ "$svc" = "systemd" ] && systemctl is-active --quiet "$SERVICE_NAME" 2>/dev/null; then
$SUDO systemctl stop "$SERVICE_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
elif [ "$svc" = "openrc" ] && rc-service "$SERVICE_NAME" status >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO rc-service "$SERVICE_NAME" stop 2>/dev/null || true
fi
}
install_binary() {
src="$1"
dst="$2"
bin_src="$1"; bin_dst="$2"
if [ -e "$INSTALL_DIR" ] && [ ! -d "$INSTALL_DIR" ]; then
die "'$INSTALL_DIR' is not a directory."
fi
if [ -w "$INSTALL_DIR" ] || { [ ! -e "$INSTALL_DIR" ] && [ -w "$(dirname "$INSTALL_DIR")" ]; }; then
mkdir -p "$INSTALL_DIR"
install -m 0755 "$src" "$dst"
elif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sudo mkdir -p "$INSTALL_DIR"
sudo install -m 0755 "$src" "$dst"
$SUDO mkdir -p "$INSTALL_DIR" || die "Failed to create install directory"
if command -v install >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO install -m 0755 "$bin_src" "$bin_dst" || die "Failed to install binary"
else
die "cannot write to $INSTALL_DIR and sudo is not available"
$SUDO rm -f "$bin_dst" 2>/dev/null || true
$SUDO cp "$bin_src" "$bin_dst" && $SUDO chmod 0755 "$bin_dst" || die "Failed to copy binary"
fi
$SUDO sh -c '[ -x "$1" ]' _ "$bin_dst" || die "Binary not executable: $bin_dst"
if command -v setcap >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO setcap cap_net_bind_service=+ep "$bin_dst" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
}
need_cmd uname
need_cmd tar
need_cmd mktemp
need_cmd grep
need_cmd install
generate_secret() {
secret="$(command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1 && openssl rand -hex 16 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$secret" ] || [ "${#secret}" -ne 32 ]; then
if command -v od >/dev/null 2>&1; then secret="$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=16 count=1 2>/dev/null | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')"
elif command -v hexdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then secret="$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=16 count=1 2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/1 "%02x"')"
elif command -v xxd >/dev/null 2>&1; then secret="$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=16 count=1 2>/dev/null | xxd -p | tr -d '\n')"
fi
fi
if [ "${#secret}" -eq 32 ]; then echo "$secret"; else return 1; fi
}
ARCH="$(detect_arch)"
OS="$(detect_os)"
generate_config_content() {
escaped_tls_domain="$(printf '%s\n' "$TLS_DOMAIN" | tr -d '[:cntrl:]' | sed 's/\\/\\\\/g; s/"/\\"/g')"
if [ "$OS" != "linux" ]; then
case "$OS" in
openbsd)
die "install.sh installs only Linux release artifacts. On OpenBSD, build from source (see docs/OPENBSD.en.md)."
;;
*)
die "unsupported operating system for install.sh: $OS"
;;
esac
fi
cat <<EOF
[general]
use_middle_proxy = false
LIBC="$(detect_libc)"
[general.modes]
classic = false
secure = false
tls = true
case "$VERSION" in
latest)
URL="https://github.com/$REPO/releases/latest/download/${BIN_NAME}-${ARCH}-linux-${LIBC}.tar.gz"
;;
*)
URL="https://github.com/$REPO/releases/download/${VERSION}/${BIN_NAME}-${ARCH}-linux-${LIBC}.tar.gz"
[server]
port = 443
[server.api]
enabled = true
listen = "127.0.0.1:9091"
whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32"]
[censorship]
tls_domain = "${escaped_tls_domain}"
[access.users]
hello = "$1"
EOF
}
install_config() {
if [ -n "$SUDO" ]; then
if $SUDO sh -c '[ -f "$1" ]' _ "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
say " -> Config already exists at $CONFIG_FILE. Skipping creation."
return 0
fi
elif [ -f "$CONFIG_FILE" ]; then
say " -> Config already exists at $CONFIG_FILE. Skipping creation."
return 0
fi
toml_secret="$(generate_secret)" || die "Failed to generate secret."
generate_config_content "$toml_secret" | write_root "$CONFIG_FILE" || die "Failed to install config"
$SUDO chown root:telemt "$CONFIG_FILE" && $SUDO chmod 640 "$CONFIG_FILE"
say " -> Config created successfully."
say " -> Generated secret for default user 'hello': $toml_secret"
}
generate_systemd_content() {
cat <<EOF
[Unit]
Description=Telemt
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User=telemt
Group=telemt
WorkingDirectory=$WORK_DIR
ExecStart="${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}" "${CONFIG_FILE}"
Restart=on-failure
LimitNOFILE=65536
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
EOF
}
generate_openrc_content() {
cat <<EOF
#!/sbin/openrc-run
name="$SERVICE_NAME"
description="Telemt Proxy Service"
command="${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}"
command_args="${CONFIG_FILE}"
command_background=true
command_user="telemt:telemt"
pidfile="/run/\${RC_SVCNAME}.pid"
directory="${WORK_DIR}"
rc_ulimit="-n 65536"
depend() { need net; use logger; }
EOF
}
install_service() {
svc="$(get_svc_mgr)"
if [ "$svc" = "systemd" ]; then
generate_systemd_content | write_root "/etc/systemd/system/${SERVICE_NAME}.service"
$SUDO chown root:root "/etc/systemd/system/${SERVICE_NAME}.service" && $SUDO chmod 644 "/etc/systemd/system/${SERVICE_NAME}.service"
$SUDO systemctl daemon-reload || true
$SUDO systemctl enable "$SERVICE_NAME" || true
if ! $SUDO systemctl start "$SERVICE_NAME"; then
say "[WARNING] Failed to start service"
SERVICE_START_FAILED=1
fi
elif [ "$svc" = "openrc" ]; then
generate_openrc_content | write_root "/etc/init.d/${SERVICE_NAME}"
$SUDO chown root:root "/etc/init.d/${SERVICE_NAME}" && $SUDO chmod 0755 "/etc/init.d/${SERVICE_NAME}"
$SUDO rc-update add "$SERVICE_NAME" default 2>/dev/null || true
if ! $SUDO rc-service "$SERVICE_NAME" start 2>/dev/null; then
say "[WARNING] Failed to start service"
SERVICE_START_FAILED=1
fi
else
cmd="\"${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}\" \"${CONFIG_FILE}\""
if [ -n "$SUDO" ]; then
say " -> Service manager not found. Start manually: sudo -u telemt $cmd"
else
say " -> Service manager not found. Start manually: su -s /bin/sh telemt -c '$cmd'"
fi
fi
}
kill_user_procs() {
if command -v pkill >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO pkill -u telemt "$BIN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
sleep 1
$SUDO pkill -9 -u telemt "$BIN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
else
if command -v pgrep >/dev/null 2>&1; then
pids="$(pgrep -u telemt 2>/dev/null || true)"
else
pids="$(ps -u telemt -o pid= 2>/dev/null || true)"
fi
if [ -n "$pids" ]; then
for pid in $pids; do
case "$pid" in ''|*[!0-9]*) continue ;; *) $SUDO kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true ;; esac
done
sleep 1
for pid in $pids; do
case "$pid" in ''|*[!0-9]*) continue ;; *) $SUDO kill -9 "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true ;; esac
done
fi
fi
}
uninstall() {
say "Starting uninstallation of $BIN_NAME..."
say ">>> Stage 1: Stopping services"
stop_service
say ">>> Stage 2: Removing service configuration"
svc="$(get_svc_mgr)"
if [ "$svc" = "systemd" ]; then
$SUDO systemctl disable "$SERVICE_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
$SUDO rm -f "/etc/systemd/system/${SERVICE_NAME}.service"
$SUDO systemctl daemon-reload 2>/dev/null || true
elif [ "$svc" = "openrc" ]; then
$SUDO rc-update del "$SERVICE_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
$SUDO rm -f "/etc/init.d/${SERVICE_NAME}"
fi
say ">>> Stage 3: Terminating user processes"
kill_user_procs
say ">>> Stage 4: Removing binary"
$SUDO rm -f "${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}"
if [ "$ACTION" = "purge" ]; then
say ">>> Stage 5: Purging configuration, data, and user"
$SUDO rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR" "$WORK_DIR"
$SUDO rm -f "$CONFIG_FILE"
if [ "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" != "$CONFIG_DIR" ] && [ "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" != "." ] && [ "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" != "/" ]; then
$SUDO rmdir "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
$SUDO userdel telemt 2>/dev/null || $SUDO deluser telemt 2>/dev/null || true
$SUDO groupdel telemt 2>/dev/null || $SUDO delgroup telemt 2>/dev/null || true
else
say "Note: Configuration and user kept. Run with 'purge' to remove completely."
fi
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
printf ' UNINSTALLATION COMPLETE\n'
printf '====================================================================\n\n'
exit 0
}
case "$ACTION" in
help) show_help ;;
uninstall|purge) verify_common; uninstall ;;
install)
say "Starting installation of $BIN_NAME (Version: $TARGET_VERSION)"
say ">>> Stage 1: Verifying environment and dependencies"
verify_common; verify_install_deps
if [ "$TARGET_VERSION" != "latest" ]; then
TARGET_VERSION="${TARGET_VERSION#v}"
fi
ARCH="$(detect_arch)"; LIBC="$(detect_libc)"
FILE_NAME="${BIN_NAME}-${ARCH}-linux-${LIBC}.tar.gz"
if [ "$TARGET_VERSION" = "latest" ]; then
DL_URL="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/latest/download/${FILE_NAME}"
else
DL_URL="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TARGET_VERSION}/${FILE_NAME}"
fi
say ">>> Stage 2: Downloading archive"
TEMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)" || die "Temp directory creation failed"
if [ -z "$TEMP_DIR" ] || [ ! -d "$TEMP_DIR" ]; then
die "Temp directory is invalid or was not created"
fi
fetch_file "$DL_URL" "${TEMP_DIR}/${FILE_NAME}" || die "Download failed"
say ">>> Stage 3: Extracting archive"
if ! gzip -dc "${TEMP_DIR}/${FILE_NAME}" | tar -xf - -C "$TEMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null; then
die "Extraction failed (downloaded archive might be invalid or 404)."
fi
EXTRACTED_BIN="$(find "$TEMP_DIR" -type f -name "$BIN_NAME" -print 2>/dev/null | head -n 1 || true)"
[ -n "$EXTRACTED_BIN" ] || die "Binary '$BIN_NAME' not found in archive"
say ">>> Stage 4: Setting up environment (User, Group, Directories)"
ensure_user_group; setup_dirs; stop_service
say ">>> Stage 5: Installing binary"
install_binary "$EXTRACTED_BIN" "${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}"
say ">>> Stage 6: Generating configuration"
install_config
say ">>> Stage 7: Installing and starting service"
install_service
if [ "${SERVICE_START_FAILED:-0}" -eq 1 ]; then
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
printf ' INSTALLATION COMPLETED WITH WARNINGS\n'
printf '====================================================================\n\n'
printf 'The service was installed but failed to start automatically.\n'
printf 'Please check the logs to determine the issue.\n\n'
else
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
printf ' INSTALLATION SUCCESS\n'
printf '====================================================================\n\n'
fi
svc="$(get_svc_mgr)"
if [ "$svc" = "systemd" ]; then
printf 'To check the status of your proxy service, run:\n'
printf ' systemctl status %s\n\n' "$SERVICE_NAME"
elif [ "$svc" = "openrc" ]; then
printf 'To check the status of your proxy service, run:\n'
printf ' rc-service %s status\n\n' "$SERVICE_NAME"
fi
printf 'To get your user connection links (for Telegram), run:\n'
if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf ' curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9091/v1/users | jq -r '\''.data[] | "User: \\(.username)\\n\\(.links.tls[0] // empty)\\n"'\''\n'
else
printf ' curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9091/v1/users\n'
printf ' (Tip: Install '\''jq'\'' for a much cleaner output)\n'
fi
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
;;
esac
TMPDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$TMPDIR"' EXIT INT TERM
say "Installing $BIN_NAME ($VERSION) for $ARCH-linux-$LIBC..."
fetch_to_stdout "$URL" | tar -xzf - -C "$TMPDIR"
[ -f "$TMPDIR/$BIN_NAME" ] || die "archive did not contain $BIN_NAME"
install_binary "$TMPDIR/$BIN_NAME" "$INSTALL_DIR/$BIN_NAME"
say "Installed: $INSTALL_DIR/$BIN_NAME"
"$INSTALL_DIR/$BIN_NAME" --version 2>/dev/null || true
+1 -4
View File
@@ -24,10 +24,7 @@ pub(super) fn success_response<T: Serialize>(
.unwrap()
}
pub(super) fn error_response(
request_id: u64,
failure: ApiFailure,
) -> hyper::Response<Full<Bytes>> {
pub(super) fn error_response(request_id: u64, failure: ApiFailure) -> hyper::Response<Full<Bytes>> {
let payload = ErrorResponse {
ok: false,
error: ErrorBody {
+93 -31
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
#![allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use std::path::PathBuf;
@@ -19,8 +21,8 @@ use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::proxy::route_mode::RouteRuntimeController;
use crate::startup::StartupTracker;
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
mod config_store;
mod events;
@@ -35,11 +37,12 @@ mod runtime_watch;
mod runtime_zero;
mod users;
use config_store::{current_revision, parse_if_match};
use http_utils::{error_response, read_json, read_optional_json, success_response};
use config_store::{current_revision, load_config_from_disk, parse_if_match};
use events::ApiEventStore;
use http_utils::{error_response, read_json, read_optional_json, success_response};
use model::{
ApiFailure, CreateUserRequest, HealthData, PatchUserRequest, RotateSecretRequest, SummaryData,
ApiFailure, CreateUserRequest, DeleteUserResponse, HealthData, PatchUserRequest,
RotateSecretRequest, SummaryData, UserActiveIps,
};
use runtime_edge::{
EdgeConnectionsCacheEntry, build_runtime_connections_summary_data,
@@ -55,11 +58,11 @@ use runtime_stats::{
MinimalCacheEntry, build_dcs_data, build_me_writers_data, build_minimal_all_data,
build_upstreams_data, build_zero_all_data,
};
use runtime_watch::spawn_runtime_watchers;
use runtime_zero::{
build_limits_effective_data, build_runtime_gates_data, build_security_posture_data,
build_system_info_data,
};
use runtime_watch::spawn_runtime_watchers;
use users::{create_user, delete_user, patch_user, rotate_secret, users_from_config};
pub(super) struct ApiRuntimeState {
@@ -208,15 +211,15 @@ async fn handle(
));
}
if !api_cfg.whitelist.is_empty()
&& !api_cfg
.whitelist
.iter()
.any(|net| net.contains(peer.ip()))
if !api_cfg.whitelist.is_empty() && !api_cfg.whitelist.iter().any(|net| net.contains(peer.ip()))
{
return Ok(error_response(
request_id,
ApiFailure::new(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden", "Source IP is not allowed"),
ApiFailure::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"forbidden",
"Source IP is not allowed",
),
));
}
@@ -347,7 +350,8 @@ async fn handle(
}
("GET", "/v1/runtime/connections/summary") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let data = build_runtime_connections_summary_data(shared.as_ref(), cfg.as_ref()).await;
let data =
build_runtime_connections_summary_data(shared.as_ref(), cfg.as_ref()).await;
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, data, revision))
}
("GET", "/v1/runtime/events/recent") => {
@@ -359,15 +363,33 @@ async fn handle(
);
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, data, revision))
}
("GET", "/v1/stats/users/active-ips") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let usernames: Vec<_> = cfg.access.users.keys().cloned().collect();
let active_ips_map = shared.ip_tracker.get_active_ips_for_users(&usernames).await;
let mut data: Vec<UserActiveIps> = active_ips_map
.into_iter()
.filter(|(_, ips)| !ips.is_empty())
.map(|(username, active_ips)| UserActiveIps {
username,
active_ips,
})
.collect();
data.sort_by(|a, b| a.username.cmp(&b.username));
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, data, revision))
}
("GET", "/v1/stats/users") | ("GET", "/v1/users") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let disk_cfg = load_config_from_disk(&shared.config_path).await?;
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
let (detected_ip_v4, detected_ip_v6) = shared.detected_link_ips();
let users = users_from_config(
&cfg,
&disk_cfg,
&shared.stats,
&shared.ip_tracker,
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
Some(runtime_cfg.as_ref()),
)
.await;
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, users, revision))
@@ -386,17 +408,27 @@ async fn handle(
let expected_revision = parse_if_match(req.headers());
let body = read_json::<CreateUserRequest>(req.into_body(), body_limit).await?;
let result = create_user(body, expected_revision, &shared).await;
let (data, revision) = match result {
let (mut data, revision) = match result {
Ok(ok) => ok,
Err(error) => {
shared.runtime_events.record("api.user.create.failed", error.code);
shared
.runtime_events
.record("api.user.create.failed", error.code);
return Err(error);
}
};
shared
.runtime_events
.record("api.user.create.ok", format!("username={}", data.user.username));
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::CREATED, data, revision))
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
data.user.in_runtime = runtime_cfg.access.users.contains_key(&data.user.username);
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.create.ok",
format!("username={}", data.user.username),
);
let status = if data.user.in_runtime {
StatusCode::CREATED
} else {
StatusCode::ACCEPTED
};
Ok(success_response(status, data, revision))
}
_ => {
if let Some(user) = path.strip_prefix("/v1/users/")
@@ -405,16 +437,20 @@ async fn handle(
{
if method == Method::GET {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let disk_cfg = load_config_from_disk(&shared.config_path).await?;
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
let (detected_ip_v4, detected_ip_v6) = shared.detected_link_ips();
let users = users_from_config(
&cfg,
&disk_cfg,
&shared.stats,
&shared.ip_tracker,
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
Some(runtime_cfg.as_ref()),
)
.await;
if let Some(user_info) = users.into_iter().find(|entry| entry.username == user)
if let Some(user_info) =
users.into_iter().find(|entry| entry.username == user)
{
return Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, user_info, revision));
}
@@ -435,9 +471,10 @@ async fn handle(
));
}
let expected_revision = parse_if_match(req.headers());
let body = read_json::<PatchUserRequest>(req.into_body(), body_limit).await?;
let body =
read_json::<PatchUserRequest>(req.into_body(), body_limit).await?;
let result = patch_user(user, body, expected_revision, &shared).await;
let (data, revision) = match result {
let (mut data, revision) = match result {
Ok(ok) => ok,
Err(error) => {
shared.runtime_events.record(
@@ -447,10 +484,17 @@ async fn handle(
return Err(error);
}
};
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
data.in_runtime = runtime_cfg.access.users.contains_key(&data.username);
shared
.runtime_events
.record("api.user.patch.ok", format!("username={}", data.username));
return Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, data, revision));
let status = if data.in_runtime {
StatusCode::OK
} else {
StatusCode::ACCEPTED
};
return Ok(success_response(status, data, revision));
}
if method == Method::DELETE {
if api_cfg.read_only {
@@ -475,11 +519,21 @@ async fn handle(
return Err(error);
}
};
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.delete.ok",
format!("username={}", deleted_user),
);
return Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, deleted_user, revision));
shared
.runtime_events
.record("api.user.delete.ok", format!("username={}", deleted_user));
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
let in_runtime = runtime_cfg.access.users.contains_key(&deleted_user);
let response = DeleteUserResponse {
username: deleted_user,
in_runtime,
};
let status = if response.in_runtime {
StatusCode::ACCEPTED
} else {
StatusCode::OK
};
return Ok(success_response(status, response, revision));
}
if method == Method::POST
&& let Some(base_user) = user.strip_suffix("/rotate-secret")
@@ -507,7 +561,7 @@ async fn handle(
&shared,
)
.await;
let (data, revision) = match result {
let (mut data, revision) = match result {
Ok(ok) => ok,
Err(error) => {
shared.runtime_events.record(
@@ -517,11 +571,19 @@ async fn handle(
return Err(error);
}
};
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
data.user.in_runtime =
runtime_cfg.access.users.contains_key(&data.user.username);
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.rotate_secret.ok",
format!("username={}", base_user),
);
return Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, data, revision));
let status = if data.user.in_runtime {
StatusCode::OK
} else {
StatusCode::ACCEPTED
};
return Ok(success_response(status, data, revision));
}
if method == Method::POST {
return Ok(error_response(
+49 -2
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::sync::OnceLock;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hyper::StatusCode;
use rand::Rng;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
const MAX_USERNAME_LEN: usize = 64;
#[derive(Debug)]
@@ -79,10 +81,21 @@ pub(super) struct ZeroCoreData {
pub(super) connections_total: u64,
pub(super) connections_bad_total: u64,
pub(super) handshake_timeouts_total: u64,
pub(super) accept_permit_timeout_total: u64,
pub(super) configured_users: usize,
pub(super) telemetry_core_enabled: bool,
pub(super) telemetry_user_enabled: bool,
pub(super) telemetry_me_level: String,
pub(super) conntrack_control_enabled: bool,
pub(super) conntrack_control_available: bool,
pub(super) conntrack_pressure_active: bool,
pub(super) conntrack_event_queue_depth: u64,
pub(super) conntrack_rule_apply_ok: bool,
pub(super) conntrack_delete_attempt_total: u64,
pub(super) conntrack_delete_success_total: u64,
pub(super) conntrack_delete_not_found_total: u64,
pub(super) conntrack_delete_error_total: u64,
pub(super) conntrack_close_event_drop_total: u64,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Clone)]
@@ -134,6 +147,7 @@ pub(super) struct UpstreamSummaryData {
pub(super) direct_total: usize,
pub(super) socks4_total: usize,
pub(super) socks5_total: usize,
pub(super) shadowsocks_total: usize,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Clone)]
@@ -171,6 +185,24 @@ pub(super) struct ZeroMiddleProxyData {
pub(super) route_drop_queue_full_total: u64,
pub(super) route_drop_queue_full_base_total: u64,
pub(super) route_drop_queue_full_high_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_batches_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_batch_frames_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_batch_bytes_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_flush_reason_queue_drain_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_flush_reason_batch_frames_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_flush_reason_batch_bytes_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_flush_reason_max_delay_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_flush_reason_ack_immediate_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_flush_reason_close_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_data_frames_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_ack_frames_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_payload_bytes_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_write_mode_coalesced_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_write_mode_split_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_quota_reject_pre_write_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_quota_reject_post_write_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_frame_buf_shrink_total: u64,
pub(super) d2c_frame_buf_shrink_bytes_total: u64,
pub(super) socks_kdf_strict_reject_total: u64,
pub(super) socks_kdf_compat_fallback_total: u64,
pub(super) endpoint_quarantine_total: u64,
@@ -407,6 +439,7 @@ pub(super) struct UserLinks {
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct UserInfo {
pub(super) username: String,
pub(super) in_runtime: bool,
pub(super) user_ad_tag: Option<String>,
pub(super) max_tcp_conns: Option<usize>,
pub(super) expiration_rfc3339: Option<String>,
@@ -421,12 +454,24 @@ pub(super) struct UserInfo {
pub(super) links: UserLinks,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct UserActiveIps {
pub(super) username: String,
pub(super) active_ips: Vec<IpAddr>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct CreateUserResponse {
pub(super) user: UserInfo,
pub(super) secret: String,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct DeleteUserResponse {
pub(super) username: String,
pub(super) in_runtime: bool,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub(super) struct CreateUserRequest {
pub(super) username: String,
@@ -481,7 +526,9 @@ pub(super) fn is_valid_username(user: &str) -> bool {
}
pub(super) fn random_user_secret() -> String {
static API_SECRET_RNG: OnceLock<SecureRandom> = OnceLock::new();
let rng = API_SECRET_RNG.get_or_init(SecureRandom::new);
let mut bytes = [0u8; 16];
rand::rng().fill(&mut bytes);
rng.fill(&mut bytes);
hex::encode(bytes)
}
+1 -5
View File
@@ -167,11 +167,7 @@ async fn current_me_pool_stage_progress(shared: &ApiShared) -> Option<f64> {
let pool = shared.me_pool.read().await.clone()?;
let status = pool.api_status_snapshot().await;
let configured_dc_groups = status.configured_dc_groups;
let covered_dc_groups = status
.dcs
.iter()
.filter(|dc| dc.alive_writers > 0)
.count();
let covered_dc_groups = status.dcs.iter().filter(|dc| dc.alive_writers > 0).count();
let dc_coverage = ratio_01(covered_dc_groups, configured_dc_groups);
let writer_coverage = ratio_01(status.alive_writers, status.required_writers);
+62 -10
View File
@@ -107,6 +107,25 @@ pub(super) struct RuntimeMeQualityRouteDropData {
pub(super) queue_full_high_total: u64,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct RuntimeMeQualityFamilyStateData {
pub(super) family: &'static str,
pub(super) state: &'static str,
pub(super) state_since_epoch_secs: u64,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub(super) suppressed_until_epoch_secs: Option<u64>,
pub(super) fail_streak: u32,
pub(super) recover_success_streak: u32,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct RuntimeMeQualityDrainGateData {
pub(super) route_quorum_ok: bool,
pub(super) redundancy_ok: bool,
pub(super) block_reason: &'static str,
pub(super) updated_at_epoch_secs: u64,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct RuntimeMeQualityDcRttData {
pub(super) dc: i16,
@@ -120,6 +139,8 @@ pub(super) struct RuntimeMeQualityDcRttData {
pub(super) struct RuntimeMeQualityPayload {
pub(super) counters: RuntimeMeQualityCountersData,
pub(super) route_drops: RuntimeMeQualityRouteDropData,
pub(super) family_states: Vec<RuntimeMeQualityFamilyStateData>,
pub(super) drain_gate: RuntimeMeQualityDrainGateData,
pub(super) dc_rtt: Vec<RuntimeMeQualityDcRttData>,
}
@@ -158,6 +179,7 @@ pub(super) struct RuntimeUpstreamQualitySummaryData {
pub(super) direct_total: usize,
pub(super) socks4_total: usize,
pub(super) socks5_total: usize,
pub(super) shadowsocks_total: usize,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -360,6 +382,19 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_me_quality_data(shared: &ApiShared) -> Runtime
};
let status = pool.api_status_snapshot().await;
let family_states = pool
.api_family_state_snapshot()
.into_iter()
.map(|entry| RuntimeMeQualityFamilyStateData {
family: entry.family,
state: entry.state,
state_since_epoch_secs: entry.state_since_epoch_secs,
suppressed_until_epoch_secs: entry.suppressed_until_epoch_secs,
fail_streak: entry.fail_streak,
recover_success_streak: entry.recover_success_streak,
})
.collect();
let drain_gate_snapshot = pool.api_drain_gate_snapshot();
RuntimeMeQualityData {
enabled: true,
reason: None,
@@ -380,6 +415,13 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_me_quality_data(shared: &ApiShared) -> Runtime
queue_full_base_total: shared.stats.get_me_route_drop_queue_full_base(),
queue_full_high_total: shared.stats.get_me_route_drop_queue_full_high(),
},
family_states,
drain_gate: RuntimeMeQualityDrainGateData {
route_quorum_ok: drain_gate_snapshot.route_quorum_ok,
redundancy_ok: drain_gate_snapshot.redundancy_ok,
block_reason: drain_gate_snapshot.block_reason,
updated_at_epoch_secs: drain_gate_snapshot.updated_at_epoch_secs,
},
dc_rtt: status
.dcs
.into_iter()
@@ -404,7 +446,9 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_upstream_quality_data(
connect_attempt_total: shared.stats.get_upstream_connect_attempt_total(),
connect_success_total: shared.stats.get_upstream_connect_success_total(),
connect_fail_total: shared.stats.get_upstream_connect_fail_total(),
connect_failfast_hard_error_total: shared.stats.get_upstream_connect_failfast_hard_error_total(),
connect_failfast_hard_error_total: shared
.stats
.get_upstream_connect_failfast_hard_error_total(),
};
let Some(snapshot) = shared.upstream_manager.try_api_snapshot() else {
@@ -444,6 +488,7 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_upstream_quality_data(
direct_total: snapshot.summary.direct_total,
socks4_total: snapshot.summary.socks4_total,
socks5_total: snapshot.summary.socks5_total,
shadowsocks_total: snapshot.summary.shadowsocks_total,
}),
upstreams: Some(
snapshot
@@ -455,6 +500,7 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_upstream_quality_data(
crate::transport::UpstreamRouteKind::Direct => "direct",
crate::transport::UpstreamRouteKind::Socks4 => "socks4",
crate::transport::UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5 => "socks5",
crate::transport::UpstreamRouteKind::Shadowsocks => "shadowsocks",
},
address: upstream.address,
weight: upstream.weight,
@@ -474,7 +520,9 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_upstream_quality_data(
crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference::PreferV6 => "prefer_v6",
crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference::PreferV4 => "prefer_v4",
crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference::BothWork => "both_work",
crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference::Unavailable => "unavailable",
crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference::Unavailable => {
"unavailable"
}
},
})
.collect(),
@@ -512,14 +560,18 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_nat_stun_data(shared: &ApiShared) -> RuntimeNa
live_total: snapshot.live_servers.len(),
},
reflection: RuntimeNatStunReflectionBlockData {
v4: snapshot.reflection_v4.map(|entry| RuntimeNatStunReflectionData {
addr: entry.addr.to_string(),
age_secs: entry.age_secs,
}),
v6: snapshot.reflection_v6.map(|entry| RuntimeNatStunReflectionData {
addr: entry.addr.to_string(),
age_secs: entry.age_secs,
}),
v4: snapshot
.reflection_v4
.map(|entry| RuntimeNatStunReflectionData {
addr: entry.addr.to_string(),
age_secs: entry.age_secs,
}),
v6: snapshot
.reflection_v6
.map(|entry| RuntimeNatStunReflectionData {
addr: entry.addr.to_string(),
age_secs: entry.age_secs,
}),
},
stun_backoff_remaining_ms: snapshot.stun_backoff_remaining_ms,
}),
+5 -4
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::sync::{Mutex, OnceLock};
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ use serde::Serialize;
use crate::config::{ProxyConfig, UpstreamType};
use crate::network::probe::{detect_interface_ipv4, detect_interface_ipv6, is_bogon};
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{bnd_snapshot, timeskew_snapshot, upstream_bnd_snapshots};
use crate::transport::UpstreamRouteKind;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{bnd_snapshot, timeskew_snapshot, upstream_bnd_snapshots};
use super::ApiShared;
@@ -262,8 +262,8 @@ fn update_kdf_ewma(now_epoch_secs: u64, total_errors: u64) -> f64 {
let delta_errors = total_errors.saturating_sub(guard.last_total_errors);
let instant_rate_per_min = (delta_errors as f64) * 60.0 / (dt_secs as f64);
let alpha = 1.0 - f64::exp(-(dt_secs as f64) / KDF_EWMA_TAU_SECS);
guard.ewma_errors_per_min = guard.ewma_errors_per_min
+ alpha * (instant_rate_per_min - guard.ewma_errors_per_min);
guard.ewma_errors_per_min =
guard.ewma_errors_per_min + alpha * (instant_rate_per_min - guard.ewma_errors_per_min);
guard.last_epoch_secs = now_epoch_secs;
guard.last_total_errors = total_errors;
guard.ewma_errors_per_min
@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ fn map_route_kind(value: UpstreamRouteKind) -> &'static str {
UpstreamRouteKind::Direct => "direct",
UpstreamRouteKind::Socks4 => "socks4",
UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5 => "socks5",
UpstreamRouteKind::Shadowsocks => "shadowsocks",
}
}
+39 -10
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use crate::config::ApiConfig;
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference;
use crate::transport::UpstreamRouteKind;
use crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference;
use super::ApiShared;
use super::model::{
@@ -39,10 +39,21 @@ pub(super) fn build_zero_all_data(stats: &Stats, configured_users: usize) -> Zer
connections_total: stats.get_connects_all(),
connections_bad_total: stats.get_connects_bad(),
handshake_timeouts_total: stats.get_handshake_timeouts(),
accept_permit_timeout_total: stats.get_accept_permit_timeout_total(),
configured_users,
telemetry_core_enabled: telemetry.core_enabled,
telemetry_user_enabled: telemetry.user_enabled,
telemetry_me_level: telemetry.me_level.to_string(),
conntrack_control_enabled: stats.get_conntrack_control_enabled(),
conntrack_control_available: stats.get_conntrack_control_available(),
conntrack_pressure_active: stats.get_conntrack_pressure_active(),
conntrack_event_queue_depth: stats.get_conntrack_event_queue_depth(),
conntrack_rule_apply_ok: stats.get_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(),
conntrack_delete_attempt_total: stats.get_conntrack_delete_attempt_total(),
conntrack_delete_success_total: stats.get_conntrack_delete_success_total(),
conntrack_delete_not_found_total: stats.get_conntrack_delete_not_found_total(),
conntrack_delete_error_total: stats.get_conntrack_delete_error_total(),
conntrack_close_event_drop_total: stats.get_conntrack_close_event_drop_total(),
},
upstream: build_zero_upstream_data(stats),
middle_proxy: ZeroMiddleProxyData {
@@ -68,6 +79,25 @@ pub(super) fn build_zero_all_data(stats: &Stats, configured_users: usize) -> Zer
route_drop_queue_full_total: stats.get_me_route_drop_queue_full(),
route_drop_queue_full_base_total: stats.get_me_route_drop_queue_full_base(),
route_drop_queue_full_high_total: stats.get_me_route_drop_queue_full_high(),
d2c_batches_total: stats.get_me_d2c_batches_total(),
d2c_batch_frames_total: stats.get_me_d2c_batch_frames_total(),
d2c_batch_bytes_total: stats.get_me_d2c_batch_bytes_total(),
d2c_flush_reason_queue_drain_total: stats.get_me_d2c_flush_reason_queue_drain_total(),
d2c_flush_reason_batch_frames_total: stats.get_me_d2c_flush_reason_batch_frames_total(),
d2c_flush_reason_batch_bytes_total: stats.get_me_d2c_flush_reason_batch_bytes_total(),
d2c_flush_reason_max_delay_total: stats.get_me_d2c_flush_reason_max_delay_total(),
d2c_flush_reason_ack_immediate_total: stats
.get_me_d2c_flush_reason_ack_immediate_total(),
d2c_flush_reason_close_total: stats.get_me_d2c_flush_reason_close_total(),
d2c_data_frames_total: stats.get_me_d2c_data_frames_total(),
d2c_ack_frames_total: stats.get_me_d2c_ack_frames_total(),
d2c_payload_bytes_total: stats.get_me_d2c_payload_bytes_total(),
d2c_write_mode_coalesced_total: stats.get_me_d2c_write_mode_coalesced_total(),
d2c_write_mode_split_total: stats.get_me_d2c_write_mode_split_total(),
d2c_quota_reject_pre_write_total: stats.get_me_d2c_quota_reject_pre_write_total(),
d2c_quota_reject_post_write_total: stats.get_me_d2c_quota_reject_post_write_total(),
d2c_frame_buf_shrink_total: stats.get_me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_total(),
d2c_frame_buf_shrink_bytes_total: stats.get_me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_bytes_total(),
socks_kdf_strict_reject_total: stats.get_me_socks_kdf_strict_reject(),
socks_kdf_compat_fallback_total: stats.get_me_socks_kdf_compat_fallback(),
endpoint_quarantine_total: stats.get_me_endpoint_quarantine_total(),
@@ -136,7 +166,8 @@ fn build_zero_upstream_data(stats: &Stats) -> ZeroUpstreamData {
.get_upstream_connect_duration_success_bucket_501_1000ms(),
connect_duration_success_bucket_gt_1000ms: stats
.get_upstream_connect_duration_success_bucket_gt_1000ms(),
connect_duration_fail_bucket_le_100ms: stats.get_upstream_connect_duration_fail_bucket_le_100ms(),
connect_duration_fail_bucket_le_100ms: stats
.get_upstream_connect_duration_fail_bucket_le_100ms(),
connect_duration_fail_bucket_101_500ms: stats
.get_upstream_connect_duration_fail_bucket_101_500ms(),
connect_duration_fail_bucket_501_1000ms: stats
@@ -178,6 +209,7 @@ pub(super) fn build_upstreams_data(shared: &ApiShared, api_cfg: &ApiConfig) -> U
direct_total: snapshot.summary.direct_total,
socks4_total: snapshot.summary.socks4_total,
socks5_total: snapshot.summary.socks5_total,
shadowsocks_total: snapshot.summary.shadowsocks_total,
};
let upstreams = snapshot
.upstreams
@@ -391,8 +423,7 @@ async fn get_minimal_payload_cached(
adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint: runtime
.adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint,
adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs: runtime.adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs,
adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total: runtime
.adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total,
adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total: runtime.adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total,
adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override: runtime.adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override,
adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core: runtime
.adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core,
@@ -400,12 +431,9 @@ async fn get_minimal_payload_cached(
.adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core,
adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core: runtime
.adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core,
adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core: runtime
.adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core,
adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global: runtime
.adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global,
adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global: runtime
.adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global,
adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core: runtime.adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core,
adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global: runtime.adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global,
adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global: runtime.adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global,
adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_detected: runtime.adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_detected,
adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_effective: runtime.adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_effective,
adaptive_floor_global_cap_raw: runtime.adaptive_floor_global_cap_raw,
@@ -517,6 +545,7 @@ fn map_route_kind(value: UpstreamRouteKind) -> &'static str {
UpstreamRouteKind::Direct => "direct",
UpstreamRouteKind::Socks4 => "socks4",
UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5 => "socks5",
UpstreamRouteKind::Shadowsocks => "shadowsocks",
}
}
+37 -6
View File
@@ -35,11 +35,14 @@ pub(super) struct RuntimeGatesData {
pub(super) conditional_cast_enabled: bool,
pub(super) me_runtime_ready: bool,
pub(super) me2dc_fallback_enabled: bool,
pub(super) me2dc_fast_enabled: bool,
pub(super) use_middle_proxy: bool,
pub(super) route_mode: &'static str,
pub(super) reroute_active: bool,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub(super) reroute_to_direct_at_epoch_secs: Option<u64>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub(super) reroute_reason: Option<&'static str>,
pub(super) startup_status: &'static str,
pub(super) startup_stage: String,
pub(super) startup_progress_pct: f64,
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ pub(super) struct RuntimeGatesData {
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct EffectiveTimeoutLimits {
pub(super) client_first_byte_idle_secs: u64,
pub(super) client_handshake_secs: u64,
pub(super) tg_connect_secs: u64,
pub(super) client_keepalive_secs: u64,
@@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ pub(super) struct EffectiveMiddleProxyLimits {
pub(super) writer_pick_mode: &'static str,
pub(super) writer_pick_sample_size: u8,
pub(super) me2dc_fallback: bool,
pub(super) me2dc_fast: bool,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -95,6 +100,11 @@ pub(super) struct EffectiveUserIpPolicyLimits {
pub(super) window_secs: u64,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct EffectiveUserTcpPolicyLimits {
pub(super) global_each: usize,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct EffectiveLimitsData {
pub(super) update_every_secs: u64,
@@ -104,6 +114,7 @@ pub(super) struct EffectiveLimitsData {
pub(super) upstream: EffectiveUpstreamLimits,
pub(super) middle_proxy: EffectiveMiddleProxyLimits,
pub(super) user_ip_policy: EffectiveUserIpPolicyLimits,
pub(super) user_tcp_policy: EffectiveUserTcpPolicyLimits,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -128,7 +139,8 @@ pub(super) fn build_system_info_data(
.runtime_state
.last_config_reload_epoch_secs
.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let last_config_reload_epoch_secs = (last_reload_epoch_secs > 0).then_some(last_reload_epoch_secs);
let last_config_reload_epoch_secs =
(last_reload_epoch_secs > 0).then_some(last_reload_epoch_secs);
let git_commit = option_env!("TELEMT_GIT_COMMIT")
.or(option_env!("VERGEN_GIT_SHA"))
@@ -153,7 +165,10 @@ pub(super) fn build_system_info_data(
uptime_seconds: shared.stats.uptime_secs(),
config_path: shared.config_path.display().to_string(),
config_hash: revision.to_string(),
config_reload_count: shared.runtime_state.config_reload_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
config_reload_count: shared
.runtime_state
.config_reload_count
.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
last_config_reload_epoch_secs,
}
}
@@ -165,6 +180,8 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_gates_data(
let startup_summary = build_runtime_startup_summary(shared).await;
let route_state = shared.route_runtime.snapshot();
let route_mode = route_state.mode.as_str();
let fast_fallback_enabled =
cfg.general.use_middle_proxy && cfg.general.me2dc_fallback && cfg.general.me2dc_fast;
let reroute_active = cfg.general.use_middle_proxy
&& cfg.general.me2dc_fallback
&& matches!(route_state.mode, RelayRouteMode::Direct);
@@ -173,6 +190,15 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_gates_data(
} else {
None
};
let reroute_reason = if reroute_active {
if fast_fallback_enabled {
Some("fast_not_ready_fallback")
} else {
Some("strict_grace_fallback")
}
} else {
None
};
let me_runtime_ready = if !cfg.general.use_middle_proxy {
true
} else {
@@ -190,10 +216,12 @@ pub(super) async fn build_runtime_gates_data(
conditional_cast_enabled: cfg.general.use_middle_proxy,
me_runtime_ready,
me2dc_fallback_enabled: cfg.general.me2dc_fallback,
me2dc_fast_enabled: fast_fallback_enabled,
use_middle_proxy: cfg.general.use_middle_proxy,
route_mode,
reroute_active,
reroute_to_direct_at_epoch_secs,
reroute_reason,
startup_status: startup_summary.status,
startup_stage: startup_summary.stage,
startup_progress_pct: startup_summary.progress_pct,
@@ -206,8 +234,9 @@ pub(super) fn build_limits_effective_data(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> EffectiveLimitsD
me_reinit_every_secs: cfg.general.effective_me_reinit_every_secs(),
me_pool_force_close_secs: cfg.general.effective_me_pool_force_close_secs(),
timeouts: EffectiveTimeoutLimits {
client_first_byte_idle_secs: cfg.timeouts.client_first_byte_idle_secs,
client_handshake_secs: cfg.timeouts.client_handshake,
tg_connect_secs: cfg.timeouts.tg_connect,
tg_connect_secs: cfg.general.tg_connect,
client_keepalive_secs: cfg.timeouts.client_keepalive,
client_ack_secs: cfg.timeouts.client_ack,
me_one_retry: cfg.timeouts.me_one_retry,
@@ -233,9 +262,7 @@ pub(super) fn build_limits_effective_data(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> EffectiveLimitsD
adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total,
adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override,
adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override: cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override,
adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core,
@@ -261,12 +288,16 @@ pub(super) fn build_limits_effective_data(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> EffectiveLimitsD
writer_pick_mode: me_writer_pick_mode_label(cfg.general.me_writer_pick_mode),
writer_pick_sample_size: cfg.general.me_writer_pick_sample_size,
me2dc_fallback: cfg.general.me2dc_fallback,
me2dc_fast: cfg.general.me2dc_fast,
},
user_ip_policy: EffectiveUserIpPolicyLimits {
global_each: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each,
mode: user_max_unique_ips_mode_label(cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_mode),
window_secs: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_window_secs,
},
user_tcp_policy: EffectiveUserTcpPolicyLimits {
global_each: cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each,
},
}
}
+164 -37
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
None => random_user_secret(),
};
if let Some(ad_tag) = body.user_ad_tag.as_ref() && !is_valid_ad_tag(ad_tag) {
if let Some(ad_tag) = body.user_ad_tag.as_ref()
&& !is_valid_ad_tag(ad_tag)
{
return Err(ApiFailure::bad_request(
"user_ad_tag must be exactly 32 hex characters",
));
@@ -65,12 +67,18 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
));
}
cfg.access.users.insert(body.username.clone(), secret.clone());
cfg.access
.users
.insert(body.username.clone(), secret.clone());
if let Some(ad_tag) = body.user_ad_tag {
cfg.access.user_ad_tags.insert(body.username.clone(), ad_tag);
cfg.access
.user_ad_tags
.insert(body.username.clone(), ad_tag);
}
if let Some(limit) = body.max_tcp_conns {
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert(body.username.clone(), limit);
cfg.access
.user_max_tcp_conns
.insert(body.username.clone(), limit);
}
if let Some(expiration) = expiration {
cfg.access
@@ -78,7 +86,9 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
.insert(body.username.clone(), expiration);
}
if let Some(quota) = body.data_quota_bytes {
cfg.access.user_data_quota.insert(body.username.clone(), quota);
cfg.access
.user_data_quota
.insert(body.username.clone(), quota);
}
let updated_limit = body.max_unique_ips;
@@ -108,11 +118,15 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps);
}
let revision = save_access_sections_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg, &touched_sections).await?;
let revision =
save_access_sections_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg, &touched_sections).await?;
drop(_guard);
if let Some(limit) = updated_limit {
shared.ip_tracker.set_user_limit(&body.username, limit).await;
shared
.ip_tracker
.set_user_limit(&body.username, limit)
.await;
}
let (detected_ip_v4, detected_ip_v6) = shared.detected_link_ips();
@@ -122,6 +136,7 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
&shared.ip_tracker,
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
None,
)
.await;
let user = users
@@ -129,8 +144,16 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
.find(|entry| entry.username == body.username)
.unwrap_or(UserInfo {
username: body.username.clone(),
in_runtime: false,
user_ad_tag: None,
max_tcp_conns: None,
max_tcp_conns: cfg
.access
.user_max_tcp_conns
.get(&body.username)
.copied()
.filter(|limit| *limit > 0)
.or((cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each > 0)
.then_some(cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each)),
expiration_rfc3339: None,
data_quota_bytes: None,
max_unique_ips: updated_limit,
@@ -140,12 +163,7 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
recent_unique_ips: 0,
recent_unique_ips_list: Vec::new(),
total_octets: 0,
links: build_user_links(
&cfg,
&secret,
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
),
links: build_user_links(&cfg, &secret, detected_ip_v4, detected_ip_v6),
});
Ok((CreateUserResponse { user, secret }, revision))
@@ -157,12 +175,16 @@ pub(super) async fn patch_user(
expected_revision: Option<String>,
shared: &ApiShared,
) -> Result<(UserInfo, String), ApiFailure> {
if let Some(secret) = body.secret.as_ref() && !is_valid_user_secret(secret) {
if let Some(secret) = body.secret.as_ref()
&& !is_valid_user_secret(secret)
{
return Err(ApiFailure::bad_request(
"secret must be exactly 32 hex characters",
));
}
if let Some(ad_tag) = body.user_ad_tag.as_ref() && !is_valid_ad_tag(ad_tag) {
if let Some(ad_tag) = body.user_ad_tag.as_ref()
&& !is_valid_ad_tag(ad_tag)
{
return Err(ApiFailure::bad_request(
"user_ad_tag must be exactly 32 hex characters",
));
@@ -187,10 +209,14 @@ pub(super) async fn patch_user(
cfg.access.user_ad_tags.insert(user.to_string(), ad_tag);
}
if let Some(limit) = body.max_tcp_conns {
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
cfg.access
.user_max_tcp_conns
.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
}
if let Some(expiration) = expiration {
cfg.access.user_expirations.insert(user.to_string(), expiration);
cfg.access
.user_expirations
.insert(user.to_string(), expiration);
}
if let Some(quota) = body.data_quota_bytes {
cfg.access.user_data_quota.insert(user.to_string(), quota);
@@ -198,7 +224,9 @@ pub(super) async fn patch_user(
let mut updated_limit = None;
if let Some(limit) = body.max_unique_ips {
cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
cfg.access
.user_max_unique_ips
.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
updated_limit = Some(limit);
}
@@ -217,6 +245,7 @@ pub(super) async fn patch_user(
&shared.ip_tracker,
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
None,
)
.await;
let user_info = users
@@ -263,7 +292,8 @@ pub(super) async fn rotate_secret(
AccessSection::UserDataQuota,
AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps,
];
let revision = save_access_sections_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg, &touched_sections).await?;
let revision =
save_access_sections_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg, &touched_sections).await?;
drop(_guard);
let (detected_ip_v4, detected_ip_v6) = shared.detected_link_ips();
@@ -273,6 +303,7 @@ pub(super) async fn rotate_secret(
&shared.ip_tracker,
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
None,
)
.await;
let user_info = users
@@ -330,7 +361,8 @@ pub(super) async fn delete_user(
AccessSection::UserDataQuota,
AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps,
];
let revision = save_access_sections_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg, &touched_sections).await?;
let revision =
save_access_sections_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg, &touched_sections).await?;
drop(_guard);
shared.ip_tracker.remove_user_limit(user).await;
shared.ip_tracker.clear_user_ips(user).await;
@@ -344,6 +376,7 @@ pub(super) async fn users_from_config(
ip_tracker: &UserIpTracker,
startup_detected_ip_v4: Option<IpAddr>,
startup_detected_ip_v6: Option<IpAddr>,
runtime_cfg: Option<&ProxyConfig>,
) -> Vec<UserInfo> {
let mut names = cfg.access.users.keys().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>();
names.sort();
@@ -365,12 +398,7 @@ pub(super) async fn users_from_config(
.users
.get(&username)
.map(|secret| {
build_user_links(
cfg,
secret,
startup_detected_ip_v4,
startup_detected_ip_v6,
)
build_user_links(cfg, secret, startup_detected_ip_v4, startup_detected_ip_v6)
})
.unwrap_or(UserLinks {
classic: Vec::new(),
@@ -378,8 +406,18 @@ pub(super) async fn users_from_config(
tls: Vec::new(),
});
users.push(UserInfo {
in_runtime: runtime_cfg
.map(|runtime| runtime.access.users.contains_key(&username))
.unwrap_or(false),
user_ad_tag: cfg.access.user_ad_tags.get(&username).cloned(),
max_tcp_conns: cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.get(&username).copied(),
max_tcp_conns: cfg
.access
.user_max_tcp_conns
.get(&username)
.copied()
.filter(|limit| *limit > 0)
.or((cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each > 0)
.then_some(cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each)),
expiration_rfc3339: cfg
.access
.user_expirations
@@ -392,10 +430,8 @@ pub(super) async fn users_from_config(
.get(&username)
.copied()
.filter(|limit| *limit > 0)
.or(
(cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each > 0)
.then_some(cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each),
),
.or((cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each > 0)
.then_some(cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each)),
current_connections: stats.get_user_curr_connects(&username),
active_unique_ips: active_ip_list.len(),
active_unique_ips_list: active_ip_list,
@@ -481,11 +517,11 @@ fn resolve_link_hosts(
push_unique_host(&mut hosts, host);
continue;
}
if let Some(ip) = listener.announce_ip {
if !ip.is_unspecified() {
push_unique_host(&mut hosts, &ip.to_string());
continue;
}
if let Some(ip) = listener.announce_ip
&& !ip.is_unspecified()
{
push_unique_host(&mut hosts, &ip.to_string());
continue;
}
if listener.ip.is_unspecified() {
let detected_ip = if listener.ip.is_ipv4() {
@@ -558,3 +594,94 @@ fn resolve_tls_domains(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Vec<&str> {
}
domains
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::stats::Stats;
#[tokio::test]
async fn users_from_config_reports_effective_tcp_limit_with_global_fallback() {
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.users.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
);
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each = 7;
let stats = Stats::new();
let tracker = UserIpTracker::new();
let users = users_from_config(&cfg, &stats, &tracker, None, None, None).await;
let alice = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "alice")
.expect("alice must be present");
assert!(!alice.in_runtime);
assert_eq!(alice.max_tcp_conns, Some(7));
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert("alice".to_string(), 5);
let users = users_from_config(&cfg, &stats, &tracker, None, None, None).await;
let alice = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "alice")
.expect("alice must be present");
assert!(!alice.in_runtime);
assert_eq!(alice.max_tcp_conns, Some(5));
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert("alice".to_string(), 0);
let users = users_from_config(&cfg, &stats, &tracker, None, None, None).await;
let alice = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "alice")
.expect("alice must be present");
assert!(!alice.in_runtime);
assert_eq!(alice.max_tcp_conns, Some(7));
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each = 0;
let users = users_from_config(&cfg, &stats, &tracker, None, None, None).await;
let alice = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "alice")
.expect("alice must be present");
assert!(!alice.in_runtime);
assert_eq!(alice.max_tcp_conns, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn users_from_config_marks_runtime_membership_when_snapshot_is_provided() {
let mut disk_cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
disk_cfg.access.users.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
);
disk_cfg.access.users.insert(
"bob".to_string(),
"fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210".to_string(),
);
let mut runtime_cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
runtime_cfg.access.users.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
);
let stats = Stats::new();
let tracker = UserIpTracker::new();
let users =
users_from_config(&disk_cfg, &stats, &tracker, None, None, Some(&runtime_cfg)).await;
let alice = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "alice")
.expect("alice must be present");
let bob = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "bob")
.expect("bob must be present");
assert!(alice.in_runtime);
assert!(!bob.in_runtime);
}
}
+455 -96
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,270 @@
//! CLI commands: --init (fire-and-forget setup)
//! CLI commands: --init (fire-and-forget setup), daemon options, subcommands
//!
//! Subcommands:
//! - `start [OPTIONS] [config.toml]` - Start the daemon
//! - `stop [--pid-file PATH]` - Stop a running daemon
//! - `reload [--pid-file PATH]` - Reload configuration (SIGHUP)
//! - `status [--pid-file PATH]` - Check daemon status
//! - `run [OPTIONS] [config.toml]` - Run in foreground (default behavior)
use rand::RngExt;
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;
use rand::Rng;
#[cfg(unix)]
use crate::daemon::{self, DEFAULT_PID_FILE, DaemonOptions};
/// CLI subcommand to execute.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Subcommand {
/// Run the proxy (default, or explicit `run` subcommand).
Run,
/// Start as daemon (`start` subcommand).
Start,
/// Stop a running daemon (`stop` subcommand).
Stop,
/// Reload configuration (`reload` subcommand).
Reload,
/// Check daemon status (`status` subcommand).
Status,
/// Fire-and-forget setup (`--init`).
Init,
}
/// Parsed subcommand with its options.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ParsedCommand {
pub subcommand: Subcommand,
pub pid_file: PathBuf,
pub config_path: String,
#[cfg(unix)]
pub daemon_opts: DaemonOptions,
pub init_opts: Option<InitOptions>,
}
impl Default for ParsedCommand {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
subcommand: Subcommand::Run,
#[cfg(unix)]
pid_file: PathBuf::from(DEFAULT_PID_FILE),
#[cfg(not(unix))]
pid_file: PathBuf::from("/var/run/telemt.pid"),
config_path: "config.toml".to_string(),
#[cfg(unix)]
daemon_opts: DaemonOptions::default(),
init_opts: None,
}
}
}
/// Parse CLI arguments into a command structure.
pub fn parse_command(args: &[String]) -> ParsedCommand {
let mut cmd = ParsedCommand::default();
// Check for --init first (legacy form)
if args.iter().any(|a| a == "--init") {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Init;
cmd.init_opts = parse_init_args(args);
return cmd;
}
// Check for subcommand as first argument
if let Some(first) = args.first() {
match first.as_str() {
"start" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Start;
#[cfg(unix)]
{
cmd.daemon_opts = parse_daemon_args(args);
// Force daemonize for start command
cmd.daemon_opts.daemonize = true;
}
}
"stop" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Stop;
}
"reload" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Reload;
}
"status" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Status;
}
"run" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Run;
#[cfg(unix)]
{
cmd.daemon_opts = parse_daemon_args(args);
}
}
_ => {
// No subcommand, default to Run
#[cfg(unix)]
{
cmd.daemon_opts = parse_daemon_args(args);
}
}
}
}
// Parse remaining options
let mut i = 0;
while i < args.len() {
match args[i].as_str() {
// Skip subcommand names
"start" | "stop" | "reload" | "status" | "run" => {}
// PID file option (for stop/reload/status)
"--pid-file" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
cmd.pid_file = PathBuf::from(&args[i]);
#[cfg(unix)]
{
cmd.daemon_opts.pid_file = Some(cmd.pid_file.clone());
}
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--pid-file=") => {
cmd.pid_file = PathBuf::from(s.trim_start_matches("--pid-file="));
#[cfg(unix)]
{
cmd.daemon_opts.pid_file = Some(cmd.pid_file.clone());
}
}
// Config path (positional, non-flag argument)
s if !s.starts_with('-') => {
cmd.config_path = s.to_string();
}
_ => {}
}
i += 1;
}
cmd
}
/// Execute a subcommand that doesn't require starting the server.
/// Returns `Some(exit_code)` if the command was handled, `None` if server should start.
#[cfg(unix)]
pub fn execute_subcommand(cmd: &ParsedCommand) -> Option<i32> {
match cmd.subcommand {
Subcommand::Stop => Some(cmd_stop(&cmd.pid_file)),
Subcommand::Reload => Some(cmd_reload(&cmd.pid_file)),
Subcommand::Status => Some(cmd_status(&cmd.pid_file)),
Subcommand::Init => {
if let Some(opts) = cmd.init_opts.clone() {
match run_init(opts) {
Ok(()) => Some(0),
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("[telemt] Init failed: {}", e);
Some(1)
}
}
} else {
Some(1)
}
}
// Run and Start need the server
Subcommand::Run | Subcommand::Start => None,
}
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
pub fn execute_subcommand(cmd: &ParsedCommand) -> Option<i32> {
match cmd.subcommand {
Subcommand::Stop | Subcommand::Reload | Subcommand::Status => {
eprintln!("[telemt] Subcommand not supported on this platform");
Some(1)
}
Subcommand::Init => {
if let Some(opts) = cmd.init_opts.clone() {
match run_init(opts) {
Ok(()) => Some(0),
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("[telemt] Init failed: {}", e);
Some(1)
}
}
} else {
Some(1)
}
}
Subcommand::Run | Subcommand::Start => None,
}
}
/// Stop command: send SIGTERM to the running daemon.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn cmd_stop(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
use nix::sys::signal::Signal;
println!("Stopping telemt daemon...");
match daemon::signal_pid_file(pid_file, Signal::SIGTERM) {
Ok(()) => {
println!("Stop signal sent successfully");
// Wait for process to exit (up to 10 seconds)
for _ in 0..20 {
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(500));
if let daemon::DaemonStatus::NotRunning = daemon::check_status(pid_file) {
println!("Daemon stopped");
return 0;
}
}
println!("Daemon may still be shutting down");
0
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("Failed to stop daemon: {}", e);
1
}
}
}
/// Reload command: send SIGHUP to trigger config reload.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn cmd_reload(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
use nix::sys::signal::Signal;
println!("Reloading telemt configuration...");
match daemon::signal_pid_file(pid_file, Signal::SIGHUP) {
Ok(()) => {
println!("Reload signal sent successfully");
0
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("Failed to reload daemon: {}", e);
1
}
}
}
/// Status command: check if daemon is running.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn cmd_status(pid_file: &Path) -> i32 {
match daemon::check_status(pid_file) {
daemon::DaemonStatus::Running(pid) => {
println!("telemt is running (pid {})", pid);
0
}
daemon::DaemonStatus::Stale(pid) => {
println!("telemt is not running (stale pid file, was pid {})", pid);
// Clean up stale PID file
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(pid_file);
1
}
daemon::DaemonStatus::NotRunning => {
println!("telemt is not running");
1
}
}
}
/// Options for the init command
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct InitOptions {
pub port: u16,
pub domain: String,
@@ -15,6 +274,64 @@ pub struct InitOptions {
pub no_start: bool,
}
/// Parse daemon-related options from CLI args.
#[cfg(unix)]
pub fn parse_daemon_args(args: &[String]) -> DaemonOptions {
let mut opts = DaemonOptions::default();
let mut i = 0;
while i < args.len() {
match args[i].as_str() {
"--daemon" | "-d" => {
opts.daemonize = true;
}
"--foreground" | "-f" => {
opts.foreground = true;
}
"--pid-file" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
opts.pid_file = Some(PathBuf::from(&args[i]));
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--pid-file=") => {
opts.pid_file = Some(PathBuf::from(s.trim_start_matches("--pid-file=")));
}
"--run-as-user" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
opts.user = Some(args[i].clone());
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--run-as-user=") => {
opts.user = Some(s.trim_start_matches("--run-as-user=").to_string());
}
"--run-as-group" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
opts.group = Some(args[i].clone());
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--run-as-group=") => {
opts.group = Some(s.trim_start_matches("--run-as-group=").to_string());
}
"--working-dir" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
opts.working_dir = Some(PathBuf::from(&args[i]));
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--working-dir=") => {
opts.working_dir = Some(PathBuf::from(s.trim_start_matches("--working-dir=")));
}
_ => {}
}
i += 1;
}
opts
}
impl Default for InitOptions {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
@@ -35,10 +352,10 @@ pub fn parse_init_args(args: &[String]) -> Option<InitOptions> {
if !args.iter().any(|a| a == "--init") {
return None;
}
let mut opts = InitOptions::default();
let mut i = 0;
while i < args.len() {
match args[i].as_str() {
"--port" => {
@@ -78,16 +395,22 @@ pub fn parse_init_args(args: &[String]) -> Option<InitOptions> {
}
i += 1;
}
Some(opts)
}
/// Run the fire-and-forget setup.
pub fn run_init(opts: InitOptions) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
use crate::service::{self, InitSystem, ServiceOptions};
eprintln!("[telemt] Fire-and-forget setup");
eprintln!();
// 1. Generate or validate secret
// 1. Detect init system
let init_system = service::detect_init_system();
eprintln!("[+] Detected init system: {}", init_system);
// 2. Generate or validate secret
let secret = match opts.secret {
Some(s) => {
if s.len() != 32 || !s.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
@@ -98,80 +421,134 @@ pub fn run_init(opts: InitOptions) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
}
None => generate_secret(),
};
eprintln!("[+] Secret: {}", secret);
eprintln!("[+] User: {}", opts.username);
eprintln!("[+] Port: {}", opts.port);
eprintln!("[+] Domain: {}", opts.domain);
// 2. Create config directory
// 3. Create config directory
fs::create_dir_all(&opts.config_dir)?;
let config_path = opts.config_dir.join("config.toml");
// 3. Write config
// 4. Write config
let config_content = generate_config(&opts.username, &secret, opts.port, &opts.domain);
fs::write(&config_path, &config_content)?;
eprintln!("[+] Config written to {}", config_path.display());
// 4. Write systemd unit
let exe_path = std::env::current_exe()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| PathBuf::from("/usr/local/bin/telemt"));
let unit_path = Path::new("/etc/systemd/system/telemt.service");
let unit_content = generate_systemd_unit(&exe_path, &config_path);
match fs::write(unit_path, &unit_content) {
// 5. Generate and write service file
let exe_path =
std::env::current_exe().unwrap_or_else(|_| PathBuf::from("/usr/local/bin/telemt"));
let service_opts = ServiceOptions {
exe_path: &exe_path,
config_path: &config_path,
user: None, // Let systemd/init handle user
group: None,
pid_file: "/var/run/telemt.pid",
working_dir: Some("/var/lib/telemt"),
description: "Telemt MTProxy - Telegram MTProto Proxy",
};
let service_path = service::service_file_path(init_system);
let service_content = service::generate_service_file(init_system, &service_opts);
// Ensure parent directory exists
if let Some(parent) = Path::new(service_path).parent() {
let _ = fs::create_dir_all(parent);
}
match fs::write(service_path, &service_content) {
Ok(()) => {
eprintln!("[+] Systemd unit written to {}", unit_path.display());
eprintln!("[+] Service file written to {}", service_path);
// Make script executable for OpenRC/FreeBSD
#[cfg(unix)]
if init_system == InitSystem::OpenRC || init_system == InitSystem::FreeBSDRc {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
let mut perms = fs::metadata(service_path)?.permissions();
perms.set_mode(0o755);
fs::set_permissions(service_path, perms)?;
}
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("[!] Cannot write systemd unit (run as root?): {}", e);
eprintln!("[!] Manual unit file content:");
eprintln!("{}", unit_content);
// Still print links and config
eprintln!("[!] Cannot write service file (run as root?): {}", e);
eprintln!("[!] Manual service file content:");
eprintln!("{}", service_content);
// Still print links and installation instructions
eprintln!();
eprintln!("{}", service::installation_instructions(init_system));
print_links(&opts.username, &secret, opts.port, &opts.domain);
return Ok(());
}
}
// 5. Reload systemd
run_cmd("systemctl", &["daemon-reload"]);
// 6. Enable service
run_cmd("systemctl", &["enable", "telemt.service"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service enabled");
// 7. Start service (unless --no-start)
if !opts.no_start {
run_cmd("systemctl", &["start", "telemt.service"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service started");
// Brief delay then check status
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1));
let status = Command::new("systemctl")
.args(["is-active", "telemt.service"])
.output();
match status {
Ok(out) if out.status.success() => {
eprintln!("[+] Service is running");
}
_ => {
eprintln!("[!] Service may not have started correctly");
eprintln!("[!] Check: journalctl -u telemt.service -n 20");
// 6. Install and enable service based on init system
match init_system {
InitSystem::Systemd => {
run_cmd("systemctl", &["daemon-reload"]);
run_cmd("systemctl", &["enable", "telemt.service"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service enabled");
if !opts.no_start {
run_cmd("systemctl", &["start", "telemt.service"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service started");
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(1));
let status = Command::new("systemctl")
.args(["is-active", "telemt.service"])
.output();
match status {
Ok(out) if out.status.success() => {
eprintln!("[+] Service is running");
}
_ => {
eprintln!("[!] Service may not have started correctly");
eprintln!("[!] Check: journalctl -u telemt.service -n 20");
}
}
} else {
eprintln!("[+] Service not started (--no-start)");
eprintln!("[+] Start manually: systemctl start telemt.service");
}
}
} else {
eprintln!("[+] Service not started (--no-start)");
eprintln!("[+] Start manually: systemctl start telemt.service");
InitSystem::OpenRC => {
run_cmd("rc-update", &["add", "telemt", "default"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service enabled");
if !opts.no_start {
run_cmd("rc-service", &["telemt", "start"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service started");
} else {
eprintln!("[+] Service not started (--no-start)");
eprintln!("[+] Start manually: rc-service telemt start");
}
}
InitSystem::FreeBSDRc => {
run_cmd("sysrc", &["telemt_enable=YES"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service enabled");
if !opts.no_start {
run_cmd("service", &["telemt", "start"]);
eprintln!("[+] Service started");
} else {
eprintln!("[+] Service not started (--no-start)");
eprintln!("[+] Start manually: service telemt start");
}
}
InitSystem::Unknown => {
eprintln!("[!] Unknown init system - service file written but not installed");
eprintln!("[!] You may need to install it manually");
}
}
eprintln!();
// 8. Print links
// 7. Print links
print_links(&opts.username, &secret, opts.port, &opts.domain);
Ok(())
}
@@ -183,7 +560,7 @@ fn generate_secret() -> String {
fn generate_config(username: &str, secret: &str, port: u16, domain: &str) -> String {
format!(
r#"# Telemt MTProxy — auto-generated config
r#"# Telemt MTProxy — auto-generated config
# Re-run `telemt --init` to regenerate
show_link = ["{username}"]
@@ -198,8 +575,16 @@ desync_all_full = false
update_every = 43200
hardswap = false
me_pool_drain_ttl_secs = 90
me_instadrain = false
me_pool_drain_threshold = 32
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs = 10
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer = 2
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core = 16
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms = 1000
me_bind_stale_mode = "never"
me_pool_min_fresh_ratio = 0.8
me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs = 120
me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs = 90
tg_connect = 10
[network]
ipv4 = true
@@ -225,8 +610,8 @@ ip = "0.0.0.0"
ip = "::"
[timeouts]
client_handshake = 15
tg_connect = 10
client_first_byte_idle_secs = 300
client_handshake = 60
client_keepalive = 60
client_ack = 300
@@ -238,6 +623,7 @@ fake_cert_len = 2048
tls_full_cert_ttl_secs = 90
[access]
user_max_tcp_conns_global_each = 0
replay_check_len = 65536
replay_window_secs = 120
ignore_time_skew = false
@@ -257,35 +643,6 @@ weight = 10
)
}
fn generate_systemd_unit(exe_path: &Path, config_path: &Path) -> String {
format!(
r#"[Unit]
Description=Telemt MTProxy
Documentation=https://github.com/nicepkg/telemt
After=network-online.target
Wants=network-online.target
[Service]
Type=simple
ExecStart={exe} {config}
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
LimitNOFILE=65535
# Security hardening
NoNewPrivileges=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
ReadWritePaths=/etc/telemt
PrivateTmp=true
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
"#,
exe = exe_path.display(),
config = config_path.display(),
)
}
fn run_cmd(cmd: &str, args: &[&str]) {
match Command::new(cmd).args(args).output() {
Ok(output) => {
@@ -302,11 +659,13 @@ fn run_cmd(cmd: &str, args: &[&str]) {
fn print_links(username: &str, secret: &str, port: u16, domain: &str) {
let domain_hex = hex::encode(domain);
println!("=== Proxy Links ===");
println!("[{}]", username);
println!(" EE-TLS: tg://proxy?server=YOUR_SERVER_IP&port={}&secret=ee{}{}",
port, secret, domain_hex);
println!(
" EE-TLS: tg://proxy?server=YOUR_SERVER_IP&port={}&secret=ee{}{}",
port, secret, domain_hex
);
println!();
println!("Replace YOUR_SERVER_IP with your server's public IP.");
println!("The proxy will auto-detect and display the correct link on startup.");
+205 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use ipnetwork::IpNetwork;
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::collections::HashMap;
// Helper defaults kept private to the config module.
const DEFAULT_NETWORK_IPV6: Option<bool> = Some(false);
@@ -27,8 +27,10 @@ const DEFAULT_ME_C2ME_CHANNEL_CAPACITY: usize = 1024;
const DEFAULT_ME_READER_ROUTE_DATA_WAIT_MS: u64 = 2;
const DEFAULT_ME_D2C_FLUSH_BATCH_MAX_FRAMES: usize = 32;
const DEFAULT_ME_D2C_FLUSH_BATCH_MAX_BYTES: usize = 128 * 1024;
const DEFAULT_ME_D2C_FLUSH_BATCH_MAX_DELAY_US: u64 = 1500;
const DEFAULT_ME_D2C_ACK_FLUSH_IMMEDIATE: bool = false;
const DEFAULT_ME_D2C_FLUSH_BATCH_MAX_DELAY_US: u64 = 500;
const DEFAULT_ME_D2C_ACK_FLUSH_IMMEDIATE: bool = true;
const DEFAULT_ME_QUOTA_SOFT_OVERSHOOT_BYTES: u64 = 64 * 1024;
const DEFAULT_ME_D2C_FRAME_BUF_SHRINK_THRESHOLD_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024;
const DEFAULT_DIRECT_RELAY_COPY_BUF_C2S_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024;
const DEFAULT_DIRECT_RELAY_COPY_BUF_S2C_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024;
const DEFAULT_ME_WRITER_PICK_SAMPLE_SIZE: u8 = 3;
@@ -36,7 +38,20 @@ const DEFAULT_ME_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS_UNHEALTHY: u64 = 1000;
const DEFAULT_ME_HEALTH_INTERVAL_MS_HEALTHY: u64 = 3000;
const DEFAULT_ME_ADMISSION_POLL_MS: u64 = 1000;
const DEFAULT_ME_WARN_RATE_LIMIT_MS: u64 = 5000;
const DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_HYBRID_MAX_WAIT_MS: u64 = 3000;
const DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_BLOCKING_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 250;
const DEFAULT_ME_C2ME_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 4000;
const DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_ENABLED: bool = true;
const DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_GRACE_SECS: u64 = 10;
const DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_PER_WRITER: u8 = 2;
const DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_BUDGET_PER_CORE: u16 = 16;
const DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_COOLDOWN_MS: u64 = 1000;
const DEFAULT_USER_MAX_UNIQUE_IPS_WINDOW_SECS: u64 = 30;
const DEFAULT_ACCEPT_PERMIT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 250;
const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_CONTROL_ENABLED: bool = true;
const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_PRESSURE_HIGH_WATERMARK_PCT: u8 = 85;
const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_PRESSURE_LOW_WATERMARK_PCT: u8 = 70;
const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_DELETE_BUDGET_PER_SEC: u64 = 4096;
const DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_CONNECT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 2;
const DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_UNHEALTHY_FAIL_THRESHOLD: u32 = 5;
const DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_CONNECT_BUDGET_MS: u64 = 3000;
@@ -56,6 +71,26 @@ pub(crate) fn default_tls_domain() -> String {
"petrovich.ru".to_string()
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_fetch_scope() -> String {
String::new()
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_fetch_attempt_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
5_000
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_fetch_total_budget_ms() -> u64 {
15_000
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_fetch_strict_route() -> bool {
true
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_fetch_profile_cache_ttl_secs() -> u64 {
600
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_port() -> u16 {
443
}
@@ -79,6 +114,26 @@ pub(crate) fn default_replay_window_secs() -> u64 {
}
pub(crate) fn default_handshake_timeout() -> u64 {
60
}
pub(crate) fn default_client_first_byte_idle_secs() -> u64 {
300
}
pub(crate) fn default_relay_idle_policy_v2_enabled() -> bool {
true
}
pub(crate) fn default_relay_client_idle_soft_secs() -> u64 {
120
}
pub(crate) fn default_relay_client_idle_hard_secs() -> u64 {
360
}
pub(crate) fn default_relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs() -> u64 {
30
}
@@ -87,11 +142,11 @@ pub(crate) fn default_connect_timeout() -> u64 {
}
pub(crate) fn default_keepalive() -> u64 {
60
15
}
pub(crate) fn default_ack_timeout() -> u64 {
300
90
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_one_retry() -> u8 {
12
@@ -114,10 +169,7 @@ pub(crate) fn default_weight() -> u16 {
}
pub(crate) fn default_metrics_whitelist() -> Vec<IpNetwork> {
vec![
"127.0.0.1/32".parse().unwrap(),
"::1/128".parse().unwrap(),
]
vec!["127.0.0.1/32".parse().unwrap(), "::1/128".parse().unwrap()]
}
pub(crate) fn default_api_listen() -> String {
@@ -140,19 +192,55 @@ pub(crate) fn default_api_minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms() -> u64 {
1000
}
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_enabled() -> bool { false }
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms() -> u64 { 1000 }
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_top_n() -> usize { 10 }
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_events_capacity() -> usize { 256 }
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_enabled() -> bool {
false
}
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms() -> u64 {
1000
}
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_top_n() -> usize {
10
}
pub(crate) fn default_api_runtime_edge_events_capacity() -> usize {
256
}
pub(crate) fn default_proxy_protocol_header_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
500
}
pub(crate) fn default_proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs() -> Vec<IpNetwork> {
vec!["0.0.0.0/0".parse().unwrap(), "::/0".parse().unwrap()]
}
pub(crate) fn default_server_max_connections() -> u32 {
10_000
}
pub(crate) fn default_listen_backlog() -> u32 {
1024
}
pub(crate) fn default_accept_permit_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ACCEPT_PERMIT_TIMEOUT_MS
}
pub(crate) fn default_conntrack_control_enabled() -> bool {
DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_CONTROL_ENABLED
}
pub(crate) fn default_conntrack_pressure_high_watermark_pct() -> u8 {
DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_PRESSURE_HIGH_WATERMARK_PCT
}
pub(crate) fn default_conntrack_pressure_low_watermark_pct() -> u8 {
DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_PRESSURE_LOW_WATERMARK_PCT
}
pub(crate) fn default_conntrack_delete_budget_per_sec() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_DELETE_BUDGET_PER_SEC
}
pub(crate) fn default_prefer_4() -> u8 {
4
}
@@ -213,6 +301,10 @@ pub(crate) fn default_me2dc_fallback() -> bool {
true
}
pub(crate) fn default_me2dc_fast() -> bool {
false
}
pub(crate) fn default_keepalive_interval() -> u64 {
8
}
@@ -349,6 +441,14 @@ pub(crate) fn default_me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate() -> bool {
DEFAULT_ME_D2C_ACK_FLUSH_IMMEDIATE
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ME_QUOTA_SOFT_OVERSHOOT_BYTES
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes() -> usize {
DEFAULT_ME_D2C_FRAME_BUF_SHRINK_THRESHOLD_BYTES
}
pub(crate) fn default_direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes() -> usize {
DEFAULT_DIRECT_RELAY_COPY_BUF_C2S_BYTES
}
@@ -377,6 +477,18 @@ pub(crate) fn default_me_warn_rate_limit_ms() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ME_WARN_RATE_LIMIT_MS
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_HYBRID_MAX_WAIT_MS
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_BLOCKING_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_c2me_send_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ME_C2ME_SEND_TIMEOUT_MS
}
pub(crate) fn default_upstream_connect_retry_attempts() -> u32 {
DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_CONNECT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS
}
@@ -469,6 +581,56 @@ pub(crate) fn default_alpn_enforce() -> bool {
true
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_shape_hardening() -> bool {
true
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode() -> bool {
false
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes() -> usize {
512
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes() -> usize {
4096
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur() -> bool {
false
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes() -> usize {
512
}
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub(crate) fn default_mask_relay_max_bytes() -> usize {
5 * 1024 * 1024
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn default_mask_relay_max_bytes() -> usize {
32 * 1024
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
5
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_timing_normalization_enabled() -> bool {
false
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms() -> u64 {
0
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms() -> u64 {
0
}
pub(crate) fn default_stun_servers() -> Vec<String> {
vec![
"stun.l.google.com:5349".to_string(),
@@ -583,15 +745,39 @@ pub(crate) fn default_proxy_secret_len_max() -> usize {
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs() -> u64 {
120
90
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_pool_drain_ttl_secs() -> u64 {
90
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_instadrain() -> bool {
false
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_pool_drain_threshold() -> u64 {
128
32
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled() -> bool {
DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_ENABLED
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_GRACE_SECS
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer() -> u8 {
DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_PER_WRITER
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core() -> u16 {
DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_BUDGET_PER_CORE
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_ME_POOL_DRAIN_SOFT_EVICT_COOLDOWN_MS
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_bind_stale_ttl_secs() -> u64 {
@@ -645,6 +831,10 @@ pub(crate) fn default_user_max_unique_ips_window_secs() -> u64 {
DEFAULT_USER_MAX_UNIQUE_IPS_WINDOW_SECS
}
pub(crate) fn default_user_max_tcp_conns_global_each() -> usize {
0
}
pub(crate) fn default_user_max_unique_ips_global_each() -> usize {
0
}
+219 -101
View File
@@ -31,11 +31,10 @@ use notify::{EventKind, RecursiveMode, Watcher, recommended_watcher};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch};
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use crate::config::{
LogLevel, MeBindStaleMode, MeFloorMode, MeSocksKdfPolicy, MeTelemetryLevel,
MeWriterPickMode,
};
use super::load::{LoadedConfig, ProxyConfig};
use crate::config::{
LogLevel, MeBindStaleMode, MeFloorMode, MeSocksKdfPolicy, MeTelemetryLevel, MeWriterPickMode,
};
const HOT_RELOAD_DEBOUNCE: Duration = Duration::from_millis(50);
@@ -44,16 +43,17 @@ const HOT_RELOAD_DEBOUNCE: Duration = Duration::from_millis(50);
/// Fields that are safe to swap without restarting listeners.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct HotFields {
pub log_level: LogLevel,
pub ad_tag: Option<String>,
pub dns_overrides: Vec<String>,
pub desync_all_full: bool,
pub update_every_secs: u64,
pub me_reinit_every_secs: u64,
pub me_reinit_singleflight: bool,
pub log_level: LogLevel,
pub ad_tag: Option<String>,
pub dns_overrides: Vec<String>,
pub desync_all_full: bool,
pub update_every_secs: u64,
pub me_reinit_every_secs: u64,
pub me_reinit_singleflight: bool,
pub me_reinit_coalesce_window_ms: u64,
pub hardswap: bool,
pub me_pool_drain_ttl_secs: u64,
pub hardswap: bool,
pub me_pool_drain_ttl_secs: u64,
pub me_instadrain: bool,
pub me_pool_drain_threshold: u64,
pub me_pool_min_fresh_ratio: f32,
pub me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs: u64,
@@ -106,18 +106,21 @@ pub struct HotFields {
pub me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes: usize,
pub me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us: u64,
pub me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate: bool,
pub me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes: u64,
pub me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes: usize,
pub direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes: usize,
pub direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes: usize,
pub me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy: u64,
pub me_health_interval_ms_healthy: u64,
pub me_admission_poll_ms: u64,
pub me_warn_rate_limit_ms: u64,
pub users: std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
pub user_ad_tags: std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
pub user_max_tcp_conns: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize>,
pub user_expirations: std::collections::HashMap<String, chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
pub user_data_quota: std::collections::HashMap<String, u64>,
pub user_max_unique_ips: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize>,
pub users: std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
pub user_ad_tags: std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
pub user_max_tcp_conns: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize>,
pub user_max_tcp_conns_global_each: usize,
pub user_expirations: std::collections::HashMap<String, chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
pub user_data_quota: std::collections::HashMap<String, u64>,
pub user_max_unique_ips: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize>,
pub user_max_unique_ips_global_each: usize,
pub user_max_unique_ips_mode: crate::config::UserMaxUniqueIpsMode,
pub user_max_unique_ips_window_secs: u64,
@@ -126,16 +129,17 @@ pub struct HotFields {
impl HotFields {
pub fn from_config(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Self {
Self {
log_level: cfg.general.log_level.clone(),
ad_tag: cfg.general.ad_tag.clone(),
dns_overrides: cfg.network.dns_overrides.clone(),
desync_all_full: cfg.general.desync_all_full,
update_every_secs: cfg.general.effective_update_every_secs(),
me_reinit_every_secs: cfg.general.me_reinit_every_secs,
me_reinit_singleflight: cfg.general.me_reinit_singleflight,
log_level: cfg.general.log_level.clone(),
ad_tag: cfg.general.ad_tag.clone(),
dns_overrides: cfg.network.dns_overrides.clone(),
desync_all_full: cfg.general.desync_all_full,
update_every_secs: cfg.general.effective_update_every_secs(),
me_reinit_every_secs: cfg.general.me_reinit_every_secs,
me_reinit_singleflight: cfg.general.me_reinit_singleflight,
me_reinit_coalesce_window_ms: cfg.general.me_reinit_coalesce_window_ms,
hardswap: cfg.general.hardswap,
me_pool_drain_ttl_secs: cfg.general.me_pool_drain_ttl_secs,
hardswap: cfg.general.hardswap,
me_pool_drain_ttl_secs: cfg.general.me_pool_drain_ttl_secs,
me_instadrain: cfg.general.me_instadrain,
me_pool_drain_threshold: cfg.general.me_pool_drain_threshold,
me_pool_min_fresh_ratio: cfg.general.me_pool_min_fresh_ratio,
me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs: cfg.general.me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs,
@@ -187,15 +191,11 @@ impl HotFields {
me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint,
me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs,
me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs: cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs,
me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total,
me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override,
me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override: cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override,
me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core,
@@ -214,26 +214,37 @@ impl HotFields {
me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global: cfg
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global,
me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms: cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms,
me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms: cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms,
me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct: cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct,
me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms: cfg
.general
.me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms,
me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms: cfg
.general
.me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms,
me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct: cfg
.general
.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct,
me_reader_route_data_wait_ms: cfg.general.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms,
me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames: cfg.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames,
me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes: cfg.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes,
me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us: cfg.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us,
me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate: cfg.general.me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate,
me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes: cfg.general.me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes,
me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes: cfg
.general
.me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes,
direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes: cfg.general.direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes,
direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes: cfg.general.direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes,
me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy: cfg.general.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy,
me_health_interval_ms_healthy: cfg.general.me_health_interval_ms_healthy,
me_admission_poll_ms: cfg.general.me_admission_poll_ms,
me_warn_rate_limit_ms: cfg.general.me_warn_rate_limit_ms,
users: cfg.access.users.clone(),
user_ad_tags: cfg.access.user_ad_tags.clone(),
user_max_tcp_conns: cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.clone(),
user_expirations: cfg.access.user_expirations.clone(),
user_data_quota: cfg.access.user_data_quota.clone(),
user_max_unique_ips: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips.clone(),
users: cfg.access.users.clone(),
user_ad_tags: cfg.access.user_ad_tags.clone(),
user_max_tcp_conns: cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.clone(),
user_max_tcp_conns_global_each: cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each,
user_expirations: cfg.access.user_expirations.clone(),
user_data_quota: cfg.access.user_data_quota.clone(),
user_max_unique_ips: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips.clone(),
user_max_unique_ips_global_each: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each,
user_max_unique_ips_mode: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_mode,
user_max_unique_ips_window_secs: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_window_secs,
@@ -332,7 +343,9 @@ struct ReloadState {
impl ReloadState {
fn new(applied_snapshot_hash: Option<u64>) -> Self {
Self { applied_snapshot_hash }
Self {
applied_snapshot_hash,
}
}
fn is_applied(&self, hash: u64) -> bool {
@@ -431,6 +444,7 @@ fn overlay_hot_fields(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig) -> ProxyConfig {
cfg.general.me_reinit_coalesce_window_ms = new.general.me_reinit_coalesce_window_ms;
cfg.general.hardswap = new.general.hardswap;
cfg.general.me_pool_drain_ttl_secs = new.general.me_pool_drain_ttl_secs;
cfg.general.me_instadrain = new.general.me_instadrain;
cfg.general.me_pool_drain_threshold = new.general.me_pool_drain_threshold;
cfg.general.me_pool_min_fresh_ratio = new.general.me_pool_min_fresh_ratio;
cfg.general.me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs = new.general.me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs;
@@ -478,10 +492,14 @@ fn overlay_hot_fields(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig) -> ProxyConfig {
new.general.me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total;
cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override =
new.general.me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override;
cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core =
new.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core;
cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core =
new.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core;
cfg.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core = new
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core;
cfg.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core = new
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core;
cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core =
new.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core;
cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core =
@@ -501,6 +519,9 @@ fn overlay_hot_fields(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig) -> ProxyConfig {
cfg.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes = new.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes;
cfg.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us = new.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us;
cfg.general.me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate = new.general.me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate;
cfg.general.me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes = new.general.me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes;
cfg.general.me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes =
new.general.me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes;
cfg.general.direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes = new.general.direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes;
cfg.general.direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes = new.general.direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes;
cfg.general.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy = new.general.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy;
@@ -511,6 +532,7 @@ fn overlay_hot_fields(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig) -> ProxyConfig {
cfg.access.users = new.access.users.clone();
cfg.access.user_ad_tags = new.access.user_ad_tags.clone();
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns = new.access.user_max_tcp_conns.clone();
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each = new.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each;
cfg.access.user_expirations = new.access.user_expirations.clone();
cfg.access.user_data_quota = new.access.user_data_quota.clone();
cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips = new.access.user_max_unique_ips.clone();
@@ -540,8 +562,7 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
|| old.server.api.minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms
!= new.server.api.minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms
|| old.server.api.runtime_edge_enabled != new.server.api.runtime_edge_enabled
|| old.server.api.runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms
!= new.server.api.runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms
|| old.server.api.runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms != new.server.api.runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms
|| old.server.api.runtime_edge_top_n != new.server.api.runtime_edge_top_n
|| old.server.api.runtime_edge_events_capacity
!= new.server.api.runtime_edge_events_capacity
@@ -552,6 +573,7 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
}
if old.server.proxy_protocol != new.server.proxy_protocol
|| !listeners_equal(&old.server.listeners, &new.server.listeners)
|| old.server.listen_backlog != new.server.listen_backlog
|| old.server.listen_addr_ipv4 != new.server.listen_addr_ipv4
|| old.server.listen_addr_ipv6 != new.server.listen_addr_ipv6
|| old.server.listen_tcp != new.server.listen_tcp
@@ -563,6 +585,7 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
}
if old.censorship.tls_domain != new.censorship.tls_domain
|| old.censorship.tls_domains != new.censorship.tls_domains
|| old.censorship.tls_fetch_scope != new.censorship.tls_fetch_scope
|| old.censorship.mask != new.censorship.mask
|| old.censorship.mask_host != new.censorship.mask_host
|| old.censorship.mask_port != new.censorship.mask_port
@@ -576,6 +599,22 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
|| old.censorship.tls_full_cert_ttl_secs != new.censorship.tls_full_cert_ttl_secs
|| old.censorship.alpn_enforce != new.censorship.alpn_enforce
|| old.censorship.mask_proxy_protocol != new.censorship.mask_proxy_protocol
|| old.censorship.mask_shape_hardening != new.censorship.mask_shape_hardening
|| old.censorship.mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes
!= new.censorship.mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes
|| old.censorship.mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes != new.censorship.mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes
|| old.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur != new.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur
|| old.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes
!= new.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes
|| old.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes != new.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes
|| old.censorship.mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms
!= new.censorship.mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms
|| old.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_enabled
!= new.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_enabled
|| old.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms
!= new.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms
|| old.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms
!= new.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms
{
warned = true;
warn!("config reload: censorship settings changed; restart required");
@@ -616,6 +655,9 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
}
if old.general.me_route_no_writer_mode != new.general.me_route_no_writer_mode
|| old.general.me_route_no_writer_wait_ms != new.general.me_route_no_writer_wait_ms
|| old.general.me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms != new.general.me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms
|| old.general.me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms
!= new.general.me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms
|| old.general.me_route_inline_recovery_attempts
!= new.general.me_route_inline_recovery_attempts
|| old.general.me_route_inline_recovery_wait_ms
@@ -634,9 +676,11 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
warned = true;
warn!("config reload: general.me_init_retry_attempts changed; restart required");
}
if old.general.me2dc_fallback != new.general.me2dc_fallback {
if old.general.me2dc_fallback != new.general.me2dc_fallback
|| old.general.me2dc_fast != new.general.me2dc_fast
{
warned = true;
warn!("config reload: general.me2dc_fallback changed; restart required");
warn!("config reload: general.me2dc_fallback/me2dc_fast changed; restart required");
}
if old.general.proxy_config_v4_cache_path != new.general.proxy_config_v4_cache_path
|| old.general.proxy_config_v6_cache_path != new.general.proxy_config_v6_cache_path
@@ -655,6 +699,7 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
if old.general.upstream_connect_retry_attempts != new.general.upstream_connect_retry_attempts
|| old.general.upstream_connect_retry_backoff_ms
!= new.general.upstream_connect_retry_backoff_ms
|| old.general.tg_connect != new.general.tg_connect
|| old.general.upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold
!= new.general.upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold
|| old.general.upstream_connect_failfast_hard_errors
@@ -805,6 +850,12 @@ fn log_changes(
old_hot.me_pool_drain_ttl_secs, new_hot.me_pool_drain_ttl_secs,
);
}
if old_hot.me_instadrain != new_hot.me_instadrain {
info!(
"config reload: me_instadrain: {} → {}",
old_hot.me_instadrain, new_hot.me_instadrain,
);
}
if old_hot.me_pool_drain_threshold != new_hot.me_pool_drain_threshold {
info!(
@@ -845,8 +896,7 @@ fn log_changes(
{
info!(
"config reload: me_bind_stale: mode={:?} ttl={}s",
new_hot.me_bind_stale_mode,
new_hot.me_bind_stale_ttl_secs
new_hot.me_bind_stale_mode, new_hot.me_bind_stale_ttl_secs
);
}
if old_hot.me_secret_atomic_snapshot != new_hot.me_secret_atomic_snapshot
@@ -926,8 +976,7 @@ fn log_changes(
if old_hot.me_socks_kdf_policy != new_hot.me_socks_kdf_policy {
info!(
"config reload: me_socks_kdf_policy: {:?} → {:?}",
old_hot.me_socks_kdf_policy,
new_hot.me_socks_kdf_policy,
old_hot.me_socks_kdf_policy, new_hot.me_socks_kdf_policy,
);
}
@@ -981,8 +1030,7 @@ fn log_changes(
|| old_hot.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct
!= new_hot.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct
|| old_hot.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms != new_hot.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms
|| old_hot.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy
!= new_hot.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy
|| old_hot.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy != new_hot.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy
|| old_hot.me_health_interval_ms_healthy != new_hot.me_health_interval_ms_healthy
|| old_hot.me_admission_poll_ms != new_hot.me_admission_poll_ms
|| old_hot.me_warn_rate_limit_ms != new_hot.me_warn_rate_limit_ms
@@ -1004,34 +1052,47 @@ fn log_changes(
|| old_hot.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes != new_hot.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes
|| old_hot.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us != new_hot.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us
|| old_hot.me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate != new_hot.me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate
|| old_hot.me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes != new_hot.me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes
|| old_hot.me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes
!= new_hot.me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes
|| old_hot.direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes != new_hot.direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes
|| old_hot.direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes != new_hot.direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes
{
info!(
"config reload: relay_tuning: me_d2c_frames={} me_d2c_bytes={} me_d2c_delay_us={} me_ack_flush_immediate={} direct_buf_c2s={} direct_buf_s2c={}",
"config reload: relay_tuning: me_d2c_frames={} me_d2c_bytes={} me_d2c_delay_us={} me_ack_flush_immediate={} me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes={} me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes={} direct_buf_c2s={} direct_buf_s2c={}",
new_hot.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames,
new_hot.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes,
new_hot.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us,
new_hot.me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate,
new_hot.me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes,
new_hot.me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes,
new_hot.direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes,
new_hot.direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes,
);
}
if old_hot.users != new_hot.users {
let mut added: Vec<&String> = new_hot.users.keys()
let mut added: Vec<&String> = new_hot
.users
.keys()
.filter(|u| !old_hot.users.contains_key(*u))
.collect();
added.sort();
let mut removed: Vec<&String> = old_hot.users.keys()
let mut removed: Vec<&String> = old_hot
.users
.keys()
.filter(|u| !new_hot.users.contains_key(*u))
.collect();
removed.sort();
let mut changed: Vec<&String> = new_hot.users.keys()
let mut changed: Vec<&String> = new_hot
.users
.keys()
.filter(|u| {
old_hot.users.get(*u)
old_hot
.users
.get(*u)
.map(|s| s != &new_hot.users[*u])
.unwrap_or(false)
})
@@ -1041,10 +1102,18 @@ fn log_changes(
if !added.is_empty() {
info!(
"config reload: users added: [{}]",
added.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(", ")
added
.iter()
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ")
);
let host = resolve_link_host(new_cfg, detected_ip_v4, detected_ip_v6);
let port = new_cfg.general.links.public_port.unwrap_or(new_cfg.server.port);
let port = new_cfg
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(new_cfg.server.port);
for user in &added {
if let Some(secret) = new_hot.users.get(*user) {
print_user_links(user, secret, &host, port, new_cfg);
@@ -1054,13 +1123,21 @@ fn log_changes(
if !removed.is_empty() {
info!(
"config reload: users removed: [{}]",
removed.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(", ")
removed
.iter()
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ")
);
}
if !changed.is_empty() {
info!(
"config reload: users secret changed: [{}]",
changed.iter().map(|s| s.as_str()).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(", ")
changed
.iter()
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ")
);
}
}
@@ -1071,6 +1148,12 @@ fn log_changes(
new_hot.user_max_tcp_conns.len()
);
}
if old_hot.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each != new_hot.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each {
info!(
"config reload: user_max_tcp_conns policy global_each={}",
new_hot.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each
);
}
if old_hot.user_expirations != new_hot.user_expirations {
info!(
"config reload: user_expirations updated ({} entries)",
@@ -1091,8 +1174,7 @@ fn log_changes(
}
if old_hot.user_max_unique_ips_global_each != new_hot.user_max_unique_ips_global_each
|| old_hot.user_max_unique_ips_mode != new_hot.user_max_unique_ips_mode
|| old_hot.user_max_unique_ips_window_secs
!= new_hot.user_max_unique_ips_window_secs
|| old_hot.user_max_unique_ips_window_secs != new_hot.user_max_unique_ips_window_secs
{
info!(
"config reload: user_max_unique_ips policy global_each={} mode={:?} window={}s",
@@ -1127,7 +1209,10 @@ fn reload_config(
let next_manifest = WatchManifest::from_source_files(&source_files);
if let Err(e) = new_cfg.validate() {
error!("config reload: validation failed: {}; keeping old config", e);
error!(
"config reload: validation failed: {}; keeping old config",
e
);
return Some(next_manifest);
}
@@ -1192,7 +1277,7 @@ pub fn spawn_config_watcher(
) -> (watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>, watch::Receiver<LogLevel>) {
let initial_level = initial.general.log_level.clone();
let (config_tx, config_rx) = watch::channel(initial);
let (log_tx, log_rx) = watch::channel(initial_level);
let (log_tx, log_rx) = watch::channel(initial_level);
let config_path = normalize_watch_path(&config_path);
let initial_loaded = ProxyConfig::load_with_metadata(&config_path).ok();
@@ -1209,25 +1294,29 @@ pub fn spawn_config_watcher(
let tx_inotify = notify_tx.clone();
let manifest_for_inotify = manifest_state.clone();
let mut inotify_watcher = match recommended_watcher(move |res: notify::Result<notify::Event>| {
let Ok(event) = res else { return };
if !matches!(event.kind, EventKind::Modify(_) | EventKind::Create(_) | EventKind::Remove(_)) {
return;
}
let is_our_file = manifest_for_inotify
.read()
.map(|manifest| manifest.matches_event_paths(&event.paths))
.unwrap_or(false);
if is_our_file {
let _ = tx_inotify.try_send(());
}
}) {
Ok(watcher) => Some(watcher),
Err(e) => {
warn!("config watcher: inotify unavailable: {}", e);
None
}
};
let mut inotify_watcher =
match recommended_watcher(move |res: notify::Result<notify::Event>| {
let Ok(event) = res else { return };
if !matches!(
event.kind,
EventKind::Modify(_) | EventKind::Create(_) | EventKind::Remove(_)
) {
return;
}
let is_our_file = manifest_for_inotify
.read()
.map(|manifest| manifest.matches_event_paths(&event.paths))
.unwrap_or(false);
if is_our_file {
let _ = tx_inotify.try_send(());
}
}) {
Ok(watcher) => Some(watcher),
Err(e) => {
warn!("config watcher: inotify unavailable: {}", e);
None
}
};
apply_watch_manifest(
inotify_watcher.as_mut(),
Option::<&mut notify::poll::PollWatcher>::None,
@@ -1243,7 +1332,10 @@ pub fn spawn_config_watcher(
let mut poll_watcher = match notify::poll::PollWatcher::new(
move |res: notify::Result<notify::Event>| {
let Ok(event) = res else { return };
if !matches!(event.kind, EventKind::Modify(_) | EventKind::Create(_) | EventKind::Remove(_)) {
if !matches!(
event.kind,
EventKind::Modify(_) | EventKind::Create(_) | EventKind::Remove(_)
) {
return;
}
let is_our_file = manifest_for_poll
@@ -1291,7 +1383,9 @@ pub fn spawn_config_watcher(
}
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
if notify_rx.recv().await.is_none() { break; }
if notify_rx.recv().await.is_none() {
break;
}
// Debounce: drain extra events that arrive within a short quiet window.
tokio::time::sleep(HOT_RELOAD_DEBOUNCE).await;
@@ -1393,7 +1487,10 @@ mod tests {
new.server.port = old.server.port.saturating_add(1);
let applied = overlay_hot_fields(&old, &new);
assert_eq!(HotFields::from_config(&old), HotFields::from_config(&applied));
assert_eq!(
HotFields::from_config(&old),
HotFields::from_config(&applied)
);
assert_eq!(applied.server.port, old.server.port);
}
@@ -1412,7 +1509,10 @@ mod tests {
applied.general.me_bind_stale_mode,
new.general.me_bind_stale_mode
);
assert_ne!(HotFields::from_config(&old), HotFields::from_config(&applied));
assert_ne!(
HotFields::from_config(&old),
HotFields::from_config(&applied)
);
}
#[test]
@@ -1426,7 +1526,10 @@ mod tests {
applied.general.me_keepalive_interval_secs,
old.general.me_keepalive_interval_secs
);
assert_eq!(HotFields::from_config(&old), HotFields::from_config(&applied));
assert_eq!(
HotFields::from_config(&old),
HotFields::from_config(&applied)
);
}
#[test]
@@ -1438,7 +1541,10 @@ mod tests {
let applied = overlay_hot_fields(&old, &new);
assert_eq!(applied.general.hardswap, new.general.hardswap);
assert_eq!(applied.general.use_middle_proxy, old.general.use_middle_proxy);
assert_eq!(
applied.general.use_middle_proxy,
old.general.use_middle_proxy
);
assert!(!config_equal(&applied, &new));
}
@@ -1450,14 +1556,19 @@ mod tests {
write_reload_config(&path, Some(initial_tag), None);
let initial_cfg = Arc::new(ProxyConfig::load(&path).unwrap());
let initial_hash = ProxyConfig::load_with_metadata(&path).unwrap().rendered_hash;
let initial_hash = ProxyConfig::load_with_metadata(&path)
.unwrap()
.rendered_hash;
let (config_tx, _config_rx) = watch::channel(initial_cfg.clone());
let (log_tx, _log_rx) = watch::channel(initial_cfg.general.log_level.clone());
let mut reload_state = ReloadState::new(Some(initial_hash));
write_reload_config(&path, Some(final_tag), None);
reload_config(&path, &config_tx, &log_tx, None, None, &mut reload_state).unwrap();
assert_eq!(config_tx.borrow().general.ad_tag.as_deref(), Some(final_tag));
assert_eq!(
config_tx.borrow().general.ad_tag.as_deref(),
Some(final_tag)
);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
}
@@ -1470,7 +1581,9 @@ mod tests {
write_reload_config(&path, Some(initial_tag), None);
let initial_cfg = Arc::new(ProxyConfig::load(&path).unwrap());
let initial_hash = ProxyConfig::load_with_metadata(&path).unwrap().rendered_hash;
let initial_hash = ProxyConfig::load_with_metadata(&path)
.unwrap()
.rendered_hash;
let (config_tx, _config_rx) = watch::channel(initial_cfg.clone());
let (log_tx, _log_rx) = watch::channel(initial_cfg.general.log_level.clone());
let mut reload_state = ReloadState::new(Some(initial_hash));
@@ -1493,7 +1606,9 @@ mod tests {
write_reload_config(&path, Some(initial_tag), None);
let initial_cfg = Arc::new(ProxyConfig::load(&path).unwrap());
let initial_hash = ProxyConfig::load_with_metadata(&path).unwrap().rendered_hash;
let initial_hash = ProxyConfig::load_with_metadata(&path)
.unwrap()
.rendered_hash;
let (config_tx, _config_rx) = watch::channel(initial_cfg.clone());
let (log_tx, _log_rx) = watch::channel(initial_cfg.general.log_level.clone());
let mut reload_state = ReloadState::new(Some(initial_hash));
@@ -1507,7 +1622,10 @@ mod tests {
write_reload_config(&path, Some(final_tag), None);
reload_config(&path, &config_tx, &log_tx, None, None, &mut reload_state).unwrap();
assert_eq!(config_tx.borrow().general.ad_tag.as_deref(), Some(final_tag));
assert_eq!(
config_tx.borrow().general.ad_tag.as_deref(),
Some(final_tag)
);
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
}
+1000 -36
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
//! Configuration.
pub(crate) mod defaults;
mod types;
mod load;
pub mod hot_reload;
mod load;
mod types;
pub use load::ProxyConfig;
pub use types::*;
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
use super::*;
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
fn write_temp_config(contents: &str) -> PathBuf {
let nonce = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("system time must be after unix epoch")
.as_nanos();
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt-idle-policy-{nonce}.toml"));
fs::write(&path, contents).expect("temp config write must succeed");
path
}
fn remove_temp_config(path: &PathBuf) {
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
#[test]
fn default_timeouts_enable_apple_compatible_handshake_profile() {
let cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
assert_eq!(cfg.timeouts.client_first_byte_idle_secs, 300);
assert_eq!(cfg.timeouts.client_handshake, 60);
}
#[test]
fn load_accepts_zero_first_byte_idle_timeout_as_legacy_opt_out() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[timeouts]
client_first_byte_idle_secs = 0
"#,
);
let cfg = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect("config with zero first-byte idle timeout must load");
assert_eq!(cfg.timeouts.client_first_byte_idle_secs, 0);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_relay_hard_idle_smaller_than_soft_idle_with_clear_error() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[timeouts]
relay_client_idle_soft_secs = 120
relay_client_idle_hard_secs = 60
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("config with hard<soft must fail");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains(
"timeouts.relay_client_idle_hard_secs must be >= timeouts.relay_client_idle_soft_secs"
),
"error must explain the violated hard>=soft invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_relay_grace_larger_than_hard_idle_with_clear_error() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[timeouts]
relay_client_idle_soft_secs = 60
relay_client_idle_hard_secs = 120
relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs = 121
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("config with grace>hard must fail");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("timeouts.relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs must be <= timeouts.relay_client_idle_hard_secs"),
"error must explain the violated grace<=hard invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_zero_handshake_timeout_with_clear_error() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[timeouts]
client_handshake = 0
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("config with zero handshake timeout must fail");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("timeouts.client_handshake must be > 0"),
"error must explain that handshake timeout must be positive, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
use super::*;
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
fn write_temp_config(contents: &str) -> PathBuf {
let nonce = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("system time must be after unix epoch")
.as_nanos();
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
"telemt-load-mask-prefetch-timeout-security-{nonce}.toml"
));
fs::write(&path, contents).expect("temp config write must succeed");
path
}
fn remove_temp_config(path: &PathBuf) {
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_below_min_bound() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms = 4
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path)
.expect_err("prefetch timeout below minimum security bound must be rejected");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms must be within [5, 50]"),
"error must explain timeout bound invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_above_max_bound() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms = 51
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path)
.expect_err("prefetch timeout above max security bound must be rejected");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms must be within [5, 50]"),
"error must explain timeout bound invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_accepts_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_within_bounds() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms = 20
"#,
);
let cfg =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect("prefetch timeout within security bounds must be accepted");
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms, 20);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
use super::*;
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
fn write_temp_config(contents: &str) -> PathBuf {
let nonce = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("system time must be after unix epoch")
.as_nanos();
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt-load-mask-shape-security-{nonce}.toml"));
fs::write(&path, contents).expect("temp config write must succeed");
path
}
fn remove_temp_config(path: &PathBuf) {
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_zero_mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes = 0
mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes = 4096
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("zero mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes must be rejected");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes must be > 0"),
"error must explain floor>0 invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_mask_shape_bucket_cap_less_than_floor() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes = 1024
mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes = 512
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes < floor must be rejected");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains(
"censorship.mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes must be >= censorship.mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes"
),
"error must explain cap>=floor invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_accepts_mask_shape_bucket_cap_equal_to_floor() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_hardening = true
mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes = 1024
mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes = 1024
"#,
);
let cfg = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect("equal cap and floor must be accepted");
assert!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_hardening);
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes, 1024);
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes, 1024);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_above_cap_blur_when_shape_hardening_disabled() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_hardening = false
mask_shape_above_cap_blur = true
mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes = 64
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("above-cap blur must require shape hardening enabled");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains(
"censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur requires censorship.mask_shape_hardening = true"
),
"error must explain blur prerequisite, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_above_cap_blur_with_zero_max_bytes() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_hardening = true
mask_shape_above_cap_blur = true
mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes = 0
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("above-cap blur max bytes must be > 0 when enabled");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes must be > 0 when censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur is enabled"),
"error must explain blur max bytes invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_timing_normalization_floor_zero_when_enabled() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_timing_normalization_enabled = true
mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms = 0
mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms = 200
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("timing normalization floor must be > 0 when enabled");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms must be > 0 when censorship.mask_timing_normalization_enabled is true"),
"error must explain timing floor invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_timing_normalization_ceiling_below_floor() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_timing_normalization_enabled = true
mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms = 220
mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms = 200
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("timing normalization ceiling must be >= floor");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms must be >= censorship.mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms"),
"error must explain timing ceiling/floor invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_accepts_valid_timing_normalization_and_above_cap_blur_config() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_hardening = true
mask_shape_above_cap_blur = true
mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes = 128
mask_timing_normalization_enabled = true
mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms = 150
mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms = 240
"#,
);
let cfg = ProxyConfig::load(&path)
.expect("valid blur and timing normalization settings must be accepted");
assert!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_hardening);
assert!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur);
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes, 128);
assert!(cfg.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_enabled);
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms, 150);
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms, 240);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_aggressive_shape_mode_when_shape_hardening_disabled() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_hardening = false
mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode = true
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path)
.expect_err("aggressive shape hardening mode must require shape hardening enabled");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode requires censorship.mask_shape_hardening = true"),
"error must explain aggressive-mode prerequisite, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_accepts_aggressive_shape_mode_when_shape_hardening_enabled() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_shape_hardening = true
mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode = true
mask_shape_above_cap_blur = true
mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes = 8
"#,
);
let cfg = ProxyConfig::load(&path)
.expect("aggressive shape hardening mode should be accepted when prerequisites are met");
assert!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_hardening);
assert!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode);
assert!(cfg.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_zero_mask_relay_max_bytes() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_relay_max_bytes = 0
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("mask_relay_max_bytes must be > 0");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes must be > 0"),
"error must explain non-zero relay cap invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_mask_relay_max_bytes_above_upper_bound() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_relay_max_bytes = 67108865
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("mask_relay_max_bytes above hard cap must be rejected");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes must be <= 67108864"),
"error must explain relay cap upper bound invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_accepts_valid_mask_relay_max_bytes() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
mask_relay_max_bytes = 8388608
"#,
);
let cfg = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect("valid mask_relay_max_bytes must be accepted");
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes, 8_388_608);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
use super::*;
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
fn write_temp_config(contents: &str) -> PathBuf {
let nonce = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("system time must be after unix epoch")
.as_nanos();
let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt-load-security-{nonce}.toml"));
fs::write(&path, contents).expect("temp config write must succeed");
path
}
fn remove_temp_config(path: &PathBuf) {
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_server_hello_delay_equal_to_handshake_timeout_budget() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[timeouts]
client_handshake = 1
[censorship]
server_hello_delay_max_ms = 1000
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("delay equal to handshake timeout must be rejected");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains(
"censorship.server_hello_delay_max_ms must be < timeouts.client_handshake * 1000"
),
"error must explain delay<timeout invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_server_hello_delay_larger_than_handshake_timeout_budget() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[timeouts]
client_handshake = 1
[censorship]
server_hello_delay_max_ms = 1500
"#,
);
let err =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("delay larger than handshake timeout must be rejected");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains(
"censorship.server_hello_delay_max_ms must be < timeouts.client_handshake * 1000"
),
"error must explain delay<timeout invariant, got: {msg}"
);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
#[test]
fn load_accepts_server_hello_delay_strictly_below_handshake_timeout_budget() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[timeouts]
client_handshake = 1
[censorship]
server_hello_delay_max_ms = 999
"#,
);
let cfg =
ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect("delay below handshake timeout budget must be accepted");
assert_eq!(cfg.timeouts.client_handshake, 1);
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.server_hello_delay_max_ms, 999);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}
+461 -36
View File
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ impl MeSocksKdfPolicy {
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum MeBindStaleMode {
Never,
#[default]
Never,
Ttl,
Always,
}
@@ -429,6 +429,11 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_me2dc_fallback")]
pub me2dc_fallback: bool,
/// Fast ME->Direct fallback mode for new sessions.
/// Active only when both `use_middle_proxy=true` and `me2dc_fallback=true`.
#[serde(default = "default_me2dc_fast")]
pub me2dc_fast: bool,
/// Enable ME keepalive padding frames.
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub me_keepalive_enabled: bool,
@@ -462,8 +467,13 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_me_c2me_channel_capacity")]
pub me_c2me_channel_capacity: usize,
/// Maximum wait in milliseconds for enqueueing C2ME commands when the queue is full.
/// `0` keeps legacy unbounded wait behavior.
#[serde(default = "default_me_c2me_send_timeout_ms")]
pub me_c2me_send_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Bounded wait in milliseconds for routing ME DATA to per-connection queue.
/// `0` keeps legacy no-wait behavior.
/// `0` keeps non-blocking routing; values >0 enable bounded wait for compatibility.
#[serde(default = "default_me_reader_route_data_wait_ms")]
pub me_reader_route_data_wait_ms: u64,
@@ -484,6 +494,14 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate")]
pub me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate: bool,
/// Additional bytes above strict per-user quota allowed in hot-path soft mode.
#[serde(default = "default_me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes")]
pub me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes: u64,
/// Shrink threshold for reusable ME->Client frame assembly buffer.
#[serde(default = "default_me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes")]
pub me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes: usize,
/// Copy buffer size for client->DC direction in direct relay.
#[serde(default = "default_direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes")]
pub direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes: usize,
@@ -645,6 +663,10 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_upstream_connect_budget_ms")]
pub upstream_connect_budget_ms: u64,
/// Per-attempt TCP connect timeout to Telegram DC (seconds).
#[serde(default = "default_connect_timeout")]
pub tg_connect: u64,
/// Consecutive failed requests before upstream is marked unhealthy.
#[serde(default = "default_upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold")]
pub upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold: u32,
@@ -716,6 +738,15 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_no_writer_wait_ms")]
pub me_route_no_writer_wait_ms: u64,
/// Maximum cumulative wait in milliseconds for hybrid no-writer mode before failfast.
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms")]
pub me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms: u64,
/// Maximum wait in milliseconds for blocking ME writer channel send fallback.
/// `0` keeps legacy unbounded wait behavior.
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms")]
pub me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Number of inline recovery attempts in legacy mode.
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_inline_recovery_attempts")]
pub me_route_inline_recovery_attempts: u32,
@@ -798,11 +829,35 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_me_pool_drain_ttl_secs")]
pub me_pool_drain_ttl_secs: u64,
/// Force-remove any draining writer on the next cleanup tick, regardless of age/deadline.
#[serde(default = "default_me_instadrain")]
pub me_instadrain: bool,
/// Maximum allowed number of draining ME writers before oldest ones are force-closed in batches.
/// Set to 0 to disable threshold-based draining cleanup and keep timeout-only behavior.
#[serde(default = "default_me_pool_drain_threshold")]
pub me_pool_drain_threshold: u64,
/// Enable staged client eviction for draining ME writers that remain non-empty past TTL.
#[serde(default = "default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled")]
pub me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled: bool,
/// Extra grace in seconds after drain TTL before soft-eviction stage starts.
#[serde(default = "default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs")]
pub me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs: u64,
/// Maximum number of client sessions to evict from one draining writer per health tick.
#[serde(default = "default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer")]
pub me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer: u8,
/// Soft-eviction budget per CPU core for one health tick.
#[serde(default = "default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core")]
pub me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core: u16,
/// Cooldown for repetitive soft-eviction on the same writer in milliseconds.
#[serde(default = "default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms")]
pub me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms: u64,
/// Policy for new binds on stale draining writers.
#[serde(default)]
pub me_bind_stale_mode: MeBindStaleMode,
@@ -817,7 +872,7 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
pub me_pool_min_fresh_ratio: f32,
/// Drain timeout in seconds for stale ME writers after endpoint map changes.
/// Set to 0 to keep stale writers draining indefinitely (no force-close).
/// Set to 0 to use the runtime safety fallback timeout.
#[serde(default = "default_me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs")]
pub me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs: u64,
@@ -893,6 +948,7 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
middle_proxy_warm_standby: default_middle_proxy_warm_standby(),
me_init_retry_attempts: default_me_init_retry_attempts(),
me2dc_fallback: default_me2dc_fallback(),
me2dc_fast: default_me2dc_fast(),
me_keepalive_enabled: default_true(),
me_keepalive_interval_secs: default_keepalive_interval(),
me_keepalive_jitter_secs: default_keepalive_jitter(),
@@ -901,11 +957,15 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
me_writer_cmd_channel_capacity: default_me_writer_cmd_channel_capacity(),
me_route_channel_capacity: default_me_route_channel_capacity(),
me_c2me_channel_capacity: default_me_c2me_channel_capacity(),
me_c2me_send_timeout_ms: default_me_c2me_send_timeout_ms(),
me_reader_route_data_wait_ms: default_me_reader_route_data_wait_ms(),
me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames: default_me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames(),
me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes: default_me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes(),
me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us: default_me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us(),
me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate: default_me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate(),
me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes: default_me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes(),
me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes:
default_me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes(),
direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes: default_direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes(),
direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes: default_direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes(),
me_warmup_stagger_enabled: default_true(),
@@ -916,27 +976,42 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
me_reconnect_backoff_cap_ms: default_reconnect_backoff_cap_ms(),
me_reconnect_fast_retry_count: default_me_reconnect_fast_retry_count(),
me_single_endpoint_shadow_writers: default_me_single_endpoint_shadow_writers(),
me_single_endpoint_outage_mode_enabled: default_me_single_endpoint_outage_mode_enabled(),
me_single_endpoint_outage_disable_quarantine: default_me_single_endpoint_outage_disable_quarantine(),
me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_min_ms: default_me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_min_ms(),
me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_max_ms: default_me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_max_ms(),
me_single_endpoint_shadow_rotate_every_secs: default_me_single_endpoint_shadow_rotate_every_secs(),
me_single_endpoint_outage_mode_enabled: default_me_single_endpoint_outage_mode_enabled(
),
me_single_endpoint_outage_disable_quarantine:
default_me_single_endpoint_outage_disable_quarantine(),
me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_min_ms:
default_me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_min_ms(),
me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_max_ms:
default_me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_max_ms(),
me_single_endpoint_shadow_rotate_every_secs:
default_me_single_endpoint_shadow_rotate_every_secs(),
me_floor_mode: MeFloorMode::default(),
me_adaptive_floor_idle_secs: default_me_adaptive_floor_idle_secs(),
me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint: default_me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint(),
me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint: default_me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint(),
me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint:
default_me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint(),
me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint:
default_me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint(),
me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs: default_me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs(),
me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total: default_me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total(),
me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total:
default_me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total(),
me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override: default_me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core: default_me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core: default_me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core: default_me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core: default_me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global: default_me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global: default_me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core:
default_me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core:
default_me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core:
default_me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core:
default_me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global:
default_me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global(),
me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global:
default_me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global(),
upstream_connect_retry_attempts: default_upstream_connect_retry_attempts(),
upstream_connect_retry_backoff_ms: default_upstream_connect_retry_backoff_ms(),
upstream_connect_budget_ms: default_upstream_connect_budget_ms(),
tg_connect: default_connect_timeout(),
upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold: default_upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold(),
upstream_connect_failfast_hard_errors: default_upstream_connect_failfast_hard_errors(),
stun_iface_mismatch_ignore: false,
@@ -948,13 +1023,16 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
me_socks_kdf_policy: MeSocksKdfPolicy::Strict,
me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms: default_me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms(),
me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms: default_me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms(),
me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct: default_me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct(),
me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct:
default_me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct(),
me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy: default_me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy(),
me_health_interval_ms_healthy: default_me_health_interval_ms_healthy(),
me_admission_poll_ms: default_me_admission_poll_ms(),
me_warn_rate_limit_ms: default_me_warn_rate_limit_ms(),
me_route_no_writer_mode: MeRouteNoWriterMode::default(),
me_route_no_writer_wait_ms: default_me_route_no_writer_wait_ms(),
me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms: default_me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms(),
me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms: default_me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms(),
me_route_inline_recovery_attempts: default_me_route_inline_recovery_attempts(),
me_route_inline_recovery_wait_ms: default_me_route_inline_recovery_wait_ms(),
links: LinksConfig::default(),
@@ -972,7 +1050,8 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
me_hardswap_warmup_delay_min_ms: default_me_hardswap_warmup_delay_min_ms(),
me_hardswap_warmup_delay_max_ms: default_me_hardswap_warmup_delay_max_ms(),
me_hardswap_warmup_extra_passes: default_me_hardswap_warmup_extra_passes(),
me_hardswap_warmup_pass_backoff_base_ms: default_me_hardswap_warmup_pass_backoff_base_ms(),
me_hardswap_warmup_pass_backoff_base_ms:
default_me_hardswap_warmup_pass_backoff_base_ms(),
me_config_stable_snapshots: default_me_config_stable_snapshots(),
me_config_apply_cooldown_secs: default_me_config_apply_cooldown_secs(),
me_snapshot_require_http_2xx: default_me_snapshot_require_http_2xx(),
@@ -983,7 +1062,14 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
me_secret_atomic_snapshot: default_me_secret_atomic_snapshot(),
proxy_secret_len_max: default_proxy_secret_len_max(),
me_pool_drain_ttl_secs: default_me_pool_drain_ttl_secs(),
me_instadrain: default_me_instadrain(),
me_pool_drain_threshold: default_me_pool_drain_threshold(),
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled: default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled(),
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs: default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs(),
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer: default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer(),
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core:
default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core(),
me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms: default_me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms(),
me_bind_stale_mode: MeBindStaleMode::default(),
me_bind_stale_ttl_secs: default_me_bind_stale_ttl_secs(),
me_pool_min_fresh_ratio: default_me_pool_min_fresh_ratio(),
@@ -1008,8 +1094,10 @@ impl GeneralConfig {
/// Resolve the active updater interval for ME infrastructure refresh tasks.
/// `update_every` has priority, otherwise legacy proxy_*_auto_reload_secs are used.
pub fn effective_update_every_secs(&self) -> u64 {
self.update_every
.unwrap_or_else(|| self.proxy_secret_auto_reload_secs.min(self.proxy_config_auto_reload_secs))
self.update_every.unwrap_or_else(|| {
self.proxy_secret_auto_reload_secs
.min(self.proxy_config_auto_reload_secs)
})
}
/// Resolve periodic zero-downtime reinit interval for ME writers.
@@ -1019,8 +1107,13 @@ impl GeneralConfig {
/// Resolve force-close timeout for stale writers.
/// `me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs` remains backward-compatible alias.
/// A configured `0` uses the runtime safety fallback (300s).
pub fn effective_me_pool_force_close_secs(&self) -> u64 {
self.me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs
if self.me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs == 0 {
300
} else {
self.me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs
}
}
}
@@ -1123,6 +1216,118 @@ impl Default for ApiConfig {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ConntrackMode {
#[default]
Tracked,
Notrack,
Hybrid,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ConntrackBackend {
#[default]
Auto,
Nftables,
Iptables,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ConntrackPressureProfile {
Conservative,
#[default]
Balanced,
Aggressive,
}
impl ConntrackPressureProfile {
pub fn client_first_byte_idle_cap_secs(self) -> u64 {
match self {
Self::Conservative => 30,
Self::Balanced => 20,
Self::Aggressive => 10,
}
}
pub fn direct_activity_timeout_secs(self) -> u64 {
match self {
Self::Conservative => 180,
Self::Balanced => 120,
Self::Aggressive => 60,
}
}
pub fn middle_soft_idle_cap_secs(self) -> u64 {
match self {
Self::Conservative => 60,
Self::Balanced => 30,
Self::Aggressive => 20,
}
}
pub fn middle_hard_idle_cap_secs(self) -> u64 {
match self {
Self::Conservative => 180,
Self::Balanced => 90,
Self::Aggressive => 60,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ConntrackControlConfig {
/// Enables runtime conntrack-control worker for pressure mitigation.
#[serde(default = "default_conntrack_control_enabled")]
pub inline_conntrack_control: bool,
/// Conntrack mode for listener ingress traffic.
#[serde(default)]
pub mode: ConntrackMode,
/// Netfilter backend used to reconcile notrack rules.
#[serde(default)]
pub backend: ConntrackBackend,
/// Pressure profile for timeout caps under resource saturation.
#[serde(default)]
pub profile: ConntrackPressureProfile,
/// Listener IP allow-list for hybrid mode.
/// Ignored in tracked/notrack mode.
#[serde(default)]
pub hybrid_listener_ips: Vec<IpAddr>,
/// Pressure high watermark as percentage.
#[serde(default = "default_conntrack_pressure_high_watermark_pct")]
pub pressure_high_watermark_pct: u8,
/// Pressure low watermark as percentage.
#[serde(default = "default_conntrack_pressure_low_watermark_pct")]
pub pressure_low_watermark_pct: u8,
/// Maximum conntrack delete operations per second.
#[serde(default = "default_conntrack_delete_budget_per_sec")]
pub delete_budget_per_sec: u64,
}
impl Default for ConntrackControlConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
inline_conntrack_control: default_conntrack_control_enabled(),
mode: ConntrackMode::default(),
backend: ConntrackBackend::default(),
profile: ConntrackPressureProfile::default(),
hybrid_listener_ips: Vec::new(),
pressure_high_watermark_pct: default_conntrack_pressure_high_watermark_pct(),
pressure_low_watermark_pct: default_conntrack_pressure_low_watermark_pct(),
delete_budget_per_sec: default_conntrack_delete_budget_per_sec(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ServerConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_port")]
@@ -1158,9 +1363,10 @@ pub struct ServerConfig {
/// Trusted source CIDRs allowed to send incoming PROXY protocol headers.
///
/// When non-empty, connections from addresses outside this allowlist are
/// rejected before `src_addr` is applied.
#[serde(default)]
/// If this field is omitted in config, it defaults to trust-all CIDRs
/// (`0.0.0.0/0` and `::/0`). If it is explicitly set to an empty list,
/// all PROXY protocol headers are rejected.
#[serde(default = "default_proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs")]
pub proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs: Vec<IpNetwork>,
/// Port for the Prometheus-compatible metrics endpoint.
@@ -1183,10 +1389,24 @@ pub struct ServerConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub listeners: Vec<ListenerConfig>,
/// TCP `listen(2)` backlog for client-facing sockets (also used for the metrics HTTP listener).
/// The effective queue is capped by the kernel (for example `somaxconn` on Linux).
#[serde(default = "default_listen_backlog")]
pub listen_backlog: u32,
/// Maximum number of concurrent client connections.
/// 0 means unlimited.
#[serde(default = "default_server_max_connections")]
pub max_connections: u32,
/// Maximum wait in milliseconds while acquiring a connection slot permit.
/// `0` keeps legacy unbounded wait behavior.
#[serde(default = "default_accept_permit_timeout_ms")]
pub accept_permit_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Runtime conntrack control and pressure policy.
#[serde(default)]
pub conntrack_control: ConntrackControlConfig,
}
impl Default for ServerConfig {
@@ -1200,24 +1420,48 @@ impl Default for ServerConfig {
listen_tcp: None,
proxy_protocol: false,
proxy_protocol_header_timeout_ms: default_proxy_protocol_header_timeout_ms(),
proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs: Vec::new(),
proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs: default_proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs(),
metrics_port: None,
metrics_listen: None,
metrics_whitelist: default_metrics_whitelist(),
api: ApiConfig::default(),
listeners: Vec::new(),
listen_backlog: default_listen_backlog(),
max_connections: default_server_max_connections(),
accept_permit_timeout_ms: default_accept_permit_timeout_ms(),
conntrack_control: ConntrackControlConfig::default(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TimeoutsConfig {
/// Maximum idle wait in seconds for the first client byte before handshake parsing starts.
/// `0` disables the separate idle phase and keeps legacy timeout behavior.
#[serde(default = "default_client_first_byte_idle_secs")]
pub client_first_byte_idle_secs: u64,
/// Maximum active handshake duration in seconds after the first client byte is received.
#[serde(default = "default_handshake_timeout")]
pub client_handshake: u64,
#[serde(default = "default_connect_timeout")]
pub tg_connect: u64,
/// Enables soft/hard relay client idle policy for middle-relay sessions.
#[serde(default = "default_relay_idle_policy_v2_enabled")]
pub relay_idle_policy_v2_enabled: bool,
/// Soft idle threshold for middle-relay client uplink activity in seconds.
/// Hitting this threshold marks the session as idle-candidate, but does not close it.
#[serde(default = "default_relay_client_idle_soft_secs")]
pub relay_client_idle_soft_secs: u64,
/// Hard idle threshold for middle-relay client uplink activity in seconds.
/// Hitting this threshold closes the session.
#[serde(default = "default_relay_client_idle_hard_secs")]
pub relay_client_idle_hard_secs: u64,
/// Additional grace in seconds added to hard idle window after recent downstream activity.
#[serde(default = "default_relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs")]
pub relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs: u64,
#[serde(default = "default_keepalive")]
pub client_keepalive: u64,
@@ -1237,8 +1481,13 @@ pub struct TimeoutsConfig {
impl Default for TimeoutsConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
client_first_byte_idle_secs: default_client_first_byte_idle_secs(),
client_handshake: default_handshake_timeout(),
tg_connect: default_connect_timeout(),
relay_idle_policy_v2_enabled: default_relay_idle_policy_v2_enabled(),
relay_client_idle_soft_secs: default_relay_client_idle_soft_secs(),
relay_client_idle_hard_secs: default_relay_client_idle_hard_secs(),
relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs:
default_relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs(),
client_keepalive: default_keepalive(),
client_ack: default_ack_timeout(),
me_one_retry: default_me_one_retry(),
@@ -1247,6 +1496,90 @@ impl Default for TimeoutsConfig {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum UnknownSniAction {
#[default]
Drop,
Mask,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum TlsFetchProfile {
ModernChromeLike,
ModernFirefoxLike,
CompatTls12,
LegacyMinimal,
}
impl TlsFetchProfile {
pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
TlsFetchProfile::ModernChromeLike => "modern_chrome_like",
TlsFetchProfile::ModernFirefoxLike => "modern_firefox_like",
TlsFetchProfile::CompatTls12 => "compat_tls12",
TlsFetchProfile::LegacyMinimal => "legacy_minimal",
}
}
}
fn default_tls_fetch_profiles() -> Vec<TlsFetchProfile> {
vec![
TlsFetchProfile::ModernChromeLike,
TlsFetchProfile::ModernFirefoxLike,
TlsFetchProfile::CompatTls12,
TlsFetchProfile::LegacyMinimal,
]
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TlsFetchConfig {
/// Ordered list of ClientHello profiles used for adaptive fallback.
#[serde(default = "default_tls_fetch_profiles")]
pub profiles: Vec<TlsFetchProfile>,
/// When true and upstream route is configured, TLS fetch fails closed on
/// upstream connect errors and does not fallback to direct TCP.
#[serde(default = "default_tls_fetch_strict_route")]
pub strict_route: bool,
/// Timeout per one profile attempt in milliseconds.
#[serde(default = "default_tls_fetch_attempt_timeout_ms")]
pub attempt_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Total wall-clock budget in milliseconds across all profile attempts.
#[serde(default = "default_tls_fetch_total_budget_ms")]
pub total_budget_ms: u64,
/// Adds GREASE-style values into selected ClientHello extensions.
#[serde(default)]
pub grease_enabled: bool,
/// Produces deterministic ClientHello randomness for debugging/tests.
#[serde(default)]
pub deterministic: bool,
/// TTL for winner-profile cache entries in seconds.
/// Set to 0 to disable profile cache.
#[serde(default = "default_tls_fetch_profile_cache_ttl_secs")]
pub profile_cache_ttl_secs: u64,
}
impl Default for TlsFetchConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
profiles: default_tls_fetch_profiles(),
strict_route: default_tls_fetch_strict_route(),
attempt_timeout_ms: default_tls_fetch_attempt_timeout_ms(),
total_budget_ms: default_tls_fetch_total_budget_ms(),
grease_enabled: false,
deterministic: false,
profile_cache_ttl_secs: default_tls_fetch_profile_cache_ttl_secs(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AntiCensorshipConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_tls_domain")]
@@ -1256,6 +1589,19 @@ pub struct AntiCensorshipConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub tls_domains: Vec<String>,
/// Policy for TLS ClientHello with unknown (non-configured) SNI.
#[serde(default)]
pub unknown_sni_action: UnknownSniAction,
/// Upstream scope used for TLS front metadata fetches.
/// Empty value keeps default upstream routing behavior.
#[serde(default = "default_tls_fetch_scope")]
pub tls_fetch_scope: String,
/// Fetch strategy for TLS front metadata bootstrap and periodic refresh.
#[serde(default)]
pub tls_fetch: TlsFetchConfig,
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub mask: bool,
@@ -1306,6 +1652,54 @@ pub struct AntiCensorshipConfig {
/// Allows the backend to see the real client IP.
#[serde(default)]
pub mask_proxy_protocol: u8,
/// Enable shape-channel hardening on mask backend path by padding
/// client->mask stream tail to configured buckets on stream end.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_shape_hardening")]
pub mask_shape_hardening: bool,
/// Opt-in aggressive shape hardening mode.
/// When enabled, masking may shape some backend-silent timeout paths and
/// enforces strictly positive above-cap blur when blur is enabled.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode")]
pub mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode: bool,
/// Minimum bucket size for mask shape hardening padding.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes")]
pub mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes: usize,
/// Maximum bucket size for mask shape hardening padding.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes")]
pub mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes: usize,
/// Add bounded random tail bytes even when total bytes already exceed
/// mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur")]
pub mask_shape_above_cap_blur: bool,
/// Maximum random bytes appended above cap when above-cap blur is enabled.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes")]
pub mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes: usize,
/// Maximum bytes relayed per direction on unauthenticated masking fallback paths.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_relay_max_bytes")]
pub mask_relay_max_bytes: usize,
/// Prefetch timeout (ms) for extending fragmented masking classifier window.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms")]
pub mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Enable outcome-time normalization envelope for masking fallback.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_timing_normalization_enabled")]
pub mask_timing_normalization_enabled: bool,
/// Lower bound (ms) for masking outcome timing envelope.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms")]
pub mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms: u64,
/// Upper bound (ms) for masking outcome timing envelope.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms")]
pub mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms: u64,
}
impl Default for AntiCensorshipConfig {
@@ -1313,6 +1707,9 @@ impl Default for AntiCensorshipConfig {
Self {
tls_domain: default_tls_domain(),
tls_domains: Vec::new(),
unknown_sni_action: UnknownSniAction::Drop,
tls_fetch_scope: default_tls_fetch_scope(),
tls_fetch: TlsFetchConfig::default(),
mask: default_true(),
mask_host: None,
mask_port: default_mask_port(),
@@ -1326,6 +1723,17 @@ impl Default for AntiCensorshipConfig {
tls_full_cert_ttl_secs: default_tls_full_cert_ttl_secs(),
alpn_enforce: default_alpn_enforce(),
mask_proxy_protocol: 0,
mask_shape_hardening: default_mask_shape_hardening(),
mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode: default_mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode(),
mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes: default_mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes(),
mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes: default_mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes(),
mask_shape_above_cap_blur: default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur(),
mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes: default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes(),
mask_relay_max_bytes: default_mask_relay_max_bytes(),
mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms: default_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms(),
mask_timing_normalization_enabled: default_mask_timing_normalization_enabled(),
mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms: default_mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms(),
mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms: default_mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms(),
}
}
}
@@ -1342,6 +1750,12 @@ pub struct AccessConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub user_max_tcp_conns: HashMap<String, usize>,
/// Global per-user TCP connection limit applied when a user has no
/// positive individual override.
/// `0` disables the inherited limit.
#[serde(default = "default_user_max_tcp_conns_global_each")]
pub user_max_tcp_conns_global_each: usize,
#[serde(default)]
pub user_expirations: HashMap<String, DateTime<Utc>>,
@@ -1378,6 +1792,7 @@ impl Default for AccessConfig {
users: default_access_users(),
user_ad_tags: HashMap::new(),
user_max_tcp_conns: HashMap::new(),
user_max_tcp_conns_global_each: default_user_max_tcp_conns_global_each(),
user_expirations: HashMap::new(),
user_data_quota: HashMap::new(),
user_max_unique_ips: HashMap::new(),
@@ -1418,6 +1833,11 @@ pub enum UpstreamType {
#[serde(default)]
password: Option<String>,
},
Shadowsocks {
url: String,
#[serde(default)]
interface: Option<String>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -1498,7 +1918,10 @@ impl ShowLink {
}
impl Serialize for ShowLink {
fn serialize<S: serde::Serializer>(&self, serializer: S) -> std::result::Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
fn serialize<S: serde::Serializer>(
&self,
serializer: S,
) -> std::result::Result<S::Ok, S::Error> {
match self {
ShowLink::None => Vec::<String>::new().serialize(serializer),
ShowLink::All => serializer.serialize_str("*"),
@@ -1508,7 +1931,9 @@ impl Serialize for ShowLink {
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for ShowLink {
fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> std::result::Result<Self, D::Error> {
fn deserialize<D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(
deserializer: D,
) -> std::result::Result<Self, D::Error> {
use serde::de;
struct ShowLinkVisitor;
@@ -1524,14 +1949,14 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for ShowLink {
if v == "*" {
Ok(ShowLink::All)
} else {
Err(de::Error::invalid_value(
de::Unexpected::Str(v),
&r#""*""#,
))
Err(de::Error::invalid_value(de::Unexpected::Str(v), &r#""*""#))
}
}
fn visit_seq<A: de::SeqAccess<'de>>(self, mut seq: A) -> std::result::Result<ShowLink, A::Error> {
fn visit_seq<A: de::SeqAccess<'de>>(
self,
mut seq: A,
) -> std::result::Result<ShowLink, A::Error> {
let mut names = Vec::new();
while let Some(name) = seq.next_element::<String>()? {
names.push(name);
+704
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
use tokio::process::Command;
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch};
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
use crate::config::{ConntrackBackend, ConntrackMode, ProxyConfig};
use crate::proxy::middle_relay::note_global_relay_pressure;
use crate::proxy::shared_state::{ConntrackCloseEvent, ConntrackCloseReason, ProxySharedState};
use crate::stats::Stats;
const CONNTRACK_EVENT_QUEUE_CAPACITY: usize = 32_768;
const PRESSURE_RELEASE_TICKS: u8 = 3;
const PRESSURE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1);
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum NetfilterBackend {
Nftables,
Iptables,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct PressureSample {
conn_pct: Option<u8>,
fd_pct: Option<u8>,
accept_timeout_delta: u64,
me_queue_pressure_delta: u64,
}
struct PressureState {
active: bool,
low_streak: u8,
prev_accept_timeout_total: u64,
prev_me_queue_pressure_total: u64,
}
impl PressureState {
fn new(stats: &Stats) -> Self {
Self {
active: false,
low_streak: 0,
prev_accept_timeout_total: stats.get_accept_permit_timeout_total(),
prev_me_queue_pressure_total: stats.get_me_c2me_send_full_total(),
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn spawn_conntrack_controller(
config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
) {
if !cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
let enabled = config_rx.borrow().server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control;
stats.set_conntrack_control_enabled(enabled);
stats.set_conntrack_control_available(false);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
stats.set_conntrack_event_queue_depth(0);
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(false);
shared.disable_conntrack_close_sender();
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
if enabled {
warn!("conntrack control is configured but unsupported on this OS; disabling runtime worker");
}
return;
}
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel(CONNTRACK_EVENT_QUEUE_CAPACITY);
shared.set_conntrack_close_sender(tx);
tokio::spawn(async move {
run_conntrack_controller(config_rx, stats, shared, rx).await;
});
}
async fn run_conntrack_controller(
mut config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
mut close_rx: mpsc::Receiver<ConntrackCloseEvent>,
) {
let mut cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
let mut pressure_state = PressureState::new(stats.as_ref());
let mut delete_budget_tokens = cfg.server.conntrack_control.delete_budget_per_sec;
let mut backend = pick_backend(cfg.server.conntrack_control.backend);
apply_runtime_state(stats.as_ref(), shared.as_ref(), &cfg, backend.is_some(), false);
reconcile_rules(&cfg, backend, stats.as_ref()).await;
loop {
tokio::select! {
changed = config_rx.changed() => {
if changed.is_err() {
break;
}
cfg = config_rx.borrow_and_update().clone();
backend = pick_backend(cfg.server.conntrack_control.backend);
delete_budget_tokens = cfg.server.conntrack_control.delete_budget_per_sec;
apply_runtime_state(stats.as_ref(), shared.as_ref(), &cfg, backend.is_some(), pressure_state.active);
reconcile_rules(&cfg, backend, stats.as_ref()).await;
}
event = close_rx.recv() => {
let Some(event) = event else {
break;
};
stats.set_conntrack_event_queue_depth(close_rx.len() as u64);
if !cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control {
continue;
}
if !pressure_state.active {
continue;
}
if !matches!(event.reason, ConntrackCloseReason::Timeout | ConntrackCloseReason::Pressure | ConntrackCloseReason::Reset) {
continue;
}
if delete_budget_tokens == 0 {
continue;
}
stats.increment_conntrack_delete_attempt_total();
match delete_conntrack_entry(event).await {
DeleteOutcome::Deleted => {
delete_budget_tokens = delete_budget_tokens.saturating_sub(1);
stats.increment_conntrack_delete_success_total();
}
DeleteOutcome::NotFound => {
delete_budget_tokens = delete_budget_tokens.saturating_sub(1);
stats.increment_conntrack_delete_not_found_total();
}
DeleteOutcome::Error => {
delete_budget_tokens = delete_budget_tokens.saturating_sub(1);
stats.increment_conntrack_delete_error_total();
}
}
}
_ = tokio::time::sleep(PRESSURE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL) => {
delete_budget_tokens = cfg.server.conntrack_control.delete_budget_per_sec;
stats.set_conntrack_event_queue_depth(close_rx.len() as u64);
let sample = collect_pressure_sample(stats.as_ref(), &cfg, &mut pressure_state);
update_pressure_state(
stats.as_ref(),
shared.as_ref(),
&cfg,
&sample,
&mut pressure_state,
);
if pressure_state.active {
note_global_relay_pressure(shared.as_ref());
}
}
}
}
shared.disable_conntrack_close_sender();
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
}
fn apply_runtime_state(
stats: &Stats,
shared: &ProxySharedState,
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
backend_available: bool,
pressure_active: bool,
) {
let enabled = cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control;
let available = enabled && backend_available && has_cap_net_admin();
if enabled && !available {
warn!(
"conntrack control enabled but unavailable (missing CAP_NET_ADMIN or backend binaries)"
);
}
stats.set_conntrack_control_enabled(enabled);
stats.set_conntrack_control_available(available);
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(enabled && pressure_active);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(enabled && pressure_active);
}
fn collect_pressure_sample(
stats: &Stats,
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
state: &mut PressureState,
) -> PressureSample {
let current_connections = stats.get_current_connections_total();
let conn_pct = if cfg.server.max_connections == 0 {
None
} else {
Some(
((current_connections.saturating_mul(100)) / u64::from(cfg.server.max_connections))
.min(100) as u8,
)
};
let fd_pct = fd_usage_pct();
let accept_total = stats.get_accept_permit_timeout_total();
let accept_delta = accept_total.saturating_sub(state.prev_accept_timeout_total);
state.prev_accept_timeout_total = accept_total;
let me_total = stats.get_me_c2me_send_full_total();
let me_delta = me_total.saturating_sub(state.prev_me_queue_pressure_total);
state.prev_me_queue_pressure_total = me_total;
PressureSample {
conn_pct,
fd_pct,
accept_timeout_delta: accept_delta,
me_queue_pressure_delta: me_delta,
}
}
fn update_pressure_state(
stats: &Stats,
shared: &ProxySharedState,
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
sample: &PressureSample,
state: &mut PressureState,
) {
if !cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control {
if state.active {
state.active = false;
state.low_streak = 0;
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
info!("Conntrack pressure mode deactivated (feature disabled)");
}
return;
}
let high = cfg.server.conntrack_control.pressure_high_watermark_pct;
let low = cfg.server.conntrack_control.pressure_low_watermark_pct;
let high_hit = sample.conn_pct.is_some_and(|v| v >= high)
|| sample.fd_pct.is_some_and(|v| v >= high)
|| sample.accept_timeout_delta > 0
|| sample.me_queue_pressure_delta > 0;
let low_clear = sample.conn_pct.is_none_or(|v| v <= low)
&& sample.fd_pct.is_none_or(|v| v <= low)
&& sample.accept_timeout_delta == 0
&& sample.me_queue_pressure_delta == 0;
if !state.active && high_hit {
state.active = true;
state.low_streak = 0;
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(true);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(true);
info!(
conn_pct = ?sample.conn_pct,
fd_pct = ?sample.fd_pct,
accept_timeout_delta = sample.accept_timeout_delta,
me_queue_pressure_delta = sample.me_queue_pressure_delta,
"Conntrack pressure mode activated"
);
return;
}
if state.active && low_clear {
state.low_streak = state.low_streak.saturating_add(1);
if state.low_streak >= PRESSURE_RELEASE_TICKS {
state.active = false;
state.low_streak = 0;
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
info!("Conntrack pressure mode deactivated");
}
return;
}
state.low_streak = 0;
}
async fn reconcile_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig, backend: Option<NetfilterBackend>, stats: &Stats) {
if !cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control {
clear_notrack_rules_all_backends().await;
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(true);
return;
}
if !has_cap_net_admin() {
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(false);
return;
}
let Some(backend) = backend else {
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(false);
return;
};
let apply_result = match backend {
NetfilterBackend::Nftables => apply_nft_rules(cfg).await,
NetfilterBackend::Iptables => apply_iptables_rules(cfg).await,
};
if let Err(error) = apply_result {
warn!(error = %error, "Failed to reconcile conntrack/notrack rules");
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(false);
} else {
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(true);
}
}
fn pick_backend(configured: ConntrackBackend) -> Option<NetfilterBackend> {
match configured {
ConntrackBackend::Auto => {
if command_exists("nft") {
Some(NetfilterBackend::Nftables)
} else if command_exists("iptables") {
Some(NetfilterBackend::Iptables)
} else {
None
}
}
ConntrackBackend::Nftables => command_exists("nft").then_some(NetfilterBackend::Nftables),
ConntrackBackend::Iptables => command_exists("iptables").then_some(NetfilterBackend::Iptables),
}
}
fn command_exists(binary: &str) -> bool {
let Some(path_var) = std::env::var_os("PATH") else {
return false;
};
std::env::split_paths(&path_var).any(|dir| {
let candidate: PathBuf = dir.join(binary);
candidate.exists() && candidate.is_file()
})
}
fn notrack_targets(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> (Vec<Option<IpAddr>>, Vec<Option<IpAddr>>) {
let mode = cfg.server.conntrack_control.mode;
let mut v4_targets: BTreeSet<Option<IpAddr>> = BTreeSet::new();
let mut v6_targets: BTreeSet<Option<IpAddr>> = BTreeSet::new();
match mode {
ConntrackMode::Tracked => {}
ConntrackMode::Notrack => {
if cfg.server.listeners.is_empty() {
if let Some(ipv4) = cfg
.server
.listen_addr_ipv4
.as_ref()
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
{
if ipv4.is_unspecified() {
v4_targets.insert(None);
} else {
v4_targets.insert(Some(ipv4));
}
}
if let Some(ipv6) = cfg
.server
.listen_addr_ipv6
.as_ref()
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
{
if ipv6.is_unspecified() {
v6_targets.insert(None);
} else {
v6_targets.insert(Some(ipv6));
}
}
} else {
for listener in &cfg.server.listeners {
if listener.ip.is_ipv4() {
if listener.ip.is_unspecified() {
v4_targets.insert(None);
} else {
v4_targets.insert(Some(listener.ip));
}
} else if listener.ip.is_unspecified() {
v6_targets.insert(None);
} else {
v6_targets.insert(Some(listener.ip));
}
}
}
}
ConntrackMode::Hybrid => {
for ip in &cfg.server.conntrack_control.hybrid_listener_ips {
if ip.is_ipv4() {
v4_targets.insert(Some(*ip));
} else {
v6_targets.insert(Some(*ip));
}
}
}
}
(
v4_targets.into_iter().collect(),
v6_targets.into_iter().collect(),
)
}
async fn apply_nft_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<(), String> {
let _ = run_command("nft", &["delete", "table", "inet", "telemt_conntrack"], None).await;
if matches!(cfg.server.conntrack_control.mode, ConntrackMode::Tracked) {
return Ok(());
}
let (v4_targets, v6_targets) = notrack_targets(cfg);
let mut rules = Vec::new();
for ip in v4_targets {
let rule = if let Some(ip) = ip {
format!("tcp dport {} ip daddr {} notrack", cfg.server.port, ip)
} else {
format!("tcp dport {} notrack", cfg.server.port)
};
rules.push(rule);
}
for ip in v6_targets {
let rule = if let Some(ip) = ip {
format!("tcp dport {} ip6 daddr {} notrack", cfg.server.port, ip)
} else {
format!("tcp dport {} notrack", cfg.server.port)
};
rules.push(rule);
}
let rule_blob = if rules.is_empty() {
String::new()
} else {
format!(" {}\n", rules.join("\n "))
};
let script = format!(
"table inet telemt_conntrack {{\n chain preraw {{\n type filter hook prerouting priority raw; policy accept;\n{rule_blob} }}\n}}\n"
);
run_command("nft", &["-f", "-"], Some(script)).await
}
async fn apply_iptables_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<(), String> {
apply_iptables_rules_for_binary("iptables", cfg, true).await?;
apply_iptables_rules_for_binary("ip6tables", cfg, false).await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn apply_iptables_rules_for_binary(
binary: &str,
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
ipv4: bool,
) -> Result<(), String> {
if !command_exists(binary) {
return Ok(());
}
let chain = "TELEMT_NOTRACK";
let _ = run_command(binary, &["-t", "raw", "-D", "PREROUTING", "-j", chain], None).await;
let _ = run_command(binary, &["-t", "raw", "-F", chain], None).await;
let _ = run_command(binary, &["-t", "raw", "-X", chain], None).await;
if matches!(cfg.server.conntrack_control.mode, ConntrackMode::Tracked) {
return Ok(());
}
run_command(binary, &["-t", "raw", "-N", chain], None).await?;
run_command(binary, &["-t", "raw", "-F", chain], None).await?;
if run_command(binary, &["-t", "raw", "-C", "PREROUTING", "-j", chain], None).await.is_err() {
run_command(binary, &["-t", "raw", "-I", "PREROUTING", "1", "-j", chain], None).await?;
}
let (v4_targets, v6_targets) = notrack_targets(cfg);
let selected = if ipv4 { v4_targets } else { v6_targets };
for ip in selected {
let mut args = vec![
"-t".to_string(),
"raw".to_string(),
"-A".to_string(),
chain.to_string(),
"-p".to_string(),
"tcp".to_string(),
"--dport".to_string(),
cfg.server.port.to_string(),
];
if let Some(ip) = ip {
args.push("-d".to_string());
args.push(ip.to_string());
}
args.push("-j".to_string());
args.push("CT".to_string());
args.push("--notrack".to_string());
let arg_refs: Vec<&str> = args.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
run_command(binary, &arg_refs, None).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
async fn clear_notrack_rules_all_backends() {
let _ = run_command("nft", &["delete", "table", "inet", "telemt_conntrack"], None).await;
let _ = run_command("iptables", &["-t", "raw", "-D", "PREROUTING", "-j", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"], None).await;
let _ = run_command("iptables", &["-t", "raw", "-F", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"], None).await;
let _ = run_command("iptables", &["-t", "raw", "-X", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"], None).await;
let _ = run_command("ip6tables", &["-t", "raw", "-D", "PREROUTING", "-j", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"], None).await;
let _ = run_command("ip6tables", &["-t", "raw", "-F", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"], None).await;
let _ = run_command("ip6tables", &["-t", "raw", "-X", "TELEMT_NOTRACK"], None).await;
}
enum DeleteOutcome {
Deleted,
NotFound,
Error,
}
async fn delete_conntrack_entry(event: ConntrackCloseEvent) -> DeleteOutcome {
if !command_exists("conntrack") {
return DeleteOutcome::Error;
}
let args = vec![
"-D".to_string(),
"-p".to_string(),
"tcp".to_string(),
"-s".to_string(),
event.src.ip().to_string(),
"--sport".to_string(),
event.src.port().to_string(),
"-d".to_string(),
event.dst.ip().to_string(),
"--dport".to_string(),
event.dst.port().to_string(),
];
let arg_refs: Vec<&str> = args.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
match run_command("conntrack", &arg_refs, None).await {
Ok(()) => DeleteOutcome::Deleted,
Err(error) => {
if error.contains("0 flow entries have been deleted") {
DeleteOutcome::NotFound
} else {
debug!(error = %error, "conntrack delete failed");
DeleteOutcome::Error
}
}
}
}
async fn run_command(binary: &str, args: &[&str], stdin: Option<String>) -> Result<(), String> {
if !command_exists(binary) {
return Err(format!("{binary} is not available"));
}
let mut command = Command::new(binary);
command.args(args);
if stdin.is_some() {
command.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped());
}
command.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null());
command.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped());
let mut child = command
.spawn()
.map_err(|e| format!("spawn {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
if let Some(blob) = stdin
&& let Some(mut writer) = child.stdin.take()
{
writer
.write_all(blob.as_bytes())
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("stdin write {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
}
let output = child
.wait_with_output()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("wait {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
if output.status.success() {
return Ok(());
}
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim().to_string();
Err(if stderr.is_empty() {
format!("{binary} exited with status {}", output.status)
} else {
stderr
})
}
fn fd_usage_pct() -> Option<u8> {
let soft_limit = nofile_soft_limit()?;
if soft_limit == 0 {
return None;
}
let fd_count = std::fs::read_dir("/proc/self/fd").ok()?.count() as u64;
Some(((fd_count.saturating_mul(100)) / soft_limit).min(100) as u8)
}
fn nofile_soft_limit() -> Option<u64> {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
let mut lim = libc::rlimit {
rlim_cur: 0,
rlim_max: 0,
};
let rc = unsafe { libc::getrlimit(libc::RLIMIT_NOFILE, &mut lim) };
if rc != 0 {
return None;
}
return Some(lim.rlim_cur);
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
{
None
}
}
fn has_cap_net_admin() -> bool {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
{
let Ok(status) = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status") else {
return false;
};
for line in status.lines() {
if let Some(raw) = line.strip_prefix("CapEff:") {
let caps = raw.trim();
if let Ok(bits) = u64::from_str_radix(caps, 16) {
const CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIT: u64 = 12;
return (bits & (1u64 << CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIT)) != 0;
}
}
}
false
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
{
false
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
#[test]
fn pressure_activates_on_accept_timeout_spike() {
let stats = Stats::new();
let shared = ProxySharedState::new();
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control = true;
let mut state = PressureState::new(&stats);
let sample = PressureSample {
conn_pct: Some(10),
fd_pct: Some(10),
accept_timeout_delta: 1,
me_queue_pressure_delta: 0,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &sample, &mut state);
assert!(state.active);
assert!(shared.conntrack_pressure_active());
assert!(stats.get_conntrack_pressure_active());
}
#[test]
fn pressure_releases_after_hysteresis_window() {
let stats = Stats::new();
let shared = ProxySharedState::new();
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control = true;
let mut state = PressureState::new(&stats);
let high_sample = PressureSample {
conn_pct: Some(95),
fd_pct: Some(95),
accept_timeout_delta: 0,
me_queue_pressure_delta: 0,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &high_sample, &mut state);
assert!(state.active);
let low_sample = PressureSample {
conn_pct: Some(10),
fd_pct: Some(10),
accept_timeout_delta: 0,
me_queue_pressure_delta: 0,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &low_sample, &mut state);
assert!(state.active);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &low_sample, &mut state);
assert!(state.active);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &low_sample, &mut state);
assert!(!state.active);
assert!(!shared.conntrack_pressure_active());
assert!(!stats.get_conntrack_pressure_active());
}
#[test]
fn pressure_does_not_activate_when_disabled() {
let stats = Stats::new();
let shared = ProxySharedState::new();
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control = false;
let mut state = PressureState::new(&stats);
let sample = PressureSample {
conn_pct: Some(100),
fd_pct: Some(100),
accept_timeout_delta: 10,
me_queue_pressure_delta: 10,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &sample, &mut state);
assert!(!state.active);
assert!(!shared.conntrack_pressure_active());
assert!(!stats.get_conntrack_pressure_active());
}
}
+144 -125
View File
@@ -13,10 +13,13 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
use aes::Aes256;
use ctr::{Ctr128BE, cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher}};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use aes::Aes256;
use ctr::{
Ctr128BE,
cipher::{KeyIvInit, StreamCipher},
};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
type Aes256Ctr = Ctr128BE<Aes256>;
@@ -42,33 +45,39 @@ impl AesCtr {
cipher: Aes256Ctr::new(key.into(), (&iv_bytes).into()),
}
}
/// Create from key and IV slices
pub fn from_key_iv(key: &[u8], iv: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
if key.len() != 32 {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength { expected: 32, got: key.len() });
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength {
expected: 32,
got: key.len(),
});
}
if iv.len() != 16 {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength { expected: 16, got: iv.len() });
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength {
expected: 16,
got: iv.len(),
});
}
let key: [u8; 32] = key.try_into().unwrap();
let iv = u128::from_be_bytes(iv.try_into().unwrap());
Ok(Self::new(&key, iv))
}
/// Encrypt/decrypt data in-place (CTR mode is symmetric)
pub fn apply(&mut self, data: &mut [u8]) {
self.cipher.apply_keystream(data);
}
/// Encrypt data, returning new buffer
pub fn encrypt(&mut self, data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut output = data.to_vec();
self.apply(&mut output);
output
}
/// Decrypt data (for CTR, identical to encrypt)
pub fn decrypt(&mut self, data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
self.encrypt(data)
@@ -99,27 +108,33 @@ impl Drop for AesCbc {
impl AesCbc {
/// AES block size
const BLOCK_SIZE: usize = 16;
/// Create new AES-CBC cipher with key and IV
pub fn new(key: [u8; 32], iv: [u8; 16]) -> Self {
Self { key, iv }
}
/// Create from slices
pub fn from_slices(key: &[u8], iv: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> {
if key.len() != 32 {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength { expected: 32, got: key.len() });
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength {
expected: 32,
got: key.len(),
});
}
if iv.len() != 16 {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength { expected: 16, got: iv.len() });
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidKeyLength {
expected: 16,
got: iv.len(),
});
}
Ok(Self {
key: key.try_into().unwrap(),
iv: iv.try_into().unwrap(),
})
}
/// Encrypt a single block using raw AES (no chaining)
fn encrypt_block(&self, block: &[u8; 16], key_schedule: &aes::Aes256) -> [u8; 16] {
use aes::cipher::BlockEncrypt;
@@ -127,7 +142,7 @@ impl AesCbc {
key_schedule.encrypt_block((&mut output).into());
output
}
/// Decrypt a single block using raw AES (no chaining)
fn decrypt_block(&self, block: &[u8; 16], key_schedule: &aes::Aes256) -> [u8; 16] {
use aes::cipher::BlockDecrypt;
@@ -135,7 +150,7 @@ impl AesCbc {
key_schedule.decrypt_block((&mut output).into());
output
}
/// XOR two 16-byte blocks
fn xor_blocks(a: &[u8; 16], b: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
let mut result = [0u8; 16];
@@ -144,27 +159,28 @@ impl AesCbc {
}
result
}
/// Encrypt data using CBC mode with proper chaining
///
/// CBC Encryption: C[i] = AES_Encrypt(P[i] XOR C[i-1]), where C[-1] = IV
pub fn encrypt(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if !data.len().is_multiple_of(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(
format!("CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}", data.len())
));
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(format!(
"CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}",
data.len()
)));
}
if data.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
use aes::cipher::KeyInit;
let key_schedule = aes::Aes256::new((&self.key).into());
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(data.len());
let mut prev_ciphertext = self.iv;
for chunk in data.chunks(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
let plaintext: [u8; 16] = chunk.try_into().unwrap();
let xored = Self::xor_blocks(&plaintext, &prev_ciphertext);
@@ -172,30 +188,31 @@ impl AesCbc {
prev_ciphertext = ciphertext;
result.extend_from_slice(&ciphertext);
}
Ok(result)
}
/// Decrypt data using CBC mode with proper chaining
///
/// CBC Decryption: P[i] = AES_Decrypt(C[i]) XOR C[i-1], where C[-1] = IV
pub fn decrypt(&self, data: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
if !data.len().is_multiple_of(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(
format!("CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}", data.len())
));
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(format!(
"CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}",
data.len()
)));
}
if data.is_empty() {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
use aes::cipher::KeyInit;
let key_schedule = aes::Aes256::new((&self.key).into());
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(data.len());
let mut prev_ciphertext = self.iv;
for chunk in data.chunks(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
let ciphertext: [u8; 16] = chunk.try_into().unwrap();
let decrypted = self.decrypt_block(&ciphertext, &key_schedule);
@@ -203,75 +220,77 @@ impl AesCbc {
prev_ciphertext = ciphertext;
result.extend_from_slice(&plaintext);
}
Ok(result)
}
/// Encrypt data in-place
pub fn encrypt_in_place(&self, data: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
if !data.len().is_multiple_of(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(
format!("CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}", data.len())
));
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(format!(
"CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}",
data.len()
)));
}
if data.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
use aes::cipher::KeyInit;
let key_schedule = aes::Aes256::new((&self.key).into());
let mut prev_ciphertext = self.iv;
for i in (0..data.len()).step_by(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
let block = &mut data[i..i + Self::BLOCK_SIZE];
for j in 0..Self::BLOCK_SIZE {
block[j] ^= prev_ciphertext[j];
}
let block_array: &mut [u8; 16] = block.try_into().unwrap();
*block_array = self.encrypt_block(block_array, &key_schedule);
prev_ciphertext = *block_array;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Decrypt data in-place
pub fn decrypt_in_place(&self, data: &mut [u8]) -> Result<()> {
if !data.len().is_multiple_of(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(
format!("CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}", data.len())
));
return Err(ProxyError::Crypto(format!(
"CBC data must be aligned to 16 bytes, got {}",
data.len()
)));
}
if data.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
use aes::cipher::KeyInit;
let key_schedule = aes::Aes256::new((&self.key).into());
let mut prev_ciphertext = self.iv;
for i in (0..data.len()).step_by(Self::BLOCK_SIZE) {
let block = &mut data[i..i + Self::BLOCK_SIZE];
let current_ciphertext: [u8; 16] = block.try_into().unwrap();
let block_array: &mut [u8; 16] = block.try_into().unwrap();
*block_array = self.decrypt_block(block_array, &key_schedule);
for j in 0..Self::BLOCK_SIZE {
block[j] ^= prev_ciphertext[j];
}
prev_ciphertext = current_ciphertext;
}
Ok(())
}
}
@@ -318,227 +337,227 @@ impl Decryptor for PassthroughEncryptor {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// ============= AES-CTR Tests =============
#[test]
fn test_aes_ctr_roundtrip() {
let key = [0u8; 32];
let iv = 12345u128;
let original = b"Hello, MTProto!";
let mut enc = AesCtr::new(&key, iv);
let encrypted = enc.encrypt(original);
let mut dec = AesCtr::new(&key, iv);
let decrypted = dec.decrypt(&encrypted);
assert_eq!(original.as_slice(), decrypted.as_slice());
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_ctr_in_place() {
let key = [0x42u8; 32];
let iv = 999u128;
let original = b"Test data for in-place encryption";
let mut data = original.to_vec();
let mut cipher = AesCtr::new(&key, iv);
cipher.apply(&mut data);
assert_ne!(&data[..], original);
let mut cipher = AesCtr::new(&key, iv);
cipher.apply(&mut data);
assert_eq!(&data[..], original);
}
// ============= AES-CBC Tests =============
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_roundtrip() {
let key = [0u8; 32];
let iv = [0u8; 16];
let original = [0u8; 32];
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
let encrypted = cipher.encrypt(&original).unwrap();
let decrypted = cipher.decrypt(&encrypted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(original.as_slice(), decrypted.as_slice());
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_chaining_works() {
let key = [0x42u8; 32];
let iv = [0x00u8; 16];
let plaintext = [0xAAu8; 32];
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&plaintext).unwrap();
let block1 = &ciphertext[0..16];
let block2 = &ciphertext[16..32];
assert_ne!(
block1, block2,
"CBC chaining broken: identical plaintext blocks produced identical ciphertext"
);
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_known_vector() {
let key = [0u8; 32];
let iv = [0u8; 16];
let plaintext = [0u8; 16];
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&plaintext).unwrap();
let decrypted = cipher.decrypt(&ciphertext).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext.as_slice(), decrypted.as_slice());
assert_ne!(ciphertext.as_slice(), plaintext.as_slice());
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_multi_block() {
let key = [0x12u8; 32];
let iv = [0x34u8; 16];
let plaintext: Vec<u8> = (0..80).collect();
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&plaintext).unwrap();
let decrypted = cipher.decrypt(&ciphertext).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, decrypted);
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_in_place() {
let key = [0x12u8; 32];
let iv = [0x34u8; 16];
let original = [0x56u8; 48];
let mut buffer = original;
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
cipher.encrypt_in_place(&mut buffer).unwrap();
assert_ne!(&buffer[..], &original[..]);
cipher.decrypt_in_place(&mut buffer).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&buffer[..], &original[..]);
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_empty_data() {
let cipher = AesCbc::new([0u8; 32], [0u8; 16]);
let encrypted = cipher.encrypt(&[]).unwrap();
assert!(encrypted.is_empty());
let decrypted = cipher.decrypt(&[]).unwrap();
assert!(decrypted.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_unaligned_error() {
let cipher = AesCbc::new([0u8; 32], [0u8; 16]);
let result = cipher.encrypt(&[0u8; 15]);
assert!(result.is_err());
let result = cipher.encrypt(&[0u8; 17]);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_avalanche_effect() {
let key = [0xAB; 32];
let iv = [0xCD; 16];
let plaintext1 = [0u8; 32];
let mut plaintext2 = [0u8; 32];
plaintext2[0] = 0x01;
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
let ciphertext1 = cipher.encrypt(&plaintext1).unwrap();
let ciphertext2 = cipher.encrypt(&plaintext2).unwrap();
assert_ne!(&ciphertext1[0..16], &ciphertext2[0..16]);
assert_ne!(&ciphertext1[16..32], &ciphertext2[16..32]);
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_iv_matters() {
let key = [0x55; 32];
let plaintext = [0x77u8; 16];
let cipher1 = AesCbc::new(key, [0u8; 16]);
let cipher2 = AesCbc::new(key, [1u8; 16]);
let ciphertext1 = cipher1.encrypt(&plaintext).unwrap();
let ciphertext2 = cipher2.encrypt(&plaintext).unwrap();
assert_ne!(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
}
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_deterministic() {
let key = [0x99; 32];
let iv = [0x88; 16];
let plaintext = [0x77u8; 32];
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
let ciphertext1 = cipher.encrypt(&plaintext).unwrap();
let ciphertext2 = cipher.encrypt(&plaintext).unwrap();
assert_eq!(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
}
// ============= Zeroize Tests =============
#[test]
fn test_aes_cbc_zeroize_on_drop() {
let key = [0xAA; 32];
let iv = [0xBB; 16];
let cipher = AesCbc::new(key, iv);
// Verify key/iv are set
assert_eq!(cipher.key, [0xAA; 32]);
assert_eq!(cipher.iv, [0xBB; 16]);
drop(cipher);
// After drop, key/iv are zeroized (can't observe directly,
// but the Drop impl runs without panic)
}
// ============= Error Handling Tests =============
#[test]
fn test_invalid_key_length() {
let result = AesCtr::from_key_iv(&[0u8; 16], &[0u8; 16]);
assert!(result.is_err());
let result = AesCbc::from_slices(&[0u8; 16], &[0u8; 16]);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_invalid_iv_length() {
let result = AesCtr::from_key_iv(&[0u8; 32], &[0u8; 8]);
assert!(result.is_err());
let result = AesCbc::from_slices(&[0u8; 32], &[0u8; 8]);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
}
}
+8 -27
View File
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@
//! usages are intentional and protocol-mandated.
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
use sha2::Sha256;
use md5::Md5;
use sha1::Sha1;
use sha2::Digest;
use sha2::Sha256;
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
@@ -28,8 +28,7 @@ pub fn sha256(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
/// SHA-256 HMAC
pub fn sha256_hmac(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(key)
.expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
let mut mac = HmacSha256::new_from_slice(key).expect("HMAC accepts any key length");
mac.update(data);
mac.finalize().into_bytes().into()
}
@@ -124,27 +123,18 @@ pub fn derive_middleproxy_keys(
srv_ipv6: Option<&[u8; 16]>,
) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 16]) {
let s = build_middleproxy_prekey(
nonce_srv,
nonce_clt,
clt_ts,
srv_ip,
clt_port,
purpose,
clt_ip,
srv_port,
secret,
clt_ipv6,
srv_ipv6,
nonce_srv, nonce_clt, clt_ts, srv_ip, clt_port, purpose, clt_ip, srv_port, secret,
clt_ipv6, srv_ipv6,
);
let md5_1 = md5(&s[1..]);
let sha1_sum = sha1(&s);
let md5_2 = md5(&s[2..]);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
key[..12].copy_from_slice(&md5_1[..12]);
key[12..].copy_from_slice(&sha1_sum);
(key, md5_2)
}
@@ -164,17 +154,8 @@ mod tests {
let secret = vec![0x55u8; 128];
let prekey = build_middleproxy_prekey(
&nonce_srv,
&nonce_clt,
&clt_ts,
srv_ip,
&clt_port,
b"CLIENT",
clt_ip,
&srv_port,
&secret,
None,
None,
&nonce_srv, &nonce_clt, &clt_ts, srv_ip, &clt_port, b"CLIENT", clt_ip, &srv_port,
&secret, None, None,
);
let digest = sha256(&prekey);
assert_eq!(
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ pub mod aes;
pub mod hash;
pub mod random;
pub use aes::{AesCtr, AesCbc};
pub use aes::{AesCbc, AesCtr};
pub use hash::{
build_middleproxy_prekey, crc32, crc32c, derive_middleproxy_keys, sha256, sha256_hmac,
};
+37 -37
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
#![allow(deprecated)]
#![allow(dead_code)]
use rand::{Rng, RngCore, SeedableRng};
use rand::rngs::StdRng;
use parking_lot::Mutex;
use zeroize::Zeroize;
use crate::crypto::AesCtr;
use parking_lot::Mutex;
use rand::rngs::StdRng;
use rand::{Rng, RngExt, SeedableRng};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
/// Cryptographically secure PRNG with AES-CTR
pub struct SecureRandom {
@@ -34,16 +34,16 @@ impl SecureRandom {
pub fn new() -> Self {
let mut seed_source = rand::rng();
let mut rng = StdRng::from_rng(&mut seed_source);
let mut key = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut key);
let iv: u128 = rng.random();
let cipher = AesCtr::new(&key, iv);
// Zeroize local key copy — cipher already consumed it
key.zeroize();
Self {
inner: Mutex::new(SecureRandomInner {
rng,
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ impl SecureRandom {
}),
}
}
/// Fill a caller-provided buffer with random bytes.
pub fn fill(&self, out: &mut [u8]) {
let mut inner = self.inner.lock();
@@ -94,25 +94,25 @@ impl SecureRandom {
self.fill(&mut out);
out
}
/// Generate random number in range [0, max)
pub fn range(&self, max: usize) -> usize {
if max == 0 {
return 0;
}
let mut inner = self.inner.lock();
inner.rng.gen_range(0..max)
inner.rng.random_range(0..max)
}
/// Generate random bits
pub fn bits(&self, k: usize) -> u64 {
if k == 0 {
return 0;
}
let bytes_needed = k.div_ceil(8);
let bytes = self.bytes(bytes_needed.min(8));
let mut result = 0u64;
for (i, &b) in bytes.iter().enumerate() {
if i >= 8 {
@@ -120,14 +120,14 @@ impl SecureRandom {
}
result |= (b as u64) << (i * 8);
}
if k < 64 {
result &= (1u64 << k) - 1;
}
result
}
/// Choose random element from slice
pub fn choose<'a, T>(&self, slice: &'a [T]) -> Option<&'a T> {
if slice.is_empty() {
@@ -136,22 +136,22 @@ impl SecureRandom {
Some(&slice[self.range(slice.len())])
}
}
/// Shuffle slice in place
pub fn shuffle<T>(&self, slice: &mut [T]) {
let mut inner = self.inner.lock();
for i in (1..slice.len()).rev() {
let j = inner.rng.gen_range(0..=i);
let j = inner.rng.random_range(0..=i);
slice.swap(i, j);
}
}
/// Generate random u32
pub fn u32(&self) -> u32 {
let mut inner = self.inner.lock();
inner.rng.random()
}
/// Generate random u64
pub fn u64(&self) -> u64 {
let mut inner = self.inner.lock();
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ impl Default for SecureRandom {
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::collections::HashSet;
#[test]
fn test_bytes_uniqueness() {
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ mod tests {
let b = rng.bytes(32);
assert_ne!(a, b);
}
#[test]
fn test_bytes_length() {
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
@@ -186,63 +186,63 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(rng.bytes(100).len(), 100);
assert_eq!(rng.bytes(1000).len(), 1000);
}
#[test]
fn test_range() {
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
for _ in 0..1000 {
let n = rng.range(10);
assert!(n < 10);
}
assert_eq!(rng.range(1), 0);
assert_eq!(rng.range(0), 0);
}
#[test]
fn test_bits() {
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
for _ in 0..100 {
assert!(rng.bits(1) <= 1);
}
for _ in 0..100 {
assert!(rng.bits(8) <= 255);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_choose() {
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
let items = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5];
let mut seen = HashSet::new();
for _ in 0..1000 {
if let Some(&item) = rng.choose(&items) {
seen.insert(item);
}
}
assert_eq!(seen.len(), 5);
let empty: Vec<i32> = vec![];
assert!(rng.choose(&empty).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_shuffle() {
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
let original = vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10];
let mut shuffled = original.clone();
rng.shuffle(&mut shuffled);
let mut sorted = shuffled.clone();
sorted.sort();
assert_eq!(sorted, original);
assert_ne!(shuffled, original);
}
}
+541
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
//! Unix daemon support for telemt.
//!
//! Provides classic Unix daemonization (double-fork), PID file management,
//! and privilege dropping for running telemt as a background service.
use std::fs::{self, File, OpenOptions};
use std::io::{self, Read, Write};
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use nix::fcntl::{Flock, FlockArg};
use nix::unistd::{self, ForkResult, Gid, Pid, Uid, chdir, close, fork, getpid, setsid};
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
/// Default PID file location.
pub const DEFAULT_PID_FILE: &str = "/var/run/telemt.pid";
/// Daemon configuration options parsed from CLI.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct DaemonOptions {
/// Run as daemon (fork to background).
pub daemonize: bool,
/// Path to PID file.
pub pid_file: Option<PathBuf>,
/// User to run as after binding sockets.
pub user: Option<String>,
/// Group to run as after binding sockets.
pub group: Option<String>,
/// Working directory for the daemon.
pub working_dir: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Explicit foreground mode (for systemd Type=simple).
pub foreground: bool,
}
impl DaemonOptions {
/// Returns the effective PID file path.
pub fn pid_file_path(&self) -> &Path {
self.pid_file
.as_deref()
.unwrap_or(Path::new(DEFAULT_PID_FILE))
}
/// Returns true if we should actually daemonize.
/// Foreground flag takes precedence.
pub fn should_daemonize(&self) -> bool {
self.daemonize && !self.foreground
}
}
/// Error types for daemon operations.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum DaemonError {
#[error("fork failed: {0}")]
ForkFailed(#[source] nix::Error),
#[error("setsid failed: {0}")]
SetsidFailed(#[source] nix::Error),
#[error("chdir failed: {0}")]
ChdirFailed(#[source] nix::Error),
#[error("failed to open /dev/null: {0}")]
DevNullFailed(#[source] io::Error),
#[error("failed to redirect stdio: {0}")]
RedirectFailed(#[source] nix::Error),
#[error("PID file error: {0}")]
PidFile(String),
#[error("another instance is already running (pid {0})")]
AlreadyRunning(i32),
#[error("user '{0}' not found")]
UserNotFound(String),
#[error("group '{0}' not found")]
GroupNotFound(String),
#[error("failed to set uid/gid: {0}")]
PrivilegeDrop(#[source] nix::Error),
#[error("io error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] io::Error),
}
/// Result of a successful daemonize() call.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum DaemonizeResult {
/// We are the parent process and should exit.
Parent,
/// We are the daemon child process and should continue.
Child,
}
/// Performs classic Unix double-fork daemonization.
///
/// This detaches the process from the controlling terminal:
/// 1. First fork - parent exits, child continues
/// 2. setsid() - become session leader
/// 3. Second fork - ensure we can never acquire a controlling terminal
/// 4. chdir("/") - don't hold any directory open
/// 5. Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr to /dev/null
///
/// Returns `DaemonizeResult::Parent` in the original parent (which should exit),
/// or `DaemonizeResult::Child` in the final daemon child.
pub fn daemonize(working_dir: Option<&Path>) -> Result<DaemonizeResult, DaemonError> {
// First fork
match unsafe { fork() } {
Ok(ForkResult::Parent { .. }) => {
// Parent exits
return Ok(DaemonizeResult::Parent);
}
Ok(ForkResult::Child) => {
// Child continues
}
Err(e) => return Err(DaemonError::ForkFailed(e)),
}
// Create new session, become session leader
setsid().map_err(DaemonError::SetsidFailed)?;
// Second fork to ensure we can never acquire a controlling terminal
match unsafe { fork() } {
Ok(ForkResult::Parent { .. }) => {
// Intermediate parent exits
std::process::exit(0);
}
Ok(ForkResult::Child) => {
// Final daemon child continues
}
Err(e) => return Err(DaemonError::ForkFailed(e)),
}
// Change working directory
let target_dir = working_dir.unwrap_or(Path::new("/"));
chdir(target_dir).map_err(DaemonError::ChdirFailed)?;
// Redirect stdin, stdout, stderr to /dev/null
redirect_stdio_to_devnull()?;
Ok(DaemonizeResult::Child)
}
/// Redirects stdin, stdout, and stderr to /dev/null.
fn redirect_stdio_to_devnull() -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
let devnull = File::options()
.read(true)
.write(true)
.open("/dev/null")
.map_err(DaemonError::DevNullFailed)?;
let devnull_fd = std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd::as_raw_fd(&devnull);
// Use libc::dup2 directly for redirecting standard file descriptors
// nix 0.31's dup2 requires OwnedFd which doesn't work well with stdio fds
unsafe {
// Redirect stdin (fd 0)
if libc::dup2(devnull_fd, 0) < 0 {
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(nix::errno::Errno::last()));
}
// Redirect stdout (fd 1)
if libc::dup2(devnull_fd, 1) < 0 {
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(nix::errno::Errno::last()));
}
// Redirect stderr (fd 2)
if libc::dup2(devnull_fd, 2) < 0 {
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(nix::errno::Errno::last()));
}
}
// Close original devnull fd if it's not one of the standard fds
if devnull_fd > 2 {
let _ = close(devnull_fd);
}
Ok(())
}
/// PID file manager with flock-based locking.
pub struct PidFile {
path: PathBuf,
file: Option<File>,
locked: bool,
}
impl PidFile {
/// Creates a new PID file manager for the given path.
pub fn new<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Self {
Self {
path: path.as_ref().to_path_buf(),
file: None,
locked: false,
}
}
/// Checks if another instance is already running.
///
/// Returns the PID of the running instance if one exists.
pub fn check_running(&self) -> Result<Option<i32>, DaemonError> {
if !self.path.exists() {
return Ok(None);
}
// Try to read existing PID
let mut contents = String::new();
File::open(&self.path)
.and_then(|mut f| f.read_to_string(&mut contents))
.map_err(|e| {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!("cannot read {}: {}", self.path.display(), e))
})?;
let pid: i32 = contents
.trim()
.parse()
.map_err(|_| DaemonError::PidFile(format!("invalid PID in {}", self.path.display())))?;
// Check if process is still running
if is_process_running(pid) {
Ok(Some(pid))
} else {
// Stale PID file
debug!(pid, path = %self.path.display(), "Removing stale PID file");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.path);
Ok(None)
}
}
/// Acquires the PID file lock and writes the current PID.
///
/// Fails if another instance is already running.
pub fn acquire(&mut self) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
// Check for running instance first
if let Some(pid) = self.check_running()? {
return Err(DaemonError::AlreadyRunning(pid));
}
// Ensure parent directory exists
if let Some(parent) = self.path.parent() {
if !parent.exists() {
fs::create_dir_all(parent).map_err(|e| {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
"cannot create directory {}: {}",
parent.display(),
e
))
})?;
}
}
// Open/create PID file with exclusive lock
let file = OpenOptions::new()
.write(true)
.create(true)
.truncate(true)
.mode(0o644)
.open(&self.path)
.map_err(|e| {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!("cannot open {}: {}", self.path.display(), e))
})?;
// Try to acquire exclusive lock (non-blocking)
let flock = Flock::lock(file, FlockArg::LockExclusiveNonblock).map_err(|(_, errno)| {
// Check if another instance grabbed the lock
if let Some(pid) = self.check_running().ok().flatten() {
DaemonError::AlreadyRunning(pid)
} else {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!("cannot lock {}: {}", self.path.display(), errno))
}
})?;
// Write our PID
let pid = getpid();
let mut file = flock
.unlock()
.map_err(|(_, errno)| DaemonError::PidFile(format!("unlock failed: {}", errno)))?;
writeln!(file, "{}", pid).map_err(|e| {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
"cannot write PID to {}: {}",
self.path.display(),
e
))
})?;
// Re-acquire lock and keep it
let flock = Flock::lock(file, FlockArg::LockExclusiveNonblock).map_err(|(_, errno)| {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!("cannot re-lock {}: {}", self.path.display(), errno))
})?;
self.file = Some(flock.unlock().map_err(|(_, errno)| {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!("unlock for storage failed: {}", errno))
})?);
self.locked = true;
info!(pid = pid.as_raw(), path = %self.path.display(), "PID file created");
Ok(())
}
/// Releases the PID file lock and removes the file.
pub fn release(&mut self) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
if let Some(file) = self.file.take() {
drop(file);
}
self.locked = false;
if self.path.exists() {
fs::remove_file(&self.path).map_err(|e| {
DaemonError::PidFile(format!("cannot remove {}: {}", self.path.display(), e))
})?;
debug!(path = %self.path.display(), "PID file removed");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Returns the path to this PID file.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn path(&self) -> &Path {
&self.path
}
}
impl Drop for PidFile {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if self.locked {
if let Err(e) = self.release() {
warn!(error = %e, "Failed to clean up PID file on drop");
}
}
}
}
/// Checks if a process with the given PID is running.
fn is_process_running(pid: i32) -> bool {
// kill(pid, 0) checks if process exists without sending a signal
nix::sys::signal::kill(Pid::from_raw(pid), None).is_ok()
}
/// Drops privileges to the specified user and group.
///
/// This should be called after binding privileged ports but before
/// entering the main event loop.
pub fn drop_privileges(user: Option<&str>, group: Option<&str>) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
// Look up group first (need to do this while still root)
let target_gid = if let Some(group_name) = group {
Some(lookup_group(group_name)?)
} else if let Some(user_name) = user {
// If no group specified but user is, use user's primary group
Some(lookup_user_primary_gid(user_name)?)
} else {
None
};
// Look up user
let target_uid = if let Some(user_name) = user {
Some(lookup_user(user_name)?)
} else {
None
};
// Drop privileges: set GID first, then UID
// (Setting UID first would prevent us from setting GID)
if let Some(gid) = target_gid {
unistd::setgid(gid).map_err(DaemonError::PrivilegeDrop)?;
// Also set supplementary groups to just this one
unistd::setgroups(&[gid]).map_err(DaemonError::PrivilegeDrop)?;
info!(gid = gid.as_raw(), "Dropped group privileges");
}
if let Some(uid) = target_uid {
unistd::setuid(uid).map_err(DaemonError::PrivilegeDrop)?;
info!(uid = uid.as_raw(), "Dropped user privileges");
}
Ok(())
}
/// Looks up a user by name and returns their UID.
fn lookup_user(name: &str) -> Result<Uid, DaemonError> {
// Use libc getpwnam
let c_name =
std::ffi::CString::new(name).map_err(|_| DaemonError::UserNotFound(name.to_string()))?;
unsafe {
let pwd = libc::getpwnam(c_name.as_ptr());
if pwd.is_null() {
Err(DaemonError::UserNotFound(name.to_string()))
} else {
Ok(Uid::from_raw((*pwd).pw_uid))
}
}
}
/// Looks up a user's primary GID by username.
fn lookup_user_primary_gid(name: &str) -> Result<Gid, DaemonError> {
let c_name =
std::ffi::CString::new(name).map_err(|_| DaemonError::UserNotFound(name.to_string()))?;
unsafe {
let pwd = libc::getpwnam(c_name.as_ptr());
if pwd.is_null() {
Err(DaemonError::UserNotFound(name.to_string()))
} else {
Ok(Gid::from_raw((*pwd).pw_gid))
}
}
}
/// Looks up a group by name and returns its GID.
fn lookup_group(name: &str) -> Result<Gid, DaemonError> {
let c_name =
std::ffi::CString::new(name).map_err(|_| DaemonError::GroupNotFound(name.to_string()))?;
unsafe {
let grp = libc::getgrnam(c_name.as_ptr());
if grp.is_null() {
Err(DaemonError::GroupNotFound(name.to_string()))
} else {
Ok(Gid::from_raw((*grp).gr_gid))
}
}
}
/// Reads PID from a PID file.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn read_pid_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<i32, DaemonError> {
let path = path.as_ref();
let mut contents = String::new();
File::open(path)
.and_then(|mut f| f.read_to_string(&mut contents))
.map_err(|e| DaemonError::PidFile(format!("cannot read {}: {}", path.display(), e)))?;
contents
.trim()
.parse()
.map_err(|_| DaemonError::PidFile(format!("invalid PID in {}", path.display())))
}
/// Sends a signal to the process specified in a PID file.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn signal_pid_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(
path: P,
signal: nix::sys::signal::Signal,
) -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
let pid = read_pid_file(&path)?;
if !is_process_running(pid) {
return Err(DaemonError::PidFile(format!(
"process {} from {} is not running",
pid,
path.as_ref().display()
)));
}
nix::sys::signal::kill(Pid::from_raw(pid), signal)
.map_err(|e| DaemonError::PidFile(format!("cannot signal process {}: {}", pid, e)))?;
Ok(())
}
/// Returns the status of the daemon based on PID file.
#[allow(dead_code)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum DaemonStatus {
/// Daemon is running with the given PID.
Running(i32),
/// PID file exists but process is not running.
Stale(i32),
/// No PID file exists.
NotRunning,
}
/// Checks the daemon status from a PID file.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub fn check_status<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> DaemonStatus {
let path = path.as_ref();
if !path.exists() {
return DaemonStatus::NotRunning;
}
match read_pid_file(path) {
Ok(pid) => {
if is_process_running(pid) {
DaemonStatus::Running(pid)
} else {
DaemonStatus::Stale(pid)
}
}
Err(_) => DaemonStatus::NotRunning,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_daemon_options_default() {
let opts = DaemonOptions::default();
assert!(!opts.daemonize);
assert!(!opts.should_daemonize());
assert_eq!(opts.pid_file_path(), Path::new(DEFAULT_PID_FILE));
}
#[test]
fn test_daemon_options_foreground_overrides() {
let opts = DaemonOptions {
daemonize: true,
foreground: true,
..Default::default()
};
assert!(!opts.should_daemonize());
}
#[test]
fn test_check_status_not_running() {
let path = "/tmp/telemt_test_nonexistent.pid";
assert_eq!(check_status(path), DaemonStatus::NotRunning);
}
#[test]
fn test_pid_file_basic() {
let path = "/tmp/telemt_test_pidfile.pid";
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
let mut pf = PidFile::new(path);
assert!(pf.check_running().unwrap().is_none());
pf.acquire().unwrap();
assert!(Path::new(path).exists());
// Read it back
let pid = read_pid_file(path).unwrap();
assert_eq!(pid, std::process::id() as i32);
pf.release().unwrap();
assert!(!Path::new(path).exists());
}
}
+116 -95
View File
@@ -12,28 +12,15 @@ use thiserror::Error;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum StreamError {
/// Partial read: got fewer bytes than expected
PartialRead {
expected: usize,
got: usize,
},
PartialRead { expected: usize, got: usize },
/// Partial write: wrote fewer bytes than expected
PartialWrite {
expected: usize,
written: usize,
},
PartialWrite { expected: usize, written: usize },
/// Stream is in poisoned state and cannot be used
Poisoned {
reason: String,
},
Poisoned { reason: String },
/// Buffer overflow: attempted to buffer more than allowed
BufferOverflow {
limit: usize,
attempted: usize,
},
BufferOverflow { limit: usize, attempted: usize },
/// Invalid frame format
InvalidFrame {
details: String,
},
InvalidFrame { details: String },
/// Unexpected end of stream
UnexpectedEof,
/// Underlying I/O error
@@ -47,13 +34,21 @@ impl fmt::Display for StreamError {
write!(f, "partial read: expected {} bytes, got {}", expected, got)
}
Self::PartialWrite { expected, written } => {
write!(f, "partial write: expected {} bytes, wrote {}", expected, written)
write!(
f,
"partial write: expected {} bytes, wrote {}",
expected, written
)
}
Self::Poisoned { reason } => {
write!(f, "stream poisoned: {}", reason)
}
Self::BufferOverflow { limit, attempted } => {
write!(f, "buffer overflow: limit {}, attempted {}", limit, attempted)
write!(
f,
"buffer overflow: limit {}, attempted {}",
limit, attempted
)
}
Self::InvalidFrame { details } => {
write!(f, "invalid frame: {}", details)
@@ -90,9 +85,7 @@ impl From<StreamError> for std::io::Error {
StreamError::UnexpectedEof => {
std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof, err)
}
StreamError::Poisoned { .. } => {
std::io::Error::other(err)
}
StreamError::Poisoned { .. } => std::io::Error::other(err),
StreamError::BufferOverflow { .. } => {
std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::OutOfMemory, err)
}
@@ -112,7 +105,7 @@ impl From<StreamError> for std::io::Error {
pub trait Recoverable {
/// Check if error is recoverable (can retry operation)
fn is_recoverable(&self) -> bool;
/// Check if connection can continue after this error
fn can_continue(&self) -> bool;
}
@@ -123,19 +116,22 @@ impl Recoverable for StreamError {
Self::PartialRead { .. } | Self::PartialWrite { .. } => true,
Self::Io(e) => matches!(
e.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock
| std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted
| std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock
| std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted
| std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut
),
Self::Poisoned { .. }
Self::Poisoned { .. }
| Self::BufferOverflow { .. }
| Self::InvalidFrame { .. }
| Self::UnexpectedEof => false,
}
}
fn can_continue(&self) -> bool {
!matches!(self, Self::Poisoned { .. } | Self::UnexpectedEof | Self::BufferOverflow { .. })
!matches!(
self,
Self::Poisoned { .. } | Self::UnexpectedEof | Self::BufferOverflow { .. }
)
}
}
@@ -143,19 +139,19 @@ impl Recoverable for std::io::Error {
fn is_recoverable(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock
| std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted
| std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut
std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock
| std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted
| std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut
)
}
fn can_continue(&self) -> bool {
!matches!(
self.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe
| std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset
| std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted
| std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected
| std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset
| std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted
| std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected
)
}
}
@@ -165,96 +161,91 @@ impl Recoverable for std::io::Error {
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum ProxyError {
// ============= Crypto Errors =============
#[error("Crypto error: {0}")]
Crypto(String),
#[error("Invalid key length: expected {expected}, got {got}")]
InvalidKeyLength { expected: usize, got: usize },
// ============= Stream Errors =============
#[error("Stream error: {0}")]
Stream(#[from] StreamError),
// ============= Protocol Errors =============
#[error("Invalid handshake: {0}")]
InvalidHandshake(String),
#[error("Invalid protocol tag: {0:02x?}")]
InvalidProtoTag([u8; 4]),
#[error("Invalid TLS record: type={record_type}, version={version:02x?}")]
InvalidTlsRecord { record_type: u8, version: [u8; 2] },
#[error("Replay attack detected from {addr}")]
ReplayAttack { addr: SocketAddr },
#[error("Time skew detected: client={client_time}, server={server_time}")]
TimeSkew { client_time: u32, server_time: u32 },
#[error("Invalid message length: {len} (min={min}, max={max})")]
InvalidMessageLength { len: usize, min: usize, max: usize },
#[error("Checksum mismatch: expected={expected:08x}, got={got:08x}")]
ChecksumMismatch { expected: u32, got: u32 },
#[error("Sequence number mismatch: expected={expected}, got={got}")]
SeqNoMismatch { expected: i32, got: i32 },
#[error("TLS handshake failed: {reason}")]
TlsHandshakeFailed { reason: String },
#[error("Telegram handshake timeout")]
TgHandshakeTimeout,
// ============= Network Errors =============
#[error("Connection timeout to {addr}")]
ConnectionTimeout { addr: String },
#[error("Connection refused by {addr}")]
ConnectionRefused { addr: String },
#[error("IO error: {0}")]
Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
// ============= Proxy Protocol Errors =============
#[error("Invalid proxy protocol header")]
InvalidProxyProtocol,
#[error("Unknown TLS SNI")]
UnknownTlsSni,
#[error("Proxy error: {0}")]
Proxy(String),
// ============= Config Errors =============
#[error("Config error: {0}")]
Config(String),
#[error("Invalid secret for user {user}: {reason}")]
InvalidSecret { user: String, reason: String },
// ============= User Errors =============
#[error("User {user} expired")]
UserExpired { user: String },
#[error("User {user} exceeded connection limit")]
ConnectionLimitExceeded { user: String },
#[error("User {user} exceeded data quota")]
DataQuotaExceeded { user: String },
#[error("Unknown user")]
UnknownUser,
#[error("Rate limited")]
RateLimited,
// ============= General Errors =============
#[error("Internal error: {0}")]
Internal(String),
}
@@ -269,7 +260,7 @@ impl Recoverable for ProxyError {
_ => false,
}
}
fn can_continue(&self) -> bool {
match self {
Self::Stream(e) => e.can_continue(),
@@ -301,17 +292,19 @@ impl<T, R, W> HandshakeResult<T, R, W> {
pub fn is_success(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, HandshakeResult::Success(_))
}
/// Check if bad client
pub fn is_bad_client(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, HandshakeResult::BadClient { .. })
}
/// Map the success value
pub fn map<U, F: FnOnce(T) -> U>(self, f: F) -> HandshakeResult<U, R, W> {
match self {
HandshakeResult::Success(v) => HandshakeResult::Success(f(v)),
HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer } => HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer },
HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer } => {
HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer }
}
HandshakeResult::Error(e) => HandshakeResult::Error(e),
}
}
@@ -338,76 +331,104 @@ impl<T, R, W> From<StreamError> for HandshakeResult<T, R, W> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_stream_error_display() {
let err = StreamError::PartialRead { expected: 100, got: 50 };
let err = StreamError::PartialRead {
expected: 100,
got: 50,
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains("100"));
assert!(err.to_string().contains("50"));
let err = StreamError::Poisoned { reason: "test".into() };
let err = StreamError::Poisoned {
reason: "test".into(),
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains("test"));
}
#[test]
fn test_stream_error_recoverable() {
assert!(StreamError::PartialRead { expected: 10, got: 5 }.is_recoverable());
assert!(StreamError::PartialWrite { expected: 10, written: 5 }.is_recoverable());
assert!(
StreamError::PartialRead {
expected: 10,
got: 5
}
.is_recoverable()
);
assert!(
StreamError::PartialWrite {
expected: 10,
written: 5
}
.is_recoverable()
);
assert!(!StreamError::Poisoned { reason: "x".into() }.is_recoverable());
assert!(!StreamError::UnexpectedEof.is_recoverable());
}
#[test]
fn test_stream_error_can_continue() {
assert!(!StreamError::Poisoned { reason: "x".into() }.can_continue());
assert!(!StreamError::UnexpectedEof.can_continue());
assert!(StreamError::PartialRead { expected: 10, got: 5 }.can_continue());
assert!(
StreamError::PartialRead {
expected: 10,
got: 5
}
.can_continue()
);
}
#[test]
fn test_stream_error_to_io_error() {
let stream_err = StreamError::UnexpectedEof;
let io_err: std::io::Error = stream_err.into();
assert_eq!(io_err.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof);
}
#[test]
fn test_handshake_result() {
let success: HandshakeResult<i32, (), ()> = HandshakeResult::Success(42);
assert!(success.is_success());
assert!(!success.is_bad_client());
let bad: HandshakeResult<i32, (), ()> = HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader: (), writer: () };
let bad: HandshakeResult<i32, (), ()> = HandshakeResult::BadClient {
reader: (),
writer: (),
};
assert!(!bad.is_success());
assert!(bad.is_bad_client());
}
#[test]
fn test_handshake_result_map() {
let success: HandshakeResult<i32, (), ()> = HandshakeResult::Success(42);
let mapped = success.map(|x| x * 2);
match mapped {
HandshakeResult::Success(v) => assert_eq!(v, 84),
_ => panic!("Expected success"),
}
}
#[test]
fn test_proxy_error_recoverable() {
let err = ProxyError::RateLimited;
assert!(err.is_recoverable());
let err = ProxyError::InvalidHandshake("bad".into());
assert!(!err.is_recoverable());
}
#[test]
fn test_error_display() {
let err = ProxyError::ConnectionTimeout { addr: "1.2.3.4:443".into() };
let err = ProxyError::ConnectionTimeout {
addr: "1.2.3.4:443".into(),
};
assert!(err.to_string().contains("1.2.3.4:443"));
let err = ProxyError::InvalidProxyProtocol;
assert!(err.to_string().contains("proxy protocol"));
}
}
}
+112 -6
View File
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex as AsyncMutex, RwLock};
@@ -22,10 +22,19 @@ pub struct UserIpTracker {
limit_mode: Arc<RwLock<UserMaxUniqueIpsMode>>,
limit_window: Arc<RwLock<Duration>>,
last_compact_epoch_secs: Arc<AtomicU64>,
pub(crate) cleanup_queue: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(String, IpAddr)>>>,
cleanup_queue: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(String, IpAddr)>>>,
cleanup_drain_lock: Arc<AsyncMutex<()>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct UserIpTrackerMemoryStats {
pub active_users: usize,
pub recent_users: usize,
pub active_entries: usize,
pub recent_entries: usize,
pub cleanup_queue_len: usize,
}
impl UserIpTracker {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
@@ -41,7 +50,6 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
}
}
pub fn enqueue_cleanup(&self, user: String, ip: IpAddr) {
match self.cleanup_queue.lock() {
Ok(mut queue) => queue.push((user, ip)),
@@ -58,6 +66,19 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn cleanup_queue_len_for_tests(&self) -> usize {
self.cleanup_queue
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.len()
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn cleanup_queue_mutex_for_tests(&self) -> Arc<Mutex<Vec<(String, IpAddr)>>> {
Arc::clone(&self.cleanup_queue)
}
pub(crate) async fn drain_cleanup_queue(&self) {
// Serialize queue draining and active-IP mutation so check-and-add cannot
// observe stale active entries that are already queued for removal.
@@ -129,7 +150,15 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
let mut active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
let mut recent_ips = self.recent_ips.write().await;
let mut users = Vec::<String>::with_capacity(active_ips.len().saturating_add(recent_ips.len()));
let window = *self.limit_window.read().await;
let now = Instant::now();
for user_recent in recent_ips.values_mut() {
Self::prune_recent(user_recent, now, window);
}
let mut users =
Vec::<String>::with_capacity(active_ips.len().saturating_add(recent_ips.len()));
users.extend(active_ips.keys().cloned());
for user in recent_ips.keys() {
if !active_ips.contains_key(user) {
@@ -138,8 +167,14 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
}
for user in users {
let active_empty = active_ips.get(&user).map(|ips| ips.is_empty()).unwrap_or(true);
let recent_empty = recent_ips.get(&user).map(|ips| ips.is_empty()).unwrap_or(true);
let active_empty = active_ips
.get(&user)
.map(|ips| ips.is_empty())
.unwrap_or(true);
let recent_empty = recent_ips
.get(&user)
.map(|ips| ips.is_empty())
.unwrap_or(true);
if active_empty && recent_empty {
active_ips.remove(&user);
recent_ips.remove(&user);
@@ -147,6 +182,26 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
}
}
pub async fn memory_stats(&self) -> UserIpTrackerMemoryStats {
let cleanup_queue_len = self
.cleanup_queue
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.len();
let active_ips = self.active_ips.read().await;
let recent_ips = self.recent_ips.read().await;
let active_entries = active_ips.values().map(HashMap::len).sum();
let recent_entries = recent_ips.values().map(HashMap::len).sum();
UserIpTrackerMemoryStats {
active_users: active_ips.len(),
recent_users: recent_ips.len(),
active_entries,
recent_entries,
cleanup_queue_len,
}
}
pub async fn set_limit_policy(&self, mode: UserMaxUniqueIpsMode, window_secs: u64) {
{
let mut current_mode = self.limit_mode.write().await;
@@ -432,6 +487,7 @@ impl Default for UserIpTracker {
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
fn test_ipv4(oct1: u8, oct2: u8, oct3: u8, oct4: u8) -> IpAddr {
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(oct1, oct2, oct3, oct4))
@@ -745,4 +801,54 @@ mod tests {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(1100)).await;
assert!(tracker.check_and_add("test_user", ip2).await.is_ok());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_memory_stats_reports_queue_and_entry_counts() {
let tracker = UserIpTracker::new();
tracker.set_user_limit("test_user", 4).await;
let ip1 = test_ipv4(10, 2, 0, 1);
let ip2 = test_ipv4(10, 2, 0, 2);
tracker.check_and_add("test_user", ip1).await.unwrap();
tracker.check_and_add("test_user", ip2).await.unwrap();
tracker.enqueue_cleanup("test_user".to_string(), ip1);
let snapshot = tracker.memory_stats().await;
assert_eq!(snapshot.active_users, 1);
assert_eq!(snapshot.recent_users, 1);
assert_eq!(snapshot.active_entries, 2);
assert_eq!(snapshot.recent_entries, 2);
assert_eq!(snapshot.cleanup_queue_len, 1);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_compact_prunes_stale_recent_entries() {
let tracker = UserIpTracker::new();
tracker
.set_limit_policy(UserMaxUniqueIpsMode::TimeWindow, 1)
.await;
let stale_user = "stale-user".to_string();
let stale_ip = test_ipv4(10, 3, 0, 1);
{
let mut recent_ips = tracker.recent_ips.write().await;
recent_ips
.entry(stale_user.clone())
.or_insert_with(HashMap::new)
.insert(stale_ip, Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(5));
}
tracker.last_compact_epoch_secs.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
tracker
.check_and_add("trigger-user", test_ipv4(10, 3, 0, 2))
.await
.unwrap();
let recent_ips = tracker.recent_ips.read().await;
let stale_exists = recent_ips
.get(&stale_user)
.map(|ips| ips.contains_key(&stale_ip))
.unwrap_or(false);
assert!(!stale_exists);
}
}
+305
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
//! Logging configuration for telemt.
//!
//! Supports multiple log destinations:
//! - stderr (default, works with systemd journald)
//! - syslog (Unix only, for traditional init systems)
//! - file (with optional rotation)
#![allow(dead_code)] // Infrastructure module - used via CLI flags
use std::path::Path;
use tracing_subscriber::layer::SubscriberExt;
use tracing_subscriber::util::SubscriberInitExt;
use tracing_subscriber::{EnvFilter, fmt, reload};
/// Log destination configuration.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub enum LogDestination {
/// Log to stderr (default, captured by systemd journald).
#[default]
Stderr,
/// Log to syslog (Unix only).
#[cfg(unix)]
Syslog,
/// Log to a file with optional rotation.
File {
path: String,
/// Rotate daily if true.
rotate_daily: bool,
},
}
/// Logging options parsed from CLI/config.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct LoggingOptions {
/// Where to send logs.
pub destination: LogDestination,
/// Disable ANSI colors.
pub disable_colors: bool,
}
/// Guard that must be held to keep file logging active.
/// When dropped, flushes and closes log files.
pub struct LoggingGuard {
_guard: Option<tracing_appender::non_blocking::WorkerGuard>,
}
impl LoggingGuard {
fn new(guard: Option<tracing_appender::non_blocking::WorkerGuard>) -> Self {
Self { _guard: guard }
}
/// Creates a no-op guard for stderr/syslog logging.
pub fn noop() -> Self {
Self { _guard: None }
}
}
/// Initialize the tracing subscriber with the specified options.
///
/// Returns a reload handle for dynamic log level changes and a guard
/// that must be kept alive for file logging.
pub fn init_logging(
opts: &LoggingOptions,
initial_filter: &str,
) -> (
reload::Handle<EnvFilter, impl tracing::Subscriber + Send + Sync>,
LoggingGuard,
) {
let (filter_layer, filter_handle) = reload::Layer::new(EnvFilter::new(initial_filter));
match &opts.destination {
LogDestination::Stderr => {
let fmt_layer = fmt::Layer::default()
.with_ansi(!opts.disable_colors)
.with_target(true);
tracing_subscriber::registry()
.with(filter_layer)
.with(fmt_layer)
.init();
(filter_handle, LoggingGuard::noop())
}
#[cfg(unix)]
LogDestination::Syslog => {
// Use a custom fmt layer that writes to syslog
let fmt_layer = fmt::Layer::default()
.with_ansi(false)
.with_target(true)
.with_writer(SyslogWriter::new);
tracing_subscriber::registry()
.with(filter_layer)
.with(fmt_layer)
.init();
(filter_handle, LoggingGuard::noop())
}
LogDestination::File { path, rotate_daily } => {
let (non_blocking, guard) = if *rotate_daily {
// Extract directory and filename prefix
let path = Path::new(path);
let dir = path.parent().unwrap_or(Path::new("/var/log"));
let prefix = path
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.unwrap_or("telemt");
let file_appender = tracing_appender::rolling::daily(dir, prefix);
tracing_appender::non_blocking(file_appender)
} else {
let file = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.create(true)
.append(true)
.open(path)
.expect("Failed to open log file");
tracing_appender::non_blocking(file)
};
let fmt_layer = fmt::Layer::default()
.with_ansi(false)
.with_target(true)
.with_writer(non_blocking);
tracing_subscriber::registry()
.with(filter_layer)
.with(fmt_layer)
.init();
(filter_handle, LoggingGuard::new(Some(guard)))
}
}
}
/// Syslog writer for tracing.
#[cfg(unix)]
struct SyslogWriter {
_private: (),
}
#[cfg(unix)]
impl SyslogWriter {
fn new() -> Self {
// Open syslog connection on first use
static INIT: std::sync::Once = std::sync::Once::new();
INIT.call_once(|| {
unsafe {
// Open syslog with ident "telemt", LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON facility
let ident = b"telemt\0".as_ptr() as *const libc::c_char;
libc::openlog(ident, libc::LOG_PID | libc::LOG_NDELAY, libc::LOG_DAEMON);
}
});
Self { _private: () }
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
impl std::io::Write for SyslogWriter {
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
// Convert to C string, stripping newlines
let msg = String::from_utf8_lossy(buf);
let msg = msg.trim_end();
if msg.is_empty() {
return Ok(buf.len());
}
// Determine priority based on log level in the message
let priority = if msg.contains(" ERROR ") || msg.contains(" error ") {
libc::LOG_ERR
} else if msg.contains(" WARN ") || msg.contains(" warn ") {
libc::LOG_WARNING
} else if msg.contains(" INFO ") || msg.contains(" info ") {
libc::LOG_INFO
} else if msg.contains(" DEBUG ") || msg.contains(" debug ") {
libc::LOG_DEBUG
} else {
libc::LOG_INFO
};
// Write to syslog
let c_msg = std::ffi::CString::new(msg.as_bytes())
.unwrap_or_else(|_| std::ffi::CString::new("(invalid utf8)").unwrap());
unsafe {
libc::syslog(
priority,
b"%s\0".as_ptr() as *const libc::c_char,
c_msg.as_ptr(),
);
}
Ok(buf.len())
}
fn flush(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
impl<'a> tracing_subscriber::fmt::MakeWriter<'a> for SyslogWriter {
type Writer = SyslogWriter;
fn make_writer(&'a self) -> Self::Writer {
SyslogWriter::new()
}
}
/// Parse log destination from CLI arguments.
pub fn parse_log_destination(args: &[String]) -> LogDestination {
let mut i = 0;
while i < args.len() {
match args[i].as_str() {
#[cfg(unix)]
"--syslog" => {
return LogDestination::Syslog;
}
"--log-file" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
return LogDestination::File {
path: args[i].clone(),
rotate_daily: false,
};
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--log-file=") => {
return LogDestination::File {
path: s.trim_start_matches("--log-file=").to_string(),
rotate_daily: false,
};
}
"--log-file-daily" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
return LogDestination::File {
path: args[i].clone(),
rotate_daily: true,
};
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--log-file-daily=") => {
return LogDestination::File {
path: s.trim_start_matches("--log-file-daily=").to_string(),
rotate_daily: true,
};
}
_ => {}
}
i += 1;
}
LogDestination::Stderr
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_parse_log_destination_default() {
let args: Vec<String> = vec![];
assert!(matches!(
parse_log_destination(&args),
LogDestination::Stderr
));
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_log_destination_file() {
let args = vec!["--log-file".to_string(), "/var/log/telemt.log".to_string()];
match parse_log_destination(&args) {
LogDestination::File { path, rotate_daily } => {
assert_eq!(path, "/var/log/telemt.log");
assert!(!rotate_daily);
}
_ => panic!("Expected File destination"),
}
}
#[test]
fn test_parse_log_destination_file_daily() {
let args = vec!["--log-file-daily=/var/log/telemt".to_string()];
match parse_log_destination(&args) {
LogDestination::File { path, rotate_daily } => {
assert_eq!(path, "/var/log/telemt");
assert!(rotate_daily);
}
_ => panic!("Expected File destination"),
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn test_parse_log_destination_syslog() {
let args = vec!["--syslog".to_string()];
assert!(matches!(
parse_log_destination(&args),
LogDestination::Syslog
));
}
}
+60 -20
View File
@@ -21,10 +21,29 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
if config.general.use_middle_proxy {
if let Some(pool) = me_pool.as_ref() {
let initial_ready = pool.admission_ready_conditional_cast().await;
admission_tx.send_replace(initial_ready);
let _ = route_runtime.set_mode(RelayRouteMode::Middle);
let mut fallback_enabled = config.general.me2dc_fallback;
let mut fast_fallback_enabled = fallback_enabled && config.general.me2dc_fast;
let (initial_gate_open, initial_route_mode, initial_fallback_reason) = if initial_ready
{
(true, RelayRouteMode::Middle, None)
} else if fast_fallback_enabled {
(
true,
RelayRouteMode::Direct,
Some("fast_not_ready_fallback"),
)
} else {
(false, RelayRouteMode::Middle, None)
};
admission_tx.send_replace(initial_gate_open);
let _ = route_runtime.set_mode(initial_route_mode);
if initial_ready {
info!("Conditional-admission gate: open / ME pool READY");
} else if let Some(reason) = initial_fallback_reason {
warn!(
fallback_reason = reason,
"Conditional-admission gate opened in ME fast fallback mode"
);
} else {
warn!("Conditional-admission gate: closed / ME pool is NOT ready)");
}
@@ -34,10 +53,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
let route_runtime_gate = route_runtime.clone();
let mut config_rx_gate = config_rx.clone();
let mut admission_poll_ms = config.general.me_admission_poll_ms.max(1);
let mut fallback_enabled = config.general.me2dc_fallback;
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut gate_open = initial_ready;
let mut route_mode = RelayRouteMode::Middle;
let mut gate_open = initial_gate_open;
let mut route_mode = initial_route_mode;
let mut ready_observed = initial_ready;
let mut not_ready_since = if initial_ready {
None
@@ -53,16 +71,23 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
let cfg = config_rx_gate.borrow_and_update().clone();
admission_poll_ms = cfg.general.me_admission_poll_ms.max(1);
fallback_enabled = cfg.general.me2dc_fallback;
fast_fallback_enabled = cfg.general.me2dc_fallback && cfg.general.me2dc_fast;
continue;
}
_ = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(admission_poll_ms)) => {}
}
let ready = pool_for_gate.admission_ready_conditional_cast().await;
let now = Instant::now();
let (next_gate_open, next_route_mode, next_fallback_active) = if ready {
let (next_gate_open, next_route_mode, next_fallback_reason) = if ready {
ready_observed = true;
not_ready_since = None;
(true, RelayRouteMode::Middle, false)
(true, RelayRouteMode::Middle, None)
} else if fast_fallback_enabled {
(
true,
RelayRouteMode::Direct,
Some("fast_not_ready_fallback"),
)
} else {
let not_ready_started_at = *not_ready_since.get_or_insert(now);
let not_ready_for = now.saturating_duration_since(not_ready_started_at);
@@ -72,11 +97,12 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
STARTUP_FALLBACK_AFTER
};
if fallback_enabled && not_ready_for > fallback_after {
(true, RelayRouteMode::Direct, true)
(true, RelayRouteMode::Direct, Some("strict_grace_fallback"))
} else {
(false, RelayRouteMode::Middle, false)
(false, RelayRouteMode::Middle, None)
}
};
let next_fallback_active = next_fallback_reason.is_some();
if next_route_mode != route_mode {
route_mode = next_route_mode;
@@ -88,17 +114,28 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
"Middle-End routing restored for new sessions"
);
} else {
let fallback_after = if ready_observed {
RUNTIME_FALLBACK_AFTER
let fallback_reason = next_fallback_reason.unwrap_or("unknown");
if fallback_reason == "strict_grace_fallback" {
let fallback_after = if ready_observed {
RUNTIME_FALLBACK_AFTER
} else {
STARTUP_FALLBACK_AFTER
};
warn!(
target_mode = route_mode.as_str(),
cutover_generation = snapshot.generation,
grace_secs = fallback_after.as_secs(),
fallback_reason,
"ME pool stayed not-ready beyond grace; routing new sessions via Direct-DC"
);
} else {
STARTUP_FALLBACK_AFTER
};
warn!(
target_mode = route_mode.as_str(),
cutover_generation = snapshot.generation,
grace_secs = fallback_after.as_secs(),
"ME pool stayed not-ready beyond grace; routing new sessions via Direct-DC"
);
warn!(
target_mode = route_mode.as_str(),
cutover_generation = snapshot.generation,
fallback_reason,
"ME pool not-ready; routing new sessions via Direct-DC (fast mode)"
);
}
}
}
}
@@ -108,7 +145,10 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
admission_tx_gate.send_replace(gate_open);
if gate_open {
if next_fallback_active {
warn!("Conditional-admission gate opened in ME fallback mode");
warn!(
fallback_reason = next_fallback_reason.unwrap_or("unknown"),
"Conditional-admission gate opened in ME fallback mode"
);
} else {
info!("Conditional-admission gate opened / ME pool READY");
}
+17 -5
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
#![allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Instant;
@@ -11,10 +13,10 @@ use crate::startup::{
COMPONENT_DC_CONNECTIVITY_PING, COMPONENT_ME_CONNECTIVITY_PING, COMPONENT_RUNTIME_READY,
StartupTracker,
};
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{
MePingFamily, MePingSample, MePool, format_me_route, format_sample_line, run_me_ping,
};
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
pub(crate) async fn run_startup_connectivity(
config: &Arc<ProxyConfig>,
@@ -47,11 +49,15 @@ pub(crate) async fn run_startup_connectivity(
let v4_ok = me_results.iter().any(|r| {
matches!(r.family, MePingFamily::V4)
&& r.samples.iter().any(|s| s.error.is_none() && s.handshake_ms.is_some())
&& r.samples
.iter()
.any(|s| s.error.is_none() && s.handshake_ms.is_some())
});
let v6_ok = me_results.iter().any(|r| {
matches!(r.family, MePingFamily::V6)
&& r.samples.iter().any(|s| s.error.is_none() && s.handshake_ms.is_some())
&& r.samples
.iter()
.any(|s| s.error.is_none() && s.handshake_ms.is_some())
});
info!("================= Telegram ME Connectivity =================");
@@ -131,8 +137,14 @@ pub(crate) async fn run_startup_connectivity(
.await;
for upstream_result in &ping_results {
let v6_works = upstream_result.v6_results.iter().any(|r| r.rtt_ms.is_some());
let v4_works = upstream_result.v4_results.iter().any(|r| r.rtt_ms.is_some());
let v6_works = upstream_result
.v6_results
.iter()
.any(|r| r.rtt_ms.is_some());
let v4_works = upstream_result
.v4_results
.iter()
.any(|r| r.rtt_ms.is_some());
if upstream_result.both_available {
if prefer_ipv6 {
+132 -35
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,24 @@
use std::time::Duration;
#![allow(clippy::items_after_test_module)]
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::sync::watch;
use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
use crate::cli;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::logging::LogDestination;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{
ProxyConfigData, fetch_proxy_config_with_raw, load_proxy_config_cache, save_proxy_config_cache,
ProxyConfigData, fetch_proxy_config_with_raw_via_upstream, load_proxy_config_cache,
save_proxy_config_cache,
};
pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_config_path(config_path_cli: &str, startup_cwd: &std::path::Path) -> PathBuf {
pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_config_path(
config_path_cli: &str,
startup_cwd: &std::path::Path,
) -> PathBuf {
let raw = PathBuf::from(config_path_cli);
let absolute = if raw.is_absolute() {
raw
@@ -20,7 +28,16 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_config_path(config_path_cli: &str, startup_cwd: &s
absolute.canonicalize().unwrap_or(absolute)
}
pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> (String, Option<PathBuf>, bool, Option<String>) {
/// Parsed CLI arguments.
pub(crate) struct CliArgs {
pub config_path: String,
pub data_path: Option<PathBuf>,
pub silent: bool,
pub log_level: Option<String>,
pub log_destination: LogDestination,
}
pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> CliArgs {
let mut config_path = "config.toml".to_string();
let mut data_path: Option<PathBuf> = None;
let mut silent = false;
@@ -28,6 +45,9 @@ pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> (String, Option<PathBuf>, bool, Option<String>) {
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
// Parse log destination
let log_destination = crate::logging::parse_log_destination(&args);
// Check for --init first (handled before tokio)
if let Some(init_opts) = cli::parse_init_args(&args) {
if let Err(e) = cli::run_init(init_opts) {
@@ -50,7 +70,9 @@ pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> (String, Option<PathBuf>, bool, Option<String>) {
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--data-path=") => {
data_path = Some(PathBuf::from(s.trim_start_matches("--data-path=").to_string()));
data_path = Some(PathBuf::from(
s.trim_start_matches("--data-path=").to_string(),
));
}
"--silent" | "-s" => {
silent = true;
@@ -65,34 +87,35 @@ pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> (String, Option<PathBuf>, bool, Option<String>) {
log_level = Some(s.trim_start_matches("--log-level=").to_string());
}
"--help" | "-h" => {
eprintln!("Usage: telemt [config.toml] [OPTIONS]");
eprintln!();
eprintln!("Options:");
eprintln!(" --data-path <DIR> Set data directory (absolute path; overrides config value)");
eprintln!(" --silent, -s Suppress info logs");
eprintln!(" --log-level <LEVEL> debug|verbose|normal|silent");
eprintln!(" --help, -h Show this help");
eprintln!();
eprintln!("Setup (fire-and-forget):");
eprintln!(
" --init Generate config, install systemd service, start"
);
eprintln!(" --port <PORT> Listen port (default: 443)");
eprintln!(
" --domain <DOMAIN> TLS domain for masking (default: www.google.com)"
);
eprintln!(
" --secret <HEX> 32-char hex secret (auto-generated if omitted)"
);
eprintln!(" --user <NAME> Username (default: user)");
eprintln!(" --config-dir <DIR> Config directory (default: /etc/telemt)");
eprintln!(" --no-start Don't start the service after install");
print_help();
std::process::exit(0);
}
"--version" | "-V" => {
println!("telemt {}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"));
std::process::exit(0);
}
// Skip daemon-related flags (already parsed)
"--daemon" | "-d" | "--foreground" | "-f" => {}
s if s.starts_with("--pid-file") => {
if !s.contains('=') {
i += 1; // skip value
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--run-as-user") => {
if !s.contains('=') {
i += 1;
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--run-as-group") => {
if !s.contains('=') {
i += 1;
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--working-dir") => {
if !s.contains('=') {
i += 1;
}
}
s if !s.starts_with('-') => {
config_path = s.to_string();
}
@@ -103,7 +126,73 @@ pub(crate) fn parse_cli() -> (String, Option<PathBuf>, bool, Option<String>) {
i += 1;
}
(config_path, data_path, silent, log_level)
CliArgs {
config_path,
data_path,
silent,
log_level,
log_destination,
}
}
fn print_help() {
eprintln!("Usage: telemt [COMMAND] [OPTIONS] [config.toml]");
eprintln!();
eprintln!("Commands:");
eprintln!(" run Run in foreground (default if no command given)");
#[cfg(unix)]
{
eprintln!(" start Start as background daemon");
eprintln!(" stop Stop a running daemon");
eprintln!(" reload Reload configuration (send SIGHUP)");
eprintln!(" status Check if daemon is running");
}
eprintln!();
eprintln!("Options:");
eprintln!(
" --data-path <DIR> Set data directory (absolute path; overrides config value)"
);
eprintln!(" --silent, -s Suppress info logs");
eprintln!(" --log-level <LEVEL> debug|verbose|normal|silent");
eprintln!(" --help, -h Show this help");
eprintln!(" --version, -V Show version");
eprintln!();
eprintln!("Logging options:");
eprintln!(" --log-file <PATH> Log to file (default: stderr)");
eprintln!(" --log-file-daily <PATH> Log to file with daily rotation");
#[cfg(unix)]
eprintln!(" --syslog Log to syslog (Unix only)");
eprintln!();
#[cfg(unix)]
{
eprintln!("Daemon options (Unix only):");
eprintln!(" --daemon, -d Fork to background (daemonize)");
eprintln!(" --foreground, -f Explicit foreground mode (for systemd)");
eprintln!(" --pid-file <PATH> PID file path (default: /var/run/telemt.pid)");
eprintln!(" --run-as-user <USER> Drop privileges to this user after binding");
eprintln!(" --run-as-group <GROUP> Drop privileges to this group after binding");
eprintln!(" --working-dir <DIR> Working directory for daemon mode");
eprintln!();
}
eprintln!("Setup (fire-and-forget):");
eprintln!(" --init Generate config, install systemd service, start");
eprintln!(" --port <PORT> Listen port (default: 443)");
eprintln!(" --domain <DOMAIN> TLS domain for masking (default: www.google.com)");
eprintln!(" --secret <HEX> 32-char hex secret (auto-generated if omitted)");
eprintln!(" --user <NAME> Username (default: user)");
eprintln!(" --config-dir <DIR> Config directory (default: /etc/telemt)");
eprintln!(" --no-start Don't start the service after install");
#[cfg(unix)]
{
eprintln!();
eprintln!("Examples:");
eprintln!(" telemt config.toml Run in foreground");
eprintln!(" telemt start config.toml Start as daemon");
eprintln!(" telemt start --pid-file /tmp/t.pid Start with custom PID file");
eprintln!(" telemt stop Stop daemon");
eprintln!(" telemt reload Reload configuration");
eprintln!(" telemt status Check daemon status");
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -146,7 +235,12 @@ mod tests {
pub(crate) fn print_proxy_links(host: &str, port: u16, config: &ProxyConfig) {
info!(target: "telemt::links", "--- Proxy Links ({}) ---", host);
for user_name in config.general.links.show.resolve_users(&config.access.users) {
for user_name in config
.general
.links
.show
.resolve_users(&config.access.users)
{
if let Some(secret) = config.access.users.get(user_name) {
info!(target: "telemt::links", "User: {}", user_name);
if config.general.modes.classic {
@@ -253,6 +347,7 @@ pub(crate) fn format_uptime(total_secs: u64) -> String {
format!("{} / {} seconds", parts.join(", "), total_secs)
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) async fn wait_until_admission_open(admission_rx: &mut watch::Receiver<bool>) -> bool {
loop {
if *admission_rx.borrow() {
@@ -273,9 +368,10 @@ pub(crate) async fn load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot(
cache_path: Option<&str>,
me2dc_fallback: bool,
label: &'static str,
upstream: Option<std::sync::Arc<UpstreamManager>>,
) -> Option<ProxyConfigData> {
loop {
match fetch_proxy_config_with_raw(url).await {
match fetch_proxy_config_with_raw_via_upstream(url, upstream.clone()).await {
Ok((cfg, raw)) => {
if !cfg.map.is_empty() {
if let Some(path) = cache_path
@@ -286,7 +382,10 @@ pub(crate) async fn load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot(
return Some(cfg);
}
warn!(snapshot = label, url, "Startup proxy-config is empty; trying disk cache");
warn!(
snapshot = label,
url, "Startup proxy-config is empty; trying disk cache"
);
if let Some(path) = cache_path {
match load_proxy_config_cache(path).await {
Ok(cached) if !cached.map.is_empty() => {
@@ -301,8 +400,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot(
Ok(_) => {
warn!(
snapshot = label,
path,
"Startup proxy-config cache is empty; ignoring cache file"
path, "Startup proxy-config cache is empty; ignoring cache file"
);
}
Err(cache_err) => {
@@ -346,8 +444,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot(
Ok(_) => {
warn!(
snapshot = label,
path,
"Startup proxy-config cache is empty; ignoring cache file"
path, "Startup proxy-config cache is empty; ignoring cache file"
);
}
Err(cache_err) => {
+119 -38
View File
@@ -12,19 +12,18 @@ use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::proxy::route_mode::{ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG, RouteRuntimeController};
use crate::proxy::ClientHandler;
use crate::proxy::route_mode::{ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG, RouteRuntimeController};
use crate::proxy::shared_state::ProxySharedState;
use crate::startup::{COMPONENT_LISTENERS_BIND, StartupTracker};
use crate::stats::beobachten::BeobachtenStore;
use crate::stats::{ReplayChecker, Stats};
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
use crate::tls_front::TlsFrontCache;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use crate::transport::{
ListenOptions, UpstreamManager, create_listener, find_listener_processes,
};
use crate::transport::{ListenOptions, UpstreamManager, create_listener, find_listener_processes};
use super::helpers::{is_expected_handshake_eof, print_proxy_links, wait_until_admission_open};
use super::helpers::{is_expected_handshake_eof, print_proxy_links};
pub(crate) struct BoundListeners {
pub(crate) listeners: Vec<(TcpListener, bool)>,
@@ -51,6 +50,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
tls_cache: Option<Arc<TlsFrontCache>>,
ip_tracker: Arc<UserIpTracker>,
beobachten: Arc<BeobachtenStore>,
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
max_connections: Arc<Semaphore>,
) -> Result<BoundListeners, Box<dyn Error>> {
startup_tracker
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
let options = ListenOptions {
reuse_port: listener_conf.reuse_allow,
ipv6_only: listener_conf.ip.is_ipv6(),
backlog: config.server.listen_backlog,
..Default::default()
};
@@ -81,8 +82,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
Ok(socket) => {
let listener = TcpListener::from_std(socket.into())?;
info!("Listening on {}", addr);
let listener_proxy_protocol =
listener_conf.proxy_protocol.unwrap_or(config.server.proxy_protocol);
let listener_proxy_protocol = listener_conf
.proxy_protocol
.unwrap_or(config.server.proxy_protocol);
let public_host = if let Some(ref announce) = listener_conf.announce {
announce.clone()
@@ -100,8 +102,14 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
listener_conf.ip.to_string()
};
if config.general.links.public_host.is_none() && !config.general.links.show.is_empty() {
let link_port = config.general.links.public_port.unwrap_or(config.server.port);
if config.general.links.public_host.is_none()
&& !config.general.links.show.is_empty()
{
let link_port = config
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(config.server.port);
print_proxy_links(&public_host, link_port, config);
}
@@ -145,12 +153,14 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
let (host, port) = if let Some(ref h) = config.general.links.public_host {
(
h.clone(),
config.general.links.public_port.unwrap_or(config.server.port),
config
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(config.server.port),
)
} else {
let ip = detected_ip_v4
.or(detected_ip_v6)
.map(|ip| ip.to_string());
let ip = detected_ip_v4.or(detected_ip_v6).map(|ip| ip.to_string());
if ip.is_none() {
warn!(
"show_link is configured but public IP could not be detected. Set public_host in config."
@@ -158,7 +168,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
}
(
ip.unwrap_or_else(|| "UNKNOWN".to_string()),
config.general.links.public_port.unwrap_or(config.server.port),
config
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(config.server.port),
)
};
@@ -178,13 +192,19 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
let perms = std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(mode);
if let Err(e) = std::fs::set_permissions(unix_path, perms) {
error!("Failed to set unix socket permissions to {}: {}", perm_str, e);
error!(
"Failed to set unix socket permissions to {}: {}",
perm_str, e
);
} else {
info!("Listening on unix:{} (mode {})", unix_path, perm_str);
}
}
Err(e) => {
warn!("Invalid listen_unix_sock_perm '{}': {}. Ignoring.", perm_str, e);
warn!(
"Invalid listen_unix_sock_perm '{}': {}. Ignoring.",
perm_str, e
);
info!("Listening on unix:{}", unix_path);
}
}
@@ -195,7 +215,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
has_unix_listener = true;
let mut config_rx_unix: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>> = config_rx.clone();
let mut admission_rx_unix = admission_rx.clone();
let admission_rx_unix = admission_rx.clone();
let stats = stats.clone();
let upstream_manager = upstream_manager.clone();
let replay_checker = replay_checker.clone();
@@ -206,23 +226,50 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
let tls_cache = tls_cache.clone();
let ip_tracker = ip_tracker.clone();
let beobachten = beobachten.clone();
let shared = shared.clone();
let max_connections_unix = max_connections.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let unix_conn_counter = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(1));
loop {
if !wait_until_admission_open(&mut admission_rx_unix).await {
warn!("Conditional-admission gate channel closed for unix listener");
break;
}
match unix_listener.accept().await {
Ok((stream, _)) => {
let permit = match max_connections_unix.clone().acquire_owned().await {
Ok(permit) => permit,
Err(_) => {
error!("Connection limiter is closed");
break;
if !*admission_rx_unix.borrow() {
drop(stream);
continue;
}
let accept_permit_timeout_ms =
config_rx_unix.borrow().server.accept_permit_timeout_ms;
let permit = if accept_permit_timeout_ms == 0 {
match max_connections_unix.clone().acquire_owned().await {
Ok(permit) => permit,
Err(_) => {
error!("Connection limiter is closed");
break;
}
}
} else {
match tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_millis(accept_permit_timeout_ms),
max_connections_unix.clone().acquire_owned(),
)
.await
{
Ok(Ok(permit)) => permit,
Ok(Err(_)) => {
error!("Connection limiter is closed");
break;
}
Err(_) => {
stats.increment_accept_permit_timeout_total();
debug!(
timeout_ms = accept_permit_timeout_ms,
"Dropping accepted unix connection: permit wait timeout"
);
drop(stream);
continue;
}
}
};
let conn_id =
@@ -241,11 +288,12 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
let tls_cache = tls_cache.clone();
let ip_tracker = ip_tracker.clone();
let beobachten = beobachten.clone();
let shared = shared.clone();
let proxy_protocol_enabled = config.server.proxy_protocol;
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _permit = permit;
if let Err(e) = crate::proxy::client::handle_client_stream(
if let Err(e) = crate::proxy::client::handle_client_stream_with_shared(
stream,
fake_peer,
config,
@@ -259,6 +307,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
tls_cache,
ip_tracker,
beobachten,
shared,
proxy_protocol_enabled,
)
.await
@@ -308,11 +357,12 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
tls_cache: Option<Arc<TlsFrontCache>>,
ip_tracker: Arc<UserIpTracker>,
beobachten: Arc<BeobachtenStore>,
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
max_connections: Arc<Semaphore>,
) {
for (listener, listener_proxy_protocol) in listeners {
let mut config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>> = config_rx.clone();
let mut admission_rx_tcp = admission_rx.clone();
let admission_rx_tcp = admission_rx.clone();
let stats = stats.clone();
let upstream_manager = upstream_manager.clone();
let replay_checker = replay_checker.clone();
@@ -323,21 +373,50 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
let tls_cache = tls_cache.clone();
let ip_tracker = ip_tracker.clone();
let beobachten = beobachten.clone();
let shared = shared.clone();
let max_connections_tcp = max_connections.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
if !wait_until_admission_open(&mut admission_rx_tcp).await {
warn!("Conditional-admission gate channel closed for tcp listener");
break;
}
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((stream, peer_addr)) => {
let permit = match max_connections_tcp.clone().acquire_owned().await {
Ok(permit) => permit,
Err(_) => {
error!("Connection limiter is closed");
break;
if !*admission_rx_tcp.borrow() {
debug!(peer = %peer_addr, "Admission gate closed, dropping connection");
drop(stream);
continue;
}
let accept_permit_timeout_ms =
config_rx.borrow().server.accept_permit_timeout_ms;
let permit = if accept_permit_timeout_ms == 0 {
match max_connections_tcp.clone().acquire_owned().await {
Ok(permit) => permit,
Err(_) => {
error!("Connection limiter is closed");
break;
}
}
} else {
match tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_millis(accept_permit_timeout_ms),
max_connections_tcp.clone().acquire_owned(),
)
.await
{
Ok(Ok(permit)) => permit,
Ok(Err(_)) => {
error!("Connection limiter is closed");
break;
}
Err(_) => {
stats.increment_accept_permit_timeout_total();
debug!(
peer = %peer_addr,
timeout_ms = accept_permit_timeout_ms,
"Dropping accepted connection: permit wait timeout"
);
drop(stream);
continue;
}
}
};
let config = config_rx.borrow_and_update().clone();
@@ -351,13 +430,14 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
let tls_cache = tls_cache.clone();
let ip_tracker = ip_tracker.clone();
let beobachten = beobachten.clone();
let shared = shared.clone();
let proxy_protocol_enabled = listener_proxy_protocol;
let real_peer_report = Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(None));
let real_peer_report_for_handler = real_peer_report.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _permit = permit;
if let Err(e) = ClientHandler::new(
if let Err(e) = ClientHandler::new_with_shared(
stream,
peer_addr,
config,
@@ -371,6 +451,7 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
tls_cache,
ip_tracker,
beobachten,
shared,
proxy_protocol_enabled,
real_peer_report_for_handler,
)
+150 -20
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
#![allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
@@ -12,8 +14,8 @@ use crate::startup::{
COMPONENT_ME_PROXY_CONFIG_V6, COMPONENT_ME_SECRET_FETCH, StartupMeStatus, StartupTracker,
};
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use super::helpers::load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot;
@@ -61,9 +63,10 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
let proxy_secret_path = config.general.proxy_secret_path.as_deref();
let pool_size = config.general.middle_proxy_pool_size.max(1);
let proxy_secret = loop {
match crate::transport::middle_proxy::fetch_proxy_secret(
match crate::transport::middle_proxy::fetch_proxy_secret_with_upstream(
proxy_secret_path,
config.general.proxy_secret_len_max,
Some(upstream_manager.clone()),
)
.await
{
@@ -127,6 +130,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
config.general.proxy_config_v4_cache_path.as_deref(),
me2dc_fallback,
"getProxyConfig",
Some(upstream_manager.clone()),
)
.await;
if cfg_v4.is_some() {
@@ -158,6 +162,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
config.general.proxy_config_v6_cache_path.as_deref(),
me2dc_fallback,
"getProxyConfigV6",
Some(upstream_manager.clone()),
)
.await;
if cfg_v6.is_some() {
@@ -229,15 +234,25 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core,
config
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core,
config
.general
.me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global,
config.general.me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global,
config.general.hardswap,
config.general.me_pool_drain_ttl_secs,
config.general.me_instadrain,
config.general.me_pool_drain_threshold,
config.general.me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled,
config.general.me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs,
config.general.me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer,
config.general.me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core,
config.general.me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms,
config.general.effective_me_pool_force_close_secs(),
config.general.me_pool_min_fresh_ratio,
config.general.me_hardswap_warmup_delay_min_ms,
@@ -262,6 +277,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
config.general.me_warn_rate_limit_ms,
config.general.me_route_no_writer_mode,
config.general.me_route_no_writer_wait_ms,
config.general.me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms,
config.general.me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms,
config.general.me_route_inline_recovery_attempts,
config.general.me_route_inline_recovery_wait_ms,
);
@@ -324,18 +341,76 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
"Middle-End pool initialized successfully"
);
let pool_health = pool_bg.clone();
let rng_health = rng_bg.clone();
let min_conns = pool_size;
tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_health_monitor(
pool_health,
rng_health,
min_conns,
)
.await;
});
break;
// ── Supervised background tasks ──────────────────
// Each task runs inside a nested tokio::spawn so
// that a panic is caught via JoinHandle and the
// outer loop restarts the task automatically.
let pool_health = pool_bg.clone();
let rng_health = rng_bg.clone();
let min_conns = pool_size;
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let p = pool_health.clone();
let r = rng_health.clone();
let res = tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_health_monitor(
p, r, min_conns,
)
.await;
})
.await;
match res {
Ok(()) => warn!("me_health_monitor exited unexpectedly, restarting"),
Err(e) => {
error!(error = %e, "me_health_monitor panicked, restarting in 1s");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
}
}
});
let pool_drain_enforcer = pool_bg.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let p = pool_drain_enforcer.clone();
let res = tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_drain_timeout_enforcer(p).await;
})
.await;
match res {
Ok(()) => warn!("me_drain_timeout_enforcer exited unexpectedly, restarting"),
Err(e) => {
error!(error = %e, "me_drain_timeout_enforcer panicked, restarting in 1s");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
}
}
});
let pool_watchdog = pool_bg.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let p = pool_watchdog.clone();
let res = tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_zombie_writer_watchdog(p).await;
})
.await;
match res {
Ok(()) => warn!("me_zombie_writer_watchdog exited unexpectedly, restarting"),
Err(e) => {
error!(error = %e, "me_zombie_writer_watchdog panicked, restarting in 1s");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
}
}
});
// CRITICAL: keep the current-thread runtime
// alive. Without this, block_on() returns,
// the Runtime is dropped, and ALL spawned
// background tasks (health monitor, drain
// enforcer, zombie watchdog) are silently
// cancelled — causing the draining-writer
// leak that brought us here.
std::future::pending::<()>().await;
unreachable!();
}
Err(e) => {
startup_tracker_bg.set_me_last_error(Some(e.to_string())).await;
@@ -393,14 +468,69 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
"Middle-End pool initialized successfully"
);
// ── Supervised background tasks ──────────────────
let pool_clone = pool.clone();
let rng_clone = rng.clone();
let min_conns = pool_size;
tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_health_monitor(
pool_clone, rng_clone, min_conns,
)
.await;
loop {
let p = pool_clone.clone();
let r = rng_clone.clone();
let res = tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_health_monitor(
p, r, min_conns,
)
.await;
})
.await;
match res {
Ok(()) => warn!(
"me_health_monitor exited unexpectedly, restarting"
),
Err(e) => {
error!(error = %e, "me_health_monitor panicked, restarting in 1s");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
}
}
});
let pool_drain_enforcer = pool.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let p = pool_drain_enforcer.clone();
let res = tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_drain_timeout_enforcer(p).await;
})
.await;
match res {
Ok(()) => warn!(
"me_drain_timeout_enforcer exited unexpectedly, restarting"
),
Err(e) => {
error!(error = %e, "me_drain_timeout_enforcer panicked, restarting in 1s");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
}
}
});
let pool_watchdog = pool.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let p = pool_watchdog.clone();
let res = tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_zombie_writer_watchdog(p).await;
})
.await;
match res {
Ok(()) => warn!(
"me_zombie_writer_watchdog exited unexpectedly, restarting"
),
Err(e) => {
error!(error = %e, "me_zombie_writer_watchdog panicked, restarting in 1s");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(1)).await;
}
}
}
});
break Some(pool);
+173 -53
View File
@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@
// - admission: conditional-cast gate and route mode switching.
// - listeners: TCP/Unix listener bind and accept-loop orchestration.
// - shutdown: graceful shutdown sequence and uptime logging.
mod helpers;
mod admission;
mod connectivity;
mod helpers;
mod listeners;
mod me_startup;
mod runtime_tasks;
@@ -28,27 +28,76 @@ use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use tracing_subscriber::{EnvFilter, fmt, prelude::*, reload};
use crate::api;
use crate::conntrack_control;
use crate::config::{LogLevel, ProxyConfig};
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::network::probe::{decide_network_capabilities, log_probe_result, run_probe};
use crate::proxy::route_mode::{RelayRouteMode, RouteRuntimeController};
use crate::proxy::shared_state::ProxySharedState;
use crate::startup::{
COMPONENT_API_BOOTSTRAP, COMPONENT_CONFIG_LOAD, COMPONENT_ME_POOL_CONSTRUCT,
COMPONENT_ME_POOL_INIT_STAGE1, COMPONENT_ME_PROXY_CONFIG_V4, COMPONENT_ME_PROXY_CONFIG_V6,
COMPONENT_ME_SECRET_FETCH, COMPONENT_NETWORK_PROBE, COMPONENT_TRACING_INIT, StartupMeStatus,
StartupTracker,
};
use crate::stats::beobachten::BeobachtenStore;
use crate::stats::telemetry::TelemetryPolicy;
use crate::stats::{ReplayChecker, Stats};
use crate::startup::{
COMPONENT_API_BOOTSTRAP, COMPONENT_CONFIG_LOAD,
COMPONENT_ME_POOL_CONSTRUCT, COMPONENT_ME_POOL_INIT_STAGE1,
COMPONENT_ME_PROXY_CONFIG_V4, COMPONENT_ME_PROXY_CONFIG_V6, COMPONENT_ME_SECRET_FETCH,
COMPONENT_NETWORK_PROBE, COMPONENT_TRACING_INIT, StartupMeStatus, StartupTracker,
};
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use helpers::{parse_cli, resolve_runtime_config_path};
#[cfg(unix)]
use crate::daemon::{DaemonOptions, PidFile, drop_privileges};
/// Runs the full telemt runtime startup pipeline and blocks until shutdown.
///
/// On Unix, daemon options should be handled before calling this function
/// (daemonization must happen before tokio runtime starts).
#[cfg(unix)]
pub async fn run_with_daemon(
daemon_opts: DaemonOptions,
) -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
run_inner(daemon_opts).await
}
/// Runs the full telemt runtime startup pipeline and blocks until shutdown.
///
/// This is the main entry point for non-daemon mode or when called as a library.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
#[cfg(unix)]
{
// Parse CLI to get daemon options even in simple run() path
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
let daemon_opts = crate::cli::parse_daemon_args(&args);
run_inner(daemon_opts).await
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
{
run_inner().await
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn run_inner(
daemon_opts: DaemonOptions,
) -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
// Acquire PID file if daemonizing or if explicitly requested
// Keep it alive until shutdown (underscore prefix = intentionally kept for RAII cleanup)
let _pid_file = if daemon_opts.daemonize || daemon_opts.pid_file.is_some() {
let mut pf = PidFile::new(daemon_opts.pid_file_path());
if let Err(e) = pf.acquire() {
eprintln!("[telemt] {}", e);
std::process::exit(1);
}
Some(pf)
} else {
None
};
let process_started_at = Instant::now();
let process_started_at_epoch_secs = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
@@ -56,9 +105,17 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
.as_secs();
let startup_tracker = Arc::new(StartupTracker::new(process_started_at_epoch_secs));
startup_tracker
.start_component(COMPONENT_CONFIG_LOAD, Some("load and validate config".to_string()))
.start_component(
COMPONENT_CONFIG_LOAD,
Some("load and validate config".to_string()),
)
.await;
let (config_path_cli, data_path, cli_silent, cli_log_level) = parse_cli();
let cli_args = parse_cli();
let config_path_cli = cli_args.config_path;
let data_path = cli_args.data_path;
let cli_silent = cli_args.silent;
let cli_log_level = cli_args.log_level;
let log_destination = cli_args.log_destination;
let startup_cwd = match std::env::current_dir() {
Ok(cwd) => cwd,
Err(e) => {
@@ -77,7 +134,10 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
} else {
let default = ProxyConfig::default();
std::fs::write(&config_path, toml::to_string_pretty(&default).unwrap()).unwrap();
eprintln!("[telemt] Created default config at {}", config_path.display());
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Created default config at {}",
config_path.display()
);
default
}
}
@@ -94,24 +154,36 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if let Some(ref data_path) = config.general.data_path {
if !data_path.is_absolute() {
eprintln!("[telemt] data_path must be absolute: {}", data_path.display());
eprintln!(
"[telemt] data_path must be absolute: {}",
data_path.display()
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
if data_path.exists() {
if !data_path.is_dir() {
eprintln!("[telemt] data_path exists but is not a directory: {}", data_path.display());
std::process::exit(1);
}
} else {
if let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(data_path) {
eprintln!("[telemt] Can't create data_path {}: {}", data_path.display(), e);
eprintln!(
"[telemt] data_path exists but is not a directory: {}",
data_path.display()
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
} else if let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(data_path) {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Can't create data_path {}: {}",
data_path.display(),
e
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
if let Err(e) = std::env::set_current_dir(data_path) {
eprintln!("[telemt] Can't use data_path {}: {}", data_path.display(), e);
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Can't use data_path {}: {}",
data_path.display(),
e
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
}
@@ -135,22 +207,54 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let (filter_layer, filter_handle) = reload::Layer::new(EnvFilter::new("info"));
startup_tracker
.start_component(COMPONENT_TRACING_INIT, Some("initialize tracing subscriber".to_string()))
.start_component(
COMPONENT_TRACING_INIT,
Some("initialize tracing subscriber".to_string()),
)
.await;
// Configure color output based on config
let fmt_layer = if config.general.disable_colors {
fmt::Layer::default().with_ansi(false)
} else {
fmt::Layer::default().with_ansi(true)
};
// Initialize logging based on destination
let _logging_guard: Option<crate::logging::LoggingGuard>;
match log_destination {
crate::logging::LogDestination::Stderr => {
// Default: log to stderr (works with systemd journald)
let fmt_layer = if config.general.disable_colors {
fmt::Layer::default().with_ansi(false)
} else {
fmt::Layer::default().with_ansi(true)
};
tracing_subscriber::registry()
.with(filter_layer)
.with(fmt_layer)
.init();
_logging_guard = None;
}
#[cfg(unix)]
crate::logging::LogDestination::Syslog => {
// Syslog: for OpenRC/FreeBSD
let logging_opts = crate::logging::LoggingOptions {
destination: log_destination,
disable_colors: true,
};
let (_, guard) = crate::logging::init_logging(&logging_opts, "info");
_logging_guard = Some(guard);
}
crate::logging::LogDestination::File { .. } => {
// File logging with optional rotation
let logging_opts = crate::logging::LoggingOptions {
destination: log_destination,
disable_colors: true,
};
let (_, guard) = crate::logging::init_logging(&logging_opts, "info");
_logging_guard = Some(guard);
}
}
tracing_subscriber::registry()
.with(filter_layer)
.with(fmt_layer)
.init();
startup_tracker
.complete_component(COMPONENT_TRACING_INIT, Some("tracing initialized".to_string()))
.complete_component(
COMPONENT_TRACING_INIT,
Some("tracing initialized".to_string()),
)
.await;
info!("Telemt MTProxy v{}", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"));
@@ -199,6 +303,7 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
config.general.upstream_connect_retry_attempts,
config.general.upstream_connect_retry_backoff_ms,
config.general.upstream_connect_budget_ms,
config.general.tg_connect,
config.general.upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold,
config.general.upstream_connect_failfast_hard_errors,
stats.clone(),
@@ -216,7 +321,8 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
config.access.user_max_unique_ips_window_secs,
)
.await;
if config.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each > 0 || !config.access.user_max_unique_ips.is_empty()
if config.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each > 0
|| !config.access.user_max_unique_ips.is_empty()
{
info!(
global_each_limit = config.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each,
@@ -243,7 +349,10 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let route_runtime = Arc::new(RouteRuntimeController::new(initial_route_mode));
let api_me_pool = Arc::new(RwLock::new(None::<Arc<MePool>>));
startup_tracker
.start_component(COMPONENT_API_BOOTSTRAP, Some("spawn API listener task".to_string()))
.start_component(
COMPONENT_API_BOOTSTRAP,
Some("spawn API listener task".to_string()),
)
.await;
if config.server.api.enabled {
@@ -326,7 +435,10 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
.await;
startup_tracker
.start_component(COMPONENT_NETWORK_PROBE, Some("probe network capabilities".to_string()))
.start_component(
COMPONENT_NETWORK_PROBE,
Some("probe network capabilities".to_string()),
)
.await;
let probe = run_probe(
&config.network,
@@ -339,11 +451,8 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
probe.detected_ipv4.map(IpAddr::V4),
probe.detected_ipv6.map(IpAddr::V6),
));
let decision = decide_network_capabilities(
&config.network,
&probe,
config.general.middle_proxy_nat_ip,
);
let decision =
decide_network_capabilities(&config.network, &probe, config.general.middle_proxy_nat_ip);
log_probe_result(&probe, &decision);
startup_tracker
.complete_component(
@@ -446,24 +555,16 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
// If ME failed to initialize, force direct-only mode.
if me_pool.is_some() {
startup_tracker
.set_transport_mode("middle_proxy")
.await;
startup_tracker
.set_degraded(false)
.await;
startup_tracker.set_transport_mode("middle_proxy").await;
startup_tracker.set_degraded(false).await;
info!("Transport: Middle-End Proxy - all DC-over-RPC");
} else {
let _ = use_middle_proxy;
use_middle_proxy = false;
// Make runtime config reflect direct-only mode for handlers.
config.general.use_middle_proxy = false;
startup_tracker
.set_transport_mode("direct")
.await;
startup_tracker
.set_degraded(true)
.await;
startup_tracker.set_transport_mode("direct").await;
startup_tracker.set_degraded(true).await;
if me2dc_fallback {
startup_tracker
.set_me_status(StartupMeStatus::Failed, "fallback_to_direct")
@@ -484,7 +585,7 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
Duration::from_secs(config.access.replay_window_secs),
));
let buffer_pool = Arc::new(BufferPool::with_config(16 * 1024, 4096));
let buffer_pool = Arc::new(BufferPool::with_config(64 * 1024, 4096));
connectivity::run_startup_connectivity(
&config,
@@ -532,6 +633,12 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
)
.await;
let _admission_tx_hold = admission_tx;
let shared_state = ProxySharedState::new();
conntrack_control::spawn_conntrack_controller(
config_rx.clone(),
stats.clone(),
shared_state.clone(),
);
let bound = listeners::bind_listeners(
&config,
@@ -552,6 +659,7 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
tls_cache.clone(),
ip_tracker.clone(),
beobachten.clone(),
shared_state.clone(),
max_connections.clone(),
)
.await?;
@@ -563,6 +671,14 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
std::process::exit(1);
}
// Drop privileges after binding sockets (which may require root for port < 1024)
if daemon_opts.user.is_some() || daemon_opts.group.is_some() {
if let Err(e) = drop_privileges(daemon_opts.user.as_deref(), daemon_opts.group.as_deref()) {
error!(error = %e, "Failed to drop privileges");
std::process::exit(1);
}
}
runtime_tasks::apply_runtime_log_filter(
has_rust_log,
&effective_log_level,
@@ -583,6 +699,9 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
runtime_tasks::mark_runtime_ready(&startup_tracker).await;
// Spawn signal handlers for SIGUSR1/SIGUSR2 (non-shutdown signals)
shutdown::spawn_signal_handlers(stats.clone(), process_started_at);
listeners::spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
listeners,
config_rx.clone(),
@@ -597,10 +716,11 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
tls_cache.clone(),
ip_tracker.clone(),
beobachten.clone(),
shared_state,
max_connections.clone(),
);
shutdown::wait_for_shutdown(process_started_at, me_pool).await;
shutdown::wait_for_shutdown(process_started_at, me_pool, stats).await;
Ok(())
}
+31 -18
View File
@@ -4,21 +4,24 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch};
use tracing::{debug, warn};
use tracing_subscriber::reload;
use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
use tracing_subscriber::reload;
use crate::config::{LogLevel, ProxyConfig};
use crate::config::hot_reload::spawn_config_watcher;
use crate::config::{LogLevel, ProxyConfig};
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::metrics;
use crate::network::probe::NetworkProbe;
use crate::startup::{COMPONENT_CONFIG_WATCHER_START, COMPONENT_METRICS_START, COMPONENT_RUNTIME_READY, StartupTracker};
use crate::startup::{
COMPONENT_CONFIG_WATCHER_START, COMPONENT_METRICS_START, COMPONENT_RUNTIME_READY,
StartupTracker,
};
use crate::stats::beobachten::BeobachtenStore;
use crate::stats::telemetry::TelemetryPolicy;
use crate::stats::{ReplayChecker, Stats};
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{MePool, MeReinitTrigger};
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{MePool, MeReinitTrigger};
use super::helpers::write_beobachten_snapshot;
@@ -79,15 +82,13 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
Some("spawn config hot-reload watcher".to_string()),
)
.await;
let (config_rx, log_level_rx): (
watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
watch::Receiver<LogLevel>,
) = spawn_config_watcher(
config_path.to_path_buf(),
config.clone(),
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
);
let (config_rx, log_level_rx): (watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>, watch::Receiver<LogLevel>) =
spawn_config_watcher(
config_path.to_path_buf(),
config.clone(),
detected_ip_v4,
detected_ip_v6,
);
startup_tracker
.complete_component(
COMPONENT_CONFIG_WATCHER_START,
@@ -114,7 +115,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
break;
}
let cfg = config_rx_policy.borrow_and_update().clone();
stats_policy.apply_telemetry_policy(TelemetryPolicy::from_config(&cfg.general.telemetry));
stats_policy
.apply_telemetry_policy(TelemetryPolicy::from_config(&cfg.general.telemetry));
if let Some(pool) = &me_pool_for_policy {
pool.update_runtime_transport_policy(
cfg.general.me_socks_kdf_policy,
@@ -130,7 +132,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
let ip_tracker_policy = ip_tracker.clone();
let mut config_rx_ip_limits = config_rx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut prev_limits = config_rx_ip_limits.borrow().access.user_max_unique_ips.clone();
let mut prev_limits = config_rx_ip_limits
.borrow()
.access
.user_max_unique_ips
.clone();
let mut prev_global_each = config_rx_ip_limits
.borrow()
.access
@@ -183,7 +189,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
let sleep_secs = cfg.general.beobachten_flush_secs.max(1);
if cfg.general.beobachten {
let ttl = std::time::Duration::from_secs(cfg.general.beobachten_minutes.saturating_mul(60));
let ttl = std::time::Duration::from_secs(
cfg.general.beobachten_minutes.saturating_mul(60),
);
let path = cfg.general.beobachten_file.clone();
let snapshot = beobachten_writer.snapshot_text(ttl);
if let Err(e) = write_beobachten_snapshot(&path, &snapshot).await {
@@ -227,8 +235,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
let config_rx_clone_rot = config_rx.clone();
let reinit_tx_rotation = reinit_tx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_rotation_task(config_rx_clone_rot, reinit_tx_rotation)
.await;
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_rotation_task(
config_rx_clone_rot,
reinit_tx_rotation,
)
.await;
});
}
@@ -312,10 +323,12 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_metrics_if_configured(
let config_rx_metrics = config_rx.clone();
let ip_tracker_metrics = ip_tracker.clone();
let whitelist = config.server.metrics_whitelist.clone();
let listen_backlog = config.server.listen_backlog;
tokio::spawn(async move {
metrics::serve(
port,
listen,
listen_backlog,
stats,
beobachten,
ip_tracker_metrics,
+194 -30
View File
@@ -1,42 +1,206 @@
//! Shutdown and signal handling for telemt.
//!
//! Handles graceful shutdown on various signals:
//! - SIGINT (Ctrl+C) / SIGTERM: Graceful shutdown
//! - SIGQUIT: Graceful shutdown with stats dump
//! - SIGUSR1: Reserved for log rotation (logs acknowledgment)
//! - SIGUSR2: Dump runtime status to log
//!
//! SIGHUP is handled separately in config/hot_reload.rs for config reload.
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
#[cfg(not(unix))]
use tokio::signal;
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
#[cfg(unix)]
use tokio::signal::unix::{SignalKind, signal};
use tracing::{info, warn};
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use super::helpers::{format_uptime, unit_label};
pub(crate) async fn wait_for_shutdown(process_started_at: Instant, me_pool: Option<Arc<MePool>>) {
match signal::ctrl_c().await {
Ok(()) => {
let shutdown_started_at = Instant::now();
info!("Shutting down...");
let uptime_secs = process_started_at.elapsed().as_secs();
info!("Uptime: {}", format_uptime(uptime_secs));
if let Some(pool) = &me_pool {
match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), pool.shutdown_send_close_conn_all())
.await
{
Ok(total) => {
info!(
close_conn_sent = total,
"ME shutdown: RPC_CLOSE_CONN broadcast completed"
);
}
Err(_) => {
warn!("ME shutdown: RPC_CLOSE_CONN broadcast timed out");
}
}
}
let shutdown_secs = shutdown_started_at.elapsed().as_secs();
info!(
"Shutdown completed successfully in {} {}.",
shutdown_secs,
unit_label(shutdown_secs, "second", "seconds")
);
/// Signal that triggered shutdown.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ShutdownSignal {
/// SIGINT (Ctrl+C)
Interrupt,
/// SIGTERM
Terminate,
/// SIGQUIT (with stats dump)
Quit,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for ShutdownSignal {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
ShutdownSignal::Interrupt => write!(f, "SIGINT"),
ShutdownSignal::Terminate => write!(f, "SIGTERM"),
ShutdownSignal::Quit => write!(f, "SIGQUIT"),
}
Err(e) => error!("Signal error: {}", e),
}
}
/// Waits for a shutdown signal and performs graceful shutdown.
pub(crate) async fn wait_for_shutdown(
process_started_at: Instant,
me_pool: Option<Arc<MePool>>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
) {
let signal = wait_for_shutdown_signal().await;
perform_shutdown(signal, process_started_at, me_pool, &stats).await;
}
/// Waits for any shutdown signal (SIGINT, SIGTERM, SIGQUIT).
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn wait_for_shutdown_signal() -> ShutdownSignal {
let mut sigint = signal(SignalKind::interrupt()).expect("Failed to register SIGINT handler");
let mut sigterm = signal(SignalKind::terminate()).expect("Failed to register SIGTERM handler");
let mut sigquit = signal(SignalKind::quit()).expect("Failed to register SIGQUIT handler");
tokio::select! {
_ = sigint.recv() => ShutdownSignal::Interrupt,
_ = sigterm.recv() => ShutdownSignal::Terminate,
_ = sigquit.recv() => ShutdownSignal::Quit,
}
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
async fn wait_for_shutdown_signal() -> ShutdownSignal {
signal::ctrl_c().await.expect("Failed to listen for Ctrl+C");
ShutdownSignal::Interrupt
}
/// Performs graceful shutdown sequence.
async fn perform_shutdown(
signal: ShutdownSignal,
process_started_at: Instant,
me_pool: Option<Arc<MePool>>,
stats: &Stats,
) {
let shutdown_started_at = Instant::now();
info!(signal = %signal, "Received shutdown signal");
// Dump stats if SIGQUIT
if signal == ShutdownSignal::Quit {
dump_stats(stats, process_started_at);
}
info!("Shutting down...");
let uptime_secs = process_started_at.elapsed().as_secs();
info!("Uptime: {}", format_uptime(uptime_secs));
// Graceful ME pool shutdown
if let Some(pool) = &me_pool {
match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), pool.shutdown_send_close_conn_all())
.await
{
Ok(total) => {
info!(
close_conn_sent = total,
"ME shutdown: RPC_CLOSE_CONN broadcast completed"
);
}
Err(_) => {
warn!("ME shutdown: RPC_CLOSE_CONN broadcast timed out");
}
}
}
let shutdown_secs = shutdown_started_at.elapsed().as_secs();
info!(
"Shutdown completed successfully in {} {}.",
shutdown_secs,
unit_label(shutdown_secs, "second", "seconds")
);
}
/// Dumps runtime statistics to the log.
fn dump_stats(stats: &Stats, process_started_at: Instant) {
let uptime_secs = process_started_at.elapsed().as_secs();
info!("=== Runtime Statistics Dump ===");
info!("Uptime: {}", format_uptime(uptime_secs));
// Connection stats
info!(
"Connections: total={}, current={} (direct={}, me={}), bad={}",
stats.get_connects_all(),
stats.get_current_connections_total(),
stats.get_current_connections_direct(),
stats.get_current_connections_me(),
stats.get_connects_bad(),
);
// ME pool stats
info!(
"ME keepalive: sent={}, pong={}, failed={}, timeout={}",
stats.get_me_keepalive_sent(),
stats.get_me_keepalive_pong(),
stats.get_me_keepalive_failed(),
stats.get_me_keepalive_timeout(),
);
// Relay stats
info!(
"Relay idle: soft_mark={}, hard_close={}, pressure_evict={}",
stats.get_relay_idle_soft_mark_total(),
stats.get_relay_idle_hard_close_total(),
stats.get_relay_pressure_evict_total(),
);
info!("=== End Statistics Dump ===");
}
/// Spawns a background task to handle operational signals (SIGUSR1, SIGUSR2).
///
/// These signals don't trigger shutdown but perform specific actions:
/// - SIGUSR1: Log rotation acknowledgment (for external log rotation tools)
/// - SIGUSR2: Dump runtime status to log
#[cfg(unix)]
pub(crate) fn spawn_signal_handlers(stats: Arc<Stats>, process_started_at: Instant) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut sigusr1 =
signal(SignalKind::user_defined1()).expect("Failed to register SIGUSR1 handler");
let mut sigusr2 =
signal(SignalKind::user_defined2()).expect("Failed to register SIGUSR2 handler");
loop {
tokio::select! {
_ = sigusr1.recv() => {
handle_sigusr1();
}
_ = sigusr2.recv() => {
handle_sigusr2(&stats, process_started_at);
}
}
}
});
}
/// No-op on non-Unix platforms.
#[cfg(not(unix))]
pub(crate) fn spawn_signal_handlers(_stats: Arc<Stats>, _process_started_at: Instant) {
// No SIGUSR1/SIGUSR2 on non-Unix
}
/// Handles SIGUSR1 - log rotation signal.
///
/// This signal is typically sent by logrotate or similar tools after
/// rotating log files. Since tracing-subscriber doesn't natively support
/// reopening files, we just acknowledge the signal. If file logging is
/// added in the future, this would reopen log file handles.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn handle_sigusr1() {
info!("SIGUSR1 received - log rotation acknowledged");
// Future: If using file-based logging, reopen file handles here
}
/// Handles SIGUSR2 - dump runtime status.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn handle_sigusr2(stats: &Stats, process_started_at: Instant) {
info!("SIGUSR2 received - dumping runtime status");
dump_stats(stats, process_started_at);
}
+29 -6
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use rand::Rng;
use rand::RngExt;
use tracing::warn;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::startup::{COMPONENT_TLS_FRONT_BOOTSTRAP, StartupTracker};
use crate::tls_front::TlsFrontCache;
use crate::tls_front::fetcher::TlsFetchStrategy;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
@@ -38,27 +39,44 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
.clone()
.unwrap_or_else(|| config.censorship.tls_domain.clone());
let mask_unix_sock = config.censorship.mask_unix_sock.clone();
let fetch_timeout = Duration::from_secs(5);
let tls_fetch_scope = (!config.censorship.tls_fetch_scope.is_empty())
.then(|| config.censorship.tls_fetch_scope.clone());
let tls_fetch = config.censorship.tls_fetch.clone();
let fetch_strategy = TlsFetchStrategy {
profiles: tls_fetch.profiles,
strict_route: tls_fetch.strict_route,
attempt_timeout: Duration::from_millis(tls_fetch.attempt_timeout_ms.max(1)),
total_budget: Duration::from_millis(tls_fetch.total_budget_ms.max(1)),
grease_enabled: tls_fetch.grease_enabled,
deterministic: tls_fetch.deterministic,
profile_cache_ttl: Duration::from_secs(tls_fetch.profile_cache_ttl_secs),
};
let fetch_timeout = fetch_strategy.total_budget;
let cache_initial = cache.clone();
let domains_initial = tls_domains.to_vec();
let host_initial = mask_host.clone();
let unix_sock_initial = mask_unix_sock.clone();
let scope_initial = tls_fetch_scope.clone();
let upstream_initial = upstream_manager.clone();
let strategy_initial = fetch_strategy.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut join = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
for domain in domains_initial {
let cache_domain = cache_initial.clone();
let host_domain = host_initial.clone();
let unix_sock_domain = unix_sock_initial.clone();
let scope_domain = scope_initial.clone();
let upstream_domain = upstream_initial.clone();
let strategy_domain = strategy_initial.clone();
join.spawn(async move {
match crate::tls_front::fetcher::fetch_real_tls(
match crate::tls_front::fetcher::fetch_real_tls_with_strategy(
&host_domain,
port,
&domain,
fetch_timeout,
&strategy_domain,
Some(upstream_domain),
scope_domain.as_deref(),
proxy_protocol,
unix_sock_domain.as_deref(),
)
@@ -100,7 +118,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
let domains_refresh = tls_domains.to_vec();
let host_refresh = mask_host.clone();
let unix_sock_refresh = mask_unix_sock.clone();
let scope_refresh = tls_fetch_scope.clone();
let upstream_refresh = upstream_manager.clone();
let strategy_refresh = fetch_strategy.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
let base_secs = rand::rng().random_range(4 * 3600..=6 * 3600);
@@ -112,14 +132,17 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
let cache_domain = cache_refresh.clone();
let host_domain = host_refresh.clone();
let unix_sock_domain = unix_sock_refresh.clone();
let scope_domain = scope_refresh.clone();
let upstream_domain = upstream_refresh.clone();
let strategy_domain = strategy_refresh.clone();
join.spawn(async move {
match crate::tls_front::fetcher::fetch_real_tls(
match crate::tls_front::fetcher::fetch_real_tls_with_strategy(
&host_domain,
port,
&domain,
fetch_timeout,
&strategy_domain,
Some(upstream_domain),
scope_domain.as_deref(),
proxy_protocol,
unix_sock_domain.as_deref(),
)
+57 -3
View File
@@ -2,17 +2,29 @@
mod api;
mod cli;
mod conntrack_control;
mod config;
mod crypto;
#[cfg(unix)]
mod daemon;
mod error;
mod ip_tracker;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/ip_tracker_encapsulation_adversarial_tests.rs"]
mod ip_tracker_encapsulation_adversarial_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/ip_tracker_hotpath_adversarial_tests.rs"]
mod ip_tracker_hotpath_adversarial_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/ip_tracker_regression_tests.rs"]
mod ip_tracker_regression_tests;
mod logging;
mod maestro;
mod metrics;
mod network;
mod protocol;
mod proxy;
mod service;
mod startup;
mod stats;
mod stream;
@@ -20,7 +32,49 @@ mod tls_front;
mod transport;
mod util;
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
maestro::run().await
fn main() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
// Install rustls crypto provider early
let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
let cmd = cli::parse_command(&args);
// Handle subcommands that don't need the server (stop, reload, status, init)
if let Some(exit_code) = cli::execute_subcommand(&cmd) {
std::process::exit(exit_code);
}
#[cfg(unix)]
{
let daemon_opts = cmd.daemon_opts;
// Daemonize BEFORE runtime
if daemon_opts.should_daemonize() {
match daemon::daemonize(daemon_opts.working_dir.as_deref()) {
Ok(daemon::DaemonizeResult::Parent) => {
std::process::exit(0);
}
Ok(daemon::DaemonizeResult::Child) => {
// continue
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("[telemt] Daemonization failed: {}", e);
std::process::exit(1);
}
}
}
tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()?
.block_on(maestro::run_with_daemon(daemon_opts))
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
{
tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()?
.block_on(maestro::run())
}
}
+1156 -112
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+4 -6
View File
@@ -26,9 +26,7 @@ fn parse_ip_spec(ip_spec: &str) -> Result<IpAddr> {
}
let ip = ip_spec.parse::<IpAddr>().map_err(|_| {
ProxyError::Config(format!(
"network.dns_overrides IP is invalid: '{ip_spec}'"
))
ProxyError::Config(format!("network.dns_overrides IP is invalid: '{ip_spec}'"))
})?;
if matches!(ip, IpAddr::V6(_)) {
return Err(ProxyError::Config(format!(
@@ -103,9 +101,9 @@ pub fn validate_entries(entries: &[String]) -> Result<()> {
/// Replace runtime DNS overrides with a new validated snapshot.
pub fn install_entries(entries: &[String]) -> Result<()> {
let parsed = parse_entries(entries)?;
let mut guard = overrides_store()
.write()
.map_err(|_| ProxyError::Config("network.dns_overrides runtime lock is poisoned".to_string()))?;
let mut guard = overrides_store().write().map_err(|_| {
ProxyError::Config("network.dns_overrides runtime lock is poisoned".to_string())
})?;
*guard = parsed;
Ok(())
}
+51 -32
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
#![allow(clippy::items_after_test_module)]
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, UdpSocket};
@@ -10,7 +11,9 @@ use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
use crate::config::{NetworkConfig, UpstreamConfig, UpstreamType};
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::network::stun::{stun_probe_family_with_bind, DualStunResult, IpFamily, StunProbeResult};
use crate::network::stun::{
DualStunResult, IpFamily, StunProbeResult, stun_probe_family_with_bind,
};
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
@@ -78,13 +81,8 @@ pub async fn run_probe(
warn!("STUN probe is enabled but network.stun_servers is empty");
DualStunResult::default()
} else {
probe_stun_servers_parallel(
&servers,
stun_nat_probe_concurrency.max(1),
None,
None,
)
.await
probe_stun_servers_parallel(&servers, stun_nat_probe_concurrency.max(1), None, None)
.await
}
} else if nat_probe {
info!("STUN probe is disabled by network.stun_use=false");
@@ -99,7 +97,8 @@ pub async fn run_probe(
let UpstreamType::Direct {
interface,
bind_addresses,
} = &upstream.upstream_type else {
} = &upstream.upstream_type
else {
continue;
};
if let Some(addrs) = bind_addresses.as_ref().filter(|v| !v.is_empty()) {
@@ -199,11 +198,10 @@ pub async fn run_probe(
if nat_probe
&& probe.reflected_ipv4.is_none()
&& probe.detected_ipv4.map(is_bogon_v4).unwrap_or(false)
&& let Some(public_ip) = detect_public_ipv4_http(&config.http_ip_detect_urls).await
{
if let Some(public_ip) = detect_public_ipv4_http(&config.http_ip_detect_urls).await {
probe.reflected_ipv4 = Some(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(public_ip), 0));
info!(public_ip = %public_ip, "STUN unavailable, using HTTP public IPv4 fallback");
}
probe.reflected_ipv4 = Some(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(public_ip), 0));
info!(public_ip = %public_ip, "STUN unavailable, using HTTP public IPv4 fallback");
}
probe.ipv4_nat_detected = match (probe.detected_ipv4, probe.reflected_ipv4) {
@@ -217,12 +215,20 @@ pub async fn run_probe(
probe.ipv4_usable = config.ipv4
&& probe.detected_ipv4.is_some()
&& (!probe.ipv4_is_bogon || probe.reflected_ipv4.map(|r| !is_bogon(r.ip())).unwrap_or(false));
&& (!probe.ipv4_is_bogon
|| probe
.reflected_ipv4
.map(|r| !is_bogon(r.ip()))
.unwrap_or(false));
let ipv6_enabled = config.ipv6.unwrap_or(probe.detected_ipv6.is_some());
probe.ipv6_usable = ipv6_enabled
&& probe.detected_ipv6.is_some()
&& (!probe.ipv6_is_bogon || probe.reflected_ipv6.map(|r| !is_bogon(r.ip())).unwrap_or(false));
&& (!probe.ipv6_is_bogon
|| probe
.reflected_ipv6
.map(|r| !is_bogon(r.ip()))
.unwrap_or(false));
Ok(probe)
}
@@ -280,8 +286,6 @@ async fn probe_stun_servers_parallel(
while next_idx < servers.len() && join_set.len() < concurrency {
let stun_addr = servers[next_idx].clone();
next_idx += 1;
let bind_v4 = bind_v4;
let bind_v6 = bind_v6;
join_set.spawn(async move {
let res = timeout(STUN_BATCH_TIMEOUT, async {
let v4 = stun_probe_family_with_bind(&stun_addr, IpFamily::V4, bind_v4).await?;
@@ -300,11 +304,15 @@ async fn probe_stun_servers_parallel(
match task {
Ok((stun_addr, Ok(Ok(result)))) => {
if let Some(v4) = result.v4 {
let entry = best_v4_by_ip.entry(v4.reflected_addr.ip()).or_insert((0, v4));
let entry = best_v4_by_ip
.entry(v4.reflected_addr.ip())
.or_insert((0, v4));
entry.0 += 1;
}
if let Some(v6) = result.v6 {
let entry = best_v6_by_ip.entry(v6.reflected_addr.ip()).or_insert((0, v6));
let entry = best_v6_by_ip
.entry(v6.reflected_addr.ip())
.or_insert((0, v6));
entry.0 += 1;
}
if result.v4.is_some() || result.v6.is_some() {
@@ -324,17 +332,11 @@ async fn probe_stun_servers_parallel(
}
let mut out = DualStunResult::default();
if let Some((_, best)) = best_v4_by_ip
.into_values()
.max_by_key(|(count, _)| *count)
{
if let Some((_, best)) = best_v4_by_ip.into_values().max_by_key(|(count, _)| *count) {
info!("STUN-Quorum reached, IP: {}", best.reflected_addr.ip());
out.v4 = Some(best);
}
if let Some((_, best)) = best_v6_by_ip
.into_values()
.max_by_key(|(count, _)| *count)
{
if let Some((_, best)) = best_v6_by_ip.into_values().max_by_key(|(count, _)| *count) {
info!("STUN-Quorum reached, IP: {}", best.reflected_addr.ip());
out.v6 = Some(best);
}
@@ -347,7 +349,8 @@ pub fn decide_network_capabilities(
middle_proxy_nat_ip: Option<IpAddr>,
) -> NetworkDecision {
let ipv4_dc = config.ipv4 && probe.detected_ipv4.is_some();
let ipv6_dc = config.ipv6.unwrap_or(probe.detected_ipv6.is_some()) && probe.detected_ipv6.is_some();
let ipv6_dc =
config.ipv6.unwrap_or(probe.detected_ipv6.is_some()) && probe.detected_ipv6.is_some();
let nat_ip_v4 = matches!(middle_proxy_nat_ip, Some(IpAddr::V4(_)));
let nat_ip_v6 = matches!(middle_proxy_nat_ip, Some(IpAddr::V6(_)));
@@ -534,10 +537,26 @@ pub fn is_bogon_v6(ip: Ipv6Addr) -> bool {
pub fn log_probe_result(probe: &NetworkProbe, decision: &NetworkDecision) {
info!(
ipv4 = probe.detected_ipv4.as_ref().map(|v| v.to_string()).unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
ipv6 = probe.detected_ipv6.as_ref().map(|v| v.to_string()).unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
reflected_v4 = probe.reflected_ipv4.as_ref().map(|v| v.ip().to_string()).unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
reflected_v6 = probe.reflected_ipv6.as_ref().map(|v| v.ip().to_string()).unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
ipv4 = probe
.detected_ipv4
.as_ref()
.map(|v| v.to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
ipv6 = probe
.detected_ipv6
.as_ref()
.map(|v| v.to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
reflected_v4 = probe
.reflected_ipv4
.as_ref()
.map(|v| v.ip().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
reflected_v6 = probe
.reflected_ipv6
.as_ref()
.map(|v| v.ip().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "-".into()),
ipv4_bogon = probe.ipv4_is_bogon,
ipv6_bogon = probe.ipv6_is_bogon,
ipv4_me = decision.ipv4_me,
+44 -31
View File
@@ -2,13 +2,20 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::OnceLock;
use tokio::net::{lookup_host, UdpSocket};
use tokio::time::{timeout, Duration, sleep};
use tokio::net::{UdpSocket, lookup_host};
use tokio::time::{Duration, sleep, timeout};
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use crate::network::dns_overrides::{resolve, split_host_port};
fn stun_rng() -> &'static SecureRandom {
static STUN_RNG: OnceLock<SecureRandom> = OnceLock::new();
STUN_RNG.get_or_init(SecureRandom::new)
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum IpFamily {
V4,
@@ -34,13 +41,13 @@ pub async fn stun_probe_dual(stun_addr: &str) -> Result<DualStunResult> {
stun_probe_family(stun_addr, IpFamily::V6),
);
Ok(DualStunResult {
v4: v4?,
v6: v6?,
})
Ok(DualStunResult { v4: v4?, v6: v6? })
}
pub async fn stun_probe_family(stun_addr: &str, family: IpFamily) -> Result<Option<StunProbeResult>> {
pub async fn stun_probe_family(
stun_addr: &str,
family: IpFamily,
) -> Result<Option<StunProbeResult>> {
stun_probe_family_with_bind(stun_addr, family, None).await
}
@@ -49,8 +56,6 @@ pub async fn stun_probe_family_with_bind(
family: IpFamily,
bind_ip: Option<IpAddr>,
) -> Result<Option<StunProbeResult>> {
use rand::RngCore;
let bind_addr = match (family, bind_ip) {
(IpFamily::V4, Some(IpAddr::V4(ip))) => SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(ip), 0),
(IpFamily::V6, Some(IpAddr::V6(ip))) => SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(ip), 0),
@@ -71,13 +76,18 @@ pub async fn stun_probe_family_with_bind(
if let Some(addr) = target_addr {
match socket.connect(addr).await {
Ok(()) => {}
Err(e) if family == IpFamily::V6 && matches!(
e.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::NetworkUnreachable
| std::io::ErrorKind::HostUnreachable
| std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported
| std::io::ErrorKind::NetworkDown
) => return Ok(None),
Err(e)
if family == IpFamily::V6
&& matches!(
e.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::NetworkUnreachable
| std::io::ErrorKind::HostUnreachable
| std::io::ErrorKind::Unsupported
| std::io::ErrorKind::NetworkDown
) =>
{
return Ok(None);
}
Err(e) => return Err(ProxyError::Proxy(format!("STUN connect failed: {e}"))),
}
} else {
@@ -88,7 +98,7 @@ pub async fn stun_probe_family_with_bind(
req[0..2].copy_from_slice(&0x0001u16.to_be_bytes()); // Binding Request
req[2..4].copy_from_slice(&0u16.to_be_bytes()); // length
req[4..8].copy_from_slice(&0x2112A442u32.to_be_bytes()); // magic cookie
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut req[8..20]); // transaction ID
stun_rng().fill(&mut req[8..20]); // transaction ID
let mut buf = [0u8; 256];
let mut attempt = 0;
@@ -120,16 +130,16 @@ pub async fn stun_probe_family_with_bind(
let magic = 0x2112A442u32.to_be_bytes();
let txid = &req[8..20];
let mut idx = 20;
while idx + 4 <= n {
let atype = u16::from_be_bytes(buf[idx..idx + 2].try_into().unwrap());
let alen = u16::from_be_bytes(buf[idx + 2..idx + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
idx += 4;
if idx + alen > n {
break;
}
let mut idx = 20;
while idx + 4 <= n {
let atype = u16::from_be_bytes(buf[idx..idx + 2].try_into().unwrap());
let alen = u16::from_be_bytes(buf[idx + 2..idx + 4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
idx += 4;
if idx + alen > n {
break;
}
match atype {
match atype {
0x0020 /* XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS */ | 0x0001 /* MAPPED-ADDRESS */ => {
if alen < 8 {
break;
@@ -198,9 +208,8 @@ pub async fn stun_probe_family_with_bind(
_ => {}
}
idx += (alen + 3) & !3;
}
idx += (alen + 3) & !3;
}
}
Ok(None)
@@ -228,7 +237,11 @@ async fn resolve_stun_addr(stun_addr: &str, family: IpFamily) -> Result<Option<S
.await
.map_err(|e| ProxyError::Proxy(format!("STUN resolve failed: {e}")))?;
let target = addrs
.find(|a| matches!((a.is_ipv4(), family), (true, IpFamily::V4) | (false, IpFamily::V6)));
let target = addrs.find(|a| {
matches!(
(a.is_ipv4(), family),
(true, IpFamily::V4) | (false, IpFamily::V6)
)
});
Ok(target)
}
+168 -97
View File
@@ -33,35 +33,89 @@ pub static TG_DATACENTERS_V6: LazyLock<Vec<IpAddr>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
// ============= Middle Proxies (for advertising) =============
pub static TG_MIDDLE_PROXIES_V4: LazyLock<std::collections::HashMap<i32, Vec<(IpAddr, u16)>>> =
pub static TG_MIDDLE_PROXIES_V4: LazyLock<std::collections::HashMap<i32, Vec<(IpAddr, u16)>>> =
LazyLock::new(|| {
let mut m = std::collections::HashMap::new();
m.insert(1, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 50)), 8888)]);
m.insert(-1, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 50)), 8888)]);
m.insert(2, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 161, 144)), 8888)]);
m.insert(-2, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 161, 144)), 8888)]);
m.insert(3, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 100)), 8888)]);
m.insert(-3, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 100)), 8888)]);
m.insert(
1,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 50)), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
-1,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 50)), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
2,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 161, 144)), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
-2,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 161, 144)), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
3,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 100)), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
-3,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 100)), 8888)],
);
m.insert(4, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 4, 136)), 8888)]);
m.insert(-4, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 165, 109)), 8888)]);
m.insert(
-4,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 165, 109)), 8888)],
);
m.insert(5, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 56, 183)), 8888)]);
m.insert(-5, vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 56, 183)), 8888)]);
m.insert(
-5,
vec![(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 56, 183)), 8888)],
);
m
});
pub static TG_MIDDLE_PROXIES_V6: LazyLock<std::collections::HashMap<i32, Vec<(IpAddr, u16)>>> =
pub static TG_MIDDLE_PROXIES_V6: LazyLock<std::collections::HashMap<i32, Vec<(IpAddr, u16)>>> =
LazyLock::new(|| {
let mut m = std::collections::HashMap::new();
m.insert(1, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f001::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(-1, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f001::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(2, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f002::d".parse().unwrap()), 80)]);
m.insert(-2, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f002::d".parse().unwrap()), 80)]);
m.insert(3, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f003::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(-3, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f003::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(4, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f004::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(-4, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f004::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(5, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23f:f005::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(-5, vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23f:f005::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)]);
m.insert(
1,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f001::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
-1,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f001::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
2,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f002::d".parse().unwrap()), 80)],
);
m.insert(
-2,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f002::d".parse().unwrap()), 80)],
);
m.insert(
3,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f003::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
-3,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23d:f003::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
4,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f004::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
-4,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:67c:04e8:f004::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
5,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23f:f005::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m.insert(
-5,
vec![(IpAddr::V6("2001:b28:f23f:f005::d".parse().unwrap()), 8888)],
);
m
});
@@ -89,12 +143,12 @@ impl ProtoTag {
_ => None,
}
}
/// Convert to 4 bytes (little-endian)
pub fn to_bytes(self) -> [u8; 4] {
(self as u32).to_le_bytes()
}
/// Get protocol tag as bytes slice
pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &'static [u8; 4] {
match self {
@@ -152,11 +206,29 @@ pub const TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER: u8 = 0x14;
pub const TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION: u8 = 0x17;
/// TLS record type: Alert
pub const TLS_RECORD_ALERT: u8 = 0x15;
/// Maximum TLS record size
pub const MAX_TLS_RECORD_SIZE: usize = 16384;
/// Maximum TLS chunk size (with overhead)
/// RFC 8446 §5.2 allows up to 16384 + 256 bytes of ciphertext
pub const MAX_TLS_CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 16384 + 256;
/// Maximum TLS plaintext record payload size.
/// RFC 8446 §5.1: "The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 bytes."
/// Use this for validating incoming unencrypted records
/// (ClientHello, ChangeCipherSpec, unprotected Handshake messages).
pub const MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE: usize = 16_384;
/// Structural minimum for a valid TLS 1.3 ClientHello with SNI.
/// Derived from RFC 8446 §4.1.2 field layout + Appendix D.4 compat mode.
/// Deliberately conservative (below any real client) to avoid false
/// positives on legitimate connections with compact extension sets.
pub const MIN_TLS_CLIENT_HELLO_SIZE: usize = 100;
/// Maximum TLS ciphertext record payload size.
/// RFC 8446 §5.2: "The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14 + 256 bytes."
/// The +256 accounts for maximum AEAD expansion overhead.
/// Use this for validating or sizing buffers for encrypted records.
pub const MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE: usize = 16_384 + 256;
#[deprecated(note = "use MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE")]
pub const MAX_TLS_RECORD_SIZE: usize = MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE;
#[deprecated(note = "use MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE")]
pub const MAX_TLS_CHUNK_SIZE: usize = MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE;
/// Secure Intermediate payload is expected to be 4-byte aligned.
pub fn is_valid_secure_payload_len(data_len: usize) -> bool {
@@ -204,9 +276,7 @@ pub const SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = 8192;
// ============= Statistics =============
/// Duration buckets for histogram metrics
pub static DURATION_BUCKETS: &[f64] = &[
0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0, 15.0, 60.0, 300.0, 600.0, 1800.0,
];
pub static DURATION_BUCKETS: &[f64] = &[0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0, 15.0, 60.0, 300.0, 600.0, 1800.0];
// ============= Reserved Nonce Patterns =============
@@ -217,29 +287,27 @@ pub static RESERVED_NONCE_FIRST_BYTES: &[u8] = &[0xef];
pub static RESERVED_NONCE_BEGINNINGS: &[[u8; 4]] = &[
[0x48, 0x45, 0x41, 0x44], // HEAD
[0x50, 0x4F, 0x53, 0x54], // POST
[0x47, 0x45, 0x54, 0x20], // GET
[0x47, 0x45, 0x54, 0x20], // GET
[0xee, 0xee, 0xee, 0xee], // Intermediate
[0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd], // Secure
[0x16, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02], // TLS
];
/// Reserved continuation bytes (bytes 4-7)
pub static RESERVED_NONCE_CONTINUES: &[[u8; 4]] = &[
[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00],
];
pub static RESERVED_NONCE_CONTINUES: &[[u8; 4]] = &[[0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]];
// ============= RPC Constants (for Middle Proxy) =============
/// RPC Proxy Request
/// RPC Flags (from Erlang mtp_rpc.erl)
pub const RPC_FLAG_NOT_ENCRYPTED: u32 = 0x2;
pub const RPC_FLAG_HAS_AD_TAG: u32 = 0x8;
pub const RPC_FLAG_MAGIC: u32 = 0x1000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_EXTMODE2: u32 = 0x20000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_PAD: u32 = 0x8000000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_INTERMEDIATE: u32 = 0x20000000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_ABRIDGED: u32 = 0x40000000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_QUICKACK: u32 = 0x80000000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_HAS_AD_TAG: u32 = 0x8;
pub const RPC_FLAG_MAGIC: u32 = 0x1000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_EXTMODE2: u32 = 0x20000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_PAD: u32 = 0x8000000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_INTERMEDIATE: u32 = 0x20000000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_ABRIDGED: u32 = 0x40000000;
pub const RPC_FLAG_QUICKACK: u32 = 0x80000000;
pub const RPC_PROXY_REQ: [u8; 4] = [0xee, 0xf1, 0xce, 0x36];
/// RPC Proxy Answer
@@ -267,63 +335,66 @@ pub mod rpc_flags {
pub const FLAG_QUICKACK: u32 = 0x80000000;
}
// ============= Middle-End Proxy Servers =============
pub const ME_PROXY_PORT: u16 = 8888;
// ============= Middle-End Proxy Servers =============
pub const ME_PROXY_PORT: u16 = 8888;
pub static TG_MIDDLE_PROXIES_FLAT_V4: LazyLock<Vec<(IpAddr, u16)>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
vec![
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 50)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 161, 144)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 100)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 4, 136)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 56, 183)), 8888),
]
});
// ============= RPC Constants (u32 native endian) =============
// From mtproto-common.h + net-tcp-rpc-common.h + mtproto-proxy.c
pub const RPC_NONCE_U32: u32 = 0x7acb87aa;
pub const RPC_HANDSHAKE_U32: u32 = 0x7682eef5;
pub const RPC_HANDSHAKE_ERROR_U32: u32 = 0x6a27beda;
pub const TL_PROXY_TAG_U32: u32 = 0xdb1e26ae; // mtproto-proxy.c:121
// mtproto-common.h
pub const RPC_PROXY_REQ_U32: u32 = 0x36cef1ee;
pub const RPC_PROXY_ANS_U32: u32 = 0x4403da0d;
pub const RPC_CLOSE_CONN_U32: u32 = 0x1fcf425d;
pub const RPC_CLOSE_EXT_U32: u32 = 0x5eb634a2;
pub const RPC_SIMPLE_ACK_U32: u32 = 0x3bac409b;
pub const RPC_PING_U32: u32 = 0x5730a2df;
pub const RPC_PONG_U32: u32 = 0x8430eaa7;
pub const RPC_CRYPTO_NONE_U32: u32 = 0;
pub const RPC_CRYPTO_AES_U32: u32 = 1;
pub mod proxy_flags {
pub const FLAG_HAS_AD_TAG: u32 = 1;
pub const FLAG_NOT_ENCRYPTED: u32 = 0x2;
pub const FLAG_HAS_AD_TAG2: u32 = 0x8;
pub const FLAG_MAGIC: u32 = 0x1000;
pub const FLAG_EXTMODE2: u32 = 0x20000;
pub const FLAG_PAD: u32 = 0x8000000;
pub const FLAG_INTERMEDIATE: u32 = 0x20000000;
pub const FLAG_ABRIDGED: u32 = 0x40000000;
pub const FLAG_QUICKACK: u32 = 0x80000000;
}
pub static TG_MIDDLE_PROXIES_FLAT_V4: LazyLock<Vec<(IpAddr, u16)>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
vec![
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 50)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 161, 144)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(149, 154, 175, 100)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 4, 136)), 8888),
(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(91, 108, 56, 183)), 8888),
]
});
pub mod rpc_crypto_flags {
pub const USE_CRC32C: u32 = 0x800;
}
pub const ME_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 5;
pub const ME_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 10;
#[cfg(test)]
// ============= RPC Constants (u32 native endian) =============
// From mtproto-common.h + net-tcp-rpc-common.h + mtproto-proxy.c
pub const RPC_NONCE_U32: u32 = 0x7acb87aa;
pub const RPC_HANDSHAKE_U32: u32 = 0x7682eef5;
pub const RPC_HANDSHAKE_ERROR_U32: u32 = 0x6a27beda;
pub const TL_PROXY_TAG_U32: u32 = 0xdb1e26ae; // mtproto-proxy.c:121
// mtproto-common.h
pub const RPC_PROXY_REQ_U32: u32 = 0x36cef1ee;
pub const RPC_PROXY_ANS_U32: u32 = 0x4403da0d;
pub const RPC_CLOSE_CONN_U32: u32 = 0x1fcf425d;
pub const RPC_CLOSE_EXT_U32: u32 = 0x5eb634a2;
pub const RPC_SIMPLE_ACK_U32: u32 = 0x3bac409b;
pub const RPC_PING_U32: u32 = 0x5730a2df;
pub const RPC_PONG_U32: u32 = 0x8430eaa7;
pub const RPC_CRYPTO_NONE_U32: u32 = 0;
pub const RPC_CRYPTO_AES_U32: u32 = 1;
pub mod proxy_flags {
pub const FLAG_HAS_AD_TAG: u32 = 1;
pub const FLAG_NOT_ENCRYPTED: u32 = 0x2;
pub const FLAG_HAS_AD_TAG2: u32 = 0x8;
pub const FLAG_MAGIC: u32 = 0x1000;
pub const FLAG_EXTMODE2: u32 = 0x20000;
pub const FLAG_PAD: u32 = 0x8000000;
pub const FLAG_INTERMEDIATE: u32 = 0x20000000;
pub const FLAG_ABRIDGED: u32 = 0x40000000;
pub const FLAG_QUICKACK: u32 = 0x80000000;
}
pub mod rpc_crypto_flags {
pub const USE_CRC32C: u32 = 0x800;
}
pub const ME_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 5;
pub const ME_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 10;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/tls_size_constants_security_tests.rs"]
mod tls_size_constants_security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_proto_tag_roundtrip() {
for tag in [ProtoTag::Abridged, ProtoTag::Intermediate, ProtoTag::Secure] {
@@ -332,20 +403,20 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(tag, parsed);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_proto_tag_values() {
assert_eq!(ProtoTag::Abridged.to_bytes(), PROTO_TAG_ABRIDGED);
assert_eq!(ProtoTag::Intermediate.to_bytes(), PROTO_TAG_INTERMEDIATE);
assert_eq!(ProtoTag::Secure.to_bytes(), PROTO_TAG_SECURE);
}
#[test]
fn test_invalid_proto_tag() {
assert!(ProtoTag::from_bytes([0, 0, 0, 0]).is_none());
assert!(ProtoTag::from_bytes([0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff]).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_datacenters_count() {
assert_eq!(TG_DATACENTERS_V4.len(), 5);
+11 -11
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ impl FrameExtra {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
/// Create with quickack flag set
pub fn with_quickack() -> Self {
Self {
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ impl FrameExtra {
..Default::default()
}
}
/// Create with simple_ack flag set
pub fn with_simple_ack() -> Self {
Self {
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ impl FrameExtra {
..Default::default()
}
}
/// Check if any flags are set
pub fn has_flags(&self) -> bool {
self.quickack || self.simple_ack || self.skip_send
@@ -76,22 +76,22 @@ impl FrameMode {
FrameMode::Abridged => 4,
FrameMode::Intermediate => 4,
FrameMode::SecureIntermediate => 4 + 3, // length + padding
FrameMode::Full => 12 + 16, // header + max CBC padding
FrameMode::Full => 12 + 16, // header + max CBC padding
}
}
}
/// Validate message length for MTProto
pub fn validate_message_length(len: usize) -> bool {
use super::constants::{MIN_MSG_LEN, MAX_MSG_LEN, PADDING_FILLER};
use super::constants::{MAX_MSG_LEN, MIN_MSG_LEN, PADDING_FILLER};
(MIN_MSG_LEN..=MAX_MSG_LEN).contains(&len) && len.is_multiple_of(PADDING_FILLER.len())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_frame_extra_default() {
let extra = FrameExtra::default();
@@ -100,18 +100,18 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!extra.skip_send);
assert!(!extra.has_flags());
}
#[test]
fn test_frame_extra_flags() {
let extra = FrameExtra::with_quickack();
assert!(extra.quickack);
assert!(extra.has_flags());
let extra = FrameExtra::with_simple_ack();
assert!(extra.simple_ack);
assert!(extra.has_flags());
}
#[test]
fn test_validate_message_length() {
assert!(validate_message_length(12)); // MIN_MSG_LEN
@@ -119,4 +119,4 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!validate_message_length(8)); // Too small
assert!(!validate_message_length(13)); // Not aligned to 4
}
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ pub use frame::*;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use obfuscation::*;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use tls::*;
pub use tls::*;
+31 -32
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
use zeroize::Zeroize;
use crate::crypto::{sha256, AesCtr};
use super::constants::*;
use crate::crypto::{AesCtr, sha256};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
/// Obfuscation parameters from handshake
///
@@ -44,41 +44,40 @@ impl ObfuscationParams {
let dec_prekey_iv = &handshake[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
let dec_prekey = &dec_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
let dec_iv_bytes = &dec_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
let enc_prekey_iv: Vec<u8> = dec_prekey_iv.iter().rev().copied().collect();
let enc_prekey = &enc_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
let enc_iv_bytes = &enc_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
for (username, secret) in secrets {
let mut dec_key_input = Vec::with_capacity(PREKEY_LEN + secret.len());
dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(dec_prekey);
dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(secret);
let decrypt_key = sha256(&dec_key_input);
let decrypt_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(dec_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
let mut decryptor = AesCtr::new(&decrypt_key, decrypt_iv);
let decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(handshake);
let tag_bytes: [u8; 4] = decrypted[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4]
.try_into()
.unwrap();
let proto_tag = match ProtoTag::from_bytes(tag_bytes) {
Some(tag) => tag,
None => continue,
};
let dc_idx = i16::from_le_bytes(
decrypted[DC_IDX_POS..DC_IDX_POS + 2].try_into().unwrap()
);
let dc_idx =
i16::from_le_bytes(decrypted[DC_IDX_POS..DC_IDX_POS + 2].try_into().unwrap());
let mut enc_key_input = Vec::with_capacity(PREKEY_LEN + secret.len());
enc_key_input.extend_from_slice(enc_prekey);
enc_key_input.extend_from_slice(secret);
let encrypt_key = sha256(&enc_key_input);
let encrypt_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(enc_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
return Some((
ObfuscationParams {
decrypt_key,
@@ -91,20 +90,20 @@ impl ObfuscationParams {
username.clone(),
));
}
None
}
/// Create AES-CTR decryptor for client -> proxy direction
pub fn create_decryptor(&self) -> AesCtr {
AesCtr::new(&self.decrypt_key, self.decrypt_iv)
}
/// Create AES-CTR encryptor for proxy -> client direction
pub fn create_encryptor(&self) -> AesCtr {
AesCtr::new(&self.encrypt_key, self.encrypt_iv)
}
/// Get the combined encrypt key and IV for fast mode
pub fn enc_key_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(KEY_LEN + IV_LEN);
@@ -120,7 +119,7 @@ pub fn generate_nonce<R: FnMut(usize) -> Vec<u8>>(mut random_bytes: R) -> [u8; H
let nonce_vec = random_bytes(HANDSHAKE_LEN);
let mut nonce = [0u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
nonce.copy_from_slice(&nonce_vec);
if is_valid_nonce(&nonce) {
return nonce;
}
@@ -132,17 +131,17 @@ pub fn is_valid_nonce(nonce: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN]) -> bool {
if RESERVED_NONCE_FIRST_BYTES.contains(&nonce[0]) {
return false;
}
let first_four: [u8; 4] = nonce[..4].try_into().unwrap();
if RESERVED_NONCE_BEGINNINGS.contains(&first_four) {
return false;
}
let continue_four: [u8; 4] = nonce[4..8].try_into().unwrap();
if RESERVED_NONCE_CONTINUES.contains(&continue_four) {
return false;
}
true
}
@@ -153,7 +152,7 @@ pub fn prepare_tg_nonce(
enc_key_iv: Option<&[u8]>,
) {
nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4].copy_from_slice(&proto_tag.to_bytes());
if let Some(key_iv) = enc_key_iv {
let reversed: Vec<u8> = key_iv.iter().rev().copied().collect();
nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN].copy_from_slice(&reversed);
@@ -171,39 +170,39 @@ pub fn encrypt_nonce(nonce: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN]) -> Vec<u8> {
let key_iv = &nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
let enc_key = sha256(key_iv);
let enc_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(key_iv[..IV_LEN].try_into().unwrap());
let mut encryptor = AesCtr::new(&enc_key, enc_iv);
let mut result = nonce.to_vec();
let encrypted_part = encryptor.encrypt(&nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..]);
result[PROTO_TAG_POS..].copy_from_slice(&encrypted_part);
result
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_is_valid_nonce() {
let mut valid = [0x42u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
valid[4..8].copy_from_slice(&[1, 2, 3, 4]);
assert!(is_valid_nonce(&valid));
let mut invalid = [0x00u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
invalid[0] = 0xef;
assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
let mut invalid = [0x00u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
invalid[..4].copy_from_slice(b"HEAD");
assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
let mut invalid = [0x42u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
invalid[4..8].copy_from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0]);
assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
}
#[test]
fn test_generate_nonce() {
let mut counter = 0u8;
@@ -211,7 +210,7 @@ mod tests {
counter = counter.wrapping_add(1);
vec![counter; n]
});
assert!(is_valid_nonce(&nonce));
assert_eq!(nonce.len(), HANDSHAKE_LEN);
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use super::*;
use std::time::Instant;
use crate::crypto::sha256_hmac;
use std::time::Instant;
/// Helper to create a byte vector of specific length.
fn make_garbage(len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@ fn make_valid_tls_handshake_with_session_id(
let digest = make_digest(secret, &handshake, timestamp);
handshake[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN]
.copy_from_slice(&digest);
handshake[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN].copy_from_slice(&digest);
handshake
}
@@ -96,15 +95,15 @@ fn extract_sni_with_overlapping_extension_lengths_rejected() {
h.push(0); // Session ID length: 0
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01]); // Cipher suites
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x00]); // Compression
// Extensions start
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x20]); // Total Extensions length: 32
// Extension 1: SNI (type 0)
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00]);
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00]);
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x40]); // Claimed len: 64 (OVERFLOWS total extensions len 32)
h.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 64]);
assert!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(&h).is_none());
}
@@ -118,19 +117,19 @@ fn extract_sni_with_infinite_loop_potential_extension_rejected() {
h.push(0); // Session ID length: 0
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01]); // Cipher suites
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x00]); // Compression
// Extensions start
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x10]); // Total Extensions length: 16
// Extension: zero length but claims more?
// Extension: zero length but claims more?
// If our parser didn't advance, it might loop.
// Telemt uses `pos += 4 + elen;` so it always advances.
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x12, 0x34]); // Unknown type
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00]); // Length 0
// Fill the rest with garbage
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x42; 12]);
// We expect it to finish without SNI found
assert!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(&h).is_none());
}
@@ -143,7 +142,7 @@ fn extract_sni_with_invalid_hostname_rejected() {
sni.push(0);
sni.extend_from_slice(&(host.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
sni.extend_from_slice(host);
let mut h = vec![0x16, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x60]; // Record header
h.push(0x01); // ClientHello
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x00, 0x5C]);
@@ -152,16 +151,19 @@ fn extract_sni_with_invalid_hostname_rejected() {
h.push(0);
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01]);
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x01, 0x00]);
let mut ext = Vec::new();
ext.extend_from_slice(&0x0000u16.to_be_bytes());
ext.extend_from_slice(&(sni.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
ext.extend_from_slice(&sni);
h.extend_from_slice(&(ext.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&ext);
assert!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(&h).is_none(), "Invalid SNI hostname must be rejected");
assert!(
extract_sni_from_client_hello(&h).is_none(),
"Invalid SNI hostname must be rejected"
);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -233,7 +235,7 @@ fn is_tls_handshake_robustness_against_probing() {
assert!(is_tls_handshake(&[0x16, 0x03, 0x01]));
// Valid TLS 1.2/1.3 ClientHello (Legacy Record Layer)
assert!(is_tls_handshake(&[0x16, 0x03, 0x03]));
// Invalid record type but matching version
assert!(!is_tls_handshake(&[0x17, 0x03, 0x03]));
// Plaintext HTTP request
@@ -247,12 +249,12 @@ fn validate_tls_handshake_at_time_strict_boundary() {
let secret = b"strict_boundary_secret_32_bytes_";
let secrets = vec![("u".to_string(), secret.to_vec())];
let now: i64 = 1_000_000_000;
// Boundary: exactly TIME_SKEW_MAX (120s past)
let ts_past = (now - TIME_SKEW_MAX) as u32;
let h = make_valid_tls_handshake_with_session_id(secret, ts_past, &[0x42; 32]);
assert!(validate_tls_handshake_at_time(&h, &secrets, false, now).is_some());
// Boundary + 1s: should be rejected
let ts_too_past = (now - TIME_SKEW_MAX - 1) as u32;
let h2 = make_valid_tls_handshake_with_session_id(secret, ts_too_past, &[0x42; 32]);
@@ -268,14 +270,14 @@ fn extract_sni_with_duplicate_extensions_rejected() {
sni1.push(0);
sni1.extend_from_slice(&(host1.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
sni1.extend_from_slice(host1);
let host2 = b"second.com";
let mut sni2 = Vec::new();
sni2.extend_from_slice(&((host2.len() + 3) as u16).to_be_bytes());
sni2.push(0);
sni2.extend_from_slice(&(host2.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
sni2.extend_from_slice(host2);
let mut ext = Vec::new();
// Ext 1: SNI
ext.extend_from_slice(&0x0000u16.to_be_bytes());
@@ -285,7 +287,7 @@ fn extract_sni_with_duplicate_extensions_rejected() {
ext.extend_from_slice(&0x0000u16.to_be_bytes());
ext.extend_from_slice(&(sni2.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
ext.extend_from_slice(&sni2);
let mut body = Vec::new();
body.extend_from_slice(&[0x03, 0x03]);
body.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
@@ -306,10 +308,9 @@ fn extract_sni_with_duplicate_extensions_rejected() {
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x03, 0x03]);
h.extend_from_slice(&(handshake.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&handshake);
// Parser might return first, see second, or fail. OWASP ASVS prefers rejection of unexpected dups.
// Telemt's `extract_sni` returns the first one found.
assert!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(&h).is_some());
// Duplicate SNI extensions are ambiguous and must fail closed.
assert!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(&h).is_none());
}
#[test]
@@ -318,21 +319,26 @@ fn extract_alpn_with_malformed_list_rejected() {
alpn_payload.extend_from_slice(&0x0005u16.to_be_bytes()); // Total len 5
alpn_payload.push(10); // Labeled len 10 (OVERFLOWS total 5)
alpn_payload.extend_from_slice(b"h2");
let mut ext = Vec::new();
ext.extend_from_slice(&0x0010u16.to_be_bytes()); // Type: ALPN (16)
ext.extend_from_slice(&(alpn_payload.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
ext.extend_from_slice(&alpn_payload);
let mut h = vec![0x16, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x40, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x03, 0x03];
let mut h = vec![
0x16, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x40, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x03, 0x03,
];
h.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
h.push(0);
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00]);
h.extend_from_slice(&(ext.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
h.extend_from_slice(&ext);
let res = extract_alpn_from_client_hello(&h);
assert!(res.is_empty(), "Malformed ALPN list must return empty or fail");
assert!(
res.is_empty(),
"Malformed ALPN list must return empty or fail"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -344,9 +350,9 @@ fn extract_sni_with_huge_extension_header_rejected() {
h.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
h.push(0);
h.extend_from_slice(&[0x00, 0x02, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00]);
// Extensions start
h.extend_from_slice(&[0xFF, 0xFF]); // Total extensions: 65535 (OVERFLOWS everything)
assert!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(&h).is_none());
}
@@ -84,7 +84,10 @@ fn make_valid_client_hello_record(host: &str, alpn_protocols: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u
#[test]
fn client_hello_fuzz_corpus_never_panics_or_accepts_corruption() {
let valid = make_valid_client_hello_record("example.com", &[b"h2", b"http/1.1"]);
assert_eq!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(&valid).as_deref(), Some("example.com"));
assert_eq!(
extract_sni_from_client_hello(&valid).as_deref(),
Some("example.com")
);
assert_eq!(
extract_alpn_from_client_hello(&valid),
vec![b"h2".to_vec(), b"http/1.1".to_vec()]
@@ -121,8 +124,14 @@ fn client_hello_fuzz_corpus_never_panics_or_accepts_corruption() {
continue;
}
assert!(extract_sni_from_client_hello(input).is_none(), "corpus item {idx} must fail closed for SNI");
assert!(extract_alpn_from_client_hello(input).is_empty(), "corpus item {idx} must fail closed for ALPN");
assert!(
extract_sni_from_client_hello(input).is_none(),
"corpus item {idx} must fail closed for SNI"
);
assert!(
extract_alpn_from_client_hello(input).is_empty(),
"corpus item {idx} must fail closed for ALPN"
);
}
}
@@ -163,7 +172,9 @@ fn tls_handshake_fuzz_corpus_never_panics_and_rejects_digest_mutations() {
for _ in 0..32 {
let mut mutated = base.clone();
for _ in 0..2 {
seed = seed.wrapping_mul(2862933555777941757).wrapping_add(3037000493);
seed = seed
.wrapping_mul(2862933555777941757)
.wrapping_add(3037000493);
let idx = TLS_DIGEST_POS + (seed as usize % TLS_DIGEST_LEN);
mutated[idx] ^= ((seed >> 17) as u8).wrapping_add(1);
}
@@ -171,9 +182,13 @@ fn tls_handshake_fuzz_corpus_never_panics_and_rejects_digest_mutations() {
}
for (idx, handshake) in corpus.iter().enumerate() {
let result = catch_unwind(|| validate_tls_handshake_at_time(handshake, &secrets, false, now));
let result =
catch_unwind(|| validate_tls_handshake_at_time(handshake, &secrets, false, now));
assert!(result.is_ok(), "corpus item {idx} must not panic");
assert!(result.unwrap().is_none(), "corpus item {idx} must fail closed");
assert!(
result.unwrap().is_none(),
"corpus item {idx} must fail closed"
);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
use super::*;
#[test]
fn extension_builder_fails_closed_on_u16_length_overflow() {
let builder = TlsExtensionBuilder {
extensions: vec![0u8; (u16::MAX as usize) + 1],
};
let built = builder.build();
assert!(
built.is_empty(),
"oversized extension blob must fail closed instead of truncating length field"
);
}
#[test]
fn server_hello_builder_fails_closed_on_session_id_len_overflow() {
let builder = ServerHelloBuilder {
random: [0u8; 32],
session_id: vec![0xAB; (u8::MAX as usize) + 1],
cipher_suite: cipher_suite::TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
compression: 0,
extensions: TlsExtensionBuilder::new(),
};
let message = builder.build_message();
let record = builder.build_record();
assert!(
message.is_empty(),
"session_id length overflow must fail closed in message builder"
);
assert!(
record.is_empty(),
"session_id length overflow must fail closed in record builder"
);
}
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
use super::*;
use crate::crypto::sha256_hmac;
use crate::tls_front::emulator::build_emulated_server_hello;
use crate::tls_front::types::{CachedTlsData, ParsedServerHello, TlsBehaviorProfile, TlsProfileSource};
use crate::tls_front::types::{
CachedTlsData, ParsedServerHello, TlsBehaviorProfile, TlsProfileSource,
};
use std::time::SystemTime;
/// Build a TLS-handshake-like buffer that contains a valid HMAC digest
@@ -39,8 +41,7 @@ fn make_valid_tls_handshake_with_session_id(
digest[28 + i] ^= ts[i];
}
handshake[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN]
.copy_from_slice(&digest);
handshake[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN].copy_from_slice(&digest);
handshake
}
@@ -180,7 +181,10 @@ fn second_user_in_list_found_when_first_does_not_match() {
("user_b".to_string(), secret_b.to_vec()),
];
let result = validate_tls_handshake(&handshake, &secrets, true);
assert!(result.is_some(), "user_b must be found even though user_a comes first");
assert!(
result.is_some(),
"user_b must be found even though user_a comes first"
);
assert_eq!(result.unwrap().user, "user_b");
}
@@ -428,8 +432,7 @@ fn censor_probe_random_digests_all_rejected() {
let mut h = vec![0x42u8; min_len];
h[TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN] = session_id_len as u8;
let rand_digest = rng.bytes(TLS_DIGEST_LEN);
h[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN]
.copy_from_slice(&rand_digest);
h[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN].copy_from_slice(&rand_digest);
assert!(
validate_tls_handshake(&h, &secrets, true).is_none(),
"Random digest at attempt {attempt} must not match"
@@ -553,8 +556,7 @@ fn system_time_before_unix_epoch_is_rejected_without_panic() {
fn system_time_far_future_overflowing_i64_returns_none() {
// i64::MAX + 1 seconds past epoch overflows i64 when cast naively with `as`.
let overflow_secs = u64::try_from(i64::MAX).unwrap() + 1;
if let Some(far_future) =
UNIX_EPOCH.checked_add(std::time::Duration::from_secs(overflow_secs))
if let Some(far_future) = UNIX_EPOCH.checked_add(std::time::Duration::from_secs(overflow_secs))
{
assert!(
system_time_to_unix_secs(far_future).is_none(),
@@ -620,7 +622,10 @@ fn appended_trailing_byte_causes_rejection() {
let mut h = make_valid_tls_handshake(secret, 0);
let secrets = vec![("u".to_string(), secret.to_vec())];
assert!(validate_tls_handshake(&h, &secrets, true).is_some(), "baseline");
assert!(
validate_tls_handshake(&h, &secrets, true).is_some(),
"baseline"
);
h.push(0x00);
assert!(
@@ -647,8 +652,7 @@ fn zero_length_session_id_accepted() {
let computed = sha256_hmac(secret, &handshake);
// timestamp = 0 → ts XOR bytes are all zero → digest = computed unchanged.
handshake[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN]
.copy_from_slice(&computed);
handshake[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN].copy_from_slice(&computed);
let secrets = vec![("u".to_string(), secret.to_vec())];
let result = validate_tls_handshake(&handshake, &secrets, true);
@@ -773,10 +777,18 @@ fn ignore_time_skew_explicitly_decouples_from_boot_time_cap() {
let secrets = vec![("u".to_string(), secret.to_vec())];
let cap_zero = validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, true, 0, 0);
let cap_nonzero =
validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, true, 0, BOOT_TIME_COMPAT_MAX_SECS);
let cap_nonzero = validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(
&h,
&secrets,
true,
0,
BOOT_TIME_COMPAT_MAX_SECS,
);
assert!(cap_zero.is_some(), "ignore_time_skew=true must accept valid HMAC");
assert!(
cap_zero.is_some(),
"ignore_time_skew=true must accept valid HMAC"
);
assert!(
cap_nonzero.is_some(),
"ignore_time_skew path must not depend on boot-time cap"
@@ -888,8 +900,8 @@ fn adversarial_skew_boundary_matrix_accepts_only_inclusive_window_when_boot_disa
let ts_i64 = now - offset;
let ts = u32::try_from(ts_i64).expect("timestamp must fit u32 for test matrix");
let h = make_valid_tls_handshake(secret, ts);
let accepted = validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, false, now, 0)
.is_some();
let accepted =
validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, false, now, 0).is_some();
let expected = (TIME_SKEW_MIN..=TIME_SKEW_MAX).contains(&offset);
assert_eq!(
accepted, expected,
@@ -917,8 +929,8 @@ fn light_fuzz_skew_window_rejects_outside_range_when_boot_disabled() {
let ts = u32::try_from(ts_i64).expect("timestamp must fit u32 for fuzz test");
let h = make_valid_tls_handshake(secret, ts);
let accepted = validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, false, now, 0)
.is_some();
let accepted =
validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, false, now, 0).is_some();
assert!(
!accepted,
"offset {offset} must be rejected outside strict skew window"
@@ -940,8 +952,8 @@ fn stress_boot_disabled_validation_matches_time_diff_oracle() {
let ts = s as u32;
let h = make_valid_tls_handshake(secret, ts);
let accepted = validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, false, now, 0)
.is_some();
let accepted =
validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(&h, &secrets, false, now, 0).is_some();
let time_diff = now - i64::from(ts);
let expected = (TIME_SKEW_MIN..=TIME_SKEW_MAX).contains(&time_diff);
assert_eq!(
@@ -960,7 +972,10 @@ fn integration_large_user_list_with_boot_disabled_finds_only_matching_user() {
let mut secrets = Vec::new();
for i in 0..512u32 {
secrets.push((format!("noise-{i}"), format!("noise-secret-{i}").into_bytes()));
secrets.push((
format!("noise-{i}"),
format!("noise-secret-{i}").into_bytes(),
));
}
secrets.push(("target-user".to_string(), target_secret.to_vec()));
@@ -1018,7 +1033,10 @@ fn u32_max_timestamp_accepted_with_ignore_time_skew() {
let secrets = vec![("u".to_string(), secret.to_vec())];
let result = validate_tls_handshake(&h, &secrets, true);
assert!(result.is_some(), "u32::MAX timestamp must be accepted with ignore_time_skew=true");
assert!(
result.is_some(),
"u32::MAX timestamp must be accepted with ignore_time_skew=true"
);
assert_eq!(
result.unwrap().timestamp,
u32::MAX,
@@ -1150,16 +1168,17 @@ fn first_matching_user_wins_over_later_duplicate_secret() {
let secrets = vec![
("decoy_1".to_string(), b"wrong_1".to_vec()),
("winner".to_string(), shared.to_vec()), // first match
("winner".to_string(), shared.to_vec()), // first match
("decoy_2".to_string(), b"wrong_2".to_vec()),
("loser".to_string(), shared.to_vec()), // second match — must not win
("loser".to_string(), shared.to_vec()), // second match — must not win
("decoy_3".to_string(), b"wrong_3".to_vec()),
];
let result = validate_tls_handshake(&h, &secrets, true);
assert!(result.is_some());
assert_eq!(
result.unwrap().user, "winner",
result.unwrap().user,
"winner",
"first matching user must be returned even when a later entry also matches"
);
}
@@ -1189,7 +1208,7 @@ fn test_parse_tls_record_header() {
let header = [0x17, 0x03, 0x03, 0x40, 0x00];
let result = parse_tls_record_header(&header).unwrap();
assert_eq!(result.0, TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION);
assert_eq!(result.1, 16384);
assert_eq!(usize::from(result.1), MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE);
}
#[test]
@@ -1425,7 +1444,8 @@ fn test_build_server_hello_structure() {
assert!(response.len() > ccs_start + 6);
assert_eq!(response[ccs_start], TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER);
let ccs_len = 5 + u16::from_be_bytes([response[ccs_start + 3], response[ccs_start + 4]]) as usize;
let ccs_len =
5 + u16::from_be_bytes([response[ccs_start + 3], response[ccs_start + 4]]) as usize;
let app_start = ccs_start + ccs_len;
assert!(response.len() > app_start + 5);
assert_eq!(response[app_start], TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION);
@@ -1729,7 +1749,10 @@ fn empty_secret_hmac_is_supported() {
let handshake = make_valid_tls_handshake(secret, 0);
let secrets = vec![("empty".to_string(), secret.to_vec())];
let result = validate_tls_handshake(&handshake, &secrets, true);
assert!(result.is_some(), "Empty HMAC key must not panic and must validate when correct");
assert!(
result.is_some(),
"Empty HMAC key must not panic and must validate when correct"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -1802,7 +1825,10 @@ fn server_hello_application_data_payload_varies_across_runs() {
let app_len = u16::from_be_bytes([response[app_pos + 3], response[app_pos + 4]]) as usize;
let payload = response[app_pos + 5..app_pos + 5 + app_len].to_vec();
assert!(payload.iter().any(|&b| b != 0), "Payload must not be all-zero deterministic filler");
assert!(
payload.iter().any(|&b| b != 0),
"Payload must not be all-zero deterministic filler"
);
unique_payloads.insert(payload);
}
@@ -1846,7 +1872,13 @@ fn large_replay_window_does_not_expand_time_skew_acceptance() {
#[test]
fn parse_tls_record_header_accepts_tls_version_constant() {
let header = [TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE, TLS_VERSION[0], TLS_VERSION[1], 0x00, 0x2A];
let header = [
TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE,
TLS_VERSION[0],
TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00,
0x2A,
];
let parsed = parse_tls_record_header(&header).expect("TLS_VERSION header should be accepted");
assert_eq!(parsed.0, TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE);
assert_eq!(parsed.1, 42);
@@ -1868,7 +1900,10 @@ fn server_hello_clamps_fake_cert_len_lower_bound() {
let app_len = u16::from_be_bytes([response[app_pos + 3], response[app_pos + 4]]) as usize;
assert_eq!(response[app_pos], TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION);
assert_eq!(app_len, 64, "fake cert payload must be clamped to minimum 64 bytes");
assert_eq!(
app_len, 64,
"fake cert payload must be clamped to minimum 64 bytes"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -1887,7 +1922,10 @@ fn server_hello_clamps_fake_cert_len_upper_bound() {
let app_len = u16::from_be_bytes([response[app_pos + 3], response[app_pos + 4]]) as usize;
assert_eq!(response[app_pos], TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION);
assert_eq!(app_len, 16_640, "fake cert payload must be clamped to TLS record max bound");
assert_eq!(
app_len, MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE,
"fake cert payload must be clamped to TLS record max bound"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -1898,7 +1936,15 @@ fn server_hello_new_session_ticket_count_matches_configuration() {
let rng = crate::crypto::SecureRandom::new();
let tickets: u8 = 3;
let response = build_server_hello(secret, &client_digest, &session_id, 1024, &rng, None, tickets);
let response = build_server_hello(
secret,
&client_digest,
&session_id,
1024,
&rng,
None,
tickets,
);
let mut pos = 0usize;
let mut app_records = 0usize;
@@ -1906,7 +1952,10 @@ fn server_hello_new_session_ticket_count_matches_configuration() {
let rtype = response[pos];
let rlen = u16::from_be_bytes([response[pos + 3], response[pos + 4]]) as usize;
let next = pos + 5 + rlen;
assert!(next <= response.len(), "TLS record must stay inside response bounds");
assert!(
next <= response.len(),
"TLS record must stay inside response bounds"
);
if rtype == TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION {
app_records += 1;
}
@@ -1927,7 +1976,15 @@ fn server_hello_new_session_ticket_count_is_safely_capped() {
let session_id = vec![0x54; 32];
let rng = crate::crypto::SecureRandom::new();
let response = build_server_hello(secret, &client_digest, &session_id, 1024, &rng, None, u8::MAX);
let response = build_server_hello(
secret,
&client_digest,
&session_id,
1024,
&rng,
None,
u8::MAX,
);
let mut pos = 0usize;
let mut app_records = 0usize;
@@ -1935,7 +1992,10 @@ fn server_hello_new_session_ticket_count_is_safely_capped() {
let rtype = response[pos];
let rlen = u16::from_be_bytes([response[pos + 3], response[pos + 4]]) as usize;
let next = pos + 5 + rlen;
assert!(next <= response.len(), "TLS record must stay inside response bounds");
assert!(
next <= response.len(),
"TLS record must stay inside response bounds"
);
if rtype == TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION {
app_records += 1;
}
@@ -1943,8 +2003,7 @@ fn server_hello_new_session_ticket_count_is_safely_capped() {
}
assert_eq!(
app_records,
5,
app_records, 5,
"response must cap ticket-like tail records to four plus one main application record"
);
}
@@ -1972,10 +2031,14 @@ fn boot_time_handshake_replay_remains_blocked_after_cache_window_expires() {
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(70));
let validation_after_expiry = validate_tls_handshake_with_replay_window(&handshake, &secrets, false, 2)
.expect("boot-time handshake must still cryptographically validate after cache expiry");
let validation_after_expiry =
validate_tls_handshake_with_replay_window(&handshake, &secrets, false, 2)
.expect("boot-time handshake must still cryptographically validate after cache expiry");
let digest_half_after_expiry = &validation_after_expiry.digest[..TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
assert_eq!(digest_half, digest_half_after_expiry, "replay key must be stable for same handshake");
assert_eq!(
digest_half, digest_half_after_expiry,
"replay key must be stable for same handshake"
);
assert!(
checker.check_and_add_tls_digest(digest_half_after_expiry),
@@ -2006,8 +2069,9 @@ fn adversarial_boot_time_handshake_should_not_be_replayable_after_cache_expiry()
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(70));
let validation_after_expiry = validate_tls_handshake_with_replay_window(&handshake, &secrets, false, 2)
.expect("boot-time handshake still validates cryptographically after cache expiry");
let validation_after_expiry =
validate_tls_handshake_with_replay_window(&handshake, &secrets, false, 2)
.expect("boot-time handshake still validates cryptographically after cache expiry");
let digest_half_after_expiry = &validation_after_expiry.digest[..TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
assert_eq!(
@@ -2067,11 +2131,14 @@ fn light_fuzz_boot_time_timestamp_matrix_with_short_replay_window_obeys_boot_cap
let ts = (s as u32) % 8;
let handshake = make_valid_tls_handshake(secret, ts);
let accepted = validate_tls_handshake_with_replay_window(&handshake, &secrets, false, 2)
.is_some();
let accepted =
validate_tls_handshake_with_replay_window(&handshake, &secrets, false, 2).is_some();
if ts < 2 {
assert!(accepted, "timestamp {ts} must remain boot-time compatible under 2s cap");
assert!(
accepted,
"timestamp {ts} must remain boot-time compatible under 2s cap"
);
} else {
assert!(
!accepted,
@@ -2107,7 +2174,9 @@ fn server_hello_application_data_contains_alpn_marker_when_selected() {
let expected = [0x00u8, 0x10, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, b'h', b'2'];
assert!(
app_payload.windows(expected.len()).any(|window| window == expected),
app_payload
.windows(expected.len())
.any(|window| window == expected),
"first application payload must carry ALPN marker for selected protocol"
);
}
@@ -2137,7 +2206,10 @@ fn server_hello_ignores_oversized_alpn_and_still_caps_ticket_tail() {
let rtype = response[pos];
let rlen = u16::from_be_bytes([response[pos + 3], response[pos + 4]]) as usize;
let next = pos + 5 + rlen;
assert!(next <= response.len(), "TLS record must stay inside response bounds");
assert!(
next <= response.len(),
"TLS record must stay inside response bounds"
);
if rtype == TLS_RECORD_APPLICATION {
app_records += 1;
if first_app_payload.is_none() {
@@ -2146,7 +2218,9 @@ fn server_hello_ignores_oversized_alpn_and_still_caps_ticket_tail() {
}
pos = next;
}
let marker = [0x00u8, 0x10, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x04, 0x03, b'x', b'x', b'x', b'x'];
let marker = [
0x00u8, 0x10, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x04, 0x03, b'x', b'x', b'x', b'x',
];
assert_eq!(
app_records, 5,
@@ -2310,13 +2384,13 @@ fn light_fuzz_tls_header_classifier_and_parser_policy_consistency() {
&& header[1] == 0x03
&& (header[2] == 0x01 || header[2] == 0x03);
assert_eq!(
classified,
expected_classified,
classified, expected_classified,
"classifier policy mismatch for header {header:02x?}"
);
let parsed = parse_tls_record_header(&header);
let expected_parsed = header[1] == 0x03 && (header[2] == 0x01 || header[2] == TLS_VERSION[1]);
let expected_parsed =
header[1] == 0x03 && (header[2] == 0x01 || header[2] == TLS_VERSION[1]);
assert_eq!(
parsed.is_some(),
expected_parsed,
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
use super::{MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE, MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE, MIN_TLS_CLIENT_HELLO_SIZE};
#[test]
fn tls_size_constants_match_rfc_8446() {
assert_eq!(MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE, 16_384);
assert_eq!(MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE, 16_640);
assert!(MIN_TLS_CLIENT_HELLO_SIZE < 512);
assert!(MIN_TLS_CLIENT_HELLO_SIZE > 64);
assert!(MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE > MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE);
}
+226 -117
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,66 @@
//! actually carries MTProto authentication data.
#![allow(dead_code)]
#![cfg_attr(not(test), forbid(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks))]
#![cfg_attr(
not(test),
deny(
clippy::unwrap_used,
clippy::expect_used,
clippy::panic,
clippy::todo,
clippy::unimplemented,
clippy::correctness,
clippy::option_if_let_else,
clippy::or_fun_call,
clippy::branches_sharing_code,
clippy::single_option_map,
clippy::useless_let_if_seq,
clippy::redundant_locals,
clippy::cloned_ref_to_slice_refs,
unsafe_code,
clippy::await_holding_lock,
clippy::await_holding_refcell_ref,
clippy::debug_assert_with_mut_call,
clippy::macro_use_imports,
clippy::cast_ptr_alignment,
clippy::cast_lossless,
clippy::ptr_as_ptr,
clippy::large_stack_arrays,
clippy::same_functions_in_if_condition,
trivial_casts,
trivial_numeric_casts,
unused_extern_crates,
unused_import_braces,
rust_2018_idioms
)
)]
#![cfg_attr(
not(test),
allow(
clippy::use_self,
clippy::redundant_closure,
clippy::too_many_arguments,
clippy::doc_markdown,
clippy::missing_const_for_fn,
clippy::unnecessary_operation,
clippy::redundant_pub_crate,
clippy::derive_partial_eq_without_eq,
clippy::type_complexity,
clippy::new_ret_no_self,
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::significant_drop_tightening,
clippy::significant_drop_in_scrutinee,
clippy::float_cmp,
clippy::nursery
)
)]
use crate::crypto::{sha256_hmac, SecureRandom};
use super::constants::*;
use crate::crypto::{SecureRandom, sha256_hmac};
#[cfg(test)]
use crate::error::ProxyError;
use super::constants::*;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use x25519_dalek::{X25519_BASEPOINT_BYTES, x25519};
@@ -31,7 +86,7 @@ pub const TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Operators with known clock-drifted clients should tune deployment config
/// (for example replay-window policy) to match their environment.
pub const TIME_SKEW_MIN: i64 = -2 * 60; // 2 minutes before
pub const TIME_SKEW_MAX: i64 = 2 * 60; // 2 minutes after
pub const TIME_SKEW_MAX: i64 = 2 * 60; // 2 minutes after
/// Maximum accepted boot-time timestamp (seconds) before skew checks are enforced.
pub const BOOT_TIME_MAX_SECS: u32 = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60;
/// Hard cap for boot-time compatibility bypass to avoid oversized acceptance
@@ -69,7 +124,6 @@ pub struct TlsValidation {
/// Client digest for response generation
pub digest: [u8; TLS_DIGEST_LEN],
/// Timestamp extracted from digest
pub timestamp: u32,
}
@@ -87,60 +141,63 @@ impl TlsExtensionBuilder {
extensions: Vec::with_capacity(128),
}
}
/// Add Key Share extension with X25519 key
fn add_key_share(&mut self, public_key: &[u8; 32]) -> &mut Self {
// Extension type: key_share (0x0033)
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(&extension_type::KEY_SHARE.to_be_bytes());
self.extensions
.extend_from_slice(&extension_type::KEY_SHARE.to_be_bytes());
// Key share entry: curve (2) + key_len (2) + key (32) = 36 bytes
// Extension data length
let entry_len: u16 = 2 + 2 + 32; // curve + length + key
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(&entry_len.to_be_bytes());
// Named curve: x25519
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(&named_curve::X25519.to_be_bytes());
self.extensions
.extend_from_slice(&named_curve::X25519.to_be_bytes());
// Key length
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(&(32u16).to_be_bytes());
// Key data
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(public_key);
self
}
/// Add Supported Versions extension
fn add_supported_versions(&mut self, version: u16) -> &mut Self {
// Extension type: supported_versions (0x002b)
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(&extension_type::SUPPORTED_VERSIONS.to_be_bytes());
self.extensions
.extend_from_slice(&extension_type::SUPPORTED_VERSIONS.to_be_bytes());
// Extension data: length (2) + version (2)
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(&(2u16).to_be_bytes());
// Selected version
self.extensions.extend_from_slice(&version.to_be_bytes());
self
}
/// Build final extensions with length prefix
fn build(self) -> Vec<u8> {
let Ok(len) = u16::try_from(self.extensions.len()) else {
return Vec::new();
};
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(2 + self.extensions.len());
// Extensions length (2 bytes)
let len = self.extensions.len() as u16;
result.extend_from_slice(&len.to_be_bytes());
// Extensions data
result.extend_from_slice(&self.extensions);
result
}
/// Get current extensions without length prefix (for calculation)
fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.extensions
}
@@ -172,12 +229,12 @@ impl ServerHelloBuilder {
extensions: TlsExtensionBuilder::new(),
}
}
fn with_x25519_key(mut self, key: &[u8; 32]) -> Self {
self.extensions.add_key_share(key);
self
}
fn with_tls13_version(mut self) -> Self {
// TLS 1.3 = 0x0304
self.extensions.add_supported_versions(0x0304);
@@ -186,9 +243,14 @@ impl ServerHelloBuilder {
/// Build ServerHello message (without record header)
fn build_message(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let Ok(session_id_len) = u8::try_from(self.session_id.len()) else {
return Vec::new();
};
let extensions = self.extensions.extensions.clone();
let extensions_len = extensions.len() as u16;
let Ok(extensions_len) = u16::try_from(extensions.len()) else {
return Vec::new();
};
// Calculate total length
let body_len = 2 + // version
32 + // random
@@ -196,55 +258,67 @@ impl ServerHelloBuilder {
2 + // cipher suite
1 + // compression
2 + extensions.len(); // extensions length + data
if body_len > 0x00ff_ffff {
return Vec::new();
}
let mut message = Vec::with_capacity(4 + body_len);
// Handshake header
message.push(0x02); // ServerHello message type
// 3-byte length
let len_bytes = (body_len as u32).to_be_bytes();
let Ok(body_len_u32) = u32::try_from(body_len) else {
return Vec::new();
};
let len_bytes = body_len_u32.to_be_bytes();
message.extend_from_slice(&len_bytes[1..4]);
// Server version (TLS 1.2 in header, actual version in extension)
message.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
// Random (32 bytes) - placeholder, will be replaced with digest
message.extend_from_slice(&self.random);
// Session ID
message.push(self.session_id.len() as u8);
message.push(session_id_len);
message.extend_from_slice(&self.session_id);
// Cipher suite
message.extend_from_slice(&self.cipher_suite);
// Compression method
message.push(self.compression);
// Extensions length
message.extend_from_slice(&extensions_len.to_be_bytes());
// Extensions data
message.extend_from_slice(&extensions);
message
}
/// Build complete ServerHello TLS record
fn build_record(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let message = self.build_message();
if message.is_empty() {
return Vec::new();
}
let Ok(message_len) = u16::try_from(message.len()) else {
return Vec::new();
};
let mut record = Vec::with_capacity(5 + message.len());
// TLS record header
record.push(TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE);
record.extend_from_slice(&TLS_VERSION);
record.extend_from_slice(&(message.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
record.extend_from_slice(&message_len.to_be_bytes());
// Message
record.extend_from_slice(&message);
record
}
}
@@ -256,7 +330,6 @@ impl ServerHelloBuilder {
/// Returns validation result if a matching user is found.
/// The result **must** be used — ignoring it silently bypasses authentication.
#[must_use]
pub fn validate_tls_handshake(
handshake: &[u8],
secrets: &[(String, Vec<u8>)],
@@ -320,7 +393,6 @@ fn system_time_to_unix_secs(now: SystemTime) -> Option<i64> {
i64::try_from(d.as_secs()).ok()
}
fn validate_tls_handshake_at_time(
handshake: &[u8],
secrets: &[(String, Vec<u8>)],
@@ -346,12 +418,12 @@ fn validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(
if handshake.len() < TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN + 1 {
return None;
}
// Extract digest
let digest: [u8; TLS_DIGEST_LEN] = handshake[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN]
.try_into()
.ok()?;
// Extract session ID
let session_id_len_pos = TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN;
let session_id_len = handshake.get(session_id_len_pos).copied()? as usize;
@@ -359,17 +431,17 @@ fn validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(
return None;
}
let session_id_start = session_id_len_pos + 1;
if handshake.len() < session_id_start + session_id_len {
return None;
}
let session_id = handshake[session_id_start..session_id_start + session_id_len].to_vec();
// Build message for HMAC (with zeroed digest)
let mut msg = handshake.to_vec();
msg[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN].fill(0);
let mut first_match: Option<(&String, u32)> = None;
for (user, secret) in secrets {
@@ -408,7 +480,7 @@ fn validate_tls_handshake_at_time_with_boot_cap(
}
}
}
if first_match.is_none() {
first_match = Some((user, timestamp));
}
@@ -450,28 +522,33 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
new_session_tickets: u8,
) -> Vec<u8> {
const MIN_APP_DATA: usize = 64;
const MAX_APP_DATA: usize = 16640; // RFC 8446 §5.2 upper bound
const MAX_APP_DATA: usize = MAX_TLS_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE;
let fake_cert_len = fake_cert_len.clamp(MIN_APP_DATA, MAX_APP_DATA);
let x25519_key = gen_fake_x25519_key(rng);
// Build ServerHello
let server_hello = ServerHelloBuilder::new(session_id.to_vec())
.with_x25519_key(&x25519_key)
.with_tls13_version()
.build_record();
// Build Change Cipher Spec record
let change_cipher_spec = [
TLS_RECORD_CHANGE_CIPHER,
TLS_VERSION[0], TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00, 0x01, // length = 1
0x01, // CCS byte
TLS_VERSION[0],
TLS_VERSION[1],
0x00,
0x01, // length = 1
0x01, // CCS byte
];
// Build first encrypted flight mimic as opaque ApplicationData bytes.
// Embed a compact EncryptedExtensions-like ALPN block when selected.
let mut fake_cert = Vec::with_capacity(fake_cert_len);
if let Some(proto) = alpn.as_ref().filter(|p| !p.is_empty() && p.len() <= u8::MAX as usize) {
if let Some(proto) = alpn
.as_ref()
.filter(|p| !p.is_empty() && p.len() <= u8::MAX as usize)
{
let proto_list_len = 1usize + proto.len();
let ext_data_len = 2usize + proto_list_len;
let marker_len = 4usize + ext_data_len;
@@ -496,7 +573,7 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
// Fill ApplicationData with fully random bytes of desired length to avoid
// deterministic DPI fingerprints (fixed inner content type markers).
app_data_record.extend_from_slice(&fake_cert);
// Build optional NewSessionTicket records (TLS 1.3 handshake messages are encrypted;
// here we mimic with opaque ApplicationData records of plausible size).
let mut tickets = Vec::new();
@@ -515,7 +592,10 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
// Combine all records
let mut response = Vec::with_capacity(
server_hello.len() + change_cipher_spec.len() + app_data_record.len() + tickets.iter().map(|r| r.len()).sum::<usize>()
server_hello.len()
+ change_cipher_spec.len()
+ app_data_record.len()
+ tickets.iter().map(|r| r.len()).sum::<usize>(),
);
response.extend_from_slice(&server_hello);
response.extend_from_slice(&change_cipher_spec);
@@ -523,18 +603,17 @@ pub fn build_server_hello(
for t in &tickets {
response.extend_from_slice(t);
}
// Compute HMAC for the response
let mut hmac_input = Vec::with_capacity(TLS_DIGEST_LEN + response.len());
hmac_input.extend_from_slice(client_digest);
hmac_input.extend_from_slice(&response);
let response_digest = sha256_hmac(secret, &hmac_input);
// Insert computed digest into ServerHello
// Position: record header (5) + message type (1) + length (3) + version (2) = 11
response[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN]
.copy_from_slice(&response_digest);
response[TLS_DIGEST_POS..TLS_DIGEST_POS + TLS_DIGEST_LEN].copy_from_slice(&response_digest);
response
}
@@ -588,6 +667,9 @@ pub fn extract_sni_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
return None;
}
let mut saw_sni_extension = false;
let mut extracted_sni = None;
while pos + 4 <= ext_end {
let etype = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]);
let elen = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos + 2], handshake[pos + 3]]) as usize;
@@ -595,6 +677,12 @@ pub fn extract_sni_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
if pos + elen > ext_end {
break;
}
if etype == 0x0000 {
if saw_sni_extension {
return None;
}
saw_sni_extension = true;
}
if etype == 0x0000 && elen >= 5 {
// server_name extension
let list_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]) as usize;
@@ -602,17 +690,19 @@ pub fn extract_sni_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
let sn_end = std::cmp::min(sn_pos + list_len, pos + elen);
while sn_pos + 3 <= sn_end {
let name_type = handshake[sn_pos];
let name_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[sn_pos + 1], handshake[sn_pos + 2]]) as usize;
let name_len =
u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[sn_pos + 1], handshake[sn_pos + 2]]) as usize;
sn_pos += 3;
if sn_pos + name_len > sn_end {
break;
}
if name_type == 0 && name_len > 0
if name_type == 0
&& name_len > 0
&& let Ok(host) = std::str::from_utf8(&handshake[sn_pos..sn_pos + name_len])
&& is_valid_sni_hostname(host)
{
if is_valid_sni_hostname(host) {
return Some(host.to_string());
}
extracted_sni = Some(host.to_string());
break;
}
sn_pos += name_len;
}
@@ -620,7 +710,7 @@ pub fn extract_sni_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<String> {
pos += elen;
}
None
extracted_sni
}
fn is_valid_sni_hostname(host: &str) -> bool {
@@ -669,35 +759,49 @@ pub fn extract_alpn_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
}
pos += 4; // type + len
pos += 2 + 32; // version + random
if pos >= handshake.len() { return Vec::new(); }
if pos >= handshake.len() {
return Vec::new();
}
let session_id_len = *handshake.get(pos).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
pos += 1 + session_id_len;
if pos + 2 > handshake.len() { return Vec::new(); }
let cipher_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos+1]]) as usize;
if pos + 2 > handshake.len() {
return Vec::new();
}
let cipher_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]) as usize;
pos += 2 + cipher_len;
if pos >= handshake.len() { return Vec::new(); }
if pos >= handshake.len() {
return Vec::new();
}
let comp_len = *handshake.get(pos).unwrap_or(&0) as usize;
pos += 1 + comp_len;
if pos + 2 > handshake.len() { return Vec::new(); }
let ext_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos+1]]) as usize;
if pos + 2 > handshake.len() {
return Vec::new();
}
let ext_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]) as usize;
pos += 2;
let ext_end = pos + ext_len;
if ext_end > handshake.len() { return Vec::new(); }
if ext_end > handshake.len() {
return Vec::new();
}
let mut out = Vec::new();
while pos + 4 <= ext_end {
let etype = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos+1]]);
let elen = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos+2], handshake[pos+3]]) as usize;
let etype = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]);
let elen = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos + 2], handshake[pos + 3]]) as usize;
pos += 4;
if pos + elen > ext_end { break; }
if pos + elen > ext_end {
break;
}
if etype == extension_type::ALPN && elen >= 3 {
let list_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos+1]]) as usize;
let list_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]) as usize;
let mut lp = pos + 2;
let list_end = (pos + 2).saturating_add(list_len).min(pos + elen);
while lp < list_end {
let plen = handshake[lp] as usize;
lp += 1;
if lp + plen > list_end { break; }
out.push(handshake[lp..lp+plen].to_vec());
if lp + plen > list_end {
break;
}
out.push(handshake[lp..lp + plen].to_vec());
lp += plen;
}
break;
@@ -707,30 +811,28 @@ pub fn extract_alpn_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
out
}
/// Check if bytes look like a TLS ClientHello
pub fn is_tls_handshake(first_bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
if first_bytes.len() < 3 {
return false;
}
// TLS ClientHello commonly uses legacy record versions 0x0301 or 0x0303.
first_bytes[0] == TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE
&& first_bytes[1] == 0x03
first_bytes[0] == TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE
&& first_bytes[1] == 0x03
&& (first_bytes[2] == 0x01 || first_bytes[2] == 0x03)
}
/// Parse TLS record header, returns (record_type, length)
pub fn parse_tls_record_header(header: &[u8; 5]) -> Option<(u8, u16)> {
let record_type = header[0];
let version = [header[1], header[2]];
// We accept both TLS 1.0 header (for ClientHello) and TLS 1.2/1.3
if version != [0x03, 0x01] && version != TLS_VERSION {
return None;
}
let length = u16::from_be_bytes([header[3], header[4]]);
Some((record_type, length))
}
@@ -746,7 +848,7 @@ fn validate_server_hello_structure(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ProxyError> {
version: [0, 0],
});
}
// Check record header
if data[0] != TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidTlsRecord {
@@ -754,7 +856,7 @@ fn validate_server_hello_structure(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ProxyError> {
version: [data[1], data[2]],
});
}
// Check version
if data[1..3] != TLS_VERSION {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidTlsRecord {
@@ -762,31 +864,34 @@ fn validate_server_hello_structure(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ProxyError> {
version: [data[1], data[2]],
});
}
// Check record length
let record_len = u16::from_be_bytes([data[3], data[4]]) as usize;
if data.len() < 5 + record_len {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidHandshake(
format!("ServerHello record truncated: expected {}, got {}",
5 + record_len, data.len())
));
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidHandshake(format!(
"ServerHello record truncated: expected {}, got {}",
5 + record_len,
data.len()
)));
}
// Check message type
if data[5] != 0x02 {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidHandshake(
format!("Expected ServerHello (0x02), got 0x{:02x}", data[5])
));
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidHandshake(format!(
"Expected ServerHello (0x02), got 0x{:02x}",
data[5]
)));
}
// Parse message length
let msg_len = u32::from_be_bytes([0, data[6], data[7], data[8]]) as usize;
if msg_len + 4 != record_len {
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidHandshake(
format!("Message length mismatch: {} + 4 != {}", msg_len, record_len)
));
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidHandshake(format!(
"Message length mismatch: {} + 4 != {}",
msg_len, record_len
)));
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -796,7 +901,7 @@ fn validate_server_hello_structure(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ProxyError> {
/// Using `static_assertions` ensures these can never silently break across
/// refactors without a compile error.
mod compile_time_security_checks {
use super::{TLS_DIGEST_LEN, TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN};
use super::{TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN, TLS_DIGEST_LEN};
use static_assertions::const_assert;
// The digest must be exactly one SHA-256 output.
@@ -814,13 +919,17 @@ mod compile_time_security_checks {
// ============= Security-focused regression tests =============
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tls_security_tests.rs"]
#[path = "tests/tls_security_tests.rs"]
mod security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tls_adversarial_tests.rs"]
#[path = "tests/tls_adversarial_tests.rs"]
mod adversarial_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tls_fuzz_security_tests.rs"]
#[path = "tests/tls_fuzz_security_tests.rs"]
mod fuzz_security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/tls_length_cast_hardening_security_tests.rs"]
mod length_cast_hardening_security_tests;
+406
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
#![allow(dead_code)]
// Adaptive buffer policy is staged and retained for deterministic rollout.
// Keep definitions compiled for compatibility and security test scaffolding.
use dashmap::DashMap;
use std::cmp::max;
use std::sync::OnceLock;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
const EMA_ALPHA: f64 = 0.2;
const PROFILE_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
const THROUGHPUT_UP_BPS: f64 = 8_000_000.0;
const THROUGHPUT_DOWN_BPS: f64 = 2_000_000.0;
const RATIO_CONFIRM_THRESHOLD: f64 = 1.12;
const TIER1_HOLD_TICKS: u32 = 8;
const TIER2_HOLD_TICKS: u32 = 4;
const QUIET_DEMOTE_TICKS: u32 = 480;
const HARD_COOLDOWN_TICKS: u32 = 20;
const HARD_PENDING_THRESHOLD: u32 = 3;
const HARD_PARTIAL_RATIO_THRESHOLD: f64 = 0.25;
const DIRECT_C2S_CAP_BYTES: usize = 128 * 1024;
const DIRECT_S2C_CAP_BYTES: usize = 512 * 1024;
const ME_FRAMES_CAP: usize = 96;
const ME_BYTES_CAP: usize = 384 * 1024;
const ME_DELAY_MIN_US: u64 = 150;
const MAX_USER_PROFILES_ENTRIES: usize = 50_000;
const MAX_USER_KEY_BYTES: usize = 512;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub enum AdaptiveTier {
Base = 0,
Tier1 = 1,
Tier2 = 2,
Tier3 = 3,
}
impl AdaptiveTier {
pub fn promote(self) -> Self {
match self {
Self::Base => Self::Tier1,
Self::Tier1 => Self::Tier2,
Self::Tier2 => Self::Tier3,
Self::Tier3 => Self::Tier3,
}
}
pub fn demote(self) -> Self {
match self {
Self::Base => Self::Base,
Self::Tier1 => Self::Base,
Self::Tier2 => Self::Tier1,
Self::Tier3 => Self::Tier2,
}
}
fn ratio(self) -> (usize, usize) {
match self {
Self::Base => (1, 1),
Self::Tier1 => (5, 4),
Self::Tier2 => (3, 2),
Self::Tier3 => (2, 1),
}
}
pub fn as_u8(self) -> u8 {
self as u8
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum TierTransitionReason {
SoftConfirmed,
HardPressure,
QuietDemotion,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct TierTransition {
pub from: AdaptiveTier,
pub to: AdaptiveTier,
pub reason: TierTransitionReason,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default)]
pub struct RelaySignalSample {
pub c2s_bytes: u64,
pub s2c_requested_bytes: u64,
pub s2c_written_bytes: u64,
pub s2c_write_ops: u64,
pub s2c_partial_writes: u64,
pub s2c_consecutive_pending_writes: u32,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct SessionAdaptiveController {
tier: AdaptiveTier,
max_tier_seen: AdaptiveTier,
throughput_ema_bps: f64,
incoming_ema_bps: f64,
outgoing_ema_bps: f64,
tier1_hold_ticks: u32,
tier2_hold_ticks: u32,
quiet_ticks: u32,
hard_cooldown_ticks: u32,
}
impl SessionAdaptiveController {
pub fn new(initial_tier: AdaptiveTier) -> Self {
Self {
tier: initial_tier,
max_tier_seen: initial_tier,
throughput_ema_bps: 0.0,
incoming_ema_bps: 0.0,
outgoing_ema_bps: 0.0,
tier1_hold_ticks: 0,
tier2_hold_ticks: 0,
quiet_ticks: 0,
hard_cooldown_ticks: 0,
}
}
pub fn max_tier_seen(&self) -> AdaptiveTier {
self.max_tier_seen
}
pub fn observe(&mut self, sample: RelaySignalSample, tick_secs: f64) -> Option<TierTransition> {
if tick_secs <= f64::EPSILON {
return None;
}
if self.hard_cooldown_ticks > 0 {
self.hard_cooldown_ticks -= 1;
}
let c2s_bps = (sample.c2s_bytes as f64 * 8.0) / tick_secs;
let incoming_bps = (sample.s2c_requested_bytes as f64 * 8.0) / tick_secs;
let outgoing_bps = (sample.s2c_written_bytes as f64 * 8.0) / tick_secs;
let throughput = c2s_bps.max(outgoing_bps);
self.throughput_ema_bps = ema(self.throughput_ema_bps, throughput);
self.incoming_ema_bps = ema(self.incoming_ema_bps, incoming_bps);
self.outgoing_ema_bps = ema(self.outgoing_ema_bps, outgoing_bps);
let tier1_now = self.throughput_ema_bps >= THROUGHPUT_UP_BPS;
if tier1_now {
self.tier1_hold_ticks = self.tier1_hold_ticks.saturating_add(1);
} else {
self.tier1_hold_ticks = 0;
}
let ratio = if self.outgoing_ema_bps <= f64::EPSILON {
0.0
} else {
self.incoming_ema_bps / self.outgoing_ema_bps
};
let tier2_now = ratio >= RATIO_CONFIRM_THRESHOLD;
if tier2_now {
self.tier2_hold_ticks = self.tier2_hold_ticks.saturating_add(1);
} else {
self.tier2_hold_ticks = 0;
}
let partial_ratio = if sample.s2c_write_ops == 0 {
0.0
} else {
sample.s2c_partial_writes as f64 / sample.s2c_write_ops as f64
};
let hard_now = sample.s2c_consecutive_pending_writes >= HARD_PENDING_THRESHOLD
|| partial_ratio >= HARD_PARTIAL_RATIO_THRESHOLD;
if hard_now && self.hard_cooldown_ticks == 0 {
return self.promote(TierTransitionReason::HardPressure, HARD_COOLDOWN_TICKS);
}
if self.tier1_hold_ticks >= TIER1_HOLD_TICKS && self.tier2_hold_ticks >= TIER2_HOLD_TICKS {
return self.promote(TierTransitionReason::SoftConfirmed, 0);
}
let demote_candidate =
self.throughput_ema_bps < THROUGHPUT_DOWN_BPS && !tier2_now && !hard_now;
if demote_candidate {
self.quiet_ticks = self.quiet_ticks.saturating_add(1);
if self.quiet_ticks >= QUIET_DEMOTE_TICKS {
self.quiet_ticks = 0;
return self.demote(TierTransitionReason::QuietDemotion);
}
} else {
self.quiet_ticks = 0;
}
None
}
fn promote(
&mut self,
reason: TierTransitionReason,
hard_cooldown_ticks: u32,
) -> Option<TierTransition> {
let from = self.tier;
let to = from.promote();
if from == to {
return None;
}
self.tier = to;
self.max_tier_seen = max(self.max_tier_seen, to);
self.hard_cooldown_ticks = hard_cooldown_ticks;
self.tier1_hold_ticks = 0;
self.tier2_hold_ticks = 0;
self.quiet_ticks = 0;
Some(TierTransition { from, to, reason })
}
fn demote(&mut self, reason: TierTransitionReason) -> Option<TierTransition> {
let from = self.tier;
let to = from.demote();
if from == to {
return None;
}
self.tier = to;
self.tier1_hold_ticks = 0;
self.tier2_hold_ticks = 0;
Some(TierTransition { from, to, reason })
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
struct UserAdaptiveProfile {
tier: AdaptiveTier,
seen_at: Instant,
}
fn profiles() -> &'static DashMap<String, UserAdaptiveProfile> {
static USER_PROFILES: OnceLock<DashMap<String, UserAdaptiveProfile>> = OnceLock::new();
USER_PROFILES.get_or_init(DashMap::new)
}
pub fn seed_tier_for_user(user: &str) -> AdaptiveTier {
if user.len() > MAX_USER_KEY_BYTES {
return AdaptiveTier::Base;
}
let now = Instant::now();
if let Some(entry) = profiles().get(user) {
let value = *entry.value();
drop(entry);
if now.saturating_duration_since(value.seen_at) <= PROFILE_TTL {
return value.tier;
}
profiles().remove_if(user, |_, v| now.saturating_duration_since(v.seen_at) > PROFILE_TTL);
}
AdaptiveTier::Base
}
pub fn record_user_tier(user: &str, tier: AdaptiveTier) {
if user.len() > MAX_USER_KEY_BYTES {
return;
}
let now = Instant::now();
let mut was_vacant = false;
match profiles().entry(user.to_string()) {
dashmap::mapref::entry::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
let existing = *entry.get();
let effective = if now.saturating_duration_since(existing.seen_at) > PROFILE_TTL {
tier
} else {
max(existing.tier, tier)
};
entry.insert(UserAdaptiveProfile {
tier: effective,
seen_at: now,
});
}
dashmap::mapref::entry::Entry::Vacant(slot) => {
slot.insert(UserAdaptiveProfile { tier, seen_at: now });
was_vacant = true;
}
}
if was_vacant && profiles().len() > MAX_USER_PROFILES_ENTRIES {
profiles().retain(|_, v| now.saturating_duration_since(v.seen_at) <= PROFILE_TTL);
}
}
pub fn direct_copy_buffers_for_tier(
tier: AdaptiveTier,
base_c2s: usize,
base_s2c: usize,
) -> (usize, usize) {
let (num, den) = tier.ratio();
(
scale(base_c2s, num, den, DIRECT_C2S_CAP_BYTES),
scale(base_s2c, num, den, DIRECT_S2C_CAP_BYTES),
)
}
pub fn me_flush_policy_for_tier(
tier: AdaptiveTier,
base_frames: usize,
base_bytes: usize,
base_delay: Duration,
) -> (usize, usize, Duration) {
let (num, den) = tier.ratio();
let frames = scale(base_frames, num, den, ME_FRAMES_CAP).max(1);
let bytes = scale(base_bytes, num, den, ME_BYTES_CAP).max(4096);
let delay_us = base_delay.as_micros() as u64;
let adjusted_delay_us = match tier {
AdaptiveTier::Base => delay_us,
AdaptiveTier::Tier1 => (delay_us.saturating_mul(7)).saturating_div(10),
AdaptiveTier::Tier2 => delay_us.saturating_div(2),
AdaptiveTier::Tier3 => (delay_us.saturating_mul(3)).saturating_div(10),
}
.max(ME_DELAY_MIN_US)
.min(delay_us.max(ME_DELAY_MIN_US));
(frames, bytes, Duration::from_micros(adjusted_delay_us))
}
fn ema(prev: f64, value: f64) -> f64 {
if prev <= f64::EPSILON {
value
} else {
(prev * (1.0 - EMA_ALPHA)) + (value * EMA_ALPHA)
}
}
fn scale(base: usize, numerator: usize, denominator: usize, cap: usize) -> usize {
let scaled = base
.saturating_mul(numerator)
.saturating_div(denominator.max(1));
scaled.min(cap).max(1)
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/adaptive_buffers_security_tests.rs"]
mod adaptive_buffers_security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/adaptive_buffers_record_race_security_tests.rs"]
mod adaptive_buffers_record_race_security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn sample(
c2s_bytes: u64,
s2c_requested_bytes: u64,
s2c_written_bytes: u64,
s2c_write_ops: u64,
s2c_partial_writes: u64,
s2c_consecutive_pending_writes: u32,
) -> RelaySignalSample {
RelaySignalSample {
c2s_bytes,
s2c_requested_bytes,
s2c_written_bytes,
s2c_write_ops,
s2c_partial_writes,
s2c_consecutive_pending_writes,
}
}
#[test]
fn test_soft_promotion_requires_tier1_and_tier2() {
let mut ctrl = SessionAdaptiveController::new(AdaptiveTier::Base);
let tick_secs = 0.25;
let mut promoted = None;
for _ in 0..8 {
promoted = ctrl.observe(
sample(
300_000, // ~9.6 Mbps
320_000, // incoming > outgoing to confirm tier2
250_000, 10, 0, 0,
),
tick_secs,
);
}
let transition = promoted.expect("expected soft promotion");
assert_eq!(transition.from, AdaptiveTier::Base);
assert_eq!(transition.to, AdaptiveTier::Tier1);
assert_eq!(transition.reason, TierTransitionReason::SoftConfirmed);
}
#[test]
fn test_hard_promotion_on_pending_pressure() {
let mut ctrl = SessionAdaptiveController::new(AdaptiveTier::Base);
let transition = ctrl
.observe(sample(10_000, 20_000, 10_000, 4, 1, 3), 0.25)
.expect("expected hard promotion");
assert_eq!(transition.reason, TierTransitionReason::HardPressure);
assert_eq!(transition.to, AdaptiveTier::Tier1);
}
#[test]
fn test_quiet_demotion_is_slow_and_stepwise() {
let mut ctrl = SessionAdaptiveController::new(AdaptiveTier::Tier2);
let mut demotion = None;
for _ in 0..QUIET_DEMOTE_TICKS {
demotion = ctrl.observe(sample(1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0), 0.25);
}
let transition = demotion.expect("expected quiet demotion");
assert_eq!(transition.from, AdaptiveTier::Tier2);
assert_eq!(transition.to, AdaptiveTier::Tier1);
assert_eq!(transition.reason, TierTransitionReason::QuietDemotion);
}
}
+894 -191
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-109
View File
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
use super::*;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::error::ProxyError;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Priority 3: Massive Concurrency Stress (OWASP ASVS 5.1.6)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn client_stress_10k_connections_limit_strict() {
let user = "stress-user";
let limit = 512;
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
let iterations = 1000;
let mut tasks = Vec::new();
for i in 0..iterations {
let stats = Arc::clone(&stats);
let ip_tracker = Arc::clone(&ip_tracker);
let config = config.clone();
let user_str = user.to_string();
tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
let peer = SocketAddr::new(
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, (i % 254 + 1) as u8)),
10000 + (i % 1000) as u16,
);
match RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
&user_str,
&config,
stats,
peer,
ip_tracker,
).await {
Ok(res) => Ok(res),
Err(ProxyError::ConnectionLimitExceeded { .. }) => Err(()),
Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
}
}));
}
let results = futures::future::join_all(tasks).await;
let mut successes = 0;
let mut failures = 0;
let mut reservations = Vec::new();
for res in results {
match res.unwrap() {
Ok(r) => {
successes += 1;
reservations.push(r);
}
Err(_) => failures += 1,
}
}
assert_eq!(successes, limit, "Should allow exactly 'limit' connections");
assert_eq!(failures, iterations - limit, "Should fail the rest with LimitExceeded");
assert_eq!(stats.get_user_curr_connects(user), limit as u64);
drop(reservations);
ip_tracker.drain_cleanup_queue().await;
assert_eq!(stats.get_user_curr_connects(user), 0, "Stats must converge to 0 after all drops");
assert_eq!(ip_tracker.get_active_ip_count(user).await, 0, "IP tracker must converge to 0");
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Priority 3: IP Tracker Race Stress
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn client_ip_tracker_race_condition_stress() {
let user = "race-user";
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 100).await;
let iterations = 1000;
let mut tasks = Vec::new();
for i in 0..iterations {
let ip_tracker = Arc::clone(&ip_tracker);
let ip = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, (i % 254 + 1) as u8));
tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
for _ in 0..10 {
if let Ok(()) = ip_tracker.check_and_add("race-user", ip).await {
ip_tracker.remove_ip("race-user", ip).await;
}
}
}));
}
futures::future::join_all(tasks).await;
assert_eq!(ip_tracker.get_active_ip_count(user).await, 0, "IP count must be zero after balanced add/remove burst");
}
+196 -23
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::ffi::OsString;
use std::fs::OpenOptions;
use std::io::Write;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::sync::{Mutex, OnceLock};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt, ReadHalf, WriteHalf, split};
use tokio::sync::watch;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
@@ -17,14 +17,20 @@ use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use crate::protocol::constants::*;
use crate::proxy::handshake::{HandshakeSuccess, encrypt_tg_nonce_with_ciphers, generate_tg_nonce};
use crate::proxy::relay::relay_bidirectional;
use crate::proxy::shared_state::{
ConntrackCloseEvent, ConntrackClosePublishResult, ConntrackCloseReason, ProxySharedState,
};
use crate::proxy::route_mode::{
RelayRouteMode, RouteCutoverState, ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG, affected_cutover_state,
ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG, RelayRouteMode, RouteCutoverState, affected_cutover_state,
cutover_stagger_delay,
};
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::stream::{BufferPool, CryptoReader, CryptoWriter};
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
#[cfg(unix)]
use nix::fcntl::{Flock, FlockArg, OFlag, openat};
#[cfg(unix)]
use nix::sys::stat::Mode;
#[cfg(unix)]
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
@@ -137,6 +143,7 @@ fn unknown_dc_log_path_is_still_safe(path: &SanitizedUnknownDcLogPath) -> bool {
true
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn open_unknown_dc_log_append(path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<std::fs::File> {
#[cfg(unix)]
{
@@ -156,6 +163,56 @@ fn open_unknown_dc_log_append(path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<std::fs::File> {
}
}
fn open_unknown_dc_log_append_anchored(
path: &SanitizedUnknownDcLogPath,
) -> std::io::Result<std::fs::File> {
#[cfg(unix)]
{
let parent = OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.custom_flags(libc::O_DIRECTORY | libc::O_NOFOLLOW | libc::O_CLOEXEC)
.open(&path.allowed_parent)?;
let oflags = OFlag::O_CREAT
| OFlag::O_APPEND
| OFlag::O_WRONLY
| OFlag::O_NOFOLLOW
| OFlag::O_CLOEXEC;
let mode = Mode::from_bits_truncate(0o600);
let path_component = Path::new(path.file_name.as_os_str());
let fd = openat(&parent, path_component, oflags, mode)
.map_err(|err| std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(err as i32))?;
let file = std::fs::File::from(fd);
Ok(file)
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
{
let _ = path;
Err(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
"unknown_dc_file_log_enabled requires unix O_NOFOLLOW support",
))
}
}
fn append_unknown_dc_line(file: &mut std::fs::File, dc_idx: i16) -> std::io::Result<()> {
#[cfg(unix)]
{
let cloned = file.try_clone()?;
let mut locked = Flock::lock(cloned, FlockArg::LockExclusive)
.map_err(|(_, err)| std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(err as i32))?;
let write_result = writeln!(&mut *locked, "dc_idx={dc_idx}");
let _ = locked
.unlock()
.map_err(|(_, err)| std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(err as i32))?;
write_result
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
{
writeln!(file, "dc_idx={dc_idx}")
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn clear_unknown_dc_log_cache_for_testing() {
if let Some(set) = LOGGED_UNKNOWN_DCS.get()
@@ -171,7 +228,43 @@ fn unknown_dc_test_lock() -> &'static Mutex<()> {
TEST_LOCK.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(()))
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) async fn handle_via_direct<R, W>(
client_reader: CryptoReader<R>,
client_writer: CryptoWriter<W>,
success: HandshakeSuccess,
upstream_manager: Arc<UpstreamManager>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
config: Arc<ProxyConfig>,
buffer_pool: Arc<BufferPool>,
rng: Arc<SecureRandom>,
route_rx: watch::Receiver<RouteCutoverState>,
route_snapshot: RouteCutoverState,
session_id: u64,
) -> Result<()>
where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
handle_via_direct_with_shared(
client_reader,
client_writer,
success,
upstream_manager,
stats,
config.clone(),
buffer_pool,
rng,
route_rx,
route_snapshot,
session_id,
SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], config.server.port)),
ProxySharedState::new(),
)
.await
}
pub(crate) async fn handle_via_direct_with_shared<R, W>(
client_reader: CryptoReader<R>,
client_writer: CryptoWriter<W>,
success: HandshakeSuccess,
@@ -183,6 +276,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn handle_via_direct<R, W>(
mut route_rx: watch::Receiver<RouteCutoverState>,
route_snapshot: RouteCutoverState,
session_id: u64,
local_addr: SocketAddr,
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
) -> Result<()>
where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
@@ -222,7 +317,19 @@ where
stats.increment_user_connects(user);
let _direct_connection_lease = stats.acquire_direct_connection_lease();
let relay_result = relay_bidirectional(
let buffer_pool_trim = Arc::clone(&buffer_pool);
let relay_activity_timeout = if shared.conntrack_pressure_active() {
Duration::from_secs(
config
.server
.conntrack_control
.profile
.direct_activity_timeout_secs(),
)
} else {
Duration::from_secs(1800)
};
let relay_result = crate::proxy::relay::relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout(
client_reader,
client_writer,
tg_reader,
@@ -233,14 +340,13 @@ where
Arc::clone(&stats),
config.access.user_data_quota.get(user).copied(),
buffer_pool,
relay_activity_timeout,
);
tokio::pin!(relay_result);
let relay_result = loop {
if let Some(cutover) = affected_cutover_state(
&route_rx,
RelayRouteMode::Direct,
route_snapshot.generation,
) {
if let Some(cutover) =
affected_cutover_state(&route_rx, RelayRouteMode::Direct, route_snapshot.generation)
{
let delay = cutover_stagger_delay(session_id, cutover.generation);
warn!(
user = %user,
@@ -269,9 +375,59 @@ where
Err(e) => debug!(user = %user, error = %e, "Direct relay ended with error"),
}
buffer_pool_trim.trim_to(buffer_pool_trim.max_buffers().min(64));
let pool_snapshot = buffer_pool_trim.stats();
stats.set_buffer_pool_gauges(
pool_snapshot.pooled,
pool_snapshot.allocated,
pool_snapshot.allocated.saturating_sub(pool_snapshot.pooled),
);
let close_reason = classify_conntrack_close_reason(&relay_result);
let publish_result = shared.publish_conntrack_close_event(ConntrackCloseEvent {
src: success.peer,
dst: local_addr,
reason: close_reason,
});
if !matches!(
publish_result,
ConntrackClosePublishResult::Sent | ConntrackClosePublishResult::Disabled
) {
stats.increment_conntrack_close_event_drop_total();
}
relay_result
}
fn classify_conntrack_close_reason(result: &Result<()>) -> ConntrackCloseReason {
match result {
Ok(()) => ConntrackCloseReason::NormalEof,
Err(crate::error::ProxyError::Io(error))
if matches!(error.kind(), std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut) =>
{
ConntrackCloseReason::Timeout
}
Err(crate::error::ProxyError::Io(error))
if matches!(
error.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset
| std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted
| std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe
| std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected
| std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof
) =>
{
ConntrackCloseReason::Reset
}
Err(crate::error::ProxyError::Proxy(message))
if message.contains("pressure") || message.contains("evicted") =>
{
ConntrackCloseReason::Pressure
}
Err(_) => ConntrackCloseReason::Other,
}
}
fn get_dc_addr_static(dc_idx: i16, config: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
let prefer_v6 = config.network.prefer == 6 && config.network.ipv6.unwrap_or(true);
let datacenters = if prefer_v6 {
@@ -288,7 +444,9 @@ fn get_dc_addr_static(dc_idx: i16, config: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
for addr_str in addrs {
match addr_str.parse::<SocketAddr>() {
Ok(addr) => parsed.push(addr),
Err(_) => warn!(dc_idx = dc_idx, addr_str = %addr_str, "Invalid DC override address in config, ignoring"),
Err(_) => {
warn!(dc_idx = dc_idx, addr_str = %addr_str, "Invalid DC override address in config, ignoring")
}
}
}
@@ -310,7 +468,10 @@ fn get_dc_addr_static(dc_idx: i16, config: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
// Unknown DC requested by client without override: log and fall back.
if !config.dc_overrides.contains_key(&dc_key) {
warn!(dc_idx = dc_idx, "Requested non-standard DC with no override; falling back to default cluster");
warn!(
dc_idx = dc_idx,
"Requested non-standard DC with no override; falling back to default cluster"
);
if config.general.unknown_dc_file_log_enabled
&& let Some(path) = &config.general.unknown_dc_log_path
&& let Ok(handle) = tokio::runtime::Handle::try_current()
@@ -319,9 +480,9 @@ fn get_dc_addr_static(dc_idx: i16, config: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
if should_log_unknown_dc(dc_idx) {
handle.spawn_blocking(move || {
if unknown_dc_log_path_is_still_safe(&path)
&& let Ok(mut file) = open_unknown_dc_log_append(&path.resolved_path)
&& let Ok(mut file) = open_unknown_dc_log_append_anchored(&path)
{
let _ = writeln!(file, "dc_idx={dc_idx}");
let _ = append_unknown_dc_line(&mut file, dc_idx);
}
});
}
@@ -351,15 +512,15 @@ fn get_dc_addr_static(dc_idx: i16, config: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
))
}
async fn do_tg_handshake_static(
mut stream: TcpStream,
async fn do_tg_handshake_static<S>(
mut stream: S,
success: &HandshakeSuccess,
config: &ProxyConfig,
rng: &SecureRandom,
) -> Result<(
CryptoReader<tokio::net::tcp::OwnedReadHalf>,
CryptoWriter<tokio::net::tcp::OwnedWriteHalf>,
)> {
) -> Result<(CryptoReader<ReadHalf<S>>, CryptoWriter<WriteHalf<S>>)>
where
S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Unpin,
{
let (nonce, _tg_enc_key, _tg_enc_iv, _tg_dec_key, _tg_dec_iv) = generate_tg_nonce(
success.proto_tag,
success.dc_idx,
@@ -380,7 +541,7 @@ async fn do_tg_handshake_static(
stream.write_all(&encrypted_nonce).await?;
stream.flush().await?;
let (read_half, write_half) = stream.into_split();
let (read_half, write_half) = split(stream);
let max_pending = config.general.crypto_pending_buffer;
Ok((
@@ -390,5 +551,17 @@ async fn do_tg_handshake_static(
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "direct_relay_security_tests.rs"]
#[path = "tests/direct_relay_security_tests.rs"]
mod security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/direct_relay_business_logic_tests.rs"]
mod business_logic_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/direct_relay_common_mistakes_tests.rs"]
mod common_mistakes_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/direct_relay_subtle_adversarial_tests.rs"]
mod subtle_adversarial_tests;
+566 -240
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-231
View File
@@ -1,231 +0,0 @@
use super::*;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use crate::crypto::sha256;
fn make_valid_mtproto_handshake(secret_hex: &str, proto_tag: ProtoTag, dc_idx: i16) -> [u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN] {
let secret = hex::decode(secret_hex).expect("secret hex must decode");
let mut handshake = [0x5Au8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
for (idx, b) in handshake[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN + IV_LEN]
.iter_mut()
.enumerate()
{
*b = (idx as u8).wrapping_add(1);
}
let dec_prekey = &handshake[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN];
let dec_iv_bytes = &handshake[SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
let mut dec_key_input = Vec::with_capacity(PREKEY_LEN + secret.len());
dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(dec_prekey);
dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(&secret);
let dec_key = sha256(&dec_key_input);
let mut dec_iv_arr = [0u8; IV_LEN];
dec_iv_arr.copy_from_slice(dec_iv_bytes);
let dec_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(dec_iv_arr);
let mut stream = AesCtr::new(&dec_key, dec_iv);
let keystream = stream.encrypt(&[0u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN]);
let mut target_plain = [0u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
target_plain[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4].copy_from_slice(&proto_tag.to_bytes());
target_plain[DC_IDX_POS..DC_IDX_POS + 2].copy_from_slice(&dc_idx.to_le_bytes());
for idx in PROTO_TAG_POS..HANDSHAKE_LEN {
handshake[idx] = target_plain[idx] ^ keystream[idx];
}
handshake
}
fn auth_probe_test_guard() -> std::sync::MutexGuard<'static, ()> {
auth_probe_test_lock()
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
}
fn test_config_with_secret_hex(secret_hex: &str) -> ProxyConfig {
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.users.clear();
cfg.access.users.insert("user".to_string(), secret_hex.to_string());
cfg.access.ignore_time_skew = true;
cfg.general.modes.secure = true;
cfg
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mutational Bit-Flipping Tests (OWASP ASVS 5.1.4)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn mtproto_handshake_bit_flip_anywhere_rejected() {
let _guard = auth_probe_test_guard();
clear_auth_probe_state_for_testing();
let secret_hex = "11223344556677889900aabbccddeeff";
let base = make_valid_mtproto_handshake(secret_hex, ProtoTag::Secure, 2);
let config = test_config_with_secret_hex(secret_hex);
let replay_checker = ReplayChecker::new(128, Duration::from_secs(60));
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.1:12345".parse().unwrap();
// Baseline check
let res = handle_mtproto_handshake(&base, tokio::io::empty(), tokio::io::sink(), peer, &config, &replay_checker, false, None).await;
match res {
HandshakeResult::Success(_) => {},
_ => panic!("Baseline failed: expected Success"),
}
// Flip bits in the encrypted part (beyond the key material)
for byte_pos in SKIP_LEN..HANDSHAKE_LEN {
let mut h = base;
h[byte_pos] ^= 0x01; // Flip 1 bit
let res = handle_mtproto_handshake(&h, tokio::io::empty(), tokio::io::sink(), peer, &config, &replay_checker, false, None).await;
assert!(matches!(res, HandshakeResult::BadClient { .. }), "Flip at byte {byte_pos} bit 0 must be rejected");
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Adversarial Probing / Timing Neutrality (OWASP ASVS 5.1.7)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn mtproto_handshake_timing_neutrality_mocked() {
let secret_hex = "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff";
let base = make_valid_mtproto_handshake(secret_hex, ProtoTag::Secure, 1);
let config = test_config_with_secret_hex(secret_hex);
let replay_checker = ReplayChecker::new(128, Duration::from_secs(60));
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.2:54321".parse().unwrap();
const ITER: usize = 50;
let mut start = Instant::now();
for _ in 0..ITER {
let _ = handle_mtproto_handshake(&base, tokio::io::empty(), tokio::io::sink(), peer, &config, &replay_checker, false, None).await;
}
let duration_success = start.elapsed();
start = Instant::now();
for i in 0..ITER {
let mut h = base;
h[SKIP_LEN + (i % 48)] ^= 0xFF;
let _ = handle_mtproto_handshake(&h, tokio::io::empty(), tokio::io::sink(), peer, &config, &replay_checker, false, None).await;
}
let duration_fail = start.elapsed();
let avg_diff_ms = (duration_success.as_millis() as f64 - duration_fail.as_millis() as f64).abs() / ITER as f64;
// Threshold (loose for CI)
assert!(avg_diff_ms < 100.0, "Timing difference too large: {} ms/iter", avg_diff_ms);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Stress Tests (OWASP ASVS 5.1.6)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn auth_probe_throttle_saturation_stress() {
let _guard = auth_probe_test_guard();
clear_auth_probe_state_for_testing();
let now = Instant::now();
// Record enough failures for one IP to trigger backoff
let target_ip = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1));
for _ in 0..AUTH_PROBE_BACKOFF_START_FAILS {
auth_probe_record_failure(target_ip, now);
}
assert!(auth_probe_is_throttled(target_ip, now));
// Stress test with many unique IPs
for i in 0..500u32 {
let ip = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, (i % 256) as u8));
auth_probe_record_failure(ip, now);
}
let tracked = AUTH_PROBE_STATE
.get()
.map(|state| state.len())
.unwrap_or(0);
assert!(
tracked <= AUTH_PROBE_TRACK_MAX_ENTRIES,
"auth probe state grew past hard cap: {tracked} > {AUTH_PROBE_TRACK_MAX_ENTRIES}"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mtproto_handshake_abridged_prefix_rejected() {
let _guard = auth_probe_test_guard();
clear_auth_probe_state_for_testing();
let mut handshake = [0x5Au8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
handshake[0] = 0xef; // Abridged prefix
let config = ProxyConfig::default();
let replay_checker = ReplayChecker::new(128, Duration::from_secs(60));
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.3:12345".parse().unwrap();
let res = handle_mtproto_handshake(&handshake, tokio::io::empty(), tokio::io::sink(), peer, &config, &replay_checker, false, None).await;
// MTProxy stops immediately on 0xef
assert!(matches!(res, HandshakeResult::BadClient { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mtproto_handshake_preferred_user_mismatch_continues() {
let _guard = auth_probe_test_guard();
clear_auth_probe_state_for_testing();
let secret1_hex = "11111111111111111111111111111111";
let secret2_hex = "22222222222222222222222222222222";
let base = make_valid_mtproto_handshake(secret2_hex, ProtoTag::Secure, 1);
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.access.users.insert("user1".to_string(), secret1_hex.to_string());
config.access.users.insert("user2".to_string(), secret2_hex.to_string());
config.access.ignore_time_skew = true;
config.general.modes.secure = true;
let replay_checker = ReplayChecker::new(128, Duration::from_secs(60));
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.4:12345".parse().unwrap();
// Even if we prefer user1, if user2 matches, it should succeed.
let res = handle_mtproto_handshake(&base, tokio::io::empty(), tokio::io::sink(), peer, &config, &replay_checker, false, Some("user1")).await;
if let HandshakeResult::Success((_, _, success)) = res {
assert_eq!(success.user, "user2");
} else {
panic!("Handshake failed even though user2 matched");
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mtproto_handshake_concurrent_flood_stability() {
let _guard = auth_probe_test_guard();
clear_auth_probe_state_for_testing();
let secret_hex = "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff";
let base = make_valid_mtproto_handshake(secret_hex, ProtoTag::Secure, 1);
let mut config = test_config_with_secret_hex(secret_hex);
config.access.ignore_time_skew = true;
let replay_checker = Arc::new(ReplayChecker::new(1024, Duration::from_secs(60)));
let config = Arc::new(config);
let mut tasks = Vec::new();
for i in 0..50 {
let base = base;
let config = Arc::clone(&config);
let replay_checker = Arc::clone(&replay_checker);
let peer: SocketAddr = format!("192.0.2.{}:12345", (i % 254) + 1).parse().unwrap();
tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
let res = handle_mtproto_handshake(&base, tokio::io::empty(), tokio::io::sink(), peer, &config, &replay_checker, false, None).await;
matches!(res, HandshakeResult::Success(_))
}));
}
// We don't necessarily care if they all succeed (some might fail due to replay if they hit the same chunk),
// but the system must not panic or hang.
for task in tasks {
let _ = task.await.unwrap();
}
}
+825 -100
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-213
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@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
use super::*;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::io::duplex;
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::time::{Instant, Duration};
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::stats::beobachten::BeobachtenStore;
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Probing Indistinguishability (OWASP ASVS 5.1.7)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn masking_probes_indistinguishable_timing() {
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.censorship.mask = true;
config.censorship.mask_host = Some("127.0.0.1".to_string());
config.censorship.mask_port = 80; // Should timeout/refuse
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.10:443".parse().unwrap();
let local_addr: SocketAddr = "127.0.0.1:443".parse().unwrap();
let beobachten = BeobachtenStore::new();
// Test different probe types
let probes = vec![
(b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n".to_vec(), "HTTP"),
(b"SSH-2.0-probe".to_vec(), "SSH"),
(vec![0x16, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00], "TLS-scanner"),
(vec![0x42; 5], "port-scanner"),
];
for (probe, type_name) in probes {
let (client_reader, _client_writer) = duplex(256);
let (_client_visible_reader, client_visible_writer) = duplex(256);
let start = Instant::now();
handle_bad_client(
client_reader,
client_visible_writer,
&probe,
peer,
local_addr,
&config,
&beobachten,
).await;
let elapsed = start.elapsed();
// We expect any outcome to take roughly MASK_TIMEOUT (50ms in tests)
// to mask whether the backend was reachable or refused.
assert!(elapsed >= Duration::from_millis(30), "Probe {type_name} finished too fast: {elapsed:?}");
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Masking Budget Stress Tests (OWASP ASVS 5.1.6)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn masking_budget_stress_under_load() {
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.censorship.mask = true;
config.censorship.mask_host = Some("127.0.0.1".to_string());
config.censorship.mask_port = 1; // Unlikely port
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.20:443".parse().unwrap();
let local_addr: SocketAddr = "127.0.0.1:443".parse().unwrap();
let beobachten = Arc::new(BeobachtenStore::new());
let mut tasks = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..50 {
let (client_reader, _client_writer) = duplex(256);
let (_client_visible_reader, client_visible_writer) = duplex(256);
let config = config.clone();
let beobachten = Arc::clone(&beobachten);
tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
let start = Instant::now();
handle_bad_client(
client_reader,
client_visible_writer,
b"probe",
peer,
local_addr,
&config,
&beobachten,
).await;
start.elapsed()
}));
}
for task in tasks {
let elapsed = task.await.unwrap();
assert!(elapsed >= Duration::from_millis(30), "Stress probe finished too fast: {elapsed:?}");
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// detect_client_type Fingerprint Check
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[test]
fn test_detect_client_type_boundary_cases() {
// 9 bytes = port-scanner
assert_eq!(detect_client_type(&[0x42; 9]), "port-scanner");
// 10 bytes = unknown
assert_eq!(detect_client_type(&[0x42; 10]), "unknown");
// HTTP verbs without trailing space
assert_eq!(detect_client_type(b"GET/"), "port-scanner"); // because len < 10
assert_eq!(detect_client_type(b"GET /path"), "HTTP");
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Priority 2: Slowloris and Slow Read Attacks (OWASP ASVS 5.1.5)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn masking_slowloris_client_idle_timeout_rejected() {
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let backend_addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
let initial = b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: front.example\r\n\r\n".to_vec();
let accept_task = tokio::spawn({
let initial = initial.clone();
async move {
let (mut stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
let mut observed = vec![0u8; initial.len()];
stream.read_exact(&mut observed).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(observed, initial);
let mut drip = [0u8; 1];
let drip_read = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(220), stream.read_exact(&mut drip)).await;
assert!(
drip_read.is_err() || drip_read.unwrap().is_err(),
"backend must not receive post-timeout slowloris drip bytes"
);
}
});
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.censorship.mask = true;
config.censorship.mask_host = Some("127.0.0.1".to_string());
config.censorship.mask_port = backend_addr.port();
let beobachten = BeobachtenStore::new();
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.10:12345".parse().unwrap();
let local: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.1:443".parse().unwrap();
let (mut client_writer, client_reader) = duplex(1024);
let (_client_visible_reader, client_visible_writer) = duplex(1024);
let handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
handle_bad_client(
client_reader,
client_visible_writer,
&initial,
peer,
local,
&config,
&beobachten,
)
.await;
});
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(160)).await;
let _ = client_writer.write_all(b"X").await;
handle.await.unwrap();
accept_task.await.unwrap();
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Priority 2: Fallback Server Down / Fingerprinting (OWASP ASVS 5.1.7)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn masking_fallback_down_mimics_timeout() {
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.censorship.mask = true;
config.censorship.mask_host = Some("127.0.0.1".to_string());
config.censorship.mask_port = 1; // Unlikely port
let (server_reader, server_writer) = duplex(1024);
let beobachten = BeobachtenStore::new();
let peer: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.12:12345".parse().unwrap();
let local: SocketAddr = "192.0.2.1:443".parse().unwrap();
let start = Instant::now();
handle_bad_client(server_reader, server_writer, b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n", peer, local, &config, &beobachten).await;
let elapsed = start.elapsed();
// It should wait for MASK_TIMEOUT (50ms in tests) even if connection was refused immediately
assert!(elapsed >= Duration::from_millis(40), "Must respect connect budget even on failure: {:?}", elapsed);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Priority 2: SSRF Prevention (OWASP ASVS 5.1.2)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn masking_ssrf_resolve_internal_ranges_blocked() {
use crate::network::dns_overrides::resolve_socket_addr;
let blocked_ips = ["127.0.0.1", "169.254.169.254", "10.0.0.1", "192.168.1.1", "0.0.0.0"];
for ip in blocked_ips {
assert!(
resolve_socket_addr(ip, 80).is_none(),
"runtime DNS overrides must not resolve unconfigured literal host targets"
);
}
}
+1567 -277
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+74 -1
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,73 @@
//! Proxy Defs
// Apply strict linting to proxy production code while keeping test builds noise-tolerant.
#![cfg_attr(test, allow(warnings))]
#![cfg_attr(not(test), forbid(clippy::undocumented_unsafe_blocks))]
#![cfg_attr(
not(test),
deny(
clippy::unwrap_used,
clippy::expect_used,
clippy::panic,
clippy::todo,
clippy::unimplemented,
clippy::correctness,
clippy::option_if_let_else,
clippy::or_fun_call,
clippy::branches_sharing_code,
clippy::single_option_map,
clippy::useless_let_if_seq,
clippy::redundant_locals,
clippy::cloned_ref_to_slice_refs,
unsafe_code,
clippy::await_holding_lock,
clippy::await_holding_refcell_ref,
clippy::debug_assert_with_mut_call,
clippy::macro_use_imports,
clippy::cast_ptr_alignment,
clippy::cast_lossless,
clippy::ptr_as_ptr,
clippy::large_stack_arrays,
clippy::same_functions_in_if_condition,
trivial_casts,
trivial_numeric_casts,
unused_extern_crates,
unused_import_braces,
rust_2018_idioms
)
)]
#![cfg_attr(
not(test),
allow(
clippy::use_self,
clippy::redundant_closure,
clippy::too_many_arguments,
clippy::doc_markdown,
clippy::missing_const_for_fn,
clippy::unnecessary_operation,
clippy::redundant_pub_crate,
clippy::derive_partial_eq_without_eq,
clippy::type_complexity,
clippy::new_ret_no_self,
clippy::cast_possible_truncation,
clippy::cast_possible_wrap,
clippy::significant_drop_tightening,
clippy::significant_drop_in_scrutinee,
clippy::float_cmp,
clippy::nursery
)
)]
pub mod adaptive_buffers;
pub mod client;
pub mod direct_relay;
pub mod handshake;
pub mod masking;
pub mod middle_relay;
pub mod route_mode;
pub mod relay;
pub mod route_mode;
pub mod session_eviction;
pub mod shared_state;
pub use client::ClientHandler;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
@@ -15,3 +76,15 @@ pub use handshake::*;
pub use masking::*;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
pub use relay::*;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/test_harness_common.rs"]
mod test_harness_common;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/proxy_shared_state_isolation_tests.rs"]
mod proxy_shared_state_isolation_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/proxy_shared_state_parallel_execution_tests.rs"]
mod proxy_shared_state_parallel_execution_tests;
+177 -125
View File
@@ -51,21 +51,18 @@
//! - `poll_write` on client = S→C (to client) → `octets_to`, `msgs_to`
//! - `SharedCounters` (atomics) let the watchdog read stats without locking
use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use crate::stats::{Stats, UserStats};
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
use std::io;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, OnceLock};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
use std::time::Duration;
use dashmap::DashMap;
use tokio::io::{
AsyncRead, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt, ReadBuf, copy_bidirectional_with_sizes,
};
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt, ReadBuf, copy_bidirectional_with_sizes};
use tokio::time::Instant;
use tracing::{debug, trace, warn};
use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
// ============= Constants =============
@@ -73,6 +70,7 @@ use crate::stream::BufferPool;
///
/// iOS keeps Telegram connections alive in background for up to 30 minutes.
/// Closing earlier causes unnecessary reconnects and handshake overhead.
#[allow(dead_code)]
const ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1800);
/// Watchdog check interval — also used for periodic rate logging.
@@ -81,6 +79,11 @@ const ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1800);
/// without measurable overhead from atomic reads.
const WATCHDOG_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
#[inline]
fn watchdog_delta(current: u64, previous: u64) -> u64 {
current.saturating_sub(previous)
}
// ============= CombinedStream =============
/// Combines separate read and write halves into a single bidirectional stream.
@@ -206,10 +209,10 @@ struct StatsIo<S> {
counters: Arc<SharedCounters>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
user: String,
user_stats: Arc<UserStats>,
quota_limit: Option<u64>,
quota_exceeded: Arc<AtomicBool>,
quota_read_wake_scheduled: bool,
quota_write_wake_scheduled: bool,
quota_bytes_since_check: u64,
epoch: Instant,
}
@@ -225,15 +228,16 @@ impl<S> StatsIo<S> {
) -> Self {
// Mark initial activity so the watchdog doesn't fire before data flows
counters.touch(Instant::now(), epoch);
let user_stats = stats.get_or_create_user_stats_handle(&user);
Self {
inner,
counters,
stats,
user,
user_stats,
quota_limit,
quota_exceeded,
quota_read_wake_scheduled: false,
quota_write_wake_scheduled: false,
quota_bytes_since_check: 0,
epoch,
}
}
@@ -262,22 +266,22 @@ fn is_quota_io_error(err: &io::Error) -> bool {
.is_some()
}
static QUOTA_USER_LOCKS: OnceLock<DashMap<String, Arc<Mutex<()>>>> = OnceLock::new();
const QUOTA_NEAR_LIMIT_BYTES: u64 = 64 * 1024;
const QUOTA_LARGE_CHARGE_BYTES: u64 = 16 * 1024;
const QUOTA_ADAPTIVE_INTERVAL_MIN_BYTES: u64 = 4 * 1024;
const QUOTA_ADAPTIVE_INTERVAL_MAX_BYTES: u64 = 64 * 1024;
fn quota_user_lock(user: &str) -> Arc<Mutex<()>> {
let locks = QUOTA_USER_LOCKS.get_or_init(DashMap::new);
if let Some(existing) = locks.get(user) {
return Arc::clone(existing.value());
}
#[inline]
fn quota_adaptive_interval_bytes(remaining_before: u64) -> u64 {
remaining_before.saturating_div(2).clamp(
QUOTA_ADAPTIVE_INTERVAL_MIN_BYTES,
QUOTA_ADAPTIVE_INTERVAL_MAX_BYTES,
)
}
let created = Arc::new(Mutex::new(()));
match locks.entry(user.to_string()) {
dashmap::mapref::entry::Entry::Occupied(entry) => Arc::clone(entry.get()),
dashmap::mapref::entry::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
entry.insert(Arc::clone(&created));
created
}
}
#[inline]
fn should_immediate_quota_check(remaining_before: u64, charge_bytes: u64) -> bool {
remaining_before <= QUOTA_NEAR_LIMIT_BYTES || charge_bytes >= QUOTA_LARGE_CHARGE_BYTES
}
impl<S: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for StatsIo<S> {
@@ -287,61 +291,60 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for StatsIo<S> {
buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>,
) -> Poll<io::Result<()>> {
let this = self.get_mut();
if this.quota_exceeded.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
if this.quota_exceeded.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
let quota_lock = this
.quota_limit
.is_some()
.then(|| quota_user_lock(&this.user));
let _quota_guard = if let Some(lock) = quota_lock.as_ref() {
match lock.try_lock() {
Ok(guard) => {
this.quota_read_wake_scheduled = false;
Some(guard)
}
Err(_) => {
if !this.quota_read_wake_scheduled {
this.quota_read_wake_scheduled = true;
let waker = cx.waker().clone();
tokio::task::spawn(async move {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
waker.wake();
});
}
return Poll::Pending;
}
let mut remaining_before = None;
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit {
let used_before = this.user_stats.quota_used();
let remaining = limit.saturating_sub(used_before);
if remaining == 0 {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
} else {
None
};
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit
&& this.stats.get_user_total_octets(&this.user) >= limit
{
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
remaining_before = Some(remaining);
}
let before = buf.filled().len();
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_read(cx, buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
let n = buf.filled().len() - before;
if n > 0 {
let n_to_charge = n as u64;
// C→S: client sent data
this.counters.c2s_bytes.fetch_add(n as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
this.counters
.c2s_bytes
.fetch_add(n_to_charge, Ordering::Relaxed);
this.counters.c2s_ops.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
this.counters.touch(Instant::now(), this.epoch);
this.stats.add_user_octets_from(&this.user, n as u64);
this.stats.increment_user_msgs_from(&this.user);
this.stats
.add_user_octets_from_handle(this.user_stats.as_ref(), n_to_charge);
this.stats
.increment_user_msgs_from_handle(this.user_stats.as_ref());
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit
&& this.stats.get_user_total_octets(&this.user) >= limit
{
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
if let (Some(limit), Some(remaining)) = (this.quota_limit, remaining_before) {
this.stats
.quota_charge_post_write(this.user_stats.as_ref(), n_to_charge);
if should_immediate_quota_check(remaining, n_to_charge) {
this.quota_bytes_since_check = 0;
if this.user_stats.quota_used() >= limit {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
} else {
this.quota_bytes_since_check =
this.quota_bytes_since_check.saturating_add(n_to_charge);
let interval = quota_adaptive_interval_bytes(remaining);
if this.quota_bytes_since_check >= interval {
this.quota_bytes_since_check = 0;
if this.user_stats.quota_used() >= limit {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
}
}
}
trace!(user = %this.user, bytes = n, "C->S");
@@ -360,71 +363,57 @@ impl<S: AsyncWrite + Unpin> AsyncWrite for StatsIo<S> {
buf: &[u8],
) -> Poll<io::Result<usize>> {
let this = self.get_mut();
if this.quota_exceeded.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
if this.quota_exceeded.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
let quota_lock = this
.quota_limit
.is_some()
.then(|| quota_user_lock(&this.user));
let _quota_guard = if let Some(lock) = quota_lock.as_ref() {
match lock.try_lock() {
Ok(guard) => {
this.quota_write_wake_scheduled = false;
Some(guard)
}
Err(_) => {
if !this.quota_write_wake_scheduled {
this.quota_write_wake_scheduled = true;
let waker = cx.waker().clone();
tokio::task::spawn(async move {
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
waker.wake();
});
}
return Poll::Pending;
}
}
} else {
None
};
let write_buf = if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit {
let used = this.stats.get_user_total_octets(&this.user);
if used >= limit {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
let mut remaining_before = None;
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit {
let used_before = this.user_stats.quota_used();
let remaining = limit.saturating_sub(used_before);
if remaining == 0 {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
remaining_before = Some(remaining);
}
let remaining = (limit - used) as usize;
if buf.len() > remaining {
// Fail closed: do not emit partial S->C payload when remaining
// quota cannot accommodate the pending write request.
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
buf
} else {
buf
};
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_write(cx, write_buf) {
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_write(cx, buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(n)) => {
if n > 0 {
let n_to_charge = n as u64;
// S→C: data written to client
this.counters.s2c_bytes.fetch_add(n as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
this.counters
.s2c_bytes
.fetch_add(n_to_charge, Ordering::Relaxed);
this.counters.s2c_ops.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
this.counters.touch(Instant::now(), this.epoch);
this.stats.add_user_octets_to(&this.user, n as u64);
this.stats.increment_user_msgs_to(&this.user);
this.stats
.add_user_octets_to_handle(this.user_stats.as_ref(), n_to_charge);
this.stats
.increment_user_msgs_to_handle(this.user_stats.as_ref());
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit
&& this.stats.get_user_total_octets(&this.user) >= limit
{
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
if let (Some(limit), Some(remaining)) = (this.quota_limit, remaining_before) {
this.stats
.quota_charge_post_write(this.user_stats.as_ref(), n_to_charge);
if should_immediate_quota_check(remaining, n_to_charge) {
this.quota_bytes_since_check = 0;
if this.user_stats.quota_used() >= limit {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
} else {
this.quota_bytes_since_check =
this.quota_bytes_since_check.saturating_add(n_to_charge);
let interval = quota_adaptive_interval_bytes(remaining);
if this.quota_bytes_since_check >= interval {
this.quota_bytes_since_check = 0;
if this.user_stats.quota_used() >= limit {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
}
}
}
trace!(user = %this.user, bytes = n, "S->C");
@@ -465,6 +454,7 @@ impl<S: AsyncWrite + Unpin> AsyncWrite for StatsIo<S> {
/// - Clean shutdown: both write sides are shut down on exit
/// - Error propagation: quota exits return `ProxyError::DataQuotaExceeded`,
/// other I/O failures are returned as `ProxyError::Io`
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn relay_bidirectional<CR, CW, SR, SW>(
client_reader: CR,
client_writer: CW,
@@ -483,6 +473,42 @@ where
SR: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
SW: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout(
client_reader,
client_writer,
server_reader,
server_writer,
c2s_buf_size,
s2c_buf_size,
user,
stats,
quota_limit,
_buffer_pool,
ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT,
)
.await
}
pub async fn relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout<CR, CW, SR, SW>(
client_reader: CR,
client_writer: CW,
server_reader: SR,
server_writer: SW,
c2s_buf_size: usize,
s2c_buf_size: usize,
user: &str,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
quota_limit: Option<u64>,
_buffer_pool: Arc<BufferPool>,
activity_timeout: Duration,
) -> Result<()>
where
CR: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
CW: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
SR: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
SW: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
let activity_timeout = activity_timeout.max(Duration::from_secs(1));
let epoch = Instant::now();
let counters = Arc::new(SharedCounters::new());
let quota_exceeded = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
@@ -518,13 +544,13 @@ where
let now = Instant::now();
let idle = wd_counters.idle_duration(now, epoch);
if wd_quota_exceeded.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
if wd_quota_exceeded.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
warn!(user = %wd_user, "User data quota reached, closing relay");
return;
}
// ── Activity timeout ────────────────────────────────────
if idle >= ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT {
if idle >= activity_timeout {
let c2s = wd_counters.c2s_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let s2c = wd_counters.s2c_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
warn!(
@@ -540,8 +566,8 @@ where
// ── Periodic rate logging ───────────────────────────────
let c2s = wd_counters.c2s_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let s2c = wd_counters.s2c_bytes.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let c2s_delta = c2s - prev_c2s;
let s2c_delta = s2c - prev_s2c;
let c2s_delta = watchdog_delta(c2s, prev_c2s);
let s2c_delta = watchdog_delta(s2c, prev_s2c);
if c2s_delta > 0 || s2c_delta > 0 {
let secs = WATCHDOG_INTERVAL.as_secs_f64();
@@ -657,7 +683,33 @@ where
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "relay_security_tests.rs"]
mod security_tests;
#[path = "relay_adversarial_tests.rs"]
mod adversarial_tests;
#[path = "tests/relay_adversarial_tests.rs"]
mod adversarial_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/relay_quota_boundary_blackhat_tests.rs"]
mod relay_quota_boundary_blackhat_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/relay_quota_model_adversarial_tests.rs"]
mod relay_quota_model_adversarial_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/relay_quota_overflow_regression_tests.rs"]
mod relay_quota_overflow_regression_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/relay_quota_extended_attack_surface_security_tests.rs"]
mod relay_quota_extended_attack_surface_security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/relay_watchdog_delta_security_tests.rs"]
mod relay_watchdog_delta_security_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/relay_atomic_quota_invariant_tests.rs"]
mod relay_atomic_quota_invariant_tests;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/relay_baseline_invariant_tests.rs"]
mod relay_baseline_invariant_tests;
-122
View File
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
use super::*;
use crate::error::ProxyError;
use crate::stats::Stats;
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::io::{duplex, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::time::{Duration, Instant, timeout};
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Priority 3: Async Relay HOL Blocking Prevention (OWASP ASVS 5.1.5)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn relay_hol_blocking_prevention_regression() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let user = "hol-user";
let (client_peer, relay_client) = duplex(65536);
let (relay_server, server_peer) = duplex(65536);
let (client_reader, client_writer) = tokio::io::split(relay_client);
let (server_reader, server_writer) = tokio::io::split(relay_server);
let (mut cp_reader, mut cp_writer) = tokio::io::split(client_peer);
let (mut sp_reader, mut sp_writer) = tokio::io::split(server_peer);
let relay_task = tokio::spawn(relay_bidirectional(
client_reader,
client_writer,
server_reader,
server_writer,
8192,
8192,
user,
Arc::clone(&stats),
None,
Arc::new(BufferPool::new()),
));
let payload_size = 1024 * 10;
let s2c_payload = vec![0x41; payload_size];
let c2s_payload = vec![0x42; payload_size];
let s2c_handle = tokio::spawn(async move {
sp_writer.write_all(&s2c_payload).await.unwrap();
let mut total_read = 0;
let mut buf = [0u8; 10];
while total_read < payload_size {
let n = cp_reader.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap();
total_read += n;
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
}
});
let start = Instant::now();
cp_writer.write_all(&c2s_payload).await.unwrap();
let mut server_buf = vec![0u8; payload_size];
sp_reader.read_exact(&mut server_buf).await.unwrap();
let elapsed = start.elapsed();
assert!(elapsed < Duration::from_millis(1000), "C->S must not be blocked by slow S->C (HOL blocking): {:?}", elapsed);
assert_eq!(server_buf, c2s_payload);
s2c_handle.abort();
relay_task.abort();
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
// Priority 3: Data Quota Mid-Session Cutoff (OWASP ASVS 5.1.6)
// ------------------------------------------------------------------
#[tokio::test]
async fn relay_quota_mid_session_cutoff() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let user = "quota-mid-user";
let quota = 5000;
let (client_peer, relay_client) = duplex(8192);
let (relay_server, server_peer) = duplex(8192);
let (client_reader, client_writer) = tokio::io::split(relay_client);
let (server_reader, server_writer) = tokio::io::split(relay_server);
let (mut _cp_reader, mut cp_writer) = tokio::io::split(client_peer);
let (mut sp_reader, _sp_writer) = tokio::io::split(server_peer);
let relay_task = tokio::spawn(relay_bidirectional(
client_reader,
client_writer,
server_reader,
server_writer,
1024,
1024,
user,
Arc::clone(&stats),
Some(quota),
Arc::new(BufferPool::new()),
));
// Send 4000 bytes (Ok)
let buf1 = vec![0x42; 4000];
cp_writer.write_all(&buf1).await.unwrap();
let mut server_recv = vec![0u8; 4000];
sp_reader.read_exact(&mut server_recv).await.unwrap();
// Send another 2000 bytes (Total 6000 > 5000)
let buf2 = vec![0x42; 2000];
let _ = cp_writer.write_all(&buf2).await;
let relay_res = timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), relay_task).await.unwrap();
match relay_res {
Ok(Err(ProxyError::DataQuotaExceeded { .. })) => {
// Expected
}
other => panic!("Expected DataQuotaExceeded error, got: {:?}", other),
}
let mut small_buf = [0u8; 1];
let n = sp_reader.read(&mut small_buf).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(n, 0, "Server must see EOF after quota reached");
}
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