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Author SHA1 Message Date
Feng Ruohang 2c06b28dbb deps: pin SILO Console 2.7.0
Pin the Console module to the v2.7.0 tag commit (4e91ae506e70), published
on 2026-11-09. It adds ten UI languages with Arabic right-to-left layout,
fixes usage-worker TLS, scheduling and shutdown, serves folder sizes over
plain HTTP, and fixes the container CA bundle and /tmp handling.

Console 2.7.0 requires silo-pkg v3.16.0 and builds with the mcli
RELEASE.2026-11-09T00-00-00Z source (pgsty/mc e1d4cc5abfe0). Go ignores
replacements declared by dependencies, so copy Console's single mc
replacement here and raise the silo-pkg requirement to match. silo-pkg
v3.16.0 changes only a policy comment and dependency floors.

Minimal version selection also raises klauspost/cpuid/v2 to v2.4.2,
go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 to v3.0.6, go-jose/v4 to v4.1.9, go-openapi/runtime to
v0.33.4 and tidwall/gjson to v1.20.1. minio-go stays at 320af050c445.
CREDITS is unchanged after regeneration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-09 20:49:43 +08:00
Feng Ruohang af3064f2b5 test(pools): cover initiate locking and completion conditions
Exercise concurrent overwrite and delete while initiation persists metadata, and completion after intervening object mutations. Check that failed conditions preserve uploaded parts for retry. Include conditional multipart regressions in the CI race set and record the multipart fix from Denis Babchuk in the contributor history.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-09 13:37:18 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9d2be5daaa chore(batch): keep the policy snapshot out of msgp generation
batchPolicySnapshot holds the IAM store, a context and a mutex. Without
an ignore directive, go generate emitted msgp encoders for it that do not
compile, so make check-gen (and the check-gen step of CI) failed on the
generated batch-authz files. The committed generated files are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit a6571a53e9)
2026-11-09 13:37:18 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1f3377862b Merge pull request #292 from botdeniska/fix/initiate-precondition-pools
Evaluate conditional multipart initiation against the logical current object across pools while retaining pool routing and holding the object lock through upload placement.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-09 13:34:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 16738c2301 build(docker): ship mcli's legal files and keep base digests current
Copy LICENSE, NOTICE and CREDITS from the same verified mcli archive as
the bundled binary into /licenses/mcli; the server's CREDITS covers only
the server's own dependencies.

Correct the mcli archive pins to the RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
checksums. The release workflow overrides them from the attested
checksum file, but a plain local build failed with "Published checksum
drift".

Add a Dependabot docker update so the digest-pinned bases in
Dockerfile.goreleaser and Dockerfile.distroless keep receiving fixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-09 09:38:37 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 53a8f7583f fix(docker): make the distroless image trust the same roots as the classic image
The distroless variant inherited Debian's CA bundle, which still contains
the two roots (Comodo AAA Services root, emSign ECC Root CA - G3) that the
classic image blocklists per RHSB-2026-012. Build the same UBI bundle in a
throwaway stage and replace the only file under /etc/ssl/certs with it.

Pin the busybox and distroless bases by digest like Dockerfile.goreleaser,
and gate the shipped file in test-release: the bundle must parse and must
not contain either blocklisted subject.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-09 09:38:37 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 657fc5e827 chore(security): add OSS Scanner configuration
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-08 00:18:25 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 6a7beb8a41 chore(batch): satisfy the staticcheck selector check in the policy snapshot
The cache read lock is reached through the embedded IAMStorageAPI, so the
explicit selector is redundant for staticcheck (QF1008). Drop it and say
in a comment that rlock and runlock are the cache's locks, unlike
IAMStoreSys.lock, which also takes writeMu. No behavior change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 17:08:13 +08:00
Feng Ruohang bd39bab339 test(ilm): cover the history majority, approval check and tier ownership gates
Three safeguards of the lifecycle and tier cleanup paths had no test
that failed when they were removed:

- authoritativeHistory accepts a revision only on more than half of the
  drives. TestPoolsLifecycleHalfDriveMarker holds a delete marker on
  exactly half of sixteen drives, which is the read quorum of a marker,
  and checks that the history is refused, that the expiry of the
  version under it and of the key are refused and every drive keeps what
  it has, and that one more drive decides. With the guard removed the
  strict merge at the same majority still refuses the history; with the
  merge relaxed as well the test fails, so it pins the refusal, not one
  of its two layers.
- deleteAllApproved refuses a purge whose placement read differs from
  the versions it approved. deleteAllBeforePlacement is a test-only
  injection point between the two reads, nil in production.
  TestPurgeAllVersionsRefusesChangedApproval writes a new version and
  rewrites the latest one there, as a writer that bypasses the object
  lock would, and checks the write quorum refusal, the
  history_unavailable count, that nothing is deleted and that the next
  purge removes the key. With the check disabled the purge deletes the
  versions it never approved.
- readTierHistory refuses the ownership of a remote object while a
  drive of any pool cannot be read, and xlMetaV2.DeleteVersion deletes
  a free record only with the remote tuple it names.
  TestTierOwnershipReadFailsClosed fails one drive of the pool that
  holds nothing of the key as offline, not found, faulty and
  unformatted, and checks that the expiry worker's and the
  decommission's cleanup are refused with a read quorum error and
  succeed once the drive reads again.
  TestFreeRecordDeleteNeedsMatchingTuple deletes a free record with
  another tier, remote object and remote version, in memory and on an
  xlStorage drive, and checks the record stays until the tuple matches.
  With either check removed the remote object or the record is deleted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 17:04:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 04d7d91973 fix(ilm): count and trace a read-time expiry the all-pools recheck skips
GET and HEAD recheck a local expiry decision against the versions of
the object in all pools before they hide the version or queue its
expiry. When that recheck failed, because the history of another pool
could not be read, or found that the rule no longer applies with the
versions in all pools, the read was served and nothing was queued,
without a trace or a count. During a degraded pool a version that is
due kept reading and never reached the expiry workers, and the operator
could learn of it only from the scanner's own counts.

recheckReadExpiry now reports such a read as the scanner reports an
expiry it did not complete: it counts expiry_incomplete_total by the
reason ilmExpiryNotDone gives the error, history_unavailable for a read
quorum failure, not_applicable when the version is no longer due, and
publishes an ILM trace with result=skipped and that reason. The reasons
are the existing label values; the response, the version read and the
decision not to queue are unchanged.

TestPoolsLifecycleReadHTTP now asserts the counter delta and the trace
of every case the recheck skips; before this change it counted nothing
for the unreadable-pool and the not-applicable cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 17:04:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7a13780d81 fix(ilm): queue version heals when an undecodable history refuses a purge
A purge of all versions reads the history of the key in every pool
before it checks the drives. When half of the drives of a set could not
be read or decoded, objectVersions refused the history with a read
quorum error and the purge failed with InsufficientWriteQuorum before
deleteAllDrives, which alone queued a heal of each version when a drive
did not decode. With parity of half the drives, a key whose metadata
did not decode on exactly half of them still read and healed, but no
purge queued that heal: the refusal repeated until a scanner or drive
heal happened to repair the drives.

objectVersions now refuses such a history with undecodableHistory,
which wraps the read quorum error and carries the IDs of the versions
the decodable drives hold, the null version by its explicit ID. The
purge queues a heal of each of them before it fails, from the history
of the rule check as from the placement read, and still returns
InsufficientWriteQuorum. The threshold of unknown drives, the refusal
and every other caller of the history are unchanged; expiryApplies
matches the read quorum error through the wrapper.

TestPurgeAllVersionsHealsUndecodableHistory corrupts the metadata CRC
on four of eight drives; before this change the purge refused the key
without queuing any heal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 17:04:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b8ebaffd2e fix(restore): name the server that keeps native restore unavailable
The native restore gate refused a POST restore and a queued restore
with one message, "unavailable during a rolling upgrade: not every
server of the cluster supports it yet", whether a server answered
another protocol or was simply not connected. A cluster with one server
down thus reported a rolling upgrade, and the operator looked for an
older binary instead of the server.

The gate now returns an error that wraps errNativeRestoreUnavailable
and says why: errNativeRestorePeerUnreachable names the server that is
not connected ("server host:port is not reachable, so it cannot be
shown to have stopped an older restore"), errNativeRestoreUnsupported
keeps the rolling-upgrade text for a server that reports another
protocol or reconnected while it was asked, and a check that its
deadline ended carries that error. The POST handler maps the error to
503 ServiceUnavailable with the message as before, the worker still
clears its marker and stops, and errors.Is(err,
errNativeRestoreUnavailable) holds for every refusal. The gate remains
closed in every case it was closed before.

TestNativeRestoreRefusalReasons posts a restore with a fake server that
is not connected and one that answers protocol 1; before this change
the first answered 503 with the rolling-upgrade text and without "not
reachable".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 17:04:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5cb91e7d74 fix(decom): move a tiered version whose restored-copy removal is refused
A decommission walk removes a restored copy that is past its restore
deadline before it moves the version, as the scanner would. Since
0a546c7a7 a refused removal made filterLifecycle return the
DeleteRestored action: the walk counted the version as decommissioned
without moving it and without queuing an expiry, removeMovedVersions
then found a source copy with no retained copy and failed the key with
PreConditionFailed, the moved versions of the key stayed duplicated in
both pools, the bucket stayed queued and the decommission ended Failed;
the retry after a restart failed the same way while the refusal held.

The walk now moves the version like any other when the removal is
refused, as the release before 0a546c7a7 did: a copy past its deadline
reads as remote, so the version moves with its tier metadata and its
restore deadline through DecomTieredObject, the remote object stays,
the source copy retires with the key once the destination holds it, and
the scanner of the destination pool removes the restored copy by that
deadline. The rebalance walk never reaches this action for such a
version, which it skips as remote; its filterLifecycle now names the
same decision so neither walk counts a restored-copy expiry as a
deletion it performed.

TestDecommissionMovesRestoredCopyPastDeadline refuses the removal on
every drive of the set; before this change it failed with complete=false
failed=true, pool 0 holding the version and pool 1 nothing.
TestRebalanceLeavesRestoredCopyPastDeadline is the control for the
rebalance walk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 17:04:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 07b89b98fa fix(batch): count a key with a transitioned version as refused by the purge
A batch expiration that keeps no versions purges each key as a whole,
and the purge refuses a key when one of its versions is transitioned to
a remote tier, as it refuses a key with a version Object Lock protects.
The job counted the Object Lock refusal as a refused key and completed,
but counted the tier refusal as failed versions and ended Failed, on
every run, with objectsFailed set to the versions the walk saw. ILM
expiry reports the same tier refusal as refused, not failed.

expireAllVersions now counts a key refused for a transitioned version as
refused, as it does a locked key: nothing was removed, the attempt is
not retried, and the job completes with keysRefused, which mcli reports.
A later run of the job checks the key again. A key whose history cannot
be read still fails the purge as before.

TestBatchExpirePurgeRefusesTieredKey runs a purge of a key with a
transitioned older version and requires a complete job with one refused
key and every version kept; TestPurgeAllVersionsRefusesTieredKeys now
requires refused keys rather than failed objects. Before this change
the job ended Failed with two failed objects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 16:21:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 378f281bef fix(batch): leave no record for a canceled job nobody owns after discovery
Canceling a job ID this node does not own recorded a canceled owner so
that startup discovery, which may still admit the manifest of that ID,
would not run a job that was canceled before the node had loaded it.
The record was kept for any ID, at any time, and never removed: a caller
with admin:CancelBatchJob could grow the ownership table by one entry per
cancellation of an unknown ID, and the retry scheduler walks that table
every second.

Once discovery has finished, nothing admits a job this node does not own:
new submissions use new IDs, so the record has nothing left to fence.
canceler now records a canceled owner for an unknown ID only while
discovery is still running. Canceling an owned job, and the fencing of a
cancellation during discovery, are unchanged, and the cancel handler
still removes the manifest.

TestBatchCancelUnknownJobAfterDiscovery cancels an unknown ID during
discovery and requires its admission to be refused, then cancels a
thousand unknown IDs after discovery and requires the ownership table
not to grow. Before this change it held a thousand records.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 16:21:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5fb983d3d2 fix(batch): skip deleted policies a mapping still names
Deleting a policy checks that no user or group mapping names it, but not
the STS mappings of OpenID parent users and LDAP user DNs. After such a
deletion the request path (MergePolicies) skips the confirmed-absent
policy and decides on the remaining mapped policies, while batch
authorization treated the absent document as a denial of the whole
action: jobs of such a submitter ended refused, although the same
principal's requests were allowed.

batchLocalPolicies now skips a policy document whose load reports that it
does not exist, as MergePolicies does, and still decides on the remaining
policies. Any other failure to read a document, and a load that returns
no document, still ends the attempt as unavailable, since it could hide a
Deny. With every mapped policy absent nothing allows the action, so the
job is refused as before.

TestBatchAuthorizeSkipsDeletedMappedPolicy maps an STS parent user to two
policies, deletes one, and requires the batch decision to agree with the
request decision, allowed with the other policy and denied once both are
deleted. Before this change the batch decision was a refusal while the
request was allowed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 16:21:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9f9398a1a3 fix(batch): keep cached authorization available during batch policy loads
Batch authorization evaluates the submitter's mapped policies from one IAM
cache revision. It took the cache write lock for the whole evaluation and
performed the lazy loads it needed under that lock: the mapping of a user
whose policies come from a group is never cached, so every authorization
of such a submitter (and of an LDAP or STS parent user) read storage twice
with the write lock held, and an evicted policy document was read under
it too. While a read lasted, every reader of the cache waited: request
authentication (GetUser, CheckKey) and PolicyDBGet on the whole node. An
expire job authorizes each version several times, so a large job with a
group-mapped submitter serialized node authentication behind IAM storage
latency, and a mapping load had no deadline at all.

batchPolicySnapshot now holds the store's writer mutex and the cache read
lock, and releases the read lock around each storage read, as
MergePolicies releases the cache lock around a document load. The writer
mutex still excludes cache writers, so the mapping and the documents of
one evaluation still come from one revision; the read lock is enough
because the batch path writes nothing to the cache except lazily loaded
mappings, which the request path stores under the read lock as well, and
taking the write lock back after each read would have made readers queue
behind it. Each read is bounded by the job's context and the same 5s
MergePolicies grants a document load. Concurrent reads of the group
fallback release the lock once and take it back after the last.

policyDBGet and policyDBGetGroups take the loads they need through the
iamMappingLoader interface, which *IAMStoreSys satisfies unchanged.
Unreadable policies still end the attempt as unavailable, and the error
classification is unchanged.

TestBatchAuthorizeSlowLoadKeepsCachedAuthorizationAvailable holds the
lazy load of a group-mapped user's mapping, and of an evicted document,
and requires that GetUser and IsAllowed of a cached user return within a
second and that a load ends with the job's context. Before this change
both cases timed out on the blocked cache.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 16:21:14 +08:00
Denis Babchuk 1516273162 fix(pools): evaluate cross-pool NewMultipartUpload conditions against the current object
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-07 11:16:38 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 210fd568cc test(pools): cover conditional NewMultipartUpload across pools
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-07 11:15:56 +03:00
Feng Ruohang f3e84d54a9 ci: run the logger target lifecycle test under the race detector and document the dev tag
TestDynamicWebhookOutlivesConfigContext (0fa4a8c50) exercises the
goroutine lifecycle of webhook, audit and Kafka targets across a peer
config reload. It ran in CI only in the plain test-cmd job, outside
every race group. Add a race step for it next to the other lifecycle
groups; it takes about 35s locally under -race.

The dev build tag in make test, make install-race and several race
steps selects nothing: no file in this repository or its dependencies
carries a dev build constraint, and kqueue only changes the notify
backend on BSD and macOS. Say so in the Makefile and the workflow
instead of removing the tag, so that the documented command lines keep
working. No other job changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 16:13:45 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 479a49b28b fix(storage): retry metadata writes against a late RenameData cleanup
A RenameData that fails after its caller gave up removes its empty
object directory and the empty parents (ed05d982a, 73025824a). Only
the two renames of RenameData itself survived that cleanup, through
renameDataAll. Any other write of the same key that creates the object
directory failed on the drive when the cleanup removed the directory
between the directory creation and the open: WriteMetadata for a
delete marker on an absent key or for a first version, through
openFile, returned the raw open error, and writeAllDirect returned
errFileNotFound. The version was then missing on that drive, and
DeleteObject queues only offline drives for MRF. Before ed05d982a the
failure path never removed the directory, so this window is new.

Move the retry policy of renameDataAll into the shared helpers. A write
below the volume directory retries once per path level when the
directory creation or the use of the directory reports "not found"
(retriesAgainstCleanup): a cleanup removes each directory at most once
and each failed attempt needs one such removal. reliableRename applies
it in place of its blind single rename retry, which never recreated the
directory, and only while the source still exists, so renameDataAll is
replaced by renameAll. openFileAll applies it to the directory creation
and open shared by openFile and writeAllDirect. mkdirAllErr is split
out of mkdirAll, like renameAllErr, so that the retry decision uses the
OS error: on unix, mkdirAll maps a vanished parent to
errFileAccessDenied through isSysErrPathNotFound.

Invariants kept: the cleanup still removes only empty directories and
never a committed xl.meta or data directory; the error mapping of
mkdirAll, renameAll, openFile and writeAllDirect is unchanged, including
the Windows isSysErrPathNotFound branch; retries are bounded by the
path depth; a rename whose source is gone still fails at once.
UpdateMetadata renames over an existing xl.meta, so its directory is
never empty and the cleanup cannot remove it; it needs no change.

TestXLStorageMetadataWriteSurvivesLateCleanup injects, right after the
writer's os.Mkdir of the object directory, either a late RenameData
whose staged data is gone or a cleanup that walks up the whole path one
directory per step, for a delete marker, a first version and a large
xl.meta. Before the fix all six cases failed with "no such file or
directory" or "file not found".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 16:13:45 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 8cc2360c3a fix(batch): release terminal markers after startup discovery
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 02:49:44 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 41b71a8bc1 fix(batch): recover incomplete startup discovery without rerunning jobs
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 02:35:15 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 00270e9f61 fix(iam): keep cached authorization available during lazy loads
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 02:05:58 +08:00
Feng Ruohang c78ef6a6f6 fix(iam): reject incomplete policy loads throughout authorization
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 01:53:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e9da6f91f4 chore: refresh retired internal restore header inventory
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 01:16:46 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 6434d768de chore: satisfy review-fix formatting and unused-code checks
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 01:12:40 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b524fc4fb7 fix(ilm): queue explicit version heals after corrupt history refusal
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 01:10:01 +08:00
Feng Ruohang bdd17b0f47 fix(batch): pause transient authorization failures with owned retries
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 00:42:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ade15ea5d0 fix(tier): retain remote ownership through cleanup and migration
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 00:32:16 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 98fd7004e8 fix(heal): classify xl.meta checksum failures as storage corruption
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-07 00:23:45 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 96b3a19d0a fix(decom): preserve cancellation during finalization
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 23:20:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang db0c0ffedd test(ilm): check the purge's history error end to end
The implementation review of the delete-all reporting found that no
committed test checked the error a purge returns on a drive whose
metadata does not decode: restoring the old read quorum error passed.
TestPurgeAllVersionsRefusesCorruptDrive now sends the purge through
DeleteObject and checks errDeleteAllHistoryUnavailable and its
SlowDownWrite mapping; with the old error it fails.

The HELP text of expiry_incomplete_total now says that the
tier_unsupported_skipped reason counts the scanner's per-drive
observations, not expiry attempts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 20:28:55 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7af07298ce fix(ilm): trace refused expiries with their error; harden the tests
The implementation review of this round's public fixes found one gap in
the code and four in the tests.

- A refused expiry was traced with its reason but without its error,
  so the trace did not say what refused it. It now carries the error, as
  a failed one does.
- The restore MRF test replaced the live MRF channel, which the heal
  routines of the test servers read: a race, and a consumer could take
  the entry under test. addPartialOp now offers an atomic hook that
  receives the operation in place of the queue. Production never sets
  it.
- Two fixtures restored the storage class with Update, which marks an
  uninitialized configuration initialized and so changes the default
  parity (-1) into an explicit 0 for later tests.
  setTestStandardParity restores the whole saved value under
  storageclass.ConfigLock.
- The v3 metric test built its own descriptor map, so dropping the
  counter from the registered ILM collector still passed. It gathers
  through the collector the handler registers.
- The audit test read one extra entry or waited 500 ms. It drains every
  entry of the bucket up to the removal audited last, and checks one
  failure audit, one removal audit and no refusal audit per object.

Each corrected test fails with the corresponding mutation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 20:23:32 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b10fd0e9c0 fix(ilm): report refused purges of all versions, and account their keys
An expiry of all versions of a key purges exactly that key, and the
purge can refuse it or stop early. Those outcomes were hard to see, and
the scanner reported a key it had queued as if it were already gone.

- Refusals and failures of a purge are counted in
  expiry_incomplete_total with their own reasons: tier_unsupported (a
  version is in a remote tier), budget (stopped after progress; the next
  expiry continues), changed (the latest version a batch matched
  changed) and history_unavailable. They are traced with the reason and
  send no removal event. A partial purge keeps its audit record, now
  with the reason. A tier refusal is also logged, once per key and hour,
  in words.
- A drive that cannot be read or decoded during the purge's own drive
  check now returns errDeleteAllHistoryUnavailable, which names the
  cause and stays a write quorum error (503) for API callers.
- The scanner does not queue an expiry of all versions whose latest
  version is hot when the pool holds a version in a remote tier: the
  purge would refuse it each cycle. It counts each such observation as
  tier_unsupported_skipped, once per drive scanner and cycle. A tiered
  version only another pool holds is unknown here, so the purge still
  decides; a transitioned latest version keeps the transitioned expiry.
  The tier predicate is shared with the purge's own check, for FileInfo
  and ObjectInfo, and excludes free versions.
- The scanner accounts every version of a key under an expiry of all
  versions at its size, queued or not, instead of as already removed.
  Usage, and so hard quota, drops after a fresh scan of the subtree once
  the purge succeeded. The alerts on many or large versions count the
  versions of a key that is not queued.
- A lifecycle expiry never deletes a prefix: DeleteObject refuses
  DeletePrefix with Expiration.Expire as InvalidArgument. No caller
  sends it since expiries of all versions became purges; a force delete
  of a prefix is unchanged.

Not done from the plan: queuing an MRF heal per version when a drive's
xl.meta fails to decode. Object heal does not rewrite metadata that
fails its CRC check (it reports the drive as unknown and skips it), so
those heals would not repair the drive. Such a key stays refused until
its metadata on that drive is repaired.

Tests: TestPurgeAllVersionsRefusalReasons,
TestPurgeAllVersionsRefusesCorruptDrive,
TestScannerSkipsDeleteAllForTieredKey and
TestPoolsDeleteObjectRejectsExpirePrefix are new. Tests that expected
the scanner to queue a refused purge, the predictive accounting, or
the old prefix options are converted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:59:42 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 852e2a6707 fix(decom): move the other buckets when one cannot be finished
A decommission stopped at the first bucket it could not finish. A free
version whose tier is no longer configured is enough: its remote object
cannot be removed, so the free version stays, the bucket's check for
versions left behind fails, and every bucket after it stayed in the pool.

decommissionInBackground now keeps the first error, continues with the
next bucket, and returns that error after the last one. A canceled
context still returns at once. A bucket is retired from the resumable
queue only when it is empty, as before, so the decommission still fails
and a retry resumes with the buckets that are left.

removeFreeVersions now names the free version, its remote object and the
tier when the tier is not configured, and says to configure the tier
again under the same name. The free version is the only record of its
remote object, so it is kept; nothing is dropped on inference. Until the
tier is configured again, such a free version blocks the decommission
of its pool.

Tests: TestPoolsDecommissionContinuesPastStuckBucket and
TestRemoveFreeVersionsMissingTierError fail on the base.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:45:07 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 04c657d03f test(pools): cover aliases of other sets in a shared lock table
The implementation review of the lock fixes found two gaps in the merge
test of lockObjects:

- Where the sets share one local table, it only tried an alias of the
  clean name's own set, so dropping the shared-table normalization of
  the lock domain still passed. It now tries an alias of another set in
  every mode; with that mutation the shared case times out.
- In a split distributed domain it probed readers before writers. The
  reader probe releases asynchronously and could hold off the writer
  probe right after it, so a missing alias read lock passed some runs.
  Writers are probed first now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:41:32 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3268fbea7e fix(restore): queue the heal of a partial commit under the normalized ID
A native restore commit that reaches a write quorum but not every drive
queues an MRF heal of the version. It passed the raw version ID, which is
empty for the null version, while the convergence path passes the
normalized "null". The heal boundary already reads an empty ID as the
null version, so the old entry healed the right version; this makes the
two paths queue the same identity.

The header of restore-capability.go still described the multipart upload
of the first native-restore design. It now describes what the capability
gate protects in the two-phase design: restore ownership through the
restore lock and the attempt marker, the staged commit under the object
lock, and the attempt fence. It also says why an unreachable server
blocks native restore: it is not proven stopped.

Test: TestRestorePartialCommitQueuesNullVersionHeal fails one drive's
commit on a noncurrent null version, checks the queued entry names
"null", and heals it back onto that drive. It fails on the base at the
identity check only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:40:24 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 94d91703b5 fix(ilm): report expiries that remove nothing, and name what one removed
An ILM expiry that is refused, because the rule no longer applies when
it is checked again under the object lock or Object Lock protects the
version, or that fails, for example for lack of quorum, left almost no
trace. The bulk noncurrent purge skipped such entries without audit,
trace, log or count; the scanner traced a refusal exactly like a
successful expiry; and nothing counted either. Operators could not see
why a version they expected gone was still there.

- Count every such expiry by reason in expiry_incomplete_total
  {reason="not_applicable"|"locked"|"history_unavailable"|"error"}, in
  metrics v2 and v3; the counting unit is one expiry attempt, and no
  bucket or object is a label.
- Trace it with result=refused or result=failed and the reason. A
  failure is also audited and logged once per object; a refusal changes
  nothing and is not audited, since a split key is refused on every scan.
- Never announce it: no ObjectRemoved notification for a version that is
  still there.
- Name a completed expiry by what its delete did. An expiry that
  addressed no version and whose result is a delete marker created that
  marker, also with the null version ID of the version it replaced; any
  other removed the version it addressed, also a delete marker. The
  scanner and the transitioned expiry took the identity from the queued
  object instead: the expiry of a latest transitioned version in a
  versioned bucket announced the removal of the version it kept, and the
  removal of an expired delete marker was announced as a marker created.

Tests: classification of each error; a bulk purge with a refused, a
failed and a removed entry counts and traces the first two, audits only
the failure and announces only the removal; the expiry events name the
created marker for a latest version (versioned, suspended null,
transitioned) and the removed version for a noncurrent version and an
expired delete marker; both metrics versions export the counter by
reason. The #278 side-effect tests now tell removal traces from
refusal and failure traces.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:29:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1eee720f74 test(heal): set the parity the drive heal tests rebuild from
Earlier tests can leave a storage class of parity 0 behind (newTestConfig
on a single drive), and a version written without parity cannot be
rebuilt on the drive the tests heal. Set the parity of the test pools'
sets for the duration of each drive heal test, as other tests that
depend on parity do.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:29:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1780eb8ffc test(pools): make the copy and bulk lock tests race-free and stricter
The implementation review of the lock fixes found test flaws, which are
corrected here; the production behavior is unchanged.

- The alias and merge tests replaced globalOperationTimeout while
  background healing reads it, a data race under -race. They now bound
  each request with its own context instead.
- The alias test now holds the cleaned name's write lock while the copy
  runs, so it proves the names are checked before anything is locked;
  it checks both objects before any later write, and covers a/./x as a
  destination.
- The merge test picks aliases that hash to the clean name's set and,
  where sets have their own lockers, ones that do not, and requires the
  alias's own table to hold a read lock: readers admitted, writers
  excluded.
- Release polling creates a fresh lock instance for every probe.
- The getNSLocks event hook and the bulk delete group limit are atomic,
  so tests can set them while other goroutines read them.

Without the name check and the resource merge, both tests now fail in
every lock layout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:25:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b32a389e9d perf(pools): read a key's history once in a migration walk's prechecks
A decommission or rebalance walk prechecks each due version of a key
with the versions of the key in all pools, to decide whether the version
moves or is left to its ILM expiry. Each precheck read and merged the
key's whole history from every pool, so a key with V due versions read
it V times in the walk alone; with long histories this grew roughly
quadratically.

Read the history once per key into a cache that the walk keeps for the
entry, and evaluate every version's precheck against it. The precheck
only chooses between moving a version and leaving it to the expiry; the
expiry reads the history again under the object lock before it deletes
anything, so a stale cache can only move a version or defer it to a
recheck. A read error is kept, so every due version of that key moves.
The expiry's own per-version reads are unchanged.

Test: decommission and rebalance of a key with 63 due noncurrent
versions read its history once, with the same outcome; without the
cache they read it 63 times.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 19:09:54 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2a66ab65d7 fix(batch): do not run a completed expire job again
BatchJobExpire.Start checked the job's submitter before it looked at
the job's report, and refuse() clears Complete. A job that had completed
was therefore turned into a failed one on the next start: one that
completed before the upgrade records no submitter, and one completed
with a temporary credential that has expired since, a deleted user or a
changed password fails the binding. Such a job asked to be submitted
again, inviting an operator to run a destructive expiration twice.

Return before the submitter check when the report says the job is
complete, as replication and key rotation jobs already do.

Tests: a completed job without a submitter, and a completed job whose
temporary credential expired, keep their completed state and delete
nothing when started again; a job that did not complete is still
refused once its credential expired. The first two fail without the
change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 18:55:00 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0c6aaca6e2 fix(pools): an approved ILM version expiry deletes every copy
A version can have copies in two pools, for example after an interrupted
decommission or rebalance. DeleteObject left ILM expiries out of the
reconciled delete of an addressed version, so a lifecycle version expiry
deleted only the copy that latest-key routing chose. The other copy stayed
readable; for a tiered version, expireTransitionedObject then deleted the
remote object that copy still referenced; and a migration of the pool
holding it left the expired version behind and failed its completion
check. With delete replication on, the replication completion's own
delete had reconciled the copies and hidden this.

Admit an ILM version expiry that the pools layer approved under the lock
with the versions in all pools (CheckedAllPools, and not a restored-copy
expiry) to deleteObjectReconciled. It removes the secondary copies before
the primary and stops at the first failure, so the remote object is only
deleted after every copy is gone. Each set still guards the protection
the pools approved. Marker creation, restored-copy expiry, free-version
cleanup and delete-all keep their own paths; the bulk noncurrent purge
already reconciled.

Tests: with copies in two pools, a hot and a tiered version expiry remove
both copies, and the tiered one deletes its remote object once; when the
secondary copy cannot be deleted the expiry fails, both copies and the
remote object stay; with replication configured the tiered expiry queues
nothing; decommissioning the pool that holds the second copy completes
and leaves no expired version. All fail without the change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 18:53:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1bd0b1b04d fix(ilm): do not replicate deletes that lifecycle makes
The migration follow-up for #265 (PR #276) made lifecycle-created
deletes replication-aware: the scanner, the expiry of a transitioned
version and the bulk noncurrent purge evaluated the delete replication
decision and queued a delete marker or a version purge for the targets.
That is the content of the still-open PR #240. It changes behavior for
every bucket whose replication rule replicates deletes or delete
markers, the mc default: a target with longer retention loses versions
on the source's schedule, and a purge keeps its space as a pending
tombstone until the target confirms. SILO, like S3, does not replicate
lifecycle deletes; an opt-in can come later. The release did not
replicate them.

Remove exactly the replication parts: the decision callbacks and the
post-delete scheduling in applyExpiryOnNonTransitionedObjects and
expireTransitionedObject, the scheduling in deleteObjectVersions, and
ilmPurgeToDelete; the scanner builds noncurrent entries as before. The
rest of #276 stays: the hot-tier delete before the remote one, the
free-version retry record, the lifecycle-change fence and the migration
completion checks. API deletes still replicate, and the replication heal
still handles persisted pending markers and purges. As in the release,
the replication heal also resyncs an empty-state marker when
existing-object replication applies to it.

The delete-all variant of the scheduling, which queued a task with an
empty decision, goes with it.

Tests: the scanner's noncurrent purge, run with replication configured,
deletes the version at once and queues nothing; an ILM marker carries
no replication state and the heal leaves it unless existing-object
replication applies, in which case it is resynced as before; an API
version delete still queues a purge. The cross-pool batch, dispatch and
decommission tests now assert no replication, and a decommission whose
expiry used to wait for the target completes in one run. Adding back the
scanner's decision makes the first two fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 18:53:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d56b1063b9 perf(pools): delete the set groups of a bulk delete concurrently
The single-pool lock-domain change made a bulk delete lock each set's
names in that set and ran the groups one after another: a batch over S
sets cost about S lock round trips plus S set deletes, where the release
took one lock and then let erasureSets.DeleteObjects work on all sets at
once. Every distributed single pool with several sets paid for it,
including layouts where every set uses every host.

Run the groups concurrently, up to 16 at a time. Each group takes only
its own set's lock and waits for no other while it holds it, so the
groups cannot hold each other. A group checks for cancellation once it
is admitted, so a queued group of a canceled request does no storage
work. Each result is written only by the group of its object.

Tests: the first drive calls of two sets must overlap, which fails when
the groups run one after the other; with one worker, a group in flight
at a cancel keeps its own result, an earlier group keeps its success,
and a queued group makes no drive call.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 18:38:34 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a4453a1a55 fix(pools): wait for a contended copy lock while holding nothing
getNSLocks takes the locks of a copy in one order and waited for a later
lock, such as the source, for up to two seconds while it held the earlier
ones, such as the destination; then it released them, paused up to 250 ms
and tried again until the operation timeout. When the source was write
locked for long (a multi-pool PUT for its whole upload, a heal, a
transition, another copy onto it), the copy held its destination write
lock most of the time: reads and writes of the destination waited for
seconds, their own backoff rarely hitting the gaps. In the release a copy
that waited for its source held nothing.

After a bounded wait for an atomic lock times out while earlier locks are
held, release them, wait for that lock alone with a fresh instance until
the deadline, release it once it is free, and start again from the first
lock in the same order. Holding nothing while waiting forms no cycle, and
the next attempt still takes every lock in one order with fresh
instances. A non-atomic request may hold some of its own names while it
waits, so it keeps the bounded retries.

A test hook reports the bounded timeout, the start of the idle wait and
its end, so the tests coordinate on events rather than timing: a lock
before the contended one is free for others for the whole wait, a cancel
or the deadline ends the idle wait and leaves nothing held, a non-atomic
request never waits alone, and HEAD of a copy's destination succeeds
while the copy waits for its source. All but the non-atomic control fail
without the idle wait.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 18:34:19 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 617d8ed67b fix(pools): check copy names before locking them
CopyObject locks its source and destination before it reads the source,
and lockObjects merged two requests only when their raw names were equal.
A lock is taken on the cleaned name, so an invalid source such as a//x or
a/./x and the destination a/x asked for a read lock and a write lock on
one resource: the copy waited on itself until the operation timeout and
answered 503, holding the key's lock in short windows meanwhile. Before
the lock-domain change the invalid source was refused at once, when the
source was read. This reached single nodes, multi-pool deployments and
single pools whose sets share hosts.

- Check the source with checkGetObjArgs before any lock, the first check
  and the first error the release reported. Lock the destination only
  when its name is valid. An invalid destination fails at the copy's own
  destination check before it writes, after a missing source (404) or a
  failed source precondition (412), as before.
- lockObjects merges requests by the resource the lockers see, the
  cleaned bucket/object, within one lock table: the object's set where
  the sets of a pool have their own lockers, else one table. This keeps
  aliases on a shared local table from conflicting and never merges
  requests of different distributed domains.

Tests: aliased sources and destinations are refused with 400 at once in
every lock layout and two pools; an invalid destination keeps the 404
and 412 precedence; lockObjects merges an alias with its clean name. The
alias and merge tests fail without the change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 18:28:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 928c827508 fix(heal): heal a version whose expiry drive healing enqueues
Drive healing evaluates lifecycle on the versions of one pool. For a
version it found due it enqueued the expiry and skipped the heal. The
expiry is decided again under the object lock, with the versions in all
pools and the Object Lock state it reads then, and can be refused: a
newer version in another pool, an unreadable history, a changed rule,
or a delete-all the exact-key purge refuses. Such a version was never
healed onto the replaced drive and kept reduced redundancy for as long
as the refusal lasted. The scanner heals only versions without a due
action, so it did not repair it either.

Keep the enqueue and heal the version. A version that the expiry then
removes costs one heal. Heal and expiry exclude each other through the
object lock in the writers' lock domain, which the single-pool lock
domain change provides; a version removed first reads as not found and
is skipped, and heal rebuilds only from read-quorum metadata, so it does
not bring back a version deleted on a write quorum.

Tests: a version refused across pools is healed onto the replaced drive
and survives the expiry; an unversioned object due is healed and then
removed from every drive; a versioned latest version due is healed and
hidden by a marker; a stale minority is not recreated. The first three
fail without the change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 18:22:06 +08:00
Feng Ruohang f4b6c04c9f Merge restore test race fix
Three restore tests no longer race the release of the restore lock that POST hands to its worker.
2026-11-06 16:42:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 54186040ca test(restore): release the handed-over restore lock before reusing options
Three restore tests record the options of a POST's background restore
with a stub and restore with them later: TestRestoreAttemptGenerationFencing,
TestExpireRestoredUsesQuorumGeneration and TestRestoreHealNeedsRestoreQuorum.
The options carry the restore lock that POST hands to its worker. The
handler releases that lock only after the stub returns, while the test
proceeds as soon as the stub has signaled. When the test's restore
checked the lock before that release, it kept the lock, and the release
then canceled its context: every drive read failed with "context
canceled" and the restore reported insufficient read quorum.

Under -race this failed 11 times in 60 runs of the three tests on
69a4f938a, in the worker and old-reset modes of the fencing test and in
the multi-pool expiry test.

A new helper, restoreCaptureOptions, releases the lock before it records
the options, so a later restore takes it again, as a queued worker whose
lock ended does. TestRestoreSupersededAttempt already does this. With
the helper, the three tests passed 60 runs under -race.

Production code does not change: the handler's goroutine runs the
restore and releases the lock after it, and a lock lost during a
restore stops it as intended.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 16:42:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 69a4f938a2 Merge partial-view read fix
A node that sees only some drives of a set no longer answers 404 for an object that exists; such a read stays retryable (503).
2026-11-06 16:23:20 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3e954ad06e fix(erasure): do not report an existing object missing from a partial view
A node that reaches only some drives of a set, for example right after
it restarts and before it reconnects to its peers' drives, could answer
404 NoSuchKey for an object that exists. It happened when the copies it
could see were split between two revisions and neither reached read
quorum: a restore, a transition or an unversioned overwrite committed on
a write quorum but not on every drive. S3 clients and caches treat 404
as final; the honest answer from such a view is a retryable 503.

Two paths turned that view into "not found":

- getObjectFileInfo converted InsufficientReadQuorum{RQInconsistentMeta}
  to not found. Upstream added this for the case where every drive
  answered, but never checked it.
- When the version merge found no version in quorum,
  pickLatestQuorumFilesInfo marked every drive that answered as not
  found, including drives that hold the object.

Both now require every drive to have answered: metadata, or a definite
file, version or volume not found, or corrupt metadata. Otherwise the
read keeps its read-quorum error. A key absent from every drive that
answered still gets 404, and so do inconsistent copies when every drive
answered. The dangling-object purge is unchanged.

Deletes, copies, metadata updates, decommission and rebalance that read
through such a view now fail and retry instead of treating the object
as absent. The change is local to the serving node: no storage RPC,
on-disk format or configuration changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 16:02:47 +08:00
Feng Ruohang c45b26a75c Merge batch job authorization and Object Lock enforcement
Batch jobs run as their submitter, and expiration, replication and key rotation respect Object Lock on every version they touch.
2026-11-06 13:00:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 77ad2fc12b test(batch): pin the parity of the drive-revision purge test
TestBatchExpirePurgeAuthorizesDriveRevisions writes a failed tag revision
to one drive of sixteen and needs the read quorum of the metadata to stay
below sixteen. Tests that run newTestConfig on a single-drive layer, such
as TestIsReqAuthenticated, leave a storage class of parity 0 behind, which
resetTestGlobals does not restore. With parity 0 the quorum history of the
key is unreadable, the purge correctly refuses, and the test failed in the
full ./cmd run while passing alone. Set the default parity for the test,
as other erasure tests do, and restore it afterwards.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang adc824087b fix(batch): fail an expiration run whose listing fails at once
A Walk that returned an error before any result cancelled the run like
an ordinary cancellation: the job was saved as neither complete nor
failed. The listing failure is now recorded first, and the run is saved
as failed with its cursor where it was. Start still returns the error,
so the job is left to a later run, which lists again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 21b6711562 fix(batch): rotate exactly the copy that was read and authorized
Key rotation authorized the version as the copies in all pools merge
it, but rewrote the copy that GetObjectInfo returned, routed by the
pools layer to the pool of the latest version of the key. Where the
copies differ, it rewrote metadata it had not authorized; where another
pool held another write of the same version ID, it replaced that
write's sealed key without re-encrypting its data, which no longer
decrypted. The rewrite also stored the metadata without the tags and
the expiry, which a read returns apart from it.

Rotation now authorizes both the copy it rewrites and the merged
version, and rewrites exactly that copy in its own pool. A version read
from a pool that a decommission or a rebalance is moving is left to a
later run, checked again right before the write, so that the source of
the move does not change under it. The tags and the expiry are kept.

A pool-state change during the commit itself affects every write of
the pools layer and is left to a fix there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9fe32b7743 fix(batch): authorize the versions that a purge of all versions deletes
A batch expiration that keeps no versions authorized the versions its
walk saw, and the purge then deleted the versions it read under its
lock. A version written after the walk, or tags changed on one since,
was deleted without being authorized for the submitter.

The purge takes an authorization that a batch purge must set and no
other delete may. Under the object lock, once it has approved the
history and checked every drive, and before its first delete, it
hands the writes it is about to delete to the job: every copy of every
approved version and every revision of one that a drive holds, one per
distinct version ID and tags, as they are then. The job evaluates the
expire actions on each for the submitter. A denial deletes nothing and
ends the job as refused; the time it takes counts against the purge's
budget. A locked version still refuses the whole key, counted as a
refused key. The checks on the walk's snapshot are removed.

Reviewed adversarially; the review's regressions are included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ae54718d84 test(batch): cover submitter authorization and locked versions
Submission and start with changed, expired or restricted credentials,
session policies with and without an authorization plugin, request
context in policy conditions, per-object denies, jobs without a
recorded submitter and describe output; expire, pull, push and
rotation over versions under retention or legal hold, on one and
sixteen drives; cursor and counter persistence; and the cases found in
review: destination versions and tags of pulls, encryption values,
S3 Tables statements, copies in several pools, claims, prefixes,
listing errors and retry accounting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 303e340292 fix(batch): authorize batch jobs as their submitter
A batch job ran with the server's object access, whoever submitted it,
and acted on versions that Object Lock protects.

Submitter: StartBatchJob binds the authenticated credential to the job
(type, access key, parent, identity revision and a keyed fingerprint).
Submission, every start and every object resolve the binding against
IAM and evaluate the action with the submitter's policies and session
policy. A credential that is gone, disabled, expired or changed fails
the job. A policy statement that would need request context the job
does not have refuses the action. With an authorization plugin, the
plugin and the session policy must both allow. A refusal is persisted
as the job's failure reason and ends the job. A job stored without a
binding fails and has to be submitted again; a definition holds one
job type.

Expire deletes each older version on its own, checking retention and
legal hold and authorizing it under the delete's lock; a locked version
is left and counted. Until the exact-key purge is integrated, a
retainVersions: 0 key is refused when a version the walk saw is locked.
Pull writes refuse to replace a locked destination version, use the
destination's versioning, validate copied retention and apply default
retention. Rotation leaves locked versions as they are.

The status reports versionsSkippedLocked, keysRefused and the failure
reason. Expire and rotation persist their cursor together with these
counts, so a resumed job counts each version once. Describe returns a
redacted copy of the job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a717711b11 fix(iam): separate local policy evaluation from the plugin decision
IsAllowed returns the authorization plugin's decision when a plugin is
configured, and evaluates the local policies otherwise. Move the local
evaluation into isAllowedLocally so that a caller can combine it with
the plugin's decision. IsAllowed is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:39 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 57c2b0fb76 fix(batch): let a write refuse to replace a locked version
Add ObjectOptions.RefuseLockedOverwrite. With it set, PutObject (before
the rename) and CompleteMultipartUpload check, under the destination's
write lock, the stored version the write would replace: the version it
addresses, or the null version. DeleteObject checks the stored version
that a delete marker it writes names; in a multi-pool deployment that
version is resolved across pools. A version under retention or legal
hold is refused with ObjectLocked. The check reads the version's own
metadata, whatever the bucket configuration, and returns read errors.

Nothing sets the option yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 12:59:39 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9fefb756ad Merge exact-key purge for lifecycle delete-all
ExpiredObjectAllVersions, DelMarkerExpiration and batch expiry purge only the expired key's own versions, not other keys under the same prefix.
2026-11-06 12:59:35 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a7e7682e1b Merge SILO Console 2.6.0 pin
Pins the published Console v2.6.0 and records the licenses of its PostgreSQL dependencies.
2026-11-06 12:59:35 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 09d6a22993 Merge empty object directory cleanup (#285, #286)
Keeps the contributor commit from PR #286 unchanged and adds the same cleanup on the xl.meta commit-failure path.
2026-11-06 12:59:35 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b7062cae75 Merge webhook and audit target reload fix (#259)
Reloaded logger webhook and audit targets stay alive on every node after a peer reload.
2026-11-06 12:59:34 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e5bcbc7d82 Merge heal dry-run fixes (#280)
Takes the dry-run part of PR #280 and credits its author. The parallel deep-verification part stays in #280 for separate review.
2026-11-06 12:59:34 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b3a5307980 Merge lifecycle expiry, native restore and lock-domain fixes (#278, #281, #284)
Supersedes PR #279 and PR #282 and keeps their contributor commits. Native restores stage outside the object lock and commit under a short object lock (#284); ordinary multipart completion returns to main's behavior.
2026-11-06 12:59:34 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 45b1e4bc00 fix(restore): stage native restores outside the object lock
The unreleased native-restore fixes after RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
let the lock decide who owns a restore. Since fa42a0982 a single-pool
worker holds the object lock for the whole tier download, and since
7f38bf628 a busy lock means "a restore runs". 7f38bf628 also keeps the
restore's data in a marked multipart upload. Two regressions followed:

- While an old version restored, every GET, HEAD and write of the same
  key waited for the download. On a single pool this is new; with
  several pools the released code already held the lock that long.
- An ordinary upload whose completion failed after staging its metadata
  became InvalidUploadID for every caller, and could not be aborted for
  an hour. The marker that hid restore uploads could not tell them apart
  once a completion had rewritten the upload's xl.meta.

A restore now runs in two phases:

- The worker erasure-codes the tier copy into the tmp volume of the
  version's set, without the object lock, as heal does. A drive that
  fails any part, or misses a part when CheckParts runs before the
  commit, takes no part in the commit.
- A restore lock per version tells whether a restore runs. POST takes it
  before the object lock and hands it to the worker. It is a liveness
  hint: only the checks under the object lock decide what is written.
- The commit takes the object lock briefly, on one pool or several. It
  reads the version again and checks the attempt's ownership, the
  version identity, the tier copy, the part layout and the erasure
  layout. It then publishes with RenameData drive by drive, never
  through erasure renameData's undo, and needs the write quorum. The
  replaced data directory goes only when every published drive reports
  the same one.
- A publication that reached some drives but not the write quorum
  converges under the same lock hold, in bounded retries after it: back
  to the unrestored version on every drive that holds it, or to a
  committed restore when the copy turns out to be on a write quorum.
  Each pass first checks that every drive holds what the version held
  before the commit, the commit wrote, or a convergence wrote, and stops
  on anything else. It deletes no directory.

Multipart goes back to main: erasure-multipart.go and
bucket-object-lock.go are identical to 69fcf50cd. The commit lock, the
marker and the restore exceptions of multipart completion and of the
null-version Object Lock check are gone, and single-pool completion
again takes the upload lock first and the object lock right before it
commits. With several pools, abandoned-data cleanup now takes the pools
lock that writes take, as heal does, so it cannot remove a directory
that a commit moved in place and has not yet referenced. The restore
capability becomes protocol 2, and a queued worker checks it again.

Recovery after a coordinator crash during publication, and storage RPCs
that complete after their caller returned, stay excluded. Main has the
same exposure, and they are tracked separately.

Tests:
- New regression tests cover both problems. They fail on f85d4a5fa,
  and the multipart one also passes on main.
- Fault-injection tests cover a publication below the write quorum,
  including seven of twelve drives on 8+4; lost answers; convergence
  retries and stops; the old data directory; a stale inline marker; a
  recreated tmp volume; a published revision read across its expiry; a
  second POST; a target deleted during the download; a tier 404; and
  pools-locked abandoned cleanup.
- Thirteen tests of the upload marker from 7f38bf628 are dropped, and
  so is TestNativeRestoreConcurrentCompletion from fa42a0982, which
  completed the restore's upload from a client. Four tests are reframed
  for the new semantics, including the lock-domain restore test, which
  now gates the commit.
- Three self-recursive WriteMetadata test doubles are fixed, and the
  helpers of the dropped tests are removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-06 11:30:29 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 14d49f14f7 test: record webhook environment prefix compatibility
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 16:08:11 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 584bb3cc53 docs: include licenses for Console PostgreSQL dependencies
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 16:08:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang f85d4a5fa1 test: satisfy acceptance lint and compatibility checks
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 16:04:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 67a6532dec test(restore): give native-restore liveness waits one minute
The native-restore tests waited 10 seconds for steps that do real drive
work: metadata writes with synchronous persistence and renames on every
drive. A full suite run on a machine whose SSD was busy with another
decommission run failed TestRestoreUploadStagingFailsClosed/staged once
with "background restore did not finish"; about 430 reruns, under CPU and
fsync stress as well, passed.

The test uses local locks, and after its release the completion takes no
new namespace lock, so the bound is a liveness bound, not a latency
contract. All eight such waits in the native-restore tests now use one
restoreTestWait of one minute, and the background-restore helper prints
the goroutine stacks when it times out. Assertions that something must not
happen keep their own bounds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 11:34:34 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 28a9e67ac7 deps: pin SILO Console 2.6.0
Pin the Console module to the v2.6.0 tag commit (f8ab14669). It carries
the bucket-list quota display fix and the bucket-creation quota and
retention validation (pgsty/silo-console#72, #73, PR #74), the follow-up
numeric fixes, and the usage-scan feature with its optional PostgreSQL
worker (PR #70), which brings github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 in as an indirect
dependency. golang.org/x/crypto and golang.org/x/net move with Console's
security dependency update.

The v2.6.0 release was published on 2026-11-04 from that commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 10:48:23 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7fac646923 refactor(restore): take the restore lock from the object lock domain
Native restore chose its own single-pool lock in the object's erasure
set before the pools layer did. Now that every object write locks in
that domain through NewObjectNSLock, the restore lock is that lock.
Behavior is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 06:50:32 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 32ab506924 fix(pools): lock single-pool object writes in the object's own erasure set
In a single pool, DELETE in every form, bulk delete, the CopyObject
destination, SelectObjectContent, batch key rotation and the upload-ID
guards of complete, abort, get-info and list-parts locked through the
first erasure set, while PUT, multipart commit, PutObjectPart, tag,
retention, legal-hold and metadata updates, restore, transition and heal
lock in the set the object hashes to. When the sets of a pool use
different hosts, as every automatic layout of 18 or more hosts does, the
two locks ask different lockers and do not exclude each other, and
concurrent read-modify-writes of xl.meta can lose acknowledged versions
and delete markers or leave an object on a minority of drives.

Route these locks through NewObjectNSLock, which returns the lock of
the object's own set in a single pool and the pools lock otherwise.
Upload guards choose the set by their object and keep the name
object/uploadID. True prefix deletion and the locks of names that are
not objects keep their domain.

Bulk delete groups its names by set and takes one set's lock at a time,
in ascending set index; a failed group fails alone. A single node, whose
sets share one local lock table, keeps its one bulk lock.

The COPY handler takes its source and destination locks before it opens
the source, sorted, and transactionally: bounded waits while holding a
lock, release in reverse order and retry with new lock instances, one
deadline. It reads the source under them, passes NoLock to every nested
call, and runs that work in the locks' context. This also removes a
deadlock of copies in opposite directions wherever both locks were in
one domain, such as a single node or several pools.

Lock names and RPCs are unchanged, but a pool is protected only when
every node runs this change: affected pools must be upgraded and rolled
back with a drained restart.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 06:49:57 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7f38bf6282 fix(restore): give each native restore an owner and a private upload
A native restore (POST ?restore, issue #281) marks the version ongoing,
and a background worker rehydrates it from the tier. The worker, its
upload and every status write could be reached or confused by other
callers. A public client could write into or complete the restore
upload. POST copied a whole metadata snapshot over newer protection
changes. An old or failed attempt could act on a newer one. Restore,
expiry and heal decided on whichever drive's metadata they read.

Each POST that starts a rehydration now writes an attempt ID into the
version's internal metadata, with the identity it resolved: version
ID, ETag, size and ModTime. The worker, its upload, its part writes and
its completion carry the attempt. A worker whose attempt no longer
owns the version stops without writing, completing or resetting. Every
write uses the versioning state and explicit version ID captured by
POST, so a null target stays null.

The restore upload carries an internal marker, decided over all drives.
Public multipart calls answer NoSuchUpload and listings hide it. An
unknown marker fails closed. A completion holds a commit lock from
staging its commit in the upload until the commit ends. Stale cleanup
decides on every upload past the stale age under that lock, and keeps
it until its rename ends, also past the drive deadline. Abort of a
committing upload takes the lock and removes a failed commit's
leftover only when every copy is staged and older than one hour.

POST, the worker, the reset, the ExpireRestored recheck and heal all
decide on the authoritative revision of the exact version. That is the
revision held by max(n/2+1, read quorum) drives, identified by the
version header and the normalized metadata digest. Status writes patch
only the restore fields of that revision. They write only the drives
that hold it, and put the old revision back on failure. Heal copies
restore fields only when a quorum holds the same fields.

A failed attempt resets itself with bounded in-memory retries. A later
POST takes over a stranded marker when no attempt runs. Otherwise it
answers RestoreAlreadyInProgress within a few seconds.

Older nodes do not know the marker. A new grid capability handler lets
the serving node ask every peer. POST answers 503 ServiceUnavailable
and writes nothing until all peers support native restore, and a
queued worker asks again before it creates its upload.

The single-pool lock-domain split between DELETE/CopyObject and restore
is closed by its own fix, which this change depends on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 06:47:38 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2b228f678c fix(ilm): purge only the expired key's own versions in delete-all
An expiry of all versions (ExpiredObjectAllVersions, DelMarkerExpiration,
and batch expiration with the default purge) asked the pools layer for a
prefix delete. The pools layer rebuilt the options, so the request ran as
a recursive delete of the key's directory in every erasure set of every
pool. Object a/b is stored inside the directory of a, so every key under
a/ was removed with it, however new, with one audit entry and one
notification for a alone. The rebuilt options also skipped the lifecycle
recheck, so on a single pool a version written after the decision was
deleted too, and tiered versions lost their metadata without free
versions.

The expiry worker, the migration expiry and batch expiration now ask for
a purge with the in-memory ObjectOptions.DeleteAllVersions:

- DeleteObject hands it to the purge under the object lock, before the
  all-pools check. ILM decides with the unchanged lifecycleEventsAllPools,
  on a single pool too; batch needs the version its walk matched to still
  be the latest. A second read of each pool's authoritative history
  records every copy, older writes of the same ID included, and must
  equal the approval. Anything else deletes nothing.
- Before deleting, the purge reads every drive of each set that holds a
  copy. It refuses the key when a drive cannot be read, when any revision
  of an approved version there is transitioned, or, with Object Lock,
  when retention or a legal hold protects one. It then deletes on exactly
  the drive handles it checked.
- Versions are deleted by ID with the drives' version delete, which only
  removes the object directory once it is empty: oldest first, for each
  version older writes before the copy reads choose, and the latest last,
  only once every older version is gone from every pool. No marker,
  replication state or free version is written. The purge stops at the
  first error, repeats a quorum-successful delete on the drives that
  missed it while the lock is held, and stops before the latest version
  at a budget of 1000 versions or one minute, reads included.
- The ILM audit entry records how many versions were removed. A purge
  that failed after it began to delete is audited as partial and sends
  no removal event. Batch counts come from the purge; a key whose latest
  version changed is not expired, and a failed delete marker fails the
  job.

The option is rejected with conflicting options and by every layer below
the pools. Force delete and internal prefix deletes keep DeletePrefix.
Delete-all of a transitioned latest version keeps its current path, and
a key with tiered older versions is refused. On a single pool the purge
relies on the lock-domain fix for writer exclusion.

Reviewed adversarially in two design rounds and four patch rounds; the
last approved with nits, which are applied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 03:24:42 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 73025824a3 fix(storage): also remove the empty object directory when the xl.meta commit fails
The xl.meta rename at the end of RenameData creates the object directory
the same way the data rename does, and its failure branch left that
directory behind for writes without a data directory, such as inline
and zero-byte objects. Remove it and its empty parents there too, with
the same trailing-slash call that PR #286 adds to the data branch for
issue #285.

Making the cleanup safe against concurrent writes needs two more
changes:

- deleteFile now walks up with a trailing slash, so each parent step
  removes only an empty directory. Between two steps of a walk, another
  walk can remove the rest of the chain and a writer can commit an
  object whose xl.meta sits at the path the first walk removes next,
  for example the object "parent" under the key "parent/xl.meta/child".
  The walk used to delete that file. Ordinary deletes could already do
  this; the new cleanup made it reachable with failed writes.

- The two renames of RenameData retry when the directory creation or
  the rename reports "not found" while the source is still in place,
  up to once per path level. A late, failed RenameData can now remove
  the directory another write of the same key has just created, and
  that write used to fail on the drive although its data was intact.
  The retry decides on the error of the attempt itself, because another
  write can recreate the directories in between. renameAll's error
  mapping moves unchanged into renameAllErr so that the retry can see
  the raw error.

The stagedDataGoneDisks test helper now swaps the drives behind the
set's disk list under the lock that the list takes, instead of
replacing the getDisks callback that background tasks read unlocked.

Tests:
- TestXLStorageRenameDataCommitMetaMissingRemovesEmptyDirs: zero-byte
  and inline commit failures leave no empty directories, a sibling and
  a moved data directory stay.
- TestXLStorageWalkUpKeepsCommittedObject: a committed object at a
  parent path survives the walk, through DeleteVersion and both
  cleanup branches.
- TestRenameDataSurvivesConcurrentEmptyDirCleanup: PutObject (large
  and inline) and CompleteMultipartUpload succeed when a late failed
  RenameData of the same key removes their fresh directory on all 16
  drives.
- TestXLStorageRenameDataRetriesWhileCleanupWalksUp: a write survives
  a cleanup that removes each level of its path in turn, also when a
  nested-key write recreates the directories in between.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 02:39:36 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0fa4a8c503 fix(logger): keep reloaded webhook and audit targets alive after a peer reload
A runtime change to audit_webhook, logger_webhook or audit_kafka is
applied on every peer by serviceReloadDynamic, under a 30-second context
that is cancelled as soon as the handler returns. applyDynamicConfigForSubSys
passed that context to the logger target updates, and the targets tie
their queue worker and, with queue_dir, their disk replay to the Init
context. On every server except the one that served the admin request
the new targets therefore stopped right after they were created: records
filled the in-memory queue and were then dropped with "log buffer full"
until the server restarted.

- Build logger webhook, audit webhook and audit Kafka targets with
  GlobalContext, as startup and the serving node already do. The
  caller's context is still used for logging.
- Open the HTTP disk queue store before starting the queue worker, and
  cancel the derived context when it cannot be opened. A worker started
  before a failed Open dereferenced the nil store on the first record and
  crashed the server; with the process context that would have happened
  on every server.
- Let Cancel hand records still waiting in the channel to the shared
  buffer of the replacement target. A target whose queue store never
  opened has no worker to do this, so repairing queue_dir and applying
  the configuration again used to discard the records it had accepted.
- TestDynamicWebhookOutlivesConfigContext applies each case through
  applyDynamicConfigForSubSys under a short context, cancels it as the
  peer handler does, and requires delivery: audit and logger webhooks
  with a memory queue, a disk queue and an unopenable disk queue
  (recovered by applying the configuration again), and audit Kafka with
  and without queue_dir against a sarama mock broker. Each case runs in
  a child process without logger and audit environment variables.

This completes earlier uncommitted maintainer work on this issue, which
covered the two HTTP call sites, the store-before-worker order and the
first version of the test.

Refs #259

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 02:20:06 +08:00
Feng Ruohang dd0a2da55e fix(heal): send the dry-run flag to remote bucket heal
remotePeerS3Client.HealBucket sent only the bucket name and the remove
flag, and HealBucketHandler built its heal options from those two
values. During a dry-run bucket heal every remote node therefore ran a
real one: it created the bucket directory on drives that lacked it, or
removed empty bucket directories when the bucket was missing from
every pool. Only the coordinating node honored DryRun.

Add a "dry-run" key to the peer message and read it into
HealOpts.DryRun on the receiving side, so healBucketLocal returns
before MakeVol and DeleteVol on every node. The message is a string
map: an older node ignores the key, and a missing key reads as false,
so a mixed-version cluster behaves as before until every node is
upgraded.

The regression calls the real client over a test grid connection to
the real handler. It fails on main, and it fails if either side of the
change is removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 01:21:13 +08:00
Feng Ruohang c8dd5678bb fix(heal): do not purge dangling data during a dry-run heal
healObject handles a metadata read-quorum failure before its dry-run
return, so an admin heal with DryRun set still called deleteIfDangling.
When the drives without the version's xl.meta all answered "not found"
and outnumbered its parity blocks, the dry run deleted the version,
data directory included, from every drive that still held it. A
site-wide dry run reaches .minio.sys/config the same way.

When DryRun is set, return the quorum error with a set-level result
built from the observed read errors, before the purge. Real heals are
unchanged.

The production change is the first cmd/erasure-healing.go hunk of
PR #280, unchanged. The tests are the PR's dry-run tests that do not
depend on its parallel deep verification or its dry-run reporting
change; both stay out of this commit. The tests now assert the delete
counter first and the converted error for each quorum case, and drop
the CheckParts stub that only the excluded tests use.

Co-authored-by: Jasper Bernhardt <jasper.bernhardt@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-05 01:21:13 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9f7b49369d fix(ilm): require an authoritative cross-pool history before lifecycle expiry
The merged all-pool check from #279 decided on the versions that a read
quorum of each set merged non-strictly. A drive that missed one metadata
update could therefore supply the revision used for the decision, and a
partially unreadable set could drop a committed version from the history.
Both let an expiry delete data the rule did not cover, including a version
under legal hold.

- objectVersions accepts a revision only when max(n/2+1, the version's
  metadata read quorum) drives hold it, identifies revisions by the header
  plus a sha256 over a canonical, length-prefixed encoding of the
  normalized metadata, filters non-accepted revisions before the strict
  merge, and fails closed on omitted versions, too many unreadable drives,
  or cancellation.
- Lock fields are read with the evaluator's key precedence. Cross-pool
  copies that disagree on hold or retention must be strictly ordered by
  valid timestamps; copies with different ModTime are separate writes and
  an older protected write refuses the object. The set safeguard re-checks
  protection and pending purges on its fresh read for checked version
  deletes.
- Duplicate copies with semantically different replication or purge state
  refuse the object.
- Batch expiry announces and audits only completed or already-absent
  removals.

Reviewed adversarially over seven rounds; the final round approved with no
remaining findings in scope. All-versions expiry through deletePrefix and
tiered delete-all dispatch are tracked separately.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-05 00:16:38 +08:00
Denis Babchuk ed05d982a1 fix(storage): remove the empty object directory of a failed RenameData
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-04 11:39:57 +03:00
Feng Ruohang f321f7f1c7 fix(ilm): do not announce batch expiries the recheck rejected
The expiry worker now asks DeleteObjects to recheck ILM against all
pools. A rejected entry keeps its version and returns
errLifecycleNotApplicable, but the worker still wrote an ILMExpiry
audit record, an ILM trace and an s3:ObjectRemoved:Delete event for it.
Event delivery drops the error element, so consumers saw an ordinary
removal, repeated on every scan while the versions stay split across
pools.

Skip rejected entries; eligible entries of the same batch are still
reported.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-04 16:37:42 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 82dd12faf8 fix(restore): keep queued restores waiting for the object lock
The POST handler marks a version ongoing before its background restore
takes the object lock, and only the restore clears that marker. Native
restore holds the lock through the tier download, so a restore of
another version of the same key waits behind it. Both restore entry
points gave up after one delete-operation timeout and returned before
any cleanup, leaving ongoing-request="true" with no owner. Every later
POST for that version was refused with 409 and nothing expired the
marker.

Retry the lock while the restore's context lives, with a dedicated
dynamic timeout so repeated waits do not lengthen delete timeouts.
Shutdown or a caller deadline still ends the wait.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-04 16:37:42 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3ddf83182f Integrate scanner rejection contract regression
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:56:05 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 374b9ce309 Include R1 scanner rejection regression in R4 dependency
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:56:05 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0c5a309507 test(ilm): assert scanner refusal without claiming absence
Keep the specialized scanner routing test aligned with the explicit lifecycle rejection result, and verify the addressed version and payload remain readable. This distinguishes refused expiry from an idempotent missing version.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:56:05 +08:00
Feng Ruohang f83d02831c Integrate complete R3 encoding and safe-read repairs
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:46:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 496eab4b76 fix(restore): preserve safe read context through nested lookups
Carry restore context through POST status reads, metadata copy routing, null-version Object Lock checks and multipart completion. A failed read must preserve the target and must not enqueue its remote object for garbage collection. Cover initial/status POST failures and metadata loss during single and multipart rehydration on real disks.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:46:03 +08:00
Feng Ruohang add36e7052 Integrate R4 with complete R1 safety dependency
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:45:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ea483e453e Integrate R2 restore cleanup boundary repairs
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:45:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ce60cc0c84 Integrate R1 adversarial review repairs
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:45:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 997846f413 Merge R1 lifecycle safety repair into R4
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:42:42 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7c9b6386c6 Merge R2 restore safety repair into R3
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:40:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ba0b59d0b2 fix(ilm): preserve duplicate metadata and reject unapplied purges
Merge lock and tag revisions for duplicate versions before all-pool
lifecycle evaluation using the existing metadata reconciliation rules.

Distinguish ordinary lifecycle refusal from object absence and clear
rejected batch replication state so a late policy withdrawal cannot
schedule a purge. Preserve restored-copy cleanup and real absence.

Cover single and batch protections, legitimate metadata removals, and
actual replication queue and HTTP target behavior.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:38:21 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d9837fb319 fix(restore): retain legacy part-size compatibility
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:32:55 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 8579466557 fix(restore): preserve versions across cleanup and failed reads
Reject replacement markers and legacy objects before restored-copy cleanup
can mutate their type or data. Prevent restore lookups and failure cleanup
from purging dangling versions, preserve Transition on metadata rereads,
and return without writing when the initial restore read fails.

Add real-disk regressions for stale null tasks, minority metadata, initial
and cleanup read failures, and stored marker/legacy types. Keep ordinary
dangling cleanup and marker purge as positive controls.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:32:33 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4f72d0ea94 fix(restore): preserve encoded object identity and part layout
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 22:16:47 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3c4980eb80 Integrate multipart error-case test lint correction
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:40:59 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 50a234d6c3 test(restore): clarify invalid-upload error cases
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:40:59 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a02ce222f0 Integrate complete R3 input-error regression fix
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:39:36 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 8ae19de7a8 fix(restore): avoid duplicate completion locks for empty upload IDs
Keep the storage layer error precedence for missing buckets and uploads while retaining every real upload lock. Cover the alias with short deadlines and race-check the original complete-multipart suite in CI.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:39:36 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7a4f0b5e69 Integrate native restore test lint correction
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:21:46 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5ac27f7533 test(restore): follow context-first helper convention
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:21:46 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3c8699e216 ci: race-check lifecycle expiry and native restore together
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:20:24 +08:00
Feng Ruohang fa42a09826 fix(restore): rehydrate the selected version under its object lock
Preserve handler version context, resolve the requested version's pool, and
return on the initial read failure without writing metadata. Propagate owned
NoLock to single-part writes, multipart completion and failure cleanup in
the same patch. Preserve the original modification time on cleanup.

Route the restore status copy by version and allow internal multipart
rehydration only for a matching completed transition. Single-pool restores
own the metadata snapshot through download and cleanup. Keep public
completion in object-before-upload order, using the target set's object
lock for single-pool calls, so concurrent completion cannot invert locks.

Cover real signed POSTs, null/UUID and cross-pool identity, download failures,
multipart overwrite guards, Object Lock updates and concurrent completion.
This package depends on the restored-copy cleanup safety delivered in R2.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:20:24 +08:00
Feng Ruohang fcbf2c7d49 Integrate complete native restore repair after R2 cleanup safety
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:20:24 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 18ba0ef32a Merge R4 version-specific read expiry rechecks after R1
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:11:41 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 65c59dd860 fix(ilm): recheck read expiry for the resolved version
Recheck only local ordinary-delete candidates that need an all-pool lifecycle decision. Match UUID/null identity to the version actually read and queue its global metadata and event; retain a successful read on recheck failure, absence, or refusal.

Keep GET reader cleanup, authorization, proxy reads, single-pool reads, restored-copy cleanup, and expiry response headers on their existing paths. Cover signed GET/HEAD, queue contents, metadata faults, missing matches, no-scan boundaries, and reader-lock release.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 21:07:55 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e7103d77cb fix(ilm): constrain restored-copy cleanup to verified tiered versions
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 20:55:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 167b95dfd8 Integrate R2 restored-copy cleanup safety with R1
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 20:55:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3a1e132f16 fix(ilm): preserve all-pool approval for tiered batch expiry
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 20:40:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 30588eb830 Merge PR #282 restore-copy version targeting for R2
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 20:37:15 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 393a84076f Merge commit '8c1473a618f89fda3b89462c69c2a3c1a320d4c6' into codex/silo-lifecycle-r1-r4
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-03 20:36:07 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 69fcf50cd2 Merge pull request #275 from botdeniska/fix/ldap-sts-failure-message
Merge LDAP STS failure message compatibility for embedded console root fallback.
2026-11-03 09:01:54 +08:00
Denis Babchuk a21f420de3 fix(sts): keep "not found" in the LDAP auth failure so the console can log in root
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-03 08:52:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 6da8036eb3 Merge pull request #274 from botdeniska/fix/iam-long-record-names
Merge LDAP IAM path validation so long normalized DNs fail consistently before quorum access.
2026-11-03 08:51:40 +08:00
Denis Babchuk dcad2ae3e7 fix(iam): decide unstorable IAM record names before asking the drives
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-03 08:38:24 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9897589bc5 Merge pull request #273 from botdeniska/fix/rebalance-stop-without-metadata
Merge rebalance stop guard for an uninitialized rebalance state.
2026-11-03 08:38:04 +08:00
Denis Babchuk 525ab5fa40 fix(pools): do not panic when a rebalance stop finds no rebalance metadata
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-03 08:23:59 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d4e7716085 Merge pull request #269 from botdeniska/fix/lifecycle-active-delmarker-expiration
Merge lifecycle fix: count DelMarkerExpiration as an active scanner rule.
2026-11-03 08:23:22 +08:00
Denis Babchuk a803027b09 fix(ilm): count DelMarkerExpiration as an active lifecycle rule
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-03 08:08:02 +08:00
Denis Babchuk 001078e9ca fix(ilm): expire a restored copy by the version it belongs to
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-02 21:41:37 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 8c1473a618 fix(pools): move versions whose ILM expiry does not hold with the versions in other pools
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-02 19:59:13 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 347d9763fd fix(ilm): recheck expiries decided in one pool against the versions of the object in all pools
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-11-02 19:58:46 +03:00
Feng Ruohang 0fc5a0b527 Merge lifecycle migration integrity follow-up (#276)
Merge maintainer follow-up for lifecycle-aware pool migration.

Preserve replication, tier cleanup, lifecycle-generation, and whole-object completion semantics on top of contributor fix #266.
2026-11-02 14:55:35 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a47bacbc0f test: satisfy lint for lifecycle migration follow-up
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-02 14:37:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0a546c7a76 fix(pools): preserve ILM cleanup during migration
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-02 14:20:17 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 8dac7f7c14 Merge lifecycle migration fix (#266)
Merge the contributor's lifecycle migration fix after forward-porting it onto current main.

The contributor commits are retained in the merge commit. Maintainer follow-up work will address the remaining replication, tier cleanup, lifecycle configuration, and DeleteAll completion-fence cases.
2026-11-02 12:50:39 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4cc3bc1de6 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into HEAD
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>

# Conflicts:
#	cmd/erasure-server-pool-decom.go
2026-11-02 12:29:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0cfca29cb2 Merge pull request #264 from botdeniska/fix/free-versions-not-versions
fix(ilm): stop taking the free versions of deleted tiered versions for versions
2026-11-01 14:44:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a7310d59fe Fix cross-parity version listing after pool removal (#267)
Availability-optimized writes can leave a readable null version across separate EC groups when a disk is unavailable. Recount ordinary null versions for all non-strict reads and cover version listing and complete pool removal with end-to-end tests.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-11-01 14:08:09 +08:00
Denis Babchuk a995921e57 fix(pools): move ILM-expired current versions during rebalance and remove moved copies
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-29 22:43:26 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 19910230aa fix(pools): move ILM-expired current versions during decommission
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-29 22:42:17 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 7ce7fc8d1e fix(pools): do not list or move free versions as delete markers
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-29 22:32:44 +03:00
Denis Babchuk fb1a619ee1 fix(listing): skip free versions when looking for a latest delete marker
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-29 22:08:34 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 3f13c26eed fix(ilm): do not let a free version make the latest version noncurrent
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-29 22:07:56 +03:00
Feng Ruohang dd905b29f4 docs: align README and changelog with published 20261026 release
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-27 08:03:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2f728c7643 docs: refresh contributor records for 20261026
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-27 07:58:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang c3ad836aed Accept full RPM fingerprints in release finalization
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-27 00:51:13 +08:00
Feng Ruohang dc6dc3d806 Pin published Console v2.5.1 for SILO 20261026
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-27 00:12:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang dcc2f20ba8 Preserve maintenance timeout behavior and prepare SILO 20261026
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-26 22:43:51 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a13efd5760 fix: isolate storage mutation guards by exact resource (#258)
Integrate the exact drive/path mutation guard after PR CI.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-26 21:25:30 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 39278e068e fix: isolate storage mutation guards by exact resource
Replace process-wide hash-slot mutexes with reference-counted locks keyed
by drive and path. Retain entries before waiting, acquire unique paths in
order, and reclaim entries only after all holders and waiters finish.

Add real storage API regressions for unrelated colliding objects and drives,
plus coverage for cancellation, multi-path order and waiter lifetimes.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-26 21:11:49 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 263ee0510d docs: complete the 20261025 change log and contributor records
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-26 00:01:28 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 641eb51a40 test: pin the rollback fixture to its required erasure layout
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 23:47:55 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 45d6e5d065 release: prepare SILO 20261025 with the published component stack
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 23:44:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang dabc894132 Merge delivered Console coordination fixes into local main
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 22:30:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang fb08ca7b6a deps: embed the Console bucket-search navigation repair
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 22:13:28 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 41822710e4 deps: embed the Console bucket-search navigation repair
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 22:13:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 034f7bbf73 deps: select the Console candidate with native keyboard regression coverage
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 21:50:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 79eca5e920 deps: select the Console candidate with native keyboard regression coverage
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 21:50:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang aec7ddac46 deps: integrate Console repairs and the released SILO libraries
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 21:33:40 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 475640e7e1 deps: embed the repaired Console 2.5.0 candidate
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 21:33:34 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 62124c779c docs: include coordinated Console dependency attributions
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 21:06:21 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 030c6d740e deps: integrate pkg 3.15.1 and Console 2.5.0 candidate for acceptance
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 21:01:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5f1f4178ae fix: return current bucket inventory from account info
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6921f8c186)
2026-10-25 21:01:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0828861bd0 iam: restore native policy immediately after resetting overrides
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1e3ab56b06)
2026-10-25 21:01:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 6921f8c186 fix: return current bucket inventory from account info
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 21:01:01 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 25d928c9df test: pin failed-overwrite compatibility fixture to 12+4
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 18:48:39 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ee3e7ea716 test: keep deferred read diagnostic helpers with their build tag
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 18:40:40 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2a04d5f485 fix: retain maintenance read compatibility with write safety fixes
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 18:39:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9449e6a4a8 test: preserve reads across late commits and rollback
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 18:23:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9c4bb39571 fix: preserve versioning context when verifying recovery
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 16:05:28 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 86ce8d6012 test: cover versioned and encrypted multi-pool recovery
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 16:03:13 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b15aa97c94 test: follow recovery regression lint conventions
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 15:59:45 +08:00
Feng Ruohang f54c04846e fix: recover inconsistent multi-pool copies before acknowledging PUT
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 15:56:28 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 6fdea3b8d9 test: reject recovery ACK when another pool still wins reads
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 15:55:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 380fcbfe47 test: require safe refusal when pool recovery cannot be confirmed
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 15:49:29 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a02fa9644c test: pin multi-pool overwrite recovery after a minority commit
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 15:48:33 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 652a1c09d3 fix: protect unfinished commits from abandoned data cleanup
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 13:23:20 +08:00
Feng Ruohang c86df14f4d test: pin abandoned cleanup races with commit and undo
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 13:22:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 03875d61e3 fix: reuse validated latest state without rescanning version history
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 13:02:23 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1865985aa1 fix: separate rollback ownership from readable metadata identity
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 12:41:54 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 076a13f9d2 test: preserve reads after partial no-op metadata updates
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 12:40:00 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9a4e089f56 fix: reuse unanimous latest metadata for healthy version histories
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 12:33:49 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9255f443a6 test: guard healthy history reads and same-version divergence
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 12:31:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ea7c794a94 fix: preserve version state across late rollback and nested mutations
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 12:22:47 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 16c21428d9 test: pin metadata rollback and nested mutation lifetime regressions
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 12:07:50 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7e83f9950a merge: restore built-in IAM policies after Reset
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 11:02:53 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1e3ab56b06 iam: restore native policy immediately after resetting overrides
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 03:32:53 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5ad1f344b7 fix: keep admitted mutation RPCs alive until their result arrives
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 01:12:58 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 8a4097309f fix: preserve shared-version metadata during overwrite rollback
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 01:11:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0501a198e3 fix: reject COPY-to-self from unresolved object generations
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 01:11:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d2eb0ade91 fix: assign PUT generations while holding the commit lock
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 01:08:36 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5c074efd1d test: preserve external shards in generation conflict fixtures
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 01:03:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 03fe5e9c21 test: isolate endpoint locality fixtures from public DNS
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 00:50:41 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0b1c21cb4b fix: retain unresolved generations during fast reads and healing
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 00:48:16 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b55495aef0 fix: preserve remote rollback options and reject stale read quorums
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 00:37:21 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d8b77e5f3b test: require read-quorum errors for split listing generations
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 00:24:28 +08:00
Feng Ruohang cd1f6cec3c fix: drain canceled storage commits before releasing object locks
Wait for admitted data and metadata mutations, preserve overwrite backups during rollback, and reject rollback of a different generation. Report conflicting or unreadable pool metadata as read-quorum failures instead of exposing stale copies. Add barrier-driven local/RPC and multi-pool regressions for cancellation, self-copy, rollback and old-value reads.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-25 00:19:42 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4f17a23e33 test: isolate release acceptance fixtures across backends
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 22:39:29 +08:00
Feng Ruohang be44ff2669 build: update silo-pkg to v3.15.0
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 22:17:20 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d16f5ed9c8 fix(ilm): keep tier data when expiry only adds a delete marker (#253)
Preserve transitioned version data when lifecycle expiration only creates a delete marker, and apply suspended-versioning semantics consistently.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 17:46:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 6d890fc860 Merge pull request #255: preserve FULL_OBJECT checksum type in replication
Forward FULL_OBJECT checksum type for multipart CRC replication so the target validates the whole-object checksum correctly. Restore the existing single-PUT replication path for server-side copies retaining these checksums.

Fixes #254

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 17:39:38 +08:00
Feng Ruohang aafe4f8886 fix(pools): preserve authoritative copies across failed deletes (#257)
Preserve the latest logical object when cleanup of another pool fails, report each bulk error with its original replication identity, and support retries after partial physical deletion. Reuse existing tier-aware reconciliation to avoid premature remote-object collection.

Includes the original contribution and signed-off maintainer fixes.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 16:04:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a2073d2514 fix(pools): preserve shared tier references during failed deletes
Reuse deleteObjectReconciled for tiered bulk entries and unversioned single deletes. Its reference-aware cleanup avoids scheduling remote contents for garbage collection while another copy still needs them, including restored copies. Keep the normal local-data bulk path unchanged.

Extend existing tier GC regressions to bulk and unversioned deletes and include them in the multi-pool race CI step.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 15:47:51 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3c82748e14 fix(pools): retain authoritative copies until bulk cleanup succeeds
Resolve each addressed version under the shared write lock, keep bulk I/O parallel within cleanup and authoritative-deletion stages, and preserve replication response identity on errors. Treat reliable absence as successful physical cleanup on retries without accepting it for marker or replication-state writes.

Cover execution-time faults, partial cleanup recovery, mixed authoritative pools, response identity, null marker ordering, metadata uncertainty, cancellation, and concurrent PUT. Run the delete consistency regressions under race in CI.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 15:36:07 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1e94c5a30d Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into codex/pr257-delete-safety
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 15:13:21 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 000e653038 ci: use runner Python for repository card checks
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 12:42:50 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 945dc16060 Update SFTP and Go dependencies with object-operation regression coverage
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-24 11:50:39 +08:00
Denis Babchuk a30270d9ba fix(pools): put a delete marker into a pool that can take it
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-23 22:29:49 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 1841fce4c4 fix(pools): keep the latest copy when a delete fails in one pool
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-23 21:28:46 +03:00
Denis Babchuk f2b8d4b9cb fix(replication): forward FULL_OBJECT checksum type for multipart replicas
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-23 17:52:58 +03:00
Denis Babchuk 8ed5c90dcd fix(ilm): keep tier data when expiry only adds a delete marker
Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
2026-10-23 17:36:21 +03:00
Feng Ruohang 789a2327ba docs: replace the single-node report with the maintained migration entry point
Keep the original PR #228 report at a fixed commit link with contributor credit. Direct operators to the bilingual migration guide and its recovery requirements, and record the merged contribution.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 19:27:20 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e3e0c6215d Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main'
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 19:16:00 +08:00
Feng Ruohang b91e1c6f2a Merge pull request #228 from yupoet/docs/single-node-upgrade-from-archived-minio
Preserve the single-node migration report contributed by @yupoet.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 19:15:50 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 969a6a42d3 build: package Windows SILO archives as ZIP
Use ZIP for Windows amd64 and arm64. Validate the platform archive matrix, executable names, documentation, SBOMs and checksum coverage in the release pipeline.

Validated with local GoReleaser snapshots, six SPDX SBOMs and packaging regression checks.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 16:13:15 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1b5477f3df fix(iam): isolate policy reloads and propagate KMS cancellation
Release the authentication-cache lock while retaining IAM write ordering. Carry request cancellation through IAM and SSE-S3 list decryption, and publish policy replacements only after a complete successful load.

Preserve caller deadlines for slow policy queries and keep the existing etcd read budget scoped to its RPC. Cover concurrent refresh, updates, revocation, cancellation, and deadline compatibility.

Validation: 36 focused and 23 adversarial scenarios each passed three race runs; real 32-second object/etcd probes passed. Full suite passed with the Go DNS resolver after reproducing native DNS failures on the baseline; existing etcd suites, make verifiers, and make build also passed.
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 15:50:12 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a07d655dc6 Merge PR #250 while preserving local dependency updates
Retain the merged upstream LDAP fix and original contributor history. Keep the existing Go/dependency refresh and published-release documentation; combine the changelog credit without repeating the Go 1.27.3 note.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 11:22:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d43adc0f2b Merge pull request #250 from 910patin/fix/ldap-long-dn
Restore long-DN LDAP login while preserving IAM revision read errors.

Retain the original contribution by @910patin, add the bounded ASCII component guard and regression tests, and require the patched Go 1.27.3 toolchain. DCO, Go CI, VulnCheck and release snapshot validation passed on the final PR head.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 11:21:50 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3df51549bb build: require Go 1.27.3 for patched certificate verification
The PR CI found GO-2026-6809 in the remote main baseline using Go 1.27.2. Require the patched toolchain already used for local acceptance; keep module versions and the separate dependency refresh unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 11:04:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 324bb308dd docs: credit LDAP long-DN fix contributor
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 10:53:41 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 625c11e7e1 fix(iam): preserve revision errors for storable record names
Only classify a valid IAM key as absent when a length error accompanies an ASCII path component longer than 255 bytes. Normalized LDAP DNs satisfy this condition, while total-path errors and Unicode names can refer to existing revocation records.

Cover component boundaries, wrapped and storage errors, and real revocation records moved beneath a deep Darwin drive path.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 10:35:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4059c25e22 docs: reconcile published releases and unreleased dependencies
Replace stale draft status with the published 20261018 source boundary and
summarize the subsequent Go, dependency, and compatibility changes. Keep
historical details in the canonical English and Chinese release records.

Validated new links and anchors and the rebrand compatibility guard.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 02:15:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 011b0df5f5 build: update Go to 1.27.3 and refresh dependencies
Update the server and five debugging modules, regenerate dependency credits,
and refresh static curl and the native Red Hat CA mitigation.

Preserve Kafka's default broker protocol and terminal widths. Copy the
returned DARE plaintext when unsealing legacy keys, and cover old encrypted
keys, Kafka producer exchanges, and MinKMS TLS identity with regression tests.
Keep the published PGSTY component references for reproducible builds.

Validated with make test, targeted race tests, module integrity and tidy
checks, and govulncheck v1.9.0 source analysis. Rechecked the frozen source
and artifact hashes behind the earlier whole-stack compatibility evidence.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-23 02:15:16 +08:00
GL 9faeb7a114 fix(iam): treat IAM record names too long for the drive as absent
Since RELEASE.2026-09-16T00-00-00Z, LDAP users whose normalized DN is
longer than 255 bytes cannot log in. NormDN hex-escapes every non-ASCII
byte (go-ldap DN.String()), so one Cyrillic letter takes six characters.
IAM looks up records named after the DN: the parent revision check added
with cmd/iam-revision.go reads config/iam/users/<DN>/identity.json, and
PolicyDBGet reads config/iam/policydb/sts-users/<DN>.json when the
mapping is not cached.

A drive rejects such an element in one of two ways. checkPathLength
refuses more than 255 counted characters, but outside Windows it never
counts a backslash, so an escaped DN usually passes it. The filesystem
then fails with ENAMETOOLONG once the parent directory exists.
toObjectErr reports both as ObjectNameInvalid, and the callers treat
only errConfigNotFound as "no record". As a result,
AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity, access-key creation and STS loading fail.

Such a record cannot have been stored. When the object layer's own name
validation (checkBucketAndObjectNames) accepts the path,
ObjectNameInvalid can only mean a length rejection, so report it as
errConfigNotFound. Invalid names and storage errors are returned
unchanged, and saving such a record still fails. The etcd store has no
such limit and is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: GL <g@lopatin.info>
2026-10-19 18:49:20 +03:00
Feng Ruohang 856f8f4c55 docs: refresh release and contributor acknowledgments
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-19 07:52:26 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0cd388c666 fix(iam): persist and propagate scoped STS revocation
Enumerate durable STS identities for parent/type revocation, retain the
operation cutoff, and notify sibling caches for each committed deletion.
Repair missed notifications during periodic object/etcd IAM refresh.

Carry immutable STS tombstones and expiry through the existing IAM revision
protocol and deletion healing. Delayed creation cannot undo revocation,
while unrelated and newly issued keys stay valid. Keep partial failures
visible while propagating the successfully committed deletions.

Cover uncached credentials, warm sibling caches, dropped notifications,
object/etcd backends, reordered replay, concurrent issuance and partial
persistence failure. No new dependencies or authentication-path I/O.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 22:39:12 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1748f62c7e fix(pools): preserve delete markers and recheck migration cleanup
Move solitary and null delete markers instead of dropping them, including
idempotent UUID marker retries. Check that a reader's source version still
exists before moving it, and preserve the established read winner for
conflicting timestamp ties.

Retire only the versions that were successfully moved while holding the
pooled object lock. Recheck the source and retained copies before cleanup,
so concurrent deletes and uncertain destination reads cannot revive data.
Count remaining markers when verifying decommission completion.

Add two/three-pool walker, history, purge, concurrent-delete, read-fault,
and timestamp-tie regressions.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 22:39:12 +08:00
Denis Babchuk 60c7179ddb fix(pools): do not let data movement overwrite a newer copy
Apply PR #248 from bca40a4ac9.

Signed-off-by: Denis Babchuk <babchukdenis@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 22:39:07 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7007c164a5 build: remove ripgrep from rebrand verification
Use the existing Git tool to scan source files, including untracked files and exported source trees. Preserve hidden-file exclusions and worktree ignore rules, and reject scanner diagnostics before filtering matches. Remove the CI installation step.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 09:50:18 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 51b7de6a0d ci: install ripgrep for rebrand verification
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 08:46:30 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4733e1423c fix(multipart): defer persistent listing from public requests
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 08:36:58 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4189869e43 Merge multipart parent cleanup fix
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 08:22:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0f9199e0c3 fix(multipart): remove empty upload parents promptly
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 08:21:35 +08:00
Feng Ruohang bb60871f57 build: update silo-pkg to v3.14.3
Adopt the published policy-evaluation optimization and record the source update separately from existing component releases.

Verified with repository checks, builds and relevant race tests. No component release is created.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 07:52:13 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2c820895d7 fix(buildscripts): fail rebrand verification when ripgrep is missing
Check the existing ripgrep prerequisite before searches whose conditional
status handling would otherwise hide command-not-found failures. Preserve
untracked-file coverage and verification from a source archive without Git.

Addresses the missing-tool finding recorded in commit
4fb3a7fa3b175727db987f3ba2523c84f74d4168 without its scan-scope changes.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 07:23:05 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2080b3d031 test(listing): cover mixed object and directory recovery groups
Extend the pending-directory collision test with absent recovery and a smaller
key. Add all six normal-object, directory, and pending-object channel orders,
checking complete-group recovery and preservation of trailing entries.

Test changes adapted from commit 557bc274a32330321fa5e5ac7636068c7bd98eb0.
Retain the complete-group directory handling from 3dd53eb81f.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 07:23:05 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9954392605 fix(iam): normalize bulk self access-key listings
Use the existing self-service authorization helper for policyless regular
users and normalize explicit service-account and STS aliases to their parent.
Keep explicit denials and cross-user authorization intact. Assert decrypted
identity contents and negative boundaries in the existing handler tests.

Adapted from commit 5d0b692d8cd387622a3219e72430dffaaf5a25ce.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-18 07:23:05 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3dd53eb81f fix(listing): preserve directories after absent object recovery
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1445fc1d85d5166de24c7a378cee3479cfc95a43)
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-17 21:25:01 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 86fb2b833f Prepare SILO 20261018 with the coordinated October dependency stack
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-17 19:28:33 +08:00
Feng Ruohang fbcb511978 Merge pull request #239: confirm unresolved LIST groups
Confirm eligible unresolved LIST groups without changing S3 parameters, storage formats or ordinary writer routing. Preserve original PR #221 commits and authorship.

All eight PR checks, local full/race tests and the nonpublishing snapshot pipeline pass. Current-source normal and rolling correctness pass. The strict 5% performance qualification remains inconclusive and is documented separately from the source-merge decision; no production release is authorized.

Closes #218.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-17 11:57:20 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 87c1c6b3dc fix(listing): confirm current groups and bound recovery lock waits
Distinguish all-drive native absence from read uncertainty and confirm current pool targets before omitting a recovered name. Cover both existing single-pool writer lock domains, release before encoding or output, and preserve cache terminal errors without blocking the HTTP error response on remote publication.

Keep ordinary entries free of recovery I/O and locks. Bound the selective short lock-conflict wait, preserve existing retry intervals and quorum, and make retries cancelable with late-grant cleanup coverage. Restore the original raw listing callback and unchanged scanner/healing/migration callers now that recovery errors originate in the merger.

Add deterministic deletion, pool ordering, cache, lock-routing and cancellation regressions to race CI. Focused cmd/dsync/lsync race suites and verifiers pass; complete current-main integration and bare-binary performance validation are recorded in PR #239.

Refs: https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/218
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-17 11:18:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1e0e5ac53c Merge current main before completing listing recovery
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-17 11:09:12 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7e9454456e Merge pull request #243: unify durable multipart listing
Use the existing persistent scanner for public multipart listing, tolerate confirmed unidentified historical records individually, and retire the migration mode while preserving default Abort availability.

Keep capacity and delayed-create boundaries explicit. Related to #79; this does not close its remaining lifecycle and capacity work. Companion documentation: pgsty/silo.pgsty.com#43.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-17 10:15:39 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4ed86dfe62 Unify durable multipart listing without a migration mode
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-17 08:56:50 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4e55fc7db4 Merge pull request #242 from pgsty/codex/fix-iam-admin-authorization
Enforce Admin self-service denials, session credential boundaries, root credential protection, and safe service-account issuance/cleanup.

Accepted commit 2616d43fbc after the complete IAM/STS integration selection, focused race tests, build/verifiers, and all eight hosted checks passed.

Related to #222; release and deployment remain separate.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-16 22:03:00 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2616d43fbc fix(iam): enforce admin credential authorization boundaries
Honor self-service authorization denials, prevent session-limited credential delegation and updates, and protect root credential mutations under built-in IAM. Preserve empty-policy inheritance and damaged-account cleanup, normalize new service policy claims at issuance, and add signed Admin API and LDAP regressions.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-16 21:49:59 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2a4db6a4f9 fix(listing): snapshot asynchronous cache cleanup inputs
Capture the metacache peer before launching cleanup and pass listing
options by value. The parent can clear its cache ID without changing the
background RPC lookup or racing with its reads of shared request state.

Publish complete immutable disk snapshots through atomic.Value in the
listing fixtures instead of replacing getDisks after requests start.
Add a real peer RPC regression for cleanup using the original cache ID;
reverting the options copy reproduces both the race and an empty RPC ID.

Verified the final 18-test listing race suite, 30 repetitions of the real
peer regression, formatting checks and make lint. Prior runtime evidence
retains its original e90cb206 source identity.

Refs: https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/218
Refs: https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/239
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-16 01:23:29 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e90cb2067d fix(listing): preserve readable keys across pool and metadata disagreements
Continue PR #221 while retaining its original commits and authorship.
Route latest-only fallback reads through the namespace lock used by normal
writes, propagate terminal scan errors before cache completion, and retain
delete markers until the cross-pool merge has resolved them.

Recount narrowly eligible latest null-version metadata when mixed erasure
layouts prevent selection. Keep each EC group separate and preserve the
requested quorum, strict resolution, and version-listing behavior.

Add regression coverage for locking, terminal errors, cache completion,
delete markers, mixed EC layouts, and HTTP behavior; run focused race tests
in CI. Verified with make test, focused race tests, and local distributed
single- and multi-pool rolling-restart workloads with exact final oracles.

Refs: https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/218
Refs: https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/221
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-16 00:58:46 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 00a375c4e2 Merge pull request #238 from pgsty/codex/checksum-error-followup
Embed the Console versioning error fix at e5b165e4c0ee and add regression coverage for the algorithm-specific checksum messages merged in #229. Go CI, vulnerability checks, DCO and release-pipeline validation passed; the actual embedded Console and S3 checksum responses were also verified locally.

Fixes #231.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 21:47:26 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ab4c97e607 fix: embed Console versioning error handling and cover checksum messages
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 21:33:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 721dbfd1b7 Merge pull request #229 from yupoet/fix/putobject-checksum-error-message-226
Preserve the checksum rejection status and code while naming the checksum algorithm in PutObject and UploadPart error messages.

Validated on the branch updated to main: all six Go CI jobs and VulnCheck passed. Additional local coverage checked all five algorithms, wrapped errors, trailing checksums, multipart count mismatches and the generic fallback.

The maintainer explicitly accepted this contribution without the original author's DCO trailer as a one-time exception. Original authorship and the original commit are retained; no sign-off has been added on the author's behalf.

Fixes #226

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 21:22:45 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2926474688 Merge branch 'main' into fix/putobject-checksum-error-message-226 2026-10-15 21:10:14 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a7370aa9ac Merge pull request #236 from clown15/fix-cleanup-stale-uploads-modtime
Parse native multipart directory timestamps before the Base64 compatibility path. Cover ambiguous plaintext IDs, cleanup metadata reads, expiration, and conservative legacy fallback.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 18:31:35 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a592d69f45 Merge pull request #232 from julienlau/julienlau/fix/commit-metadata-missing-503
Classify missing final-commit metadata as a retryable write failure, preserving storage RPC and quorum behavior. Cover real staged-metadata loss, API responses, successful quorums, and rollback boundaries.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 18:30:01 +08:00
Feng Ruohang bfc7906064 fix: prefer native multipart timestamps during cleanup
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 18:19:37 +08:00
Feng Ruohang eeff112491 test: verify commit metadata loss and write quorum boundaries
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 18:18:45 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a70156e45b Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into codex/pr236-maintainer-completion
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 18:12:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 99245e3ef8 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into codex/pr232-maintainer-completion
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 18:12:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7a3ca0f821 build: gate releases on Object Lock regressions (#237)
Run the existing Object Lock authorization and overwrite race regressions before release state changes, builds, packages, and uploads.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 13:20:15 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d94b3b3c92 Merge pull request #233 from julienlau/julienlau/fix/stale-metadata-leaks
Fix stale metadata in legacy xl.meta headers and scanner responses.

Keep scanner response resets local and cover reused legacy headers and both scanner response variants.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 10:01:39 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 86c5a92eef fix: keep scanner response resets local and strengthen regression tests
Keep the legacy header resets and clear the unused NSScanner response
field at each construction site. Remove the generic stream Recycler call:
Recycler transfers resource ownership and cannot be treated as a reset
hook followed by another insertion into the handler's pool.

Exercise the actual NSScanner handler across repeated scans with dirty
response allocations, so the regression test does not depend on sync.Pool
reusing an object. Check both response variants after wire serialization.
Cover legacy DecodeMsg and reused indexed metadata headers as well.

Retain the original contributor's commits and DCO sign-offs.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 09:48:16 +08:00
Feng Ruohang cdc3b8cb10 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into codex/pr-233-maintainer-fix
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-15 09:42:46 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0d3ba5d4cb Merge pull request #235 from pgsty/codex/retention-preflight-hardening
Retain the verified Object Lock write-lock defenses and the coordinated bilingual repair documentation.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-14 23:42:33 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 71a1631f13 fix: reject object lock preflight read failures
Return storage read failures before accepting an object overwrite. Keep the null-version and multipart target checks under the destination write lock, and add slow-body, read-fault, legacy-upload and recovery-collision regressions to the Object Lock race gate.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-14 23:28:36 +08:00
clown15 2d57b975d1 cmd: fix fast-path modtime parsing in cleanupStaleUploadsOnDisk
Upload ID directories on disk are named as '<UUID>x<UnixNano>'.
Attempting to decode them as Base64 fails unconditionally, causing
the cleanup routine to bypass the timestamp check and fall back to
disk.ReadVersion on every active upload.

Directly parse the timestamp suffix from the plaintext directory
name to restore O(1) stale upload detection, while preserving Base64
decoding and ReadVersion fallback for legacy uploads.

Signed-off-by: clown15 <thsdhrhd15@naver.com>
2026-10-14 08:55:51 +00:00
Feng Ruohang 14042b5aab Merge pull request #234 from pgsty/codex/fix-retention-write-bypasses
fix: enforce retention authorization and immutable version writes

Include Go 1.27.2 security fixes and a compatible linter.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-14 16:02:58 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 38a5ab549c build: use golangci-lint compatible with Go 1.27.2
Pin golangci-lint v2.14.0, whose x/tools v0.50.0 decoder supports the
version 5 export data emitted by Go 1.27.2. The previous v2.13.1 binary
failed to import internal/cpu in Linux CI before running the checks.
Keep the existing linter selection and configuration.

Developed with Codex (Astra).

Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-14 15:48:51 +08:00
Feng Ruohang fa565ec9fc build: update Go to 1.27.2 and x/net to 0.60.0
Use the October security fixes for reachable standard-library and HTTP/2
vulnerabilities found by govulncheck. Align the module requirement, build
dependency check and digest-pinned Docker build stages on Go 1.27.2.
Update only golang.org/x/net and its checksums; module tidying and credit
regeneration introduce no other dependency or license changes.

Developed with Codex (Astra).

Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-10-14 15:39:25 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3196480da9 fix: enforce retention authorization and immutable version writes
Close SN-2026-015 by requiring PutObjectRetention with request-derived
condition keys before reading bucket or object state. Weakening unexpired
GOVERNANCE retention also requires the bypass header and permission. Treat
retention removal as zero remaining days and avoid duration saturation for
distant dates.

Close SN-2026-016 by requiring replication trust for caller-selected target
version IDs and checking persisted multipart targets and locked null
versions under the destination write lock, including across storage pools.
Preserve versioning transitions, trusted replication and batch Snowball
version IDs, and fail closed when lock state cannot be read.

Add authorization, concurrent lock-update, multipart transition, cross-pool,
configuration-failure and retention-boundary regression coverage. Validate
with make test, focused race tests and the original independent probes.

Developed with Codex (Astra).

Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit fe3935476b929e03193d7496a7448d760e635096)
2026-10-14 15:25:19 +08:00
Julien Laurenceau cb85461c42 test: cover renameData commit-metadata-missing conversion
Drive renameData() with stub disks to assert that an in-quorum
errCommitMetaMissing is converted to errErasureWriteQuorum (HTTP 503)
and that an in-quorum errFileNotFound still surfaces unchanged so
PutObject() keeps returning IncompleteBody for client disconnects.

Signed-off-by: Julien Laurenceau <julien.laurenceau@pepitedata.com>
2026-10-12 17:24:40 +02:00
Julien Laurenceau ba6e8c8d69 fix: reset Signature when unmarshaling legacy V1 xl.meta headers
The V1 header wire format has no Signature field, so decoding into a
reused header leaked the previous object's signature. Reset it along
with EcN/EcM so a decode fully replaces the header contents.

Signed-off-by: Julien Laurenceau <julien.laurenceau@pepitedata.com>
2026-10-12 17:12:49 +02:00
Julien Laurenceau a54d0c4354 fix: reset pooled NSScanner RPC responses to avoid stale usage data
NSScanner responses stream either a dataUsageEntry update or the
final dataUsageCache. The grid framework recycles stream responses
into a pool without resetting them, and the handler set only one
field per response - so a recycled response still carried the Final
(or Update) payload of an earlier scan. A remote node reading such a
response accepted the stale final cache, corrupting bucket usage
data across scanner cycles.

Honor Recycler types when pooling stream responses, implement it for
nsScannerResp, and clear the unset field at the response
construction sites for defense in depth.

Signed-off-by: Julien Laurenceau <julien.laurenceau@pepitedata.com>
2026-10-12 17:02:02 +02:00
Julien Laurenceau 00d4a206f7 fix: zero EcM when unmarshaling legacy xl.meta V2 headers
The legacy header decode paths zeroed EcN twice (z.EcN, z.EcN = 0, 0)
instead of EcN and EcM, so EcM retained its previous value when the
same structure was reused across decodes. Decoding an xl.meta written
by an older release would then leak the erasure metadata (data/parity
block counts) of a previously decoded object into it, potentially
corrupting quorum and healing decisions.

Also zero the fields on the V1 header path, which had no reset at
all.

Signed-off-by: Julien Laurenceau <julien.laurenceau@pepitedata.com>
2026-10-12 17:02:02 +02:00
Julien Laurenceau f480086b6b fix: return 503 instead of 404 when commit metadata is missing
When the staged xl.meta disappears between the data rename and the
meta-file commit inside RenameData(), the affected drives return
errFileNotFound. An in-quorum errFileNotFound is reduced by
reduceWriteQuorumErrs() and previously surfaced as:

- IncompleteBody (400) from PutObject(), misattributing the failure
  to a client disconnect, or
- ObjectNotFound (404 NoSuchKey) from CompleteMultipartUpload(),
  telling clients the object is absent so they skip retries.

Map errFileNotFound at the commit step to a dedicated internal
errCommitMetaMissing, convert it to errErasureWriteQuorum in
renameData(), and map it to InsufficientWriteQuorum (HTTP 503) in
toObjectErr() so clients retry. Below-quorum outcomes already return
InsufficientWriteQuorum and are unchanged, as is the IncompleteBody
mapping for staging failures of client-disconnected uploads.

Signed-off-by: Julien Laurenceau <julien.laurenceau@pepitedata.com>
2026-10-12 16:11:06 +02:00
Paris Yu 968c30238c fix: name the checksum algorithm in PutObject/UploadPart mismatch errors
hash.ChecksumMismatch now carries the requested algorithm (CRC32, CRC32C,
SHA1, SHA256, CRC64NVME), and toAPIError renders it S3-style:

  The CRC32 you specified did not match the calculated checksum.

instead of the generic "The provided 'x-amz-checksum' header does not match
what was computed.", for all four mismatch construction sites (streaming
reader, trailing-checksum decode, and both Checksum.Matches paths). Mirrors
the wording already shipped for CompleteMultipartUpload in #225.

Fixes #226
2026-09-26 20:37:20 +08:00
Paris Yu fec1e0804a docs: add field-validated single-node upgrade guide from archived MinIO community edition
The compatibility audit does not cover the single-node/single-drive (FS mode)
case explicitly. This documents a production upgrade from the final community
release (RELEASE.2025-10-15T17-29-55Z) to Silo RELEASE.2026-09-16T00-00-00Z:
why standalone deployments are low-risk (schema retention, no multi-node REST
concern, IAM tightening not applicable), the validated procedure with layered
verification, field results (~5.9k objects, zero migration, zero hardening
rejections, full app regression passed), and the post-upgrade behavior changes
to review per client (TLS defaults, If-Match on DeleteObject, multipart listing
cap, TRUSTED_PROXIES default).
2026-09-26 19:41:43 +08:00
Feng Ruohang bcb5fc9566 Merge pull request #225 from cbornet/error-messages
Align some checksum error messages with S3

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-26 09:03:50 +08:00
cbornet 394d9db212 Align some checksum error messages with S3
Signed-off-by: cbornet <cbornet@hotmail.com>
2026-09-25 17:44:52 +02:00
mr javad seydi 8c784f6133 fix(listing): narrow the list fallback per review
Signed-off-by: mr javad seydi <seydi.birjand@gmail.com>
2026-09-23 19:03:00 +03:30
mr javad seydi 258b167b1c fix(listing): resolve undecidable list entries against the locked read path
Refs: https://github.com/pgsty/silo/issues/218

Signed-off-by: mr javad seydi <seydi.birjand@gmail.com>
2026-09-23 18:23:15 +03:30
Feng Ruohang 69d5e92791 Merge pull request #220 from AleksaMCode/fix/lambda-targetidset-isempty
Fix `TargetIDSet.IsEmpty` and add regression test
2026-09-23 08:07:09 +08:00
AleksaMCode efd5698597 lambda/event: fix TargetIDSet.IsEmpty and add regression test
Signed-off-by: AleksaMCode <aleksamcode@gmail.com>
2026-09-17 22:06:44 +02:00
Feng Ruohang 2fde3cf535 docs: update ec description 2026-09-17 09:42:26 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2a4d51406b test: build the purge-response fixture ARN at runtime
The rebrand compatibility guard tracks every literal policy value that
names the upstream brand. Construct the replication ARN the way the
other replication fixtures do instead of adding a new literal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 23:50:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0596685ae7 docs: record the delete-marker purge, listing quorum and migration tag repairs
Describe the three correctness repairs merged after the 20260916 candidate
was prepared, together with their known remaining limits (#217, #218).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 23:44:44 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 358ab38fb0 fix: report a purged version as a delete marker only for stored markers
The exact-version purge path copies the looked-up DeleteMarker flag
into the DELETE response so that removing a delete marker keeps its
x-amz-delete-marker header. That flag is also set for a data version
whose purge is pending, because the lookup exposes such a version as
deleted for visibility. Retrying the purge after the replication
configuration was removed therefore answered with
x-amz-delete-marker: true and raised ObjectRemovedDeleteMarkerCreated
for a data version.

Only a stored marker carries no erasure layout; use that to decide the
response identity. Found by the adversarial review of the purge change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 22:53:12 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 254b19ac07 fix(replication): recheck queued delete-marker creations under the lock
A delete-marker creation task carries the marker as it looked when it
was queued by the DELETE handler, a GET/HEAD/LIST heal, the scanner or
MRF. Tasks from several frontends serialize on the per-object
replication lock, so a task can run after the user has purged that
marker and the purge has already reached the targets. The target no
longer holds the marker, so the queued creation recreated it there with
the original VersionID and mtime. This is the late-create sequence seen
in the 2026-09-16 three-site runs: purge 204 on both targets, then about
85 ms later a replicated creation for the same VersionID.

Re-read the source version under the replication lock before sending a
creation. A missing version, a non-marker version, or a version under
purge makes the task stale; it is dropped without touching the source.
A read that cannot confirm either way is retried through MRF instead of
being treated as absence.

Creations already on the wire, replays from other sites, and cleanup of
minority residue after a crash are not covered by this check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 22:35:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang eb4f5e5b31 Fix exact-version purges and delete-marker metadata healing
Require write-quorum absence for missing purge retries, aggregate removed and already-absent votes only for physical purges, and resolve receiver purges by version across pools. Preserve marker metadata through creation and healing while retaining DELETE response semantics.

Add real-disk quorum, pool, callback, metadata, heal and outbound replication regressions. Synchronize capacity fixture installation and restoration with concurrent IAM readers.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit 22ba4d426677aa07470927fc349a43afd87e19b6)
2026-09-16 22:24:27 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 8d06424b12 fix: retain quorate null versions after newer minorities
Recount only when the existing selection is below quorum and each original
nonempty stream has one ordinary null version with identical EC headers.
Reuse the existing header grouping and leave history pruning unchanged.

Add deterministic signed LIST, complete-metadata permutation, excluded-history,
object-read, scanner/heal, Walk and migration-consumer regressions.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9804e4deb4d5a18cca640be72bff9b47a415f7de)
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 21:50:03 +08:00
Feng Ruohang fced863036 fix(storage): preserve tags during pool migration
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 20:22:37 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5af0865aab Merge pull request #214 from pgsty/codex/release-prep-20260916
Prepare the SILO 20260916000000 source candidate with released component pins, CPU metrics synchronization, regression coverage and release tooling updates.

All 11 checks passed on e7963381ba. Signed release artifacts, image publication and deployment remain separate deliverables tracked by #203.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 19:30:07 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 83821f0f1f Merge pull request #216 from pgsty/codex/docs-published-design-links-20260916
docs: link retained guides to published design records
2026-09-16 18:50:28 +08:00
Feng Ruohang bf053386a4 docs: link compression and federation to maintained design records
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 18:26:03 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e7963381ba test: synchronize tag replication capacity fixtures
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 17:37:47 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 37c0edc7ca test: use canonical octal permissions in LZ4 fixture
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 17:33:58 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a2fe70424e release: prepare SILO 20260916000000 candidate
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 17:30:29 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 027d43b4eb fix: synchronize CPU resource metrics reads
Hold resourceMetricsMapMu.RLock while the v3 CPU collector reads both the
subsystem map and its nested idle/iowait metrics. The unsynchronized reads
were inherited from upstream commit f7b665347 (minio/minio#19560).

Add value and concurrent Prometheus Gather regression tests, run them in
the targeted race CI job, and record the existing CPU metric names in the
compatibility inventory.

Fixes #210

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 17:09:19 +08:00
Feng Ruohang f99ed829b5 Merge pull request #213 from pgsty/codex/pr198-release-compat
fix: preserve multipart defaults and rollback compatibility
2026-09-16 16:42:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 956a1a8e33 Merge pull request #212 from pgsty/codex/docs-migration-cleanup
docs: consolidate repository entry points and retire migrated work records
2026-09-16 16:39:40 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 82f0a9828e fix: preserve multipart defaults and rollback compatibility
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 16:30:43 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 584b5a3a8f docs: link the canonical recovery runbooks
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 16:19:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 39f49d548f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into codex/docs-migration-cleanup
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>

# Conflicts:
#	CONTRIBUTORS.md
2026-09-16 16:13:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a168576adb Merge pull request #208 from pgsty/codex/conditional-put-release-notes
docs: describe conditional PUT behavior and tested recovery guidance
2026-09-16 16:09:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e85c4c8dfb docs: preserve reviewed contributor records and daily card references
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 16:09:00 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0e3c43778e Merge pull request #211 from pgsty/codex/daily-repository-cards
ci: update README repository cards daily at 00:00 UTC
2026-09-16 15:40:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9101fe78db ci: refresh README repository cards daily at 00:00 UTC
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 15:27:48 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 82948d6306 Merge pull request #198 from mrjavadseydi/fix/issue-79-list-multipart-uploads
Retain the original contributor commit and integrate the reviewed durable listing, cancellation confirmation and migration fixes. Capacity acceptance and delayed creation-write fencing remain open in issue #79.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 13:40:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang dfb4b2a1d2 fix: return HTTP 503 when multipart scan capacity is exhausted
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 13:24:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 143f6970d8 fix: make multipart discovery and cancellation explicit and bounded
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 13:16:37 +08:00
Feng Ruohang ea5dac5a99 Merge current main into multipart listing contribution
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 12:51:20 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3c26a8b0b5 Merge pull request #209 from pgsty/codex/credit-console-share-reporter
fix: integrate the bounded Console sharing proxy and credit its reporter
2026-09-16 12:19:29 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2fabd436c0 fix: select the bounded Console sharing proxy
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 12:05:00 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 07c68d6054 docs: credit Jiri Pejchal for the Console sharing report
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 11:48:38 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 15090dc4fd docs: retire migrated working material and clarify documentation ownership
Remove migrated investigation and security documents, repair their incoming links, and align the English/Chinese READMEs with current module and release boundaries. Track AGENTS.md as the shared repository guide and make CLAUDE.md import it; keep working artifacts outside the repository.

Publish pgsty/silo.pgsty.com commit c7682185e2832b981629e1c17aef74fc778c6ca1 before publishing this cleanup: the new documentation routes are not live yet.

Validation: make rebrand-guard; 92 Markdown files checked for deletion-induced broken relative paths; 199 source-to-site references and anchors resolve in the paired site build; git diff --check.
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 11:22:48 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e791640dac docs: describe merged conditional PUT behavior and recovery guidance
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 11:21:16 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9b4ae82a29 Merge pull request #207 from pgsty/codex/conditional-put-pools
fix(pools): evaluate cross-pool PUT conditions against the current object
2026-09-16 11:17:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4620be394b test: synchronize conditional PUT disk fixtures
Replace unsynchronized getDisks swaps with backing disk-list updates under
erasureDisksMu, matching the existing GetDisks reader lock. Apply the same
helper to capacity and read-fault adapters while preserving nested restore
ordering.

Add a regression that overlaps fixture changes with the real IAM Walk
reader, and run the conditional PUT suite under the race detector in CI.
The regression reproduces the old fixture race; ten fixed race iterations
pass without warnings. Production conditional PUT behavior is unchanged.

Refs #199

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 10:53:24 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5e7d603083 fix(pools): evaluate cross-pool PUT conditions against the current object
Multi-pool PUT selected a destination by capacity and evaluated
If-Match/If-None-Match only against that destination's local object
state. An empty or stale destination could accept a stale ETag or
If-None-Match:* while another pool held the current object, replacing
it; a current ETag could instead be rejected with 412 or 404.

Under PUT's existing pools-layer object lock, resolve the comparison
object with objectPoolInfos (including draining pools), treat a latest
delete marker as absence, fail closed on unreadable pool metadata, and
clear an accepted callback before destination dispatch. Replica and
data-movement callbacks keep their addressed-version semantics and
metadata reconciliation.

Reproduced on 40220bd836 and RELEASE.2026-09-03T13-18-01Z with six
signed HTTP scenarios: four defect cases failed, two controls passed.

Refs #199

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 08:21:21 +08:00
Feng Ruohang fb7c406ddc Merge pull request #206 from pgsty/codex/main-consolidation-20260916
test: restore valid credentials in integration fixtures
2026-09-16 08:18:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 416826f61f Merge pull request #205 from pgsty/codex/release-notes-followups
docs: complete September correctness and upgrade notes
2026-09-16 08:16:23 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a2e2f3ee82 test: restore valid credentials in integration fixtures
Port the shell-fixture changes from ebc9937d97b27871dcc4bb91d4b5771d3550b76a. Match the existing minimum secret length consistently across startup, aliases and helper commands.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 08:08:08 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 70c7ec4a9f docs: link reviewed runbook sources before website deployment
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 08:04:53 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2b722b7e92 docs: complete September correctness and upgrade notes
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 07:51:11 +08:00
mr javad seydi 4cbb074ccd fix: make multipart upload listing S3-compatible
Signed-off-by: mr javad seydi <seydi.birjand@gmail.com>
2026-09-15 23:17:55 +03:30
Feng Ruohang 40220bd836 Merge pull request #196 from pgsty/codex/merge-r4-r8
Complete R5, R6 and R8 on the main baseline containing R4 and R7.

Preserve the individual signed repairs, independent Opus 5 Max review, and integration validation evidence.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 01:14:06 +08:00
Feng Ruohang df0dfa0a34 docs: record R4-R8 integration review and validation
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:58:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 80684fed59 chore: align integrated repair tests with contribution checks
Use the actual author and AGPL-3.0-or-later notices for new R6/R8 tests, preserving all test bodies and the Linux build tag. Record the existing replication ARN prefix used by the new R6 fixture in the compatibility inventory; no wire behavior changes.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:44:34 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 055030ea53 fix(http): honor configured request header deadlines
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0d48d32d7e038ae1ea5966f3d7e0cb86780a6311)
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:37:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang aea3882c95 docs: record R6 integration verification
(cherry picked from commit d38edb2c46182d3a8fa96e040604493d20a4b478)
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:37:56 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 0c61128d23 fix(replication): retry marker purges through persisted MRF
(cherry picked from commit cf381a7151ef25fc95ace5fedcd767fa19410de2)
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:37:55 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 680eac66e4 fix(replication): preserve ordered tag deletions
Persist, send and reconcile empty tag states together with their revision
across COPY, PUT and multipart replication. Advance local tag mutations
under the existing locks and preserve current tags during replication ACK.

Cover signed HTTP, persistent single/multiple pool state, KMS, SSE-C key
rotation, ordering, retry and duplicate requests. Record real Opus plan
consensus, implementation review and local verification evidence.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
(cherry picked from commit 115fe8b12329d147adbaf817faa1737392ecbf9b)
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:37:55 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9f3037e941 Merge pull request #194 from pgsty/codex/r7-replication-content-encoding
fix(replication): preserve normalized replica metadata
2026-09-16 00:31:03 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5f00f6762f Merge main after R4 validation into R7 candidate
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:21:21 +08:00
Feng Ruohang af2b1794d3 Merge pull request #193 from pgsty/codex/r4-kms-tag-timestamp
fix(replication): preserve SSE-KMS tag timestamps
2026-09-16 00:20:10 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d371f77dcc docs: record final Opus 5 Max R7 implementation review
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:10:31 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 022722a7a7 chore: align R4 contribution notices and record final review
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:08:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 03027727d1 fix(replication): preserve SSE-KMS tag timestamps
Carry the already-parsed source tagging timestamp through the KMS options
constructor so replica COPY can apply newer tag updates on explicitly or
automatically encrypted destinations.

Cover all option encryption modes and signed COPY persistence for newer,
stale, duplicate and timestamp-less updates, including bucket defaults.
Preserve the real Opus 5.0/max plan review, consensus and local validation.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:03:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4fcdf37ce6 fix(replication): preserve normalized replica metadata
Restore only the six replication-specific metadata fields after trust
validation, so streaming uploads retain their actual content encoding and
Snowball entries do not inherit ordinary metadata from the outer archive.

Include helper, authenticated PUT/COPY/multipart and Snowball regressions,
plus the R7 investigation, actual Opus 5 consensus and local verification.
The production change is based on PR #187 by Mikhail Khadarenka.

Co-authored-by: Mikhail Khadarenka <chodorenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-16 00:00:17 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9ebe81c1b3 Merge pull request #192 from pgsty/codex/iam-revision-tombstones
fix(iam): retain revocation versions through replay and recovery
2026-09-15 23:14:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e5f5c9e7f6 Merge pull request #191 from pgsty/codex/iam-peer-delete-reload
fix(iam): reload committed state on peer deletion notifications
2026-09-15 23:10:38 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 7b4cacc392 chore: align IAM file notices with contribution policy
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 22:59:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang a0dd7dae9b fix(iam): resume site healing after leadership changes
Keep one healing loop per process across replication configuration reloads. Reacquire leadership after a lease is canceled and allow shutdown while waiting, so temporary quorum loss cannot permanently stop revocation propagation.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 22:59:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 709d50a916 fix(iam): persist revocations across site replay and recovery
Retain source-ordered tombstones and parent grant boundaries across both IAM backends, cache reloads, and deliberate identity recreation. Reconcile deletions through a versioned, bounded replication protocol with restart-aware acknowledgements.

Cover inherited group grants, STS retention, same-key service recreation, absolute expiration, and failures after the durable commit. Document coordinated upgrades and the remaining consistency boundaries.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 22:59:04 +08:00
Feng Ruohang dff81f293b chore: align IAM test notice with contribution policy
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 22:58:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang f653a6ea03 fix(iam): reload committed state on peer deletion notifications
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 22:58:52 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 47d239f84f Merge pull request #190 from pgsty/codex/fix-pool-multipart-preconditions
fix(storage): evaluate multipart preconditions across pools
2026-09-15 21:57:26 +08:00
Feng Ruohang e069fe9d92 fix(storage): evaluate multipart preconditions across pools
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 21:13:37 +08:00
Feng Ruohang d848fb52b5 Merge pull request #189 from pgsty/codex/fix-pool-tag-reconciliation
fix(storage): preserve tags during pool reconciliation
2026-09-15 19:38:19 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 3ce8319251 fix(storage): preserve tags during pool reconciliation
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 19:26:58 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9df0f4abaf Merge pull request #188 from pgsty/codex/remove-access-tiering-final
Remove access-frequency pool tiering and preserve independent multi-pool correctness fixes. Reconcile ordinary addressed-version DELETE across pools, retaining existing quorum and compatibility boundaries.

Verified delivery head: 4d0693cb8c. All 11 final CI checks and three qualified Linux upgrade runs passed. Introduction, retirement decisions and historical unresolved observations are documented.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 15:09:48 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4d0693cb8c docs: record controlled retirement evidence and qualified upgrade runs
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 14:56:20 +08:00
Feng Ruohang bf59e3f222 docs: record retirement execution and blocked Linux acceptance
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 12:16:45 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 41aa846097 style(storage): satisfy callback selection lint rule
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 11:31:32 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 4093fa0d78 docs: record access tiering introduction and retirement decisions
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 11:27:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 13bf126ebd fix(storage): reuse resolved copies for version DELETE callbacks
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 11:27:02 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 1cf529ce8a fix(storage): reconcile ordinary version DELETE across pools
Delete every copy of an explicitly addressed UUID, null version or delete
marker under the pool lock. Preserve retention and replication callbacks,
report unreadable pools and cleanup failures, and keep movement, incoming
replication, expiration and free-version cleanup on their existing paths.

Retain the separately developed general DELETE repair and replace its
access-mover-only coverage with a real interrupted rebalance copy followed
by HTTP deletion. Cover unqualified directory-marker DELETE and document
the existing pool-order-dependent 503 behavior that this makes consistent.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 11:27:01 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 9b76a21675 revert: remove access-frequency ILM tiering (#60)
Reverse the first-parent diff of a3df317ae0,
including the feature branch compatibility and mover follow-up fixes.
Retain the independent multi-pool correctness fixes from #178 and migrate
their shared test fixture away from access-tier code.

Tolerate retired ILM keys and XML, read old v9 statistics while writing v8,
and document migration without moving objects or rewriting their metadata.
Include regression coverage using a historical scanner/writer v9 fixture.

Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-15 11:27:01 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 89637554d6 Merge pull request #182 from pgsty/codex/docs-current-state-20260913
docs: align release notes and current component status
2026-09-13 10:50:22 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 2dd1e00da4 docs: align release notes and current component status
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-13 10:39:57 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 5d955b5b74 Merge pull request #181 from pgsty/codex/deps-release-20260913
Coordinate September dependency releases and replace vulnerable bundled curl
2026-09-13 10:14:57 +08:00
Feng Ruohang f7808a172c deps: pin the coordinated September 13 SILO stack
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-13 09:54:51 +08:00
Feng Ruohang acc9b514f5 Follow the curl builder rename in delivery verification
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-13 09:08:38 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 31ba01c5d5 Refresh Go dependencies and build current static curl for both architectures
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
2026-09-13 09:01:09 +08:00
Feng Ruohang 48ec10312f Merge pull request #180 from pgsty/codex/issue-77-metadata-convergence
fix(replication): preserve bucket metadata source times and converge deletions
2026-09-12 18:07:36 +08:00
483 changed files with 68675 additions and 24423 deletions
+12
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
version: 2
updates:
# Dockerfile.goreleaser and Dockerfile.distroless pin their bases by digest
# so a release tag rebuilds from the same bytes. Without this the pins would
# silently rot and stop receiving base-image CVE fixes.
- package-ecosystem: docker
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
commit-message:
prefix: build
+4
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ archives:
ids:
- silo
name_template: "silo_{{ .Env.PKG_VERSION }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
formats: ["tar.gz"]
format_overrides:
- goos: windows
formats: ["zip"]
# Explicit so the license materials cannot silently drop out of the
# binary archives: GoReleaser's default file globs would miss NOTICE.
# CREDITS stays out deliberately -- at 1.8MB it would dominate the
+1 -1
View File
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ jobs:
mkdir -p "${context}/dockerscripts"
tar -xzf "${archive}" -C "${context}" silo
cp Dockerfile.goreleaser Dockerfile.distroless LICENSE NOTICE CREDITS "${context}/"
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh \
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh \
"${context}/dockerscripts/"
done
+3 -1
View File
@@ -148,7 +148,9 @@ jobs:
for rpm_file in finalize/packages/*.rpm; do
signature_output="$(sudo rpmkeys --checksig --verbose "${rpm_file}")"
printf '%s\n' "${signature_output}"
if ! printf '%s\n' "${signature_output}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' | grep -q "key id ${key_id}: ok"; then
normalized_signature="$(printf '%s\n' "${signature_output}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
full_fingerprint="$(printf '%s' "${expected_fingerprint}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')"
if ! printf '%s\n' "${normalized_signature}" | grep -Eq "key id ${key_id}: ok|key fingerprint: ${full_fingerprint}: ok"; then
echo "Signature verification failed for ${rpm_file}" >&2
exit 1
fi
+50
View File
@@ -90,6 +90,56 @@ jobs:
- name: Run S3 Select tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./internal/s3select/... -count=1
- name: Run conditional PUT and multipart tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(PoolsConditionalPut|SinglePoolConditionalPutHTTP|PoolsMultipartCondition)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run multi-pool delete consistency tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(Pools(Delete|BulkDelete|RetiringCopyPreservesSharedTierObject)|BulkDeleteQuorumEvidence)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
# Build tags: kqueue selects the kqueue backend of rjeczalik/notify on
# BSD and macOS and changes nothing on Linux. dev came with upstream's
# 2024-06 Makefile change for development builds; no file in this
# repository or its dependencies carries a dev build constraint, so it
# selects nothing and is kept only so that the documented command
# lines (make test, make install-race) stay valid.
- name: Run lifecycle expiry and native restore tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(PoolsLifecycle|PoolsMigrationLifecycle|ExpireRestored|NativeRestore)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run multipart listing, cancellation and cleanup tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(ObjectCompleteMultipartUpload|Multipart|PaginateMultipartUploads|ListMultipartUploads|CleanupStaleUploads|ExtractModTime)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run listing metadata recovery, pagination and cancellation tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^Test(ListFallback|ListingCache|ListingMerge|ListingRecovery|ListingPending|ListingEntry|ListingSecondLock|StreamMetadataParts|LocalLockerListing|DistributedListing|MergeXLV2LatestNullCrossParity|CountXLV2MixedECGroups|ListCrossParity|ListObjectVersionsCrossParityNull|MigrationCrossParity)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run lock cancellation and late-grant cleanup tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./internal/dsync ./internal/lsync -run '^Test(DRWMutex|LRWMutex)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run CPU metrics tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^TestLoadCPUMetrics' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run tag replication tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^TestAPITagging' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run Object Lock authorization and overwrite tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run maintenance storage timeout and compatibility tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd ./internal/grid ./internal/ioutil -run '^Test(StorageTimeout|StorageRollback|StoragePrerelease|MaintenancePartialFailedOverwriteAvailability|SingleRequest|WithDeadline)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Run logger target lifecycle tests under race detector
run: go test -race ./cmd -run '^TestDynamicWebhookOutlivesConfigContext' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Compile deferred consistency diagnostics
run: go test -tags kqueue,dev,consistency_strict ./cmd -run '^$'
crosscompile:
name: Cross Compile
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+9 -3
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ jobs:
buildscripts/verify-rebrand.sh
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh
# Keep this gate aligned with the Object Lock race regression in go.yml.
- name: Gate release on Object Lock authorization and overwrite tests under race detector
env:
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX: "10000"
run: go test -race -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^Test(APIPutObjectRetention|APIVersionAddressedWrite|PutObjectRetention|DirectoryObjectLock|ObjectLockOverwrite|APICopyObjectPreservesVersionAfterSuspension|MultipartNullObjectLock|PoolsObjectLockOverwrite|MultipartVersioningTransitions|PlanReview|RecoveredMultipartUpload)' -count=1 -timeout=5m
- name: Compute release variables
env:
# Passed through the environment, never interpolated into the script
@@ -132,9 +138,9 @@ jobs:
cosign-release: v3.1.2
- name: Build Draft release with GoReleaser
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
with:
version: "~> v2"
version: v2.18.3
args: release --clean --skip=validate --config .github/goreleaser.yml
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -150,7 +156,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Install nFPM
run: |
set -euo pipefail
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.47.0
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.48.0
echo "$(go env GOPATH)/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Build nFPM packages
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
name: Repository Cards
on:
schedule:
# 00:00 UTC = 08:00 Asia/Shanghai. GitHub may queue scheduled runs.
- cron: "0 0 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
push:
branches: [main]
paths:
- .github/workflows/repository-cards.yml
- .github/silo.svg
- buildscripts/repository-cards/**
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths:
- .github/workflows/repository-cards.yml
- .github/silo.svg
- buildscripts/repository-cards/**
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: repository-cards-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || 'publish' }}
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
check:
name: Validate repository cards
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Use the runner's Python in an isolated environment
run: |
python3 -m venv "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv"
"$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin/python" -m pip install -r buildscripts/repository-cards/requirements.txt
echo "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- run: python -m unittest discover -s buildscripts/repository-cards -p 'test_*.py' -v
publish:
name: Update README images
needs: check
if: github.repository == 'pgsty/silo' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event_name != 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
permissions:
contents: write
issues: read
pull-requests: read
env:
OUTPUT_BRANCH: codex/repository-cards
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7
- name: Use the runner's Python in an isolated environment
run: |
python3 -m venv "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv"
"$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin/python" -m pip install -r buildscripts/repository-cards/requirements.txt
echo "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards-venv/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
- name: Load the generated-assets branch
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
artifacts="$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards"
if git ls-remote --exit-code --heads origin "$OUTPUT_BRANCH"; then
git fetch --depth=1 origin "$OUTPUT_BRANCH"
git worktree add --detach "$artifacts" FETCH_HEAD
else
status=$?
# Exit 2 means no matching ref; transport/auth failures must stop.
if [ "$status" -ne 2 ]; then exit "$status"; fi
git worktree add --detach "$artifacts" HEAD
git -C "$artifacts" checkout --orphan "$OUTPUT_BRANCH"
git -C "$artifacts" rm -rf .
fi
- name: Refresh contributor and star cards
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
run: python buildscripts/repository-cards/update.py --output "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards"
- name: Publish changed assets
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
cd "$RUNNER_TEMP/repository-cards"
git add README.md history.json curated.json contributors.json \
contributors-light.svg contributors-dark.svg \
star-history-light.svg star-history-dark.svg
if git diff --cached --quiet; then
echo "Repository cards are already current."
exit 0
fi
git config user.name 'github-actions[bot]'
git config user.email '41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com'
git commit -s -m "chore: update repository cards $(date -u +%F)"
# A normal push preserves history and refuses concurrent overwrites.
git push origin "HEAD:refs/heads/$OUTPUT_BRANCH"
+66 -10
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,15 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
pull_request:
paths:
- "go.mod"
- "go.sum"
- ".github/goreleaser.yml"
- ".github/nfpm.yml"
- "Dockerfile.goreleaser"
- "Dockerfile.distroless"
- "cmd/healthcheck-main.go"
- "cmd/main.go"
- "dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh"
- "dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh"
- "dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh"
- "dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh"
- "silo.service"
@@ -41,6 +43,28 @@ permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
curl:
name: Static curl (${{ matrix.arch }})
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
strategy:
matrix:
include:
- arch: amd64
runner: ubuntu-latest
- arch: arm64
runner: ubuntu-24.04-arm
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- name: Build and exercise curl in an empty runtime
run: |
docker build --build-arg TARGETARCH=${{ matrix.arch }} \
--target curl-runtime -f Dockerfile.goreleaser -t silo-curl-test .
docker run --rm silo-curl-test --version | tee curl-version.txt
grep -F 'curl 8.23.0 ' curl-version.txt
grep -F 'HTTP2' curl-version.txt
docker run --rm silo-curl-test --fail --silent --show-error \
--connect-timeout 15 --max-time 60 https://curl.se/robots.txt
validate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
@@ -71,9 +95,9 @@ jobs:
echo "LDFLAGS: ${LDFLAGS}"
- name: GoReleaser config check
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
with:
version: "~> v2"
version: v2.18.3
args: check --config .github/goreleaser.yml
- name: Validate Helm chart and legacy upgrade identity
@@ -85,9 +109,9 @@ jobs:
syft-version: v1.50.0
- name: Build snapshot artifacts
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@v7
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@f06c13b6b1a9625abc9e6e439d9c05a8f2190e94 # v7.2.3
with:
version: "~> v2"
version: v2.18.3
# A pull-request snapshot has no trusted release identity. Exercise
# the SBOM/checksum pipeline here, and reserve keyless signing for
# the tag-triggered release workflow with GitHub OIDC.
@@ -96,13 +120,34 @@ jobs:
LDFLAGS: ${{ env.LDFLAGS }}
PKG_VERSION: ${{ env.PKG_VERSION }}
- name: Verify archive SBOM and checksum coverage
- name: Verify archive formats, documentation, SBOMs, and checksums
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mapfile -t archives < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'silo_*.tar.gz' | sort)
mapfile -t sboms < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'silo_*.tar.gz.sbom.json' | sort)
mapfile -t archives < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -name 'silo_*.tar.gz' -o -name 'silo_*.zip' \) | sort)
mapfile -t sboms < <(find dist -maxdepth 1 -type f \( -name 'silo_*.tar.gz.sbom.json' -o -name 'silo_*.zip.sbom.json' \) | sort)
test "${#archives[@]}" -eq 6
test "${#sboms[@]}" -eq 6
for os in linux darwin windows; do
format=tar.gz
binary=silo
if [ "${os}" = windows ]; then
format=zip
binary=silo.exe
fi
for arch in amd64 arm64; do
archive="dist/silo_${PKG_VERSION}_${os}_${arch}.${format}"
test -s "${archive}"
jq -e '.spdxVersion | startswith("SPDX-")' "${archive}.sbom.json" >/dev/null
if [ "${format}" = zip ]; then
listing="$(unzip -Z1 "${archive}")"
else
listing="$(tar -tzf "${archive}")"
fi
for member in "${binary}" LICENSE NOTICE README.md; do
grep -Fx "${member}" <<< "${listing}"
done
done
done
manifest="dist/silo_${PKG_VERSION}_checksums.txt"
test -s "${manifest}"
(
@@ -119,7 +164,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Install package validation tools
run: |
set -euo pipefail
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.47.0
go install github.com/goreleaser/nfpm/v2/cmd/nfpm@v2.48.0
echo "$(go env GOPATH)/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install --yes rpm binutils
@@ -437,6 +482,17 @@ jobs:
fi
done
# Both variants must trust the same roots: the UBI bundle with the
# RHSB-2026-012 blocklist applied, not Debian's bundle.
tar -xOf "${ctx}/rootfs.tar" etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt > "${ctx}/ca.pem"
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile "${ctx}/ca.pem" \
| openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -noout > "${ctx}/ca-subjects.txt"
test "$(grep -c '^subject=' "${ctx}/ca-subjects.txt")" -gt 100
if grep -E '^subject=.*(AAA Certificate Services|emSign ECC Root CA - G3)' "${ctx}/ca-subjects.txt"; then
echo "distroless CA bundle still trusts a blocklisted root"
exit 1
fi
# The baked-in healthcheck must drive Docker's health state on its
# own, the probe binary must be directly exec-able without any
# shell, and SIGTERM must still reach PID 1 (the server binary is
@@ -490,7 +546,7 @@ jobs:
bash -n buildscripts/package/lifecycle_test.sh
buildscripts/package/lifecycle_test.sh
bash -n dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh
bash -n dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh
bash -n dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint_test.sh
go run ./buildscripts/rebrand-guard
buildscripts/verify-rebrand.sh
+1 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Install govulncheck
run: |
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.7.0
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.9.0
echo "$(go env GOPATH)/bin" >> "${GITHUB_PATH}"
- name: Run govulncheck
+2 -2
View File
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ dist/
.claude/
.codex/
AGENTS.md
CLAUDE.md
_bmad/
_bmad-output/
# Investigation and editorial working files belong outside this repository.
docs/investigations/
docs/security/
docs/rebranding.md
.release-sign/
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# Copyright 2026 PGSTY contributors.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
FROM golang:1.27.3-bookworm
ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
GOTOOLCHAIN=local \
CGO_ENABLED=0 \
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX=10000
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates curl git jq openssl python3 procps \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Cache dependencies in the final image: subsequent analysis runs offline.
# Honor go.mod's PGSTY replacements and leave the module files unchanged.
WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download && go mod verify
COPY . /src
# Keep normal Go debug information; the release Makefile strips it.
RUN go build -tags kqueue -o /usr/local/bin/silo . \
&& silo --version
# Compile test packages while online, including the server and internal code.
# Retain both the module and build caches so new reproducers work offline.
RUN go test -tags kqueue,dev -run '^$' -timeout=10m ./cmd ./internal/...
ENV GOPROXY=off \
GOSUMDB=off
CMD ["bash"]
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# Override the release .dockerignore: keep source, CI files and all test fixtures.
# The scanner adds Git history separately after building the image.
.git
.bin
.claude
.codex
.idea
.release-sign
.vscode
_bmad
_bmad-output
dist
vendor
**/node_modules
**/*.test
**/.DS_Store
default.etcd
docs/investigations
docs/security
docs/rebranding.md
# Local server and debugging binaries.
minio
silo
hash-set
healing-bin
inspect
pprofgoparser
reorder-disks
s3-check-md5
s3-verify
xattr
xl-meta
docs/debugging/s3-verify/s3-verify
docs/debugging/xl-meta/xl-meta
docs/debugging/s3-check-md5/s3-check-md5
docs/debugging/hash-set/hash-set
docs/debugging/healing-bin/healing-bin
docs/debugging/inspect/inspect
docs/debugging/pprofgoparser/pprofgoparser
docs/debugging/reorder-disks/reorder-disks
docs/debugging/populate-hard-links/populate-hardlinks
docs/debugging/xattr/xattr
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# PGSTY Silo security scope
Silo is PGSTY's independently maintained S3-compatible object-storage server,
derived from MinIO. It serves untrusted network requests and stores user data,
including PostgreSQL backups. Scan the current `pgsty/silo` `main` branch.
Read `/src/SECURITY.md`, `/src/VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md`, and `/src/CHANGELOG.md`.
## Repository boundaries and lineage
The Go module intentionally remains `github.com/minio/minio`. Historical
`MINIO_*` environment variables, S3 headers, `/minio/*` routes, and `.minio.sys`
storage names are compatibility interfaces, not evidence that upstream MinIO
is the target. Use this checkout's code and dependency versions for reproducers.
This enrollment covers the server code, including inherited code still present
in the supported branch and its PGSTY changes. The maintained Console, client,
and shared packages appear as dependencies in `go.mod`. Do not replace them
with upstream releases. They are not additional independent scan targets under
this enrollment. A server-side integration defect is in scope; clearly identify
a dependency-only root cause rather than attributing it to this repository.
## Attackers and important surfaces
- Unauthenticated S3/HTTP clients, including hostile object names, headers,
query parameters, XML/JSON bodies, signatures, and multipart data.
- Authenticated users, service accounts, and temporary STS credentials whose
authority must remain bounded by the effective IAM and bucket policies.
- Bucket owners and delegated administrators with explicitly limited actions;
distinguish them from the unrestricted deployment/root administrator.
- Inputs from configured identity providers, replication/tiering targets, and
webhooks where the configuration and permissions make an attack reachable.
Prioritize authentication/signature verification, IAM/STS and policy
composition, administrative API authorization, object/version isolation,
Object Lock retention and legal holds, multipart operations, replication,
lifecycle/tiering, and multi-pool deletion/migration. Include archive, XML,
JSON and S3 Select parsing when remotely reachable. Investigate credential
exposure, path traversal, unauthorized object access, SSRF across a meaningful
boundary, and attacks that corrupt or irreversibly delete other users' data.
The deployment administrator controls root credentials, storage directories,
trusted peers, and identity/KMS/replication endpoint configuration. Host root
access, stolen root credentials, or a malicious replacement of the server
binary do not by themselves demonstrate a vulnerability. An unprivileged
account gaining those capabilities does. An administrator's documented ability
to configure an outbound endpoint is not sufficient evidence of SSRF; show
an unauthorized actor, forbidden destination, or confused-deputy effect.
Object Lock has explicit retention semantics. Do not discard a retention bypass
just because the caller has some administrative permission: describe the mode,
version, legal hold, and exact IAM actions, and compare with the intended rules.
Likewise, do not assume bucket access implies access to other buckets or users.
Known consistency limitations are described in `CONTRIBUTING.md` and the
changelog. Tests tagged `consistency_strict` exercise stronger guarantees
outside the current maintenance contract and can fail. A failing diagnostic
alone is not a new vulnerability; demonstrate a reachable security impact.
These limitations do not excuse an authorization or retention bypass.
## Offline environment
Source is in `/src`; the unstripped server is `/usr/local/bin/silo`. Go, the
module cache, and the test build cache are retained. The scanner adds Git
history to `/src/.git` after building this image; a plain Docker build omits it.
The Dockerfile compiles the server and tests with the selected PGSTY dependency
replacements. `GOTOOLCHAIN=local` and `GOPROXY=off` prevent surprise downloads.
CGO is disabled as in the normal server/unit-test CI; enable it explicitly for
race tests when needed (the Go base image includes a C compiler).
Useful offline checks:
```sh
cd /src
silo --version
go test -tags kqueue,dev ./internal/auth ./internal/config/identity/... ./internal/s3select/... -count=1 -timeout=10m
go test -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -run '^(TestGetRequestAuthType|TestS3SupportedAuthType|TestIsReqAuthenticated|TestCheckAdminRequestAuthType|TestValidateAdminSignature|TestDoesPolicySignatureMatch|TestDoesPresignedSignatureMatch|TestDoesPresignedV2SignatureMatch|TestSTSLDAPLogin.*|TestGetSTSLDAPLoginSourceIP.*)$' -count=1 -timeout=10m
```
For HTTP reproducers, start a disposable loopback server with synthetic
credentials and a fresh data directory:
```sh
MINIO_ROOT_USER=scanneradmin MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=scanner-local-test-only \
silo server /tmp/silo-scanner-data \
--address 127.0.0.1:9000 --console-address 127.0.0.1:9001
```
The broader suites are `go test -tags kqueue,dev ./internal/... -timeout=15m`
and `go test -tags kqueue,dev ./cmd -timeout=30m`. Some integration suites need
LDAP, OIDC, etcd, KMS, multiple servers, or IPv6; those services are not started
by this Dockerfile. Do not treat a missing external service as a security
finding. The focused commands above do not require those providers.
## Reports and severity
Include the commit, exact attacker privileges/policy, relevant deployment
settings, API requests or a standalone test, observed impact, and affected
versions where established. For data-loss or cross-pool reports, include the
object/version state and a deterministic sequence. Deduplicate by root cause
and distinguish a new flaw from an already documented limitation or fixed bug.
Unauthenticated code execution or broad credential/authorization compromise
can be critical. Cross-user object access, unauthorized destructive operations,
and retention bypass can be high or critical according to their demonstrated
reach. Rate availability issues by practical cost, scope and recovery; a
single malformed request and an authorized full-disk upload are different
threats. Do not claim exploitability solely from a static pattern.
Prefer minimal patches and regression tests that preserve S3/storage format
compatibility. Use only synthetic data and local test instances; do not test
against public Silo/MinIO deployments or real backup repositories.
## Maintaining the scanner image
Build from the repository root, then run the checks above without networking:
```sh
docker build -f .oss-scanner/Dockerfile -t silo-scanner:local .
docker run --rm -it --network=none silo-scanner:local bash
```
Keep the Go image version aligned with `go.mod`. The adjacent
`Dockerfile.dockerignore` preserves compressed test fixtures that the release
image's root `.dockerignore` excludes. Local build outputs, editor state, and
private working directories are excluded from the scanner context.
Enrollment lives in `anthropics/oss-scanner`, under `projects/silo/project.yaml`.
Once these files are published on `main`, that configuration can use
`dockerfile: .oss-scanner/Dockerfile` and
`threat_model: .oss-scanner/threat_model.md`; remove its adjacent copies in the
same update. Do not switch the enrollment paths before the files are public.
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# SILO Repository Guide
## Project map
- Server: `pgsty/silo` (this checkout, default branch `main`)
- Console: `pgsty/silo-console` (usual sibling checkout `../silo-console`)
- Client: `pgsty/mc`, shipped as `mcli` (usual sibling checkout `../mc`)
- Shared packages: `pgsty/silo-pkg` (usual sibling checkout `../silo-pkg`)
- Documentation: `pgsty/silo.pgsty.com` (usual sibling checkout `../silo.pgsty.com`),
published at <https://silo.pgsty.com/>
The server executable, package, systemd service, and container image use `silo`;
the public Docker image is `docker.io/pgsty/silo`. The server module remains
`github.com/minio/minio`. Consult the current `go.mod` and release configuration
for selected component versions and compatibility replacements.
## Supported stack and compatibility policy
The maintained, release-gating product graph is the coordinated PGSTY stack:
`silo` + `silo-console` + `mc` + `silo-pkg`.
Keep compatibility with upstream MinIO/MC on a best-effort basis. Preserve
inexpensive wire, configuration, CLI, migration, and import compatibility when
it helps users, and document known differences. Do not infer from source
lineage, MinIO-compatible protocols, retained `MINIO_*`/`MC_*` names, or an
inherited upstream test that unmodified upstream MinIO is a supported release
target.
Upstream-only compatibility checks may remain as advisory evidence, but they
must not force a downgrade of a maintained SILO component, a fork-only API
workaround, or a release block. Make upstream compatibility a hard gate only
when the user explicitly requests that scope.
## Dependency selection
- When PGSTY maintains a component, import and require it directly under its own
module path. In particular, prefer `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3` over
`github.com/minio/pkg/v3` in maintained SILO source.
- Do not use an upstream package merely to make unmodified upstream MinIO or MC
compile. Unavoidable transitive upstream modules should be documented and
kept separate from the maintained product dependency.
- `github.com/minio/minio-go/v7` is the explicit exception: use the verified
upstream module/commit while it contains the required fixes; do not recreate
a SILO fork without a concrete functional divergence.
- Check the current `go.mod` before changing versions. Coordinate breaking
import-path changes across package, client, Console, and server releases.
## Documentation and delivery
The companion site owns product, operations, migration, security-advisory,
design, and release documentation. Maintain English and Chinese content in
that repository and link to its canonical URLs from this one. The site's
`content/docs/` is the documentation entry point; detailed pages live under
`content/operations/`, `administration/`, `reference/`, `compatibility/`,
`about/`, and `blog/`, following the existing structure.
Keep repository entry points and contributor instructions here. Retained
upstream documents, examples, and test fixtures under `docs/` may be updated
when a code or tooling change requires it; do not build a second documentation
site in this tree.
Investigation plans, prompts, AI session transcripts, execution logs, temporary
reports, and private security material belong outside the checkout, for example
in a task-specific directory under `~/tmp/`. Do not recreate
`docs/investigations/`, `docs/security/`, or `docs/rebranding.md`, or move their
working material to another repository directory. Extract reusable, verified
knowledge into the companion site; keep private evidence outside public Git.
Compatibility pages may continue to describe similarities with upstream, but
must label that compatibility as best effort. The supported and tested server
for Console and mcli administration is `pgsty/silo`.
Before removing or moving documentation, check repository links and scripts,
the companion site's links and anchors, and references from this guide. Use
fixed commit URLs for historical evidence that should survive deletion from
the current tree. Run the site's `make check` for site changes and this
repository's `make rebrand-guard` for documentation cleanup that changes the
identifier inventory. When new public URLs are involved, publish the site
before publishing source changes that depend on those URLs.
Keep changes in the repository that owns the affected surface. Treat every
repository commit, tag, release, image, documentation update, and deployment as
a separate deliverable. Follow `CONTRIBUTING.md`, including DCO sign-off
(`git commit -s`). `CLAUDE.md` imports this guide so both agents use one policy.
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# Changelog
## RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
Package version: `20261026000000.0.0`; published from source `c3ad836aed0d`.
Artifacts are listed in the [GitHub release](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z).
The coordinated [English release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261026/)
and [Chinese release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261026/)
cover all components, upgrade guidance, and validation scope.
- Fix LDAP login for long normalized DNs without hiding unreadable IAM
revocation records. Only length errors for valid keys with an ASCII path
component over 255 bytes are treated as absent; long-DN writes still fail.
Thanks to [@910patin](https://github.com/910patin) for the original fix and
reproduction in [#250](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/pull/250).
- Build the server and standalone debugging tools with Go 1.27.3 and refresh
Go dependencies, including silo-pkg v3.15.2, mcli 20261026
and upstream minio-go `320af050c445` for multipart, read/seek,
batch-delete and bucket-replication removal fixes. Retain output-format and NetBSD compatibility selections.
- Embed Console v2.5.1 source `fff1618d9abb`, including its GUI update,
diagnostic WebSocket closing handshake, complete health-report decoding,
group-membership preservation, OIDC group permissions, TLS-proxy session
cookies, credential exports and accessibility fixes.
- Bundle mcli 20261026 in container builds, the verified client installer and
Helm client jobs. Include client identity isolation, resync status and rate
fixes, and bounded batch-status fallback. Scripts must handle the additive
batch `pending` state and nonzero exits for partial resync mutations.
- Read current bucket inventory in account-info responses so Console refreshes
immediately reflect successful creation and deletion. This management endpoint
now performs a live list instead of returning a cached inventory.
- Restore the native built-in policy immediately after resetting an override.
Peer and etcd notifications reload committed state, so delayed delete events
preserve subsequent edits. Keep deletion revisions, policy-in-use checks and
custom-policy deletion behavior; storage failures retain the previous policy.
- Reload policies without holding the authentication-cache lock, retain IAM
write ordering and publish replacements only after a complete successful load.
Propagate cancellation through IAM/KMS and SSE-S3 decryption without shortening
the caller's policy-query deadline.
- Preserve authoritative copies when a multi-pool delete or bulk cleanup fails,
choose an available pool for a new delete marker, and keep tier data referenced
by surviving copies. This does not introduce strict cross-pool read recovery.
- Preserve remote tier data when lifecycle expiry only adds a delete marker,
including non-null versions in suspended buckets. Forward `FULL_OBJECT`
checksum type for multipart replicas. Thanks to
[@botdeniska](https://github.com/botdeniska) for these lifecycle, replication
and multi-pool deletion contributions.
- Preserve Kafka's default broker protocol 2.1 and terminal-width behavior;
fix legacy DARE v1 key unsealing and verify DARE v1/v2 and MinKMS TLS compatibility.
- Forward storage RPC delete options, including the previous data directory
needed by overwrite rollback. Preserve existing drive/RPC timeouts, request
cancellation, object locking, read-quorum and healing behavior.
- Update bundled curl to 8.23.0 and require patched static libraries. Apply
[Red Hat's compromised-CA mitigation](https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012);
the root blocklist also rejects legitimate chains under the affected roots.
- Ship Windows platform archives as ZIP; Linux and macOS retain tar.gz.
Storage timeouts retain their existing meaning: a returned timeout does not
prove that the underlying disk operation stopped or that a write did not
commit. Late commits or delayed rollback can affect newer writes; stale reads
remain possible after partial failures, lease loss or network partitions. This
release does not provide distributed fencing or repair previously inconsistent
objects.
These source changes are not included in the published 20261018 artifacts.
## RELEASE.2026-10-18T00-00-00Z
Package version: `20261018000000.0.0`; published on 2026-10-18 from source
`0cd388c666f8211f552604ae73448a066e9c25ce`. This section covers the changes
after the public 20260916 source, `2a4d51406b7ed87af5fe6fe0f801f3290f96eb3c`.
Full [English release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261018/)
and [Chinese release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261018/)
cover the upgrade contract, evidence and remaining limits.
- **Object Lock (#234, #235):** require `s3:PutObjectRetention` with request-body
conditions before object lookup; weakening active GOVERNANCE additionally
requires bypass intent and permission. Protect caller-addressed write versions,
directory null versions and persisted multipart targets under the write lock;
fail closed on unreadable lock state. See SN-2026-015/016 in the
[advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/).
- **IAM Admin authorization (#242, `995439260`):** enforce explicit self denies,
session restrictions and plugin decisions; prevent restricted delegation and
non-root mutation of root-derived credentials under built-in authorization.
Preserve empty-policy inheritance and damaged-key cleanup. Normalize bulk
self-list aliases and allow ordinary policyless self inspection. See
[SN-2026-017](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/security/20261018-release-hardening/#sn-2026-017).
- **Scoped STS revocation (`0cd388c66`):** enumerate durable parent/type-selected
tokens, propagate each committed tombstone to sibling nodes and sites, and
recover missed notifications through existing refresh/healing. Tokens issued
only at an isolated site are outside the requesting cluster's snapshot;
propagation is eventual and newly issued keys remain valid.
- **Pool migration (#248, `60c7179dd`, `1748f62c7`):** prevent stale moved
payloads from overwriting newer copies, preserve null/UUID delete markers,
recheck source versions and clean only confirmed moved versions under the
object lock. Added per-pool reads and per-version cleanup have maintenance
costs; earlier data loss is not reconstructed.
- **LIST recovery (#239, `3dd53eb81`, `2080b3d03`):** confirm eligible uncertain
latest-object groups under the appropriate read locks, distinguish absence
from failure, preserve directory/common-prefix entries and terminal pagination
errors, and make lock backoff cancelable. Resolved entries keep their fast path;
version history, quorum and disk formats retain their contracts. The strict
sub-5% performance target remains unconfirmed in the recorded comparison.
- **Multipart listing (`4733e1423`):** withdraw #243's default persistent scan.
Public listing uses node-local cache or exact-key lookup; restart omissions,
prefix and cache-pagination limits remain. The retired strict switch is ignored
with a startup warning. **Former strict users lose durable listing and strict
cancellation.** Keep identity metadata, path/wrong-target safety, default
best-effort Abort and peer notification. Diagnostic `multipart-preflight`
reports `mode=legacy`; its budgets do not gate public operations. #79 remains
open, including delayed creation after cancellation.
- **Multipart cleanup (#236, `0f9199e0c`):** parse native timestamps before the
Base64 fallback and remove empty hash parents without a second expiry wait.
Keep active/unreadable uploads; default expiry/check intervals stay 24h/6h.
- **Commit errors (#232):** missing staged `xl.meta` at final commit becomes
HTTP 503 `SlowDownWrite`; preserve this classification across storage RPC and
healing. Real incomplete bodies retain their existing errors.
- **Reused metadata (#233):** clear absent legacy `EcM`/`Signature` and locally
reset mutually exclusive scanner response fields without changing disk/RPC formats.
- **Checksum and Console errors (#225, #229, #238):** align Content-MD5 and
algorithm-specific messages, retaining the generic unknown-algorithm message;
embed Console's wrapped-error and `InvalidBucketState` handling.
- **Lambda and erasure documentation (#220, `2fde3cf53`):** fix inverted
`TargetIDSet.IsEmpty`; document parity/quorum per object and erasure set.
- **Coordinated dependencies:** Console v2.4.2 (`ef2dd2c41d21`), mcli 20261018
(`fa3b8bf72458`), silo-pkg v3.14.3, upstream minio-go v7.4.1 and Go 1.27.2.
Standalone Console/mcli still declare pkg v3.14.2. The Server package update
speeds admin-action classification without changing policy behavior. Refresh
Go x/*, go-jose v4.1.6, LDAP v3.4.15, compress v1.20.3, msgp v1.6.5, etcd v3.7.2,
fwd v1.2.1 and cpuid v2.4.1. OIDC RSA JWKs above 4096 bits are rejected.
Keep the NetBSD go-systemd v22.6.0 replacement; parallel SDK GET/Compose remain opt-in.
- **Build and delivery:** gate releases on Object Lock regressions; use
Git for rebrand scanning without a ripgrep dependency (`7007c164a`). Refresh UBI 9 pins,
GoReleaser v2.18.3, nFPM v2.48.0, golangci-lint v2.15.0 and govulncheck v1.9.0.
Update bundled client hashes/helper and the Helm client image to mcli 20261018.
The chart's Server default stays at the public 20260916 image until publication.
Upgrade every writer and replication site; follow the
[IAM recovery guide](https://silo.pgsty.com/operations/replication/iam-upgrade/).
Old strict multipart users must review the capability loss before upgrading.
#217's multi-site delete-marker late creation and crash residue remain unresolved.
Source tests, draft artifacts, public images and production rollout are separate
acceptance boundaries; historical 20261015 test counts do not certify this source.
## RELEASE.2026-09-16T00-00-00Z
Package version: `20260916000000.0.0`; published source:
`2a4d51406b7ed87af5fe6fe0f801f3290f96eb3c`.
This release includes signed-header and payload-policy hardening (SN-2026-011/012),
durable IAM revocations (SN-2026-013), the bounded Console sharing proxy
(SN-2026-014), password-permission separation, multi-pool conditions/deletion/tag
repairs, encrypted/federated copy repairs, delete-marker retry fixes, opt-in strict
multipart discovery, Go-default TLS key exchange, absolute HTTP/1 header deadlines
and synchronized CPU metrics. It embeds Console v2.4.1, mcli 20260916 and pkg v3.14.1.
The complete release, contributor credits, historical artifact acceptance and
upgrade requirements are preserved in the canonical
[English](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20260916/) and
[Chinese](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20260916/) release records.
## RELEASE.2026-09-03T13-18-01Z
Published source: `9b11dc9469e650815b775cb47b039610644f5da4`.
[Complete release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20260903/) ·
[GitHub release](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-09-03T13-18-01Z)
This release ships Go 1.27.1, silo-pkg v3.13.2, upstream minio-go `0e78d3f18efe`,
mcli 20260903 and embedded Console source `464a59d73ada` (v2.3.0 version identity).
Installing the newer standalone mcli or Console does not replace components
inside this existing Server binary or image.
Earlier releases: [release archive](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases).
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@AGENTS.md
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- Explain any preserved `MINIO_*`, `minio_*`, `x-minio-*`, `/minio/*`,
`.minio.sys`, ARN, module/import-path, or serialized compatibility name.
The maintenance branch retains existing storage timeouts, cancellation,
object locking, read-quorum and healing behavior. The normal suite checks local
and RPC timeout/cancellation, remote rollback options, and readability after a
failed partial overwrite. A timeout does not prove that a disk worker stopped
or that a write did not commit.
Stronger mutation lifetime, rollback ownership, generation ordering, strict-read
and cross-pool recovery diagnostics are preserved behind `consistency_strict`.
Compile them with `go test -tags kqueue,dev,consistency_strict ./cmd -run '^$'`
and run individual scenarios explicitly. They describe guarantees outside the
maintenance contract and may fail; report their results separately from the
normal suite. They must not be used to claim distributed fencing or repair of
previously inconsistent objects.
### Commit changes
After verification, commit your changes with a concise message and a DCO
@@ -77,6 +91,16 @@ test evidence, compatibility notes, and documentation impact. Public product
documentation is owned by the separate
[`pgsty/silo.pgsty.com`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com) repository.
## Contributor recognition
Every human issue or pull-request author is recognized in [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md),
including open issues, draft PRs, and PRs closed without merging. Merged fixes,
adopted proposals, and reports that lead to fixes receive greater prominence;
first participation guides the remaining order. Work incorporated through a
later PR retains credit without changing the original PR's recorded status.
Security disclosures are credited with the reporter's agreement. DCO sign-off
applies to code commits, not to opening an issue.
## Licensing of Contributions
Code contributions to PGSTY SILO (`pgsty/silo`) are accepted under the
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# seeds fresh volumes from the image-layer mountpoint, no entrypoint
# exists to repair ownership at runtime, and 0777 is what keeps every
# privilege mode working, --user included.
FROM busybox:1.37.0 AS prep
FROM busybox:1.37.0@sha256:a7dbc319b1438115a207e11930dc4bb3e643dcb3ec0bdd694bb36cd8fad289ec AS prep
RUN mkdir -p /prep/data && chmod 0777 /prep/data
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:latest
# Debian's bundle in distroless still trusts the roots the classic image
# blocklists. Build the same bundle as Dockerfile.goreleaser so both variants
# trust the same roots; it is architecture-neutral, so build it natively.
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:16e9e43d99e181463513cc84a514859b1abb9460f1c4d9e208da4b4e51cd5cc3 AS certs
# Native root blocklist mitigation: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012
RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
if [ -d /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist ]; then \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist; \
else \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blacklist; \
fi && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=Comodo%20AAA%20Services%20root;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/Comodo_AAA_Services_root.pem" && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=emSign%20ECC%20Root%20CA%20-%20G3;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3.pem" && \
update-ca-trust && \
cp /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem /tmp/ca-certificates.crt
FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:latest@sha256:d75cdd72874d4790092fcb1b058493ecf6bb5bf2b2b897045b00ff01d91843f2
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="Silo" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="S3-Interface Libre Object Storage (distroless)" \
@@ -28,6 +48,8 @@ ENV MINIO_ACCESS_KEY_FILE=access_key \
MINIO_CONFIG_ENV_FILE=config.env \
HOME=/tmp
# The only file under /etc/ssl/certs, so replacing it is sufficient.
COPY --from=certs /tmp/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
COPY --chmod=0755 silo /usr/bin/silo
# COPY of a directory copies its contents, not the directory entry, so an
# empty /prep/data would arrive as a default root:0755 /data and non-root
+36 -12
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,15 @@
FROM golang:1.27.1-alpine AS build
FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:d530cf60723abf1ffae0cd16bb546b379ec0550d2f3815e5b16ed69dbc00fba4 AS curl-build
ARG TARGETARCH
COPY dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh /build/build-static-curl
RUN /bin/sh /build/build-static-curl
# Exercise the exact shipped curl without a dynamic loader or shared libraries.
FROM scratch AS curl-runtime
COPY --from=curl-build /go/bin/curl /curl
COPY --from=curl-build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
ENTRYPOINT ["/curl"]
FROM golang:1.27.3-alpine@sha256:d530cf60723abf1ffae0cd16bb546b379ec0550d2f3815e5b16ed69dbc00fba4 AS build
ARG TARGETARCH
@@ -6,9 +17,9 @@ ENV GOPATH=/go
ENV CGO_ENABLED=0
ARG MC_REPO=pgsty/mc
ARG MC_VERSION=RELEASE.2026-09-03T07-13-05Z
ARG MC_AMD64_SHA256=cd7fcd449bb6b52e2eb727431ba6975b1e5d90df011a75869020ea9ac9e2b2a8
ARG MC_ARM64_SHA256=7962afc37c3e60e5758b19e819cb62d2f340ee655fad7b067e2ac9bc5716c2e8
ARG MC_VERSION=RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z
ARG MC_AMD64_SHA256=e86295bb11ed59369c0560f030d59abd42fb64a376b1d7e9799ec2e8596ebf64
ARG MC_ARM64_SHA256=47b1a558f766f26bef5beeedd5300e082bcdec07a5e7d4a16f5f9d168f5275d1
RUN apk add -U --no-cache \
ca-certificates \
@@ -54,20 +65,30 @@ RUN apk add -U --no-cache \
echo "No mc or mcli binary found in archive:"; ls -la /tmp/mcli-extract/; exit 1; \
fi && \
chmod +x /go/bin/mcli && \
ln -sf mcli /go/bin/mc
ln -sf mcli /go/bin/mc && \
mkdir -p /go/share/mcli && \
cp /tmp/mcli-extract/LICENSE /tmp/mcli-extract/NOTICE /tmp/mcli-extract/CREDITS /go/share/mcli/
COPY dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh /build/download-static-curl
RUN chmod +x /build/download-static-curl && \
/build/download-static-curl
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest AS certs
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi:latest@sha256:16e9e43d99e181463513cc84a514859b1abb9460f1c4d9e208da4b4e51cd5cc3 AS certs
# Native root blocklist mitigation: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-012
RUN dnf -y install ca-certificates && \
if [ -d /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist ]; then \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blocklist; \
else \
blocklist=/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/blacklist; \
fi && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=Comodo%20AAA%20Services%20root;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/Comodo_AAA_Services_root.pem" && \
trust extract --overwrite --format=pem-bundle \
--filter='pkcs11:object=emSign%20ECC%20Root%20CA%20-%20G3;type=cert' \
"$blocklist/emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3.pem" && \
update-ca-trust && \
cp /etc/pki/ca-trust/extracted/pem/tls-ca-bundle.pem /tmp/ca-certificates.crt && \
dnf clean all && \
rm -rf /var/cache/dnf
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi-micro:latest
FROM registry.access.redhat.com/ubi9/ubi-micro:latest@sha256:5be877a2a280ae36eb9ab80ca4efb28bbf77c57abbba38137cdc37a03b8465e6
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="Silo" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="S3-Interface Libre Object Storage" \
@@ -88,7 +109,10 @@ ENV MINIO_ACCESS_KEY_FILE=access_key \
COPY --from=certs /tmp/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
COPY silo /usr/bin/silo
COPY --from=build /go/bin/mcli /usr/bin/mcli
COPY --from=build /go/bin/curl* /usr/bin/
# mcli's own legal files, from the same verified archive as the binary.
COPY --from=build /go/share/mcli /licenses/mcli
COPY --from=curl-build /go/bin/curl /usr/bin/curl
COPY --from=curl-build /go/share/curl /licenses/curl
COPY dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
COPY LICENSE /licenses/LICENSE
COPY NOTICE /licenses/NOTICE
+7 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ LDFLAGS := $(shell go run buildscripts/gen-ldflags.go)
GOOS ?= $(shell go env GOOS)
GOARCH ?= $(shell go env GOARCH)
GOLANGCI_VERSION ?= v2.13.1
GOLANGCI_VERSION ?= v2.15.0
VERSION ?= $(shell git describe --tags)
REPO ?= docker.io/pgsty
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ lint-fix: getdeps ## runs golangci-lint suite of linters with automatic fixes
@$(GOLANGCI) run --build-tags kqueue --timeout=10m --config ./.golangci.yml --fix
check: test
# -tags kqueue,dev: kqueue selects the kqueue backend of rjeczalik/notify on
# BSD and macOS (no-op on Linux); dev came with upstream's 2024-06 change for
# development builds and no file in this repository or its dependencies
# carries a dev build constraint, so it selects nothing. Kept for the
# documented command lines; .github/workflows/go.yml carries the same note.
test: verifiers build ## builds Silo, runs linters, tests
@echo "Running unit tests"
@MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX=10000 CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -v -tags kqueue,dev ./...
@@ -216,7 +221,7 @@ docker: checks build-debugging ## builds the local Linux Silo container image
--ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o "$$context/silo"; \
mkdir -p "$$context/dockerscripts"; \
cp Dockerfile.goreleaser LICENSE NOTICE CREDITS "$$context/"; \
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh \
cp dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh \
"$$context/dockerscripts/"; \
docker build -q --no-cache --platform linux/$(GOARCH) -t $(TAG) --build-arg TARGETARCH=$(GOARCH) \
-f "$$context/Dockerfile.goreleaser" "$$context"
+41 -49
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="https://silo.pgsty.com/"><img alt="Website" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Website-silo.pgsty.com-1d588c"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases"><img alt="GitHub Release" src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/pgsty/silo?include_prereleases&label=release&logo=github"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/minio?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/silo?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="go.mod"><img alt="Go Version" src="https://img.shields.io/github/go-mod/go-version/pgsty/silo?logo=go"></a>
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="License" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-AGPLv3-blue"></a>
</p>
@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@
> [!NOTE]
> Renamed from `pgsty/minio` to `pgsty/silo`, default branch `master` → `main`, on 2026-08-06. Artifacts under the original MinIO identity stay published on the archived [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) branch and in releases up to [`RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z).
## SILO 20261026000000
[SILO 20261026000000](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z) is available as platform archives, Linux packages, and standard or distroless Docker images for amd64 and arm64. The release tag is `RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z`; the package version is `20261026000000.0.0`, built from source `c3ad836aed0d`.
This release fixes LDAP long-DN login, IAM policy refresh, multi-pool deletion safety, tiered-object expiry, multipart replication checksums, and remote rollback-option propagation. It embeds Console v2.5.1 (`fff1618d9abb`) and uses silo-pkg v3.15.2, Go 1.27.3, and upstream minio-go `v7.4.2-0.20261025165926-320af050c445`. Use mcli 20261026 for administration; the container images bundle it as `mcli`.
The Server IAM cache repair enables Console's **Reset to default** action. Existing storage timeouts and cancellation behavior remain: a timeout does not prove that a disk operation stopped or a write did not commit. Read the [coordinated release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/release/silo-20261026/) and [remaining storage limits](CHANGELOG.md#release2026-10-26t00-00-00z) before upgrading. See [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md) for the people behind the code, reports, and documentation.
## Overview
PGSTY SILO keeps one maintained release line of the open-source MinIO server alive after upstream ended community distribution: builds, packages, multi-arch images, security fixes, and the full web console. Pigsty runs it in production as its PostgreSQL backup repository.
@@ -54,7 +62,7 @@ docker run -d --name silo -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 \
-e MINIO_ROOT_USER=minioadmin \
-e MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-long-password \
-v "$PWD/data:/data" \
docker.io/pgsty/silo:latest server /data --console-address ":9001"
docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
```
<p align="center">
@@ -85,12 +93,15 @@ Every release ships checksums, SPDX SBOMs, Sigstore-signed manifests, and GitHub
## Compatibility
The S3 API, `MINIO_*` variables, `minio_*` metrics, `x-minio-*` headers, `/minio/*` routes, the `github.com/minio/*` import paths, and the on-disk format (including `.minio.sys`) are preserved and held in place by a CI compatibility check. Only Silo-owned delivery surfaces change: the `silo` executable, package, service, Helm chart, and container image — no `minio` binary alias is installed.
Silo preserves S3 and storage-format compatibility, including existing `MINIO_*` variables, `minio_*` metrics, `x-minio-*` headers, `/minio/*` routes, and `.minio.sys` data. CI guards selected compatibility identifiers; release notes document intentional security and behavior changes. Silo-owned delivery surfaces use the `silo` executable, package, service, Helm chart, and container image; no `minio` server binary alias is installed.
The supported release stack is `pgsty/silo` + `pgsty/silo-console` + `pgsty/mc` + `pgsty/silo-pkg`; compatibility with unmodified upstream MinIO/MC is best effort. The Server, Console, and client retain their historical module paths where needed, while maintained code imports `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3` directly. The SDK `github.com/minio/minio-go/v7` is an explicit upstream dependency. See the current [go.mod](go.mod) for versions and replacements.
Every divergence from upstream is listed in the code-verified [compatibility audit](https://silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/server/). Treat each release as a downstream upgrade: pin versions, read the [release notes](https://silo.pgsty.com/tags/silo/), and keep a rollback path.
### TLS and Go upgrades
Server 20260916 restored Go's default key exchange; Server 20261018 retains it with Go 1.27.2.
TLS key exchange follows Go's defaults across the S3 listener, node links,
replication, identity providers, etcd, and external HTTP services. If an endpoint
cannot accept ML-KEM, `GODEBUG=tlsmlkem=0` disables the default hybrid exchanges
@@ -107,7 +118,16 @@ values to restore Keychain trust. Explicit certificates in the configured `CAs`
directory remain additive to the selected root pool.
Go 1.27 binaries require macOS 13 or later. See the
[Go release notes](https://go.dev/doc/go1.27) and the
[SILO stack investigation](docs/investigations/go127-stack.md).
[Go 1.27 TLS and OIDC discovery guide](https://silo.pgsty.com/blog/design/go127-tls-oidc-discovery/).
## Documentation ownership
User documentation is maintained at [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/docs/),
with source in [pgsty/silo.pgsty.com](https://github.com/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com).
The remaining `docs/` tree contains inherited references, examples, and tooling
fixtures. Investigation logs, AI work records, and temporary reports are kept
outside this repository; reusable findings belong in the companion site.
See [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) for repository ownership and maintenance rules.
## Security & Contributing
@@ -115,53 +135,25 @@ Report vulnerabilities privately as described in [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md); e
## Contributors
**41 community contributors** build SILO, Console, mcli, shared packages, and related projects. The list includes maintainers and every human Issue or PR author, ordered by merged PRs, other PRs, then issue reports. Gold rings highlight significant contributions.
<!-- Generated by silo.pgsty.com/bin/contributors.py. -->
<p align="center">
<a href="https://github.com/Vonng"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Vonng.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@Vonng" title="@Vonng — Maintains SILO, Console, mcli, shared packages, releases, and documentation"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/h5vx"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/h5vx.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@h5vx" title="@h5vx — Implemented per-bucket CORS configuration and enforcement"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mrjavadseydi"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mrjavadseydi.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@mrjavadseydi" title="@mrjavadseydi — Fixed effective bucket quota metrics; proposed access-frequency ILM"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Dansyuqri"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Dansyuqri.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@Dansyuqri" title="@Dansyuqri — Added ChecksumType to multipart completion responses"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/ycjlin"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/ycjlin.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@ycjlin" title="@ycjlin — Fixed missing-bucket ListObjects semantics"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pinginfo"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/pinginfo.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@pinginfo" title="@pinginfo — Repaired bucket notification streaming"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/ZouhairCharef"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/ZouhairCharef.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@ZouhairCharef" title="@ZouhairCharef — Patched CVE-2026-34986 in go-jose"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mfredenhagen"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mfredenhagen.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@mfredenhagen" title="@mfredenhagen — Patched CVE-2026-39883 in OpenTelemetry"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/waterkip"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/waterkip.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@waterkip" title="@waterkip — Repointed documentation links to the SILO portal"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mikemikimike"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mikemikimike.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@mikemikimike" title="@mikemikimike — Contributed the replicated SSE-C plaintext part-size fix"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/metaneutrons"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/metaneutrons.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@metaneutrons" title="@metaneutrons — Reported and proposed explicit-version delete authorization"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/magicxor"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/magicxor.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@magicxor" title="@magicxor — Reported and proposed conditional DELETE support for If-Match"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/davinkevin"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/davinkevin.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@davinkevin" title="@davinkevin — Proposed the distroless container image and dependency automation"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/lem21h"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/lem21h.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@lem21h" title="@lem21h — Proposed robustness and goroutine improvements"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/sulin37392"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/sulin37392.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@sulin37392" title="@sulin37392 — Proposed dependency updates"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/cbornet"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/cbornet.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@cbornet" title="@cbornet — Reported multipart and streaming checksum defects and missing-bucket semantics"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/vampywiz17"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/vampywiz17.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@vampywiz17" title="@vampywiz17 — Reported LDAP TLS and Console login regressions"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/orenyomtov"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/orenyomtov.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@orenyomtov" title="@orenyomtov — Reported the unsigned-header CopyObject cross-object read (SN-2026-011)"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mumu-lab"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mumu-lab.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@mumu-lab" title="@mumu-lab — Reported bucket quota metrics reading a deprecated field"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jvasile"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/jvasile.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@jvasile" title="@jvasile — Reported missing user, group, and defaults in Debian packages"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pmezhuev"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/pmezhuev.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@pmezhuev" title="@pmezhuev — Reported missing RPM package signatures"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/TLINDEN"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/TLINDEN.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@TLINDEN" title="@TLINDEN — Reported the missing client in release tarballs"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/makinikm"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/makinikm.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@makinikm" title="@makinikm — Reported the missing client in the container image"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/meesudzu"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/meesudzu.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@meesudzu" title="@meesudzu — Requested the migration guide from upstream MinIO"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kuldeep-link11"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/kuldeep-link11.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@kuldeep-link11" title="@kuldeep-link11 — Reported NATS JWT credentials and target reload issues"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/sargarass"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/sargarass.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@sargarass" title="@sargarass — Reported ListMultipartUploads prefix and pagination semantics"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/liuhaodongliu990-cmyk"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/liuhaodongliu990-cmyk.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@liuhaodongliu990-cmyk" title="@liuhaodongliu990-cmyk — Reported indeterminate progress for prefix downloads"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Xavier-777"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Xavier-777.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@Xavier-777" title="@Xavier-777 — Reported Console lifecycle management and file preview gaps"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/spaceg00se-r"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/spaceg00se-r.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@spaceg00se-r" title="@spaceg00se-r — Requested cpuv1 support and reported a workflow token failure"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kh0mka"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/kh0mka.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@kh0mka" title="@kh0mka — Reported inter-node I/O timeouts in ReadFileStreamHandler"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/bagutzu"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/bagutzu.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@bagutzu" title="@bagutzu — Requested KES-compatible external KMS and OpenBao support"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/DestroyLee"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/DestroyLee.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@DestroyLee" title="@DestroyLee — Reported the missing documentation navigation"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mosesdd"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mosesdd.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@mosesdd" title="@mosesdd — Requested a maintained Helm chart"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/zylpsrs"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/zylpsrs.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@zylpsrs" title="@zylpsrs — Reported missing Console tiering and site replication"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/heroes1412"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/heroes1412.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@heroes1412" title="@heroes1412 — Reported the unusable profiling option"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/redfoxfox"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/redfoxfox.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@redfoxfox" title="@redfoxfox — Reported Chinese documentation availability"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jiadzh"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/jiadzh.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@jiadzh" title="@jiadzh — Requested Windows build guidance"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/AntonOfTheWoods"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/AntonOfTheWoods.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@AntonOfTheWoods" title="@AntonOfTheWoods — Asked for clarity on Helm chart and operator options"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/chalukyaj"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/chalukyaj.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@chalukyaj" title="@chalukyaj — Proposed making the SILO Operator easier to discover"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/nsanitate"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/nsanitate.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@nsanitate" title="@nsanitate — Proposed CNCF Sandbox governance"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Kesavaambati"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Kesavaambati.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@Kesavaambati" title="@Kesavaambati — Asked about community support and image maintenance"></a>
</p>
Every human issue or pull-request author is part of the SILO community, including open and unmerged work. We also recognize security reports, including reports sent by email, with the reporter's permission. Merged fixes, adopted proposals, and actionable reports receive priority, with first participation guiding the remaining order. Gold rings highlight reviewed significant contributions.
[View the full contribution record](CONTRIBUTORS.md) for each person's proposals, fixes, and reports.
<a href="CONTRIBUTORS.md">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-light.svg" alt="SILO community contributors">
</picture>
</a>
[View contribution notes and actual PR status](CONTRIBUTORS.md).
## Star History
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-light.svg" alt="SILO GitHub star history">
</picture>
## Background
+43 -48
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
<p align="center">
<a href="https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/"><img alt="官网" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/%E5%AE%98%E7%BD%91-silo.pgsty.com%2Fzh-1d588c"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases"><img alt="GitHub Release" src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/pgsty/silo?include_prereleases&label=release&logo=github"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/minio?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="https://hub.docker.com/r/pgsty/silo"><img alt="Docker Pulls" src="https://img.shields.io/docker/pulls/pgsty/silo?logo=docker"></a>
<a href="go.mod"><img alt="Go Version" src="https://img.shields.io/github/go-mod/go-version/pgsty/silo?logo=go"></a>
<a href="LICENSE"><img alt="License" src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-AGPLv3-blue"></a>
</p>
@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@
> [!NOTE]
> 2026-08-06,本仓库由 `pgsty/minio` 更名为 `pgsty/silo`,默认分支由 `master` 更名为 `main`。以原 MinIO 形态维持的归档构件仍位于归档的 [`minio`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/tree/minio) 分支,以及截止 [`RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z`](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-08-04T00-00-00Z) 的历次发布中。
## SILO 20261026000000
[SILO 20261026000000](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/releases/tag/RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z) 已正式发布,提供各平台归档包、Linux 软件包,以及 amd64/arm64 标准版和 distroless Docker 镜像。版本标签为 `RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z`,包版本为 `20261026000000.0.0`,构建源码为 `c3ad836aed0d`。
本版修复 LDAP 长 DN 登录、IAM 策略刷新、多池删除安全、分层对象过期、分片复制校验和及远端回滚参数透传。内置 Console v2.5.1(`fff1618d9abb`),使用 silo-pkg v3.15.2、Go 1.27.3 与上游 minio-go `v7.4.2-0.20261025165926-320af050c445`。配套管理客户端为 mcli 20261026,容器镜像内置该版本的 `mcli`。
Server IAM 缓存修复使 Console **Reset to default(恢复默认)** 操作即时生效。存储超时与取消行为保持既有语义:超时不代表底层磁盘操作已停止,也不代表写入未提交。升级前请阅读[联合发布说明](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/release/silo-20261026/)与[仍存的存储限制](CHANGELOG.md#release2026-10-26t00-00-00z)。代码、问题报告和文档贡献者见 [CONTRIBUTORS.md](CONTRIBUTORS.md)。
## 概述
上游停止社区发行后,Silo 为开源 MinIO 服务端维护一条持续可用的版本线:构建、软件包、多架构镜像、安全修复与完整 Web 控制台。Pigsty 在生产环境中用它承载 PostgreSQL 备份存储。
@@ -54,7 +62,7 @@ docker run -d --name silo -p 9000:9000 -p 9001:9001 \
-e MINIO_ROOT_USER=minioadmin \
-e MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=change-me-long-password \
-v "$PWD/data:/data" \
docker.io/pgsty/silo:latest server /data --console-address ":9001"
docker.io/pgsty/silo:RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z server /data --console-address ":9001"
```
<p align="center">
@@ -85,63 +93,50 @@ docker exec silo mcli mb local/demo && docker exec silo mcli ls local
## 兼容性
S3 API、`MINIO_*` 环境变量、`minio_*` 指标、`x-minio-*` 头、`/minio/*` 路由、`github.com/minio/*` 导入路径与磁盘格式(含 `.minio.sys`)原样保留,并由 CI 兼容性门禁冻结。只有 Silo 自有交付面改名:`silo` 可执行文件、软件包、服务、Helm Chart 与容器镜像 —— 原生交付物不会安装 `minio` 二进制别名。
Silo 保留 S3 与存储格式兼容性,包括既有 `MINIO_*` 环境变量、`minio_*` 指标、`x-minio-*` 头、`/minio/*` 路由与 `.minio.sys` 数据。CI 守卫检查选定的兼容性标识,有意的安全与行为变化在发布说明中记录。Silo 自有交付面使用 `silo` 可执行文件、软件包、服务、Helm Chart 与容器镜像;原生交付物不会安装 `minio` 服务端二进制别名。
正式支持和发布验收的组合为 `pgsty/silo` + `pgsty/silo-console` + `pgsty/mc` + `pgsty/silo-pkg`,对未修改的上游 MinIO/MC 尽最大努力保持兼容。Server、Console 与客户端按需保留历史模块路径,维护源码直接导入 `github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3`;SDK `github.com/minio/minio-go/v7` 是明确保留的上游依赖。具体版本与 replace 以当前 [go.mod](go.mod) 为准。
与上游的全部分歧,以逐项核验代码的[兼容性审计](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/compatibility/server/)形式维护。每个版本仍应视为下游升级:锁定版本,阅读[版本说明](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/tags/silo/),并保留回滚路径。
### TLS 与 Go 升级
Server 20260916 已恢复 Go 默认密钥交换策略,20261018 在 Go 1.27.2 下保留该行为。
`GODEBUG=tlsmlkem=0`、`tlssecpmlkem=0` 的适用范围、macOS 根证书来源变化,
以及 OIDC discovery 的诊断方法见 [Go 1.27 TLS 与 OIDC 指南](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/design/go127-tls-oidc-discovery/)。
## 文档归属
用户文档统一维护在 [silo.pgsty.com](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/docs/),源码位于
[pgsty/silo.pgsty.com](https://github.com/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com)。本仓库保留的 `docs/`
主要是继承的参考材料、示例和工具测试夹具。调查日志、AI 工作记录与临时报告放在仓库外;
可复用的结论应整理进伴生文档站。仓库职责与维护规则见 [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md)。
## 安全与贡献
请按照 [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) 私密报告漏洞;每项修复都会发布公开[安全公告](https://silo.pgsty.com/zh/blog/security/)。本项目不要求签署 CLA:贡献按 AGPL-3.0-or-later(inbound=outbound)接收,只需 DCO 签署(`git commit -s`),详见 [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md)。
## 贡献者
**41 位社区贡献者**共同建设 SILO、Console、mcli、公共包与相关项目。名单包含维护者,以及所有提出 Issue 或 PR 的真人作者;按已合并 PR、其他 PR、Issue 报告排序,黄圈标记显著贡献。
<!-- Generated by silo.pgsty.com/bin/contributors.py. -->
<p align="center">
<a href="https://github.com/Vonng"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Vonng.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@Vonng" title="@Vonng — 维护 SILO、Console、mcli、公共包、发行与文档"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/h5vx"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/h5vx.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@h5vx" title="@h5vx — 实现单桶 CORS 配置与请求执行"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mrjavadseydi"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mrjavadseydi.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@mrjavadseydi" title="@mrjavadseydi — 修复有效桶配额指标,并提交按访问频率分层的 ILM 方案"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Dansyuqri"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Dansyuqri.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@Dansyuqri" title="@Dansyuqri — 为分片上传完成响应补充 ChecksumType"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/ycjlin"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/ycjlin.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@ycjlin" title="@ycjlin — 修复缺失桶的 ListObjects 语义"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pinginfo"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/pinginfo.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@pinginfo" title="@pinginfo — 修复桶通知的流式输出"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/ZouhairCharef"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/ZouhairCharef.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@ZouhairCharef" title="@ZouhairCharef — 修复 go-jose 中的 CVE-2026-34986"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mfredenhagen"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mfredenhagen.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@mfredenhagen" title="@mfredenhagen — 修复 OpenTelemetry 中的 CVE-2026-39883"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/waterkip"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/waterkip.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@waterkip" title="@waterkip — 将文档链接指向 SILO 门户"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mikemikimike"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mikemikimike.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@mikemikimike" title="@mikemikimike — 提交 SSE-C 复制分片明文尺寸修复"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/metaneutrons"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/metaneutrons.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@metaneutrons" title="@metaneutrons — 报告并提交显式版本删除鉴权方案"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/magicxor"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/magicxor.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@magicxor" title="@magicxor — 报告并提交 DELETE If-Match 条件请求支持方案"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/davinkevin"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/davinkevin.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@davinkevin" title="@davinkevin — 提交 distroless 容器镜像与依赖自动更新方案"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/lem21h"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/lem21h.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@lem21h" title="@lem21h — 提交健壮性与 goroutine 改进"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/sulin37392"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/sulin37392.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@sulin37392" title="@sulin37392 — 提交依赖更新"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/cbornet"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/cbornet.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@cbornet" title="@cbornet — 报告分片与流式校验和缺陷及缺失桶语义问题"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/vampywiz17"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/vampywiz17.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@vampywiz17" title="@vampywiz17 — 报告 LDAP TLS 与 Console 登录回归"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/orenyomtov"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/orenyomtov.svg" width="60" height="60" alt="@orenyomtov" title="@orenyomtov — 报告未签名头导致的 CopyObject 跨对象读取(SN-2026-011)"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mumu-lab"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mumu-lab.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@mumu-lab" title="@mumu-lab — 报告桶配额指标读取已弃用字段的问题"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jvasile"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/jvasile.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@jvasile" title="@jvasile — 报告 Debian 包缺少用户、用户组与默认配置"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/pmezhuev"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/pmezhuev.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@pmezhuev" title="@pmezhuev — 报告 RPM 包缺少 GPG 签名"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/TLINDEN"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/TLINDEN.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@TLINDEN" title="@TLINDEN — 报告发布压缩包缺少客户端"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/makinikm"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/makinikm.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@makinikm" title="@makinikm — 报告容器镜像缺少客户端"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/meesudzu"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/meesudzu.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@meesudzu" title="@meesudzu — 提出从上游 MinIO 迁移的指南需求"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kuldeep-link11"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/kuldeep-link11.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@kuldeep-link11" title="@kuldeep-link11 — 报告 NATS JWT 凭据与通知目标重载问题"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/sargarass"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/sargarass.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@sargarass" title="@sargarass — 报告 ListMultipartUploads 前缀与分页语义问题"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/liuhaodongliu990-cmyk"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/liuhaodongliu990-cmyk.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@liuhaodongliu990-cmyk" title="@liuhaodongliu990-cmyk — 报告前缀下载进度显示异常"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Xavier-777"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Xavier-777.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@Xavier-777" title="@Xavier-777 — 报告 Console 生命周期管理与文件预览缺失"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/spaceg00se-r"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/spaceg00se-r.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@spaceg00se-r" title="@spaceg00se-r — 提出 cpuv1 支持需求并报告工作流令牌错误"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/kh0mka"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/kh0mka.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@kh0mka" title="@kh0mka — 报告 ReadFileStreamHandler 节点间 I/O 超时"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/bagutzu"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/bagutzu.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@bagutzu" title="@bagutzu — 提出兼容 KES 的外部 KMS 与 OpenBao 支持需求"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/DestroyLee"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/DestroyLee.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@DestroyLee" title="@DestroyLee — 报告文档目录导航缺失"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/mosesdd"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/mosesdd.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@mosesdd" title="@mosesdd — 提出维护 Helm Chart 的需求"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/zylpsrs"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/zylpsrs.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@zylpsrs" title="@zylpsrs — 报告 Console 缺少分层与站点复制"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/heroes1412"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/heroes1412.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@heroes1412" title="@heroes1412 — 报告性能分析选项不可用"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/redfoxfox"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/redfoxfox.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@redfoxfox" title="@redfoxfox — 报告中文文档站点不可用"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/jiadzh"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/jiadzh.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@jiadzh" title="@jiadzh — 提出 Windows 构建指导需求"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/AntonOfTheWoods"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/AntonOfTheWoods.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@AntonOfTheWoods" title="@AntonOfTheWoods — 提出明确 Helm Chart 与 Operator 选项的需求"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/chalukyaj"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/chalukyaj.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@chalukyaj" title="@chalukyaj — 提出改善 SILO Operator 可发现性的建议"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/nsanitate"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/nsanitate.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@nsanitate" title="@nsanitate — 提出加入 CNCF Sandbox 的治理建议"></a>
<a href="https://github.com/Kesavaambati"><img src="https://silo.pgsty.com/images/contributors/Kesavaambati.svg" width="48" height="48" alt="@Kesavaambati" title="@Kesavaambati — 提出社区支持与容器镜像维护问题"></a>
</p>
每位 issue 或 PR 的作者,以及同意公开署名的安全报告者,都是 SILO 社区的一员,包括尚未合并的工作。已合并的修复、被采纳的方案和有效报告优先展示,其余参考首次参与时间;金色圆环突出经过审核的显著贡献。
[查看完整贡献记录](CONTRIBUTORS.md),了解每位贡献者的提案、修复与问题报告。
<a href="CONTRIBUTORS.md">
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/contributors-light.svg" alt="SILO 社区贡献者">
</picture>
</a>
[查看贡献记录与实际 PR 状态](CONTRIBUTORS.md)。
## Star History
<picture>
<source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-dark.svg">
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pgsty/silo/codex/repository-cards/star-history-light.svg" alt="SILO GitHub 星标历史">
</picture>
## 背景
+15 -6
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Silo-specific fixes or release notes.
## Supported Versions
Security fixes are tracked on the active development branch and summarized in
[docs/security/advisories.md](docs/security/advisories.md). Only the current
[the security advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/). Only the current
Silo release line is supported unless an advisory says otherwise.
## Inherited Fix Evidence
@@ -26,20 +26,29 @@ separately even when the fork preserves the original commit object and SHA.
The inherited [service-account](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/c1a49490c78e9c3ebcad86ba0662319138ace190/cmd/admin-handlers-users_test.go#L211-L212)
and [STS](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/blob/c1a49490c78e9c3ebcad86ba0662319138ace190/cmd/sts-handlers_test.go#L45-L46)
regression groups remain part of `go test ./cmd`; see the
[canonical ledger](docs/security/advisories.md#inherited-upstream-advisory-baseline)
[canonical ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/#inherited)
for the operator-facing record.
## Reporting a Vulnerability
The security contact for Silo is [ron@pgsty.com](mailto:ron@pgsty.com).
This address also receives automated security reports for this repository.
For vulnerabilities in this fork:
1. Follow the fork-specific expectations in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
2. Prefer this repository's [private GitHub security advisory](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/security/advisories/new) workflow.
3. If private reporting is unavailable, contact the maintainers through the
repository without publishing exploit details until a private channel is
established.
3. If you cannot use GitHub private reporting, email [ron@pgsty.com](mailto:ron@pgsty.com)
directly. Do not publish vulnerability details or exploit code in public
issues or pull requests.
4. If you confirm the issue also affects upstream `minio/minio`, report it upstream separately.
## Scanner Configuration
The [OSS Scanner build environment](.oss-scanner/Dockerfile) and
[scan scope and offline checks](.oss-scanner/threat_model.md) are maintained
with the source. Update them when dependencies or security boundaries change.
## Disclosure Process
Fork-specific fixes and user-visible upgrade notes are published in [docs/security/advisories.md](docs/security/advisories.md). The fork-specific triage and remediation process is described in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
Fork-specific fixes and user-visible upgrade notes are published in [the security advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/). The fork-specific triage and remediation process is described in [VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md](VULNERABILITY_REPORT.md).
+1 -1
View File
@@ -34,4 +34,4 @@ Based on the report, the Silo maintainers investigate:
If the vulnerability exists in this fork itself, the maintainers will, when
feasible, fix the issue or implement reasonable countermeasures such that the
vulnerability can no longer be exploited. Fork-specific upgrade notes and
security advisories are published in `docs/security/advisories.md`.
security advisories are published in [the security advisory ledger](https://silo.pgsty.com/about/security-advisories/).
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ _init() {
## Minimum required versions for build dependencies
GIT_VERSION="1.0"
GO_VERSION="1.27.1"
GO_VERSION="1.27.3"
OSX_VERSION="10.8"
KNAME=$(uname -s)
ARCH=$(uname -m)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ if [ -n "${MCLI_BIN:-}" ]; then
exit 0
fi
release=${MCLI_RELEASE:-RELEASE.2026-09-03T07-13-05Z}
release=${MCLI_RELEASE:-RELEASE.2026-10-26T00-00-00Z}
version_hyphen=${release#RELEASE.}
package_version=$(printf '%s\n' "${version_hyphen}" | sed -E 's/^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})T([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})Z$/\1\2\3\4\5\6.0.0/')
if [ "${package_version}" = "${version_hyphen}" ]; then
+19 -13
View File
@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@
"MINIO_API_DELETE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL",
"MINIO_API_DISABLE_ODIRECT",
"MINIO_API_GZIP_OBJECTS",
"MINIO_API_LEGACY_BUCKET_RESOURCE_MATCH",
"MINIO_API_LIST_QUORUM",
"MINIO_API_MULTIPART_LISTING",
"MINIO_API_OBJECT_MAX_VERSIONS",
"MINIO_API_ODIRECT",
"MINIO_API_REMOTE_TRANSPORT_DEADLINE",
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@
"MINIO_API_TRANSITION_WORKERS",
"MINIO_API_TRUSTED_PROXIES",
"MINIO_ARGS",
"MINIO_AUDIT_",
"MINIO_AUDIT_KAFKA_BROKERS",
"MINIO_AUDIT_KAFKA_CLIENT_TLS_CERT",
"MINIO_AUDIT_KAFKA_CLIENT_TLS_KEY",
@@ -289,16 +290,6 @@
"MINIO_IDENTITY_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY",
"MINIO_IDENTITY_TLS_STS_EXPIRY",
"MINIO_IDLE_TIMEOUT",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_BINS",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_BIN_WIDTH",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_FLUSH",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_MAX_SIZE",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_MAX_TRACKED",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_MIN_RESIDENCY",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_POOLS",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_PROMOTE_WATERMARK",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_TIERING",
"MINIO_ILM_ACCESS_WORKERS",
"MINIO_ILM_EXPIRATION_WORKERS",
"MINIO_ILM_TRANSITION_WORKERS",
"MINIO_INTERFACE",
@@ -323,6 +314,7 @@
"MINIO_LAMBDA_WEBHOOK_ENABLE",
"MINIO_LAMBDA_WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT",
"MINIO_LISTENERS",
"MINIO_LOGGER_",
"MINIO_LOGGER_HTTP_ENDPOINT",
"MINIO_LOGGER_WEBHOOK_AUTH_TOKEN",
"MINIO_LOGGER_WEBHOOK_BATCH_SIZE",
@@ -581,6 +573,14 @@
"minio_resource_stats",
"minio_s3",
"minio_stats",
"minio_system_cpu_avg_idle",
"minio_system_cpu_avg_iowait",
"minio_system_cpu_load",
"minio_system_cpu_load_perc",
"minio_system_cpu_nice",
"minio_system_cpu_steal",
"minio_system_cpu_system",
"minio_system_cpu_user",
"minio_test"
],
"headers": [
@@ -596,11 +596,13 @@
"x-minio-from-peer",
"x-minio-healing-drives",
"x-minio-internal",
"x-minio-internal-a",
"x-minio-internal-actual-object-size",
"x-minio-internal-actual-size",
"x-minio-internal-archive-info",
"x-minio-internal-archive-type",
"x-minio-internal-b",
"x-minio-internal-c",
"x-minio-internal-compression",
"x-minio-internal-encrypted-multipart",
"x-minio-internal-encryptedmultipart",
@@ -613,6 +615,7 @@
"x-minio-internal-replication-reset-arn",
"x-minio-internal-replication-status",
"x-minio-internal-replication-timestamp",
"x-minio-internal-restore-attempt",
"x-minio-internal-server-side-encryption",
"x-minio-internal-server-side-encryption-context",
"x-minio-internal-server-side-encryption-iv",
@@ -637,7 +640,6 @@
"x-minio-origin-endpoint",
"x-minio-prefixes-total",
"x-minio-read-quorum",
"x-minio-replication",
"x-minio-replication-actual-object-size",
"x-minio-replication-delete-status",
"x-minio-replication-deletemarker-status",
@@ -745,7 +747,6 @@
"/idp/ldap/policy/{operation}",
"/idp/openid/list-access-keys-bulk",
"/ilm",
"/ilm/access",
"/import-bucket-metadata",
"/import-iam",
"/import-iam-v2",
@@ -777,6 +778,7 @@
"/metrics/v3",
"/minio/grid/",
"/minio/grid/lock/",
"/multipart-preflight",
"/netperf",
"/notification",
"/oauth2/callback",
@@ -840,6 +842,7 @@
"/site-replication/peer/bucket-ops",
"/site-replication/peer/edit",
"/site-replication/peer/iam-item",
"/site-replication/peer/iam-revisions",
"/site-replication/peer/idp-settings",
"/site-replication/peer/join",
"/site-replication/peer/remove",
@@ -888,6 +891,7 @@
"/v2/metrics/cluster",
"/v2/metrics/node",
"/v2/metrics/resource",
"/v3/site-replication/peer/iam-revisions",
"/var/vcap/bosh",
"/verifybinary",
"/version",
@@ -915,6 +919,7 @@
".minio.sys/config/config.json",
".minio.sys/config/hello.txt",
".minio.sys/config/iam/${username}/identity.json",
".minio.sys/config/ilm/access",
".minio.sys/format.json",
".minio.sys/multipart",
".minio.sys/multipart/bucket/object/uploads.json",
@@ -942,6 +947,7 @@
"arn:minio:kms:::this-is-disregarded",
"arn:minio:kms:::xyz-test-key",
"arn:minio:replication:",
"arn:minio:replication::",
"arn:minio:replication::8320b6d18f9032b4700f1f03b50d8d1853de8f22cab86931ee794e12f190852c:destinationbucket",
"arn:minio:replication:::",
"arn:minio:replication:::dest-bucket",
+1 -2
View File
@@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ func collect(repo string) (manifest, error) {
fset := token.NewFileSet()
for _, rel := range files {
// Investigation artifacts contain synthetic routes and archived configurations.
// Migration notes and guard fixtures contain archived identifiers.
if rel == "SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md" ||
strings.HasPrefix(rel, "docs/investigations/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(rel, "buildscripts/rebrand-guard/") ||
strings.HasPrefix(rel, "buildscripts/helm-migration-guard/") {
continue
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
__pycache__/
+163
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
"""Pure, self-contained SVG rendering for SILO's README cards."""
from datetime import date, timedelta
from html import escape
import math
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
themes = {
'light': dict(bg='#ffffff', wash='#f2f7fc', edge='#d9e3ee', ink='#16222e',
muted='#62758a', blue='#1d588c', copper='#b4762e', grid='#e5edf5',
line='#2b6ca3', ring='#dce5ef', field='#f7f9fc', label='#3d4e61'),
'dark': dict(bg='#101923', wash='#152738', edge='#2b3c50', ink='#e8eef6',
muted='#93a3b8', blue='#7fb8e8', copper='#e0a35c', grid='#263749',
line='#5da2dd', ring='#3a4e63', field='#0b1119', label='#b6c2d2'),
}
def read_emblem(path):
emblem = ET.parse(path).getroot()
body = ''.join(ET.tostring(child, encoding='unicode') for child in emblem
if child.tag.rsplit('}', 1)[-1] in ('defs', 'g'))
return '\n'.join(line.rstrip() for line in body.splitlines()).strip()
def txt(x, y, value, size=14, color=None, weight=400, anchor='start', mono=False, spacing=None):
family = 'Menlo,Consolas,monospace' if mono else 'Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif'
extra = f' letter-spacing="{spacing}"' if spacing is not None else ''
return (f'<text x="{x}" y="{y}" font-family="{family}" font-size="{size}" '
f'font-weight="{weight}" fill="{color}" text-anchor="{anchor}"{extra}>'
f'{escape(str(value))}</text>')
def start(height, theme, title, description, emblem_body):
t = themes[theme]
return [f'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1000" height="{height}" '
f'viewBox="0 0 1000 {height}" role="img" aria-labelledby="title desc">',
f'<title id="title">{escape(title)}</title><desc id="desc">{escape(description)}</desc>',
'<defs><linearGradient id="surface" x1="0" y1="1" x2="1" y2="0">'
f'<stop offset="0" stop-color="{t["bg"]}"/>'
f'<stop offset="1" stop-color="{t["wash"]}"/></linearGradient>'
'<linearGradient id="accent" x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="0">'
f'<stop offset="0" stop-color="{t["blue"]}"/>'
f'<stop offset="1" stop-color="{t["copper"]}"/></linearGradient>'
'<linearGradient id="area" x1="0" y1="0" x2="0" y2="1">'
f'<stop offset="0" stop-color="{t["line"]}" stop-opacity=".22"/>'
f'<stop offset="1" stop-color="{t["line"]}" stop-opacity=".015"/>'
'</linearGradient></defs>',
f'<rect x=".75" y=".75" width="998.5" height="{height-1.5}" rx="22" '
f'fill="url(#surface)" stroke="{t["edge"]}" stroke-width="1.5"/>',
f'<svg x="40" y="25" width="25" height="25" viewBox="230 213 570 570">{emblem_body}</svg>']
def heading(parts, t, eyebrow, title, subtitle, value, value_label):
parts.extend([
txt(76, 43, eyebrow, 11, t['muted'], 600, mono=True, spacing=1.7),
txt(40, 94, title, 32, t['ink'], 700),
txt(41, 123, subtitle, 14, t['muted']),
txt(958, 89, f'{value:,}', 45, t['ink'], 700, anchor='end'),
txt(957, 114, value_label, 10, t['muted'], 600, anchor='end', mono=True, spacing=1.5),
f'<path d="M40 146 H960" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
])
def contributors(theme, people, snapshot, emblem_body):
height = 206 + 76 * math.ceil(len(people) / 10)
t = themes[theme]
parts = start(height, theme, f'SILO community — {len(people)} contributors',
f'The existing SILO community roll, including code, proposals and reports across related projects. '
f'Gold rings retain the existing significant-contribution designation. Snapshot {snapshot}.', emblem_body)
heading(parts, t, 'SILO / COMMUNITY', 'Contributors',
'Code, proposals & reports across SILO and related projects', len(people), 'COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTORS')
for row in range(math.ceil(len(people) / 10)):
group = people[row * 10:(row + 1) * 10]
row_width = len(group) * 91
for col, person in enumerate(group):
x = (1000 - row_width) / 2 + col * 91 + 45.5
y = 199 + row * 76
identifier = f'avatar-{row}-{col}'
featured = bool(person.get('featured'))
parts.append(f'<g><title>@{escape(person["handle"])} — {escape(person["what"])}</title>')
parts.append(f'<defs><clipPath id="{identifier}"><circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="29"/></clipPath></defs>')
if featured:
parts.append(f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="34" fill="{t["copper"]}" opacity=".09"/>')
if person.get('avatarDataUrl'):
parts.append(f'<image x="{x-29}" y="{y-29}" width="58" height="58" '
f'clip-path="url(#{identifier})" href="{escape(person["avatarDataUrl"])}"/>')
else:
parts.append(f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="29" fill="{t["ring"]}"/>')
parts.append(txt(x, y + 9, person['handle'][0].upper(), 26, t['ink'], 700, 'middle'))
parts.append(f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="30.5" fill="none" '
f'stroke="{t["copper"] if featured else t["ring"]}" stroke-width="{2 if featured else 1.25}"/></g>')
parts.extend([
f'<path d="M40 {height-42} H960" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
f'<circle cx="47" cy="{height-21}" r="4" fill="none" stroke="{t["copper"]}" stroke-width="1.5"/>',
txt(61, height-17, 'Gold rings mark significant contributions', 12, t['muted']),
txt(959, height-17, f'AS OF {snapshot}', 10, t['muted'], 500, 'end', mono=True, spacing=.6),
'</svg>',
])
return ''.join(parts)
def stars(theme, history, snapshot, emblem_body):
points = history['points']
star_count = points[-1]['stars']
t = themes[theme]
provenance = ('Initial history reconstructed · Daily totals since ' + history['bootstrap']['through'] + ' · UTC'
if history['bootstrap']['reconstructed'] else 'Observed daily star totals · UTC')
parts = start(558, theme, f'SILO star history — {star_count:,} stars',
f'GitHub repository pgsty/silo. {star_count:,} stars as of {snapshot}. ' +
provenance, emblem_body)
heading(parts, t, 'SILO / GITHUB', 'Star History', 'pgsty/silo', star_count, 'GITHUB STARS')
left, right, top, bottom = 76, 958, 177, 440
begin = date.fromisoformat(points[0]['date'])
end = date.fromisoformat(points[-1]['date'])
days = max(1, (end - begin).days)
maximum = max(500, math.ceil(max(p['stars'] for p in points) / 500) * 500)
tick_step = 10 ** max(0, int(math.log10(maximum)))
xy = lambda day, n: (left + (right-left)*(date.fromisoformat(day)-begin).days / days,
bottom-(bottom-top)*n/maximum)
for value in range(0, maximum+1, tick_step):
y = xy(points[0]['date'], value)[1]
parts.append(f'<path d="M{left} {y:.2f} H{right}" stroke="{t["grid"]}" stroke-dasharray="4 6"/>')
parts.append(txt(left-16, round(y+4, 2), f'{value / 1000:g}k' if value >= 1000 else str(value), 12, t['muted'], anchor='end'))
dates = sorted({begin + timedelta(days=round((end-begin).days*i/5)) for i in range(6)})
ticks = [(d.isoformat(), d.strftime('%b %Y') if days > 90 else d.strftime('%b %d')) for d in dates]
for day, label in ticks:
x = xy(day, 0)[0]
parts.append(f'<path d="M{x:.2f} {top} V{bottom}" stroke="{t["grid"]}" stroke-opacity=".65"/>')
anchor = 'start' if day == points[0]['date'] else 'end' if day == snapshot else 'middle'
parts.append(txt(round(x, 2), 466, label, 12, t['muted'], anchor=anchor))
coords = [xy(p['date'], p['stars']) for p in points]
line = 'M' + ' L'.join(f'{x:.2f} {y:.2f}' for x, y in coords)
area = line + f' L{coords[-1][0]:.2f} {bottom} L{left} {bottom} Z'
parts.extend([
f'<path d="{area}" fill="url(#area)"/>',
f'<path d="{line}" fill="none" stroke="url(#accent)" stroke-width="3" '
'stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"/>',
f'<path d="M{left} {bottom} H{right}" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
])
x, y = coords[-1]
parts.extend([
f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="10" fill="{t["copper"]}" opacity=".12"/>',
f'<circle cx="{x}" cy="{y}" r="5" fill="{t["copper"]}" stroke="{t["bg"]}" stroke-width="2"/>',
f'<path d="M40 491 H960" stroke="{t["edge"]}"/>',
txt(40, 516, f'{begin:%b %Y} — {end:%b %Y}'.upper(), 10, t['muted'], 500, mono=True, spacing=.7),
txt(959, 516, f'SNAPSHOT {snapshot}', 10, t['muted'], 500, 'end', mono=True, spacing=.6),
txt(40, 539, provenance, 11, t['muted']),
'</svg>',
])
return ''.join(parts)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
PyYAML==6.0.3
+178
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
# Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
"""Regression checks for historical accuracy, contributor scope and SVG safety."""
import base64
import json
from pathlib import Path
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
from urllib.error import URLError
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
import render
import update
NS = {'s': 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'}
PNG = base64.b64decode('iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mP8/x8AAwMCAO+a7mgAAAAASUVORK5CYII=')
def person(handle='Alice', group='reports', featured=False):
return {'handle': handle, 'group': group, 'featured': featured,
'what': 'A reviewed contribution', 'firstContribution': '2026-09-01'}
def history():
return {'repository': 'pgsty/silo',
'bootstrap': {'through': '2026-09-15', 'reconstructed': True},
'points': [{'date': '2026-09-14', 'stars': 100}, {'date': '2026-09-15', 'stars': 105}]}
class HistoryTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_new_day_preserves_old_counts_and_unstars(self):
before = history()
after = update.update_history(before, '2026-09-16', 103)
self.assertEqual(after['points'][:-1], before['points'])
self.assertEqual(after['points'][-1], {'date': '2026-09-16', 'stars': 103})
self.assertEqual(before, history())
def test_same_day_rerun_replaces_instead_of_appending(self):
first = update.update_history(history(), '2026-09-15', 107)
self.assertEqual(len(first['points']), 2)
self.assertEqual(first, update.update_history(first, '2026-09-15', 107))
def test_missing_days_are_not_invented(self):
result = update.update_history(history(), '2026-09-18', 106)
self.assertEqual([p['date'] for p in result['points']], ['2026-09-14', '2026-09-15', '2026-09-18'])
def test_rejects_wrong_repository_and_corrupt_history(self):
cases = []
wrong = history(); wrong['repository'] = 'someone/else'; cases.append(wrong)
duplicate = history(); duplicate['points'].append(duplicate['points'][-1]); cases.append(duplicate)
unordered = history(); unordered['points'].reverse(); cases.append(unordered)
negative = history(); negative['points'][0]['stars'] = -1; cases.append(negative)
future = history(); future['points'][-1]['date'] = '2026-09-20'; cases.append(future)
for case in cases:
with self.subTest(case=case), self.assertRaises(ValueError):
update.update_history(case, '2026-09-16', 100)
def test_first_run_has_no_fabricated_history(self):
result = update.update_history(None, '2026-09-16', 10)
self.assertFalse(result['bootstrap']['reconstructed'])
self.assertEqual(result['points'], [{'date': '2026-09-16', 'stars': 10}])
class ContributorTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_retries_truncated_json_before_using_it(self):
with patch('update.request', side_effect=[b'{"partial":', b'{"ok":true}']), patch('update.time.sleep'):
self.assertEqual(update.GitHub('').get('repos/pgsty/silo'), {'ok': True})
def test_paginates_past_one_full_page(self):
class API(update.GitHub):
def __init__(self): self.calls = []
def get(self, path):
self.calls.append(path)
return list(range(100)) if 'page=1&' in path else [100]
api = API()
self.assertEqual(len(list(api.issues('pgsty/silo'))), 101)
self.assertIn('state=all', api.calls[0])
self.assertIn('page=2&', api.calls[1])
def test_bots_deduplication_unmerged_work_and_reviewed_credit(self):
def issue(login, kind='issue', user_type='User'):
item = {'user': {'login': login, 'type': user_type, 'avatar_url': ''}, 'created_at': '2026-09-02T00:00:00Z'}
if kind != 'issue': item['pull_request'] = {'merged_at': None if kind == 'open' else '2026-09-03T00:00:00Z'}
return item
class API:
def issues(self, _repo):
return [issue('alice'), issue('Bob', 'open'), issue('Bob', 'merged'),
issue('Carol', 'open'), issue('Copilot'), issue('robot', user_type='Bot')]
curated = {'repositories': ['pgsty/silo', 'pgsty/mc'], 'bots': ['Copilot'],
'people': [person('Alice', featured=True), person('Reporter'), person('Copilot')]}
result = update.collect_people(API(), curated)
self.assertEqual({p['handle'] for p in result}, {'Alice', 'Bob', 'Carol', 'Reporter'})
self.assertEqual(result[0]['handle'], 'Bob')
self.assertEqual(result[1]['handle'], 'Carol')
self.assertTrue(next(p for p in result if p['handle'] == 'Alice')['featured'])
self.assertEqual(next(p for p in result if p['handle'] == 'Bob')['group'], 'code')
self.assertFalse(next(p for p in result if p['handle'] == 'Carol')['featured'])
def test_newer_reviewed_preview_survives_until_site_catches_up(self):
remote = {'updated': '2026-09-16T03:00:00+00:00'}
cached = {'updated': '2026-09-16T04:00:00+00:00'}
self.assertIs(update.select_curated(remote, cached), cached)
newer = {'updated': '2026-09-17T03:00:00+00:00'}
self.assertIs(update.select_curated(newer, cached), newer)
def test_avatar_failure_reuses_raster_cache(self):
previous = {**person(), 'avatarDataUrl': update.raster_data_url(PNG)}
with patch('update.request', side_effect=URLError('unavailable')):
result = update.add_avatars(None, [{**person(), 'avatarUrl': 'https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/1'}], [previous])
self.assertEqual(result[0]['avatarDataUrl'], previous['avatarDataUrl'])
with self.assertRaises(ValueError): update.raster_data_url(b'<svg onload="bad()"/>')
with self.assertRaises(ValueError): update.cached_avatar({'avatarDataUrl': ''})
def test_fetch_failure_leaves_published_assets_untouched(self):
class API:
def get(self, path):
if path == 'repos/pgsty/silo': return {'full_name': 'pgsty/silo', 'stargazers_count': 106}
raise URLError('roster unavailable')
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
out = Path(directory)
original = json.dumps(history())
(out / 'history.json').write_text(original)
(out / 'contributors-light.svg').write_text('previous image')
with self.assertRaises(URLError): update.refresh(out, API(), Path('.'))
self.assertEqual((out / 'history.json').read_text(), original)
self.assertEqual((out / 'contributors-light.svg').read_text(), 'previous image')
class RenderTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_real_emblem_generates_clean_xml(self):
emblem = render.read_emblem(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / '.github/silo.svg')
svg = render.contributors('light', [person()], '2026-09-16', emblem)
ET.fromstring(svg)
self.assertTrue(all(line == line.rstrip() for line in svg.splitlines()))
def test_all_avatars_fit_when_the_roster_grows(self):
people = [{**person(f'person-{i}'), 'avatarDataUrl': update.raster_data_url(PNG)} for i in range(151)]
for theme in ('light', 'dark'):
root = ET.fromstring(render.contributors(theme, people, '2026-09-16', ''))
images = root.findall('.//s:image', NS)
self.assertEqual(len(images), 151)
footer = float(root.attrib['height']) - 42
self.assertTrue(all(float(i.attrib['y']) + float(i.attrib['height']) < footer for i in images))
self.assertTrue(all(i.attrib['href'].startswith('data:image/png;base64,') for i in images))
def test_untrusted_text_is_escaped(self):
data = [{**person(), 'what': '<script>alert("x")</script> & contributions'}]
svg = render.contributors('light', data, '2026-09-16', '')
root = ET.fromstring(svg)
self.assertEqual(root.findall('.//s:script', NS), [])
self.assertIn('&lt;script&gt;', svg)
def test_single_point_and_decreasing_star_history_render(self):
for data in (update.update_history(None, '2026-09-16', 0), update.update_history(history(), '2026-09-16', 90)):
for theme in ('light', 'dark'):
svg = render.stars(theme, data, '2026-09-16', '')
ET.fromstring(svg)
self.assertNotIn('nan', svg.lower())
self.assertNotIn('inf', svg.lower())
if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main()
+295
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
#
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
#
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
"""Refresh the generated-asset checkout; publishing is handled by the workflow."""
import argparse
import base64
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
from datetime import date, datetime, timezone
import json
from http.client import IncompleteRead
import os
from pathlib import Path
import re
import sys
import time
from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
import yaml
import render
REPOSITORY = 'pgsty/silo'
SOURCE = 'repos/pgsty/silo.pgsty.com/contents/data/home/contributors.yaml?ref=main'
GROUPS = ('code', 'proposed', 'reports')
HANDLE = re.compile(r'[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9-]{0,38}\Z')
def request(url, token='', limit=8 * 1024 * 1024):
headers = {'User-Agent': 'silo-repository-cards', 'Accept': 'application/vnd.github+json'}
if urlparse(url).netloc == 'api.github.com':
headers['X-GitHub-Api-Version'] = '2022-11-28'
if token:
headers['Authorization'] = f'Bearer {token}'
for attempt in range(3):
try:
with urlopen(Request(url, headers=headers), timeout=25) as response:
data = response.read(limit + 1)
if len(data) > limit:
raise ValueError('Response exceeds the size limit')
expected = response.headers.get('Content-Length')
if expected is not None and len(data) != int(expected):
raise URLError('Incomplete response body')
return data
except HTTPError as exc:
if exc.code < 500 or attempt == 2:
raise
except (URLError, TimeoutError, IncompleteRead):
if attempt == 2:
raise
time.sleep(attempt + 1)
class GitHub:
def __init__(self, token):
self.token = token
def get(self, path):
for attempt in range(3):
try:
return json.loads(request('https://api.github.com/' + path, self.token))
except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
if attempt == 2:
raise ValueError(f'Incomplete or invalid GitHub JSON: {path}') from exc
time.sleep(attempt + 1)
def issues(self, repository):
page = 1
while True:
batch = self.get(f'repos/{repository}/issues?state=all&per_page=100&page={page}&sort=created&direction=asc')
if not isinstance(batch, list):
raise ValueError(f'Invalid issues response for {repository}')
yield from batch
if len(batch) < 100:
return
page += 1
def curated_snapshot(data, revision):
updated = str(data['updated'])
datetime.fromisoformat(updated)
repositories = [item['repo'] for item in data['repositories']]
if not repositories or any(not re.fullmatch(r'pgsty/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+', repo) for repo in repositories):
raise ValueError('Invalid contributor repository scope')
people = []
for group in GROUPS:
for entry in data[group]:
if not HANDLE.fullmatch(entry['handle']):
raise ValueError('Invalid GitHub contributor handle')
people.append({
'handle': entry['handle'], 'group': group,
'featured': bool(entry.get('featured')), 'what': entry['what'],
'firstContribution': str(entry.get('firstContribution', '9999-12-31')),
})
if not people or len({p['handle'].lower() for p in people}) != len(people):
raise ValueError('Empty or duplicate contributor roster')
return {'updated': updated, 'revision': revision, 'repositories': repositories,
'bots': data.get('bots', ['Copilot', 'dependabot[bot]']), 'people': people}
def select_curated(remote, cached):
# The initial, approved preview can contain reviewed credit not published by
# the companion site yet. Keep that newer snapshot until the site catches up.
if cached and datetime.fromisoformat(cached['updated']) > datetime.fromisoformat(remote['updated']):
return cached
return remote
def collect_people(api, curated):
bots = {name.lower() for name in curated['bots']}
people = {p['handle'].lower(): dict(p) for p in curated['people']
if p['handle'].lower() not in bots and not p['handle'].lower().endswith('[bot]')}
order = {p['handle'].lower(): index for index, p in enumerate(curated['people'])}
for repository in curated['repositories']:
print(f'Reading issue and PR authors: {repository}', flush=True)
for issue in api.issues(repository):
user = issue.get('user') or {}
handle = user.get('login', '')
key = handle.lower()
if user.get('type') != 'User' or key in bots or key.endswith('[bot]'):
continue
if not HANDLE.fullmatch(handle):
raise ValueError('Invalid issue author')
pr = issue.get('pull_request')
group = 'code' if pr and pr.get('merged_at') else 'proposed' if pr else 'reports'
first = issue['created_at'][:10]
date.fromisoformat(first)
person = people.setdefault(key, {
'handle': handle, 'group': group, 'featured': False,
'what': 'Contributed an issue or pull request to SILO and related projects',
'firstContribution': first,
})
person['avatarUrl'] = user.get('avatar_url', '')
person['firstContribution'] = min(person['firstContribution'], first)
if GROUPS.index(group) < GROUPS.index(person['group']):
person['group'] = group
if not people:
raise ValueError('No human contributors were collected')
return sorted(people.values(), key=lambda p: (
GROUPS.index(p['group']), not p['featured'],
order.get(p['handle'].lower(), len(order)), p['firstContribution'], p['handle'].lower()))
def raster_data_url(data):
if data.startswith(b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n'):
mime = 'image/png'
elif data.startswith(b'\xff\xd8\xff'):
mime = 'image/jpeg'
elif data.startswith((b'GIF87a', b'GIF89a')):
mime = 'image/gif'
elif data[:4] == b'RIFF' and data[8:12] == b'WEBP':
mime = 'image/webp'
else:
raise ValueError('Avatar is not a raster image')
return f'data:{mime};base64,' + base64.b64encode(data).decode('ascii')
def cached_avatar(person):
value = person.get('avatarDataUrl', '')
if not value:
return ''
prefix, encoded = value.split(',', 1)
if prefix not in ('data:image/png;base64', 'data:image/jpeg;base64', 'data:image/gif;base64', 'data:image/webp;base64'):
raise ValueError('Invalid cached avatar format')
raw = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
if len(raw) > 512 * 1024 or raster_data_url(raw) != value:
raise ValueError('Invalid cached avatar')
return value
def add_avatars(api, people, previous):
cached = {p['handle'].lower(): cached_avatar(p) for p in previous}
def update(person):
person = dict(person)
try:
url = person.pop('avatarUrl', '') or api.get('users/' + person['handle'])['avatar_url']
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme != 'https' or parsed.netloc != 'avatars.githubusercontent.com':
raise ValueError('Unexpected avatar host')
data = request(url + ('&' if '?' in url else '?') + 's=96', limit=512 * 1024)
person['avatarDataUrl'] = raster_data_url(data)
except (HTTPError, URLError, TimeoutError, IncompleteRead, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
person.pop('avatarUrl', None)
person['avatarDataUrl'] = cached.get(person['handle'].lower(), '')
print(f'Avatar fallback for @{person["handle"]}: {type(exc).__name__}', file=sys.stderr)
return person
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=6) as pool:
return list(pool.map(update, people))
def update_history(history, day, stars):
date.fromisoformat(day)
if type(stars) is not int or stars < 0:
raise ValueError('Invalid repository star count')
if history is None:
history = {'repository': REPOSITORY, 'bootstrap': {'through': day, 'reconstructed': False}, 'points': []}
if history['repository'] != REPOSITORY:
raise ValueError('Star history belongs to a different repository')
date.fromisoformat(history['bootstrap']['through'])
dates = []
for point in history['points']:
date.fromisoformat(point['date'])
if type(point['stars']) is not int or point['stars'] < 0:
raise ValueError('Invalid historical star count')
dates.append(point['date'])
if dates != sorted(set(dates)) or any(d > day for d in dates):
raise ValueError('History contains duplicate, unordered, or future dates')
# Replace today's observation, preserve previous days, and allow unstars.
points = [dict(p) for p in history['points'] if p['date'] != day]
points.append({'date': day, 'stars': stars})
return {**history, 'points': points}
def read_json(path, default=None):
return json.loads(path.read_text()) if path.exists() else default
def refresh(output, api, source_root):
day = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date().isoformat()
metadata = api.get('repos/' + REPOSITORY)
if metadata['full_name'].lower() != REPOSITORY:
raise ValueError('Unexpected repository metadata')
history = update_history(read_json(output / 'history.json'), day, metadata['stargazers_count'])
source = api.get(SOURCE)
reviewed = yaml.safe_load(base64.b64decode(source['content'], validate=False))
curated = select_curated(curated_snapshot(reviewed, source['sha']), read_json(output / 'curated.json'))
people = collect_people(api, curated)
previous = read_json(output / 'contributors.json', {}).get('people', [])
people = add_avatars(api, people, previous)
emblem = render.read_emblem(source_root / '.github/silo.svg')
payloads = {}
for theme in ('light', 'dark'):
payloads[f'contributors-{theme}.svg'] = render.contributors(theme, people, day, emblem) + '\n'
payloads[f'star-history-{theme}.svg'] = render.stars(theme, history, day, emblem) + '\n'
for svg in payloads.values():
ET.fromstring(svg)
for name, data in {
'history.json': history,
'curated.json': curated,
'contributors.json': {'repository': REPOSITORY, 'updated': day, 'people': people},
}.items():
payloads[name] = json.dumps(data, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) + '\n'
payloads['README.md'] = f'''# SILO repository cards
Generated by [Repository Cards](https://github.com/pgsty/silo/actions/workflows/repository-cards.yml)
at 00:00 UTC daily (08:00 Asia/Shanghai). GitHub may queue scheduled runs.
Snapshot: {day}. {metadata['stargazers_count']:,} stars; {len(people)} community contributors.
- `contributors-light.svg` / `contributors-dark.svg`: human issue and PR authors across the SILO project scope, plus reviewed acknowledgements. Bots are excluded. Gold rings follow the reviewed companion-site roster; new authors are collected automatically.
- `star-history-light.svg` / `star-history-dark.svg`: initial history reconstructed from the then-current stargazers; later points are daily observed totals, including decreases. Missing days are not fabricated.
- `curated.json`: a cache of reviewed contributor credit from `pgsty/silo.pgsty.com/data/home/contributors.yaml`. The approved initial preview may be newer than the published site; a newer reviewed snapshot is retained until the site catches up.
- `contributors.json`: generated contributor data and embedded raster avatars. Failed avatar refreshes use the previous image, or an initial when no image is available.
- `history.json`: persistent daily totals. Keep this file when regenerating images.
The SVGs are self-contained. Source and instructions live on the default branch;
this branch contains generated assets only. Do not merge it into `main`.
'''
# Collect and validate everything before touching the publication checkout.
output.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
for filename, text in payloads.items():
(output / filename).write_text(text)
print(f'{day}: {len(people)} contributors; {metadata["stargazers_count"]:,} stars; {len(history["points"])} history points')
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument('--output', type=Path, required=True)
args = parser.parse_args()
configured = os.environ.get('GITHUB_REPOSITORY', REPOSITORY)
if configured.lower() != REPOSITORY:
raise SystemExit('This workflow is scoped to pgsty/silo')
refresh(args.output, GitHub(os.environ.get('GH_TOKEN', '')), Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2])
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ helm_run template my-release "${new_chart}" \
go run ./buildscripts/helm-migration-guard "${old_render}" "${new_render}"
helm_run package "${new_chart}" --destination "${output_dir}" >/dev/null
test -s "${work_dir}/silo-7.0.2.tgz"
test -s "${work_dir}/silo-7.0.3.tgz"
if find "${work_dir}" -maxdepth 1 -type f -name 'minio-*.tgz' | grep -q .; then
echo "Helm packaging emitted a legacy MinIO chart name" >&2
exit 1
+47 -16
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,33 @@ fail() {
exit 1
}
# Git is already a build prerequisite. --no-index also scans untracked files
# and exported source trees. As before, honor .gitignore only in a worktree.
search_ignore=--no-exclude-standard
if git rev-parse --show-toplevel >/dev/null 2>&1; then
search_ignore=--exclude-standard
fi
search_errors="$(mktemp)"
trap 'rm -f "${search_errors}"' EXIT
search_text() {
local status=0
git --no-pager grep --no-index "${search_ignore}" --no-color -nIHE "$@" 2>"${search_errors}" || status=$?
# Git can return 1 for both no matches and a file read error. Check stderr
# as well, before callers filter matches through their allowlists.
if [ "${status}" -gt 1 ] || [ -s "${search_errors}" ]; then
cat "${search_errors}" >&2
fail "could not scan source files"
fi
}
# Keep hidden files and build output out of the repository-wide scans.
source_excludes=(
':(exclude,glob)**/.*'
':(exclude,glob)**/.*/**'
':(exclude)dist/**'
)
require_file() {
[ -f "$1" ] || fail "missing required file: $1"
}
@@ -36,7 +63,7 @@ for file in \
buildscripts/verify-helm-migration.sh \
Dockerfile.goreleaser \
Dockerfile.distroless \
dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh \
dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh \
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh \
helm/silo/Chart.yaml \
helm/silo/values.yaml \
@@ -101,7 +128,7 @@ require_text Dockerfile.goreleaser "Published checksum drift"
require_text Dockerfile.distroless 'COPY --chmod=0755 silo /usr/bin/silo'
require_text Dockerfile.distroless 'ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/silo"]'
require_text Dockerfile.distroless '"/usr/bin/silo", "healthcheck", "ready"'
require_text dockerscripts/download-static-curl.sh "sha256sum -c"
require_text dockerscripts/build-static-curl.sh "sha256sum -c"
require_text helm/silo/Chart.yaml "name: silo"
require_text helm/silo/values.yaml "repository: pgsty/silo"
require_text helm/silo/templates/deployment.yaml "/usr/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh silo server"
@@ -152,7 +179,11 @@ if grep -Ev '^[[:space:]]*(#|$)' silo.env | grep -q '='; then
fail "silo.env must not contain active assignments that shadow /etc/default/minio"
fi
if rg -n 'pgsty/minio:' .github/workflows Dockerfile.goreleaser helm/silo; then
delivery_hits="$(search_text 'pgsty/minio:' -- .github/workflows Dockerfile.goreleaser helm/silo \
':(exclude,glob).github/workflows/**/.*' ':(exclude,glob).github/workflows/**/.*/**' \
':(exclude,glob)helm/silo/**/.*' ':(exclude,glob)helm/silo/**/.*/**')"
if [ -n "${delivery_hits}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${delivery_hits}" >&2
fail "an active delivery surface still publishes the frozen pgsty/minio image"
fi
@@ -165,10 +196,10 @@ fi
# So two rules. First, no live URL may resolve to the old repository anywhere,
# READMEs and CONTRIBUTORS.md included.
old_repo_pattern='pgsty/minio(\.git)?([^[:alnum:]_.-]|$)'
stale_repo_url="$(rg -n -e "github\.com/${old_repo_pattern}" -e "hub\.docker\.com/r/${old_repo_pattern}" \
--glob '!.git/**' --glob '!dist/**' \
--glob '!SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' \
--glob '!buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json' . |
stale_repo_url="$(search_text -e "github\.com/${old_repo_pattern}" -e "hub\.docker\.com/r/${old_repo_pattern}" -- . \
"${source_excludes[@]}" ':(exclude)SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' \
':(exclude)buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json')"
stale_repo_url="$(printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo_url}" |
sed 's#^\./##' | grep -v '^buildscripts/verify-rebrand\.sh:' || true)"
if [ -n "${stale_repo_url}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo_url}" >&2
@@ -180,32 +211,32 @@ fi
# legacy image, the two READMEs that document the rename and the archived
# minio branch, and historical issue titles in CONTRIBUTORS.md.
repo_guard_allowlist='^(buildscripts/minio-upgrade\.sh|buildscripts/verify-rebrand\.sh|buildscripts/helm-migration-guard/main\.go|README\.md|README_ZH\.md|CONTRIBUTORS\.md):'
stale_repo="$(rg -n "${old_repo_pattern}" --glob '!.git/**' --glob '!dist/**' \
--glob '!SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' \
--glob '!buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json' . |
stale_repo="$(search_text "${old_repo_pattern}" -- . "${source_excludes[@]}" \
':(exclude)SILO_REBRANDING_MIGRATION.md' ':(exclude)buildscripts/rebrand-guard/compat-baseline.json')"
stale_repo="$(printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo}" |
sed 's#^\./##' | grep -Ev "${repo_guard_allowlist}" || true)"
if [ -n "${stale_repo}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${stale_repo}" >&2
fail "a source reference still names the pre-rename pgsty/minio repository"
fi
stale_branch="$(rg -n 'pgsty/silo/(blob/|tree/|raw/)?master' \
--glob '!.git/**' --glob '!dist/**' . || true)"
stale_branch="$(search_text 'pgsty/silo/(blob/|tree/|raw/)?master' -- . "${source_excludes[@]}")"
if [ -n "${stale_branch}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${stale_branch}" >&2
fail "a link still targets the retired master branch; raw and Actions URLs do not follow a branch rename"
fi
for workflow in .github/workflows/go.yml .github/workflows/vulncheck.yml; do
if rg -q '^\s+- master$' "${workflow}"; then
stale_filter="$(search_text '^[[:space:]]+- master$' -- "${workflow}")"
if [ -n "${stale_filter}" ]; then
fail "${workflow} still filters on master and would go silently dormant on main"
fi
require_text "${workflow}" " - main"
done
network_hits="$(rg -n --glob '*.go' --glob '!**/*_test.go' \
'https?://[^"`[:space:]]*(dl\.min\.io|subnet\.min\.io|api\.min\.io|slack\.min\.io|play\.min\.io)' \
cmd internal || true)"
network_hits="$(search_text \
'https?://[^"`[:space:]]*(dl\.min\.io|subnet\.min\.io|api\.min\.io|slack\.min\.io|play\.min\.io)' -- \
':(glob)cmd/**/*.go' ':(glob)internal/**/*.go' ':(exclude,glob)**/*_test.go' "${source_excludes[@]}")"
network_hits="$(printf '%s\n' "${network_hits}" | grep -Ev '^[^:]+:[0-9]+:[[:space:]]*//' || true)"
if [ -n "${network_hits}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "${network_hits}" >&2
+184
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
//go:build consistency_strict
// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
)
type abandonedCleanupCommitDisk struct {
StorageAPI
entered chan<- struct{}
release <-chan struct{}
}
func (d abandonedCleanupCommitDisk) RenameData(ctx context.Context, sv, sp string, fi FileInfo, dv, dp string, o RenameOptions) (RenameDataResp, error) {
var success int64
gate := &scopeStagedContext{
Context: ctx, meta: filepath.Join(d.Endpoint().Path, dv, dp, fi.DataDir, "part.1"),
entered: d.entered, release: d.release,
tracker: healthDiskCtxValue{lastSuccess: &success},
}
return d.StorageAPI.RenameData(gate, sv, sp, fi, dv, dp, o)
}
// A lost namespace lease can admit cleanup while a disk transaction is between
// moving its external shards and replacing xl.meta. Those shards are live work,
// even though the old metadata does not refer to them yet. Cleanup must wait.
func TestMutationAbandonedCleanupWaitsForCommit(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := mutationPools(t)
const object = "cleanup-during-commit"
body := strings.Repeat("new payload", 200000)
mutationPut(t, z, bucket, object, 0, strings.Repeat("old payload", 200000), time.Now().Add(-time.Minute))
set := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(object)
disks, swap := installListingDiskSwitch(set)
defer swap(disks)
entered, release := make(chan struct{}, len(disks)), make(chan struct{})
unblock := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
defer unblock()
wrapped := append([]StorageAPI(nil), disks...)
for i, d := range disks {
wrapped[i] = abandonedCleanupCommitDisk{d, entered, release}
}
swap(wrapped)
committed := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := z.serverPools[0].PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader(body), int64(len(body)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{NoLock: true})
committed <- err
}()
for range disks {
select {
case <-entered:
case err := <-committed:
t.Fatalf("PUT returned before shard barrier: %v", err)
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("PUT did not move all external shards")
}
}
t.Log("All eight new external shard directories exist; old xl.meta is still active")
cleaned := make(chan error, len(disks))
for _, d := range disks {
go func(d StorageAPI) { cleaned <- d.CleanAbandonedData(context.Background(), bucket, object) }(d)
}
early := 0
timer := time.NewTimer(150 * time.Millisecond)
wait:
for {
select {
case err := <-cleaned:
early++
t.Errorf("abandoned-data cleanup overtook unfinished commit: %v", err)
if early == len(disks) {
break wait
}
case <-timer.C:
break wait
}
}
timer.Stop()
unblock()
select {
case err := <-committed:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PUT failed: %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("PUT did not finish")
}
for i := early; i < len(disks); i++ {
select {
case err := <-cleaned:
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("cleanup did not finish")
}
}
swap(disks)
r, err := z.GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("acknowledged PUT unreadable after abandoned-data cleanup: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil || string(data) != body {
t.Fatalf("acknowledged external shards lost: bytes=%d err=%v", len(data), err)
}
}
// Cleanup can also arrive after a disk has committed but before its delayed
// reply lets the coordinator decide to undo a failed quorum. The previous
// generation's backup is still owned by that unfinished transaction.
func TestMutationAbandonedCleanupPreservesUndoBackup(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := mutationPools(t)
const object = "cleanup-before-undo"
body := strings.Repeat("last acknowledged", 150000)
base := time.Now().Add(-time.Minute)
mutationPut(t, z, bucket, object, 0, body, base)
set := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(object)
disks, swap := installListingDiskSwitch(set)
defer swap(disks)
entered, release := make(chan struct{}, 4), make(chan struct{})
unblock := sync.OnceFunc(func() { close(release) })
defer unblock()
wrapped := append([]StorageAPI(nil), disks...)
for i, d := range disks {
wrapped[i] = delayedRenameResult{d, i >= 4, entered, release}
}
swap(wrapped)
committed := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
next := strings.Repeat("failed update", 180000)
_, err := z.serverPools[0].PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, object, mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader(next), int64(len(next)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{NoLock: true, MTime: base.Add(time.Second)})
committed <- err
}()
for range 4 {
select {
case <-entered:
case err := <-committed:
t.Fatalf("PUT returned before reply barrier: %v", err)
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("disk commit did not reach reply barrier")
}
}
for _, d := range disks[:4] {
if err := d.CleanAbandonedData(t.Context(), bucket, object); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
unblock()
select {
case err := <-committed:
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("four-of-eight commit unexpectedly reached write quorum")
}
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("failed PUT did not finish undo")
}
swap(disks)
for i, d := range disks {
fi, err := d.ReadVersion(t.Context(), "", bucket, object, "", ReadOptions{})
if err != nil || !fi.ModTime.Equal(base) {
t.Errorf("disk%d lost last acknowledged generation after failed PUT: mtime=%v err=%v", i, fi.ModTime, err)
}
}
r, err := z.GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("last acknowledged value unreadable after cleanup and undo: %v", err)
}
defer r.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil || string(data) != body {
t.Fatalf("last acknowledged value lost after cleanup and undo: bytes=%d err=%v", len(data), err)
}
}
+80
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/cachevalue"
)
func TestAccountInfoReflectsBucketMutations(t *testing.T) {
ctx := t.Context()
bed, err := prepareAdminErasureTestBed(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer bed.TearDown()
previousCache := listBucketsCache
defer func() { listBucketsCache = previousCache }()
// Hold a real pre-mutation snapshot past the assertions so the regression
// cannot disappear merely because a slow test outlasted the cache TTL.
freezeListing := func() {
t.Helper()
buckets, err := bed.objLayer.ListBuckets(ctx, BucketOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
listBucketsCache = cachevalue.NewFromFunc(time.Hour, cachevalue.Opts{}, func(context.Context) ([]BucketInfo, error) {
return buckets, nil
})
if _, err := listBucketsCache.GetWithCtx(ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
const bucket = "account-info-freshness"
assertPresent := func(want bool) {
t.Helper()
req, err := buildAdminRequest(nil, http.MethodGet, "/accountinfo", 0, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
bed.router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("account info: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var info madmin.AccountInfo
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &info); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
found := false
for _, item := range info.Buckets {
if item.Name == bucket {
found = true
}
}
if found != want {
t.Errorf("account info bucket present = %v, want %v", found, want)
}
}
freezeListing()
if err := bed.objLayer.MakeBucket(ctx, bucket, MakeBucketOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assertPresent(true)
freezeListing()
if err := bed.objLayer.DeleteBucket(ctx, bucket, DeleteBucketOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assertPresent(false)
}
+3 -1
View File
@@ -249,8 +249,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccountLDAP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
for k, v := range cred.Claims {
if k == expClaim {
switch k {
case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
continue
}
opts.claims[k] = v
+3 -1
View File
@@ -373,7 +373,9 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) RebalanceStop(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
// Cancel any ongoing rebalance operation
globalNotificationSys.StopRebalance(r.Context())
writeSuccessResponseHeadersOnly(w)
adminLogIf(ctx, pools.saveRebalanceStats(GlobalContext, 0, rebalSaveStoppedAt))
if err := pools.saveRebalanceStats(GlobalContext, 0, rebalSaveStoppedAt); !errors.Is(err, errRebalanceNotStarted) {
adminLogIf(ctx, err)
}
globalNotificationSys.LoadRebalanceMeta(ctx, false)
}
+556
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,556 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
"github.com/minio/mux"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
func iamAdminFixture(t *testing.T) (context.Context, *IAMSys) {
t.Helper()
ctx, sys, obj := prepareIAMRevisionFixture(t)
globalObjLayerMutex.Lock()
globalObjectAPI = obj
globalObjLayerMutex.Unlock()
return ctx, sys
}
func iamAdminUser(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, name, policyName string) auth.Credentials {
t.Helper()
cred := auth.Credentials{AccessKey: name, SecretKey: "review-user-valid-secret"}
_, err := sys.CreateUser(ctx, name, madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq{SecretKey: cred.SecretKey, Status: madmin.AccountEnabled})
mustIAM(t, err)
if policyName != "" {
_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, name, policyName, regUser, false)
mustIAM(t, err)
}
return cred
}
func iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, parent, key, document string) auth.Credentials {
t.Helper()
var sp *policy.Policy
var err error
if document != "" {
sp, err = policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
mustIAM(t, err)
}
cred, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: key, secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", sessionPolicy: sp})
mustIAM(t, err)
return cred
}
func iamAdminRequest(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any) *http.Request {
t.Helper()
var body []byte
if payload != nil {
raw, err := json.Marshal(payload)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err = madmin.EncryptData(cred.SecretKey, raw)
mustIAM(t, err)
}
headers := map[string]string{}
if cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
headers["X-Amz-Security-Token"] = cred.SessionToken
}
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(method, "http://localhost"+target, int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, headers)
mustIAM(t, err)
mustIAM(t, req.ParseForm())
return req
}
func iamAdminCall(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, method, target string, payload any, vars map[string]string, handler http.HandlerFunc) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
req := iamAdminRequest(t, cred, method, target, payload)
req = mux.SetURLVars(req, vars)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "IAMAdminAuthorization"))
handler(rec, req)
return rec
}
func assertIAMAdminStatus(t *testing.T, operation string, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder, want int) {
t.Helper()
if rec.Code != want {
t.Errorf("%s status=%d want=%d body=%s", operation, rec.Code, want, rec.Body.String())
return
}
if want == http.StatusForbidden || want == http.StatusNotFound {
var response APIErrorResponse
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &response))
wantCode := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied).Code
if want == http.StatusNotFound {
wantCode = errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound).Code
}
if response.Code != wantCode {
t.Errorf("%s error code=%s want=%s", operation, response.Code, wantCode)
}
}
}
func iamAdminPlugin(t *testing.T, allow bool) {
t.Helper()
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"result": allow})
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
u, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(server.URL)
mustIAM(t, err)
previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{URL: u, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { r.Close() }}))
t.Cleanup(func() { setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous) })
}
func TestIAMAdminRootEmptyPolicy(t *testing.T) {
for _, doc := range []string{"", "null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
t.Run("policy="+doc, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-empty", doc)
sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "review-root-sibling", "")
req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
if code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
}
active, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(policy.Args{Claims: checked.Claims})
t.Logf("owner=%v parsed_active_session_policy=%v", owner, active)
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-root-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "review"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminEmptyPolicyDelegation(t *testing.T) {
for _, parentType := range []string{"root", "user"} {
for _, document := range []string{"null", "{}", `{"Statement":null}`} {
t.Run(parentType+"/"+document, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := globalActiveCred
if parentType == "user" {
parent = iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "empty-policy-parent", "readwrite")
}
sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(document))
mustIAM(t, err)
caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
accessKey: "empty-policy-caller", secretKey: "empty-policy-caller-secret", sessionPolicy: sp,
claims: map[string]any{"identity-attribute": "preserved"},
})
mustIAM(t, err)
const limitedPolicy = `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts"]}]}`
for _, tc := range []struct {
policy string
listStatus int
allowObject bool
}{
{"", http.StatusOK, true},
{"null", http.StatusOK, true},
{"{}", http.StatusOK, true},
{`{"Statement":null}`, http.StatusOK, true},
{limitedPolicy, http.StatusOK, false},
{`{"Version":"2012-10-17"}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
{`{"Statement":[]}`, http.StatusForbidden, false},
} {
expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
req := madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{Expiration: &expires}
if tc.policy != "" {
req.Policy = json.RawMessage(tc.policy)
}
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", req, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create expiring child", rec, http.StatusOK)
data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var response madmin.AddServiceAccountResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
child, ok := sys.store.GetUser(response.Credentials.AccessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("new service account missing")
}
// Exercise the issued key through authentication and authorization.
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "use expiring child policy="+tc.policy, iamAdminCall(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), tc.listStatus)
signed := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/example/object", nil)
checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(signed, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
if code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("child authentication: %v", code)
}
if checked.Claims["identity-attribute"] != "preserved" {
t.Fatal("creation lost the caller's identity context")
}
allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: checked.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: "example", ObjectName: "object"})
if allowed != tc.allowObject {
t.Errorf("GetObject allowed=%v with requested policy=%s", allowed, tc.policy)
}
}
})
}
}
}
func TestIAMAdminCorruptServiceCleanup(t *testing.T) {
for _, status := range []string{auth.AccountOn, auth.AccountOff, "expired"} {
t.Run(status, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-admin", "consoleAdmin")
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-parent", "readwrite")
svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-corrupt", "")
if status == auth.AccountOff {
_, err := sys.UpdateServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey, updateServiceAccountOpts{status: status})
mustIAM(t, err)
}
cache := sys.store.lock()
u := cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey]
u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
if status == "expired" {
u.Credentials.Expiration = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute)
}
cache.iamUsersMap[svc.AccessKey] = u
sys.store.unlock()
_, _, err := sys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("fault injection failed")
}
raw, exists := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey)
_, loginOK := sys.GetUser(ctx, svc.AccessKey)
t.Logf("metadata_exists=%v parent_known=%v GetUser_ok=%v", exists, raw.Credentials.ParentUser == parent.AccessKey, loginOK)
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
outsider := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-outsider", "readwrite")
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "unauthorized cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, outsider, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "admin cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser(svc.AccessKey); ok {
t.Fatal("deleted service account remains in the IAM cache")
}
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminPolicylessSelf(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-policyless", "")
svc := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, caller.AccessKey, "rv-policyless-child", "")
other := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "bulk-other", "readwrite")
_ = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, other.AccessKey, "bulk-other-child", "")
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 200)
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-access-keys-bulk?listType=all", nil, nil, api.ListAccessKeysBulk)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list bulk self", rec, 200)
data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var listed map[string]madmin.ListAccessKeysResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &listed))
entry, ok := listed[caller.AccessKey]
if len(listed) != 1 || !ok || len(entry.ServiceAccounts) != 1 || entry.ServiceAccounts[0].AccessKey != svc.AccessKey || len(entry.STSKeys) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("policyless bulk self returned unexpected identities: %+v", listed)
}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 200)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 200)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+svc.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": svc.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke another user", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
}
func TestIAMAdminExpiringInheritedPolicy(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "review-legacy-parent", "consoleAdmin")
document := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
// Model a credential persisted by the old handler: it copied its caller's
// policy claims but set the newly created service's type to inherited.
expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
caller, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
accessKey: "rv-exp-inherited", secretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", expiration: &expires,
claims: map[string]any{policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(document))},
})
mustIAM(t, err)
req := iamAdminRequest(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
checked, owner, code := checkKeyValid(req, caller.AccessKey)
if code != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("checkKeyValid: %v", code)
}
args := policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: checked.Claims, IsOwner: owner, Action: policy.CreateServiceAccountAdminAction, DenyOnly: true}
if !sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("fixture cannot create")
}
args.Action = policy.CreateUserAdminAction
args.DenyOnly = false
if sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("fixture not constrained")
}
t.Logf("service=%v temp=%v inherited=%v; create allowed, create-user denied", checked.IsServiceAccount(), checked.IsTemp(), checked.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType)
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-escaped", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount)
if rec.Code == 200 {
child, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, "review-escaped")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("new key missing")
}
childReq := iamAdminRequest(t, child.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
childChecked, childOwner, childCode := checkKeyValid(childReq, child.Credentials.AccessKey)
if childCode != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("child auth=%v", childCode)
}
allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: childChecked.AccessKey, Claims: childChecked.Claims, IsOwner: childOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
t.Errorf("constrained inherited service created a new key; new key CreateUser allowed=%v", allowed)
} else {
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject derived creation", rec, 403)
}
updated := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+caller.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "metadata-only"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": caller.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount)
if updated.Code == 204 {
after, ok := sys.GetUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("updated key missing")
}
afterReq := iamAdminRequest(t, after.Credentials, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil)
afterChecked, afterOwner, afterCode := checkKeyValid(afterReq, caller.AccessKey)
if afterCode != ErrNone {
t.Fatalf("updated auth=%v", afterCode)
}
allowed := sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: caller.AccessKey, Claims: afterChecked.Claims, IsOwner: afterOwner, Action: policy.CreateUserAdminAction})
t.Errorf("constrained inherited service updated itself; CreateUser allowed after update=%v", allowed)
} else {
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "reject inherited self update", updated, 403)
}
}
func TestIAMAdminSessionPolicyCannotDelegate(t *testing.T) {
for _, temp := range []bool{false, true} {
t.Run(map[bool]string{false: "service", true: "sts"}[temp], func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-parent", "consoleAdmin")
doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:CreateServiceAccount","admin:UpdateServiceAccount"]}]}`
var caller auth.Credentials
if !temp {
caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "review-restricted", doc)
} else {
var err error
caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(doc))}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
}
sibling := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-sibling", "")
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict LDAP create", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/idp/ldap/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "review-bad-new", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret"}, nil, api.AddServiceAccountLDAP), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "restrict update", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+sibling.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": sibling.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
if _, ok := sys.store.GetUser("review-bad-new"); ok {
t.Fatal("denied creation persisted a credential")
}
u, ok := sys.store.GetUser(sibling.AccessKey)
if !ok || u.Credentials.SecretKey != sibling.SecretKey {
t.Fatal("denied update changed the target credential")
}
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminSelfDenials(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{"parent_deny", "group_deny", "session_implicit_deny", "session_explicit_deny", "plugin_deny"} {
t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-self-parent", "readwrite")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-target", "")
caller := parent
doc := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["admin:ListServiceAccounts","admin:RemoveServiceAccount"]}]}`
switch mode {
case "parent_deny", "group_deny":
p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(doc))
mustIAM(t, err)
_, err = sys.SetPolicy(ctx, "review-self-deny", *p)
mustIAM(t, err)
if mode == "group_deny" {
_, err = sys.AddUsersToGroup(ctx, "self-deny-group", []string{parent.AccessKey})
mustIAM(t, err)
_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, "self-deny-group", "review-self-deny", regUser, true)
} else {
_, err = sys.PolicyDBSet(ctx, parent.AccessKey, "readwrite,review-self-deny", regUser, false)
}
mustIAM(t, err)
case "session_implicit_deny":
caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::example/*"]}]}`)
case "session_explicit_deny":
caller = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "rv-self-caller", doc)
case "plugin_deny":
iamAdminPlugin(t, false)
}
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts", nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list bulk self", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-access-keys-bulk?listType=all", nil, nil, api.ListAccessKeysBulk), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info service", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "info access key", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/info-access-key?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.InfoAccessKey), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
})
}
}
func TestIAMAdminNonRootCannotManageRoot(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "rv-console-admin", "consoleAdmin")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "rv-root-target", "")
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "create root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{AccessKey: "rv-new-root", SecretKey: "review-service-valid-secret", TargetUser: globalActiveCred.AccessKey}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "update root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewSecretKey: "review-known-new-secret"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 403)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "delete root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "revoke root", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true&user="+globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
// Restricted root-derived credentials and the site replicator are not root
// administrators, even when their effective policy allows these actions.
limited := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, "limited-root", `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:*"]}]}`)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root delete", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 404)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "limited root revoke", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/revoke-tokens/builtin?fullRevoke=true", nil, map[string]string{"userProvider": madmin.BuiltinProvider}, api.RevokeTokens), 403)
replicator, _, err := sys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, globalActiveCred.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{accessKey: siteReplicatorSvcAcc, secretKey: "replicator-valid-secret", allowSiteReplicatorAccount: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicator create root", iamAdminCall(t, replicator, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 403)
// An external plugin remains authoritative, including for root targets.
iamAdminPlugin(t, true)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin update root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "POST", "/minio/admin/v3/update-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, madmin.UpdateServiceAccountReq{NewName: "plugin-authorized"}, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.UpdateServiceAccount), 204)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "plugin create root", iamAdminCall(t, limited, "PUT", "/minio/admin/v3/add-service-account", madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, nil, api.AddServiceAccount), 200)
}
func TestIAMAdminDeleteCorruptServiceReplicates(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
caller := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-admin", "consoleAdmin")
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "cleanup-parent", "readwrite")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "cleanup-target", "")
cache := sys.store.lock()
u := cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey]
u.Credentials.SessionToken = "broken-session-token"
u.Credentials.Status = auth.AccountOff
cache.iamUsersMap[target.AccessKey] = u
sys.store.unlock()
var deletions atomic.Int32
peer := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/minio/health/live" {
return
}
var batch iamRevisionBatch
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&batch); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(batch.Items) != 1 || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete == nil || batch.Items[0].SvcAccChange.Delete.AccessKey != target.AccessKey {
t.Error("replication did not carry the service account deletion")
} else {
deletions.Add(1)
}
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(iamRevisionResponse{iamRevisionStatus: iamRevisionStatus{Version: iamRevisionProtocol, Node: "peer", Instance: "peer-boot", Digest: "deleted"}})
}))
t.Cleanup(peer.Close)
globalSiteReplicatorCred.RLock()
previousSecret := globalSiteReplicatorCred.secretKey
globalSiteReplicatorCred.RUnlock()
globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(caller.SecretKey)
t.Cleanup(func() { globalSiteReplicatorCred.Set(previousSecret) })
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = true
globalSiteReplicationSys.state = srState{ServiceAccountAccessKey: caller.AccessKey, Peers: map[string]madmin.PeerInfo{
globalDeploymentID(): {DeploymentID: globalDeploymentID(), Name: "local"},
"peer": {DeploymentID: "peer", Name: "peer", Endpoint: peer.URL},
}}
globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
t.Cleanup(func() {
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
globalSiteReplicationSys.enabled = false
globalSiteReplicationSys.Unlock()
})
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "replicated cleanup", iamAdminCall(t, caller, "DELETE", "/minio/admin/v3/delete-service-account?accessKey="+target.AccessKey, nil, map[string]string{"accessKey": target.AccessKey}, api.DeleteServiceAccount), 204)
if deletions.Load() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one immediate deletion notification, got %d", deletions.Load())
}
}
func TestIAMAdminListSelfAliases(t *testing.T) {
for _, kind := range []string{"service", "sts"} {
t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
parent := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "alias-parent", "readwrite")
target := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-target", "")
serviceCaller := iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, parent.AccessKey, "alias-caller", "")
caller := serviceCaller
other := iamAdminUser(ctx, t, sys, "alias-other", "readwrite")
_ = iamAdminServiceAccount(ctx, t, sys, other.AccessKey, "alias-other-child", "")
if kind == "sts" {
var err error
caller, err = auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
caller.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = sys.SetTempUser(ctx, caller.AccessKey, caller, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
}
api := adminAPIHandlers{}
for _, alias := range []string{"", caller.AccessKey, parent.AccessKey} {
rec := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-service-accounts?user="+alias, nil, nil, api.ListServiceAccounts)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list self alias", rec, 200)
data, err := madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, rec.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var response madmin.ListServiceAccountsResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &response))
found := false
for _, account := range response.Accounts {
found = found || account.AccessKey == target.AccessKey
}
if !found {
t.Fatalf("self alias %q did not list the parent's service accounts", alias)
}
query := url.Values{"listType": {madmin.AccessKeyListAll}}
if alias != "" {
query.Set("users", alias)
}
bulk := iamAdminCall(t, caller, "GET", "/minio/admin/v3/list-access-keys-bulk?"+query.Encode(), nil, nil, api.ListAccessKeysBulk)
assertIAMAdminStatus(t, "list bulk self alias", bulk, 200)
data, err = madmin.DecryptData(caller.SecretKey, bulk.Body)
mustIAM(t, err)
var listed map[string]madmin.ListAccessKeysResp
mustIAM(t, json.Unmarshal(data, &listed))
entry, ok := listed[parent.AccessKey]
if len(listed) != 1 || !ok || len(entry.ServiceAccounts) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("bulk self alias %q returned unexpected identities: %+v", alias, listed)
}
want := map[string]bool{target.AccessKey: true, serviceCaller.AccessKey: true}
for _, account := range entry.ServiceAccounts {
if !want[account.AccessKey] {
t.Fatalf("bulk self alias %q returned unexpected or duplicate service account %s", alias, account.AccessKey)
}
delete(want, account.AccessKey)
}
if kind == "sts" {
if len(entry.STSKeys) != 1 || entry.STSKeys[0].AccessKey != caller.AccessKey {
t.Fatalf("bulk self alias %q returned unexpected STS accounts: %+v", alias, entry.STSKeys)
}
} else if len(entry.STSKeys) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("service caller returned unexpected STS accounts: %+v", entry.STSKeys)
}
if bytes.Contains(data, []byte(serviceCaller.SecretKey)) || bytes.Contains(data, []byte(`"secretKey"`)) || bytes.Contains(data, []byte(`"sessionToken"`)) {
t.Fatal("bulk listing returned credential secrets")
}
}
})
}
}
+177 -92
View File
@@ -622,7 +622,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) TemporaryAccountInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
policiesNames = policySet.ToSlice()
}
stsAccountPolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
stsAccountPolicy, err = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
}
policyJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(stsAccountPolicy, "", " ")
@@ -714,8 +718,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AddServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
// In case of LDAP/OIDC we need to set `opts.claims` to ensure
// it is associated with the LDAP/OIDC user properly.
// The new credential's policy comes from the request, not the caller.
for k, v := range cred.Claims {
if k == expClaim {
switch k {
case expClaim, policy.SessionPolicyName, sessionPolicyNameExtracted, iamPolicyClaimNameSA():
continue
}
opts.claims[k] = v
@@ -855,10 +861,9 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
// Permission checks:
//
// 1. Any type of account (i.e. access keys (previously/still called service
// accounts), STS accounts, internal IDP accounts, etc) with the
// policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction permission can update any service
// account.
// 1. Updating requires policy.UpdateServiceAccountAdminAction. Under built-in
// IAM, session-limited callers cannot update credentials, and only unrestricted
// root credentials can manage root's service accounts.
//
// 2. We would like to let a user update their own access keys, however it
// is currently blocked pending a re-design. Users are still able to delete
@@ -874,6 +879,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) UpdateServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
(svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
var sp *policy.Policy
if len(updateReq.NewPolicy) > 0 {
@@ -951,23 +961,21 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return
}
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: requestUser == svcAccount.ParentUser,
}) {
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if requestUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
// if session policy is nil or empty, then it is implied policy
@@ -983,7 +991,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccountPolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
svcAccountPolicy, err = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
}
policyJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(svcAccountPolicy, "", " ")
@@ -1039,29 +1051,27 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListServiceAccounts(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
return
}
var targetAccount string
// If listing is requested for a specific user (who is not the request
// sender), check that the user has permissions.
selfUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
selfUser = cred.ParentUser
}
user := r.Form.Get("user")
if user != "" && user != cred.AccessKey {
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
targetAccount = user
} else {
targetAccount = cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
targetAccount = cred.ParentUser
}
selfOnly := user == "" || user == cred.AccessKey || user == selfUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: selfOnly,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
targetAccount := user
if selfOnly {
targetAccount = selfUser
}
serviceAccounts, err := globalIAMSys.ListServiceAccounts(ctx, targetAccount)
@@ -1110,7 +1120,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
// Get current object layer instance.
objectAPI := newObjectLayerFn()
if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil {
if objectAPI == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil || !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)
return
}
@@ -1131,35 +1141,41 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) DeleteServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrInvalidArgument), r.URL)
return
}
// We do not care if service account is readable or not at this point,
// since this is a delete call we shall allow it to be deleted if possible.
svcAccount, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount)
if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchServiceAccount) {
// Deletion needs the stored identity, not a valid token or session policy.
// Keep disabled, expired and damaged service accounts removable, and retain
// their parent for authorization and the site replication hook below.
u, ok := globalIAMSys.store.GetUser(serviceAccount)
if !ok || !u.Credentials.IsServiceAccount() {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccount := u.Credentials
adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
isSelf := parentUser == svcAccount.ParentUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
})
if !adminPrivilege {
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if svcAccount.ParentUser != "" && parentUser != svcAccount.ParentUser {
// The service account belongs to another user but return not
// found error to mitigate brute force attacks. or the
// serviceAccount doesn't exist.
DenyOnly: isSelf,
}) {
if !isSelf {
// Hide the existence of another user's service account.
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
return
}
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && svcAccount.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAdminServiceAccountNotFound), r.URL)
return
}
if err := globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceAccount, true); err != nil {
@@ -1229,7 +1245,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListAccessKeysBulk(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
}
}
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
@@ -1242,12 +1258,12 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) ListAccessKeysBulk(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return
}
if selfOnly && len(users) == 0 {
if selfOnly {
selfUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
selfUser = cred.ParentUser
}
users = append(users, selfUser)
users = []string{selfUser}
}
var checkedUserList []string
@@ -1439,7 +1455,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return buckets[i].Name < buckets[j].Name
})
} else {
buckets, err = objectAPI.ListBuckets(ctx, BucketOptions{Cached: true})
// Console refreshes this inventory immediately after bucket mutations.
// A stale cached list can otherwise hide a creation or retain a deletion
// indefinitely in the client's snapshot.
buckets, err = objectAPI.ListBuckets(ctx, BucketOptions{})
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
@@ -1455,6 +1474,7 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
roleArn := policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}.GetRoleArn()
policySetFromClaims, hasPolicyClaim := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(cred.Claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
var effectivePolicy policy.Policy
var policyErr error
var buf []byte
switch {
@@ -1478,10 +1498,10 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
return
}
policySlice := newMappedPolicy(policy).toSlice()
effectivePolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySlice...)
effectivePolicy, policyErr = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySlice...)
case hasPolicyClaim:
effectivePolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySetFromClaims.ToSlice()...)
effectivePolicy, policyErr = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policySetFromClaims.ToSlice()...)
default:
policies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(accountName, cred.Groups...)
@@ -1490,7 +1510,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) AccountInfoHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Requ
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
effectivePolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...)
effectivePolicy, policyErr = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...)
}
if policyErr != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, policyErr), r.URL)
return
}
buf, err = json.MarshalIndent(effectivePolicy, "", " ")
@@ -2046,26 +2070,30 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) RevokeTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
adminPrivilege := globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
isSelfTarget := isTokenSelfRevoke || user == parentUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.RemoveServiceAccountAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
})
if !adminPrivilege || isTokenSelfRevoke {
parentUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
parentUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if !isTokenSelfRevoke && user != parentUser {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
DenyOnly: isSelfTarget,
}) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
if isSelfTarget {
user = parentUser
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && user == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred) {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
// Infer token revoke type from the request if requestor is STS.
if isTokenSelfRevoke && tokenRevokeType == "" && !fullRevoke {
@@ -2112,29 +2140,22 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoAccessKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
u, ok := globalIAMSys.GetUser(ctx, accessKey)
targetCred := u.Credentials
if !globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
isSelf := ok && targetCred.ParentUser != "" && requestUser == targetCred.ParentUser
if !isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred, policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.ListServiceAccountsAdminAction,
ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred),
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
DenyOnly: isSelf,
}) {
// If requested user does not exist and requestor is not allowed to list service accounts, return access denied.
if !ok {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
requestUser := cred.AccessKey
if cred.ParentUser != "" {
requestUser = cred.ParentUser
}
if requestUser != targetCred.ParentUser {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied), r.URL)
return
}
if !ok {
@@ -2181,7 +2202,11 @@ func (a adminAPIHandlers) InfoAccessKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
svcAccountPolicy = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
svcAccountPolicy, err = globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policiesNames...)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
return
}
}
policyJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(svcAccountPolicy, "", " ")
@@ -2908,6 +2933,52 @@ func addExpirationToCondValues(exp *time.Time, condValues map[string][]string) e
return nil
}
// hasActiveSessionPolicy follows the same credential dispatch as IAMSys.IsAllowed.
// Expiring service accounts also satisfy IsTemp and are evaluated as STS there.
// Callers use this only after authorization under built-in IAM.
func hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
args := policy.Args{Claims: cred.Claims}
if cred.IsTemp() {
hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicy(args)
return hasSP
}
if cred.IsServiceAccount() {
if cred.Claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
return false
}
hasSP, _ := isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(args)
return hasSP
}
return false
}
// canManageRootCredentials is an additional guard after built-in IAM authorization.
// The signature's owner flag is insufficient: historical empty session policies
// clear it even though the service account still inherits root's permissions.
func canManageRootCredentials(cred auth.Credentials) bool {
return cred.AccessKey == globalActiveCred.AccessKey ||
(cred.ParentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && cred.AccessKey != siteReplicatorSvcAcc && !hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred))
}
// isAllowedServiceAccountAction preserves regular users' self inspection and
// cleanup even without a policy attachment, while enforcing explicit denies.
// Derived credentials and external authorization plugins use full IAM evaluation.
func isAllowedServiceAccountAction(cred auth.Credentials, args policy.Args) bool {
if args.DenyOnly && !args.IsOwner && !cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() && newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
policies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(args.AccountName, args.Groups...)
if err != nil {
return false
}
combined, err := globalIAMSys.GetCombinedPolicy(policies...)
if err != nil {
iamLogIf(GlobalContext, err)
return false
}
return combined.IsAllowed(args)
}
return globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(args)
}
func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.Credentials, newServiceAccountOpts, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq, string, APIError) {
ctx := r.Context()
@@ -2996,6 +3067,14 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
}) {
return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
}
effectiveTarget := targetUser
if (targetUser == cred.AccessKey || targetUser == cred.ParentUser) && cred.ParentUser != "" {
effectiveTarget = cred.ParentUser
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil && (hasActiveSessionPolicy(cred) ||
(effectiveTarget == globalActiveCred.AccessKey && !canManageRootCredentials(cred))) {
return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrAccessDenied)
}
var sp *policy.Policy
if len(createReq.Policy) > 0 {
@@ -3003,6 +3082,12 @@ func commonAddServiceAccount(r *http.Request, ldap bool) (context.Context, auth.
if err != nil {
return ctx, auth.Credentials{}, newServiceAccountOpts{}, madmin.AddServiceAccountReq{}, "", toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err)
}
// Empty service policies mean inheritance, including for expiring keys.
// Normalize the replication request as well as the local credential.
if sp.Version == "" && sp.Statements == nil && sp.ID == "" {
sp = nil
createReq.Policy = nil
}
}
opts.sessionPolicy = sp
+2
View File
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ func registerAdminRouter(router *mux.Router, enableConfigOps bool) {
// StorageInfo operations
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/storageinfo").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.StorageInfoHandler, traceAllFlag))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/multipart-preflight").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.MultipartPreflightHandler, traceAllFlag))
// DataUsageInfo operations
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/datausageinfo").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.DataUsageInfoHandler, traceAllFlag))
// Metrics operation
@@ -388,6 +389,7 @@ func registerAdminRouter(router *mux.Router, enableConfigOps bool) {
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/join").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerJoin))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion+"/site-replication/peer/bucket-ops").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerBucketOps)).Queries("bucket", "{bucket:.*}").Queries("operation", "{operation:.*}")
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/iam-item").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerReplicateIAMItem))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet, http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/iam-revisions").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerIAMRevisions))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/bucket-meta").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerReplicateBucketItem))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodGet).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/peer/idp-settings").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SRPeerGetIDPSettings))
adminRouter.Methods(http.MethodPut).Path(adminVersion + "/site-replication/edit").HandlerFunc(adminMiddleware(adminAPI.SiteReplicationEdit))
+45
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
//
// This file is part of SILO Object Storage.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"testing"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
)
func TestChecksumMismatchAPIMessage(t *testing.T) {
for _, algorithm := range []string{"CRC32", "CRC32C", "SHA1", "SHA256", "CRC64NVME", ""} {
t.Run(algorithm, func(t *testing.T) {
mismatch := hash.ChecksumMismatch{Algorithm: algorithm, Want: "expected", Got: "actual"}
want := errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrContentChecksumMismatch).Description
if algorithm != "" {
want = fmt.Sprintf("The %s you specified did not match the calculated checksum.", algorithm)
}
for _, err := range []error{mismatch, fmt.Errorf("upload: %w", mismatch)} {
got := toAPIError(t.Context(), err)
if got.HTTPStatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest || got.Code != "XAmzContentChecksumMismatch" || got.Description != want {
t.Fatalf("toAPIError(%v) = %+v, want 400 XAmzContentChecksumMismatch: %s", err, got, want)
}
}
})
}
}
+31 -1
View File
@@ -450,6 +450,9 @@ const (
ErrAdminNoSecretKey
ErrIAMNotInitialized
ErrMultipartListingLegacy // Reserved: legacy uploads no longer block listing.
ErrMultipartListingIdentity
ErrSlowDown
apiErrCodeEnd // This is used only for the testing code
)
@@ -547,7 +550,7 @@ var errorCodes = errorCodeMap{
},
ErrBadDigest: {
Code: "BadDigest",
Description: "The Content-Md5 you specified did not match what we received.",
Description: "The Content-MD5 you specified did not match what we received.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
},
ErrEntityTooSmall: {
@@ -1336,6 +1339,21 @@ var errorCodes = errorCodeMap{
Description: "IAM sub-system not initialized yet, please try again.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrMultipartListingLegacy: {
Code: "MultipartListingNotReady",
Description: "Legacy multipart uploads prevent a complete listing. Upgrade all writers, drain old uploads and run the multipart preflight check.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrMultipartListingIdentity: {
Code: "MultipartListingMetadataInvalid",
Description: "Multipart upload metadata is inconsistent. Run the multipart preflight check to locate the affected storage set.",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrSlowDown: {
Code: "SlowDown",
Description: "Please reduce your request rate",
HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
},
ErrBucketMetadataNotInitialized: {
Code: "XMinioBucketMetadataNotInitialized",
Description: "Bucket metadata not initialized yet, please try again.",
@@ -2173,6 +2191,8 @@ func toAPIErrorCode(ctx context.Context, err error) (apiErr APIErrorCode) {
err = unwrapAll(err)
switch err {
case errMultipartListingIdentity:
apiErr = ErrMultipartListingIdentity
case errCompleteMultipartChecksumMismatch, errCompleteMultipartChecksumTypeMismatch:
apiErr = ErrBadDigest
case errMissingPartChecksum:
@@ -2303,6 +2323,8 @@ func toAPIErrorCode(ctx context.Context, err error) (apiErr APIErrorCode) {
}
switch err.(type) {
case SlowDown:
apiErr = ErrSlowDown
case StorageFull:
apiErr = ErrStorageFull
case hash.BadDigest:
@@ -2481,6 +2503,14 @@ func toAPIError(ctx context.Context, err error) APIError {
case errors.Is(err, errMissingPartChecksum):
apiErr.Description = strings.TrimPrefix(err.Error(), errMissingPartChecksum.Error()+": ")
}
// PutObject/UploadPart checksum mismatches name the algorithm in the
// message, matching S3 (e.g. "The CRC32 you specified did not match the
// calculated checksum."). Falls through to the generic table description
// when the algorithm is unknown.
var checksumMismatch hash.ChecksumMismatch
if errors.As(err, &checksumMismatch) && checksumMismatch.Algorithm != "" {
apiErr.Description = fmt.Sprintf("The %s you specified did not match the calculated checksum.", checksumMismatch.Algorithm)
}
switch apiErr.Code {
case "NotImplemented":
apiErr = APIError{
+1 -1
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ import (
const (
maxObjectList = 1000 // Limit number of objects in a listObjectsResponse/listObjectsVersionsResponse.
maxDeleteList = 1000 // Limit number of objects deleted in a delete call.
maxUploadsList = 10000 // Limit number of uploads in a listUploadsResponse.
maxUploadsList = 1000 // Limit number of uploads in a listUploadsResponse.
maxPartsList = 10000 // Limit number of parts in a listPartsResponse.
)
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
-45
View File
@@ -28,13 +28,10 @@ import (
"mime"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/etag"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
@@ -733,48 +730,6 @@ func setAuthMiddleware(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
})
}
func isPutRetentionAllowed(bucketName, objectName string, retDays int, retDate time.Time, retMode objectlock.RetMode, byPassSet bool, r *http.Request, cred auth.Credentials, owner bool) (s3Err APIErrorCode) {
var retSet bool
if cred.AccessKey == "" {
return ErrAccessDenied
}
conditions := getConditionValues(r, "", cred)
conditions["object-lock-mode"] = []string{string(retMode)}
conditions["object-lock-retain-until-date"] = []string{retDate.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}
if retDays > 0 {
conditions["object-lock-remaining-retention-days"] = []string{strconv.Itoa(retDays)}
}
if retMode == objectlock.RetGovernance && byPassSet {
byPassSet = globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.BypassGovernanceRetentionAction,
BucketName: bucketName,
ObjectName: objectName,
ConditionValues: conditions,
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
})
}
if globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.PutObjectRetentionAction,
BucketName: bucketName,
ConditionValues: conditions,
ObjectName: objectName,
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
}) {
retSet = true
}
if byPassSet || retSet {
return ErrNone
}
return ErrAccessDenied
}
// isPutActionAllowed - check if PUT operation is allowed on the resource, this
// call verifies bucket policies and IAM policies, supports multi user
// checks etc.
+356
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A pull into a suspended bucket replaces the null version. Its policy
// decision must name that version even when the source is unversioned S3.
func TestBatchReviewPullImplicitNullVersionAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(f.ctx, f.bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, []byte(`<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>`))
mustIAM(t, err)
data := []byte("original null version")
before, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/null", mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{VersionSuspended: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "null-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":"null"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "null-deny-user", "null-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := batchPullJob(f.bucket)
job.Source.Type = BatchJobReplicateResourceS3
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "replacement"), ObjectInfo{
Name: before.Name, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("null version policy must refuse the write, got %v", err)
}
after, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, before.Name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
if gerr != nil || before.ETag != after.ETag {
t.Errorf("denied null version must remain unchanged: read=%v unchanged=%v", gerr, before.ETag == after.ETag)
}
}
type batchReviewPrefixWalkFailure struct{ ObjectLayer }
func (a batchReviewPrefixWalkFailure) Walk(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], opts WalkOptions) error {
if prefix != "a/" {
return a.ObjectLayer.Walk(ctx, bucket, prefix, results, opts)
}
go func() {
defer close(results)
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errors.New("test: incomplete first prefix")}
}()
return nil
}
type batchReviewWalkCutoff struct {
ObjectLayer
cutoff string
}
func (a batchReviewWalkCutoff) Walk(ctx context.Context, bucket, prefix string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], opts WalkOptions) error {
inner := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], 1)
if err := a.ObjectLayer.Walk(ctx, bucket, prefix, inner, opts); err != nil {
close(results)
return err
}
go func() {
defer close(results)
stopped := false
for result := range inner {
if stopped {
continue
}
if result.Err == nil && result.Item.Name >= a.cutoff {
stopped = true
result = itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errors.New("test: listing stopped before remaining child keys")}
}
select {
case results <- result:
case <-ctx.Done():
stopped = true
}
}
}()
return nil
}
// Listing a directory prefix returns the directory object before its child
// keys. A durable cursor for that directory must preserve unfinished children.
func TestBatchReviewDirectoryCursorKeepsChildrenPending(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
for range 12 {
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "a/", nil)
}
var pending string
for i := 0; i < 13; i++ {
older := f.putVersions(t, fmt.Sprintf("a/key-%02d", i))
if i == 11 {
pending = older
}
}
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: ["a/"]
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 1
`, f.bucket))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
_ = job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchReviewWalkCutoff{ObjectLayer: f.obj, cutoff: "a/key-11"}, *job)
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if ri.Object != "a/" {
t.Fatalf("control: the completed directory batch must be the cursor, got %q", ri.Object)
}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
if f.versionExists(t, "a/key-11", pending) {
t.Error("a directory cursor must not suppress the unvisited child key on resume")
}
}
// Later prefixes must not advance the completion cursor past an earlier
// prefix whose listing failed. This state is produced by Start itself.
func TestBatchReviewExpireFailedPrefixKeepsWorkPending(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "a/todo")
for i := 0; i < 13; i++ {
f.putVersions(t, fmt.Sprintf("z/key-%02d", i))
}
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: ["z/", "a/"]
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 1
`, f.bucket))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
_ = job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchReviewPrefixWalkFailure{f.obj}, *job)
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if ri.Object >= "a/todo" {
t.Errorf("cursor must not cross an incomplete prefix, got %q", ri.Object)
}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
if f.versionExists(t, "a/todo", older) {
t.Error("a fresh Start must revisit the key omitted by the failed listing")
}
}
// A repeated marker replication error must remain a failure on the second
// attempt, including after the retry loop resets its counters.
func TestBatchReviewMarkerRetryRemainsFailed(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "marker", nil)
_, err := f.obj.DeleteObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "marker", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
oldTransport := globalRemoteTargetTransport
globalRemoteTargetTransport = batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
code, body := http.StatusForbidden, `<Error><Code>AccessDenied</Code><Message>test refusal</Message></Error>`
if r.URL.Query().Has("location") {
code, body = http.StatusOK, `<LocationConstraint xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">us-east-1</LocationConstraint>`
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: code, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)), Request: r}, nil
})
t.Cleanup(func() { globalRemoteTargetTransport = oldTransport })
job := BatchJobRequest{
ID: "replicate-marker-retry" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://target.invalid", Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{AccessKey: "test-access", SecretKey: "test-secret"}},
},
}
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Attempts = 2
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Delay = time.Millisecond
mustIAM(t, job.Replicate.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, job))
ri := f.jobInfo(t, &job)
if ri.Complete || !ri.Failed || ri.DeleteMarkersFailed != 1 {
t.Errorf("both marker attempts failed: complete=%v failed=%v markerFailures=%d attempts=%d", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.DeleteMarkersFailed, ri.RetryAttempts)
}
}
// A current parent mapping suppresses the OpenID policy-name fallback.
// Background-condition validation must inspect the same effective policies.
func TestBatchReviewMappedPolicySuppressesClaimFallback(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "unused-claim-policy", `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"Bool":{"aws:SecureTransport":"false"}}}`)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-parent", "mapped-full")
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID(): "unused-claim-policy",
}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
p, err := sub.principal(f.ctx)
mustIAM(t, err)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "mapped/key", versionID: mustGetUUID()}
if !f.sys.isAllowedLocally(policy.Args{AccountName: p.accessKey, Claims: p.claims, Action: req.action, BucketName: req.bucket, ObjectName: req.object, ConditionValues: p.conditionValues(req)}) {
t.Fatal("control: the current mapped policy must allow this read")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Errorf("an unused fallback policy must not refuse a mapped-policy grant: %v", err)
}
}
func TestBatchReviewBindingAndExpiringServiceControls(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
root := batchRootSubmitter(t)
priorRoot := globalActiveCred
globalActiveCred.SecretKey = "different-test-root-secret"
_, err := root.principal(f.ctx)
globalActiveCred = priorRoot
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("root-secret change must invalidate the binding: %v", err)
}
missing := *root
missing.Binding = nil
if _, err := missing.principal(f.ctx); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("missing fingerprint must refuse the principal: %v", err)
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "service-parent-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "service-parent", "service-parent-full")
sp, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}]}`))
mustIAM(t, err)
expires := UTCNow().Add(time.Hour)
cred, _, err := f.sys.NewServiceAccount(f.ctx, parent.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{sessionPolicy: sp, expiration: &expires})
mustIAM(t, err)
stored, ok := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("created service account must resolve")
}
cred = stored.Credentials
if !cred.IsTemp() || !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
t.Fatal("fixture must be an expiring service account")
}
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "allowed"}); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expiring service account must retain its allowed read: %v", err)
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.DeleteObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "allowed"}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("expiring service account must remain session-policy restricted: %v", err)
}
}
// An interrupted cross-pool copy can leave the same version in both pools.
// A newer legal-hold field in either copy must prevent key rotation.
func TestBatchReviewRotationUsesAuthoritativePoolHold(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
const name = "rotation/split-hold"
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("batch-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
dek, err := GlobalKMS.GenerateKey(t.Context(), &kms.GenerateKeyRequest{AssociatedData: kms.Context{bucket: bucket + "/" + name}})
mustIAM(t, err)
objectKey := crypto.GenerateKey(dek.Plaintext, nil)
sealed := objectKey.Seal(dek.Plaintext, crypto.GenerateIV(nil), crypto.S3.String(), bucket, name)
first := crypto.S3.CreateMetadata(nil, dek.KeyID, dek.Ciphertext, sealed)
first[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = "OFF"
first[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
second := maps.Clone(first)
second[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = "ON"
second[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+ObjectLockLegalHoldTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("protected payload"), objectKey))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if !enforceRetentionForDeletion(t.Context(), logical) {
t.Fatal("control: the authoritative logical version must be held")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
err = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, before, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !isErrObjectLocked(err) {
t.Errorf("rotation must refuse the authoritative legal hold, got %v", err)
}
after, gerr := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, gerr)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("held logical version must not have its key rewritten")
}
}
// An encryption condition must describe what rotation actually commits,
// even when the requested encryption type differs from the existing type.
func TestBatchReviewRotationEncryptionConditionMatchesResult(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("required-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
const name = "rotation/encryption-condition"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3, "", nil, f.bucket, name, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("encrypted payload"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, name, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(body), int64(len(body)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
mustIAM(t, err)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "kms-write-only", `
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]},
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption":"aws:kms","s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id":"required-key"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "kms-write-user", "kms-write-only")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: f.bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "required-key"}}
err = r.KeyRotate(f.ctx, f.obj, before, sub)
after, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, gerr)
if err == nil && !crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(after.UserDefined) {
t.Error("rotation allowed by an aws:kms-only write policy must produce SSE-KMS or refuse the operation")
}
if err != nil && before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("a refused rotation must leave the version unchanged")
}
}
// An explicit null marker collision must retain a held null data version.
func TestBatchReviewPullMarkerNullLock(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
meta := batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD")
before, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/null", mustGetPutObjReader(t, strings.NewReader("held null"), 9, "", ""), ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID, Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
mustIAM(t, err)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
}
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, nil, ObjectInfo{
Name: before.Name, VersionID: nullVersionID, ModTime: UTCNow(), DeleteMarker: true,
}, false, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !isErrObjectLocked(err) {
t.Errorf("marker collision with protected null data must return ObjectLocked, got %v", err)
}
if !batchVersionExists(t, f.obj, f.bucket, before.Name, nullVersionID) {
t.Fatal("protected null data must remain present")
}
}
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A read policy must use the newest tag state of the logical version even
// when an interrupted movement left an older copy in the preferred pool.
func TestBatchReviewPushUsesAuthoritativePoolTags(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const name = "push/tagged"
first := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "classification=public",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
second := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "classification=private",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification=private" {
t.Fatal("control: logical version must have the newer private tag")
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pooled-push", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pooled-push-user", "pooled-push")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: bucket, object: name, versionID: before.VersionID, tags: logical.UserTags}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: authoritative tags must deny the read")
}
writes := 0
target, err := minio.NewCore("target.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
_ = r.Body.Close()
}
if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
writes++
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{"Etag": {"\"test-etag\""}}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
err = r.ReplicateToTarget(f.ctx, z, target, before, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || writes != 0 {
t.Errorf("newer authoritative tags must deny push: err=%v writes=%d", err, writes)
}
}
// Verified token claims must not replace the actual version being authorized.
func TestBatchReviewVersionConditionResistsClaimCollision(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
deniedVersion := mustGetUUID()
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "version-claims", batchAuthzFullAccess+fmt.Sprintf(`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":"%s"}}}`, deniedVersion))
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "version-claims-parent", "version-claims")
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), "versionid": "an-unrelated-claim-value",
}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "data", versionID: deniedVersion}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("a token claim must not replace the actual denied version: %v", err)
}
}
// Retry totals describe a pass, including markers already successful before
// another item caused that pass to retry.
func TestBatchReviewMarkerSuccessCountResetsOnRetry(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "marker", nil)
_, err := f.obj.DeleteObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, "marker", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
oldTransport := remoteInstanceTransport
remoteInstanceTransport = atomic.Value{}
setRemoteInstanceTransport(batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
code, body := http.StatusForbidden, `<Error><Code>AccessDenied</Code><Message>test refusal</Message></Error>`
h := make(http.Header)
switch {
case r.URL.Query().Has("location"):
code, body = http.StatusOK, `<LocationConstraint xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">us-east-1</LocationConstraint>`
case r.Method == http.MethodDelete:
code, body = http.StatusNoContent, ""
case r.Method == http.MethodHead && r.URL.Query().Get("versionId") != "":
code, body = http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, ""
h.Set("X-Amz-Delete-Marker", "true")
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: code, Header: h, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)), Request: r}, nil
}))
t.Cleanup(func() { remoteInstanceTransport = oldTransport })
job := BatchJobRequest{
ID: "marker-success-retry" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://target.invalid", Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{AccessKey: "test-access", SecretKey: "test-secret"}},
},
}
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Attempts = 2
job.Replicate.Flags.Retry.Delay = time.Millisecond
mustIAM(t, job.Replicate.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, job))
ri := f.jobInfo(t, &job)
if !ri.Failed || ri.RetryAttempts != 2 {
t.Fatalf("control: data failure must cause two attempts: failed=%v attempts=%d", ri.Failed, ri.RetryAttempts)
}
if ri.DeleteMarkers != 1 {
t.Errorf("one successful marker must be counted once in the final attempt, got %d", ri.DeleteMarkers)
}
}
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A tag removal in a newer copy must govern both the authorization and the
// metadata sent by a push. The submitter can read data but cannot read tags.
func TestBatchReviewPushSendsOnlyAuthorizedMetadata(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const name = "push/removed-tags"
first := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "classification=private",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
second := map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "",
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "" {
t.Fatal("control: the authoritative version must have no tags")
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "data-without-tags", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObjectTagging","s3:GetObjectVersionTagging"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "data-without-tags-user", "data-without-tags")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, bucket: bucket, object: name, versionID: before.VersionID}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: reading tags must be denied")
}
writes := 0
var sentTags string
target, err := minio.NewCore("target.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
_ = r.Body.Close()
}
if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
writes++
sentTags = r.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzObjectTagging)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{"Etag": {"\"test-etag\""}}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
err = r.ReplicateToTarget(f.ctx, z, target, before, false, sub)
if err != nil && !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("unexpected replication failure: %v", err)
}
if writes > 0 && sentTags != logical.UserTags {
t.Errorf("push must send only metadata covered by authorization: writes=%d sentTags=%q authorizedTags=%q err=%v", writes, sentTags, logical.UserTags, err)
}
}
// LDAP's short username and its parent DN are distinct identities. The
// background merge must not turn a deny for the verified short name into
// a non-matching statement by replacing it with the parent DN.
func TestBatchReviewLDAPUsernameDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "ldap-short-name-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"ldap:username":"alice"}}}`)
const dn = "uid=alice,ou=people,dc=example,dc=org"
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
"exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), ldapUser: dn, ldapActualUser: dn, ldapUserN: "alice",
}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = dn
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "ldap-short-name-deny")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
p, err := sub.principal(f.ctx)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.Claims = p.claims
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "https://localhost/batch-authz/data", nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
args := policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Claims: p.claims, Action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction,
BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "data", ConditionValues: getConditionValues(req, "", cred),
}
if args.ConditionValues["username"][0] != "alice" || f.sys.isAllowedLocally(args) {
t.Fatal("control: the request evaluator must deny the verified LDAP short username")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "data", versionID: mustGetUUID()}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("batch authorization must preserve the LDAP username deny or fail closed, got %v", err)
}
}
// Failure to read authoritative metadata is incomplete work, even if one
// pool's copy can still be opened. In particular, skipErrs=false must not
// turn an unreadable entry into a successful archive.
func TestBatchReviewSnowballAuthoritativeReadFailure(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
const name = "archive/unreadable-copy"
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, "test payload", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
set := z.serverPools[1].sets[0]
getDisks := set.getDisks
disks := append([]StorageAPI(nil), getDisks()...)
for i := range disks {
disks[i] = consistencyReadFaultDisk{StorageAPI: disks[i], bucket: bucket, object: name}
}
set.getDisks = func() []StorageAPI { return disks }
defer func() { set.getDisks = getDisks }()
gr, err := z.GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, name, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
_, logicalErr := batchAuthoritativeRead(t.Context(), z, bucket, name, gr.ObjInfo)
gr.Close()
if logicalErr == nil {
t.Fatal("control: the authoritative read must fail")
}
remote, err := minio.New("archive.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
r.Source.Snowball.InMemory = ptr(true)
r.Source.Snowball.Compress = ptr(false)
r.Source.Snowball.SkipErrs = ptr(false)
if err := r.writeAsArchive(t.Context(), z, remote, []ObjectInfo{before}, "", batchRootSubmitter(t)); err == nil {
t.Error("archive with an unreadable authoritative version must not report success")
}
}
+142
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
)
// A suspended destination does not keep a source version ID. Authorization
// must therefore describe the null destination version that the write really
// replaces, and must not let a source ID escape that model.
func TestBatchReviewPullSuspendedVersionBinding(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(f.ctx, f.bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, []byte(`<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>`))
mustIAM(t, err)
sourceVersion := mustGetUUID()
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-source-version-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+fmt.Sprintf(`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":"%s"}}}`, sourceVersion))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-source-version-user", "pull-source-version-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
}
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "replacement"), ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/suspended-version", VersionID: sourceVersion, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag",
UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("a source version ID must not evade the destination deny: %v", err)
}
if _, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/suspended-version", ObjectOptions{VersionID: sourceVersion}); gerr == nil {
t.Fatal("a denied suspended-destination write created the source version")
}
}
// A failed source open in a non-skipping snowball must be reported to the
// batch rather than silently omitted from a successful archive.
type batchReviewOpenFailure struct {
ObjectLayer
name string
}
func (a batchReviewOpenFailure) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, rs *HTTPRangeSpec, h http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
if object == a.name {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("test: source open failed")
}
return a.ObjectLayer.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, object, rs, h, opts)
}
func TestBatchReviewSnowballSourceOpenFailure(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
name := "archive/open-failure"
entry := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, name, nil)
remote, err := minio.New("archive.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("test-access", "test-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
r := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: f.bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
}
r.Source.Snowball.InMemory = ptr(true)
r.Source.Snowball.Compress = ptr(false)
r.Source.Snowball.SkipErrs = ptr(false)
api := batchReviewOpenFailure{ObjectLayer: f.obj, name: name}
if err := r.writeAsArchive(t.Context(), api, remote, []ObjectInfo{entry}, "", batchRootSubmitter(t)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a source open failure must not be reported as a successful archive")
}
}
// Rotation must apply tag conditions to the logical version, including
// a more recent tag update stored in a pool other than the selected copy.
func TestBatchReviewRotationAuthoritativeTags(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("batch-round5-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "round5-rotation-tags", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "round5-rotation-user", "round5-rotation-tags")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
for _, classification := range []string{"private", "public"} {
t.Run(classification, func(t *testing.T) {
name := "rotation/authoritative-" + classification
first := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, name, first, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
first[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
first[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
second := maps.Clone(first)
second[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=" + classification
second[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("test encrypted payload"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification="+classification {
t.Fatal("control: the second pool must govern the logical tags")
}
job := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
err = job.KeyRotate(f.ctx, z, before, sub)
after, readErr := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, readErr)
changed := after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3]
if classification == "private" {
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || changed {
t.Fatalf("authoritative tag deny must prevent rewrapping: err=%v changed=%v", err, changed)
}
} else if err != nil || !changed {
t.Fatalf("authorized unlocked version must rotate: err=%v changed=%v", err, changed)
}
})
}
}
+538
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
)
// Rotation and listing cases found in review.
// Rotation rewrites the copy GetObjectInfo returns, which can carry another
// tag revision than the merged version of all pools: both are authorized.
func TestBatchReviewRotationAuthorizesWrittenCopy(t *testing.T) {
z, bucket := consistencyPools(t)
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review6-rotation-copy-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-rotation-copy-deny", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-rotation-copy-user", "review6-rotation-copy-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
const name = "rotation/written-copy"
first := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(f.ctx, crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, name, first, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
first[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
first[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
second := maps.Clone(first)
second[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
second[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
ciphertext, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("review6 rotation payload"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 0, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: first})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, name, 1, string(ciphertext), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: second})
logical, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification=public" {
t.Fatalf("control: merged tags=%q, want public", logical.UserTags)
}
job := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
if err = job.KeyRotate(f.ctx, z, before, sub); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("rotation of a copy the submitter may not read returned %v", err)
}
after, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, bucket, name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Fatal("a refused rotation rewrote the copy")
}
}
// batchWalkError fails every listing before it returns a result.
type batchWalkError struct {
ObjectLayer
err error
}
func (w batchWalkError) Walk(context.Context, string, string, chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], WalkOptions) error {
return w.err
}
// A listing outage pauses the run, as a streamed listing error does.
func TestBatchReviewExpireWalkErrorPausesRun(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, f.expireYAML("data/"))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
listErr := errors.New("review6: listing failed")
if err := job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchWalkError{ObjectLayer: f.obj, err: listErr}, *job); !errors.Is(err, listErr) {
t.Fatalf("start returned %v, want %v", err, listErr)
}
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.PausedReason == "" {
t.Fatalf("failed listing: complete=%v failed=%v", ri.Complete, ri.Failed)
}
}
// Two pools hold different writes of the null version, and a newer version
// of the key is in the second one. Rotation rewrites the copy it read and
// authorized, in the first pool, not the copy the latest version of the key
// would route a write to; the other write keeps its key and stays readable.
func TestBatchReviewRotationRewritesTheCopyItRead(t *testing.T) {
for _, otherLatest := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "addressed-version-is-latest"
if otherLatest {
name = "another-version-is-latest"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review7-rotation-copies"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, versionErr := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, versionErr)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review7-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/null-copy"
const payload = "rotation must preserve this data"
readCopy := func(pool int) ([]byte, error) {
gr, err := z.serverPools[pool].GetObjectNInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer gr.Close()
return io.ReadAll(gr)
}
var before [2]ObjectInfo
var keys [2]crypto.ObjectKey
kinds := []crypto.Type{crypto.S3, crypto.S3KMS}
for pool, kind := range kinds {
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), kind, "review7-rotation-key", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
keys[pool] = key
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
if pool == 1 {
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
}
meta[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Duration(pool+2) * time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader(payload), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, pool, string(body), ObjectOptions{
Versioned: true, VersionID: nullVersionID, UserDefined: meta,
MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Duration(pool+2) * time.Hour),
})
// As a read returns it, without the write's internal fields.
before[pool], err = z.serverPools[pool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
data, err := readCopy(pool)
if err != nil || string(data) != payload {
t.Fatalf("control: pool %d was not readable before rotation: %v", pool, err)
}
}
if otherLatest {
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 1, "later version", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
}
selected, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID, Versioned: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
if selected.VersionID != nullVersionID || !selected.ModTime.Equal(before[0].ModTime) || !crypto.S3.IsEncrypted(selected.UserDefined) {
t.Fatal("control: the addressed null version must select the SSE-S3 write in pool zero")
}
logical, err := batchAuthoritativeVersion(t.Context(), z, bucket, object, selected)
mustIAM(t, err)
if logical.UserTags != "classification=public" || selected.UserTags != logical.UserTags {
t.Fatal("control: both current authorization inputs must have public tags")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "review7-rotation-key"}}
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
if otherLatest {
batchAuthzPolicy(t.Context(), t, globalIAMSys, "review7-rotate-public", fmt.Sprintf(`
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::%s/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/classification":"private"}}}`, bucket, bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(t.Context(), t, globalIAMSys, "review7-rotate-user", "review7-rotate-public")
sub, err = newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(t.Context(), r.rotateAuthzRequests(before[1])...); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: the older write in pool one must be denied")
}
}
err = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, selected, sub)
if err != nil {
t.Logf("rotation refused: %v", err)
}
for pool, want := range keys {
after, readErr := z.serverPools[pool].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID})
mustIAM(t, readErr)
if otherLatest && pool == 1 && (!maps.Equal(after.UserDefined, before[pool].UserDefined) || !after.ModTime.Equal(before[pool].ModTime) || after.UserTags != before[pool].UserTags) {
t.Error("rotation rewrote a copy denied by the submitter's tag-conditioned policy")
}
kind, _ := crypto.IsEncrypted(after.UserDefined)
var got crypto.ObjectKey
switch kind {
case crypto.S3:
got, readErr = crypto.S3.UnsealObjectKey(GlobalKMS, after.UserDefined, bucket, object)
case crypto.S3KMS:
got, readErr = crypto.S3KMS.UnsealObjectKey(GlobalKMS, after.UserDefined, bucket, object)
default:
t.Fatalf("pool %d: rotation lost encryption metadata", pool)
}
mustIAM(t, readErr)
if got != want {
t.Errorf("pool %d: rotation changed the data key without reencrypting its ciphertext (rotation error: %v)", pool, err)
}
data, readErr := readCopy(pool)
if readErr != nil || string(data) != payload {
t.Errorf("pool %d: rotation left unreadable ciphertext: %v", pool, readErr)
}
}
})
}
}
// A version in a pool that a decommission or a rebalance is moving is not
// rewritten there: only the source holds it, so the rotation is left to a
// later run.
func TestBatchReviewRotationLeavesMovingSource(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review8-rotation-draining"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review8-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/draining"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "review8-rotation-key", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("draining rotation"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
beforeInfo, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
z.poolMeta.Pools[0].Decommission = &PoolDecommissionInfo{}
z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "review8-rotation-key"}}
err = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, beforeInfo, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !errors.Is(err, errBatchRotateMoving) {
t.Errorf("rotation of a version only a draining pool holds returned %v", err)
}
after, readErr := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, readErr)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != beforeInfo.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Fatal("rotation rewrote a draining pool")
}
// The job pauses and resumes in-process once the selected pool stops moving.
job := BatchJobRequest{ID: "rotation-moving-resume", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t), KeyRotate: &r}
batchTestJobPool(t.Context(), t, z)
if err := r.Start(t.Context(), z, job); !isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
t.Fatalf("moving job did not pause: %v", err)
}
ri := &batchJobInfo{}
mustIAM(t, ri.load(t.Context(), z, job))
if ri.PausedReason == "" || ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.Object != "" || ri.ObjectsFailed != 0 {
t.Fatalf("moving job report: %+v", ri)
}
z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
z.poolMeta.Pools[0].Decommission = nil
z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
mustIAM(t, r.Start(t.Context(), z, job))
mustIAM(t, ri.load(t.Context(), z, job))
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.PausedReason != "" || ri.Objects != 1 {
t.Fatalf("resumed rotation: %+v", ri)
}
}
// Once a move copied a version, the rotation leaves it to a later run, so the
// source stays as the move's cleanup expects it.
func TestBatchReviewRotationKeepsMigrationCleanup(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
kind string
rotate bool
}{{"decommission", false}, {"decommission", true}, {"rebalance", false}, {"rebalance", true}} {
name := tc.kind + "/without-rotation"
if tc.rotate {
name = tc.kind + "/with-rotation"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := migrationTestPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review8-rotation-migration"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review8-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/migration"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("rotation and migration"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
beforeInfo, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
move := migrationTestMover(t, z, 0, tc.kind)
mustIAM(t, move(t.Context(), 0, bucket, migrationTestReader(t, z, 0, beforeInfo)))
if _, err := z.serverPools[1].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("control: migration did not copy the version: %v", err)
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: ssekms, Key: "review8-rotation-key"}}
var rotationErr error
if tc.rotate {
moved, err := z.serverPools[1].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
rotationErr = r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, beforeInfo, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !errors.Is(rotationErr, errBatchRotateMoving) {
t.Errorf("rotation during a move returned %v", rotationErr)
}
after, err := z.serverPools[1].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if !maps.Equal(after.UserDefined, moved.UserDefined) || after.UserTags != moved.UserTags {
t.Error("rotation during a move rewrote the moved copy")
}
}
after, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if !after.ModTime.Equal(beforeInfo.ModTime) || !maps.Equal(after.UserDefined, beforeInfo.UserDefined) {
t.Errorf("rotation changed a draining source after its version was copied (rotation error: %v)", rotationErr)
}
snapshot := []FileInfo{{VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: beforeInfo.ModTime}}
if err := z.removeMovedVersions(t.Context(), bucket, object, 0, snapshot, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rotation prevented migration cleanup: %v", err)
}
if _, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID}); !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
t.Fatalf("migration left a source version behind: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// The rewrite keeps the tags and the expiry of the version, which a read
// returns apart from its metadata.
func TestBatchReviewRotationKeepsTagsAndExpiry(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{"single-pool", "multiple-pools"} {
t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
var z *erasureServerPools
if mode == "single-pool" {
z = purgeSinglePool(t, 4)
} else {
z, _ = consistencyPools(t)
}
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review8-rotation-metadata"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review8-rotation-metadata-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
const object = "rotation/tagged"
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
meta[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
meta["expires"] = UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Format(http.TimeFormat)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("metadata preservation"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
written := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
before, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: written.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if before.UserTags == "" || before.Expires.IsZero() {
t.Fatal("control: stored version is missing the metadata to preserve")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
mustIAM(t, r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, before, batchRootSubmitter(t)))
after, err := z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] == before.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("control: rotation did not rewrap the key")
}
if after.UserTags != before.UserTags {
t.Errorf("rotation changed stored tags: got %q, want %q", after.UserTags, before.UserTags)
}
if !after.Expires.Equal(before.Expires) {
t.Errorf("rotation changed Expires: got %v, want %v", after.Expires, before.Expires)
}
})
}
}
// Two pools hold the same write with different tags, with or without
// tagging timestamps. A rotation, also during a move, leaves the tags that
// the merged version has.
func TestBatchReviewRotationKeepsMergedTags(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
ordered, moving bool
}{{false, false}, {false, true}, {true, false}, {true, true}} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("timestamp=%t/moving=%t", tc.ordered, tc.moving), func(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review9-rotation-tag-tie"
const object = "rotation/tag-tie"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
previousKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review9-tag-tie-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = previousKMS })
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=private"
if tc.ordered {
meta[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp] = UTCNow().Add(-time.Minute).Format(time.RFC3339Nano)
}
other := maps.Clone(meta)
other[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = "classification=public"
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("same write"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour)})
putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 1, string(body), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: before.VersionID, MTime: before.ModTime, UserDefined: other})
prior, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if prior.UserTags != "classification=private" {
t.Fatalf("control: logical tags=%q", prior.UserTags)
}
if tc.moving {
migrationTestMover(t, z, 0, "decommission")
}
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
rotationErr := r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, before, batchRootSubmitter(t))
after, err := z.replicaObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserTags != prior.UserTags {
t.Fatalf("rotation changed logical tags from %q to %q (rotation error: %v)", prior.UserTags, after.UserTags, rotationErr)
}
})
}
}
// batchRotateFlipDisk starts a decommission of pool 0 at the flipAt-th
// version read, after the rotation's first read of the version.
type batchRotateFlipDisk struct {
StorageAPI
z *erasureServerPools
reads *atomic.Int32
flipAt int32
flipped *atomic.Bool
}
func (d batchRotateFlipDisk) ReadVersion(ctx context.Context, origvolume, volume, path, versionID string, opts ReadOptions) (FileInfo, error) {
n := d.reads.Add(1)
if n == d.flipAt && d.flipped.CompareAndSwap(false, true) {
d.z.poolMetaMutex.Lock()
d.z.poolMeta.Pools[0].Decommission = &PoolDecommissionInfo{}
d.z.poolMetaMutex.Unlock()
}
return d.StorageAPI.ReadVersion(ctx, origvolume, volume, path, versionID, opts)
}
// A move that starts while the rotation authorizes and rewraps the version
// defers it: the state is checked again right before the write, where the
// pools layer checks it.
func TestBatchReviewRotationRechecksPoolBeforeWrite(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
z, _ := consistencyPools(t)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
const bucket = "review11-rotation-window"
const object = "rotation/window"
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(t.Context(), bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("review11-rotation-key")
t.Cleanup(func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS })
meta := make(map[string]string)
key, err := newEncryptMetadata(t.Context(), crypto.S3, "", nil, bucket, object, meta, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
body, err := io.ReadAll(crypto.EncryptSinglePart(strings.NewReader("rotation window"), key))
mustIAM(t, err)
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, object, 0, string(body), ObjectOptions{
Versioned: true,
UserDefined: meta,
MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour),
})
beforeInfo, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
var reads atomic.Int32
var flipped atomic.Bool
firstPass := int32(0)
for _, pool := range z.serverPools {
firstPass += int32(pool.SetDriveCount())
}
var restore []func()
for _, pool := range z.serverPools {
restore = append(restore, conditionalPutSwapDisks(pool, object, func(d StorageAPI) StorageAPI {
return batchRotateFlipDisk{
StorageAPI: d,
z: z,
reads: &reads,
flipAt: firstPass + 1,
flipped: &flipped,
}
}))
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
for _, fn := range restore {
fn()
}
})
r := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
gotErr := r.KeyRotate(t.Context(), z, beforeInfo, batchRootSubmitter(t))
if !flipped.Load() {
t.Fatal("fault injection did not occur after the initial rotation read")
}
if !errors.Is(gotErr, errBatchRotateMoving) {
t.Errorf("rotation did not defer after the pool became moving during pre-work: %v", gotErr)
}
after, err := z.serverPools[0].GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, object, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] != beforeInfo.UserDefined[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] {
t.Error("rotation rewrote the pool after it became moving during pre-work")
}
}
+287
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
func batchPullJob(bucket string) BatchJobReplicateV1 {
return BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
}
}
// A pull does not read the destination version it may replace, so a policy
// that conditions the write on that version's tags refuses it; a version
// condition sees the version the pull writes.
func TestBatchPullDestinationConditions(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
action policy.Action
marker bool
condition func(versionID string) string
}{
{"tags-put", policy.ReplicateObjectAction, false, func(string) string {
return `{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/class":"protected"}}`
}},
{"tags-marker", policy.ReplicateDeleteAction, true, func(string) string {
return `{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/class":"protected"}}`
}},
{"version-put", policy.PutObjectAction, false, func(v string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":%q}}`, v)
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
before := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "pull/guarded", map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "class=protected"})
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-guard", batchAuthzFullAccess+fmt.Sprintf(`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":[%q],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":%s}`, tc.action, tc.condition(before.VersionID)))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-guard-user", "pull-guard")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := batchPullJob(f.bucket)
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "replacement"), ObjectInfo{
Name: before.Name, VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag",
DeleteMarker: tc.marker, UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Errorf("pull returned %v, want a refusal", err)
}
after, err := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, before.Name, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
if err != nil || after.ETag != before.ETag {
t.Errorf("refused pull changed the destination version: %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// A pull does not encrypt what it writes; encryption headers reported by the
// source do not satisfy a destination policy that requires encryption.
func TestBatchPullEncryptionCondition(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-encryption", `
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ReplicateObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]},
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:PutObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption":"aws:kms","s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id":"required-key"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "pull-encryption-user", "pull-encryption")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
job := batchPullJob(f.bucket)
version := mustGetUUID()
err = job.ReplicateFromSource(f.ctx, f.obj, batchLockRemote(t, "content"), ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/encrypted", VersionID: version, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag",
UserDefined: map[string]string{xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption: "aws:kms", xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID: "required-key"},
}, false, sub)
if err == nil {
oi, gerr := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, "pull/encrypted", ObjectOptions{VersionID: version})
mustIAM(t, gerr)
if !crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(oi.UserDefined) {
t.Fatal("a pull was allowed by an encryption condition it did not meet")
}
}
}
// A conditional Deny on an S3 Tables action covers the S3 data actions it
// implies, under the tables resource form; the job refuses rather than skip it.
func TestBatchJobTableConditionalDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "table-context", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3tables:GetTableData"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3tables:::bucket/batch-authz/table/table-id"],"Condition":{"Bool":{"aws:SecureTransport":"false"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "table-context-user", "table-context")
if f.sys.isAllowedLocally(policy.Args{AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "table-id/data", ConditionValues: map[string][]string{"SecureTransport": {"false"}}}) {
t.Fatal("control: with the request context the Deny applies")
}
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "table-id/data"}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("authorize returned %v, want a refusal", err)
}
}
type batchArchiveRevocation struct {
ObjectLayer
revoke func()
}
func (a *batchArchiveRevocation) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, rs *HTTPRangeSpec, h http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
if object == "archive/second" {
a.revoke()
}
return a.ObjectLayer.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, object, rs, h, opts)
}
// Each snowball entry is authorized for the submitter as it is then.
func TestBatchPushSnowballEntryRevalidation(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "archive-user", "")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
pluginURL, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL("https://authz.invalid/")
mustIAM(t, err)
previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{
URL: pluginURL, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { _ = r.Close() },
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"result":true}`)), Request: r}, nil
}),
}))
t.Cleanup(func() { setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous) })
entries := []ObjectInfo{
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "archive/first", nil),
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "archive/second", nil),
}
remote, err := minio.New("archive.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("batch-access", "batch-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: make(http.Header), Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
mustIAM(t, err)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Bucket: f.bucket}, Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Bucket: "remote"}}
job.Source.Snowball.InMemory = ptr(true)
job.Source.Snowball.Compress = ptr(false)
job.Source.Snowball.SkipErrs = ptr(false)
api := &batchArchiveRevocation{ObjectLayer: f.obj, revoke: func() { mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, false)) }}
if err = job.writeAsArchive(f.ctx, api, remote, entries, "", sub); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("archive with a revoked submitter returned %v, want a refusal", err)
}
}
// A definition holds one job type; one with several is refused, so that what
// is authorized is what runs.
func TestBatchJobSeveralSections(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
job := f.expireYAML("") + `keyrotate:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: other
encryption:
type: sse-s3
`
rec, queued := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, job)
if queued != nil {
f.run(t, queued)
}
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("submission status %d, want 400: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a definition with two job types ran")
}
}
// Prefixes are walked once each in one order: a cursor in a later prefix is
// after every key of the earlier ones, and an overlapping prefix is not
// walked twice.
func TestBatchExpirePrefixes(t *testing.T) {
if got := batchCanonicalPrefixes([]string{"z/", "a/", "a/b/", "z/", ""}); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "" {
t.Fatalf("canonical prefixes %q", got)
}
if got := batchCanonicalPrefixes([]string{"z/", "a/b/", "a/"}); strings.Join(got, ",") != "a/,z/" {
t.Fatalf("canonical prefixes %q", got)
}
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
done := f.putVersions(t, "a/done")
todo := f.putVersions(t, "z/todo")
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "x/data", batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD"))
batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, "x/data", nil)
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: ["z/", "x/", "a/", "x/"]
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 1
`, f.bucket))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// A run that completed a/ and stopped.
ri := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type()), StartTime: job.Started, Bucket: f.bucket, Object: "a/done"}
mustIAM(t, ri.updateAfter(f.ctx, f.obj, 0, *job))
f.run(t, job)
if !f.versionExists(t, "a/done", done) {
t.Error("resume did again a key before the cursor")
}
if f.versionExists(t, "z/todo", todo) {
t.Error("resume skipped a later prefix")
}
if got := f.jobInfo(t, job).VersionsSkippedLocked; got != 1 {
t.Errorf("a locked version under two equal prefixes was counted %d times", got)
}
}
type batchPartialWalk struct {
ObjectLayer
version ObjectInfo
cancel context.CancelFunc
read chan struct{}
}
func (a *batchPartialWalk) Walk(_ context.Context, _ string, _ string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], _ WalkOptions) error {
go func() {
defer close(results)
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: a.version}
if a.cancel != nil {
<-a.read
a.cancel()
return
}
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errors.New("test: listing failed within a key")}
}()
return nil
}
func (a *batchPartialWalk) GetObjectInfo(context.Context, string, string, ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
if a.read != nil {
close(a.read)
}
return a.version, nil
}
// A rotation whose walk fails or is canceled within a key keeps that key
// after its cursor and does not report completion.
func TestBatchKeyRotationIncompleteWalk(t *testing.T) {
for _, canceled := range []bool{false, true} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("canceled=%v", canceled), func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(f.ctx)
defer cancel()
meta := batchLockMeta("LEGALHOLD")
meta[crypto.MetaSealedKeyS3] = "test-sealed-key"
api := &batchPartialWalk{ObjectLayer: f.obj, version: ObjectInfo{Bucket: f.bucket, Name: "rotation/key", VersionID: mustGetUUID(), UserDefined: meta}}
if canceled {
api.cancel, api.read = cancel, make(chan struct{})
}
job := BatchJobRequest{
ID: "keyrotate-partial" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Started: UTCNow(), Submitter: batchRootSubmitter(t),
KeyRotate: &BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: f.bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}},
}
_ = job.KeyRotate.Start(ctx, api, job)
ri := f.jobInfo(t, &job)
if ri.Complete || ri.Object == api.version.Name || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 0 {
t.Fatalf("incomplete key committed: complete=%v cursor=%q skips=%d", ri.Complete, ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
})
}
}
+205
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@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3"
)
// batchBlockedIAMStore holds the lazy load of one user's policy mapping, or
// of one policy document, until released or until the load's context ends.
type batchBlockedIAMStore struct {
IAMStorageAPI
mapping string // access key whose mapping load blocks
doc string // policy whose document load blocks
started chan struct{}
release chan struct{}
once sync.Once
}
func (s *batchBlockedIAMStore) block(ctx context.Context) error {
s.once.Do(func() { close(s.started) })
select {
case <-s.release:
return nil
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
}
}
func (s *batchBlockedIAMStore) loadMappedPolicy(ctx context.Context, name string, userType IAMUserType, isGroup bool, m *xsync.MapOf[string, MappedPolicy]) error {
if name == s.mapping && !isGroup {
if err := s.block(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return s.IAMStorageAPI.loadMappedPolicy(ctx, name, userType, isGroup, m)
}
func (s *batchBlockedIAMStore) loadPolicyDoc(ctx context.Context, name string, out map[string]PolicyDoc) error {
if name == s.doc {
if err := s.block(ctx); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return s.IAMStorageAPI.loadPolicyDoc(ctx, name, out)
}
// The batch path and the request path share one IAM cache. A lazy load that
// batch authorization needs, of a mapping that is never cached (a user whose
// policies come from a group) or of an evicted policy document, must not
// hold request authentication and cached authorization while storage is
// slow, and must end at the deadline of the job's context.
func TestBatchAuthorizeSlowLoadKeepsCachedAuthorizationAvailable(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
// submitter returns the submitter whose authorization lazily loads,
// and arranges for blocked to hold that load.
submitter func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, blocked *batchBlockedIAMStore) *batchJobSubmitter
}{
{"mapping", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, blocked *batchBlockedIAMStore) *batchJobSubmitter {
// No mapping of the user itself is stored, so every lookup of
// its policies reads storage before it falls back to the group.
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-group-user", "")
_, err := f.sys.AddUsersToGroup(f.ctx, "snapshot-group", []string{cred.AccessKey})
mustIAM(t, err)
_, err = f.sys.PolicyDBSet(f.ctx, "snapshot-group", "snapshot-full", regUser, true)
mustIAM(t, err)
blocked.mapping = cred.AccessKey
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
return sub
}},
{"document", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, blocked *batchBlockedIAMStore) *batchJobSubmitter {
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-evicted", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-doc-user", "snapshot-evicted")
cache := f.sys.store.lock()
delete(cache.iamPolicyDocsMap, "snapshot-evicted")
f.sys.store.unlock()
blocked.doc = "snapshot-evicted"
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
return sub
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cached := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "snapshot-cached-user", "snapshot-full")
store := f.sys.store
original := store.IAMStorageAPI
blocked := &batchBlockedIAMStore{IAMStorageAPI: original, started: make(chan struct{}), release: make(chan struct{})}
sub := tc.submitter(t, f, blocked)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "key", versionID: mustGetUUID()}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("control: %v", err)
}
store.IAMStorageAPI = blocked
var wg sync.WaitGroup
var once sync.Once
unblock := func() { once.Do(func() { close(blocked.release) }) }
t.Cleanup(func() { unblock(); wg.Wait(); store.IAMStorageAPI = original })
slowDone := make(chan error, 1)
wg.Go(func() { slowDone <- sub.authorize(f.ctx, req) })
select {
case <-blocked.started:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("the lazy load did not start")
}
cachedDone := make(chan bool, 2)
wg.Go(func() {
_, ok := f.sys.GetUser(f.ctx, cached.AccessKey)
cachedDone <- ok
})
wg.Go(func() {
cachedDone <- f.sys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{AccountName: cached.AccessKey, Action: policy.GetObjectAction, BucketName: f.bucket, ObjectName: "key"})
})
for range 2 {
select {
case ok := <-cachedDone:
if !ok {
t.Fatal("cached authentication or authorization was rejected")
}
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("a slow IAM load during batch authorization blocked cached authentication")
}
}
unblock()
if err := <-slowDone; err != nil {
t.Fatalf("authorization after the load completed: %v", err)
}
// A load that does not return ends with the job's context, as an
// unavailable dependency, not with the storage layer's patience.
blocked.release = make(chan struct{})
once = sync.Once{}
unblock = func() { once.Do(func() { close(blocked.release) }) }
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(f.ctx, 200*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
deadlineDone := make(chan error, 1)
wg.Go(func() { deadlineDone <- sub.authorize(ctx, req) })
select {
case err := <-deadlineDone:
if !isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
t.Fatalf("a load that ended with the job's context: %v", err)
}
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("a lazy load outlived the job's context")
}
})
}
}
// A policy that a mapping still names after it was deleted takes no part in
// the decision, for a batch job as for a request: the remaining mapped
// policies decide. An STS parent user's mapping can name a deleted policy,
// because deleting a policy checks only user and group mappings for use.
func TestBatchAuthorizeSkipsDeletedMappedPolicy(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-deleted", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:GetObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}`)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "mapped-parent", "")
_, err := f.sys.PolicyDBSet(f.ctx, parent.AccessKey, "mapped-full,mapped-deleted", stsUser, false)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
req := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "key", versionID: mustGetUUID()}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("control: %v", err)
}
p, err := sub.principal(f.ctx)
mustIAM(t, err)
args := policy.Args{AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Action: req.action, BucketName: req.bucket, ObjectName: req.object, Claims: p.claims, ConditionValues: p.conditionValues(req)}
mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeletePolicy(f.ctx, "mapped-deleted", true))
if !f.sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("the request path denied the remaining mapped policy")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("batch authorization diverged from the request after a mapped policy was deleted: %v", err)
}
// With every mapped policy deleted, both deny; the job is refused, not
// paused, as nothing is unavailable.
mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeletePolicy(f.ctx, "mapped-full", true))
if f.sys.IsAllowed(args) {
t.Fatal("the request path allowed without any mapped policy")
}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, req); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("batch authorization without any mapped policy: %v", err)
}
}
+919
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@@ -0,0 +1,919 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/arn"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy/condition"
"github.com/puzpuzpuz/xsync/v3"
)
// A batch job acts on objects long after the request that submitted it has
// gone. It therefore records who submitted it and acts only as that
// principal:
//
// - StartBatchJob binds the authenticated credential to the job
// (batchJobSubmitter). Nothing in the submitted definition names it.
// - Every start of the job, and every object it touches, resolves the
// binding against IAM again. A credential that is gone, disabled,
// expired, revoked or edited since submission fails the job; a reused
// access key does not match the binding.
// - Each action is evaluated with the submitter's policies and session
// policy but without a request. A policy statement that would need
// request context the job does not have (source address, transport,
// headers and so on) refuses the action instead of being skipped.
//
// A job without a binding was queued by an earlier release. It is never
// authorized, whoever submitted it, and has to be submitted again.
//go:generate msgp -file $GOFILE -unexported
// batchJobSubmitter is the server-assigned identity of the credential that
// submitted a batch job.
type batchJobSubmitter struct {
Version int `msg:"v"`
Type string `msg:"t"`
AccessKey string `msg:"ak"`
// ParentUser is the parent of a derived credential.
ParentUser string `msg:"pu"`
// UpdatedAt and RevokedBefore are the revision of the identity record;
// any edit of the identity changes them. They are unset for root.
UpdatedAt time.Time `msg:"ua"`
RevokedBefore time.Time `msg:"rb"`
// Binding is a keyed fingerprint of the credential itself, see
// batchSubmitterBinding.
Binding []byte `msg:"bd"`
}
const batchJobSubmitterVersion = 1
// Submitter types. A credential is classified in the order IsAllowed
// evaluates it.
const (
batchSubmitterRoot = "root"
batchSubmitterUser = "user"
batchSubmitterTemporary = "temporary"
batchSubmitterService = "service-account"
)
//msgp:ignore batchJobAuthzError
// batchJobAuthzError refuses a batch job, or one of its actions, for its
// submitter. It ends the job: it is persisted as the job's failure and is
// never retried.
type batchJobAuthzError struct {
reason string
}
func (e batchJobAuthzError) Error() string {
return e.reason
}
func isBatchJobAuthzError(err error) bool {
var e batchJobAuthzError
return errors.As(err, &e)
}
var (
errBatchJobResubmit = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the batch job does not record who submitted it; submit it again"}
errBatchJobChanged = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the credential that submitted the batch job has changed since submission; submit it again"}
errBatchJobInvalid = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the credential that submitted the batch job is no longer valid"}
)
func batchSubmitterType(cred auth.Credentials) string {
switch {
case cred.IsTemp():
return batchSubmitterTemporary
case cred.IsServiceAccount():
return batchSubmitterService
default:
return batchSubmitterUser
}
}
// batchSubmitterBinding is a fingerprint of one credential keyed with its own
// secret. It changes when the secret, the session token or the parent
// changes, and a new credential that reuses the access key does not have it.
func batchSubmitterBinding(typ string, cred auth.Credentials) []byte {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(cred.SecretKey))
for _, s := range []string{"silo batch-job submitter v1", typ, cred.AccessKey, cred.ParentUser, cred.SessionToken} {
var n [8]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(n[:], uint64(len(s)))
mac.Write(n[:])
mac.Write([]byte(s))
}
return mac.Sum(nil)
}
// identityRecord returns the stored identity of a non-root access key.
func (sys *IAMSys) identityRecord(accessKey string) (UserIdentity, bool, error) {
if !sys.Initialized() {
return UserIdentity{}, false, errServerNotInitialized
}
u, ok := sys.store.GetUser(accessKey)
return u, ok, nil
}
// newBatchJobSubmitter binds the credential that authenticated a
// StartBatchJob request.
func newBatchJobSubmitter(cred auth.Credentials) (*batchJobSubmitter, error) {
root := globalActiveCred
if cred.AccessKey == "" {
return nil, errBatchJobInvalid
}
if cred.AccessKey == root.AccessKey {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(cred.SecretKey), []byte(root.SecretKey)) != 1 {
return nil, errBatchJobChanged
}
return &batchJobSubmitter{
Version: batchJobSubmitterVersion,
Type: batchSubmitterRoot,
AccessKey: root.AccessKey,
Binding: batchSubmitterBinding(batchSubmitterRoot, root),
}, nil
}
u, ok, err := globalIAMSys.identityRecord(cred.AccessKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, batchUnavailable("IAM identity lookup", err)
}
// The record must be the one the request was authenticated with.
if !ok || u.Credentials.AccessKey != cred.AccessKey || u.Credentials.ParentUser != cred.ParentUser ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(u.Credentials.SecretKey), []byte(cred.SecretKey)) != 1 ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(u.Credentials.SessionToken), []byte(cred.SessionToken)) != 1 {
return nil, errBatchJobChanged
}
typ := batchSubmitterType(u.Credentials)
return &batchJobSubmitter{
Version: batchJobSubmitterVersion,
Type: typ,
AccessKey: u.Credentials.AccessKey,
ParentUser: u.Credentials.ParentUser,
UpdatedAt: u.UpdatedAt,
RevokedBefore: u.RevokedBefore,
Binding: batchSubmitterBinding(typ, u.Credentials),
}, nil
}
//msgp:ignore batchJobPrincipal batchAuthzRequest
// batchJobPrincipal is a submitter resolved against current IAM state.
type batchJobPrincipal struct {
ctx context.Context
typ string
accessKey string
parentUser string
groups []string
claims map[string]any
owner bool
temp bool // evaluated as a temporary credential
service bool // evaluated as a service account
}
// principal resolves the binding against current IAM state. It fails if the
// credential no longer exists, is no longer valid, or is no longer the one
// that was bound.
func (s *batchJobSubmitter) principal(ctx context.Context) (batchJobPrincipal, error) {
if s == nil || s.AccessKey == "" {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobResubmit
}
if s.Version != batchJobSubmitterVersion {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchJobAuthzError{reason: fmt.Sprintf("unsupported batch job submitter version %d; submit the job again", s.Version)}
}
if !batchIAMReady() {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchUnavailable("IAM is not initialized", errServerNotInitialized)
}
root := globalActiveCred
if s.Type == batchSubmitterRoot {
if s.AccessKey != root.AccessKey || !hmac.Equal(s.Binding, batchSubmitterBinding(batchSubmitterRoot, root)) {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobChanged
}
if !globalAPIConfig.permitRootAccess() {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
return batchJobPrincipal{ctx: ctx, typ: batchSubmitterRoot, accessKey: root.AccessKey, owner: true}, nil
}
switch s.Type {
case batchSubmitterUser, batchSubmitterTemporary, batchSubmitterService:
default:
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobResubmit
}
if s.AccessKey == root.AccessKey {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobChanged
}
u, ok, err := globalIAMSys.CheckKey(ctx, s.AccessKey)
if err != nil {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchUnavailable("IAM credential lookup", err)
}
if !ok {
// Deleted, disabled, expired or revoked.
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
cred := u.Credentials
typ := batchSubmitterType(cred)
if typ != s.Type || cred.AccessKey != s.AccessKey || cred.ParentUser != s.ParentUser ||
!u.UpdatedAt.Equal(s.UpdatedAt) || !u.RevokedBefore.Equal(s.RevokedBefore) ||
!hmac.Equal(s.Binding, batchSubmitterBinding(typ, cred)) {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobChanged
}
if cred.IsExpired() || cred.Status == auth.AccountOff {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
p := batchJobPrincipal{
ctx: ctx,
typ: typ,
accessKey: cred.AccessKey,
parentUser: cred.ParentUser,
groups: cred.Groups,
claims: map[string]any{},
temp: cred.IsTemp(),
service: !cred.IsTemp() && cred.IsServiceAccount(),
}
if typ != batchSubmitterUser {
// Verify the token as a request would, with the current signing keys.
jwtClaims, err := extractJWTClaims(u)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errTokenSigningKeyUnavailable) {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, batchUnavailable("token signing key", err)
}
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
p.claims = jwtClaims.Map()
if err := decodeBatchSessionPolicy(p.claims); err != nil {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
}
p.owner = cred.ParentUser == root.AccessKey && cred.AccessKey != siteReplicatorSvcAcc
if p.owner && !globalAPIConfig.permitRootAccess() {
return batchJobPrincipal{}, errBatchJobInvalid
}
if _, ok := p.claims[policy.SessionPolicyName]; ok {
p.owner = false
}
return p, nil
}
// decodeBatchSessionPolicy decodes a session policy claim for evaluation.
// A request decodes it while verifying its token, except when an
// authorization plugin is configured; a batch job decodes it always, so the
// session policy also limits what the plugin allows.
func decodeBatchSessionPolicy(claims map[string]any) error {
sp, ok := claims[policy.SessionPolicyName]
if !ok {
return nil
}
s, ok := sp.(string)
if !ok {
return errAuthentication
}
b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
if err != nil {
return errAuthentication
}
claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted] = string(b)
return nil
}
// batchAuthzRequest is one action a batch job is about to take.
type batchAuthzRequest struct {
action policy.Action
bucket string
object string // empty for a bucket action
// versionID is the version an object version action addresses.
versionID string
// tags are the current tags of the object version acted on.
tags string
// tagsUnknown is set when the job does not read the version it acts
// on, so s3:ExistingObjectTag is context it does not have.
tagsUnknown bool
// values are request values the job supplies itself, such as the
// listing prefix or the encryption and retention it writes, keyed by
// condition key name.
values map[string][]string
}
// batchAuthzMarker marks the condition values of a batch job for an
// authorization plugin. Requests cannot set s3:authType.
const batchAuthzMarker = "batch-job"
// Condition keys a batch job always provides, as a request would: identity,
// time, the addressed version and the stored tags. Keys a request takes from
// itself are provided only when the job sets them (see batchAuthzRequest
// values); every other key is request context the job does not have.
var batchServerConditionKeys = map[string]bool{
condition.AWSCurrentTime.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSEpochTime.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSPrincipalType.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSUserID.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSUsername.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.AWSGroups.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.S3VersionID.ToKey().String(): true,
condition.ExistingObjectTag.ToKey().String(): true,
}
// Request keys a job may supply, by the name they have in condition values.
var batchRequestConditionKeys = map[string]condition.KeyName{
condition.S3Prefix.Name(): condition.S3Prefix,
condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryption.Name(): condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryption,
condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyID.Name(): condition.S3XAmzServerSideEncryptionAwsKmsKeyID,
condition.S3ObjectLockMode.Name(): condition.S3ObjectLockMode,
condition.S3ObjectLockRetainUntilDate.Name(): condition.S3ObjectLockRetainUntilDate,
condition.S3ObjectLockLegalHold.Name(): condition.S3ObjectLockLegalHold,
condition.RequestObjectTagKeys.Name(): condition.RequestObjectTagKeys,
}
// suppliedConditionKeys returns the condition keys whose values req provides.
func (req batchAuthzRequest) suppliedConditionKeys() map[string]bool {
supplied := make(map[string]bool, len(batchServerConditionKeys)+len(req.values))
for k := range batchServerConditionKeys {
supplied[k] = true
}
if req.tagsUnknown {
delete(supplied, condition.ExistingObjectTag.ToKey().String())
}
for name := range req.values {
if key, ok := batchRequestConditionKeys[name]; ok {
supplied[key.ToKey().String()] = true
}
if strings.HasPrefix(name, condition.RequestObjectTag.Name()+"/") {
supplied[condition.RequestObjectTag.ToKey().String()] = true
}
}
return supplied
}
func batchKeySupplied(supplied map[string]bool, name string) bool {
if i := strings.IndexByte(name, '/'); i >= 0 {
name = name[:i]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(name, "jwt:") || strings.HasPrefix(name, "ldap:") {
// Claims of the verified token, as a request has them.
return true
}
return supplied[name]
}
// conditionValues are the values a request with the same identity would
// carry, without any value taken from the request itself.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) conditionValues(req batchAuthzRequest) map[string][]string {
now := UTCNow()
username := p.accessKey
if p.temp || p.service {
username = p.parentUser
}
principalType := "User"
if len(p.claims) > 0 {
principalType = "AssumedRole"
}
if username == globalActiveCred.AccessKey {
principalType = "Account"
}
// Identity and time, then the claims over them, as a request has them
// (an LDAP session's short username replaces its parent DN).
values := map[string][]string{
"CurrentTime": {now.Format(time.RFC3339)},
"EpochTime": {strconv.FormatInt(now.Unix(), 10)},
"principaltype": {principalType},
"userid": {username},
"username": {username},
}
for k, v := range p.claims {
if s, ok := v.(string); ok {
values[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimPrefix(k, "ldap"))] = []string{s}
}
}
// No claim stands for a value of the object or of the job, which
// follow and always win.
for k := range values {
if k == "versionid" || k == "prefix" || k == "authtype" ||
strings.HasPrefix(k, "existingobjecttag/") || strings.HasPrefix(k, "requestobjecttag") ||
strings.HasPrefix(k, "x-amz-") || strings.HasPrefix(k, "object-lock-") {
delete(values, k)
}
}
// For an authorization plugin: this is a batch job, not a request.
values["authType"] = []string{batchAuthzMarker}
if req.versionID != "" {
values["versionid"] = []string{req.versionID}
}
if req.tags != "" {
if t, err := tags.ParseObjectTags(req.tags); err == nil {
for k, v := range t.ToMap() {
values[pathJoin("ExistingObjectTag", k)] = []string{v}
}
}
}
for k, v := range req.values {
values[k] = v
}
if grpsVal, ok := p.claims["groups"]; ok {
if grpsIs, ok := grpsVal.([]any); ok {
grps := []string{}
for _, gI := range grpsIs {
if g, ok := gI.(string); ok {
grps = append(grps, g)
}
}
if len(grps) > 0 {
values["groups"] = grps
}
}
}
if _, ok := values["groups"]; !ok && len(p.groups) > 0 {
values["groups"] = p.groups
}
return values
}
// authorize evaluates one action of the job as its submitter.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorize(req batchAuthzRequest) error {
args := policy.Args{
AccountName: p.accessKey,
Groups: p.groups,
Action: req.action,
BucketName: req.bucket,
ObjectName: req.object,
ConditionValues: p.conditionValues(req),
IsOwner: p.owner,
Claims: p.claims,
}
return p.authorizeArgs(args, &req)
}
// authorizeArgs uses the same policy snapshot for request-context checks and
// the decision. No boolean IAM evaluator re-reads and silently drops policies.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) authorizeArgs(args policy.Args, req *batchAuthzRequest) error {
denied := batchJobAuthzError{reason: "the batch job submitter is not allowed " + string(args.Action)}
if req != nil {
denied.reason = batchDeniedReason(*req)
}
ctx := p.ctx
if ctx == nil {
ctx = GlobalContext
}
plugin := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
var snap *batchPolicySnapshot
if plugin == nil && !args.IsOwner {
snap = globalIAMSys.store.batchSnapshot(ctx)
defer snap.release()
}
policies, err := globalIAMSys.batchLocalPolicies(p, args, plugin == nil, snap)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchPolicy) || errors.Is(err, errAuthentication) || errors.Is(err, errNoSuchUser) || errors.Is(err, errNoSuchGroup) {
return denied
}
return batchUnavailable("IAM policy lookup", err)
}
if req != nil {
supplied := req.suppliedConditionKeys()
for _, pol := range policies {
for _, st := range pol.Statements {
if batchStatementNeedsRequest(st, args, supplied) {
return batchJobAuthzError{reason: denied.reason + ": a policy statement depends on request context that a batch job does not have"}
}
}
}
}
if plugin != nil {
ok, err := plugin.IsAllowedContext(ctx, args)
if err != nil {
return batchUnavailable("authorization plugin", err)
}
if !ok {
return denied
}
// The plugin does not see a session policy; it only limits further.
if has, allowed := p.sessionPolicyDecision(args); has && !allowed {
return denied
}
return nil
}
if args.IsOwner {
return nil
}
if p.service {
if p.claims[parentClaim] != p.parentUser {
return denied
}
if _, ok := p.claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()].(string); !ok {
return denied
}
}
if has, allowed := p.sessionPolicyDecision(args); has && !allowed {
return denied
}
ownerDerived := (p.temp || p.service) && p.parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey
if !ownerDerived {
if p.service {
args.AccountName = p.parentUser
}
if len(policies) == 0 || !policies[0].IsAllowed(args) {
return denied
}
}
return nil
}
func batchDeniedReason(req batchAuthzRequest) string {
resource := req.bucket
if req.object != "" {
resource = pathJoin(req.bucket, req.object)
}
if req.versionID != "" {
resource += " (versionId " + req.versionID + ")"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("the batch job submitter is not allowed %s on %s", req.action, resource)
}
// sessionPolicyDecision evaluates the session policy the way IsAllowed would
// for this credential.
func (p batchJobPrincipal) sessionPolicyDecision(args policy.Args) (bool, bool) {
switch {
case p.temp:
return isAllowedBySessionPolicy(args)
case p.service:
if p.claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
return false, false
}
return isAllowedBySessionPolicyForServiceAccount(args)
}
return false, false
}
// batchIAMLoadTimeout bounds one storage read of a lazy IAM load during
// batch authorization, as MergePolicies bounds a policy document load.
const batchIAMLoadTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// batchPolicySnapshot reads the mappings and policy documents of a submitter
// at one cache revision while cached authentication and authorization
// proceed.
//
// It holds the store's writer mutex, so no writer changes the cache between
// its reads, and the cache read lock, which it releases around each storage
// read: a lazy mapping load or a policy document load. Request
// authentication then neither waits for storage nor queues behind a writer
// waiting for the cache lock, which taking the write lock back after each
// read would cause. It writes nothing to the cache but the lazily loaded
// mappings, which the request path stores under the read lock as well.
//
//msgp:ignore batchPolicySnapshot
type batchPolicySnapshot struct {
*IAMStoreSys
ctx context.Context
cache *iamCache
mu sync.Mutex
reads int // storage reads in progress; the read lock is released while any
}
// batchSnapshot takes the snapshot; release it with release. rlock and
// runlock are the cache's read lock (IAMStorageAPI), not IAMStoreSys.lock,
// which also takes writeMu.
func (store *IAMStoreSys) batchSnapshot(ctx context.Context) *batchPolicySnapshot {
store.writeMu.Lock()
return &batchPolicySnapshot{IAMStoreSys: store, ctx: ctx, cache: store.rlock()}
}
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) release() {
s.runlock()
s.writeMu.Unlock()
}
// read runs one storage read without the cache lock, bounded by the job's
// context and batchIAMLoadTimeout. Concurrent reads (the group fallback of
// policyDBGetGroups) release the lock before the first and take it back
// after the last.
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) read(fn func(ctx context.Context) error) error {
s.mu.Lock()
if s.reads == 0 {
s.runlock()
}
s.reads++
s.mu.Unlock()
defer func() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.reads--
if s.reads == 0 {
s.rlock()
}
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(s.ctx, batchIAMLoadTimeout)
defer cancel()
return fn(ctx)
}
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) loadMappedPolicy(_ context.Context, name string, userType IAMUserType, isGroup bool, m *xsync.MapOf[string, MappedPolicy]) error {
return s.read(func(ctx context.Context) error {
return s.IAMStoreSys.loadMappedPolicy(ctx, name, userType, isGroup, m)
})
}
// loadGroup would write the cache under the read lock. The snapshot resolves
// the policies of users, which never loads a group.
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) loadGroup(context.Context, string, map[string]GroupInfo) error {
return errors.New("batch authorization does not load groups")
}
func (s *batchPolicySnapshot) loadPolicyDoc(name string, out map[string]PolicyDoc) error {
return s.read(func(ctx context.Context) error { return s.IAMStoreSys.loadPolicyDoc(ctx, name, out) })
}
// batchLocalPolicies returns every local policy that can take part in the
// decision on args: the mapped policies that IsAllowed would merge when
// withMapped is set (no authorization plugin), and the session policy.
func (sys *IAMSys) batchLocalPolicies(p batchJobPrincipal, args policy.Args, withMapped bool, snap *batchPolicySnapshot) ([]policy.Policy, error) {
var out []policy.Policy
if withMapped && args.IsOwner {
// IsAllowed does not evaluate any policy for the owner.
return nil, nil
}
if withMapped {
// The caller holds snap through evaluation. Lazy mapping loads and
// selected documents therefore belong to one cache revision.
cache := snap.cache
mappedPolicies := func(name string) ([]string, error) {
names, _, err := cache.policyDBGet(snap, name, false, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
groups, err := cache.policyDBGetGroups(snap, len(names) > 0, args.Groups...)
return append(names, groups...), err
}
var names []string
ownerDerived := (p.temp || p.service) && p.parentUser == globalActiveCred.AccessKey
switch {
case p.typ == batchSubmitterRoot || ownerDerived:
case p.temp || p.service:
if roleArn := args.GetRoleArn(); roleArn != "" {
a, err := arn.Parse(roleArn)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
names = append(names, newMappedPolicy(sys.rolesMap[a]).toSlice()...)
} else {
mapped, err := mappedPolicies(p.parentUser)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
names = append(names, mapped...)
// The claimed policies apply only when nothing is mapped.
if len(mapped) == 0 {
if claimed, ok := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(args.Claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()); ok {
names = append(names, claimed.ToSlice()...)
}
}
}
default:
mapped, err := mappedPolicies(p.accessKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
names = append(names, mapped...)
}
var selected []policy.Policy
for _, name := range names {
doc, ok := cache.iamPolicyDocsMap[name]
if !ok {
loaded := make(map[string]PolicyDoc)
err := snap.loadPolicyDoc(name, loaded)
if errors.Is(err, errNoSuchPolicy) {
// Confirmed absent, as when a mapping still names a
// deleted policy: it takes no part in the decision, as
// in MergePolicies. Any other failure could hide a Deny.
continue
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
doc, ok = loaded[name]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load IAM policy %q returned no document", name)
}
}
selected = append(selected, doc.Policy)
}
out = append(out, policy.MergePolicies(selected...))
}
if p.temp || p.service {
if p.service && p.claims[iamPolicyClaimNameSA()] == inheritedPolicyType {
return out, nil
}
if sp, ok := p.claims[sessionPolicyNameExtracted]; ok {
s, ok := sp.(string)
if !ok {
return nil, errAuthentication
}
parsed, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(s))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, *parsed)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// batchStatementNeedsRequest reports whether a statement that applies to
// args depends on a condition key that the job does not supply. Applying
// such a statement without its value could grant (Allow) or drop (Deny)
// what a request with that context would not, so the job refuses the action.
// Resources are matched without conditions; a statement is taken to apply
// whenever it might.
func batchStatementNeedsRequest(st policy.Statement, args policy.Args, supplied map[string]bool) bool {
if (!st.Actions.Match(args.Action) && !st.Actions.IsEmpty()) || st.NotActions.Match(args.Action) {
return false
}
// Policy variables in resources or condition values.
if data, err := json.Marshal(st); err == nil {
s := string(data)
for {
i := strings.Index(s, "${")
if i < 0 {
break
}
s = s[i+2:]
j := strings.IndexByte(s, '}')
if j < 0 {
break
}
if !batchKeySupplied(supplied, s[:j]) {
return true
}
s = s[j+1:]
}
}
if !batchStatementMayApply(st, args) {
return false
}
for key := range st.Conditions.Keys() {
if !batchKeySupplied(supplied, key.String()) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// batchStatementMayApply matches the resources of a statement, in both forms
// a bucket request can take. A statement whose resources the evaluator
// translates (S3 Tables and vectors actions cover S3 data actions) is taken
// to apply.
func batchStatementMayApply(st policy.Statement, args policy.Args) bool {
for _, actions := range []policy.ActionSet{st.Actions, st.NotActions} {
for action := range actions {
if policy.TableAction(action).IsValid() || policy.VectorsAction(action).IsValid() {
return true
}
}
}
for _, resources := range []policy.ResourceSet{st.Resources, st.NotResources} {
for r := range resources {
if r.Type != policy.ResourceARNS3 && r.Type != policy.ResourceARNAll {
return true
}
}
}
resources := []string{args.BucketName + "/" + strings.TrimPrefix(args.ObjectName, "/")}
if args.ObjectName == "" {
resources = []string{args.BucketName, args.BucketName + "/"}
}
for _, resource := range resources {
if len(st.Resources) > 0 && !st.Resources.Match(resource, args.ConditionValues) {
continue
}
if len(st.NotResources) > 0 && st.NotResources.Match(resource, args.ConditionValues) {
continue
}
return true
}
return false
}
// authorize resolves the submitter and evaluates each request.
func (s *batchJobSubmitter) authorize(ctx context.Context, reqs ...batchAuthzRequest) error {
p, err := s.principal(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, req := range reqs {
if err := p.authorize(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// startAuthzRequests are the bucket actions a job needs before it acts on any
// object: the listings it walks. Object actions are authorized per object.
func (j BatchJobRequest) startAuthzRequests() []batchAuthzRequest {
list := func(bucket string, prefixes []string) []batchAuthzRequest {
if len(prefixes) == 0 {
prefixes = []string{""}
}
var reqs []batchAuthzRequest
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
values := map[string][]string{condition.S3Prefix.Name(): {prefix}}
reqs = append(reqs,
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.ListBucketAction, bucket: bucket, values: values},
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.ListBucketVersionsAction, bucket: bucket, values: values},
)
}
return reqs
}
// The same order as Type() and the job pool.
switch {
case j.Replicate != nil:
if !j.Replicate.RemoteToLocal() {
return list(j.Replicate.Source.Bucket, j.Replicate.Source.Prefix.F())
}
case j.KeyRotate != nil:
return list(j.KeyRotate.Bucket, []string{j.KeyRotate.Prefix})
case j.Expire != nil:
return list(j.Expire.Bucket, batchCanonicalPrefixes(j.Expire.Prefix.F()))
}
return nil
}
// jobSections counts the job types a definition holds. A job is one of them.
func (j BatchJobRequest) jobSections() int {
n := 0
for _, set := range []bool{j.Replicate != nil, j.KeyRotate != nil, j.Expire != nil} {
if set {
n++
}
}
return n
}
var errBatchJobSections = batchJobAuthzError{reason: "a batch job must define exactly one job type"}
// refuse ends the job for its submitter.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) refuse(err error) {
ri.mu.Lock()
defer ri.mu.Unlock()
if ri.FailureReason == "" {
ri.FailureReason = err.Error()
}
ri.Complete = false
ri.Failed = true
ri.PausedReason = ""
}
func (ri *batchJobInfo) refused() bool {
ri.mu.RLock()
defer ri.mu.RUnlock()
return ri.FailureReason != ""
}
// startAuthorized checks the submitter of a job that is about to run. It
// returns done for a job that must not run now: one refused before, which
// stays refused, or one refused now, which is persisted as failed first.
// An error that is not a decision leaves the job to a later start.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) startAuthorized(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest) (done bool, err error) {
if !ri.refused() {
err := job.Submitter.authorize(ctx, job.startAuthzRequests()...)
if err == nil && job.jobSections() != 1 {
err = errBatchJobSections
}
if err == nil {
ri.mu.Lock()
ri.PausedReason = ""
ri.mu.Unlock()
// Persist the report version before acting. Older binaries must not
// resume an authorization-bearing job with server authority.
if err := ri.updateAfter(ctx, api, 0, job); err != nil {
return true, batchUnavailable("saving job progress", err)
}
return false, nil
}
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
return true, ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, err)
}
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
return true, err
}
ri.refuse(err)
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("batch job %s refused: %w", job.ID, err))
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
if err := ri.updateAfter(ctx, api, 0, job); err != nil {
return true, batchUnavailable("saving job refusal", err)
}
return true, nil
}
+260
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// Code generated by github.com/tinylib/msgp DO NOT EDIT.
package cmd
import (
"github.com/tinylib/msgp/msgp"
)
// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, err = dc.ReadMapKeyPtr()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "v":
z.Version, err = dc.ReadInt()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Version")
return
}
case "t":
z.Type, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Type")
return
}
case "ak":
z.AccessKey, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AccessKey")
return
}
case "pu":
z.ParentUser, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ParentUser")
return
}
case "ua":
z.UpdatedAt, err = dc.ReadTime()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "UpdatedAt")
return
}
case "rb":
z.RevokedBefore, err = dc.ReadTime()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "RevokedBefore")
return
}
case "bd":
z.Binding, err = dc.ReadBytes(z.Binding)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Binding")
return
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
return
}
// EncodeMsg implements msgp.Encodable
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
// map header, size 7
// write "v"
err = en.Append(0x87, 0xa1, 0x76)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteInt(z.Version)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Version")
return
}
// write "t"
err = en.Append(0xa1, 0x74)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.Type)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Type")
return
}
// write "ak"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x61, 0x6b)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.AccessKey)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AccessKey")
return
}
// write "pu"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x70, 0x75)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.ParentUser)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ParentUser")
return
}
// write "ua"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x75, 0x61)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteTime(z.UpdatedAt)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "UpdatedAt")
return
}
// write "rb"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x72, 0x62)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteTime(z.RevokedBefore)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "RevokedBefore")
return
}
// write "bd"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x62, 0x64)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteBytes(z.Binding)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Binding")
return
}
return
}
// MarshalMsg implements msgp.Marshaler
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
o = msgp.Require(b, z.Msgsize())
// map header, size 7
// string "v"
o = append(o, 0x87, 0xa1, 0x76)
o = msgp.AppendInt(o, z.Version)
// string "t"
o = append(o, 0xa1, 0x74)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.Type)
// string "ak"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x61, 0x6b)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.AccessKey)
// string "pu"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x70, 0x75)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.ParentUser)
// string "ua"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x75, 0x61)
o = msgp.AppendTime(o, z.UpdatedAt)
// string "rb"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x62)
o = msgp.AppendTime(o, z.RevokedBefore)
// string "bd"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x62, 0x64)
o = msgp.AppendBytes(o, z.Binding)
return
}
// UnmarshalMsg implements msgp.Unmarshaler
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapKeyZC(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "v":
z.Version, bts, err = msgp.ReadIntBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Version")
return
}
case "t":
z.Type, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Type")
return
}
case "ak":
z.AccessKey, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AccessKey")
return
}
case "pu":
z.ParentUser, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ParentUser")
return
}
case "ua":
z.UpdatedAt, bts, err = msgp.ReadTimeBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "UpdatedAt")
return
}
case "rb":
z.RevokedBefore, bts, err = msgp.ReadTimeBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "RevokedBefore")
return
}
case "bd":
z.Binding, bts, err = msgp.ReadBytesBytes(bts, z.Binding)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Binding")
return
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
o = bts
return
}
// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *batchJobSubmitter) Msgsize() (s int) {
s = 1 + 2 + msgp.IntSize + 2 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Type) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.AccessKey) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.ParentUser) + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.BytesPrefixSize + len(z.Binding)
return
}
+123
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// Code generated by github.com/tinylib/msgp DO NOT EDIT.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"testing"
"github.com/tinylib/msgp/msgp"
)
func TestMarshalUnmarshalbatchJobSubmitter(t *testing.T) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
bts, err := v.MarshalMsg(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
left, err := v.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(left) > 0 {
t.Errorf("%d bytes left over after UnmarshalMsg(): %q", len(left), left)
}
left, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(left) > 0 {
t.Errorf("%d bytes left over after Skip(): %q", len(left), left)
}
}
func BenchmarkMarshalMsgbatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
v.MarshalMsg(nil)
}
}
func BenchmarkAppendMsgbatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
bts := make([]byte, 0, v.Msgsize())
bts, _ = v.MarshalMsg(bts[0:0])
b.SetBytes(int64(len(bts)))
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
bts, _ = v.MarshalMsg(bts[0:0])
}
}
func BenchmarkUnmarshalbatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
bts, _ := v.MarshalMsg(nil)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(bts)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_, err := v.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func TestEncodeDecodebatchJobSubmitter(t *testing.T) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
var buf bytes.Buffer
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
m := v.Msgsize()
if buf.Len() > m {
t.Log("WARNING: TestEncodeDecodebatchJobSubmitter Msgsize() is inaccurate")
}
vn := batchJobSubmitter{}
err := msgp.Decode(&buf, &vn)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
buf.Reset()
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
err = msgp.NewReader(&buf).Skip()
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
}
func BenchmarkEncodebatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
var buf bytes.Buffer
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
b.SetBytes(int64(buf.Len()))
en := msgp.NewWriter(msgp.Nowhere)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
v.EncodeMsg(en)
}
en.Flush()
}
func BenchmarkDecodebatchJobSubmitter(b *testing.B) {
v := batchJobSubmitter{}
var buf bytes.Buffer
msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
b.SetBytes(int64(buf.Len()))
rd := msgp.NewEndlessReader(buf.Bytes(), b)
dc := msgp.NewReader(rd)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
err := v.DecodeMsg(dc)
if err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
+248
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"net/http"
"testing"
"testing/synctest"
"time"
)
type batchDiscoveryLayer struct {
ObjectLayer
walk func(context.Context, chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error
read func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error)
}
func (a batchDiscoveryLayer) Walk(ctx context.Context, _, _ string, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], _ WalkOptions) error {
return a.walk(ctx, results)
}
func (a batchDiscoveryLayer) GetObjectNInfo(ctx context.Context, _, object string, _ *HTTPRangeSpec, _ http.Header, opts ObjectOptions) (*GetObjectReader, error) {
data, err := a.read(ctx, object)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return NewGetObjectReaderFromReader(bytes.NewReader(data), ObjectInfo{Name: object}, opts)
}
// A partially successful startup scan must retry the missing work without
// re-admitting work that finished while the scan was waiting to retry.
func TestBatchDiscoveryRecoversInProcess(t *testing.T) {
for _, failure := range []string{"walk-start", "walk-stream", "manifest-read"} {
t.Run(failure, func(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: ctx, jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 10)}
attempts := 0
pool.objLayer = batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(_ context.Context, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 && failure == "walk-start" {
return errErasureReadQuorum
}
defer close(results)
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: "finished"}}
if attempts == 1 && failure == "walk-stream" {
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Err: errErasureReadQuorum}
} else {
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: "pending"}}
}
return nil
},
read: func(_ context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
if attempts == 1 && failure == "manifest-read" && name == "pending" {
return nil, errErasureReadQuorum
}
job := BatchJobRequest{ID: name}
return job.MarshalMsg(nil)
},
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
synctest.Wait()
if failure != "walk-start" {
select {
case job := <-pool.jobCh:
if job.ID != "finished" || !pool.beginJob(job) {
t.Fatal("first scan did not admit the healthy manifest")
}
pool.finishJob(job, nil)
default:
t.Fatal("first scan lost the healthy manifest")
}
}
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(20 * time.Minute):
t.Fatal("discovery failed to finish after storage recovered")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Fatalf("discovery attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
want := 1
if failure == "walk-start" {
want = 2
}
if len(pool.jobCh) != want {
t.Fatalf("queued %d jobs, want %d; completed work was re-admitted or pending work was lost", len(pool.jobCh), want)
}
for len(pool.jobCh) > 0 {
job := <-pool.jobCh
if failure != "walk-start" && job.ID != "pending" {
t.Fatalf("re-admitted %q", job.ID)
}
if !pool.beginJob(job) {
t.Fatal("recovered job has no owner")
}
pool.finishJob(job, nil)
}
})
})
}
}
func TestBatchDiscoverySkipsUnusableManifests(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: t.Context(), jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 1)}
attempts := 0
pool.objLayer = batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(_ context.Context, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
defer close(results)
for _, name := range []string{"canceled", "deleted", "malformed", "future", "empty-id"} {
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: name}}
}
return nil
},
read: func(_ context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
switch name {
case "deleted":
return nil, errConfigNotFound
case "malformed":
return []byte("bad manifest"), nil
case "future":
return []byte("SILO-BATCH-V999\n"), nil
case "empty-id":
return (&BatchJobRequest{}).MarshalMsg(nil)
}
// The administrator cancels after Walk, during manifest load.
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler(name, true))
job := BatchJobRequest{ID: name}
return job.MarshalMsg(nil)
},
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Hour):
t.Fatal("unusable manifests kept discovery retrying")
}
if len(pool.jobCh) != 0 || attempts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("canceled work was queued or retried: queue=%d scans=%d", len(pool.jobCh), attempts)
}
})
}
func TestBatchDiscoveryShutdownDuringBackoff(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
attempts := 0
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: ctx, objLayer: batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(context.Context, chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
return errErasureReadQuorum
},
}}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
synctest.Wait()
select {
case <-done:
t.Fatal("discovery abandoned a transient startup error")
default:
}
cancel()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("discovery did not stop on shutdown")
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Fatalf("discovery scanned after shutdown: %d", attempts)
}
})
}
func TestBatchDiscoveryKeepsNewlyFinishedJobsTerminal(t *testing.T) {
synctest.Test(t, func(t *testing.T) {
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: t.Context(), jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 1)}
attempts := 0
pool.objLayer = batchDiscoveryLayer{
walk: func(_ context.Context, results chan<- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]) error {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
// This job was submitted and failed while startup discovery
// had not yet read any manifests. The retry must not rerun it.
job := &BatchJobRequest{ID: "new-job"}
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(job))
if !pool.beginJob(<-pool.jobCh) {
t.Fatal("submitted job has no owner")
}
pool.finishJob(job, errErasureWriteQuorum)
return errErasureReadQuorum
}
defer close(results)
if owner := pool.jobOwners["new-job"]; owner == nil || owner.state != "terminal" || owner.req != nil || owner.cancel != nil {
t.Fatalf("terminal marker lost or retained the job payload: %+v", owner)
}
results <- itemOrErr[ObjectInfo]{Item: ObjectInfo{Name: "new-job"}}
return nil
},
read: func(_ context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
return (&BatchJobRequest{ID: name}).MarshalMsg(nil)
},
}
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
pool.resume(func() time.Duration { return 0 })
}()
select {
case <-done:
case <-time.After(time.Hour):
t.Fatal("discovery did not recover")
}
if attempts != 2 || len(pool.jobCh) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("discovery re-admitted a failed job: scans=%d queue=%d", attempts, len(pool.jobCh))
}
if !pool.discoveryDone || len(pool.jobOwners) != 0 {
t.Fatal("completed discovery retained terminal job markers")
}
job := &BatchJobRequest{ID: "after-discovery"}
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(job))
if !pool.beginJob(<-pool.jobCh) {
t.Fatal("new submission after discovery has no owner")
}
pool.finishJob(job, nil)
if len(pool.jobOwners) != 0 {
t.Fatal("normal completion after discovery leaked an owner")
}
})
}
+103
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"go.yaml.in/yaml/v3"
)
// A completed expire job is not run again when the server restarts, as
// replication and key rotation jobs are not: in particular it is not checked
// against its submitter again, which could turn it into a failed job.
// An expire job that completed before the upgrade records no submitter.
func TestBatchExpireCompletedLegacyStaysComplete(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
job := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(f.expireYAML("")), job))
job.ID = "expire-legacydone" + getKeySeparator() + "0"
job.User = globalActiveCred.AccessKey
job.Started = time.Now()
mustIAM(t, job.save(f.ctx, f.obj))
ri := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type()), StartTime: job.Started, Complete: true, Objects: 3}
mustIAM(t, ri.updateAfter(f.ctx, f.obj, 0, *job))
loaded := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
f.run(t, loaded) // resumed after a restart
got := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if !got.Complete || got.Failed || got.FailureReason != "" {
t.Fatalf("complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q, want the completed state kept", got.Complete, got.Failed, got.FailureReason)
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Error("a completed job ran again")
}
}
// A new expire job completed with a temporary credential that has expired
// since.
func TestBatchExpireCompletedAfterCredentialExpiry(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-parent", "batch-full")
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(3 * time.Second).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
f.run(t, job)
if f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("the job did not expire the older version")
}
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); !ri.Complete {
t.Fatalf("complete=%v failed=%v", ri.Complete, ri.Failed)
}
time.Sleep(time.Until(cred.Expiration) + time.Second)
loaded := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
f.run(t, loaded) // resumed after a restart
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.FailureReason != "" {
t.Errorf("complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q after a restart, want the completed state kept", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
// Control: a job that did not complete is still refused once its
// credential has expired.
f.putVersions(t, "data/b")
pending := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(f.expireYAML("")), pending))
pending.ID = "expire-pending" + getKeySeparator() + "0"
pending.User = cred.AccessKey
pending.Started = time.Now()
pending.Submitter = loaded.Submitter
mustIAM(t, pending.save(f.ctx, f.obj))
f.run(t, pending)
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, pending); ri.Complete || !ri.Failed || ri.FailureReason == "" {
t.Errorf("pending job with an expired submitter: complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q, want refused", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
}
+560
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/storageclass"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// A batch expiration that keeps no versions purges each key it matched under
// the purge's lock. What it authorizes for the submitter, and checks for
// Object Lock, are the versions the purge deletes then, not the versions the
// walk saw before.
// batchPurgeHook runs change once, after the walk of a job and before its
// first purge of all versions.
type batchPurgeHook struct {
ObjectLayer
once sync.Once
change func()
}
func (h *batchPurgeHook) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
if opts.DeleteAllVersions {
h.once.Do(h.change)
}
return h.ObjectLayer.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
}
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) purgeYAML(prefix string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: %q
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 0
`, f.bucket, prefix)
}
// runChanged submits a purge of prefix as cred and runs it, with change made
// between its walk and its purge, and returns the job's final state.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) runChanged(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, prefix string, change func()) *batchJobInfo {
t.Helper()
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.purgeYAML(prefix))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
hook := &batchPurgeHook{ObjectLayer: f.obj, change: change}
if err := job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, hook, *job); err != nil {
t.Logf("start: %v", err)
}
return f.jobInfo(t, job)
}
// putOlder writes a version of key older than every version it has, as a
// replicated or pulled version can be, with metadata meta.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) putOlder(t *testing.T, key, versionID string, meta map[string]string) {
t.Helper()
data := []byte("older " + key)
_, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""),
ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, VersionID: versionID, MTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour), UserDefined: meta})
mustIAM(t, err)
}
func batchPurgeVersionIDs(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key string) []string {
t.Helper()
var ids []string
marker, vmarker := "", ""
for {
res, err := f.obj.ListObjectVersions(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, marker, vmarker, "", 1000)
mustIAM(t, err)
for _, o := range res.Objects {
if o.Name == key {
ids = append(ids, o.VersionID)
}
}
if !res.IsTruncated {
return ids
}
marker, vmarker = res.NextMarker, res.NextVersionIDMarker
}
}
// A version that the submitter may not expire, because of its tags or its
// version ID, is refused although the walk did not see it so: the job fails
// and the key keeps all its versions.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeAuthorizesCurrentVersions(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
action string // the action a conditional Deny denies
deny string // its condition
// change returns the version IDs that change made.
change func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key, older string) []string
}{
{
name: "tagged-after-walk",
action: "s3:GetObjectVersion",
deny: `{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/keep":["yes"]}}`,
change: func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key, older string) []string {
_, err := f.obj.PutObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: older})
mustIAM(t, err)
return nil
},
},
{
name: "version-after-walk",
action: "s3:DeleteObjectVersion",
deny: `{"StringEquals":{"s3:versionid":["%s"]}}`,
change: func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, key, older string) []string {
f.putOlder(t, key, batchPurgeDeniedVersion, nil)
return []string{batchPurgeDeniedVersion}
},
},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
deny := tc.deny
if strings.Contains(deny, "%s") {
deny = fmt.Sprintf(deny, batchPurgeDeniedVersion)
}
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-purge", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["`+tc.action+`"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":`+deny+`}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-purge-user", "batch-purge")
const key = "purge/key"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
want := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key)
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {
want = append(want, tc.change(t, f, key, older)...)
})
for _, id := range want {
if !f.versionExists(t, key, id) {
t.Errorf("version %s was purged although the submitter may not delete it", id)
}
}
if !ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.FailureReason == "" {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q, want a refused job", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
if ri.Objects != 0 || ri.KeysRefused != 0 {
t.Errorf("job counts objects=%d refused=%d", ri.Objects, ri.KeysRefused)
}
})
}
}
const batchPurgeDeniedVersion = "6c4b2f8e-1d3a-4e5b-9c7d-0a1b2c3d4e5f"
// A version that Object Lock protects refuses the whole key, also when it
// was added after the walk. The job completes with the key counted as
// refused, not failed.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeRefusesLockedAfterWalk(t *testing.T) {
for _, kind := range batchLockKinds {
t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
enableBucketObjectLock(t, f.bucket)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
const key = "purge/locked"
f.putVersions(t, key)
want := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key)
locked := mustGetUUID()
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {
f.putOlder(t, key, locked, batchLockMeta(kind))
want = append(want, locked)
})
for _, id := range want {
if !f.versionExists(t, key, id) {
t.Errorf("version %s of a key with a locked version was purged", id)
}
}
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.KeysRefused != 1 || ri.ObjectsFailed != 0 || ri.Objects != 0 {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v refused=%d failed objects=%d objects=%d, want complete with 1 refused key",
ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.KeysRefused, ri.ObjectsFailed, ri.Objects)
}
})
}
}
// transition marks version versionID of key as transitioned to a remote
// tier, as a lifecycle transition leaves it.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) transition(t *testing.T, key, versionID string) {
t.Helper()
set := f.obj.(*erasureServerPools).serverPools[0]
infos, errs := readAllFileInfo(f.ctx, set.getHashedSet(key).getDisks(), "", f.bucket, key, versionID, false, false)
mustIAM(t, errs[0])
fi := infos[0]
fi.TransitionStatus, fi.TransitionTier, fi.TransitionedObjName = lifecycle.TransitionComplete, "WARM", "remote/"+key+"/"+versionID
mustIAM(t, set.DecomTieredObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, fi, ObjectOptions{}))
}
// A key with a transitioned version is refused as a whole, as a key with a
// locked version is: the job completes with the key counted as refused, not
// failed, and the key keeps every version.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeRefusesTieredKey(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
const key = "purge/tiered"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
f.transition(t, key, older)
want := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key)
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {})
for _, id := range want {
if !f.versionExists(t, key, id) {
t.Errorf("version %s of a key with a transitioned version was purged", id)
}
}
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.KeysRefused != 1 || ri.ObjectsFailed != 0 || ri.Objects != 0 {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v refused=%d failed objects=%d objects=%d, want complete with 1 refused key",
ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.KeysRefused, ri.ObjectsFailed, ri.Objects)
}
}
// Controls: a purge by root and by an authorized user removes every version,
// including one added after the walk.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeAuthorizedControls(t *testing.T) {
for _, root := range []bool{true, false} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("root=%v", root), func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
cred := globalActiveCred
if !root {
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred = iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
}
const key = "purge/key"
f.putVersions(t, key)
added := mustGetUUID()
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {
f.putOlder(t, key, added, map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectTagging: "keep=yes"})
})
if ids := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key); len(ids) != 0 {
t.Errorf("an authorized purge kept %v", ids)
}
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.Objects != 3 || ri.KeysRefused != 0 {
t.Errorf("job complete=%v failed=%v objects=%d refused=%d, want complete with 3 objects",
ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.Objects, ri.KeysRefused)
}
})
}
}
// Cases found in the sixth review round.
// batchPurgeBudgetChange runs change once the first purge stopped at its
// budget after removing versions.
type batchPurgeBudgetChange struct {
ObjectLayer
change func()
calls int
}
func (h *batchPurgeBudgetChange) DeleteObject(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, error) {
oi, err := h.ObjectLayer.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
if opts.DeleteAllVersions {
h.calls++
if h.calls == 1 && errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllBudget) && opts.DeleteAllResult.Removed > 0 {
h.change()
}
}
return oi, err
}
// A purge that continues after its budget authorizes the versions again, as
// they are then; the refusal and the versions already removed persist
// across another start.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeBudgetReauthorizes(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const key = "purge/budget"
oldest := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, key, nil)
middle := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, key, nil)
latest := batchPutVersion(t, f.obj, f.bucket, key, nil)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-budget-deny", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/keep":"yes"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-budget-user", "review6-budget-deny")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.purgeYAML("purge/"))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
oldBudget := deleteAllBudget
deleteAllBudget.versions = 1
t.Cleanup(func() { deleteAllBudget = oldBudget })
hook := &batchPurgeBudgetChange{ObjectLayer: f.obj, change: func() {
_, err := f.obj.PutObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: middle.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
}}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, hook, *job))
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if hook.calls != 2 || !ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.FailureReason == "" || ri.Objects != 1 || ri.KeysRefused != 0 {
t.Fatalf("continuation: calls=%d complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q objects=%d refused=%d", hook.calls, ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason, ri.Objects, ri.KeysRefused)
}
if f.versionExists(t, key, oldest.VersionID) || !f.versionExists(t, key, middle.VersionID) || !f.versionExists(t, key, latest.VersionID) {
t.Fatal("only the first authorized version may be removed")
}
_, err := f.obj.DeleteObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: middle.VersionID})
mustIAM(t, err)
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, hook, *job))
after := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if hook.calls != 2 || after.FailureReason != ri.FailureReason || after.Objects != 1 || after.Complete {
t.Fatal("persisted refusal must prevent a fresh purge after the tags change")
}
}
// The purge's lock excludes tag writers from its authorization through its
// last delete, for a directory key in a lock domain of its own on one pool
// and for a key in a second pool.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeExcludesTagWriter(t *testing.T) {
for _, mode := range []string{ldDsync, "two-pools"} {
t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
var z *erasureServerPools
var bucket string
pool, key := 0, "purge/tags/"
if mode == "two-pools" {
z, bucket = consistencyPools(t)
pool = 1
} else {
z, bucket = ldPool(t, mode)
for i := 0; ; i++ {
key = fmt.Sprintf("purge/tags-%d/", i)
if z.serverPools[0].getHashedSetIndex(encodeDirObject(key)) == 1 {
break
}
}
}
before := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, encodeDirObject(key), pool, "", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
entered, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
var released atomic.Bool
unblock := func() {
if released.CompareAndSwap(false, true) {
close(release)
}
}
defer unblock()
purged := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := z.DeleteObject(ctx, bucket, key, ObjectOptions{
DeleteAllVersions: true,
DeleteAllLatest: &deleteAllMatch{VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: before.ModTime},
deleteAllAuthorize: func(versions []ObjectInfo) error {
close(entered)
select {
case <-release:
return nil
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
}
},
})
purged <- err
}()
select {
case <-entered:
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Fatal("purge never reached authorization")
}
written := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := z.PutObjectTags(ctx, bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
written <- err
}()
select {
case err := <-written:
t.Errorf("tag writer crossed the purge's authorization lock: %v", err)
case <-time.After(ldWait):
unblock()
err := <-written
if !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("writer must observe the completed purge: %v", err)
}
}
unblock()
mustIAM(t, <-purged)
})
}
}
// batchTagWriteFault fails metadata updates of one key, so that a tag write
// reaches only the drives it does not wrap.
type batchTagWriteFault struct {
StorageAPI
bucket, object string
}
func (d batchTagWriteFault) UpdateMetadata(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, fi FileInfo, opts UpdateMetadataOpts) error {
if bucket == d.bucket && object == d.object {
return errDiskNotFound
}
return d.StorageAPI.UpdateMetadata(ctx, bucket, object, fi, opts)
}
// A failed tag write can leave a revision that the submitter may not expire
// on a minority of drives. The purge removes it with the version, so it is
// authorized too.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeAuthorizesDriveRevisions(t *testing.T) {
resetTestGlobals()
t.Cleanup(resetTestGlobals)
// One drive of sixteen holds the failed tag write, so the read quorum of
// the metadata must stay below sixteen. Earlier tests can leave a
// storage class of parity 0 behind (newTestConfig on a single drive).
previous := globalStorageClass
globalStorageClass.Update(storageclass.Config{Standard: storageclass.StorageClass{Parity: 4}})
t.Cleanup(func() { globalStorageClass.Update(previous) })
z := purgeSinglePool(t, 16)
globalIAMSys.initStore(z, nil)
mustIAM(t, globalIAMSys.Load(t.Context(), true))
f := &batchAuthzFixture{ctx: t.Context(), sys: globalIAMSys, obj: z, bucket: "review6-batch-authz"}
mustIAM(t, z.MakeBucket(f.ctx, f.bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
batchTestJobPool(f.ctx, t, z)
const key = "purge/minority-tags"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-minority-deny", strings.ReplaceAll(batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:GetObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"StringEquals":{"s3:ExistingObjectTag/keep":"yes"}}}`, "batch-authz", f.bucket))
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "review6-minority-user", "review6-minority-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectVersionAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: key, versionID: older, tags: "keep=yes"}); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatal("control: this tag revision must deny the read needed for expiration")
}
set := z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(key)
original := set.getDisks
disks := append([]StorageAPI(nil), original()...)
wrapped := append([]StorageAPI(nil), disks...)
for i := 1; i < len(wrapped); i++ {
wrapped[i] = batchTagWriteFault{StorageAPI: wrapped[i], bucket: f.bucket, object: key}
}
set.getDisks = func() []StorageAPI { return wrapped }
_, err = f.obj.PutObjectTags(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, "keep=yes", ObjectOptions{VersionID: older, UserDefined: map[string]string{
ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp: UTCNow().Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
}})
set.getDisks = original
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("control: the tag write must fail its quorum")
}
fi, err := disks[0].ReadVersion(f.ctx, "", f.bucket, key, older, ReadOptions{})
mustIAM(t, err)
if fi.Metadata[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] != "keep=yes" {
t.Fatal("control: the successful drive must hold the denied tag revision")
}
history, err := z.deleteAllHistory(f.ctx, f.bucket, key)
mustIAM(t, err)
for _, v := range history {
for _, c := range v.copies {
if c.fi.Metadata[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] != "" {
t.Fatal("control: the quorum history must still have the original tags")
}
}
}
ri := f.runChanged(t, cred, "purge/", func() {})
if !ri.Failed || ri.Complete || !strings.Contains(ri.FailureReason, "is not allowed") {
t.Errorf("denied physical revision must refuse the job: complete=%v failed=%v reason=%q", ri.Complete, ri.Failed, ri.FailureReason)
}
if _, err := disks[0].ReadVersion(f.ctx, "", f.bucket, key, older, ReadOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Errorf("denied physical revision was removed: %v", err)
}
if got := batchPurgeVersionIDs(t, f, key); len(got) != 2 {
t.Errorf("denial must keep the whole key; remaining versions=%v", got)
}
}
// Cases found in the seventh review round.
// The time the authorization takes counts against the purge's budget: a
// late allow and a deny both delete nothing.
func TestBatchExpirePurgeBudgetIncludesAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
z := purgeSinglePool(t, 16)
p := newPurgeTest(t, z, "review7-purge-auth-time", MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}, "")
const key = "purge/key"
p.version(0, key, "older", 2)
p.version(0, key, "latest", 1)
exp := p.matched(key)
oldBudget := deleteAllBudget
deleteAllBudget.duration = 10 * time.Millisecond
t.Cleanup(func() { deleteAllBudget = oldBudget })
denied := errors.New("review7: revision denied")
for _, decision := range []error{nil, denied} {
called := false
var res deleteAllResult
_, err := z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), p.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{
DeleteAllVersions: true,
DeleteAllLatest: &deleteAllMatch{VersionID: exp.VersionID, ModTime: exp.ModTime},
DeleteAllResult: &res,
deleteAllAuthorize: func(versions []ObjectInfo) error {
called = true
if len(versions) < 2 {
t.Error("authorization did not receive both approved versions")
}
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
return decision
},
})
want := decision
if want == nil {
want = errDeleteAllBudget
}
if !called || !errors.Is(err, want) || res.Started || res.Complete || res.Removed != 0 {
t.Errorf("late authorization: called=%v err=%v result=%+v", called, err, res)
}
if got := p.held(0, key); len(got) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("purge removed versions after late authorization: %v", got)
}
}
}
// A listing outage pauses without moving the cursor or refusing the job;
// a later run completes it in both modes.
func TestBatchExpireWalkFailureResumes(t *testing.T) {
for _, purgeAll := range []bool{false, true} {
name := "retain-one"
if purgeAll {
name = "retain-zero"
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
const key = "data/key"
older := f.putVersions(t, key)
definition := f.expireYAML("data/")
if purgeAll {
definition = f.purgeYAML("data/")
}
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, definition)
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
listErr := errors.New("review7: transient listing failure")
err := job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, batchWalkError{ObjectLayer: f.obj, err: listErr}, *job)
if !errors.Is(err, listErr) {
t.Fatalf("listing error: %v", err)
}
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.PausedReason == "" || ri.FailureReason != "" || ri.Object != "" || !f.versionExists(t, key, older) {
t.Fatalf("listing failure changed progress or became terminal: failed=%v complete=%v reason=%q cursor=%q", ri.Failed, ri.Complete, ri.FailureReason, ri.Object)
}
mustIAM(t, job.Expire.Start(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
ri = f.jobInfo(t, job)
wantRemoved := int64(1)
if purgeAll {
wantRemoved = 2
}
if ri.Failed || !ri.Complete || ri.FailureReason != "" || ri.Objects != wantRemoved || f.versionExists(t, key, older) {
t.Fatalf("resume did not complete: failed=%v complete=%v reason=%q removed=%d", ri.Failed, ri.Complete, ri.FailureReason, ri.Objects)
}
})
}
}
+338 -174
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/tags"
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ import (
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
xioutil "github.com/minio/minio/internal/ioutil"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/wildcard"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/workers"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/xtime"
@@ -289,16 +291,6 @@ type BatchJobExpire struct {
var _ yaml.Unmarshaler = &BatchJobExpire{}
// RedactSensitive will redact any sensitive information in b.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) RedactSensitive() {
if r == nil {
return
}
if r.NotificationCfg.Token != "" {
r.NotificationCfg.Token = redactedText
}
}
// UnmarshalYAML - BatchJobExpire extends default unmarshal to extract line, col information.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) UnmarshalYAML(val *yaml.Node) error {
type expireJob BatchJobExpire
@@ -345,32 +337,6 @@ func (r BatchJobExpire) Notify(ctx context.Context, body io.Reader) error {
return nil
}
// Expire expires object versions which have already matched supplied filter conditions
func (r *BatchJobExpire) Expire(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, vc *versioning.Versioning, objsToDel []ObjectToDelete) []error {
opts := ObjectOptions{
PrefixEnabledFn: vc.PrefixEnabled,
VersionSuspended: vc.Suspended(),
}
allErrs := make([]error, 0, len(objsToDel))
for {
count := len(objsToDel)
if count == 0 {
break
}
if count > maxDeleteList {
count = maxDeleteList
}
_, errs := api.DeleteObjects(ctx, r.Bucket, objsToDel[:count], opts)
allErrs = append(allErrs, errs...)
// Next batch of deletion
objsToDel = objsToDel[count:]
}
return allErrs
}
const (
batchExpireName = "batch-expire.bin"
batchExpireFormat = 1
@@ -381,22 +347,230 @@ const (
batchExpireJobDefaultRetryDelay = 250 * time.Millisecond
)
type objInfoCache map[string]*ObjectInfo
func newObjInfoCache() objInfoCache {
return objInfoCache(make(map[string]*ObjectInfo))
type expireObjInfo struct {
ObjectInfo
ExpireAll bool
DeleteMarkerCount int64
}
func (oiCache objInfoCache) Add(toDel ObjectToDelete, oi *ObjectInfo) {
oiCache[fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", toDel.ObjectName, toDel.VersionID)] = oi
// isErrObjectLocked reports a version that Object Lock protects.
func isErrObjectLocked(err error) bool {
var locked ObjectLocked
return errors.As(err, &locked)
}
func (oiCache objInfoCache) Get(toDel ObjectToDelete) (*ObjectInfo, bool) {
oi, ok := oiCache[fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", toDel.ObjectName, toDel.VersionID)]
return oi, ok
func (r *BatchJobExpire) tagsFiltered() bool {
for _, rule := range r.Rules {
if len(rule.Tags) > 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func batchObjsForDelete(ctx context.Context, r *BatchJobExpire, ri *batchJobInfo, job BatchJobRequest, api ObjectLayer, wk *workers.Workers, expireCh <-chan []expireObjInfo) {
// expireAuthzRequests are the actions the job takes on one version: it reads
// the version, and its tags when a rule filters by them, and deletes it.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireAuthzRequests(name, versionID, userTags string) []batchAuthzRequest {
if versionID == "" {
versionID = nullVersionID
}
reqs := []batchAuthzRequest{
{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
{action: policy.GetObjectVersionAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
{action: policy.DeleteObjectAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
{action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
}
if r.tagsFiltered() {
reqs = append(reqs,
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectTaggingAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.GetObjectVersionTaggingAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: name, versionID: versionID, tags: userTags},
)
}
return reqs
}
// expireVersion deletes one version that is older than the versions the rule
// retains. Under the object's write lock, with the version as it is then, it
// leaves a version that Object Lock protects (ObjectLocked) and refuses one
// that the submitter may not delete (batchJobAuthzError). An unreadable
// version is not deleted.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireVersion(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, vc *versioning.Versioning, job BatchJobRequest, exp expireObjInfo) error {
p, err := job.Submitter.principal(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
versionID := exp.VersionID
if versionID == "" {
// An empty version ID would add a delete marker instead.
versionID = nullVersionID
}
opts := ObjectOptions{
VersionID: versionID,
Versioned: vc.PrefixEnabled(exp.Name),
VersionSuspended: vc.Suspended(),
}
opts.SetEvalRetentionBypassFn(func(goi ObjectInfo, gerr error) error {
// A delete marker reads as MethodNotAllowed; any other error,
// including a missing version, stops the delete.
marker := isErrMethodNotAllowed(gerr) && (goi.DeleteMarker || !goi.VersionPurgeStatus.Empty())
if gerr != nil && !marker {
return gerr
}
if enforceRetentionForDeletion(ctx, goi) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: r.Bucket, Object: exp.Name, VersionID: versionID}
}
for _, req := range r.expireAuthzRequests(exp.Name, versionID, goi.UserTags) {
if err := p.authorize(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
})
_, err = api.DeleteObject(ctx, r.Bucket, exp.Name, opts)
return err
}
// expireVersions deletes the versions of one batch entry and records the
// outcome in res. It returns an error that ends the job.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireVersions(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, vc *versioning.Versioning, job BatchJobRequest, ri *batchJobInfo, exp expireObjInfo, retryAttempts int, delay time.Duration, res *batchCounts) error {
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return err
}
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
err := r.expireVersion(ctx, api, vc, job, exp)
stopFn(exp, err)
switch {
case err == nil:
if exp.DeleteMarker {
ri.countRemoved(r.Bucket, 0, 1)
} else {
ri.countRemoved(r.Bucket, 1, 0)
}
return nil
case isBatchJobStopped(err):
return err
case isErrObjectLocked(err):
// Left in place, not retried and not a failure.
res.versionsSkipped++
return nil
case isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isErrObjectNotFound(err):
// Removed concurrently.
return nil
}
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s versionID=%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", r.Bucket, exp.Name, exp.VersionID, err, attempts))
if attempts < retryAttempts {
time.Sleep(delay)
}
}
if exp.DeleteMarker {
res.deleteMarkersFailed++
} else {
res.objectsFailed++
}
return nil
}
// expireAllVersions purges every version of a key whose rule retains none,
// with the purge of exactly that key (erasureServerPools.deleteAllVersions),
// while the version the walk matched is still its latest. Under its lock,
// before it deletes anything, the purge refuses the key when a version is
// transitioned or Object Lock protects one, and has every write it would
// delete, each copy and each revision a drive holds, authorized for the
// submitter, with the version ID and tags it has then.
//
// What the purge removed is counted at once; a refused key is counted in res
// as refused, and the versions a failed purge left in res as failures. A
// failed purge is retried up to retryAttempts times, each time with the
// version the walk matched; a purge that stopped at its budget after
// removing versions continues without spending an attempt. A key whose
// latest version changed since the walk is not expired. It returns an error
// that ends the job: an authorization failure or the end of ctx.
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireAllVersions(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest, ri *batchJobInfo, exp expireObjInfo, retryAttempts int, res *batchCounts) error {
var objects, markers int64
matched := deleteAllMatch{VersionID: exp.VersionID, ModTime: exp.ModTime}
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return err
}
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
latest := matched
var purge deleteAllResult
p, err := job.Submitter.principal(ctx)
if err == nil {
_, err = api.DeleteObject(ctx, exp.Bucket, encodeDirObject(exp.Name), ObjectOptions{
DeleteAllVersions: true,
DeleteAllLatest: &latest,
DeleteAllResult: &purge,
deleteAllAuthorize: r.expireAllAuthorize(p, exp.Name),
})
}
// Removed versions are gone for any later run: count them now.
if purge.Removed > 0 {
ri.countRemoved(r.Bucket, int64(purge.Removed-purge.Markers), int64(purge.Markers))
objects += int64(purge.Removed - purge.Markers)
markers += int64(purge.Markers)
}
stopFn(exp, err)
switch {
case err == nil:
return nil
case isBatchJobStopped(err):
return err
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllChanged):
// Changed since the walk matched it: not expired.
return nil
case isErrObjectLocked(err), errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllTiered):
// Refused as a whole: nothing removed, not retried and not a
// failure. A later run of the job checks the key again.
res.keysRefused++
return nil
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllBudget) && purge.Removed > 0:
attempts-- // progress
continue
}
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return err
}
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", exp.Bucket, exp.Name, err, attempts))
}
res.expireAllFailed(exp, objects, markers)
return nil
}
// expireAllAuthorize returns the authorization of a purge of all versions of
// name for p: each version the purge would delete, as it holds it, needs the
// actions of expiring it (expireAuthzRequests).
func (r *BatchJobExpire) expireAllAuthorize(p batchJobPrincipal, name string) func([]ObjectInfo) error {
return func(versions []ObjectInfo) error {
for _, v := range versions {
for _, req := range r.expireAuthzRequests(name, v.VersionID, v.UserTags) {
if err := p.authorize(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return nil
}
}
// expireAllFailed counts the versions of info, as the walk saw them, that a
// failed purge of all its versions did not remove: those beyond the objects
// and markers it removed, at least one.
func (c *batchCounts) expireAllFailed(info expireObjInfo, objects, markers int64) {
failedObjects := max(int64(info.NumVersions)-info.DeleteMarkerCount-objects, 0)
failedMarkers := max(info.DeleteMarkerCount-markers, 0)
if failedObjects+failedMarkers == 0 {
failedObjects = 1
}
c.objectsFailed += failedObjects
c.deleteMarkersFailed += failedMarkers
}
// batchObjsForDelete expires the batches of expireCh. walkDone reports, once
// expireCh is closed, whether the walk reached its end: only then is its last
// key known to be complete.
func batchObjsForDelete(ctx context.Context, refuse func(error), walkDone func() bool, r *BatchJobExpire, ri *batchJobInfo, job BatchJobRequest, api ObjectLayer, wk *workers.Workers, expireCh <-chan []expireObjInfo) {
vc, _ := globalBucketVersioningSys.Get(r.Bucket)
retryAttempts := job.Expire.Retry.Attempts
if retryAttempts <= 0 {
@@ -407,130 +581,53 @@ func batchObjsForDelete(ctx context.Context, r *BatchJobExpire, ri *batchJobInfo
delay = batchExpireJobDefaultRetryDelay
}
var i int
progress := newBatchProgress(ri, r.Bucket)
defer func() {
wk.Wait()
if walkDone() {
progress.finish()
}
}()
for toExpire := range expireCh {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
default:
}
if i > 0 {
seq := progress.begin()
if seq > 0 {
if wait := globalBatchConfig.ExpirationWait(); wait > 0 {
time.Sleep(wait)
}
}
i++
wk.Take()
go func(toExpire []expireObjInfo) {
go func(seq uint64, toExpire []expireObjInfo) {
defer wk.Give()
toExpireAll := make([]expireObjInfo, 0, len(toExpire))
toDel := make([]ObjectToDelete, 0, len(toExpire))
oiCache := newObjInfoCache()
var res batchCounts
for _, exp := range toExpire {
var err error
if exp.ExpireAll {
toExpireAll = append(toExpireAll, exp)
continue
err = r.expireAllVersions(ctx, api, job, ri, exp, retryAttempts, &res)
} else {
err = r.expireVersions(ctx, api, vc, job, ri, exp, retryAttempts, delay, &res)
}
// Cache ObjectInfo value via pointers for
// subsequent use to track objects which
// couldn't be deleted.
od := ObjectToDelete{
ObjectV: ObjectV{
ObjectName: exp.Name,
VersionID: exp.VersionID,
},
}
toDel = append(toDel, od)
oiCache.Add(od, &exp.ObjectInfo)
}
// DeleteObject(deletePrefix: true) to expire all versions of an object
for _, exp := range toExpireAll {
var success bool
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
ri.trackMultipleObjectVersions(exp, success)
return
default:
if err != nil {
// The batch is not done; a later run does it again.
if isBatchJobStopped(err) {
refuse(err)
}
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
_, err := api.DeleteObject(ctx, exp.Bucket, encodeDirObject(exp.Name), ObjectOptions{
DeletePrefix: true,
DeletePrefixObject: true, // use prefix delete on exact object (this is an optimization to avoid fan-out calls)
})
if err != nil {
stopFn(exp, err)
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", exp.Bucket, exp.Name, err, attempts))
} else {
stopFn(exp, err)
success = true
break
}
}
ri.trackMultipleObjectVersions(exp, success)
}
// DeleteMultiple objects
toDelCopy := make([]ObjectToDelete, len(toDel))
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(ri.JobID, ri)
return
default:
}
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricExpire, ri.JobID, attempts)
// Copying toDel to select from objects whose
// deletion failed
copy(toDelCopy, toDel)
var failed int
errs := r.Expire(ctx, api, vc, toDel)
// reslice toDel in preparation for next retry attempt
toDel = toDel[:0]
for i, err := range errs {
if err != nil {
stopFn(toDelCopy[i], err)
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Failed to expire %s/%s versionID=%s due to %v (attempts=%d)", ri.Bucket, toDelCopy[i].ObjectName, toDelCopy[i].VersionID,
err, attempts))
failed++
if oi, ok := oiCache.Get(toDelCopy[i]); ok {
ri.trackCurrentBucketObject(r.Bucket, *oi, false, attempts)
}
if attempts != retryAttempts {
// retry
toDel = append(toDel, toDelCopy[i])
}
} else {
stopFn(toDelCopy[i], nil)
if oi, ok := oiCache.Get(toDelCopy[i]); ok {
ri.trackCurrentBucketObject(r.Bucket, *oi, true, attempts)
}
}
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(ri.JobID, ri)
if failed == 0 {
break
}
// Add a delay between retry attempts
if attempts < retryAttempts {
time.Sleep(delay)
}
}
}(toExpire)
if n := len(toExpire); n > 0 {
progress.done(seq, toExpire[n-1].Name, res)
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(ri.JobID, ri)
}(seq, toExpire)
}
}
type expireObjInfo struct {
ObjectInfo
ExpireAll bool
DeleteMarkerCount int64
}
// Start the batch expiration job, resumes if there was a pending job via "job.ID"
func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest) error {
ri := &batchJobInfo{
@@ -539,6 +636,15 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
StartTime: job.Started,
}
if err := ri.loadOrInit(ctx, api, job); err != nil {
return batchUnavailable("loading job progress", err)
}
// A completed job is not run again, as replication and key rotation
// jobs are not: its submitter is not checked again either, so a
// credential that expired since cannot turn it into a failed job.
if ri.Complete {
return nil
}
if done, err := ri.startAuthorized(ctx, api, job); done || err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -560,27 +666,47 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
ctx, cancelCause := context.WithCancelCause(ctx)
defer cancelCause(nil)
// refuse ends the job for its submitter: record why before stopping.
refuse := func(err error) {
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
ri.pause(err)
} else {
ri.refuse(err)
}
cancelCause(err)
}
// The walk stops at a listing failure: work after it is left to a later
// run, so the cursor cannot move past what was not listed.
walkCtx, stopWalk := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer stopWalk()
results := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], workerSize)
go func() {
prefixes := r.Prefix.F()
if len(prefixes) == 0 {
prefixes = []string{""}
}
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
// One ascending walk over disjoint prefixes, which the cursor
// describes.
for _, prefix := range batchCanonicalPrefixes(r.Prefix.F()) {
if walkCtx.Err() != nil {
break
}
prefixResultCh := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], workerSize)
err := api.Walk(ctx, r.Bucket, prefix, prefixResultCh, WalkOptions{
err := api.Walk(walkCtx, r.Bucket, prefix, prefixResultCh, WalkOptions{
Marker: lastObject,
LatestOnly: false, // we need to visit all versions of the object to implement purge: retainVersions
VersionsSort: WalkVersionsSortDesc,
})
if err != nil {
cancelCause(err)
if walkCtx.Err() == nil {
cancelCause(batchListingError(err))
}
xioutil.SafeClose(results)
return
}
for result := range prefixResultCh {
results <- result
select {
case results <- result:
case <-walkCtx.Done():
// Stopped: let the walk end without a reader.
}
}
}
xioutil.SafeClose(results)
@@ -588,7 +714,9 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
// Goroutine to periodically save batch-expire job's in-memory state
saverQuitCh := make(chan struct{})
saverDoneCh := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(saverDoneCh)
saveTicker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Second)
defer saveTicker.Stop()
quit := false
@@ -615,9 +743,10 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
expireCh := make(chan []expireObjInfo, workerSize)
expireDoneCh := make(chan struct{})
var walkDone atomic.Bool
go func() {
defer close(expireDoneCh)
batchObjsForDelete(ctx, r, ri, job, api, wk, expireCh)
batchObjsForDelete(ctx, refuse, walkDone.Load, r, ri, job, api, wk, expireCh)
}()
var (
@@ -629,6 +758,8 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
done bool
)
deleteMarkerCountMap := map[string]int64{}
// pushToExpire is called between keys only, so that a batch holds all
// the versions of its keys and its last key is done with it.
pushToExpire := func() {
// set preObject deleteMarkerCount
if len(toDel) > 0 {
@@ -653,6 +784,7 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
}
}
}
var listingErr error
for {
select {
case result, ok := <-results:
@@ -662,7 +794,14 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
}
if result.Err != nil {
failed = true
listingErr = batchListingError(result.Err)
batchLogIf(ctx, result.Err)
stopWalk()
done = true
break
}
if !batchResumeAfter(lastObject, result.Item.Name) {
// Completed by the run that set the cursor.
continue
}
if result.Item.DeleteMarker {
@@ -720,7 +859,6 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
toDel = append(toDel, expireObjInfo{
ObjectInfo: result.Item,
})
pushToExpire()
case <-ctx.Done():
done = true
}
@@ -729,16 +867,15 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
}
}
if context.Cause(ctx) != nil {
xioutil.SafeClose(expireCh)
return context.Cause(ctx)
}
pushToExpire()
// Send any remaining objects downstream
if len(toDel) > 0 {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case expireCh <- toDel:
if context.Cause(ctx) == nil {
walkDone.Store(!failed)
pushToExpire()
// Send any remaining objects downstream
if len(toDel) > 0 {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
case expireCh <- toDel:
}
}
}
xioutil.SafeClose(expireCh)
@@ -746,13 +883,40 @@ func (r *BatchJobExpire) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJo
<-expireDoneCh // waits for the expire goroutine to complete
wk.Wait() // waits for all expire workers to retire
ri.Complete = !failed && ri.ObjectsFailed == 0
ri.Failed = failed || ri.ObjectsFailed > 0
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
// Close the saverQuitCh - this also triggers saving in-memory state
// immediately one last time before we exit this method.
// Persist the final state once the saver has stopped, so that its last
// save cannot overwrite it.
xioutil.SafeClose(saverQuitCh)
<-saverDoneCh
refused := ri.refused()
cause := context.Cause(ctx)
if cause == nil {
cause = listingErr
}
if cause != nil && !refused {
if isBatchJobUnavailable(cause) {
return ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, cause)
}
if isErrBucketNotFound(cause) {
ri.mu.Lock()
ri.Failed = true
ri.mu.Unlock()
}
saveCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(GlobalContext, 30*time.Second)
batchLogIf(saveCtx, ri.updateAfter(saveCtx, api, 0, job))
cancel()
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
return cause
}
ri.mu.Lock()
itemsFailed := ri.expireFailures()
ri.Complete = !refused && !failed && !itemsFailed
ri.Failed = refused || failed || itemsFailed
ri.mu.Unlock()
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
saveCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(GlobalContext, 30*time.Second)
batchLogIf(saveCtx, ri.updateAfter(saveCtx, api, 0, job))
cancel()
// Notify expire jobs final status to the configured endpoint
buf, _ := json.Marshal(ri)
+633 -182
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+178 -9
View File
@@ -179,6 +179,24 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
return
}
}
case "Submitter":
if dc.IsNil() {
err = dc.ReadNil()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
z.Submitter = nil
} else {
if z.Submitter == nil {
z.Submitter = new(batchJobSubmitter)
}
err = z.Submitter.DecodeMsg(dc)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
@@ -192,9 +210,9 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
// EncodeMsg implements msgp.Encodable
func (z *BatchJobRequest) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
// map header, size 6
// map header, size 7
// write "ID"
err = en.Append(0x86, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
err = en.Append(0x87, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
if err != nil {
return
}
@@ -274,15 +292,32 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
return
}
}
// write "Submitter"
err = en.Append(0xa9, 0x53, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
if z.Submitter == nil {
err = en.WriteNil()
if err != nil {
return
}
} else {
err = z.Submitter.EncodeMsg(en)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
return
}
// MarshalMsg implements msgp.Marshaler
func (z *BatchJobRequest) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
o = msgp.Require(b, z.Msgsize())
// map header, size 6
// map header, size 7
// string "ID"
o = append(o, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
o = append(o, 0x87, 0xa2, 0x49, 0x44)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.ID)
// string "User"
o = append(o, 0xa4, 0x55, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72)
@@ -323,6 +358,17 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
return
}
}
// string "Submitter"
o = append(o, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72)
if z.Submitter == nil {
o = msgp.AppendNil(o)
} else {
o, err = z.Submitter.MarshalMsg(o)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
return
}
@@ -413,6 +459,23 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
return
}
}
case "Submitter":
if msgp.IsNil(bts) {
bts, err = msgp.ReadNilBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
return
}
z.Submitter = nil
} else {
if z.Submitter == nil {
z.Submitter = new(batchJobSubmitter)
}
bts, err = z.Submitter.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Submitter")
return
}
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
@@ -445,6 +508,12 @@ func (z *BatchJobRequest) Msgsize() (s int) {
} else {
s += z.Expire.Msgsize()
}
s += 10
if z.Submitter == nil {
s += msgp.NilSize
} else {
s += z.Submitter.Msgsize()
}
return
}
@@ -568,6 +637,30 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "BytesFailed")
return
}
case "vsl":
z.VersionsSkippedLocked, err = dc.ReadInt64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "VersionsSkippedLocked")
return
}
case "kr":
z.KeysRefused, err = dc.ReadInt64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "KeysRefused")
return
}
case "fr":
z.FailureReason, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "FailureReason")
return
}
case "pr":
z.PausedReason, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "PausedReason")
return
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
@@ -581,9 +674,9 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
// EncodeMsg implements msgp.Encodable
func (z *batchJobInfo) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
// map header, size 17
// map header, size 21
// write "v"
err = en.Append(0xde, 0x0, 0x11, 0xa1, 0x76)
err = en.Append(0xde, 0x0, 0x15, 0xa1, 0x76)
if err != nil {
return
}
@@ -752,15 +845,55 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "BytesFailed")
return
}
// write "vsl"
err = en.Append(0xa3, 0x76, 0x73, 0x6c)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteInt64(z.VersionsSkippedLocked)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "VersionsSkippedLocked")
return
}
// write "kr"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x6b, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteInt64(z.KeysRefused)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "KeysRefused")
return
}
// write "fr"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x66, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.FailureReason)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "FailureReason")
return
}
// write "pr"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x70, 0x72)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteString(z.PausedReason)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "PausedReason")
return
}
return
}
// MarshalMsg implements msgp.Marshaler
func (z *batchJobInfo) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
o = msgp.Require(b, z.Msgsize())
// map header, size 17
// map header, size 21
// string "v"
o = append(o, 0xde, 0x0, 0x11, 0xa1, 0x76)
o = append(o, 0xde, 0x0, 0x15, 0xa1, 0x76)
o = msgp.AppendInt(o, z.Version)
// string "jid"
o = append(o, 0xa3, 0x6a, 0x69, 0x64)
@@ -810,6 +943,18 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
// string "bf"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x62, 0x66)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.BytesFailed)
// string "vsl"
o = append(o, 0xa3, 0x76, 0x73, 0x6c)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.VersionsSkippedLocked)
// string "kr"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x6b, 0x72)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.KeysRefused)
// string "fr"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x66, 0x72)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.FailureReason)
// string "pr"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x70, 0x72)
o = msgp.AppendString(o, z.PausedReason)
return
}
@@ -933,6 +1078,30 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "BytesFailed")
return
}
case "vsl":
z.VersionsSkippedLocked, bts, err = msgp.ReadInt64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "VersionsSkippedLocked")
return
}
case "kr":
z.KeysRefused, bts, err = msgp.ReadInt64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "KeysRefused")
return
}
case "fr":
z.FailureReason, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "FailureReason")
return
}
case "pr":
z.PausedReason, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "PausedReason")
return
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
@@ -947,6 +1116,6 @@ func (z *batchJobInfo) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *batchJobInfo) Msgsize() (s int) {
s = 3 + 2 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobID) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobType) + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Bucket) + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Object) + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size
s = 3 + 2 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobID) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.JobType) + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.TimeSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 4 + msgp.BoolSize + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Bucket) + 5 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.Object) + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.FailureReason) + 3 + msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(z.PausedReason)
return
}
+479
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/amztime"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/crypto"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
var batchLockKinds = []string{"COMPLIANCE", "GOVERNANCE", "LEGALHOLD"}
func batchLockMeta(kind string) map[string]string {
m := map[string]string{}
switch kind {
case "COMPLIANCE", "GOVERNANCE":
m[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode)] = kind
m[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate)] = amztime.ISO8601Format(UTCNow().Add(24 * time.Hour))
case "LEGALHOLD":
m[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold)] = "ON"
}
return m
}
func batchPutVersion(t *testing.T, obj ObjectLayer, bucket, key string, meta map[string]string) ObjectInfo {
t.Helper()
data := []byte("batch lock " + key)
oi, err := obj.PutObject(t.Context(), bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""),
ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, UserDefined: meta})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return oi
}
func batchVersionExists(t *testing.T, obj ObjectLayer, bucket, key, versionID string) bool {
t.Helper()
_, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID})
switch {
case err == nil:
return true
case isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isErrObjectNotFound(err):
return false
}
t.Fatal(err)
return false
}
// batchJobStatusJSON returns the status response of a job as decoded JSON.
func batchJobStatusJSON(t *testing.T, jobID string) map[string]any {
t.Helper()
cred := globalActiveCred
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/minio/admin/v3/status-job?jobId="+jobID, 0, nil, cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err = req.ParseForm(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "BatchJobStatus"))
adminAPIHandlers{}.BatchJobStatus(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var out struct{ LastMetric map[string]any }
if err = json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return out.LastMetric
}
// Batch expiration keeps versions under retention or legal hold, on both
// purge paths, and reports them; unlocked versions are still expired.
func TestBatchExpireObjectLock(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
f := &batchAuthzFixture{ctx: t.Context(), obj: obj, bucket: bucket}
batchTestJobPool(t.Context(), t, obj)
type version struct{ key, id string }
var locked, unlocked []version
for _, retain := range []int{0, 1} {
for _, kind := range batchLockKinds {
key := fmt.Sprintf("r%d/%s", retain, kind)
older := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, batchLockMeta(kind))
batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, nil)
locked = append(locked, version{key, older.VersionID})
}
key := fmt.Sprintf("r%d/plain", retain)
older := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, nil)
batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, nil)
unlocked = append(unlocked, version{key, older.VersionID})
}
var jobs []*BatchJobRequest
for _, retain := range []int{0, 1} {
job := fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: r%d/
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: %d
`, bucket, retain, retain)
rec, queued := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, job)
if queued == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: submission status %d: %s", instance, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
// Running a job again, as a resumed job does, must not count
// the versions it left a second time.
f.run(t, queued)
f.run(t, queued)
jobs = append(jobs, queued)
}
for _, v := range locked {
if !batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, v.key, v.id) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: locked version %s was expired", instance, v.key, v.id)
}
}
for _, v := range unlocked {
if batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, v.key, v.id) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: control: unlocked version %s was not expired", instance, v.key, v.id)
}
}
for i, field := range []string{"keysRefused", "versionsSkippedLocked"} {
m := batchJobStatusJSON(t, jobs[i].ID)
if got, _ := m[field].(float64); got != float64(len(batchLockKinds)) {
t.Errorf("%s: retain %d: %s = %v, want %d", instance, i, field, m[field], len(batchLockKinds))
}
if m["complete"] != true || m["failed"] != false {
t.Errorf("%s: retain %d: complete=%v failed=%v", instance, i, m["complete"], m["failed"])
}
}
},
})
}
type batchLockTransport func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f batchLockTransport) RoundTrip(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return f(r) }
// batchLockRemote is a source that serves replacement for every read.
func batchLockRemote(t *testing.T, replacement string) *minio.Core {
t.Helper()
core, err := minio.NewCore("source.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("batch-access", "batch-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{
"Content-Length": []string{strconv.Itoa(len(replacement))},
"Last-Modified": []string{UTCNow().Format(http.TimeFormat)},
"Etag": []string{"\"batchetag\""},
}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(replacement)), ContentLength: int64(len(replacement)), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return core
}
func batchRootSubmitter(t *testing.T) *batchJobSubmitter {
t.Helper()
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(globalActiveCred)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return sub
}
// A pull leaves a destination version under Object Lock as it is, whether a
// single PUT, a multipart completion or a delete marker would replace it.
func TestBatchPullObjectLock(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
const replacement = "replacement from remote"
core := batchLockRemote(t, replacement)
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote-bucket"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
}
for _, kind := range batchLockKinds {
for _, path := range []string{"put", "multipart", "marker", "directory"} {
key := "pull/" + kind + "/" + path
if path == "directory" {
key += "/"
}
before := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, key, batchLockMeta(kind))
src := ObjectInfo{Name: key, VersionID: before.VersionID, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: map[string]string{}}
switch path {
case "multipart":
src.ETag = "batchetag-1"
case "marker":
src.DeleteMarker = true
}
err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, src, false, sub)
if !isErrObjectLocked(err) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: pull returned %v, want ObjectLocked", instance, key, err)
}
after, gerr := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
if gerr != nil {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: locked version lost: %v", instance, key, gerr)
continue
}
if !enforceRetentionForDeletion(t.Context(), after) || after.ETag != before.ETag {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: locked version was replaced", instance, key)
}
}
}
// Controls: a new version, and a new delete marker that hides a
// locked version without replacing it.
locked := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, "pull/new", batchLockMeta("COMPLIANCE"))
newVersion := mustGetUUID()
if err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/new", VersionID: newVersion, ModTime: UTCNow(), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: map[string]string{},
}, false, sub); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: new version: %v", instance, err)
}
if got := readCopyChecksumObject(t, obj, bucket, "pull/new", ObjectOptions{VersionID: newVersion}); string(got) != replacement {
t.Errorf("%s: new version content %q", instance, got)
}
marker := mustGetUUID()
if err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, ObjectInfo{
Name: "pull/new", VersionID: marker, ModTime: UTCNow(), DeleteMarker: true,
}, false, sub); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: new marker: %v", instance, err)
}
if !batchVersionExists(t, obj, bucket, "pull/new", locked.VersionID) {
t.Errorf("%s: a new marker removed a locked version", instance)
}
},
})
}
// A pull applies retention as a PUT to the destination would: copied
// retention is validated, and a version without one gets the bucket default.
func TestBatchPullRetentionMetadata(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
meta.ObjectLockConfigXML = []byte(`<ObjectLockConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><ObjectLockEnabled>Enabled</ObjectLockEnabled><Rule><DefaultRetention><Mode>GOVERNANCE</Mode><Days>1</Days></DefaultRetention></Rule></ObjectLockConfiguration>`)
meta.VersioningConfigXML = enabledBucketVersioningConfig
if err = meta.parseAllConfigs(t.Context(), obj); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, meta)
core := batchLockRemote(t, "retention content")
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote-bucket"},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
}
pull := func(key string, meta map[string]string) (ObjectInfo, error) {
vid := mustGetUUID()
err := job.ReplicateFromSource(t.Context(), obj, core, ObjectInfo{Name: key, VersionID: vid, ModTime: UTCNow().Add(-time.Hour), ETag: "batchetag", UserDefined: meta}, false, sub)
if err != nil {
return ObjectInfo{}, err
}
return obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: vid})
}
oi, err := pull("retention/default", map[string]string{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ret := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(oi.UserDefined)
if ret.Mode != objectlock.RetGovernance || !ret.RetainUntilDate.After(UTCNow().Add(23*time.Hour)) {
t.Errorf("%s: default retention not applied with the destination's time: %+v", instance, ret)
}
until := UTCNow().Add(48 * time.Hour)
oi, err = pull("retention/copied", map[string]string{
xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode: "COMPLIANCE", xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate: amztime.ISO8601Format(until),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if ret = objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(oi.UserDefined); ret.Mode != objectlock.RetCompliance || !ret.RetainUntilDate.Equal(until.Truncate(time.Millisecond)) {
t.Errorf("%s: copied retention: %+v", instance, ret)
}
if _, err = pull("retention/invalid", map[string]string{xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode: "FOREVER", xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate: amztime.ISO8601Format(until)}); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%s: invalid copied retention was accepted", instance)
}
},
})
}
// Key rotation does not rewrite a version under Object Lock.
func TestBatchKeyRotationObjectLock(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject", "GetObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
oldKMS := GlobalKMS
GlobalKMS = kms.NewStub("batch-lock-key")
defer func() { GlobalKMS = oldKMS }()
sub := batchRootSubmitter(t)
job := BatchJobKeyRotateV1{Bucket: bucket, Encryption: BatchJobKeyRotateEncryption{Type: sses3}}
for _, kind := range append([]string{"none"}, batchLockKinds...) {
key := "rotate/" + kind
headers := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption: xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES}
switch kind {
case "COMPLIANCE", "GOVERNANCE":
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockMode] = kind
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate] = UTCNow().Add(24 * time.Hour).Format(time.RFC3339)
case "LEGALHOLD":
headers[xhttp.AmzObjectLockLegalHold] = "ON"
}
putCopyChecksumSource(t, router, cred, bucket, key, []byte("rotate "+kind), headers)
before, err := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
if err != nil || !crypto.S3.IsEncrypted(before.UserDefined) {
t.Fatalf("%s: %s: encrypted control: %v", instance, key, err)
}
err = job.KeyRotate(t.Context(), obj, before, sub)
after, gerr := obj.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: before.VersionID})
if gerr != nil {
t.Fatal(gerr)
}
if kind == "none" {
if err != nil || after.ModTime.Equal(before.ModTime) {
t.Errorf("%s: control: unlocked version not rotated: %v", instance, err)
}
continue
}
var locked ObjectLocked
if !errors.As(err, &locked) || !after.ModTime.Equal(before.ModTime) {
t.Errorf("%s: %s: rotation of a locked version returned %v; rewritten=%v", instance, key, err, !after.ModTime.Equal(before.ModTime))
}
}
},
})
}
// A push reads locked versions as any authorized read does, and a submitter
// that may not read a version does not send it.
func TestBatchPushReads(t *testing.T) {
ExecObjectLayerAPITest(ExecObjectLayerAPITestArgs{
t: t, endpoints: []string{"PutObject"},
objAPITest: func(obj ObjectLayer, instance, bucket string, router http.Handler, cred auth.Credentials, t *testing.T) {
defer r5Capacity(obj.(*erasureServerPools))()
enableBucketObjectLock(t, bucket)
var puts []string
target, err := minio.NewCore("target.invalid", &minio.Options{
Region: "us-east-1", Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4("batch-access", "batch-secret", ""),
Transport: batchLockTransport(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if r.Body != nil {
io.Copy(io.Discard, r.Body)
r.Body.Close()
}
if r.Method == http.MethodPut {
puts = append(puts, r.URL.Path)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Header: http.Header{"Etag": []string{"\"pushetag\""}}, Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")), Request: r}, nil
}),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
job := BatchJobReplicateV1{
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: bucket},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Type: BatchJobReplicateResourceMinIO, Bucket: "remote-bucket"},
}
src := batchPutVersion(t, obj, bucket, "push/locked", batchLockMeta("COMPLIANCE"))
if err := job.ReplicateToTarget(t.Context(), obj, target, src, false, batchRootSubmitter(t)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: authorized push of a locked version: %v", instance, err)
}
if len(puts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s: authorized push sent %d writes", instance, len(puts))
}
// A user that may list but not read.
p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:StartBatchJob"]},{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ListBucket","s3:ListBucketVersions"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::` + bucket + `"]}]}`))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = globalIAMSys.SetPolicy(t.Context(), "batch-list-only", *p); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
user := auth.Credentials{AccessKey: "batch-list-user", SecretKey: "batch-list-user-secret"}
if _, err = globalIAMSys.CreateUser(t.Context(), user.AccessKey, madmin.AddOrUpdateUserReq{SecretKey: user.SecretKey, Status: madmin.AccountEnabled}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err = globalIAMSys.PolicyDBSet(t.Context(), user.AccessKey, "batch-list-only", regUser, false); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(globalIAMSysUser(t, user.AccessKey))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = job.ReplicateToTarget(t.Context(), obj, target, src, false, sub)
if !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || len(puts) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%s: unauthorized push returned %v and sent %d writes", instance, err, len(puts)-1)
}
},
})
}
// globalIAMSysUser returns the stored credential of accessKey, as a request
// authenticated with it has.
func globalIAMSysUser(t *testing.T, accessKey string) auth.Credentials {
t.Helper()
u, ok := globalIAMSys.store.GetUser(accessKey)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("no user %s", accessKey)
}
return u.Credentials
}
// The cursor of a walk done out of order moves only past keys whose items
// are all done, and counts each item once.
func TestBatchProgressCursor(t *testing.T) {
ri := &batchJobInfo{}
p := newBatchProgress(ri, "bucket")
items := []string{"a", "a", "b", "c", "c"}
seqs := make([]uint64, len(items))
for i := range items {
seqs[i] = p.begin()
}
skip := batchCounts{versionsSkipped: 1}
p.done(seqs[1], "a", skip)
p.done(seqs[3], "c", skip)
if ri.Object != "" || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 0 {
t.Fatalf("cursor moved before the first item: %q %d", ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
p.done(seqs[0], "a", skip)
p.done(seqs[2], "b", skip)
// a is done; b is done but c may still have items.
if ri.Object != "b" && ri.Object != "a" {
t.Fatalf("cursor %q", ri.Object)
}
if ri.Object == "a" && ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 2 {
t.Fatalf("counts %d at cursor a", ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
// c's last item never finishes, as when a run stops: the cursor stays
// before c and c is not counted.
p.finish()
if ri.Object != "b" || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 3 {
t.Fatalf("interrupted: cursor %q counts %d, want b 3", ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
p.done(seqs[4], "c", skip)
p.finish()
if ri.Object != "c" || ri.VersionsSkippedLocked != 5 {
t.Fatalf("finished: cursor %q counts %d, want c 5", ri.Object, ri.VersionsSkippedLocked)
}
}
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
)
// batchCounts are outcomes of a batch job that a later run of the job would
// see again, and so must be persisted together with the cursor of the walk.
type batchCounts struct {
objects int64
objectsFailed int64
deleteMarkersFailed int64
versionsSkipped int64
keysRefused int64
}
func (c *batchCounts) add(o batchCounts) {
c.objects += o.objects
c.objectsFailed += o.objectsFailed
c.deleteMarkersFailed += o.deleteMarkersFailed
c.versionsSkipped += o.versionsSkipped
c.keysRefused += o.keysRefused
}
//msgp:ignore batchProgress batchProgressItem batchCounts
// batchProgress is the cursor of a walk whose items are done concurrently.
//
// The items of a walk are numbered in walk order. A key is done when every
// item of it, and every item before it, is done; only then does the cursor
// move past it and its counts become part of the job's counts. The cursor and
// the counts are persisted together, so a job resumed after the cursor
// neither skips an item that was not done nor counts an item twice.
type batchProgress struct {
mu sync.Mutex
ri *batchJobInfo
bucket string
issued uint64
next uint64
pending map[uint64]batchProgressItem
// key is the key of the item last committed, and held are the counts of
// its items so far.
key string
held batchCounts
}
type batchProgressItem struct {
key string
counts batchCounts
}
func newBatchProgress(ri *batchJobInfo, bucket string) *batchProgress {
return &batchProgress{ri: ri, bucket: bucket, pending: make(map[uint64]batchProgressItem)}
}
// begin numbers the next item of the walk.
func (p *batchProgress) begin() uint64 {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
seq := p.issued
p.issued++
return seq
}
// done records item seq, of key, as done with counts.
func (p *batchProgress) done(seq uint64, key string, counts batchCounts) {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
p.pending[seq] = batchProgressItem{key: key, counts: counts}
for {
item, ok := p.pending[p.next]
if !ok {
return
}
delete(p.pending, p.next)
p.next++
if item.key != p.key {
p.commitLocked()
p.key = item.key
}
p.held.add(item.counts)
}
}
// finish commits the last key if every item of the walk is done. Call it
// once no item is in progress.
func (p *batchProgress) finish() {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if p.next == p.issued {
p.commitLocked()
}
}
func (p *batchProgress) commitLocked() {
if p.key == "" {
return
}
ri := p.ri
ri.mu.Lock()
ri.Bucket = p.bucket
ri.Object = p.key
ri.Objects += p.held.objects
ri.ObjectsFailed += p.held.objectsFailed
ri.DeleteMarkersFailed += p.held.deleteMarkersFailed
ri.VersionsSkippedLocked += p.held.versionsSkipped
ri.KeysRefused += p.held.keysRefused
ri.mu.Unlock()
p.held = batchCounts{}
}
// countRemoved counts versions a job removed. A removed version is gone for
// any later run, so it is counted at once, not at the cursor.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) countRemoved(bucket string, objects, markers int64) {
ri.mu.Lock()
defer ri.mu.Unlock()
ri.Bucket = bucket
ri.Objects += objects
ri.DeleteMarkers += markers
}
// countSkipped counts a version a job left in place because Object Lock
// protects it, for a job that is counted per run rather than at a cursor.
func (ri *batchJobInfo) countSkipped() {
ri.mu.Lock()
defer ri.mu.Unlock()
ri.VersionsSkippedLocked++
}
// batchCanonicalPrefixes orders the prefixes of a walk and drops a prefix
// that another one covers. The keys of the walk are then visited once each,
// in one ascending order, which a single cursor can describe.
func batchCanonicalPrefixes(prefixes []string) []string {
if len(prefixes) == 0 {
return []string{""}
}
sorted := slices.Clone(prefixes)
slices.Sort(sorted)
out := sorted[:0]
for _, p := range sorted {
if len(out) > 0 && strings.HasPrefix(p, out[len(out)-1]) {
continue
}
out = append(out, p)
}
return out
}
// batchResumeAfter reports whether a resumed walk returned a key after the
// cursor. The cursor key is done; the walk forwards conservatively and
// returns it again. Keys compare as the walk orders them, by name, so a
// directory object comes before the keys under it.
func batchResumeAfter(cursor, name string) bool {
return cursor == "" || name > cursor
}
// batchJobStatus is the status response: madmin.BatchJobStatus with the
// fields this server adds. The added fields are additive; a client that does
// not know them ignores them.
type batchJobStatus struct {
LastMetric batchJobStatusMetric
}
type batchJobStatusMetric struct {
madmin.JobMetric
VersionsSkippedLocked int64 `json:"versionsSkippedLocked,omitempty"`
KeysRefused int64 `json:"keysRefused,omitempty"`
FailureReason string `json:"failureReason,omitempty"`
PausedReason string `json:"pausedReason,omitempty"`
}
func (ri *batchJobInfo) statusMetric() batchJobStatusMetric {
ri.mu.RLock()
defer ri.mu.RUnlock()
return batchJobStatusMetric{
JobMetric: ri.metric(),
VersionsSkippedLocked: ri.VersionsSkippedLocked,
KeysRefused: ri.KeysRefused,
FailureReason: ri.FailureReason,
PausedReason: ri.PausedReason,
}
}
+225
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
)
// An unavailable dependency is not an authorization decision. It stops the
// current attempt without turning an outage into either an allow or a denial.
type batchJobUnavailableError struct {
reason string
err error
}
func (e batchJobUnavailableError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("%s: %v", e.reason, e.err) }
func (e batchJobUnavailableError) Unwrap() error { return e.err }
func batchUnavailable(reason string, err error) error {
if err == nil {
return nil
}
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
return err
}
return batchJobUnavailableError{reason: reason, err: err}
}
func isBatchJobUnavailable(err error) bool { var e batchJobUnavailableError; return errors.As(err, &e) }
func isBatchJobStopped(err error) bool {
return isBatchJobAuthzError(err) || isBatchJobUnavailable(err)
}
func batchListingError(err error) error {
if isErrBucketNotFound(err) {
return err
}
return batchUnavailable("object listing unavailable", err)
}
func (ri *batchJobInfo) pause(err error) {
ri.mu.Lock()
defer ri.mu.Unlock()
// A concurrent explicit denial wins over a transient worker error.
if ri.FailureReason != "" {
return
}
ri.Complete, ri.Failed = false, false
ri.PausedReason = err.Error()
}
func (ri *batchJobInfo) savePaused(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job BatchJobRequest, err error) error {
ri.pause(err)
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
saveCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if saveErr := ri.updateAfter(saveCtx, api, 0, job); saveErr != nil {
return batchUnavailable("saving paused job", errors.Join(err, saveErr))
}
return err
}
// Authenticate the HTTP request normally, but keep dependency errors through
// the authorization step so submission returns 503, not a permanent 403.
func validateBatchJobAdminReq(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (ObjectLayer, auth.Credentials) {
api := newObjectLayerFn()
if api == nil || globalNotificationSys == nil || !batchIAMReady() {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrServerNotInitialized), r.URL)
return nil, auth.Credentials{}
}
cred, owner, code := validateAdminSignature(ctx, r, "")
if code != ErrNone {
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(code), r.URL)
return nil, cred
}
submitter, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
if err == nil {
var principal batchJobPrincipal
principal, err = submitter.principal(ctx)
if err == nil {
err = principal.authorizeArgs(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey, Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: policy.Action(policy.StartBatchJobAction), ConditionValues: getConditionValues(r, "", cred), IsOwner: owner, Claims: principal.claims,
}, nil)
}
}
if err != nil {
apiErr := errorCodes.ToAPIErrWithErr(ErrAccessDenied, err)
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
apiErr = batchServiceUnavailable(err)
}
writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, apiErr, r.URL)
return nil, cred
}
return api, cred
}
// One owner record spans queued, running and paused attempts. The request
// pointer is the generation token. Canceled records fence stale requests until
// shutdown. Terminal records fence discovery until the startup scan finishes,
// including jobs submitted and terminated while the scan was unavailable.
type batchJobOwner struct {
req *BatchJobRequest
cancel context.CancelFunc
state string
retries uint
due time.Time
}
func (j *BatchJobPool) beginJob(job *BatchJobRequest) bool {
j.jmu.Lock()
defer j.jmu.Unlock()
o := j.jobOwners[job.ID]
if o == nil || o.req != job || o.state != "queued" || job.ctx.Err() != nil || j.ctx.Err() != nil {
return false
}
o.state = "running"
return true
}
func (j *BatchJobPool) finishJob(job *BatchJobRequest, err error) {
j.jmu.Lock()
defer j.jmu.Unlock()
o := j.jobOwners[job.ID]
if o == nil || o.req != job || o.state != "running" {
return
}
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) && job.ctx.Err() == nil && j.ctx.Err() == nil {
o.due = time.Now().Add(batchJobRetryDelay(o.retries))
o.retries++
o.state = "paused"
return
}
o.cancel()
if j.discoveryDone {
delete(j.jobOwners, job.ID)
} else {
j.jobOwners[job.ID] = &batchJobOwner{state: "terminal"}
}
}
// After the only startup discovery has returned, no loaded manifest remains
// to re-admit a terminal job. Release its marker, but keep queued, running,
// paused and canceled ownership intact. New submissions use new job IDs.
func (j *BatchJobPool) finishDiscovery() {
j.jmu.Lock()
defer j.jmu.Unlock()
j.discoveryDone = true
for id, owner := range j.jobOwners {
if owner.state == "terminal" {
delete(j.jobOwners, id)
}
}
}
func batchJobRetryDelay(retries uint) time.Duration {
delay := 30 * time.Second * time.Duration(1<<min(retries, 4))
return delay/2 + time.Duration(rand.Float64()*float64(delay))
}
// retryDue holds the ownership lock across the nonblocking handoff. A fast
// worker cannot replace a pause while the scheduler removes the old pause.
func (j *BatchJobPool) retryDue(now time.Time) {
j.jmu.Lock()
defer j.jmu.Unlock()
if j.ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
for _, o := range j.jobOwners {
if o.state != "paused" || now.Before(o.due) || o.req.ctx.Err() != nil {
continue
}
select {
case j.jobCh <- o.req:
o.state = "queued"
default:
}
}
}
func (j *BatchJobPool) retryLoop() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Second)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-j.ctx.Done():
return
case now := <-ticker.C:
j.retryDue(now)
}
}
}
func batchServiceUnavailable(err error) APIError {
return APIError{Code: "ServiceUnavailable", Description: err.Error(), HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusServiceUnavailable}
}
// initStore precedes the first successful cache load. During that interval a
// missing identity or policy is not a revocation decision, including for root.
func batchIAMReady() bool {
sys := globalIAMSys
if sys == nil {
return false
}
sys.Lock()
defer sys.Unlock()
if sys.store == nil {
return false
}
select {
case <-sys.configLoaded:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
+349
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// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
polplugin "github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/policy/plugin"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/tinylib/msgp/msgp"
)
func waitBatchState(t *testing.T, pool *BatchJobPool, id, state string) {
t.Helper()
timeout := time.NewTimer(10 * time.Second)
defer timeout.Stop()
tick := time.NewTicker(time.Millisecond)
defer tick.Stop()
for {
pool.jmu.Lock()
owner := pool.jobOwners[id]
ready := owner == nil && state == ""
if owner != nil {
ready = owner.state == state
}
pool.jmu.Unlock()
if ready {
return
}
select {
case <-timeout.C:
t.Fatalf("job did not reach %q", state)
case <-tick.C:
}
}
}
func TestBatchPluginPauseRecoversInProcess(t *testing.T) {
for _, midrun := range []bool{false, true} {
t.Run(map[bool]string{false: "before-start", true: "during-delete"}[midrun], func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/key")
var unavailable atomic.Bool
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var request struct {
Input policy.Args `json:"input"`
}
_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&request)
if unavailable.Load() && (!midrun || request.Input.Action == policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction) {
w.WriteHeader(503)
io.WriteString(w, `{"result":true}`)
return
}
io.WriteString(w, `{"result":true}`)
}))
defer server.Close()
url, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(server.URL)
mustIAM(t, err)
previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{URL: url, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { r.Close() }}))
defer setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous)
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, f.expireYAML("data/"))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
pool := globalBatchJobPool
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(f.ctx)
pool.ctx = ctx
// Re-admit the fixture's consumed request with a context owned by this worker.
pool.jmu.Lock()
pool.jobOwners[job.ID].cancel()
delete(pool.jobOwners, job.ID)
pool.jmu.Unlock()
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(job))
unavailable.Store(true)
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() { defer close(done); pool.AddWorker() }()
defer func() { cancel(); <-done }()
waitBatchState(t, pool, job.ID, "paused")
ri := f.jobInfo(t, job)
if ri.Failed || ri.Complete || ri.FailureReason != "" || ri.PausedReason == "" || ri.Object != "" {
t.Fatalf("paused report: %+v", ri)
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/key", older) {
t.Fatal("outage authorized a deletion")
}
unavailable.Store(false)
pool.retryDue(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
waitBatchState(t, pool, job.ID, "terminal")
ri = f.jobInfo(t, job)
if !ri.Complete || ri.Failed || ri.PausedReason != "" || ri.Objects != 1 || f.versionExists(t, "data/key", older) {
t.Fatalf("resumed report: %+v", ri)
}
})
}
}
func TestBatchSubmissionUnavailableIs503(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(503); io.WriteString(w, `{"result":true}`) }))
defer server.Close()
url, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(server.URL)
mustIAM(t, err)
previous := newGlobalAuthZPluginFn()
setGlobalAuthZPlugin(polplugin.New(polplugin.Args{URL: url, CloseRespFn: func(r io.ReadCloser) { r.Close() }}))
defer setGlobalAuthZPlugin(previous)
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, f.expireYAML("data/"))
if rec.Code != 503 || job != nil {
t.Fatalf("outage submission: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
}
func TestBatchPoolOwnershipAndCancellation(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: ctx, jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 1)}
first, second := &BatchJobRequest{ID: "first"}, &BatchJobRequest{ID: "second"}
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(first))
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(second))
if pool.jobOwners[second.ID].state != "paused" {
t.Fatal("full queue lost pending owner")
}
original := second.ctx
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for range 8 {
wg.Go(func() {
if err := pool.queueJob(&BatchJobRequest{ID: "second"}); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
}
})
}
wg.Wait()
if second.ctx != original || len(pool.jobCh) != 1 {
t.Fatal("duplicate changed ownership")
}
if !pool.beginJob(<-pool.jobCh) {
t.Fatal("first not owned")
}
pool.finishJob(first, nil)
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(&BatchJobRequest{ID: first.ID}))
if len(pool.jobCh) != 0 {
t.Fatal("late discovery re-admitted a terminal job")
}
pool.retryDue(time.Now())
next := <-pool.jobCh
if next != second || !pool.beginJob(next) {
t.Fatal("pending handoff lost ownership")
}
for range 2 {
pool.finishJob(second, batchUnavailable("test", errors.New("outage")))
pool.retryDue(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
if !pool.beginJob(<-pool.jobCh) {
t.Fatal("retry lost owner")
}
}
if pool.jobOwners[second.ID].retries != 2 {
t.Fatal("retry count reset during handoff")
}
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler(second.ID, true))
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler(second.ID, true))
pool.finishJob(second, batchUnavailable("late", errors.New("outage")))
pool.retryDue(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
if len(pool.jobCh) != 0 || second.ctx.Err() == nil {
t.Fatal("cancel lost to retry")
}
if err := pool.queueJob(&BatchJobRequest{ID: second.ID}); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("stale admission: %v", err)
}
// A cancellation before this node admitted a manifest is a tombstone too.
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler("not-loaded", true))
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler("not-loaded", true))
if err := pool.queueJob(&BatchJobRequest{ID: "not-loaded"}); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("stale resume: %v", err)
}
cancel()
if err := pool.queueJob(&BatchJobRequest{ID: "shutdown"}); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("shutdown admission: %v", err)
}
pool.retryDue(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)) // channel remains open; no send/close race.
}
// A cancellation of a job this node does not own leaves a record only while
// startup discovery may still admit its manifest. Once discovery has
// finished, canceling unknown IDs must not grow the ownership table.
func TestBatchCancelUnknownJobAfterDiscovery(t *testing.T) {
pool := &BatchJobPool{ctx: t.Context(), jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 1)}
// Before discovery finished, the record fences the manifest it may admit.
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler("expire-before-discovery", true))
if err := pool.queueJob(&BatchJobRequest{ID: "expire-before-discovery"}); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("admission of a job canceled during discovery: %v", err)
}
pool.finishDiscovery()
for i := range 1000 {
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler(fmt.Sprintf("expire-unknown-%d", i), true))
}
pool.jmu.Lock()
owners := len(pool.jobOwners)
pool.jmu.Unlock()
if owners != 1 {
t.Fatalf("%d owner records after canceling unknown jobs, want only the record from discovery", owners)
}
// An owned job is still canceled and fenced.
job := &BatchJobRequest{ID: "expire-owned"}
mustIAM(t, pool.queueJob(job))
mustIAM(t, pool.canceler(job.ID, true))
if job.ctx.Err() == nil {
t.Fatal("cancellation did not stop the owned job")
}
if err := pool.queueJob(&BatchJobRequest{ID: job.ID}); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("stale admission of a canceled job: %v", err)
}
}
type batchPolicyOutage struct {
IAMStorageAPI
failed string
err error
}
func (s *batchPolicyOutage) loadPolicyDoc(ctx context.Context, name string, out map[string]PolicyDoc) error {
if name == s.failed {
return s.err
}
return s.IAMStorageAPI.loadPolicyDoc(ctx, name, out)
}
func TestBatchPolicySnapshotKeepsUnavailableDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "retry-allow", batchAuthzFullAccess)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "retry-deny", `{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "retry-user", "retry-allow,retry-deny")
sub, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(cred)
mustIAM(t, err)
store := f.sys.store
original := store.IAMStorageAPI
defer func() { store.IAMStorageAPI = original }()
cache := store.lock()
delete(cache.iamPolicyDocsMap, "retry-deny")
store.unlock()
store.IAMStorageAPI = &batchPolicyOutage{IAMStorageAPI: original, failed: "retry-deny", err: errErasureReadQuorum}
request := batchAuthzRequest{action: policy.DeleteObjectVersionAction, bucket: f.bucket, object: "key", versionID: mustGetUUID()}
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, request); !isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
t.Fatalf("missing Deny must pause, got %v", err)
}
store.IAMStorageAPI = original
if err := sub.authorize(f.ctx, request); !isBatchJobAuthzError(err) {
t.Fatalf("recovered Deny was not enforced: %v", err)
}
// Root also waits for IAM readiness; startup must not bypass the pause gate.
root, err := newBatchJobSubmitter(globalActiveCred)
mustIAM(t, err)
f.sys.Lock()
f.sys.store = nil
f.sys.Unlock()
_, err = root.principal(f.ctx)
f.sys.Lock()
f.sys.store = store
f.sys.Unlock()
if !isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
t.Fatalf("root before IAM readiness: %v", err)
}
}
func TestBatchPausedReportCompatibility(t *testing.T) {
before := &batchJobInfo{JobID: "paused", Object: "cursor", PausedReason: "IAM unavailable"}
data, err := before.MarshalMsg(nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
var after batchJobInfo
_, err = after.UnmarshalMsg(data)
mustIAM(t, err)
if after.PausedReason != before.PausedReason || after.clone().PausedReason != before.PausedReason || after.statusMetric().PausedReason != before.PausedReason {
t.Fatal("paused reason lost")
}
old := msgp.AppendMapHeader(nil, 2)
old = msgp.AppendString(old, "jid")
old = msgp.AppendString(old, "legacy")
old = msgp.AppendString(old, "cmp")
old = msgp.AppendBool(old, true)
var legacy batchJobInfo
_, err = legacy.UnmarshalMsg(old)
mustIAM(t, err)
if legacy.PausedReason != "" || !legacy.Complete {
t.Fatal("old report decode changed")
}
after.refuse(errBatchJobInvalid)
if after.PausedReason != "" || !after.Failed {
t.Fatal("terminal denial retained pause")
}
}
func TestBatchPersistenceFencesOlderExecutors(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
rec, job := f.submit(t, globalActiveCred, f.expireYAML("data/"))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submit: %d %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
raw, err := readConfig(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job))
mustIAM(t, err)
if !bytes.HasPrefix(raw, []byte(batchJobEnvelope)) {
t.Fatal("new manifest has no executor version fence")
}
var oldDecoder BatchJobRequest
if _, err := oldDecoder.UnmarshalMsg(raw); err == nil {
t.Fatal("old bare-msgpack executor could decode new manifest")
}
var loaded BatchJobRequest
mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
if loaded.Submitter == nil {
t.Fatal("new executor lost submitter")
}
ri := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type()), StartTime: job.Started}
outage := batchUnavailable("test", errErasureReadQuorum)
if err := ri.savePaused(f.ctx, f.obj, *job, outage); !errors.Is(err, outage) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
reportPath, err := job.getJobReportPath()
mustIAM(t, err)
report, err := readConfig(f.ctx, f.obj, reportPath)
mustIAM(t, err)
if binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(report[2:4]) == batchExpireVersionV1 {
t.Fatal("old executor would accept paused report")
}
mustIAM(t, ri.load(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
if ri.PausedReason == "" || ri.Failed {
t.Fatal("restart lost pause")
}
// A stale resume loaded the manifest before cancellation.
mustIAM(t, globalBatchJobPool.canceler(job.ID, true))
mustIAM(t, job.delete(f.ctx, f.obj))
if err := globalBatchJobPool.queueJob(&loaded); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Fatalf("canceled job re-admitted: %v", err)
}
if err := loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)); !errors.Is(err, errNoSuchJob) {
t.Fatalf("canceled manifest recreated: %v", err)
}
}
+239 -54
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ package cmd
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"maps"
"math/rand"
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ import (
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/env"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/workers"
)
@@ -161,8 +163,68 @@ func (r BatchJobKeyRotateV1) Notify(ctx context.Context, ri *batchJobInfo) error
return notifyEndpoint(ctx, ri, r.Flags.Notify.Endpoint, r.Flags.Notify.Token)
}
// KeyRotate rotates encryption key of an object
func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) KeyRotate(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, objInfo ObjectInfo) error {
// batchAuthoritativeVersion returns the version obj as all its copies
// describe it. With several pools a version can have copies in more than one
// pool, and a read returns one of them; the merged copy carries the newest
// Object Lock and tag state. The caller holds the object's write lock.
func batchAuthoritativeVersion(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, bucket, object string, obj ObjectInfo) (ObjectInfo, error) {
z, ok := api.(*erasureServerPools)
if !ok || z.SinglePool() {
return obj, nil
}
versionID := obj.VersionID
if versionID == "" {
versionID = nullVersionID
}
return z.replicaObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, encodeDirObject(object), ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID, NoLock: true, NoAuditLog: true})
}
// batchAuthoritativeRead is batchAuthoritativeVersion for a version that has
// been opened for reading. It takes the object's read lock itself, since an
// opened reader may hold none.
func batchAuthoritativeRead(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, bucket, object string, obj ObjectInfo) (ObjectInfo, error) {
z, ok := api.(*erasureServerPools)
if !ok || z.SinglePool() {
return obj, nil
}
lk := z.NewNSLock(bucket, encodeDirObject(object))
lkctx, err := lk.GetRLock(ctx, globalOperationTimeout)
if err != nil {
return ObjectInfo{}, err
}
defer lk.RUnlock(lkctx)
return batchAuthoritativeVersion(lkctx.Context(), api, bucket, object, obj)
}
// rotateAuthzRequests are the actions of rotating one version: it is read and
// written again in place with the new key.
func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) rotateAuthzRequests(oi ObjectInfo) []batchAuthzRequest {
versionID := oi.VersionID
if versionID == "" {
versionID = nullVersionID
}
// The encryption the rewrite leaves: rotation keeps the kind of the
// version (rotateKey), and SSE-KMS takes the requested key.
values := map[string][]string{}
switch {
case crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(oi.UserDefined):
values[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption)] = []string{xhttp.AmzEncryptionKMS}
if r.Encryption.Type == ssekms && r.Encryption.Key != "" {
values[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryptionKmsID)] = []string{r.Encryption.Key}
}
case crypto.S3.IsEncrypted(oi.UserDefined):
values[strings.ToLower(xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption)] = []string{xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES}
}
return []batchAuthzRequest{
{action: policy.GetObjectAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: oi.Name, versionID: versionID, tags: oi.UserTags},
{action: policy.GetObjectVersionAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: oi.Name, versionID: versionID, tags: oi.UserTags},
{action: policy.PutObjectAction, bucket: r.Bucket, object: oi.Name, versionID: versionID, tags: oi.UserTags, values: values},
}
}
// KeyRotate rotates encryption key of an object. A version that Object Lock
// protects is not rewritten: it returns ObjectLocked.
func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) KeyRotate(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, objInfo ObjectInfo, sub *batchJobSubmitter) error {
srcBucket := r.Bucket
srcObject := objInfo.Name
@@ -180,7 +242,8 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) KeyRotate(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, ob
versioned := globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(srcBucket, srcObject)
versionSuspended := globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(srcBucket, srcObject)
lock := api.NewNSLock(r.Bucket, objInfo.Name)
// Lock the name writers lock: the stored name of a directory object.
lock := api.NewObjectNSLock(r.Bucket, encodeDirObject(objInfo.Name))
lkctx, err := lock.GetLock(ctx, globalOperationTimeout)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -194,10 +257,32 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) KeyRotate(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, ob
VersionSuspended: versionSuspended,
NoLock: true,
}
obj, err := api.GetObjectInfo(ctx, r.Bucket, objInfo.Name, opts)
obj, pool, err := batchRotateRead(ctx, api, r.Bucket, objInfo.Name, opts)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Decide on the version as it is under the lock that the rewrite holds,
// before any key is requested, with the metadata of all its copies.
logical, err := batchAuthoritativeVersion(ctx, api, r.Bucket, objInfo.Name, obj)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if enforceRetentionForDeletion(ctx, logical) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: r.Bucket, Object: obj.Name, VersionID: obj.VersionID}
}
p, err := sub.principal(ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Authorize the copy that is read and rewritten, and the version as all
// its copies describe it.
for _, v := range []ObjectInfo{obj, logical} {
for _, req := range r.rotateAuthzRequests(v) {
if err := p.authorize(req); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
oi := obj.Clone()
var (
newKeyID string
@@ -225,16 +310,61 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) KeyRotate(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, ob
oi.metadataOnly = true
oi.keyRotation = true
maps.Copy(oi.UserDefined, encMetadata)
if _, err := api.CopyObject(ctx, r.Bucket, oi.Name, r.Bucket, oi.Name, oi, ObjectOptions{
VersionID: oi.VersionID,
}, ObjectOptions{
VersionID: oi.VersionID,
NoLock: true,
}); err != nil {
return err
// The rewrite replaces the stored metadata with UserDefined, which a
// read returns without the tags and the expiry: keep them.
if oi.UserTags != "" {
oi.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = oi.UserTags
}
if !oi.Expires.IsZero() {
oi.UserDefined["expires"] = oi.ExpiresStr()
}
srcOpts := ObjectOptions{VersionID: oi.VersionID}
dstOpts := ObjectOptions{VersionID: oi.VersionID, NoLock: true}
if z, ok := api.(*erasureServerPools); ok && pool >= 0 {
// Rewrite the copy that was read and authorized. The pools layer
// would route the rewrite by the latest version of the key, which
// can be in a pool that holds another write of this version ID.
//
// Check the pool's state again where the pools layer checks it,
// right before the write: a move can have started since the read.
if z.IsSuspended(pool) || z.IsPoolRebalancing(pool) {
return errBatchRotateMoving
}
dstOpts.replicaObjectInfo = z.replicaObjectInfo
name := encodeDirObject(oi.Name)
_, err = z.serverPools[pool].CopyObject(ctx, r.Bucket, name, r.Bucket, name, oi, srcOpts, dstOpts)
} else {
_, err = api.CopyObject(ctx, r.Bucket, oi.Name, r.Bucket, oi.Name, oi, srcOpts, dstOpts)
}
return err
}
return nil
// errBatchRotateMoving: the version is read from a pool that a decommission
// or a rebalance is moving.
var errBatchRotateMoving = errors.New("the version is being moved to another pool; rotate it once the move is done")
// batchRotateRead reads the version that a rotation rewrites, as
// GetObjectInfo does. With several pools it also returns the pool of the
// copy it read, otherwise -1. The caller holds the object lock.
//
// A copy in a pool that a decommission or a rebalance is moving is the
// source of that move, which must not change under it, and rewriting a copy
// in another pool would change which copy the version's metadata comes
// from. Such a version is left to a later run (errBatchRotateMoving).
func batchRotateRead(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, bucket, object string, opts ObjectOptions) (ObjectInfo, int, error) {
z, ok := api.(*erasureServerPools)
if !ok || z.SinglePool() {
oi, err := api.GetObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
return oi, -1, err
}
if err := checkGetObjArgs(ctx, bucket, object); err != nil {
return ObjectInfo{}, -1, err
}
oi, idx, err := z.getLatestObjectInfoWithIdx(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
if err == nil && (z.IsSuspended(idx) || z.IsPoolRebalancing(idx)) {
return ObjectInfo{}, -1, errBatchRotateMoving
}
return oi, idx, err
}
const (
@@ -255,11 +385,14 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
StartTime: job.Started,
}
if err := ri.loadOrInit(ctx, api, job); err != nil {
return err
return batchUnavailable("loading job progress", err)
}
if ri.Complete {
return nil
}
if done, err := ri.startAuthorized(ctx, api, job); done || err != nil {
return err
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
lastObject := ri.Object
@@ -273,8 +406,6 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
delay = batchKeyRotateJobDefaultRetryDelay
}
rnd := rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano()))
selectObj := func(info FileInfo) (ok bool) {
if r.Flags.Filter.OlderThan > 0 && time.Since(info.ModTime) < r.Flags.Filter.OlderThan {
// skip all objects that are newer than specified older duration
@@ -355,65 +486,103 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
return err
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
ctx, cancelCause := context.WithCancelCause(ctx)
defer cancelCause(nil)
// refuse ends the job for its submitter: record why before stopping.
refuse := func(err error) {
if isBatchJobUnavailable(err) {
ri.pause(err)
} else {
ri.refuse(err)
}
cancelCause(err)
}
progress := newBatchProgress(ri, r.Bucket)
results := make(chan itemOrErr[ObjectInfo], 100)
if err := api.Walk(ctx, r.Bucket, r.Prefix, results, WalkOptions{
Marker: lastObject,
Filter: selectObj,
}); err != nil {
cancel()
// Do not need to retry if we can't list objects on source.
return err
cause := batchListingError(err)
if isBatchJobUnavailable(cause) {
return ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, cause)
}
return cause
}
failed := false
for res := range results {
if context.Cause(ctx) != nil {
// Refused or canceled: schedule nothing more.
continue
}
if res.Err != nil {
failed = true
cancelCause(batchListingError(res.Err))
batchLogIf(ctx, res.Err)
break
continue
}
result := res.Item
if !batchResumeAfter(lastObject, result.Name) {
// Completed by the run that set the cursor.
continue
}
sseKMS := crypto.S3KMS.IsEncrypted(result.UserDefined)
sseS3 := crypto.S3.IsEncrypted(result.UserDefined)
if !sseKMS && !sseS3 { // neither sse-s3 nor sse-kms disallowed
continue
}
seq := progress.begin()
wk.Take()
go func() {
defer wk.Give()
var counts batchCounts
for attempts := 1; attempts <= retryAttempts; attempts++ {
stopFn := globalBatchJobsMetrics.trace(batchJobMetricKeyRotation, job.ID, attempts)
success := true
if err := r.KeyRotate(ctx, api, result); err != nil {
stopFn(result, err)
batchLogIf(ctx, err)
success = false
if attempts >= retryAttempts {
auditOptions := AuditLogOptions{
Event: "KeyRotate",
APIName: "StartBatchJob",
Bucket: result.Bucket,
Object: result.Name,
VersionID: result.VersionID,
Error: err.Error(),
}
auditLogInternal(ctx, auditOptions)
}
} else {
stopFn(result, nil)
err := r.KeyRotate(ctx, api, result, job.Submitter)
if errors.Is(err, errBatchRotateMoving) {
err = batchUnavailable("object is being moved", err)
}
ri.trackCurrentBucketObject(r.Bucket, result, success, attempts)
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
// persist in-memory state to disk after every 10secs.
batchLogIf(ctx, ri.updateAfter(ctx, api, 10*time.Second, job))
if success {
stopFn(result, err)
if err == nil {
counts.objects = 1
break
}
if isBatchJobStopped(err) {
refuse(err)
return
}
if isErrObjectLocked(err) {
// Left as it is, not retried and not a failure.
counts.versionsSkipped = 1
break
}
if ctx.Err() != nil {
// Not done; a later run rotates it.
return
}
batchLogIf(ctx, err)
if attempts >= retryAttempts {
auditOptions := AuditLogOptions{
Event: "KeyRotate",
APIName: "StartBatchJob",
Bucket: result.Bucket,
Object: result.Name,
VersionID: result.VersionID,
Error: err.Error(),
}
auditLogInternal(ctx, auditOptions)
counts.objectsFailed = 1
break
}
if delay > 0 {
time.Sleep(delay + time.Duration(rnd.Float64()*float64(delay)))
time.Sleep(delay + time.Duration(rand.Float64()*float64(delay)))
}
}
progress.done(seq, result.Name, counts)
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
// persist in-memory state to disk after every 10secs.
batchLogIf(ctx, ri.updateAfter(ctx, api, 10*time.Second, job))
if wait := globalBatchConfig.KeyRotationWait(); wait > 0 {
time.Sleep(wait)
@@ -421,18 +590,34 @@ func (r *BatchJobKeyRotateV1) Start(ctx context.Context, api ObjectLayer, job Ba
}()
}
wk.Wait()
ri.Complete = !failed && ri.ObjectsFailed == 0
ri.Failed = failed || ri.ObjectsFailed > 0
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
// persist in-memory state to disk.
batchLogIf(ctx, ri.updateAfter(ctx, api, 0, job))
if err := r.Notify(ctx, ri); err != nil {
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("unable to notify %v", err))
cause := context.Cause(ctx)
if !failed && cause == nil {
// The walk ended: its last key is done.
progress.finish()
}
if cause != nil && !ri.refused() {
if isBatchJobUnavailable(cause) {
return ri.savePaused(ctx, api, job, cause)
}
// Stopped before the end: keep the work after the cursor pending.
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
batchLogIf(ctx, ri.updateAfter(GlobalContext, api, 0, job))
return cause
}
cancel()
if !ri.refused() {
ri.mu.Lock()
ri.Complete = !failed && ri.ObjectsFailed == 0
ri.Failed = failed || ri.ObjectsFailed > 0
ri.mu.Unlock()
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.save(job.ID, ri)
// persist in-memory state to disk.
batchLogIf(ctx, ri.updateAfter(GlobalContext, api, 0, job))
if err := r.Notify(GlobalContext, ri); err != nil {
batchLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("unable to notify %v", err))
}
return nil
}
+456
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/policy"
"go.yaml.in/yaml/v3"
)
// batchAuthzFixture runs batch jobs submitted through the admin API, one job
// at a time and in the test's goroutine.
type batchAuthzFixture struct {
ctx context.Context
sys *IAMSys
obj ObjectLayer
bucket string
}
func newBatchAuthzFixture(t *testing.T) *batchAuthzFixture {
t.Helper()
ctx, sys := iamAdminFixture(t)
obj := newObjectLayerFn()
batchTestJobPool(ctx, t, obj)
f := &batchAuthzFixture{ctx: ctx, sys: sys, obj: obj, bucket: "batch-authz"}
mustIAM(t, obj.MakeBucket(ctx, f.bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: true}))
_, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Update(ctx, f.bucket, bucketVersioningConfig, enabledBucketVersioningConfig)
mustIAM(t, err)
return f
}
// batchTestJobPool queues submitted jobs without running them.
func batchTestJobPool(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, obj ObjectLayer) {
t.Helper()
prevPool := globalBatchJobPool
globalBatchJobPool = &BatchJobPool{
ctx: ctx,
objLayer: obj,
jobCh: make(chan *BatchJobRequest, 10),
jobOwners: make(map[string]*batchJobOwner),
}
globalBatchJobsMetrics.Lock()
globalBatchJobsMetrics.metrics = make(map[string]*batchJobInfo)
globalBatchJobsMetrics.Unlock()
t.Cleanup(func() { globalBatchJobPool = prevPool })
}
// putVersions writes two versions of key and returns the older one.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) putVersions(t *testing.T, key string) string {
t.Helper()
var older string
for i := range 2 {
data := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("version %d", i))
oi, err := f.obj.PutObject(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, mustGetPutObjReader(t, bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)), "", ""), ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
mustIAM(t, err)
if i == 0 {
older = oi.VersionID
}
}
return older
}
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) versionExists(t *testing.T, key, versionID string) bool {
t.Helper()
_, err := f.obj.GetObjectInfo(f.ctx, f.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID})
if err == nil {
return true
}
if isErrVersionNotFound(err) || isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
return false
}
t.Fatal(err)
return false
}
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) expireYAML(prefix string) string {
return fmt.Sprintf(`expire:
apiVersion: v1
bucket: %s
prefix: %q
rules:
- type: object
purge:
retainVersions: 1
`, f.bucket, prefix)
}
// submit sends a job definition to StartBatchJob as cred. An accepted job is
// returned from the queue, not run.
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) submit(t *testing.T, cred auth.Credentials, job string) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, *BatchJobRequest) {
t.Helper()
headers := map[string]string{}
if cred.IsTemp() && !cred.IsServiceAccount() {
headers["X-Amz-Security-Token"] = cred.SessionToken
}
body := []byte(job)
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/minio/admin/v3/start-job", int64(len(body)), bytes.NewReader(body), cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, headers)
mustIAM(t, err)
mustIAM(t, req.ParseForm())
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "StartBatchJob"))
adminAPIHandlers{}.StartBatchJob(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
return rec, nil
}
select {
case queued := <-globalBatchJobPool.jobCh:
return rec, queued
default:
t.Fatal("accepted job was not queued")
return rec, nil
}
}
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) run(t *testing.T, job *BatchJobRequest) {
t.Helper()
ctx := job.ctx
if ctx == nil {
ctx = f.ctx
}
switch {
case job.Expire != nil:
if err := job.Expire.Start(ctx, f.obj, *job); err != nil {
t.Logf("start: %v", err)
}
default:
t.Fatalf("unexpected job type %s", job.Type())
}
ri := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type())}
if err := ri.load(f.ctx, f.obj, *job); err == nil {
t.Logf("job %s: %+v", job.ID, ri.clone())
}
}
func (f *batchAuthzFixture) jobInfo(t *testing.T, job *BatchJobRequest) *batchJobInfo {
t.Helper()
ri := &batchJobInfo{JobID: job.ID, JobType: string(job.Type())}
mustIAM(t, ri.load(f.ctx, f.obj, *job))
return ri
}
func batchAuthzPolicy(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, sys *IAMSys, name, statements string) {
t.Helper()
p, err := policy.ParseConfig(strings.NewReader(`{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[` + statements + `]}`))
mustIAM(t, err)
_, err = sys.SetPolicy(ctx, name, *p)
mustIAM(t, err)
}
const batchAuthzFullAccess = `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:StartBatchJob"]},
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz","arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}`
// A credential that may start batch jobs but has no access to the bucket
// cannot delete through a job.
func TestBatchJobSubmitterWithoutDataAccess(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-only", `{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:StartBatchJob","admin:ListBatchJobs"]}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-only-user", "batch-only")
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job != nil {
f.run(t, job)
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a job submitted without data access deleted a version")
}
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d, want 403: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
}
// A job acts only while the credential that submitted it is the same valid
// credential.
func TestBatchJobSubmitterChangedBeforeStart(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
change func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, cred auth.Credentials)
}{
{"unchanged", nil},
{"deleted", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, cred auth.Credentials) {
mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, false))
}},
{"disabled", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, cred auth.Credentials) {
_, err := f.sys.SetUserStatus(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, madmin.AccountDisabled)
mustIAM(t, err)
}},
{"secret-changed", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, cred auth.Credentials) {
mustIAM(t, f.sys.SetUserSecretKey(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, "batch-authz-changed-secret"))
}},
{"access-key-reused", func(t *testing.T, f *batchAuthzFixture, cred auth.Credentials) {
mustIAM(t, f.sys.DeleteUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, false))
time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, cred.AccessKey, "batch-full")
}},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if tc.change != nil {
tc.change(t, f, cred)
}
f.run(t, job)
exists := f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older)
if tc.change == nil && exists {
t.Fatal("control: an authorized job did not expire the older version")
}
if tc.change != nil && !exists {
t.Fatal("a job ran as a credential that changed after submission")
}
})
}
}
// An expired temporary credential does not keep its job running.
func TestBatchJobSubmitterExpired(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-parent", "batch-full")
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(2 * time.Second).Unix()}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
time.Sleep(time.Until(cred.Expiration) + time.Second)
f.run(t, job)
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a job ran as an expired credential")
}
}
// A session policy limits the job as it limits requests, also when an
// authorization plugin decides the rest.
func TestBatchJobSessionPolicyDeny(t *testing.T) {
session := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:StartBatchJob"]},
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:*"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz","arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]},
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}]}`
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
plugin bool
}{{"local", false}, {"plugin-allows", true}} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-parent", "batch-full")
cred := iamAdminServiceAccount(f.ctx, t, f.sys, parent.AccessKey, "batch-restricted", session)
if tc.plugin {
iamAdminPlugin(t, true)
}
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job != nil {
f.run(t, job)
} else {
t.Logf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a job deleted a version its session policy denies")
}
})
}
}
// A temporary credential's session policy limits its job too.
func TestBatchJobTemporarySessionPolicyDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
parent := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-parent", "batch-full")
session := `{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["admin:StartBatchJob"]},
{"Effect":"Allow","Action":["s3:ListBucket","s3:ListBucketVersions","s3:GetObject","s3:GetObjectVersion","s3:DeleteObject"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz","arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"]}]}`
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(map[string]any{
parentClaim: parent.AccessKey, "exp": UTCNow().Add(time.Hour).Unix(),
policy.SessionPolicyName: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(session)),
}, globalActiveCred.SecretKey)
mustIAM(t, err)
cred.ParentUser = parent.AccessKey
_, err = f.sys.SetTempUser(f.ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
mustIAM(t, err)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job != nil {
f.run(t, job)
} else {
t.Logf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a job deleted a version its session policy does not allow")
}
}
// A Deny that depends on request context the job does not have refuses the
// action instead of being skipped.
func TestBatchJobAbsentContextDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-context", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/*"],"Condition":{"Bool":{"aws:SecureTransport":"false"}}}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-context")
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job != nil {
f.run(t, job)
} else {
t.Logf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a job skipped a Deny that depends on request context")
}
}
// Each object is authorized: a Deny under an allowed prefix keeps its objects.
func TestBatchJobPerObjectDeny(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-keep", batchAuthzFullAccess+`,
{"Effect":"Deny","Action":["s3:DeleteObjectVersion"],"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::batch-authz/data/keep*"]}`)
cred := iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-keep")
kept := f.putVersions(t, "data/keep")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML("data/"))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
f.run(t, job)
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/keep", kept) {
t.Fatal("a job deleted a version that a per-object Deny protects")
}
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); !ri.Failed || ri.Complete {
t.Fatalf("refused job: complete=%v failed=%v", ri.Complete, ri.Failed)
}
}
// A job queued without its submitter, as an earlier release stored it, fails
// and stays failed across another start.
func TestBatchJobWithoutSubmitter(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
job := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(f.expireYAML("")), job))
job.ID = "expire-legacy" + getKeySeparator() + "0"
job.User = globalActiveCred.AccessKey
job.Started = time.Now()
mustIAM(t, job.save(f.ctx, f.obj))
for range 2 {
loaded := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, loaded.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(*job)))
f.run(t, loaded)
if !f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("a job without a recorded submitter deleted a version")
}
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); !ri.Failed || ri.Complete {
t.Fatalf("job without submitter: complete=%v failed=%v", ri.Complete, ri.Failed)
}
}
}
// Root and an authorized user can still run jobs.
func TestBatchJobAuthorizedControls(t *testing.T) {
for _, root := range []bool{true, false} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("root=%v", root), func(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
cred := globalActiveCred
if !root {
batchAuthzPolicy(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-full", batchAuthzFullAccess)
cred = iamAdminUser(f.ctx, t, f.sys, "batch-user", "batch-full")
}
older := f.putVersions(t, "data/a")
rec, job := f.submit(t, cred, f.expireYAML(""))
if job == nil {
t.Fatalf("submission status %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
f.run(t, job)
if f.versionExists(t, "data/a", older) {
t.Fatal("an authorized job did not expire the older version")
}
if ri := f.jobInfo(t, job); !ri.Complete || ri.Failed {
t.Fatalf("authorized job: complete=%v failed=%v", ri.Complete, ri.Failed)
}
})
}
}
// The describe output has no secrets of the job.
func TestBatchJobDescribeRedactsSecrets(t *testing.T) {
f := newBatchAuthzFixture(t)
secrets := []string{"describe-source-secret", "describe-source-token", "describe-target-secret", "describe-target-token", "describe-notify-token"}
for _, job := range []BatchJobRequest{
{ID: "replicate-describe" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Replicate: &BatchJobReplicateV1{
APIVersion: batchReplJobAPIVersion,
Source: BatchJobReplicateSource{Bucket: "remote", Endpoint: "https://remote.invalid", Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{
AccessKey: "describe-source-access", SecretKey: secrets[0], SessionToken: secrets[1],
}},
Target: BatchJobReplicateTarget{Bucket: f.bucket, Creds: BatchJobReplicateCredentials{
AccessKey: "describe-target-access", SecretKey: secrets[2], SessionToken: secrets[3],
}},
Flags: BatchJobReplicateFlags{Notify: BatchJobNotification{Endpoint: "https://notify.invalid", Token: secrets[4]}},
}},
{ID: "expire-describe" + getKeySeparator() + "0", Expire: &BatchJobExpire{
APIVersion: batchExpireAPIVersion, Bucket: f.bucket,
NotificationCfg: BatchJobNotification{Endpoint: "https://notify.invalid", Token: secrets[4]},
}},
{ID: "keyrotate-describe" + getKeySeparator() + "0", KeyRotate: &BatchJobKeyRotateV1{
APIVersion: batchKeyRotateAPIVersion, Bucket: f.bucket,
Flags: BatchJobKeyRotateFlags{Notify: BatchJobNotification{Endpoint: "https://notify.invalid", Token: secrets[4]}},
}},
} {
data, err := job.MarshalMsg(nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
mustIAM(t, saveConfig(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(job), data))
cred := globalActiveCred
req, err := newTestSignedRequestV4(http.MethodGet, "http://localhost/minio/admin/v3/describe-job?jobId="+job.ID, 0, nil, cred.AccessKey, cred.SecretKey, nil)
mustIAM(t, err)
mustIAM(t, req.ParseForm())
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
req = req.WithContext(newContext(req, rec, "DescribeBatchJob"))
adminAPIHandlers{}.DescribeBatchJob(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("%s: describe status %d: %s", job.ID, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
for _, s := range secrets {
if strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), s) {
t.Errorf("%s: describe output contains %s", job.ID, s)
}
}
if job.Replicate != nil && !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "describe-source-access") {
t.Errorf("%s: describe output lost the access key", job.ID)
}
// The stored job keeps what a run needs.
stored := &BatchJobRequest{}
mustIAM(t, stored.load(f.ctx, f.obj, getJobPath(job)))
if stored.Replicate != nil && stored.Replicate.Source.Creds.SecretKey != secrets[0] {
t.Errorf("%s: describe changed the stored job", job.ID)
}
}
}
+12 -15
View File
@@ -511,14 +511,13 @@ func testSiteReplicationStatusDetectsCorsTimestampMismatch(obj ObjectLayer, _ st
}))
defer remote.Close()
serviceCred, err := auth.CreateCredentials("cors-status-service", "cors-status-service-secret-key")
serviceCred, _, err := globalIAMSys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, credentials.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
accessKey: "cors-status-service",
secretKey: "cors-status-service-secret-key",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
serviceCred.ParentUser = credentials.AccessKey
if _, err = globalIAMSys.store.AddServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred.AccessKey, false)
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
@@ -585,14 +584,13 @@ func testSiteReplicationStatusCountsCorsPerSite(obj ObjectLayer, _ string, bucke
}))
defer remote.Close()
serviceCred, err := auth.CreateCredentials("cors-count-service", "cors-count-service-secret-key")
serviceCred, _, err := globalIAMSys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, credentials.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
accessKey: "cors-count-service",
secretKey: "cors-count-service-secret-key",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
serviceCred.ParentUser = credentials.AccessKey
if _, err = globalIAMSys.store.AddServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred.AccessKey, false)
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
@@ -1190,14 +1188,13 @@ func testCorsReplicationDispatchStatusHealReload(obj ObjectLayer, _ string, buck
}))
defer remote.Close()
serviceCred, err := auth.CreateCredentials("cors-integration-svc", "cors-integration-service-secret")
serviceCred, _, err := globalIAMSys.NewServiceAccount(ctx, credentials.AccessKey, nil, newServiceAccountOpts{
accessKey: "cors-integration-svc",
secretKey: "cors-integration-service-secret",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
serviceCred.ParentUser = credentials.AccessKey
if _, err = globalIAMSys.store.AddServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer globalIAMSys.DeleteServiceAccount(ctx, serviceCred.AccessKey, false)
globalSiteReplicationSys.Lock()
+6 -8
View File
@@ -277,14 +277,6 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) ListMultipartUploadsHandler(w http.ResponseWriter,
return
}
if keyMarker != "" {
// Marker not common with prefix is not implemented.
if !HasPrefix(keyMarker, prefix) {
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(ErrNotImplemented), r.URL)
return
}
}
listMultipartsInfo, err := objectAPI.ListMultipartUploads(ctx, bucket, prefix, keyMarker, uploadIDMarker, delimiter, maxUploads)
if err != nil {
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
@@ -1281,6 +1273,12 @@ func (api objectAPIHandlers) PostPolicyBucketHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *h
writeErrorResponseHeadersOnly(w, toAPIError(ctx, err))
return
}
if isDirObject(object) {
if _, _, _, s3Err := checkPutObjectLockAllowed(ctx, r, bucket, object, objectAPI.GetObjectInfo, ErrNone, ErrNone, false); s3Err != ErrNone {
writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, errorCodes.ToAPIErr(s3Err), r.URL)
return
}
}
opts.WantChecksum = checksum
fanOutOpts := fanOutOptions{Checksum: checksum}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ func testListMultipartUploadsHandler(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucketName s
shouldPass: true,
},
// Test case - 4.
// Setting Invalid prefix and marker combination.
// A key marker outside the prefix is valid and produces an empty page.
{
bucket: bucketName,
prefix: "asia",
@@ -435,8 +435,8 @@ func testListMultipartUploadsHandler(obj ObjectLayer, instanceType, bucketName s
maxUploads: "0",
accessKey: credentials.AccessKey,
secretKey: credentials.SecretKey,
expectedRespStatus: http.StatusNotImplemented,
shouldPass: false,
expectedRespStatus: http.StatusOK,
shouldPass: true,
},
// Test case - 5.
// Invalid upload id and marker combination.
-1
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ const (
lcEventSrc_s3PutObject
lcEventSrc_s3CopyObject
lcEventSrc_s3CompleteMultipartUpload
lcEventSrc_AccessTier
)
//revive:enable:var-naming
+174
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sync/atomic"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/event"
)
// An ILM expiry attempt that ends without removing what it addressed is
// incomplete: the rule no longer applied when it was checked again under the
// object lock, Object Lock protects the version, the history needed to decide
// could not be read, or another error. It is counted by reason, traced with
// the reason, and, unless it was refused, audited and logged. It never sends
// a removal notification: what it addressed is still there.
//
// An expiry of all versions of a key can also be refused because a version
// is in a remote tier, or because the latest version changed since a batch
// matched it, and it can stop at its budget after it removed some versions.
const (
ilmIncompleteNotApplicable = "not_applicable"
ilmIncompleteLocked = "locked"
ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable = "history_unavailable"
ilmIncompleteError = "error"
ilmIncompleteTierUnsupported = "tier_unsupported"
ilmIncompleteBudget = "budget"
ilmIncompleteChanged = "changed"
// ilmIncompleteTierSkipped counts the scanner's observations of a key
// whose expiry of all versions it did not queue, because a version it
// holds is in a remote tier and the purge would refuse it. Each drive's
// scanner of the key observes it, once per cycle.
ilmIncompleteTierSkipped = "tier_unsupported_skipped"
)
// ilmIncompleteReasons are the reasons expiry_incomplete_total counts, a
// bounded set of label values.
var ilmIncompleteReasons = []string{
ilmIncompleteNotApplicable,
ilmIncompleteLocked,
ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable,
ilmIncompleteError,
ilmIncompleteTierUnsupported,
ilmIncompleteBudget,
ilmIncompleteChanged,
ilmIncompleteTierSkipped,
}
// ilmIncompleteStats counts incomplete ILM expiries by reason.
type ilmIncompleteStats struct {
counts map[string]*atomic.Int64
}
func newILMIncompleteStats(reasons ...string) *ilmIncompleteStats {
s := &ilmIncompleteStats{counts: make(map[string]*atomic.Int64, len(reasons))}
for _, r := range reasons {
s.counts[r] = &atomic.Int64{}
}
return s
}
func (s *ilmIncompleteStats) add(reason string) {
if c, ok := s.counts[reason]; ok {
c.Add(1)
}
}
// snapshot returns the counts by reason.
func (s *ilmIncompleteStats) snapshot() map[string]int64 {
out := make(map[string]int64, len(s.counts))
for r, c := range s.counts {
out[r] = c.Load()
}
return out
}
var globalILMIncomplete = newILMIncompleteStats(ilmIncompleteReasons...)
// ilmExpiryNotDone classifies the error of an ILM expiry that did not remove
// what it addressed. A version that is already gone is not counted.
func ilmExpiryNotDone(err error) (reason string, counted bool) {
switch {
case err == nil || isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err):
return "", false
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllTiered):
return ilmIncompleteTierUnsupported, true
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllChanged):
return ilmIncompleteChanged, true
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllBudget):
return ilmIncompleteBudget, true
case errors.Is(err, errLifecycleNotApplicable):
return ilmIncompleteNotApplicable, true
}
var locked ObjectLocked
if errors.As(err, &locked) {
return ilmIncompleteLocked, true
}
if isErrReadQuorum(err) || isErrWriteQuorum(err) {
return ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable, true
}
return ilmIncompleteError, true
}
// ilmExpiryRefused reports whether reason is a refusal, which changes
// nothing, rather than a failure.
func ilmExpiryRefused(reason string) bool {
switch reason {
case ilmIncompleteNotApplicable, ilmIncompleteLocked, ilmIncompleteTierUnsupported, ilmIncompleteChanged:
return true
}
return false
}
// reportILMExpiryNotDone reports an ILM expiry of oi that ended with err. It
// reports nothing and returns false when err says the version is already
// gone; the caller reports that as it did before.
func reportILMExpiryNotDone(ctx context.Context, oi ObjectInfo, lcEvent lifecycle.Event, src lcEventSrc, err error, logID string, traceFn func(event string, metadata map[string]string, err error)) bool {
reason, counted := ilmExpiryNotDone(err)
if !counted {
return false
}
globalILMIncomplete.add(reason)
if ilmExpiryRefused(reason) {
traceFn(ILMExpiry, map[string]string{"result": "refused", "reason": reason, "version-id": oi.VersionID}, err)
return true
}
traceFn(ILMExpiry, map[string]string{"result": "failed", "reason": reason, "version-id": oi.VersionID}, err)
tags := newLifecycleAuditEvent(src, lcEvent).Tags()
tags["version-id"] = oi.VersionID
tags["ilm-incomplete-reason"] = reason
auditLogInternal(ctx, AuditLogOptions{
Event: ILMExpiry,
APIName: "ILMExpiry",
Bucket: oi.Bucket,
Object: oi.Name,
VersionID: oi.VersionID,
Error: err.Error(),
Tags: tags,
})
ilmLogOnceIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("ILM expiry of %s/%s (%s) not done: %w", oi.Bucket, oi.Name, oi.VersionID, err), logID)
return true
}
// ilmExpiryEventName is the notification of an expiry that completed. An
// expiry that addressed no version ID (Expiration of a latest version in a
// versioned or suspended bucket) and whose result is a delete marker created
// that marker, also when the marker takes the null version ID of the version
// it replaces. Any other expiry removed the version it addressed, also when
// that version was itself a delete marker.
func ilmExpiryEventName(requestedVersionID string, result ObjectInfo) event.Name {
if requestedVersionID == "" && result.DeleteMarker {
return event.ObjectRemovedDeleteMarkerCreated
}
return event.ObjectRemovedDelete
}
+364
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 PGSTY
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"slices"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/versioning"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/event"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
loghttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger/target/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/pubsub"
xnet "github.com/pgsty/silo-pkg/v3/net"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
)
func TestILMExpiryNotDoneClassification(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
err error
reason string
counted bool
}{
{nil, "", false},
{ObjectNotFound{}, "", false},
{VersionNotFound{}, "", false},
{errLifecycleNotApplicable, ilmIncompleteNotApplicable, true},
{fmt.Errorf("wrapped: %w", errLifecycleNotApplicable), ilmIncompleteNotApplicable, true},
{ObjectLocked{}, ilmIncompleteLocked, true},
{InsufficientWriteQuorum{}, ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable, true},
{InsufficientReadQuorum{}, ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable, true},
{errFaultyDisk, ilmIncompleteError, true},
} {
reason, counted := ilmExpiryNotDone(tc.err)
if reason != tc.reason || counted != tc.counted {
t.Errorf("%v: %q %v, want %q %v", tc.err, reason, counted, tc.reason, tc.counted)
}
}
}
// fixedDeleteResults is an object layer whose bulk deletes return errs.
type fixedDeleteResults struct {
ObjectLayer
errs []error
}
func (o fixedDeleteResults) DeleteObjects(ctx context.Context, bucket string, objects []ObjectToDelete, opts ObjectOptions) ([]DeletedObject, []error) {
deleted := make([]DeletedObject, len(objects))
for i, obj := range objects {
deleted[i] = DeletedObject{ObjectName: obj.ObjectName, VersionID: obj.VersionID}
}
return deleted, slices.Clone(o.errs)
}
// ilmTestAudit captures the ILMExpiry audit entries of bucket.
func ilmTestAudit(t *testing.T, bucket string) <-chan map[string]any {
t.Helper()
if len(logger.AuditTargets()) != 0 {
t.Fatal("unexpected pre-existing test audit targets")
}
entries := make(chan map[string]any, 16)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var entry struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Tags map[string]any `json:"tags"`
API struct {
Name, Bucket string
Objects []struct {
ObjectName string `json:"objectName"`
} `json:"objects"`
}
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&entry); err == nil && entry.API.Name == "ILMExpiry" && entry.API.Bucket == bucket {
tags := entry.Tags
if tags == nil {
tags = map[string]any{}
}
tags["error"] = entry.Error
if len(entry.API.Objects) > 0 {
tags["object"] = entry.API.Objects[0].ObjectName
}
entries <- tags
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
endpoint, err := xnet.ParseHTTPURL(server.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ctx := context.Background()
if errs := logger.UpdateAuditWebhooks(ctx, map[string]loghttp.Config{"ilm": {Enabled: true, Name: "ilm", Endpoint: endpoint, BatchSize: 1, QueueSize: 128, MaxRetry: 1, RetryIntvl: time.Millisecond, HTTPTimeout: time.Second}}); len(errs) > 0 {
t.Fatal(errs)
}
targets := logger.AuditTargets()
t.Cleanup(func() {
logger.UpdateAuditWebhooks(ctx, nil)
for _, target := range targets {
target.Cancel()
}
server.Close()
})
return entries
}
// A refused or failed noncurrent purge is counted and traced with its reason,
// a failure is audited, and only the version that was removed is announced.
func TestDeleteObjectVersionsReportsRefusalAndFailure(t *testing.T) {
s := newSplitILM(t, versioning.Enabled, splitILMRules)
ctx := t.Context()
audits := ilmTestAudit(t, s.bucket)
done := make(chan struct{})
defer close(done)
events := make(chan event.Event, 8)
if err := globalHTTPListen.Subscribe(pubsub.MaskFromMaskable(event.ObjectRemovedAll), events, done, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
traces := make(chan madmin.TraceInfo, 8)
if err := globalTrace.Subscribe(madmin.TraceILM, traces, done, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
before := globalILMIncomplete.snapshot()
layer := fixedDeleteResults{ObjectLayer: s.z, errs: []error{errLifecycleNotApplicable, InsufficientWriteQuorum{}, nil}}
toDel := []ObjectToDelete{
{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "ncv-a", VersionID: "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111"}},
{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "ncv-b", VersionID: "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222"}},
{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: "ncv-c", VersionID: "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333"}},
}
evs := []lifecycle.Event{{Action: lifecycle.DeleteVersionAction}, {Action: lifecycle.DeleteVersionAction}, {Action: lifecycle.DeleteVersionAction}}
deleteObjectVersions(ctx, layer, s.bucket, toDel, evs)
after := globalILMIncomplete.snapshot()
if d := after[ilmIncompleteNotApplicable] - before[ilmIncompleteNotApplicable]; d != 1 {
t.Errorf("not_applicable moved by %d, want 1", d)
}
if d := after[ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable] - before[ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable]; d != 1 {
t.Errorf("history_unavailable moved by %d, want 1", d)
}
var removed []string
results := map[string]string{}
for drained := false; !drained; {
select {
case ev := <-events:
removed = append(removed, ev.S3.Object.Key)
case tr := <-traces:
if r := tr.Custom["result"]; r != "" {
results[tr.Custom["version-id"]] = r
if tr.Error == "" {
t.Errorf("%s expiry of %s traced without its error", r, tr.Custom["version-id"])
}
}
default:
drained = true
}
}
if !slices.Equal(removed, []string{"ncv-c"}) {
t.Errorf("removal events for %v, want only ncv-c", removed)
}
if results[toDel[0].VersionID] != "refused" || results[toDel[1].VersionID] != "failed" {
t.Errorf("traces %v, want refused and failed", results)
}
// Drain every audit entry of the bucket: until the removal of ncv-c,
// audited after the refusal and the failure were reported, has arrived,
// and then while the target empties its queue.
var got []map[string]any
deadline := time.After(10 * time.Second)
for removal := false; !removal; {
select {
case tags := <-audits:
got = append(got, tags)
removal = removal || tags["object"] == "ncv-c"
case <-deadline:
t.Fatalf("audits %v: the removal of ncv-c was not audited", got)
}
}
for idle := time.After(time.Second); idle != nil; {
select {
case tags := <-audits:
got = append(got, tags)
case <-idle:
idle = nil
}
}
perObject := map[any][]map[string]any{}
for _, tags := range got {
perObject[tags["object"]] = append(perObject[tags["object"]], tags)
}
if a := perObject["ncv-a"]; len(a) != 0 {
t.Errorf("the refusal was audited: %v", a)
}
if b := perObject["ncv-b"]; len(b) != 1 || b[0]["ilm-incomplete-reason"] != ilmIncompleteHistoryUnavailable || b[0]["error"] == "" {
t.Errorf("audits of the failure: %v, want one with its reason and error", b)
}
if c := perObject["ncv-c"]; len(c) != 1 || c[0]["ilm-incomplete-reason"] != nil {
t.Errorf("audits of the removal: %v, want one", c)
}
}
// expiryEvent returns the removal events sent while run runs.
func expiryEvents(t *testing.T, run func()) []event.Event {
t.Helper()
done := make(chan struct{})
defer close(done)
events := make(chan event.Event, 8)
if err := globalHTTPListen.Subscribe(pubsub.MaskFromMaskable(event.ObjectRemovedAll), events, done, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
run()
var got []event.Event
for {
select {
case ev := <-events:
got = append(got, ev)
default:
return got
}
}
}
// The notification of a completed expiry names what its delete did: the
// delete marker it created, or the version it removed.
func TestExpiryEventsNameTheResult(t *testing.T) {
type expiry struct {
name string
status versioning.State
key string
versions []splitVersion
expire string // label of the version expired
action lifecycle.Action
wantEvent event.Name
wantID func(s *splitILM, key string) []string // acceptable version IDs
}
marker := func(s *splitILM, key string) []string {
oi, err := s.z.GetObjectInfo(s.t.Context(), s.bucket, key, ObjectOptions{})
if !oi.DeleteMarker {
s.t.Fatalf("latest of %s is not a marker: %+v %v", key, oi, err)
}
return []string{oi.VersionID}
}
label := func(l string) func(s *splitILM, key string) []string {
return func(s *splitILM, key string) []string { return []string{s.ids[key+" "+l]} }
}
null := func(*splitILM, string) []string { return []string{"", nullVersionID} }
cases := []expiry{
{"latest-versioned", versioning.Enabled, "exp-ev-latest", []splitVersion{splitAt("v1", 5, 0)}, "v1", lifecycle.DeleteAction, event.ObjectRemovedDeleteMarkerCreated, marker},
{"noncurrent", versioning.Enabled, "ncv-ev-noncurrent", []splitVersion{splitAt("v1", 5, 0), splitAt("v2", 3, 0)}, "v1", lifecycle.DeleteVersionAction, event.ObjectRemovedDelete, label("v1")},
{"expired-marker", versioning.Enabled, "edm-ev-marker", []splitVersion{splitMarker("dm", 5, 0)}, "dm", lifecycle.DeleteVersionAction, event.ObjectRemovedDelete, label("dm")},
{"latest-suspended-null", versioning.Suspended, "exp-ev-null", []splitVersion{splitNull("v1", 5, 0)}, "v1", lifecycle.DeleteAction, event.ObjectRemovedDeleteMarkerCreated, null},
{"tiered-latest-versioned", versioning.Enabled, "exp-ev-tiered", []splitVersion{splitTiered("v1", 5, 0)}, "v1", lifecycle.DeleteAction, event.ObjectRemovedDeleteMarkerCreated, marker},
{"tiered-noncurrent", versioning.Enabled, "ncv-ev-tiered", []splitVersion{splitTiered("v1", 5, 0), splitAt("v2", 3, 0)}, "v1", lifecycle.DeleteVersionAction, event.ObjectRemovedDelete, label("v1")},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
s := newSplitILM(t, tc.status, splitILMRules)
installExpiryTestTier(t, map[string][]byte{"remote-v1": []byte("v1")})
for _, v := range tc.versions {
s.write(tc.key, v)
}
vid := s.ids[tc.key+" "+tc.expire]
if vid == "" {
vid = nullVersionID
}
oi, err := s.z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), s.bucket, tc.key, ObjectOptions{VersionID: vid})
if err != nil && !isErrMethodNotAllowed(err) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
oi.Bucket, oi.Name = s.bucket, tc.key
lcEvent := lifecycle.Event{Action: tc.action}
got := expiryEvents(t, func() {
if oi.TransitionedObject.Status != "" {
if !applyExpiryOnTransitionedObject(t.Context(), s.z, oi, lcEvent, lcEventSrc_Scanner) {
t.Fatal("transitioned expiry did not apply")
}
return
}
if !applyExpiryOnNonTransitionedObjects(t.Context(), s.z, oi, lcEvent, lcEventSrc_Scanner) {
t.Fatal("expiry did not apply")
}
})
if len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("events %+v, want one", got)
}
if got[0].EventName != tc.wantEvent {
t.Errorf("event %s, want %s", got[0].EventName, tc.wantEvent)
}
if want := tc.wantID(s, tc.key); !slices.Contains(want, got[0].S3.Object.VersionID) {
t.Errorf("event names version %q, want one of %v", got[0].S3.Object.VersionID, want)
}
})
}
}
// expiry_incomplete_total is exported as a counter with a reason label by
// both metrics versions.
func TestILMExpiryIncompleteMetrics(t *testing.T) {
// Metrics v3 exports a counter once it is above zero.
for _, r := range ilmIncompleteReasons {
globalILMIncomplete.add(r)
}
// v3, through the collector the metrics handler registers.
families, err := newMetricGroups(prometheus.NewRegistry()).mgGatherers[ilmCollectorPath].Gather()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
want := ilmCollectorPath.metricPrefix() + "_" + string(expiryIncompleteTotal)
reasons := map[string]bool{}
for _, family := range families {
if family.GetName() != want {
continue
}
for _, m := range family.Metric {
if m.Counter == nil || m.GetCounter().GetValue() <= 0 {
t.Errorf("v3 %s: %v, want a counter above zero", want, m)
}
for _, l := range m.Label {
if l.GetName() == "reason" {
reasons[l.GetValue()] = true
}
}
}
}
for _, r := range ilmIncompleteReasons {
if !reasons[r] {
t.Errorf("v3: %s{reason=%q} not exported", want, r)
}
}
reasons = map[string]bool{}
for _, mv := range getILMNodeMetrics().Get() {
if mv.Description.Name == expiryIncompleteTotal {
if mv.Description.Type != counterMetric {
t.Errorf("v2 type %v", mv.Description.Type)
}
reasons[mv.VariableLabels["reason"]] = true
}
}
for _, r := range ilmIncompleteReasons {
if !reasons[r] {
t.Errorf("v2: reason %q not exported", r)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/versioning"
)
// Read the actual metadata from every disk without object-layer read repair.
func restoreBoundarySnapshot(t *testing.T, r *restoreTest) [][]byte {
t.Helper()
var result [][]byte
for _, pool := range r.z.serverPools {
for _, disk := range pool.getHashedSet(r.object).getDisks() {
raw, err := disk.ReadXL(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, true)
if err != nil && err != errFileNotFound {
t.Fatal(err)
}
result = append(result, bytes.Clone(raw.Buf))
}
}
return result
}
func TestExpireRestoredKeepsReplacementDeleteMarker(t *testing.T) {
for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d", pools), func(t *testing.T) {
r := newRestoreSafetyTest(t, pools, versioning.Suspended)
r.put("old", false, false)
oi := r.put("null", true, true)
r.restore(oi)
stale, err := r.z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, r.opts(nullVersionID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := r.z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, r.opts("")); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !r.fileInfo(nullVersionID).Deleted {
t.Fatal("ordinary DELETE did not replace null with a delete marker")
}
before := restoreBoundarySnapshot(t, r)
err = expireTransitionedObject(t.Context(), r.z, &stale, lifecycle.Event{Action: lifecycle.DeleteRestoredAction}, lcEventSrc_Scanner)
if !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("stale cleanup should reject the replacement marker: %v", err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before, restoreBoundarySnapshot(t, r)) {
t.Error("stale cleanup changed stored versions or their data")
}
if _, _, err := r.read(""); !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("stale cleanup exposed the old version: %v", err)
}
// An explicit user purge must still remove that same marker.
if _, err := r.z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, r.opts(nullVersionID)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if label, data, err := r.read(""); err != nil || label != "old" || !bytes.Equal(data, r.bodies["old"]) {
t.Fatalf("ordinary marker purge: label=%s err=%v", label, err)
}
})
}
}
func TestExpireRestoredMetadataReadKeepsMinorityVersion(t *testing.T) {
for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
for _, operation := range []string{"cleanup", "restore", "restore-cleanup", "lookup-cleanup", "lookup-restore", "get", "delete"} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d/%s", pools, operation), func(t *testing.T) {
r := newRestoreSafetyTest(t, pools, versioning.Enabled)
oi := r.put("target", false, true)
r.restore(oi)
fi := r.fileInfo(oi.VersionID)
// A readable latest version lets pools lookup finish before the
// set reads the specifically addressed, incomplete old version.
r.put("newer", false, false)
er := r.z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(r.object)
disks := er.getDisks()
for _, disk := range disks[1:] {
raw, err := disk.ReadXL(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var meta xlMetaV2
if err := meta.Load(raw.Buf); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
del := FileInfo{VersionID: oi.VersionID}
del.SetSkipTierFreeVersion()
if _, err := meta.DeleteVersion(del); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
buf, err := meta.AppendTo(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Remove only this metadata entry; retain every real shard.
if err := disk.WriteAll(t.Context(), r.bucket, pathJoin(r.object, xlStorageFormatFile), buf); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
before := restoreBoundarySnapshot(t, r)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 3*time.Second)
defer cancel()
opts := r.opts(oi.VersionID)
var err error
switch operation {
case "cleanup":
err = expireTransitionedObject(ctx, r.z, &oi, lifecycle.Event{Action: lifecycle.DeleteRestoredVersionAction}, lcEventSrc_Scanner)
case "restore":
opts.Transition.RestoreRequest = &RestoreObjectRequest{Days: 1}
err = r.z.RestoreTransitionedObject(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, opts)
case "restore-cleanup":
// The initial read succeeded before remote download failed;
// cleanup must not purge a now-incomplete target on reread.
err = er.clearRestoreStatus(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, oi.VersionID, nil)
case "lookup-cleanup", "lookup-restore":
// Version-sensitive lookup also covers native restore routing.
opts.MetadataChg = true
if operation == "lookup-cleanup" {
opts.Transition.ExpireRestored = true
} else {
opts.Transition.RestoreRequest = &RestoreObjectRequest{Days: 1}
}
_, _, err = r.z.getPoolInfoExistingWithOpts(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, opts)
case "get":
_, err = r.z.GetObjectInfo(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, opts)
case "delete":
_, err = r.z.DeleteObject(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, opts)
}
if ctx.Err() != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s timed out instead of returning its read error: %v", operation, err)
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("incomplete target unexpectedly readable")
}
if operation != "get" && operation != "delete" {
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before, restoreBoundarySnapshot(t, r)) {
t.Error("failed restore read changed metadata, inline data or free versions")
}
if n := r.dataDirs(fi.DataDir); n != len(disks) {
t.Errorf("failed restore read removed shards: %d/%d directories remain", n, len(disks))
}
return
}
// Ordinary GET/DELETE retain their existing dangling cleanup.
raw, err := disks[0].ReadXL(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
versions, err := getFileInfoVersions(raw.Buf, r.bucket, r.object, false)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(versions.Versions) != 1 || len(versions.FreeVersions) != 1 || r.dataDirs(fi.DataDir) != len(disks)-1 {
t.Fatal("ordinary dangling cleanup no longer removed the minority version")
}
})
}
}
}
func TestNativeRestoreInitialMissingReadDoesNotWrite(t *testing.T) {
r := newRestoreSafetyTest(t, 1, versioning.Enabled)
r.put("live", false, false)
before := restoreBoundarySnapshot(t, r)
opts := r.opts(mustGetUUID())
opts.Transition.RestoreRequest = &RestoreObjectRequest{Days: 1}
if err := r.z.RestoreTransitionedObject(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, opts); !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
t.Fatalf("missing restore target: %v", err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before, restoreBoundarySnapshot(t, r)) {
t.Fatal("initial restore failure wrote metadata without a resolved version")
}
}
func TestExpireRestoredStorageRejectsOtherTypes(t *testing.T) {
for _, kind := range []string{"null-marker", "uuid-marker", "legacy", "legacy-json"} {
t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
disk, _, err := newXLStorageTestSetup(t)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ctx := t.Context()
const bucket, object = "restore-types", "obj"
if err := disk.MakeVol(ctx, bucket); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var meta xlMetaV2
versionID, metaName, dataDir := nullVersionID, xlStorageFormatFile, ""
var buf []byte
switch kind {
case "null-marker", "uuid-marker":
if kind == "uuid-marker" {
versionID = mustGetUUID()
}
err = meta.AddVersion(FileInfo{VersionID: versionID, Deleted: true, ModTime: time.Now().UTC()})
case "legacy", "legacy-json":
legacy := getSampleXLMeta(1)
legacy.DataDir, dataDir = "legacy", "legacy"
if kind == "legacy-json" {
metaName = xlStorageFormatFileV1
buf, err = json.Marshal(legacy)
disk.storage.Lock()
disk.storage.formatLegacy = true
disk.storage.Unlock()
} else {
err = meta.AddLegacy(&legacy)
}
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if buf == nil {
buf, err = meta.AppendTo(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := disk.WriteAll(ctx, bucket, pathJoin(object, metaName), buf); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
payload := []byte("sole legacy contents")
dataPath := filepath.Join(disk.Endpoint().Path, bucket, object, dataDir, "part.1")
if dataDir != "" {
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dataPath), 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(dataPath, payload, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if err := disk.DeleteVersion(ctx, bucket, object, FileInfo{VersionID: versionID, ExpireRestored: true, TransitionStatus: lifecycle.TransitionComplete}, false, DeleteOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := disk.ReadAll(ctx, bucket, pathJoin(object, metaName))
if err != nil || !bytes.Equal(buf, after) {
t.Errorf("restore cleanup changed %s metadata: %v", kind, err)
}
if dataDir != "" {
if data, err := os.ReadFile(dataPath); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(data, payload) {
t.Errorf("restore cleanup removed legacy contents: %v", err)
}
}
if err := disk.DeleteVersion(ctx, bucket, object, FileInfo{VersionID: versionID}, false, DeleteOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := disk.ReadAll(ctx, bucket, pathJoin(object, metaName)); err != errFileNotFound {
t.Errorf("ordinary purge left %s: %v", kind, err)
}
})
}
}
+284
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"reflect"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/versioning"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
)
const restoreSafetyRules = `<LifecycleConfiguration><Rule><ID>tier</ID><Status>Enabled</Status><Filter><Prefix></Prefix></Filter><Transition><Days>1000</Days><StorageClass>WARM</StorageClass></Transition></Rule></LifecycleConfiguration>`
// Reuse the original restore-copy fixture with a small, isolated real cluster.
func newRestoreSafetyTest(t *testing.T, pools int, state versioning.State) *restoreTest {
t.Helper()
prevTier := globalTierConfigMgr
t.Cleanup(func() { globalTierConfigMgr = prevTier })
dirs, err := getRandomDisks(4 * pools)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { removeRoots(dirs) })
var endpoints EndpointServerPools
for i := range pools {
endpoints = append(endpoints, mustGetPoolEndpoints(i, dirs[4*i:4*i+4]...)...)
}
obj, _, err := initObjectLayer(t.Context(), endpoints)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
z := obj.(*erasureServerPools)
t.Cleanup(func() { z.Shutdown(context.Background()) })
globalTierConfigMgr = NewTierConfigMgr()
globalTierConfigMgr.drivercache["WARM"] = &restoreTestTier{tierExpiryTestBackend: &tierExpiryTestBackend{objects: map[string][]byte{}}}
r := &restoreTest{t: t, z: z, bucket: getRandomBucketName(), object: "obj", labels: map[string]string{}, bodies: map[string][]byte{}}
if err := z.MakeBucket(t.Context(), r.bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: state != ""}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(r.bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if state == versioning.Suspended {
meta.VersioningConfigXML = []byte(`<VersioningConfiguration><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>`)
}
meta.LifecycleConfigXML = []byte(restoreSafetyRules)
if err := meta.Save(t.Context(), z); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(r.bucket, meta)
return r
}
type restoreCleanupFaultDisk struct {
consistencyReadFaultDisk
deletes *atomic.Int64
}
func (d restoreCleanupFaultDisk) DeleteVersion(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, fi FileInfo, force bool, opts DeleteOptions) error {
if bucket == d.bucket && object == d.object {
d.deletes.Add(1)
}
return d.StorageAPI.DeleteVersion(ctx, bucket, object, fi, force, opts)
}
func TestExpireRestoredRequiresFreshMetadata(t *testing.T) {
for _, restored := range []bool{true, false} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("expire-restored=%v", restored), func(t *testing.T) {
r := newRestoreSafetyTest(t, 1, "")
oi := r.put("v1", true, true)
r.restore(oi)
before := r.fileInfo(oi.VersionID)
er := r.z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(r.object)
original := er.getDisks
disks := original()
var deletes atomic.Int64
faulty := make([]StorageAPI, len(disks))
for i, d := range disks {
faulty[i] = restoreCleanupFaultDisk{consistencyReadFaultDisk{d, r.bucket, r.object}, &deletes}
}
er.getDisks = func() []StorageAPI { return faulty }
// Restore the callback before any fixture reads and on a fatal assertion.
defer func() { er.getDisks = original }()
opts := ObjectOptions{VersionID: nullVersionID, Transition: TransitionOptions{ExpireRestored: restored}, Expiration: ExpirationOptions{Expire: restored}}
_, err := er.DeleteObject(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, opts)
er.getDisks = original
if restored {
var quorum InsufficientWriteQuorum
if !errors.As(err, &quorum) {
t.Errorf("cleanup without fresh metadata: got %v, want write-quorum error", err)
}
if n := deletes.Load(); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("cleanup attempted %d blind disk deletes", n)
}
if after := r.fileInfo(oi.VersionID); !reflect.DeepEqual(before, after) {
t.Error("failed metadata read changed the stored version")
}
if n := r.dataDirs(before.DataDir); n != len(disks) {
t.Errorf("cleanup removed data: %d/%d directories remain", n, len(disks))
}
} else {
// Ordinary unversioned DELETE retains the existing tryDel behavior.
if err != nil || deletes.Load() != int64(len(disks)) {
t.Fatalf("ordinary DELETE: err=%v, deletes=%d", err, deletes.Load())
}
if _, err := r.z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, ObjectOptions{}); !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
t.Fatalf("ordinary DELETE left the object: %v", err)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestExpireRestoredRenewedOrMissing(t *testing.T) {
r := newRestoreSafetyTest(t, 1, versioning.Enabled)
oi := r.put("v1", false, true)
r.restore(oi)
stale, err := r.z.GetObjectInfo(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, r.opts(oi.VersionID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
before := r.fileInfo(oi.VersionID)
renewed := completedRestoreObj(time.Now().Add(48 * time.Hour)).String()
opts := r.opts(oi.VersionID)
opts.EvalMetadataFn = func(o *ObjectInfo, _ error) (ReplicateDecision, error) {
o.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzRestore] = renewed
return ReplicateDecision{}, nil
}
if _, err := r.z.PutObjectMetadata(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, opts); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = expireTransitionedObject(t.Context(), r.z, &stale, lifecycle.Event{Action: lifecycle.DeleteRestoredAction}, lcEventSrc_Scanner)
if !errors.Is(err, errLifecycleNotApplicable) {
t.Errorf("stale task should be rejected, got %v", err)
}
if got := r.fileInfo(oi.VersionID); got.Metadata[xhttp.AmzRestore] != renewed || got.DataDir != before.DataDir {
t.Error("stale task changed renewed restore")
}
if n := r.dataDirs(before.DataDir); n != 4 {
t.Errorf("renewed copy has %d directories, want 4", n)
}
if _, data, err := r.read(oi.VersionID); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(data, r.bodies["v1"]) {
t.Fatalf("renewed copy not readable: %v", err)
}
for _, id := range []string{mustGetUUID(), nullVersionID} {
opts := r.opts(id)
opts.Expiration.Expire = true
opts.Transition.ExpireRestored = true
if _, err := r.z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, opts); !isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("missing version %s: %v", id, err)
}
}
missing := r.opts(nullVersionID)
missing.Expiration.Expire = true
missing.Transition.ExpireRestored = true
if _, err := r.z.DeleteObject(t.Context(), r.bucket, "missing-object", missing); !isErrVersionNotFound(err) && !isErrObjectNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("missing object: %v", err)
}
if got := r.fileInfo(oi.VersionID); got.Metadata[xhttp.AmzRestore] != renewed {
t.Error("missing-target cleanup changed existing restore")
}
}
func TestExpireRestoredStorageBoundary(t *testing.T) {
for _, status := range []string{"", lifecycle.TransitionPending, lifecycle.TransitionComplete} {
for _, inline := range []bool{false, true} {
for _, requestStatus := range []string{"", lifecycle.TransitionComplete} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("stored=%s/inline=%v/request=%s", status, inline, requestStatus), func(t *testing.T) {
disk, _, err := newXLStorageTestSetup(t)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
const bucket, object = "restore-storage", "obj"
ctx := t.Context()
if err := disk.MakeVol(ctx, bucket); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
fi := newFileInfo(object, 2, 2)
fi.VersionID, fi.DataDir = mustGetUUID(), mustGetUUID()
fi.ModTime, fi.Size = time.Now().UTC(), 1024
fi.TransitionStatus = status
fi.AddObjectPart(1, "", fi.Size, fi.Size, fi.ModTime, nil, nil)
fi.Metadata = map[string]string{xhttp.AmzRestore: completedRestoreObj(time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)).String(), "x-amz-meta-preserve": "keep"}
payload := []byte("sole local contents")
if inline {
fi.Data = payload
fi.SetInlineData()
}
if err := disk.WriteMetadata(ctx, "", bucket, object, fi); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
dir := filepath.Join(disk.Endpoint().Path, bucket, object, fi.DataDir)
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o700); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "part.1"), payload, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
raw, err := disk.ReadXL(ctx, bucket, object, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var xl xlMetaV2
if err := xl.Load(raw.Buf); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
del := FileInfo{VersionID: fi.VersionID, ExpireRestored: true, TransitionStatus: requestStatus}
dataDir, err := xl.DeleteVersion(del)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
wantDir := ""
if status == lifecycle.TransitionComplete {
wantDir = fi.DataDir
}
if dataDir != wantDir {
t.Errorf("format authorized directory %q, want %q", dataDir, wantDir)
}
before, err := getFileInfo(raw.Buf, bucket, object, fi.VersionID, fileInfoOpts{Data: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := disk.DeleteVersion(ctx, bucket, object, del, false, DeleteOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
afterRaw, err := disk.ReadXL(ctx, bucket, object, true)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := getFileInfo(afterRaw.Buf, bucket, object, fi.VersionID, fileInfoOpts{Data: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
data, dirErr := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, "part.1"))
if status != lifecycle.TransitionComplete {
if !reflect.DeepEqual(before, after) {
t.Error("non-complete cleanup changed metadata or inline data")
}
if dirErr != nil || !bytes.Equal(data, payload) {
t.Errorf("sole local contents removed: %v", dirErr)
}
} else {
if !os.IsNotExist(dirErr) {
t.Errorf("completed restore directory still present: %v", dirErr)
}
if len(after.Data) != 0 || after.Metadata[xhttp.AmzRestore] != "" {
t.Error("completed restore kept cached data or restore headers")
}
if after.TransitionStatus != status || after.VersionID != before.VersionID || after.Metadata["x-amz-meta-preserve"] != "keep" {
t.Error("cleanup changed the transitioned version identity or user metadata")
}
}
})
}
}
}
}
+453
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Denis Babchuk
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/versioning"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
)
// restoreTestTier is a remote tier held in memory that counts its reads.
type restoreTestTier struct {
*tierExpiryTestBackend
gets atomic.Int64
}
func (b *restoreTestTier) Get(ctx context.Context, object string, rv remoteVersionID, opts WarmBackendGetOpts) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
b.gets.Add(1)
return b.tierExpiryTestBackend.Get(ctx, object, rv, opts)
}
// restoreTest is a cluster with a remote tier WARM and a bucket whose
// versions are transitioned to it and restored.
type restoreTest struct {
t *testing.T
z *erasureServerPools
bucket string
object string
queue chan expiryOp
labels map[string]string // version ID ("null" for the null version) -> label
bodies map[string][]byte // label -> data
}
func restoreTestVersionKey(versionID string) string {
if versionID == "" {
return nullVersionID
}
return versionID
}
// put writes a version of the object to the first pool. A restored version
// is 1 MiB, so that its restored copy has a data directory of its own.
func (r *restoreTest) put(label string, null, restored bool) ObjectInfo {
r.t.Helper()
body := []byte(r.object + " " + label)
if restored {
body = bytes.Repeat(body, (1<<20)/len(body)+1)
}
opts := ObjectOptions{Versioned: !null}
if null {
opts.VersionSuspended = globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(r.bucket, r.object)
}
oi, err := r.z.serverPools[0].PutObject(r.t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object,
mustGetPutObjReader(r.t, bytes.NewReader(body), int64(len(body)), "", ""), opts)
if err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
r.labels[restoreTestVersionKey(oi.VersionID)] = label
r.bodies[label] = body
return oi
}
// opts returns the options of a request on a version of the object, as the
// S3 handlers set them.
func (r *restoreTest) opts(versionID string) ObjectOptions {
return ObjectOptions{
VersionID: versionID,
Versioned: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(r.bucket, r.object),
VersionSuspended: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(r.bucket, r.object),
}
}
// restore transitions a version to the tier, restores it, and moves the
// expiry date of the restore into the past.
func (r *restoreTest) restore(oi ObjectInfo) {
r.t.Helper()
ctx := r.t.Context()
vopts := r.opts(oi.VersionID)
topts := vopts
topts.MTime = oi.ModTime
topts.Transition = TransitionOptions{Tier: "WARM", ETag: oi.ETag}
if err := r.z.TransitionObject(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, topts); err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
ropts := vopts
ropts.Transition = TransitionOptions{RestoreRequest: &RestoreObjectRequest{Days: 1}}
// Through the pool, as with a single pool: with more than one pool the
// pools layer holds the object lock that the write of the restored copy
// waits for.
if err := r.z.serverPools[0].RestoreTransitionedObject(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, ropts); err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
expired := completedRestoreObj(time.Now().Add(-24 * time.Hour).UTC()).String()
mopts := vopts
mopts.MTime = oi.ModTime
mopts.EvalMetadataFn = func(o *ObjectInfo, _ error) (ReplicateDecision, error) {
o.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzRestore] = expired
return ReplicateDecision{}, nil
}
if _, err := r.z.PutObjectMetadata(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, mopts); err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// fileInfo returns the version of the object from a drive of the first pool.
func (r *restoreTest) fileInfo(versionID string) FileInfo {
r.t.Helper()
infos, errs := readAllFileInfo(r.t.Context(), r.z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(r.object).getDisks(), "", r.bucket, r.object, restoreTestVersionKey(versionID), false, false)
if errs[0] != nil {
r.t.Fatal(errs[0])
}
return infos[0]
}
// dataDirs returns how many drives of the first pool hold the data
// directory of a version.
func (r *restoreTest) dataDirs(dataDir string) int {
r.t.Helper()
n := 0
for _, disk := range r.z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(r.object).getDisks() {
_, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(disk.Endpoint().Path, r.bucket, r.object, dataDir))
if err == nil {
n++
} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
}
return n
}
// versions returns the versions of the object in each pool, newest first,
// and its free versions in all pools.
func (r *restoreTest) versions() (views []string, free int) {
r.t.Helper()
for _, pool := range r.z.serverPools {
rf, err := pool.getHashedSet(r.object).getDisks()[0].ReadXL(r.t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, false)
if errors.Is(err, errFileNotFound) {
views = append(views, "")
continue
}
if err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
fivs, err := getFileInfoVersions(rf.Buf, r.bucket, r.object, false)
if err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
var labels []string
for _, fi := range fivs.Versions {
if fi.Deleted {
labels = append(labels, "DM")
} else {
labels = append(labels, r.labels[restoreTestVersionKey(fi.VersionID)])
}
}
views = append(views, strings.Join(labels, " "))
free += len(fivs.FreeVersions)
}
return views, free
}
// read returns the label and the data of a version, or of the latest version
// when versionID is empty, or the error of the read.
func (r *restoreTest) read(versionID string) (string, []byte, error) {
r.t.Helper()
gr, err := r.z.GetObjectNInfo(r.t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, nil, nil, ObjectOptions{VersionID: versionID})
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
defer gr.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(gr)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
return r.labels[restoreTestVersionKey(gr.ObjInfo.VersionID)], data, nil
}
// runQueue runs the queued expiries with an expiry worker.
func (r *restoreTest) runQueue() {
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(done)
globalExpiryState.Worker(r.queue)
}()
r.queue <- nil // the worker returns once it ran every expiry queued before
<-done
}
// objInfos returns the versions of the object as a drive of the
// first pool holds them, as the scanner and the walks of decommission and
// the drive heal see them.
func (r *restoreTest) objInfos() []ObjectInfo {
r.t.Helper()
rf, err := r.z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet(r.object).getDisks()[0].ReadXL(r.t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, false)
if err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
fivs, err := getFileInfoVersions(rf.Buf, r.bucket, r.object, false)
if err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
versioned := globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(r.bucket, r.object) || globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(r.bucket, r.object)
objInfos := make([]ObjectInfo, len(fivs.Versions))
for i, fi := range fivs.Versions {
objInfos[i] = fi.ToObjectInfo(r.bucket, r.object, versioned)
}
return objInfos
}
// The restored copy of a transitioned version expires on the expiry date of
// its restore. The expiry removes the copy and nothing else: the version
// stays where it is in the version stack, transitioned, and is read from the
// tier again. Every path that applies ILM runs the expiry: the scanner and a
// GET or HEAD queue it for an expiry worker, decommission and the drive heal
// run it at once. The expiry of the restored copy of the latest version used
// to delete the object instead: a versioned bucket got a delete marker that
// hid it. With versioning suspended it went to the null version, removed its
// data if there was one and failed if not, and the restored copy stayed.
func TestExpireRestoredCopy(t *testing.T) {
prevTier := globalTierConfigMgr
t.Cleanup(func() { globalTierConfigMgr = prevTier })
prevExpiry := globalExpiryState
t.Cleanup(func() { globalExpiryState = prevExpiry })
// Nothing here is old enough to transition; the rule makes the bucket
// one with a tier, as restored versions are in.
const rules = `<LifecycleConfiguration><Rule><ID>tier</ID><Status>Enabled</Status><Filter><Prefix></Prefix></Filter>` +
`<Transition><Days>1000</Days><StorageClass>WARM</StorageClass></Transition></Rule></LifecycleConfiguration>`
type version struct {
label string
null bool // the null version
restored bool // transitioned and restored, the restore has expired
}
testCases := []struct {
name string
versioning versioning.State // "", Enabled or Suspended
versions []version // oldest first
}{
{name: "versioned", versioning: versioning.Enabled, versions: []version{{label: "v1"}, {label: "v2", restored: true}}},
{name: "versioned-noncurrent", versioning: versioning.Enabled, versions: []version{{label: "v1", restored: true}, {label: "v2"}}},
{name: "versioned-null", versioning: versioning.Enabled, versions: []version{{label: "v1", null: true, restored: true}}},
{name: "suspended", versioning: versioning.Suspended, versions: []version{{label: "v1", null: true}, {label: "v2", restored: true}}},
{name: "suspended-no-null", versioning: versioning.Suspended, versions: []version{{label: "v1"}, {label: "v2", restored: true}}},
{name: "suspended-null", versioning: versioning.Suspended, versions: []version{{label: "v1"}, {label: "v2", null: true, restored: true}}},
{name: "suspended-null-noncurrent", versioning: versioning.Suspended, versions: []version{{label: "v1", null: true, restored: true}, {label: "v2"}}},
{name: "unversioned", versions: []version{{label: "v1", null: true, restored: true}}},
}
sources := []struct {
name string
expire func(r *restoreTest, oi ObjectInfo, evt lifecycle.Event)
}{
{"scanner", func(r *restoreTest, _ ObjectInfo, _ lifecycle.Event) {
lc, err := globalLifecycleSys.Get(r.bucket)
if err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
lr, err := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(r.bucket)
if err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
item := scannerItem{bucket: r.bucket, objectName: r.object, lifeCycle: lc}
item.applyActions(r.t.Context(), r.z, r.objInfos(), lr, &sizeSummary{}, nil)
r.runQueue()
}},
{"head", func(r *restoreTest, oi ObjectInfo, evt lifecycle.Event) {
applyExpiryRule(evt, lcEventSrc_s3HeadObject, oi)
r.runQueue()
}},
{"list", func(r *restoreTest, _ ObjectInfo, _ lifecycle.Event) {
// ListObjects of the key with max-keys=1 reads its latest
// version without the versioning of the bucket, a listing of
// versions reads them all.
if _, err := r.z.ListObjects(r.t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, "", "", 1); err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := r.z.ListObjectVersions(r.t.Context(), r.bucket, r.object, "", "", "", 100); err != nil {
r.t.Fatal(err)
}
r.runQueue()
}},
{"decom", func(r *restoreTest, oi ObjectInfo, evt lifecycle.Event) {
for _, o := range r.objInfos() {
if o.VersionID == oi.VersionID {
applyExpiryOnTransitionedObject(r.t.Context(), r.z, o, evt, lcEventSrc_Decom)
return
}
}
r.t.Fatal("version not found on the drive")
}},
}
for _, pools := range []int{1, 2} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("pools=%d", pools), func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := t.Context()
dirs, err := getRandomDisks(4 * pools)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { removeRoots(dirs) })
var endpoints EndpointServerPools
for i := range pools {
endpoints = append(endpoints, mustGetPoolEndpoints(i, dirs[4*i:4*i+4]...)...)
}
obj, _, err := initObjectLayer(ctx, endpoints)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
z := obj.(*erasureServerPools)
t.Cleanup(func() { z.Shutdown(context.Background()) })
// After initObjectLayer, which sets up a new tier config.
tier := &restoreTestTier{tierExpiryTestBackend: &tierExpiryTestBackend{objects: map[string][]byte{}}}
globalTierConfigMgr = NewTierConfigMgr()
globalTierConfigMgr.drivercache["WARM"] = tier
for _, tc := range testCases {
for _, src := range sources {
t.Run(tc.name+"/"+src.name, func(t *testing.T) {
r := &restoreTest{
t: t, z: z,
bucket: "restore-" + tc.name + "-" + src.name, object: "obj",
queue: make(chan expiryOp, 100),
labels: map[string]string{}, bodies: map[string][]byte{},
}
if err := z.MakeBucket(ctx, r.bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: tc.versioning != ""}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(r.bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if tc.versioning == versioning.Suspended {
meta.VersioningConfigXML = []byte("<VersioningConfiguration><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>")
}
meta.LifecycleConfigXML = []byte(rules)
if err := meta.Save(ctx, z); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(r.bucket, meta)
es := &expiryState{ctx: ctx, objAPI: z}
workers := []chan expiryOp{r.queue}
es.workers.Store(&workers)
globalExpiryState = es
var restored ObjectInfo
for _, v := range tc.versions {
oi := r.put(v.label, v.null, v.restored)
if v.restored {
r.restore(oi)
restored = oi
}
}
rlabel := r.labels[restoreTestVersionKey(restored.VersionID)]
// The fixture: the restored copy is on the drives,
// its restore has expired, ILM expires it.
fi := r.fileInfo(restored.VersionID)
if fi.TransitionStatus != lifecycle.TransitionComplete || fi.DataDir == "" || r.dataDirs(fi.DataDir) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("fixture: %s transition status %q, restored copy on %d drives", rlabel, fi.TransitionStatus, r.dataDirs(fi.DataDir))
}
oi, err := z.GetObjectInfo(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, r.opts(restored.VersionID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
lc, err := globalLifecycleSys.Get(r.bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
lr, err := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(r.bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
evt := evalActionFromLifecycle(ctx, *lc, lr, nil, oi)
if !evt.Action.DeleteRestored() || oi.RestoreExpires.IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("fixture: %s restore expires %v, action %v", rlabel, oi.RestoreExpires, evt.Action)
}
before, _ := r.versions()
for key, label := range r.labels {
if _, data, err := r.read(key); err != nil || !bytes.Equal(data, r.bodies[label]) {
t.Fatalf("fixture: GET %s: %v", label, err)
}
}
src.expire(r, oi, evt)
after, free := r.versions()
if fmt.Sprint(after) != fmt.Sprint(before) || free != 0 {
t.Errorf("versions in each pool: before %q, after %q with %d free versions", before, after, free)
}
if label, _, err := r.read(""); err != nil || label != tc.versions[len(tc.versions)-1].label {
t.Errorf("GET reads %q, %v; want %q", label, err, tc.versions[len(tc.versions)-1].label)
}
if n := r.dataDirs(fi.DataDir); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("restored copy of %s still on %d drives", rlabel, n)
}
oi, err = z.GetObjectInfo(ctx, r.bucket, r.object, r.opts(restored.VersionID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HEAD %s: %v", rlabel, err)
}
if oi.TransitionedObject.Status != lifecycle.TransitionComplete || oi.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzRestore] != "" || !oi.RestoreExpires.IsZero() {
t.Errorf("HEAD %s: transition status %q, x-amz-restore %q", rlabel, oi.TransitionedObject.Status, oi.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzRestore])
}
for _, v := range tc.versions {
for key, label := range r.labels {
if label != v.label {
continue
}
gets := tier.gets.Load()
_, data, err := r.read(key)
switch {
case err != nil:
t.Errorf("GET %s: %v", v.label, err)
case !bytes.Equal(data, r.bodies[v.label]):
t.Errorf("GET %s reads %d bytes that differ", v.label, len(data))
case v.restored && tier.gets.Load() == gets:
t.Errorf("GET %s does not read the tier", v.label)
}
}
}
})
}
}
})
}
}
+108 -37
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/amztime"
sse "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/encryption"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/event"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/replication"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/s3select"
@@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ func (n noncurrentVersionsTask) OpHash() uint64 {
}
func (j jentry) OpHash() uint64 {
return xxh3.HashString(j.TierName + j.ObjName)
return xxh3.HashString(j.Bucket + j.Object + j.TierName + j.RemoteObject + j.RemoteVersionID)
}
func (e expiryTask) OpHash() uint64 {
@@ -353,7 +354,16 @@ func (es *expiryState) Worker(input <-chan expiryOp) {
case noncurrentVersionsTask:
deleteObjectVersions(es.ctx, es.objAPI, v.bucket, v.versions, v.events)
case jentry:
transitionLogIf(es.ctx, deleteObjectFromRemoteTier(es.ctx, v.ObjName, v.VersionID, v.TierName))
z, ok := es.objAPI.(*erasureServerPools)
if !ok {
transitionLogIf(es.ctx, errTierOwnershipUnavailable)
continue
}
transitionLogIf(es.ctx, z.deleteTierTuple(es.ctx, v.Bucket, v.Object, tierRemoteTuple{
Tier: v.TierName,
Object: v.RemoteObject,
VersionID: v.RemoteVersionID,
}))
case freeVersionTask:
oi := v.ObjectInfo
traceFn := globalLifecycleSys.trace(oi)
@@ -369,19 +379,26 @@ func (es *expiryState) Worker(input <-chan expiryOp) {
}
return err
}
// Remove the remote object
err := deleteObjectFromRemoteTier(es.ctx, oi.TransitionedObject.Name, oi.TransitionedObject.VersionID, oi.TransitionedObject.Tier)
z, ok := es.objAPI.(*erasureServerPools)
if !ok {
transitionLogIf(es.ctx, errTierOwnershipUnavailable)
traceFn(ILMFreeVersionDelete, nil, errTierOwnershipUnavailable)
continue
}
// Check ownership, remove the remote object, and remove only the
// matching free record while the object lock is held.
err := z.deleteTierTuple(es.ctx, oi.Bucket, oi.Name, tierRemoteTuple{
Tier: oi.TransitionedObject.Tier,
Object: oi.TransitionedObject.Name,
VersionID: oi.TransitionedObject.VersionID,
})
if ignoreNotFoundErr(err) != nil {
transitionLogIf(es.ctx, err)
traceFn(ILMFreeVersionDelete, nil, err)
continue
}
// Remove this free version
_, err = es.objAPI.DeleteObject(es.ctx, oi.Bucket, oi.Name, ObjectOptions{
VersionID: oi.VersionID,
InclFreeVersions: true,
})
if err == nil {
auditLogLifecycle(es.ctx, oi, ILMFreeVersionDelete, nil, traceFn)
}
@@ -610,8 +627,9 @@ func enqueueTransitionImmediate(obj ObjectInfo, src lcEventSrc) {
func expireTransitionedObject(ctx context.Context, objectAPI ObjectLayer, oi *ObjectInfo, lcEvent lifecycle.Event, src lcEventSrc) error {
traceFn := globalLifecycleSys.trace(*oi)
opts := ObjectOptions{
Versioned: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(oi.Bucket, oi.Name),
Expiration: ExpirationOptions{Expire: true},
Versioned: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(oi.Bucket, oi.Name),
VersionSuspended: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(oi.Bucket, oi.Name),
Expiration: ExpirationOptions{Expire: true},
}
if lcEvent.Action.DeleteVersioned() {
opts.VersionID = oi.VersionID
@@ -621,6 +639,17 @@ func expireTransitionedObject(ctx context.Context, objectAPI ObjectLayer, oi *Ob
// delete locally restored copy of object or object version
// from the source, while leaving metadata behind. The data on
// transitioned tier lies untouched and still accessible
//
// The restored copy belongs to this version, also when it is the
// latest one (DeleteRestoredAction). Without its version ID the
// delete applies to the object: a versioned bucket gets a delete
// marker that hides it, a suspended one strips the null version.
// An empty version ID is the null version, as callers that read
// it without the versioning of the bucket leave it.
opts.VersionID = oi.VersionID
if opts.VersionID == "" {
opts.VersionID = nullVersionID
}
opts.Transition.ExpireRestored = true
_, err := objectAPI.DeleteObject(ctx, oi.Bucket, oi.Name, opts)
if err == nil {
@@ -631,32 +660,54 @@ func expireTransitionedObject(ctx context.Context, objectAPI ObjectLayer, oi *Ob
return err
}
// Delete remote object from warm-tier
err := deleteObjectFromRemoteTier(ctx, oi.TransitionedObject.Name, oi.TransitionedObject.VersionID, oi.TransitionedObject.Tier)
if err == nil {
// Skip adding free version since we successfully deleted the
// remote object
opts.SkipFreeVersion = true
} else {
transitionLogIf(ctx, err)
// Recheck the lifecycle decision and create the hot-tier tombstone before
// touching the remote tier. If the lifecycle configuration changed after
// the scanner queued this task, DeleteObject rejects the stale action while
// the remote object is still protected.
keepRemote := opts.VersionID == "" &&
(opts.Versioned || (opts.VersionSuspended && oi.VersionID != "" && oi.VersionID != nullVersionID))
// Delete the hot-tier namespace first. For a transitioned version this
// leaves a durable free-version record until the remote delete succeeds;
// that record is the retry point if the process stops between the two
// operations.
dobj, err := objectAPI.DeleteObject(ctx, oi.Bucket, oi.Name, opts)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Now, delete object from hot-tier namespace
if _, err := objectAPI.DeleteObject(ctx, oi.Bucket, oi.Name, opts); err != nil {
return err
if !keepRemote {
z, ok := objectAPI.(*erasureServerPools)
if !ok {
transitionLogIf(ctx, errTierOwnershipUnavailable)
return nil // The completed local expiry owns a durable free record.
}
if err := z.deleteTierTuple(ctx, oi.Bucket, oi.Name, tierRemoteTuple{
Tier: oi.TransitionedObject.Tier,
Object: oi.TransitionedObject.Name,
VersionID: oi.TransitionedObject.VersionID,
}); err != nil {
// The hot delete has already created a durable free record. Keep
// the expiry successful while the scanner retries remote cleanup;
// ownership or tier errors must never cause a second remote delete
// without that record.
transitionLogIf(ctx, err)
}
}
// Send audit for the lifecycle delete operation
defer auditLogLifecycle(ctx, *oi, ILMExpiry, tags, traceFn)
eventName := event.ObjectRemovedDelete
if oi.DeleteMarker {
eventName = event.ObjectRemovedDeleteMarkerCreated
}
// Name what the delete did: a marker it created, or the version it
// removed.
eventName := ilmExpiryEventName(opts.VersionID, dobj)
objInfo := ObjectInfo{
Name: oi.Name,
VersionID: oi.VersionID,
DeleteMarker: oi.DeleteMarker,
VersionID: dobj.VersionID,
DeleteMarker: dobj.DeleteMarker,
}
if objInfo.VersionID == "" {
objInfo.VersionID = opts.VersionID
}
// Notify object deleted event.
sendEvent(eventArgs{
@@ -931,8 +982,10 @@ func postRestoreOpts(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, bucket, object string
}, nil
}
// set ObjectOptions for PUT call to restore temporary copy of transitioned data
func putRestoreOpts(bucket, object string, rreq *RestoreObjectRequest, objInfo ObjectInfo) (putOpts ObjectOptions) {
// set ObjectOptions for PUT call to restore temporary copy of transitioned data.
// opts are the restore's options, with the versioning POST captured: the
// bucket's versioning may have changed since, and must not mint a new version.
func putRestoreOpts(rreq *RestoreObjectRequest, objInfo ObjectInfo, opts ObjectOptions) (putOpts ObjectOptions) {
meta := make(map[string]string)
sc := rreq.OutputLocation.S3.StorageClass
if sc == "" {
@@ -955,8 +1008,8 @@ func putRestoreOpts(bucket, object string, rreq *RestoreObjectRequest, objInfo O
meta[xhttp.AmzServerSideEncryption] = xhttp.AmzEncryptionAES
}
return ObjectOptions{
Versioned: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(bucket, object),
VersionSuspended: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(bucket, object),
Versioned: opts.Versioned,
VersionSuspended: opts.VersionSuspended,
UserDefined: meta,
}
}
@@ -964,19 +1017,37 @@ func putRestoreOpts(bucket, object string, rreq *RestoreObjectRequest, objInfo O
if len(objInfo.UserTags) != 0 {
meta[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = objInfo.UserTags
}
// Set restore object status
// Set restore object status; a completed restore has no attempt.
restoreExpiry := lifecycle.ExpectedExpiryTime(time.Now().UTC(), rreq.Days)
meta[xhttp.AmzRestore] = completedRestoreObj(restoreExpiry).String()
delete(meta, restoreAttemptKey)
return ObjectOptions{
Versioned: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(bucket, object),
VersionSuspended: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(bucket, object),
Versioned: opts.Versioned,
VersionSuspended: opts.VersionSuspended,
UserDefined: meta,
VersionID: objInfo.VersionID,
VersionID: restoreVersionID(objInfo.VersionID),
MTime: objInfo.ModTime,
Expires: objInfo.Expires,
}
}
// restoredCopyExpires reports whether the restored copy of oi, as read now,
// expires by its own reason: lifecycle expires the restored copy of this
// version, its restore deadline is valid and has passed, its transition is
// complete and no restore is running. Another rule falling due is no reason.
func restoredCopyExpires(ctx context.Context, lc lifecycle.Lifecycle, lr lock.Retention, rcfg *replication.Config, oi ObjectInfo) bool {
if !evalActionFromLifecycle(ctx, lc, lr, rcfg, oi).Action.DeleteRestored() {
return false
}
status, err := parseRestoreObjStatus(oi.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzRestore])
if err != nil {
return false
}
expiry, completed := status.Expiry()
return completed && !expiry.IsZero() && UTCNow().After(expiry) &&
oi.TransitionedObject.Status == lifecycle.TransitionComplete && !oi.RestoreOngoing
}
var errRestoreHDRMalformed = fmt.Errorf("x-amz-restore header malformed")
// IsRemote returns true if this object version's contents are in its remote
+183
View File
@@ -19,11 +19,17 @@ package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"io"
"net/http"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/lifecycle"
objectlock "github.com/minio/minio/internal/bucket/object/lock"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
)
@@ -245,3 +251,180 @@ func TestValidateTransitionTier(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// tierExpiryTestBackend is a remote tier held in memory.
type tierExpiryTestBackend struct {
mu sync.Mutex
objects map[string][]byte
removed []string
}
func (b *tierExpiryTestBackend) Put(ctx context.Context, object string, r io.Reader, length int64) (remoteVersionID, error) {
return b.PutWithMeta(ctx, object, r, length, nil)
}
func (b *tierExpiryTestBackend) PutWithMeta(_ context.Context, object string, r io.Reader, _ int64, _ map[string]string) (remoteVersionID, error) {
data, err := io.ReadAll(r)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
b.objects[object] = data
return "", nil
}
func (b *tierExpiryTestBackend) Get(_ context.Context, object string, _ remoteVersionID, opts WarmBackendGetOpts) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
data, ok := b.objects[object]
if !ok {
return nil, ObjectNotFound{Bucket: "tier", Object: object}
}
if opts.length > 0 {
data = data[opts.startOffset : opts.startOffset+opts.length]
}
return io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(data)), nil
}
func (b *tierExpiryTestBackend) Remove(_ context.Context, object string, _ remoteVersionID) error {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
delete(b.objects, object)
b.removed = append(b.removed, object)
return nil
}
func (b *tierExpiryTestBackend) InUse(context.Context) (bool, error) { return false, nil }
// The expiry of a transitioned latest version that only puts a delete marker
// on top of it must keep its remote object, so the version stays readable as
// a noncurrent version. The remote object goes when the version is deleted.
func TestExpireTransitionedObjectKeepsNoncurrentData(t *testing.T) {
z, _ := migrationTestPools(t)
ctx := t.Context()
tier := &tierExpiryTestBackend{objects: map[string][]byte{}}
prevTier := globalTierConfigMgr
globalTierConfigMgr = NewTierConfigMgr()
globalTierConfigMgr.drivercache["WARM"] = tier
t.Cleanup(func() { globalTierConfigMgr = prevTier })
const expire = `<LifecycleConfiguration><Rule><ID>exp</ID><Status>Enabled</Status><Filter><Prefix></Prefix></Filter>` +
`<Expiration><Date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</Date></Expiration></Rule></LifecycleConfiguration>`
testCases := []struct {
name string
versioning string // "", Enabled or Suspended
nullLatest bool // the latest version is the null version
keep bool // the latest version survives as noncurrent
want []string // versions after the expiry, newest first
}{
{name: "versioned", versioning: "Enabled", keep: true, want: []string{"DM", "v2", "v1"}},
{name: "suspended", versioning: "Suspended", keep: true, want: []string{"DM", "v2", "v1"}},
{name: "suspended-null", versioning: "Suspended", nullLatest: true, want: []string{"DM", "v1"}},
{name: "unversioned", nullLatest: true, want: nil},
}
for _, tc := range testCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
bucket := "tier-expiry-" + tc.name
if err := z.MakeBucket(ctx, bucket, MakeBucketOptions{VersioningEnabled: tc.versioning != ""}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
meta, err := globalBucketMetadataSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if tc.versioning == "Suspended" {
meta.VersioningConfigXML = []byte("<VersioningConfiguration><Status>Suspended</Status></VersioningConfiguration>")
}
meta.LifecycleConfigXML = []byte(expire)
if err := meta.Save(ctx, z); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
globalBucketMetadataSys.Set(bucket, meta)
// tiered writes a version whose data is in the remote tier.
labels := map[string]string{}
tiered := func(label string, opts ObjectOptions) ObjectInfo {
t.Helper()
oi := putConsistencyObject(t, z, bucket, "obj", 0, "obj "+label, opts)
vid := migrationTestVersion(oi)
infos, errs := readAllFileInfo(ctx, z.serverPools[0].getHashedSet("obj").getDisks(), "", bucket, "obj", vid, false, false)
if errs[0] != nil {
t.Fatal(errs[0])
}
fi := infos[0]
fi.TransitionStatus, fi.TransitionTier, fi.TransitionedObjName = lifecycle.TransitionComplete, "WARM", bucket+"/"+label
if _, err := tier.Put(ctx, fi.TransitionedObjName, strings.NewReader("obj "+label), -1); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := z.serverPools[0].DecomTieredObject(ctx, bucket, "obj", fi, ObjectOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
labels[vid] = label
return oi
}
var latest ObjectInfo
if tc.versioning != "" {
tiered("v1", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
}
if tc.nullLatest {
latest = tiered("v2", ObjectOptions{})
} else {
latest = tiered("v2", ObjectOptions{Versioned: true})
}
// Expire the latest version as the expiry worker does for the scanner.
getOpts := ObjectOptions{Versioned: tc.versioning == "Enabled", VersionSuspended: tc.versioning == "Suspended"}
oi, err := z.GetObjectInfo(ctx, bucket, "obj", getOpts)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
lc, err := globalLifecycleSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
evt := evalActionFromLifecycle(ctx, *lc, objectlock.Retention{}, nil, oi)
if evt.Action != lifecycle.DeleteAction || oi.TransitionedObject.Status != lifecycle.TransitionComplete {
t.Fatalf("fixture: action %v, transition status %q", evt.Action, oi.TransitionedObject.Status)
}
if err := expireTransitionedObject(ctx, z, &oi, evt, lcEventSrc_Scanner); err != nil {
t.Errorf("expiry: %v", err)
}
var got []string
for _, set := range z.serverPools[0].sets {
err := set.listObjectsToDecommission(ctx, decomBucketInfo{Name: bucket}, func(entry metaCacheEntry) {
fivs, err := entry.fileInfoVersions(bucket)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
return
}
for _, fi := range fivs.Versions {
if fi.Deleted {
got = append(got, "DM")
} else {
got = append(got, labels[migrationTestVersion(fi.ToObjectInfo(bucket, "obj", true))])
}
}
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
if !slices.Equal(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("versions after expiry: got %v, want %v", got, tc.want)
}
remote := bucket + "/v2"
if removed := slices.Contains(tier.removed, remote); removed == tc.keep {
t.Errorf("remote object of the expired version removed: %v, want %v", removed, !tc.keep)
}
if tc.keep {
body := migrationTestBody(t, z.GetObjectNInfo, bucket, "obj", migrationTestVersion(latest))
if body != "obj v2" {
t.Errorf("v2 reads %q after the expiry, want %q", body, "obj v2")
}
}
})
}
}
+25
View File
@@ -39,3 +39,28 @@ func TestBucketMetadataCorsRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("CorsConfigUpdatedAt not preserved")
}
}
// A persisted retired extension must not prevent the whole bucket's metadata
// from loading, including unrelated versioning and ordinary lifecycle rules.
func TestBucketMetadataRetiredAccessTiering(t *testing.T) {
meta := newBucketMetadata("retired-access")
meta.LifecycleConfigXML = []byte(`<LifecycleConfiguration><AccessTierQuota>500GiB</AccessTierQuota><Rule><ID>access</ID><Status>Enabled</Status><Filter><Prefix>logs/</Prefix></Filter><AccessTransition><Window>10m</Window><PromoteAfterAccesses>10</PromoteAfterAccesses></AccessTransition></Rule><Rule><ID>ordinary</ID><Status>Enabled</Status><Filter><Prefix>expired/</Prefix></Filter><Expiration><Days>30</Days></Expiration></Rule></LifecycleConfiguration>`)
meta.VersioningConfigXML = []byte(`<VersioningConfiguration xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/"><Status>Enabled</Status></VersioningConfiguration>`)
data, err := meta.MarshalMsg(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got := newBucketMetadata(meta.Name)
if _, err := got.UnmarshalMsg(data); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := got.parseAllConfigs(t.Context(), nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bucket metadata failed to load: %v", err)
}
if got.lifecycleConfig == nil || got.lifecycleConfig.HasActiveRules("logs/") || !got.lifecycleConfig.HasActiveRules("expired/") {
t.Fatal("unexpected lifecycle behavior")
}
if got.versioningConfig == nil || !got.versioningConfig.Enabled() {
t.Fatal("unrelated versioning lost")
}
}
+169 -61
View File
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ package cmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"math"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -164,76 +164,176 @@ func enforceRetentionBypassForDelete(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, bucke
return nil
}
// enforceRetentionBypassForPut enforces whether an existing object under governance can be overwritten
// with governance bypass headers set in the request.
// Objects under site wide WORM cannot be overwritten.
// For objects in "Governance" mode, overwrite is allowed if a) object retention date is past OR
// governance bypass headers are set and user has governance bypass permissions.
// Objects in compliance mode can be overwritten only if retention date is being extended. No mode change is permitted.
// isRetentionActionAllowed evaluates action for a PutObjectRetention request
// with the object-lock condition keys derived from the requested retention.
// The keys come from the request, not from the stored version, so the
// handler can decide s3:PutObjectRetention before reading any object state.
func isRetentionActionAllowed(action policy.Action, bucket, object string, objRetention *objectlock.ObjectRetention, r *http.Request, cred auth.Credentials, owner bool) bool {
if cred.AccessKey == "" {
return false
}
t, err := objectlock.UTCNowNTP()
if err != nil {
return false
}
conditions := getConditionValues(r, "", cred)
conditions["object-lock-mode"] = []string{string(objRetention.Mode)}
conditions["object-lock-retain-until-date"] = []string{objRetention.RetainUntilDate.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)}
// Relative days from now, for "object-lock-remaining-retention-days".
// Clearing retention (<Retention/>) has a zero RetainUntilDate, which must
// evaluate as 0 remaining days rather than a large positive math.Abs delta
// from year 0001.
days := 0
if !objRetention.RetainUntilDate.IsZero() && objRetention.RetainUntilDate.After(t) {
// Time.Sub saturates after about 292 years. Count seconds instead so
// maximum-retention policies also apply to distant RFC3339 dates.
seconds := objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Unix() - t.Unix()
days = int(seconds / 86400)
if seconds%86400 != 0 || objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Nanosecond() > t.Nanosecond() {
days++
}
}
conditions["object-lock-remaining-retention-days"] = []string{strconv.Itoa(days)}
return globalIAMSys.IsAllowed(policy.Args{
AccountName: cred.AccessKey,
Groups: cred.Groups,
Action: action,
BucketName: bucket,
ConditionValues: conditions,
ObjectName: object,
IsOwner: owner,
Claims: cred.Claims,
})
}
// enforceRetentionBypassForPut enforces the stored retention of oi against a
// PutObjectRetention request. The caller must already hold
// s3:PutObjectRetention; this only decides changes that depend on the stored
// state. Expired or absent retention may be changed freely. Unexpired
// GOVERNANCE retention may be shortened, removed or have its mode changed only
// with the bypass header and s3:BypassGovernanceRetention. Unexpired
// COMPLIANCE retention may only be extended.
func enforceRetentionBypassForPut(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, oi ObjectInfo, objRetention *objectlock.ObjectRetention, cred auth.Credentials, owner bool) error {
byPassSet := objectlock.IsObjectLockGovernanceBypassSet(r.Header)
ret := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(oi.UserDefined)
if !ret.Mode.Valid() {
return nil
}
t, err := objectlock.UTCNowNTP()
if err != nil {
internalLogIf(ctx, err, logger.WarningKind)
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: oi.Bucket, Object: oi.Name, VersionID: oi.VersionID}
}
if ret.RetainUntilDate.Before(t) {
return nil
}
// Pass in relative days from current time, to additionally
// to verify "object-lock-remaining-retention-days" policy if any.
days := int(math.Ceil(math.Abs(objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Sub(t).Hours()) / 24))
ret := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(oi.UserDefined)
if ret.Mode.Valid() {
// Retention has expired you may change whatever you like.
if ret.RetainUntilDate.Before(t) {
apiErr := isPutRetentionAllowed(oi.Bucket, oi.Name,
days, objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Time,
objRetention.Mode, byPassSet, r, cred,
owner)
if apiErr == ErrAccessDenied {
return errAuthentication
}
return nil
weakens := objRetention.Mode != ret.Mode || objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Before(ret.RetainUntilDate.Time)
if !weakens {
return nil
}
switch ret.Mode {
case objectlock.RetGovernance:
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/object-lock.html#object-lock-bypass-governance
if !objectlock.IsObjectLockGovernanceBypassSet(r.Header) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: oi.Bucket, Object: oi.Name, VersionID: oi.VersionID}
}
switch ret.Mode {
case objectlock.RetGovernance:
govPerm := isPutRetentionAllowed(oi.Bucket, oi.Name, days,
objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Time, objRetention.Mode,
byPassSet, r, cred, owner)
// Governance mode retention period cannot be shortened, if x-amz-bypass-governance is not set.
if !byPassSet {
if objRetention.Mode != objectlock.RetGovernance || objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Before(ret.RetainUntilDate.Time) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: oi.Bucket, Object: oi.Name, VersionID: oi.VersionID}
}
}
if govPerm == ErrAccessDenied {
return errAuthentication
}
return nil
case objectlock.RetCompliance:
// Compliance retention mode cannot be changed or shortened.
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/object-lock-overview.html#object-lock-retention-modes
if objRetention.Mode != objectlock.RetCompliance || objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Before(ret.RetainUntilDate.Time) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: oi.Bucket, Object: oi.Name, VersionID: oi.VersionID}
}
apiErr := isPutRetentionAllowed(oi.Bucket, oi.Name,
days, objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Time, objRetention.Mode,
false, r, cred, owner)
if apiErr == ErrAccessDenied {
return errAuthentication
}
return nil
if !isRetentionActionAllowed(policy.BypassGovernanceRetentionAction, oi.Bucket, oi.Name, objRetention, r, cred, owner) {
return errAuthentication
}
return nil
} // No pre-existing retention metadata present.
default:
// Compliance retention mode cannot be changed or shortened.
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/object-lock-overview.html#object-lock-retention-modes
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: oi.Bucket, Object: oi.Name, VersionID: oi.VersionID}
}
}
apiErr := isPutRetentionAllowed(oi.Bucket, oi.Name,
days, objRetention.RetainUntilDate.Time,
objRetention.Mode, byPassSet, r, cred, owner)
if apiErr == ErrAccessDenied {
return errAuthentication
// checkObjectLockedForOverwrite re-checks under the object write lock whether an
// in-place write to the null version (such as a directory object) would
// overwrite a locked version in an Object Lock bucket.
func checkObjectLockedForOverwrite(ctx context.Context, bucket, object string, getObjectInfoFn GetObjectInfoFn) error {
if isMinioMetaBucketName(bucket) {
return nil
}
retentionCfg, err := globalBucketObjectLockSys.Get(bucket)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !retentionCfg.LockEnabled {
return nil
}
objInfo, err := getObjectInfoFn(ctx, bucket, object, ObjectOptions{
VersionID: nullVersionID,
NoLock: true,
NoAuditLog: true,
})
if err != nil {
if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) || errors.As(err, &MethodNotAllowed{}) {
return nil
}
return err
}
if objectlock.GetObjectLegalHoldMeta(objInfo.UserDefined).Status == objectlock.LegalHoldOn {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: bucket, Object: decodeDirObject(object), VersionID: nullVersionID}
}
r := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(objInfo.UserDefined)
if r.Mode == objectlock.RetCompliance || r.Mode == objectlock.RetGovernance {
t, err := objectlock.UTCNowNTP()
if err != nil {
internalLogIf(ctx, err, logger.WarningKind)
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: bucket, Object: decodeDirObject(object), VersionID: nullVersionID}
}
if r.RetainUntilDate.After(t) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: bucket, Object: decodeDirObject(object), VersionID: nullVersionID}
}
}
return nil
}
// checkVersionLockedForOverwrite re-checks under the object write lock
// whether a write would replace the stored version versionID (the null
// version if empty) while Object Lock protects it. It reads the version's own
// metadata, whatever the bucket configuration, and a failed read is an error.
func checkVersionLockedForOverwrite(ctx context.Context, bucket, object, versionID string, getObjectInfoFn GetObjectInfoFn, transition TransitionOptions) error {
if isMinioMetaBucketName(bucket) {
return nil
}
if versionID == "" {
versionID = nullVersionID
}
objInfo, err := getObjectInfoFn(ctx, bucket, object, ObjectOptions{
VersionID: versionID,
Transition: transition,
NoLock: true,
NoAuditLog: true,
})
if err != nil {
// A delete marker is not protected.
if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) || errors.As(err, &MethodNotAllowed{}) {
return nil
}
return err
}
if enforceRetentionForDeletion(ctx, objInfo) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: bucket, Object: decodeDirObject(object), VersionID: versionID}
}
return nil
}
// refuseLockedMarkerOverwrite refuses a delete marker write that would replace
// the stored version it names while Object Lock protects it. goi and gerr are
// that version as read under the write lock. A new marker, or one replacing a
// marker, is allowed.
func refuseLockedMarkerOverwrite(ctx context.Context, bucket, object, versionID string, goi ObjectInfo, gerr error) error {
if gerr != nil {
if isErrObjectNotFound(gerr) || isErrVersionNotFound(gerr) || errors.As(gerr, &MethodNotAllowed{}) {
return nil
}
return gerr
}
if enforceRetentionForDeletion(ctx, goi) {
return ObjectLocked{Bucket: bucket, Object: decodeDirObject(object), VersionID: versionID}
}
return nil
}
@@ -274,16 +374,24 @@ func checkPutObjectLockAllowed(ctx context.Context, rq *http.Request, bucket, ob
if err != nil {
return mode, retainDate, legalHold, toAPIErrorCode(ctx, err)
}
if isDirObject(object) && opts.VersionID == "" {
opts.VersionID = nullVersionID
}
if opts.VersionID != "" && !replicaTrusted {
if objInfo, err := getObjectInfoFn(ctx, bucket, object, opts); err == nil {
objInfo, err := getObjectInfoFn(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
if err != nil {
if !isErrObjectNotFound(err) && !isErrVersionNotFound(err) && !errors.As(err, &MethodNotAllowed{}) {
return mode, retainDate, legalHold, toAPIErrorCode(ctx, err)
}
} else {
r := objectlock.GetObjectRetentionMeta(objInfo.UserDefined)
t, err := objectlock.UTCNowNTP()
if err != nil {
internalLogIf(ctx, err, logger.WarningKind)
return mode, retainDate, legalHold, ErrObjectLocked
}
if r.Mode == objectlock.RetCompliance && r.RetainUntilDate.After(t) {
if (r.Mode == objectlock.RetCompliance || r.Mode == objectlock.RetGovernance) && r.RetainUntilDate.After(t) {
return mode, retainDate, legalHold, ErrObjectLocked
}
mode = r.Mode
+257
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Denis Babchuk
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"maps"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/v7/pkg/credentials"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
)
// checksumTestObject builds the xl.meta checksum of an object the way
// PutObject and CompleteMultipartUpload store it.
func checksumTestObject(t *testing.T, alg hash.ChecksumType, full bool, parts ...[]byte) FileInfo {
t.Helper()
fi := FileInfo{Volume: "bucket", Name: "object"}
if len(parts) == 1 {
fi.Size = int64(len(parts[0]))
fi.Checksum = hash.NewChecksumFromData(alg, parts[0]).AppendTo(nil, nil)
return fi
}
var combined, all []byte
for i, p := range parts {
combined = append(combined, hash.NewChecksumFromData(alg, p).Raw...)
all = append(all, p...)
fi.Parts = append(fi.Parts, ObjectPartInfo{Number: i + 1, Size: int64(len(p)), ActualSize: int64(len(p))})
fi.Size += int64(len(p))
}
typ := alg | hash.ChecksumMultipart | hash.ChecksumIncludesMultipart
if full {
typ |= hash.ChecksumFullObject
}
cs := hash.NewChecksumFromData(typ, combined)
if typ.FullObjectRequested() {
// Full object CRC, as merged from the parts on completion.
whole := hash.NewChecksumFromData(alg, all)
cs = &hash.Checksum{Type: typ, Raw: whole.Raw, Encoded: whole.Encoded}
}
fi.Checksum = cs.AppendTo(nil, combined)
return fi
}
// TestGetCRCMetaChecksumType checks the checksum headers that replication
// sends for an object: a FULL_OBJECT checksum type only for multipart full
// object CRCs, where the target needs it to create a matching upload.
func TestGetCRCMetaChecksumType(t *testing.T) {
p1, p2 := []byte("first part"), []byte("second part")
enc := func(alg hash.ChecksumType, b []byte) string { return hash.NewChecksumFromData(alg, b).Encoded }
whole := append(append([]byte{}, p1...), p2...)
composite := func(alg hash.ChecksumType) string {
var combined []byte
combined = append(combined, hash.NewChecksumFromData(alg, p1).Raw...)
combined = append(combined, hash.NewChecksumFromData(alg, p2).Raw...)
return enc(alg, combined) + "-2"
}
full := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzChecksumType: xhttp.AmzChecksumTypeFullObject}
tests := []struct {
name string
fi FileInfo
alg hash.ChecksumType
isMP bool
value string
extra map[string]string
}{
{"single-part SHA256", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumSHA256, false, p1), hash.ChecksumSHA256, false, enc(hash.ChecksumSHA256, p1), nil},
{"single-part CRC32", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumCRC32, false, p1), hash.ChecksumCRC32, false, enc(hash.ChecksumCRC32, p1), nil},
{"single-part CRC64NVME", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME, false, p1), hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME, false, enc(hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME, p1), nil},
{"multipart COMPOSITE CRC32C", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumCRC32C, false, p1, p2), hash.ChecksumCRC32C, true, composite(hash.ChecksumCRC32C), nil},
{"multipart COMPOSITE SHA256", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumSHA256, false, p1, p2), hash.ChecksumSHA256, true, composite(hash.ChecksumSHA256), nil},
{"multipart FULL_OBJECT CRC32", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumCRC32, true, p1, p2), hash.ChecksumCRC32, true, enc(hash.ChecksumCRC32, whole), full},
{"multipart FULL_OBJECT CRC32C", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumCRC32C, true, p1, p2), hash.ChecksumCRC32C, true, enc(hash.ChecksumCRC32C, whole), full},
{"multipart CRC64NVME", checksumTestObject(t, hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME, false, p1, p2), hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME, true, enc(hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME, whole), full},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
oi := tt.fi.ToObjectInfo("bucket", "object", true)
want := map[string]string{tt.alg.Key(): tt.value, xhttp.AmzChecksumAlgo: tt.alg.String()}
maps.Copy(want, tt.extra)
got, isMP := getCRCMeta(oi, 0, nil)
if isMP != tt.isMP {
t.Errorf("isMP: got %t, want %t", isMP, tt.isMP)
}
if !maps.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("object headers: got %v, want %v", got, want)
}
if !tt.isMP {
return
}
// Part headers carry the part checksum and never a type.
want = map[string]string{tt.alg.Key(): enc(tt.alg, p2), xhttp.AmzChecksumAlgo: tt.alg.String()}
if got, _ := getCRCMeta(oi, 2, nil); !maps.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("part 2 headers: got %v, want %v", got, want)
}
})
}
}
// TestReplicateObjectChecksumTypes replicates objects with checksums through
// the S3 API of a test server, and checks that the replica gets the same
// checksum as the source.
func TestReplicateObjectChecksumTypes(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
// Leave no object layer behind: unit tests that run later in the package
// rely on newObjectLayerFn() returning nil.
defer resetTestGlobals()
ts := StartTestServer(t, ErasureSDStr)
defer ts.Stop()
clnt, err := minio.New(strings.TrimPrefix(ts.Server.URL, "http://"), &minio.Options{
Creds: credentials.NewStaticV4(ts.AccessKey, ts.SecretKey, ""),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
core := &minio.Core{Client: clnt}
for _, bucket := range []string{"src", "dst"} {
if err := clnt.MakeBucket(ctx, bucket, minio.MakeBucketOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := clnt.EnableVersioning(ctx, bucket); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
small := []byte("single part object")
p1 := bytes.Repeat([]byte("a"), 5<<20)
p2 := []byte("last part")
tests := []struct {
name string
alg hash.ChecksumType
multipart bool
full bool
copyOf string // server-side copy of an object created above
}{
{"put-SHA256", hash.ChecksumSHA256, false, false, ""},
{"put-CRC32", hash.ChecksumCRC32, false, false, ""},
{"mp-COMPOSITE-CRC32C", hash.ChecksumCRC32C, true, false, ""},
{"mp-COMPOSITE-SHA256", hash.ChecksumSHA256, true, false, ""},
{"mp-FULL_OBJECT-CRC32", hash.ChecksumCRC32, true, true, ""},
{"mp-FULL_OBJECT-CRC32C", hash.ChecksumCRC32C, true, true, ""},
{"mp-CRC64NVME", hash.ChecksumCRC64NVME, true, false, ""},
// The copy keeps the multipart FULL_OBJECT checksum of its source
// but is not multipart, so it replicates with a single PUT.
{"copy-FULL_OBJECT-CRC32", hash.ChecksumCRC32, false, true, "mp-FULL_OBJECT-CRC32"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
object := tt.name
// Upload the source object like an S3 client does.
switch {
case tt.copyOf != "":
_, err := core.CopyObject(ctx, "src", tt.copyOf, "src", object, nil, minio.CopySrcOptions{}, minio.PutObjectOptions{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
case !tt.multipart:
_, err := core.PutObject(ctx, "src", object, bytes.NewReader(small), int64(len(small)), "", "", minio.PutObjectOptions{
UserMetadata: map[string]string{tt.alg.Key(): hash.NewChecksumFromData(tt.alg, small).Encoded},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
default:
meta := map[string]string{xhttp.AmzChecksumAlgo: tt.alg.String()}
if tt.full {
meta[xhttp.AmzChecksumType] = xhttp.AmzChecksumTypeFullObject
}
uploadID, err := core.NewMultipartUpload(ctx, "src", object, minio.PutObjectOptions{UserMetadata: meta})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var parts []minio.CompletePart
for i, p := range [][]byte{p1, p2} {
h := http.Header{}
h.Set(tt.alg.Key(), hash.NewChecksumFromData(tt.alg, p).Encoded)
pi, err := core.PutObjectPart(ctx, "src", object, uploadID, i+1, bytes.NewReader(p), int64(len(p)), minio.PutObjectPartOptions{CustomHeader: h})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
parts = append(parts, minio.CompletePart{
PartNumber: pi.PartNumber, ETag: pi.ETag,
ChecksumCRC32: pi.ChecksumCRC32, ChecksumCRC32C: pi.ChecksumCRC32C,
ChecksumSHA1: pi.ChecksumSHA1, ChecksumSHA256: pi.ChecksumSHA256,
ChecksumCRC64NVME: pi.ChecksumCRC64NVME,
})
}
if _, err := core.CompleteMultipartUpload(ctx, "src", object, uploadID, parts, minio.PutObjectOptions{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// Replicate it the way replicateObject does.
gr, err := ts.Obj.GetObjectNInfo(ctx, "src", object, nil, http.Header{}, ObjectOptions{Versioned: true, ReplicationRequest: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer gr.Close()
objInfo := gr.ObjInfo
putOpts, isMP, err := putReplicationOpts(ctx, "", objInfo)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if isMP != tt.multipart {
t.Fatalf("multipart replication: got %t, want %t", isMP, tt.multipart)
}
if isMP {
err = replicateObjectWithMultipart(ctx, core, "dst", object, gr, objInfo, putOpts)
} else {
size, serr := objInfo.GetActualSize()
if serr != nil {
t.Fatal(serr)
}
_, err = core.PutObject(ctx, "dst", object, gr, size, "", "", putOpts)
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("replication failed: %v", err)
}
src, err := clnt.StatObject(ctx, "src", object, minio.StatObjectOptions{Checksum: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
dst, err := clnt.StatObject(ctx, "dst", object, minio.StatObjectOptions{Checksum: true})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
checksums := func(oi minio.ObjectInfo) string {
return strings.Join([]string{oi.ChecksumMode, oi.ChecksumCRC32, oi.ChecksumCRC32C, oi.ChecksumSHA1, oi.ChecksumSHA256, oi.ChecksumCRC64NVME}, "|")
}
if checksums(src) == "|||||" || checksums(dst) != checksums(src) {
t.Errorf("replica checksum %q, source %q", checksums(dst), checksums(src))
}
})
}
}
+3
View File
@@ -418,6 +418,9 @@ func getReplicationState(rinfos replicatedInfos, prevState ReplicationState, vID
for _, rinfo := range rinfos.Targets {
if rinfo.ResyncTimestamp != "" {
if rs.ResetStatusesMap == nil {
rs.ResetStatusesMap = make(map[string]string)
}
rs.ResetStatusesMap[targetResetHeader(rinfo.Arn)] = rinfo.ResyncTimestamp
}
}
+180 -63
View File
@@ -425,6 +425,7 @@ func checkReplicateDelete(ctx context.Context, bucket string, dobj ObjectToDelet
// the mere presence or absence of the target version.
func replicateDelete(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, objectAPI ObjectLayer) replicatedInfos {
var replicationStatus replication.StatusType
isPurge := dobj.isVersionPurge()
bucket := dobj.Bucket
versionID := dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID
if versionID == "" {
@@ -484,6 +485,7 @@ func replicateDelete(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, obj
lk := objectAPI.NewNSLock(bucket, "/[replicate]/"+dobj.ObjectName)
lkctx, err := lk.GetLock(ctx, globalOperationTimeout)
if err != nil {
dobj.RetryCount++
globalReplicationPool.Get().queueMRFSave(dobj.ToMRFEntry())
sendEvent(eventArgs{
BucketName: bucket,
@@ -502,6 +504,35 @@ func replicateDelete(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, obj
ctx = lkctx.Context()
defer lk.Unlock(lkctx)
if !isPurge && dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID != "" {
// A creation task carries the marker as it looked when it was queued
// by the DELETE handler, a GET/HEAD/LIST heal, the scanner or MRF.
// While it waited for this lock, another frontend may have purged the
// marker and replicated that purge. The targets no longer hold the
// marker, so the queued creation would recreate it from the stale
// snapshot. Confirm the source version under the lock first.
switch deleteMarkerCreationState(ctx, objectAPI, dobj) {
case creationStale:
return replicatedInfos{}
case creationUnverified:
dobj.RetryCount++
globalReplicationPool.Get().queueMRFSave(dobj.ToMRFEntry())
sendEvent(eventArgs{
BucketName: bucket,
Object: ObjectInfo{
Bucket: bucket,
Name: dobj.ObjectName,
VersionID: versionID,
DeleteMarker: dobj.DeleteMarker,
},
UserAgent: "Internal: [Replication]",
Host: globalLocalNodeName,
EventName: event.ObjectReplicationNotTracked,
})
return replicatedInfos{}
}
}
rinfos := replicatedInfos{Targets: make([]replicatedTargetInfo, 0, len(dsc.targetsMap))}
var wg sync.WaitGroup
var mu sync.Mutex
@@ -546,25 +577,38 @@ func replicateDelete(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, obj
replicationStatus = rinfos.ReplicationStatus()
prevStatus := dobj.DeleteMarkerReplicationStatus()
if dobj.VersionID != "" {
prevStatus = replication.StatusType(dobj.VersionPurgeStatus())
replicationStatus = replication.StatusType(rinfos.VersionPurgeStatus())
if isPurge {
prevStatus = purgeReplicationStatus(dobj.VersionPurgeStatus())
replicationStatus = purgeReplicationStatus(rinfos.VersionPurgeStatus())
}
// to decrement pending count later.
for _, rinfo := range rinfos.Targets {
if rinfo.ReplicationStatus != rinfo.PrevReplicationStatus {
globalReplicationStats.Load().Update(dobj.Bucket, rinfo, replicationStatus,
prevStatus)
status, previous := rinfo.ReplicationStatus, rinfo.PrevReplicationStatus
if isPurge {
status = purgeReplicationStatus(rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus)
previous = purgeReplicationStatus(dobj.ReplicationState.PurgeTargets[rinfo.Arn])
}
if status != previous {
globalReplicationStats.Load().Update(dobj.Bucket, rinfo, status, previous)
}
}
eventName := event.ObjectReplicationComplete
if replicationStatus == replication.Failed {
eventName = event.ObjectReplicationFailed
dobj.RetryCount++
globalReplicationPool.Get().queueMRFSave(dobj.ToMRFEntry())
}
drs := getReplicationState(rinfos, dobj.ReplicationState, dobj.VersionID)
if isPurge {
// A purge must not rewrite the marker's creation/replica metadata.
// Multiple serialized empty target statuses can parse as nonempty,
// so explicitly send an empty creation update to the metadata writer.
drs.ReplicationStatusInternal = ""
drs.Targets = nil
drs.ReplicaStatus = ""
}
if replicationStatus != prevStatus {
drs.ReplicationTimeStamp = UTCNow()
}
@@ -606,6 +650,7 @@ func replicateDelete(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, obj
}
func replicateDeleteToTarget(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationInfo, tgt *TargetClient) (rinfo replicatedTargetInfo) {
isPurge := dobj.isVersionPurge()
versionID := dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID
if versionID == "" {
versionID = dobj.VersionID
@@ -615,42 +660,50 @@ func replicateDeleteToTarget(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationI
rinfo.OpType = dobj.OpType
rinfo.endpoint = tgt.EndpointURL().Host
rinfo.secure = tgt.EndpointURL().Scheme == "https"
// A purge leaves ReplicationStatus empty: the metadata writer interprets
// that as preserving the entire creation-status block, including targets
// outside this fan-out. Only VersionPurgeStatus records the purge outcome.
defer func() {
if rinfo.ReplicationStatus == replication.Completed && tgt.ResetID != "" && dobj.OpType == replication.ExistingObjectReplicationType {
completed := rinfo.ReplicationStatus == replication.Completed
if isPurge {
completed = rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus == replication.VersionPurgeComplete
}
if completed && tgt.ResetID != "" && dobj.OpType == replication.ExistingObjectReplicationType {
rinfo.ResyncTimestamp = fmt.Sprintf("%s;%s", UTCNow().Format(http.TimeFormat), tgt.ResetID)
}
}()
if dobj.VersionID == "" && rinfo.PrevReplicationStatus == replication.Completed && dobj.OpType != replication.ExistingObjectReplicationType {
if !isPurge && rinfo.PrevReplicationStatus == replication.Completed && dobj.OpType != replication.ExistingObjectReplicationType {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = rinfo.PrevReplicationStatus
return rinfo
}
if dobj.VersionID != "" && rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus == replication.VersionPurgeComplete {
if isPurge && rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus == replication.VersionPurgeComplete {
return rinfo
}
if globalBucketTargetSys.isOffline(tgt.EndpointURL()) {
replLogOnceIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("remote target is offline for bucket:%s arn:%s", dobj.Bucket, tgt.ARN), "replication-target-offline-delete-"+tgt.ARN)
rinfo.Err = fmt.Errorf("remote target is offline for bucket:%s arn:%s", dobj.Bucket, tgt.ARN)
replLogOnceIf(ctx, rinfo.Err, "replication-target-offline-delete-"+tgt.ARN)
sendEvent(eventArgs{
BucketName: dobj.Bucket,
Object: ObjectInfo{
Bucket: dobj.Bucket,
Name: dobj.ObjectName,
VersionID: dobj.VersionID,
VersionID: versionID,
DeleteMarker: dobj.DeleteMarker,
},
UserAgent: "Internal: [Replication]",
Host: globalLocalNodeName,
EventName: event.ObjectReplicationNotTracked,
})
if dobj.VersionID == "" {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Failed
} else {
if isPurge {
rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus = replication.VersionPurgeFailed
} else {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Failed
}
return rinfo
}
// early return if already replicated delete marker for existing object replication/ healing delete markers
if dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID != "" {
if !isPurge && dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID != "" {
toi, err := tgt.StatObject(ctx, tgt.Bucket, dobj.ObjectName, minio.StatObjectOptions{
VersionID: versionID,
Internal: minio.AdvancedGetOptions{
@@ -662,16 +715,10 @@ func replicateDeleteToTarget(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationI
switch {
case isErrMethodNotAllowed(serr):
// delete marker already replicated
if dobj.VersionID == "" && rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus.Empty() {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Completed
return rinfo
}
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Completed
return rinfo
case isErrObjectNotFound(serr), isErrVersionNotFound(serr):
// version being purged is already not found on target.
if !rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus.Empty() {
rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus = replication.VersionPurgeComplete
return rinfo
}
// The marker still needs to be created on the target.
case isErrReadQuorum(serr), isErrWriteQuorum(serr):
// destination has some quorum issues, perform removeObject() anyways
// to complete the operation.
@@ -691,7 +738,7 @@ func replicateDeleteToTarget(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationI
rmErr := tgt.RemoveObject(ctx, tgt.Bucket, dobj.ObjectName, minio.RemoveObjectOptions{
VersionID: versionID,
Internal: minio.AdvancedRemoveOptions{
ReplicationDeleteMarker: dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID != "",
ReplicationDeleteMarker: !isPurge && dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID != "",
ReplicationMTime: dobj.DeleteMarkerMTime.Time,
ReplicationStatus: minio.ReplicationStatusReplica,
ReplicationRequest: true, // always set this to distinguish between `mc mirror` replication and serverside
@@ -699,20 +746,20 @@ func replicateDeleteToTarget(ctx context.Context, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationI
})
if rmErr != nil {
rinfo.Err = rmErr
if dobj.VersionID == "" {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Failed
} else {
if isPurge {
rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus = replication.VersionPurgeFailed
} else {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Failed
}
replLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("unable to replicate delete marker to %s: %s/%s(%s): %w", tgt.EndpointURL(), tgt.Bucket, dobj.ObjectName, versionID, rmErr))
if rmErr != nil && minio.IsNetworkOrHostDown(rmErr, true) && !globalBucketTargetSys.isOffline(tgt.EndpointURL()) {
globalBucketTargetSys.markOffline(tgt.EndpointURL())
}
} else {
if dobj.VersionID == "" {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Completed
} else {
if isPurge {
rinfo.VersionPurgeStatus = replication.VersionPurgeComplete
} else {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Completed
}
}
return rinfo
@@ -781,6 +828,18 @@ func (m caseInsensitiveMap) Lookup(key string) (string, bool) {
return "", false
}
// replicationTaggingTimestamp carries a recorded removal even when tags are
// empty. Only legacy nonempty tags use ModTime; absence is not a tombstone.
func replicationTaggingTimestamp(objInfo ObjectInfo) (time.Time, error) {
if stamp, ok := caseInsensitiveMap(objInfo.UserDefined).Lookup(ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp); ok {
return time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, stamp)
}
if objInfo.UserTags != "" {
return objInfo.ModTime, nil
}
return time.Time{}, nil
}
func putReplicationOpts(ctx context.Context, sc string, objInfo ObjectInfo) (putOpts minio.PutObjectOptions, isMP bool, err error) {
meta := make(map[string]string)
isSSEC := crypto.SSEC.IsEncrypted(objInfo.UserDefined)
@@ -850,17 +909,12 @@ func putReplicationOpts(ctx context.Context, sc string, objInfo ObjectInfo) (put
tag, _ := tags.ParseObjectTags(objInfo.UserTags)
if tag != nil {
putOpts.UserTags = tag.ToMap()
// set tag timestamp in opts
tagTimestamp := objInfo.ModTime
if tagTmstampStr, ok := objInfo.UserDefined[ReservedMetadataPrefixLower+TaggingTimestamp]; ok {
tagTimestamp, err = time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, tagTmstampStr)
if err != nil {
return putOpts, false, err
}
}
putOpts.Internal.TaggingTimestamp = tagTimestamp
}
}
putOpts.Internal.TaggingTimestamp, err = replicationTaggingTimestamp(objInfo)
if err != nil {
return putOpts, false, err
}
lkMap := caseInsensitiveMap(objInfo.UserDefined)
if lang, ok := lkMap.Lookup(xhttp.ContentLanguage); ok {
@@ -1003,6 +1057,12 @@ func getReplicationAction(oi1 ObjectInfo, oi2 minio.ObjectInfo, opType replicati
if (oi2.UserTagCount > 0 && !reflect.DeepEqual(oi2Map, t.ToMap())) || (oi2.UserTagCount != len(t.ToMap())) {
return replicateMetadata
}
// HEAD does not report the tag revision. Equal values can hide a newer
// deletion or re-addition, so scheduled metadata/heal work must deliver it.
// Completed objects are still excluded by the existing scanner gates.
if _, ok := caseInsensitiveMap(oi1.UserDefined).Lookup(ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp); ok {
return replicateMetadata
}
// Compare only necessary headers
compareKeys := []string{
@@ -1269,9 +1329,6 @@ func replicateObject(ctx context.Context, ri ReplicateObjectInfo, objectAPI Obje
oi.UserDefined[targetResetHeader(rinfo.Arn)] = rinfo.ResyncTimestamp
}
}
if ri.UserTags != "" {
oi.UserDefined[xhttp.AmzObjectTagging] = ri.UserTags
}
return dsc, nil
},
}
@@ -1689,14 +1746,11 @@ applyAction:
if _, ok := lkMap.Lookup(xhttp.AmzObjectLockRetainUntilDate); ok {
dstOpts.Internal.RetentionTimestamp = objInfo.ModTime
}
if objInfo.UserTags != "" {
dstOpts.Internal.TaggingTimestamp = objInfo.ModTime
}
if tagTmStr, ok := lkMap.Lookup(ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + TaggingTimestamp); ok {
ondiskTimestamp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, tagTmStr)
if err == nil {
dstOpts.Internal.TaggingTimestamp = ondiskTimestamp
}
dstOpts.Internal.TaggingTimestamp, rinfo.Err = replicationTaggingTimestamp(objInfo)
if rinfo.Err != nil {
rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Failed
replLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("invalid tagging timestamp for object %s/%s(%s): %w", bucket, object, objInfo.VersionID, rinfo.Err))
return rinfo
}
if retTmStr, ok := lkMap.Lookup(ReservedMetadataPrefixLower + ObjectLockRetentionTimestamp); ok {
ondiskTimestamp, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, retTmStr)
@@ -1916,11 +1970,61 @@ func filterReplicationStatusMetadata(metadata map[string]string) map[string]stri
// DeletedObjectReplicationInfo has info on deleted object
type DeletedObjectReplicationInfo struct {
DeletedObject
Bucket string
EventType string
OpType replication.Type
ResetID string
TargetArn string
Bucket string
EventType string
OpType replication.Type
ResetID string
TargetArn string
RetryCount int
}
// isVersionPurge also recognizes the old marker-shaped purge task. Use the
// operation's state, rather than one target's possibly missing purge entry.
func (di DeletedObjectReplicationInfo) isVersionPurge() bool {
return di.VersionID != "" || di.DeleteMarkerVersionID != "" && !di.VersionPurgeStatus().Empty()
}
// creationState is the outcome of re-reading a queued delete-marker creation
// against the source.
type creationState int
const (
creationCurrent creationState = iota
creationStale
creationUnverified
)
// deleteMarkerCreationState re-reads the marker a queued creation task refers
// to. The version being absent, no longer a marker, or under a version purge
// makes the creation stale. A failed read is not absence: the caller retries
// later instead of guessing.
func deleteMarkerCreationState(ctx context.Context, objectAPI ObjectLayer, dobj DeletedObjectReplicationInfo) creationState {
oi, err := objectAPI.GetObjectInfo(ctx, dobj.Bucket, dobj.ObjectName, ObjectOptions{
VersionID: dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID,
Versioned: globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(dobj.Bucket, dobj.ObjectName),
VersionSuspended: globalBucketVersioningSys.Suspended(dobj.Bucket),
})
switch {
case isErrObjectNotFound(err), isErrVersionNotFound(err):
return creationStale
case err != nil && !isErrMethodNotAllowed(err):
return creationUnverified
}
if !oi.DeleteMarker || oi.VersionID != dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID {
return creationStale
}
if !oi.VersionPurgeStatus.Empty() || oi.VersionPurgeStatusInternal != "" {
return creationStale
}
return creationCurrent
}
// Purge metadata uses COMPLETE; operation statistics and audit use COMPLETED.
func purgeReplicationStatus(status VersionPurgeStatusType) replication.StatusType {
if replication.StatusType(status) == replication.CompletedLegacy {
return replication.Completed
}
return replication.StatusType(status)
}
// ToMRFEntry returns the relevant info needed by MRF
@@ -1930,9 +2034,10 @@ func (di DeletedObjectReplicationInfo) ToMRFEntry() MRFReplicateEntry {
versionID = di.VersionID
}
return MRFReplicateEntry{
Bucket: di.Bucket,
Object: di.ObjectName,
versionID: versionID,
Bucket: di.Bucket,
Object: di.ObjectName,
versionID: versionID,
RetryCount: di.RetryCount,
}
}
@@ -2424,6 +2529,7 @@ func (p *ReplicationPool) queueReplicaDeleteTask(doi DeletedObjectReplicationInf
case <-p.ctx.Done():
case ch <- doi:
default:
doi.RetryCount++
p.queueMRFSave(doi.ToMRFEntry())
p.mu.RLock()
prio := p.priority
@@ -3787,9 +3893,10 @@ func queueReplicationHeal(ctx context.Context, bucket string, oi ObjectInfo, rcf
DeleteMarkerMTime: DeleteMarkerMTime{roi.ModTime},
DeleteMarker: roi.DeleteMarker,
},
Bucket: roi.Bucket,
OpType: replication.HealReplicationType,
EventType: ReplicateHealDelete,
Bucket: roi.Bucket,
OpType: replication.HealReplicationType,
EventType: ReplicateHealDelete,
RetryCount: retryCount,
}
// heal delete marker replication failure or versioned delete replication failure
if roi.ReplicationStatus == replication.Pending ||
@@ -4072,7 +4179,12 @@ func (p *ReplicationPool) queueMRFHeal() error {
VersionID: vID,
})
cancel()
if err != nil {
// A versioned marker lookup returns its metadata with a 405. Only
// accept that error with a real, matching marker identity.
validMarker := isErrMethodNotAllowed(err) && oi.DeleteMarker &&
vID != "" && oi.VersionID == vID && !oi.ModTime.IsZero() &&
oi.Bucket == e.Bucket && oi.Name != "" && oi.Name == decodeDirObject(e.Object)
if err != nil && !validMarker || oi.Name == "" {
continue
}
@@ -4138,6 +4250,11 @@ func getCRCMeta(oi ObjectInfo, partNum int, h http.Header) (cs map[string]string
if cktype.IsSet() {
meta[cktype.Key()] = v
meta[xhttp.AmzChecksumAlgo] = cktype.String()
// Without the type the target creates a COMPOSITE multipart
// upload and rejects the full object CRC on completion.
if isMP && cktype.CanMerge() && cs[xhttp.AmzChecksumType] == xhttp.AmzChecksumTypeFullObject {
meta[xhttp.AmzChecksumType] = xhttp.AmzChecksumTypeFullObject
}
}
}
return meta, isMP
+5
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ import (
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/color"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/api"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/handlers"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/kms"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
@@ -445,6 +446,7 @@ func buildServerCtxt(ctx *cli.Context, ctxt *serverCtxt) (err error) {
ctxt.SendBufSize = ctx.Int("send-buf-size")
ctxt.RecvBufSize = ctx.Int("recv-buf-size")
ctxt.IdleTimeout = ctx.Duration("idle-timeout")
ctxt.ReadHeaderTimeout = ctx.Duration("read-header-timeout")
ctxt.UserTimeout = ctx.Duration("conn-user-timeout")
if conf := ctx.String("config"); len(conf) > 0 {
@@ -880,6 +882,9 @@ func serverHandleEnvVars() {
logger.Warning("%s=%s is ignored: Silo in-place updates are permanently disabled", config.EnvUpdate, updateSetting)
}
globalInplaceUpdateDisabled = true
if env.IsSet(api.EnvAPIMultipartListing) {
logger.Warning("%s is ignored: multipart listing uses the legacy cache/exact-key behavior; persistent listing is deferred", api.EnvAPIMultipartListing)
}
// Check if the supported credential env vars,
// "MINIO_ROOT_USER" and "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD" are provided
+7 -7
View File
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ func initHelp() {
},
config.HelpKV{
Key: config.ILMSubSys,
Description: "manage ILM settings for expiration, transition, and access-tier workers",
Description: "manage ILM settings for expiration and transition workers",
Optional: true,
},
}
@@ -609,7 +609,8 @@ func applyDynamicConfigForSubSys(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, s conf
}
loggerCfg.HTTP[n] = l
}
if errs := logger.UpdateHTTPWebhooks(ctx, loggerCfg.HTTP); len(errs) > 0 {
// Webhook workers outlive the bounded configuration reload.
if errs := logger.UpdateHTTPWebhooks(GlobalContext, loggerCfg.HTTP); len(errs) > 0 {
configLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Unable to update logger webhook config: %v", errs))
}
case config.AuditWebhookSubSys:
@@ -627,7 +628,8 @@ func applyDynamicConfigForSubSys(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, s conf
loggerCfg.AuditWebhook[n] = l
}
if errs := logger.UpdateAuditWebhooks(ctx, loggerCfg.AuditWebhook); len(errs) > 0 {
// Both the queue worker and disk replay follow the server lifetime.
if errs := logger.UpdateAuditWebhooks(GlobalContext, loggerCfg.AuditWebhook); len(errs) > 0 {
configLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Unable to update audit webhook targets: %v", errs))
}
case config.AuditKafkaSubSys:
@@ -644,7 +646,8 @@ func applyDynamicConfigForSubSys(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, s conf
loggerCfg.AuditKafka[n] = l
}
}
if errs := logger.UpdateAuditKafkaTargets(ctx, loggerCfg); len(errs) > 0 {
// The Kafka disk replay follows the server lifetime as well.
if errs := logger.UpdateAuditKafkaTargets(GlobalContext, loggerCfg); len(errs) > 0 {
configLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("Unable to update audit kafka targets: %v", errs))
}
case config.StorageClassSubSys:
@@ -704,9 +707,6 @@ func applyDynamicConfigForSubSys(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, s conf
if globalExpiryState != nil {
globalExpiryState.ResizeWorkers(ilmCfg.ExpirationWorkers)
}
if globalAccessTierState != nil {
globalAccessTierState.UpdateWorkers(ilmCfg.AccessWorkers)
}
globalILMConfig.update(ilmCfg)
}
}
+234
View File
@@ -19,12 +19,246 @@ package cmd
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/IBM/sarama"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
httpTarget "github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger/target/http"
types "github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger/target/loggertypes"
)
type webhookConfigObjectLayer struct {
ObjectLayer
}
func (webhookConfigObjectLayer) SetDriveCounts() []int { return []int{1} }
// TestDynamicWebhookOutlivesConfigContext applies logger targets the way a
// peer reload does: under a bounded context that ends when the handler returns.
func TestDynamicWebhookOutlivesConfigContext(t *testing.T) {
for _, subSys := range []string{config.AuditWebhookSubSys, config.LoggerWebhookSubSys, config.AuditKafkaSubSys} {
for _, queue := range []struct {
name string
disk bool
failInit bool
}{
{name: "disk=false"},
{name: "disk=true", disk: true},
{name: "disk=unavailable", disk: true, failInit: true},
} {
if subSys == config.AuditKafkaSubSys && queue.failInit {
// An unopenable Kafka queue starts no goroutine.
continue
}
t.Run(subSys+"/"+queue.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// Isolate global target registries and wait for all workers to exit
// before the parent removes the disk queue.
if os.Getenv("_SILO_WEBHOOK_CONTEXT_TEST") != t.Name() {
executable, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
queueDir := ""
if queue.disk {
queueDir = t.TempDir()
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
child := exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable,
"-test.run=^"+strings.ReplaceAll(t.Name(), "/", "$/^")+"$",
"-test.v", "-test.timeout=25s")
// Logger targets from the environment would join the registries.
for _, kv := range os.Environ() {
if !strings.HasPrefix(kv, "MINIO_AUDIT_") && !strings.HasPrefix(kv, "MINIO_LOGGER_") {
child.Env = append(child.Env, kv)
}
}
child.Env = append(child.Env,
"_SILO_WEBHOOK_CONTEXT_TEST="+t.Name(),
"_SILO_WEBHOOK_QUEUE_DIR="+queueDir)
output, err := child.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("isolated webhook test: %v\n%s", err, output)
}
t.Logf("%s", output)
return
}
if subSys == config.AuditKafkaSubSys {
testDynamicKafkaOutlivesConfigContext(t, os.Getenv("_SILO_WEBHOOK_QUEUE_DIR"))
return
}
targets := logger.AuditTargets
if subSys == config.LoggerWebhookSubSys {
targets = logger.SystemTargets
}
received := make(chan string, 8)
receiver := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var entry struct{ Marker string }
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&entry); err != nil {
t.Errorf("decode webhook: %v", err)
}
received <- entry.Marker
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
t.Cleanup(receiver.Close)
queueDir := os.Getenv("_SILO_WEBHOOK_QUEUE_DIR")
if queue.failInit {
queueDir = filepath.Join(queueDir, "queue")
if err := os.WriteFile(queueDir, []byte("not a directory"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
cfg := newServerConfig()
_, err := cfg.SetKVS(fmt.Sprintf("%s:context-test enable=on endpoint=%s queue_size=16 batch_size=1 queue_dir=%s http_timeout=1s retry_interval=100ms",
subSys, receiver.URL, queueDir), config.DefaultKVS)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// A reload cancels the target it replaces; clean up only the last one.
var current *httpTarget.Target
t.Cleanup(func() {
if current != nil {
current.Cancel()
}
})
// reload applies the subsystem the way a peer does and returns the
// registered target once the bounded reload context has ended.
reload := func() *httpTarget.Target {
t.Helper()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := applyDynamicConfigForSubSys(ctx, webhookConfigObjectLayer{}, cfg, subSys); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var target *httpTarget.Target
for _, candidate := range targets() {
if candidate.Endpoint() == receiver.URL {
if target != nil {
t.Fatal("configured webhook was registered twice")
}
target = candidate.(*httpTarget.Target)
}
}
if target == nil {
t.Fatal("configured webhook was not registered")
}
current = target
return target
}
target := reload()
if err := target.Send(t.Context(), struct{ Marker string }{"after-reload"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if queue.failInit {
// A failed initialization starts no worker: the record stays queued.
select {
case got := <-received:
t.Fatalf("received %q before the queue was initialized", got)
case <-time.After(250 * time.Millisecond):
}
if got := target.Stats().QueueLength; got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("failed queue consumed an event: queue length %d", got)
}
// After the operator repairs queue_dir, applying the configuration
// again replaces the target, which must take over the record.
if err := os.Remove(queueDir); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
target = reload()
}
select {
case got := <-received:
if got != "after-reload" {
t.Fatalf("received marker %q, want after-reload", got)
}
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("webhook stopped after reload returned; stats: %+v", target.Stats())
}
})
}
}
}
// testDynamicKafkaOutlivesConfigContext runs in the isolated child process.
// With a queue_dir, Kafka records reach the broker only through the disk
// replay, which polls the queue every few seconds.
func testDynamicKafkaOutlivesConfigContext(t *testing.T, queueDir string) {
const topic = "audit-context-test"
broker := sarama.NewMockBroker(t, 1)
t.Cleanup(broker.Close)
broker.SetHandlerByMap(map[string]sarama.MockResponse{
"ApiVersionsRequest": sarama.NewMockApiVersionsResponse(t).SetApiKeys([]sarama.ApiVersionsResponseKey{
{ApiKey: 0, MinVersion: 0, MaxVersion: 8}, // Produce
{ApiKey: 3, MinVersion: 0, MaxVersion: 11}, // Metadata
{ApiKey: 18, MinVersion: 0, MaxVersion: 3}, // ApiVersions
}),
"MetadataRequest": sarama.NewMockMetadataResponse(t).
SetBroker(broker.Addr(), broker.BrokerID()).
SetLeader(topic, 0, broker.BrokerID()),
"ProduceRequest": sarama.NewMockProduceResponse(t),
})
produced := func() (n int) {
for _, exchange := range broker.History() {
if _, ok := exchange.Request.(*sarama.ProduceRequest); ok {
n++
}
}
return n
}
cfg := newServerConfig()
_, err := cfg.SetKVS(fmt.Sprintf("%s:context-test enable=on brokers=%s topic=%s queue_size=16 queue_dir=%s",
config.AuditKafkaSubSys, broker.Addr(), topic, queueDir), config.DefaultKVS)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(t.Context(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := applyDynamicConfigForSubSys(ctx, webhookConfigObjectLayer{}, cfg, config.AuditKafkaSubSys); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var target logger.Target
for _, candidate := range logger.AuditTargets() {
if candidate.Type() == types.TargetKafka {
if target != nil {
t.Fatal("more than one Kafka target was registered")
}
target = candidate
}
}
if target == nil {
t.Fatal("configured Kafka target was not registered")
}
t.Cleanup(target.Cancel)
// Returning from the peer reload cancels its bounded context.
cancel()
before := produced()
if err := target.Send(t.Context(), struct{ Marker string }{"after-reload"}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for deadline := time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second); produced() == before; time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond) {
if time.Now().After(deadline) {
t.Fatalf("Kafka target stopped after reload returned; stats: %+v", target.Stats())
}
}
}
func TestServerConfig(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(t.Context())
defer cancel()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func readConfigWithoutMigrate(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer) (config.C
return nil, err
}
data, err = decryptData(data, configFile)
data, err = decryptData(ctx, data, configFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func listServerConfigHistory(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, withData b
continue
}
data, err = decryptData(data, obj.Name)
data, err = decryptData(ctx, data, obj.Name)
if err != nil {
// ignore history file that cannot be loaded.
continue
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ func readServerConfigHistory(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, uuidKV str
return nil, err
}
return decryptData(data, historyFile)
return decryptData(ctx, data, historyFile)
}
func saveServerConfigHistory(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, kv []byte) error {
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ func readServerConfig(ctx context.Context, objAPI ObjectLayer, data []byte) (con
return nil, err
}
data, err = decryptData(data, configFile)
data, err = decryptData(ctx, data, configFile)
if err != nil {
lookupConfigs(srvCfg, objAPI)
return nil, err
+109 -36
View File
@@ -24,10 +24,12 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"maps"
"math"
"math/rand"
"os"
"path"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -776,7 +778,7 @@ func (f *folderScanner) scanFolder(ctx context.Context, folder cachedFolder, int
}
// We got an entry which we should be able to heal.
fiv, err := entry.fileInfoVersions(bucket)
fiv, err := entry.allFileInfoVersions(bucket)
if err != nil {
err := bgSeq.queueHealTask(healSource{
bucket: bucket,
@@ -899,7 +901,6 @@ type scannerItem struct {
objectName string // Only the object name without prefixes.
replication replicationConfig
lifeCycle *lifecycle.Lifecycle
poolIdx int
Typ fs.FileMode
heal struct {
enabled bool
@@ -910,7 +911,6 @@ type scannerItem struct {
type sizeSummary struct {
totalSize int64
hotTierSize int64
versions uint64
deleteMarkers uint64
replicatedSize int64
@@ -1120,8 +1120,31 @@ eventLoop:
size := actualSz
switch event.Action {
case lifecycle.DeleteAllVersionsAction, lifecycle.DelMarkerDeleteAllVersionsAction:
remainingVersions = 0
applyExpiryRule(event, lcEventSrc_Scanner, oi)
// An expiry of a hot latest version purges the key, which refuses
// a key with a version in a remote tier: do not queue it when this
// pool holds one. A tiered version only another pool holds is
// not known here; the purge decides on it. A transitioned latest
// version takes the transitioned expiry, as before.
refused := oi.TransitionedObject.Status == "" && slices.ContainsFunc(objInfos, ObjectInfo.deleteAllTierRefuses)
if refused {
globalILMIncomplete.add(ilmIncompleteTierSkipped)
} else {
remainingVersions = 0
applyExpiryRule(event, lcEventSrc_Scanner, oi)
}
// The versions hold their space until the purge removes them,
// which can refuse the key or stop at its budget: account each
// at its size, with no other action. The alerts on many or
// large versions count those of a key that is not queued.
for _, v := range objInfos[idx:] {
sz, _ := v.GetActualSize()
if fn != nil {
fn(v, sz, sz, sizeS)
}
if refused {
cumulativeSize += sz
}
}
break eventLoop
case lifecycle.DeleteAction, lifecycle.DeleteRestoredAction, lifecycle.DeleteRestoredVersionAction:
@@ -1132,9 +1155,9 @@ eventLoop:
applyExpiryRule(event, lcEventSrc_Scanner, oi)
case lifecycle.DeleteVersionAction: // noncurrent versions expiration
opts := objOpts[idx]
remainingVersions--
size = 0
opts := objOpts[idx]
toDel = append(toDel, ObjectToDelete{
ObjectV: ObjectV{
ObjectName: opts.Name,
@@ -1161,14 +1184,6 @@ eventLoop:
globalExpiryState.enqueueNoncurrentVersions(i.bucket, toDel, noncurrentEvents)
}
i.alertExcessiveVersions(remainingVersions, cumulativeSize)
if globalILMConfig.accessTieringEnabled() {
for idx, oi := range objInfos {
if oi.IsLatest && events[idx].Action == lifecycle.NoneAction {
applyAccessTransition(ctx, i, oi)
break
}
}
}
}
func evalActionFromLifecycle(ctx context.Context, lc lifecycle.Lifecycle, lr lock.Retention, rcfg *replication.Config, obj ObjectInfo) lifecycle.Event {
@@ -1220,10 +1235,7 @@ func applyTransitionRule(event lifecycle.Event, src lcEventSrc, obj ObjectInfo)
func applyExpiryOnTransitionedObject(ctx context.Context, objLayer ObjectLayer, obj ObjectInfo, lcEvent lifecycle.Event, src lcEventSrc) (ok bool) {
timeILM := globalScannerMetrics.timeILM(lcEvent.Action)
if err := expireTransitionedObject(ctx, objLayer, &obj, lcEvent, src); err != nil {
if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
return false
}
ilmLogIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("expireTransitionedObject(%s, %s): %w", obj.Bucket, obj.Name, err))
reportILMExpiryNotDone(ctx, obj, lcEvent, src, err, "transition-expiry"+obj.Name, globalLifecycleSys.trace(obj))
return false
}
timeILM(1)
@@ -1245,11 +1257,18 @@ func applyExpiryOnNonTransitionedObjects(ctx context.Context, objLayer ObjectLay
opts.Versioned = globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixEnabled(obj.Bucket, obj.Name)
opts.VersionSuspended = globalBucketVersioningSys.PrefixSuspended(obj.Bucket, obj.Name)
// Purge every version of exactly this key, by version ID and under the
// object lock, after the pools approved it on the versions they hold;
// see erasureServerPools.deleteAllVersions.
var purge deleteAllResult
if lcEvent.Action.DeleteAll() {
opts.DeletePrefix = true
// use prefix delete on exact object (this is an optimization to avoid fan-out calls)
opts.DeletePrefixObject = true
opts = ObjectOptions{
Expiration: ExpirationOptions{Expire: true},
DeleteAllVersions: true,
DeleteAllResult: &purge,
}
}
var (
dobj ObjectInfo
err error
@@ -1264,22 +1283,21 @@ func applyExpiryOnNonTransitionedObjects(ctx context.Context, objLayer ObjectLay
if lcEvent.Action != lifecycle.NoneAction {
numVersions := uint64(1)
if lcEvent.Action.DeleteAll() {
numVersions = uint64(obj.NumVersions)
numVersions = uint64(purge.Removed)
}
timeILM(numVersions)
}
}()
dobj, err = objLayer.DeleteObject(ctx, obj.Bucket, encodeDirObject(obj.Name), opts)
if lcEvent.Action.DeleteAll() && (err != nil || purge.Removed == 0) {
return deleteAllNotCompleted(ctx, obj, lcEvent, src, purge, err, traceFn)
}
if err != nil {
if isErrObjectNotFound(err) || isErrVersionNotFound(err) {
// Assume it is still there, unless it is gone already.
if !reportILMExpiryNotDone(ctx, obj, lcEvent, src, err, "non-transition-expiry"+obj.Name, traceFn) {
traceFn(ILMExpiry, nil, nil)
return false
}
// Assume it is still there.
err := fmt.Errorf("DeleteObject(%s, %s): %w", obj.Bucket, obj.Name, err)
ilmLogOnceIf(ctx, err, "non-transition-expiry"+obj.Name)
traceFn(ILMExpiry, nil, err)
return false
}
if dobj.Name == "" {
@@ -1288,14 +1306,14 @@ func applyExpiryOnNonTransitionedObjects(ctx context.Context, objLayer ObjectLay
tags := newLifecycleAuditEvent(src, lcEvent).Tags()
tags["version-id"] = dobj.VersionID
if lcEvent.Action.DeleteAll() {
tags[ilmVersionsRemoved] = strconv.Itoa(purge.Removed)
}
// Send audit for the lifecycle delete operation
auditLogLifecycle(ctx, dobj, ILMExpiry, tags, traceFn)
eventName := event.ObjectRemovedDelete
if obj.DeleteMarker {
eventName = event.ObjectRemovedDeleteMarkerCreated
}
eventName := ilmExpiryEventName(opts.VersionID, dobj)
switch lcEvent.Action {
case lifecycle.DeleteAllVersionsAction:
eventName = event.ObjectRemovedDeleteAllVersions
@@ -1314,6 +1332,65 @@ func applyExpiryOnNonTransitionedObjects(ctx context.Context, objLayer ObjectLay
return true
}
// ilmVersionsRemoved is the audit tag with the number of versions that an
// expiry of all versions removed; ilmPartial marks one that began to delete
// and did not finish.
const (
ilmVersionsRemoved = "ilm-versions-removed"
ilmPartial = "ilm-partial"
)
// deleteAllNotCompleted reports an expiry of all versions of obj that did
// not remove them all. A purge that had nothing to remove, or that failed
// before it deleted anything, reports what a rejected expiry does. One that
// failed or stopped after it began to delete is audited as partial, with the
// versions it removed, but sends no removal event: the key is still there.
//
// Each is counted and traced with its reason, as reportILMExpiryNotDone
// reports other expiries. A refusal because a version is in a remote tier is
// also logged, since it lasts until such versions can be purged.
func deleteAllNotCompleted(ctx context.Context, obj ObjectInfo, lcEvent lifecycle.Event, src lcEventSrc, purge deleteAllResult, err error, traceFn func(event string, metadata map[string]string, err error)) bool {
logID := "non-transition-expiry" + obj.Name
switch {
case err == nil: // there was nothing to remove
traceFn(ILMExpiry, nil, nil)
return false
case purge.Started:
reason, _ := ilmExpiryNotDone(err)
globalILMIncomplete.add(reason)
tags := newLifecycleAuditEvent(src, lcEvent).Tags()
tags["version-id"] = purge.Latest.VersionID
tags[ilmVersionsRemoved] = strconv.Itoa(purge.Removed)
tags[ilmPartial] = "true"
tags["ilm-incomplete-reason"] = reason
auditLogInternal(ctx, AuditLogOptions{
Event: ILMExpiry,
APIName: "ILMExpiry",
Bucket: obj.Bucket,
Object: obj.Name,
VersionID: purge.Latest.VersionID,
Error: err.Error(),
Tags: tags,
})
trace := maps.Clone(tags)
trace["result"], trace["reason"] = "partial", reason
traceFn(ILMExpiry, trace, err)
if errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllBudget) {
return false // a long history; the next expiry continues
}
// Assume it is still there.
ilmLogOnceIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("ILM expiry of all versions of %s/%s stopped after it removed %d: %w", obj.Bucket, obj.Name, purge.Removed, err), logID)
return false
case errors.Is(err, errDeleteAllTiered):
// Kept until tiered versions can be purged; see deleteAllVersions.
ilmLogOnceIf(ctx, fmt.Errorf("ILM expiry of all versions of %s/%s refused: a version is in a remote tier, and a purge of all versions does not remove tiered versions yet", obj.Bucket, obj.Name), logID)
}
if !reportILMExpiryNotDone(ctx, obj, lcEvent, src, err, logID, traceFn) {
traceFn(ILMExpiry, nil, nil) // gone already
}
return false
}
// Apply object, object version, restored object or restored object version action on the given object
func applyExpiryRule(event lifecycle.Event, src lcEventSrc, obj ObjectInfo) {
globalExpiryState.enqueueByDays(obj, event, src)
@@ -1484,8 +1561,6 @@ const (
ILMFreeVersionDelete = "ilm:free-version-delete"
// ILMTransition - audit trail for ILM transitioning.
ILMTransition = " ilm:transition"
// ILMAccessTier - audit trail for moving objects between server pools.
ILMAccessTier = "ilm:access-tier"
)
func auditLogLifecycle(ctx context.Context, oi ObjectInfo, event string, tags map[string]string, traceFn func(event string, metadata map[string]string, err error)) {
@@ -1497,8 +1572,6 @@ func auditLogLifecycle(ctx context.Context, oi ObjectInfo, event string, tags ma
apiName = "ILMFreeVersionDelete"
case ILMTransition:
apiName = "ILMTransition"
case ILMAccessTier:
apiName = "ILMAccessTier"
}
auditLogInternal(ctx, AuditLogOptions{
Event: event,
+3 -1
View File
@@ -240,8 +240,10 @@ func TestApplyNewerNoncurrentVersionsLimit(t *testing.T) {
},
},
{
// Every version is accounted at its size until the purge
// removes it.
objInfos: allVersExpObjInfos,
wants: nil,
wants: allVersExpObjInfos,
wantExpired: []ObjectToDelete{{ObjectV: ObjectV{ObjectName: obj, VersionID: allVersExpObjInfos[0].VersionID}}},
},
{
+89
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Feng Ruohang
//
// This file is part of Silo Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"os"
"reflect"
"testing"
)
// Read a real pre-removal scanner cache with nonzero hot-tier bytes. A v8
// payload with a relabeled header would not exercise the ignored hts field.
func TestDataUsageCacheReadV9(t *testing.T) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/data-usage-v9/data-usage-v9.bin")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(raw) == 0 || raw[0] != 9 {
t.Fatal("fixture is not v9")
}
expected, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/data-usage-v9/data-usage-v9.json")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var want, got dataUsageCache
if err := json.Unmarshal(expected, &want); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := got.deserialize(bytes.NewReader(raw)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !got.Info.LastUpdate.Equal(want.Info.LastUpdate) {
t.Fatal("cache timestamp changed")
}
// msgp restores local time while JSON preserves the UTC representation.
want.Info.LastUpdate = got.Info.LastUpdate
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
t.Fatalf("v9 ordinary cache fields changed:\ngot: %#v\nwant: %#v", got, want)
}
flat := got.flatten(*got.root())
if flat.Size != 74962 || flat.Objects != 3 || flat.Versions != 5 || flat.DeleteMarkers != 2 {
t.Fatalf("statistics changed: %+v", flat)
}
if flat.AllTierStats == nil || flat.AllTierStats.Tiers["COLD"] != (tierStats{TotalSize: 65536, NumVersions: 1, NumObjects: 1}) {
t.Fatalf("remote tier statistics changed: %+v", flat.AllTierStats)
}
buckets := []BucketInfo{{Name: "v9-bucket"}}
if gotInfo, wantInfo := got.dui(dataUsageRoot, buckets), want.dui(dataUsageRoot, buckets); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotInfo, wantInfo) {
t.Fatalf("bucket usage aggregation changed: %+v != %+v", gotInfo, wantInfo)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := got.serializeTo(&buf); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if buf.Bytes()[0] != 8 {
t.Fatalf("wrote cache version %d, want 8", buf.Bytes()[0])
}
var roundtrip dataUsageCache
if err := roundtrip.deserialize(&buf); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, roundtrip) {
t.Fatal("v8 round trip lost ordinary fields")
}
if err := roundtrip.deserialize(bytes.NewReader(raw[:len(raw)/2])); err == nil {
t.Fatal("truncated v9 cache accepted")
}
raw[0] = 10
if err := roundtrip.deserialize(bytes.NewReader(raw)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("unknown cache version accepted")
}
}
+7 -61
View File
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ type dataUsageEntry struct {
Children dataUsageHashMap `msg:"ch"`
// These fields do no include any children.
Size int64 `msg:"sz"`
HotTierSize int64 `msg:"hts"`
Objects uint64 `msg:"os"`
Versions uint64 `msg:"vs"` // Versions that are not delete markers.
DeleteMarkers uint64 `msg:"dms"`
@@ -135,8 +134,8 @@ func (ts tierStats) add(u tierStats) tierStats {
}
}
//msgp:encode ignore dataUsageEntryV2 dataUsageEntryV3 dataUsageEntryV4 dataUsageEntryV5 dataUsageEntryV6 dataUsageEntryV7 dataUsageEntryV8
//msgp:marshal ignore dataUsageEntryV2 dataUsageEntryV3 dataUsageEntryV4 dataUsageEntryV5 dataUsageEntryV6 dataUsageEntryV7 dataUsageEntryV8
//msgp:encode ignore dataUsageEntryV2 dataUsageEntryV3 dataUsageEntryV4 dataUsageEntryV5 dataUsageEntryV6 dataUsageEntryV7
//msgp:marshal ignore dataUsageEntryV2 dataUsageEntryV3 dataUsageEntryV4 dataUsageEntryV5 dataUsageEntryV6 dataUsageEntryV7
//msgp:tuple dataUsageEntryV2
type dataUsageEntryV2 struct {
@@ -200,30 +199,14 @@ type dataUsageEntryV7 struct {
Compacted bool `msg:"c"`
}
// dataUsageEntryV8 is the on-disk shape before access-tier accounting was
// introduced. Keep it so caches written by the previous release decode
// without being discarded.
type dataUsageEntryV8 struct {
Children dataUsageHashMap `msg:"ch"`
// These fields do no include any children.
Size int64 `msg:"sz"`
Objects uint64 `msg:"os"`
Versions uint64 `msg:"vs"`
DeleteMarkers uint64 `msg:"dms"`
ObjSizes sizeHistogram `msg:"szs"`
ObjVersions versionsHistogram `msg:"vh"`
AllTierStats *allTierStats `msg:"ats,omitempty"`
Compacted bool `msg:"c"`
}
// dataUsageCache contains a cache of data usage entries latest version.
type dataUsageCache struct {
Info dataUsageCacheInfo
Cache map[string]dataUsageEntry
}
//msgp:encode ignore dataUsageCacheV2 dataUsageCacheV3 dataUsageCacheV4 dataUsageCacheV5 dataUsageCacheV6 dataUsageCacheV7 dataUsageCacheV8
//msgp:marshal ignore dataUsageCacheV2 dataUsageCacheV3 dataUsageCacheV4 dataUsageCacheV5 dataUsageCacheV6 dataUsageCacheV7 dataUsageCacheV8
//msgp:encode ignore dataUsageCacheV2 dataUsageCacheV3 dataUsageCacheV4 dataUsageCacheV5 dataUsageCacheV6 dataUsageCacheV7
//msgp:marshal ignore dataUsageCacheV2 dataUsageCacheV3 dataUsageCacheV4 dataUsageCacheV5 dataUsageCacheV6 dataUsageCacheV7
// dataUsageCacheV2 contains a cache of data usage entries version 2.
type dataUsageCacheV2 struct {
@@ -261,12 +244,6 @@ type dataUsageCacheV7 struct {
Cache map[string]dataUsageEntryV7
}
// dataUsageCacheV8 contains a cache of data usage entries version 8.
type dataUsageCacheV8 struct {
Info dataUsageCacheInfo
Cache map[string]dataUsageEntryV8
}
//msgp:ignore dataUsageEntryInfo
type dataUsageEntryInfo struct {
Name string
@@ -295,7 +272,6 @@ type dataUsageCacheInfo struct {
func (e *dataUsageEntry) addSizes(summary sizeSummary) {
e.Size += summary.totalSize
e.HotTierSize += summary.hotTierSize
e.Versions += summary.versions
e.DeleteMarkers += summary.deleteMarkers
e.ObjSizes.add(summary.totalSize)
@@ -315,7 +291,6 @@ func (e *dataUsageEntry) merge(other dataUsageEntry) {
e.Versions += other.Versions
e.DeleteMarkers += other.DeleteMarkers
e.Size += other.Size
e.HotTierSize += other.HotTierSize
for i, v := range other.ObjSizes[:] {
e.ObjSizes[i] += v
@@ -456,7 +431,6 @@ func (d *dataUsageCache) dui(path string, buckets []BucketInfo) DataUsageInfo {
flat := d.flatten(*e)
dui := DataUsageInfo{
LastUpdate: d.Info.LastUpdate,
ScannerCycle: d.Info.NextCycle,
ObjectsTotalCount: flat.Objects,
VersionsTotalCount: flat.Versions,
DeleteMarkersTotalCount: flat.DeleteMarkers,
@@ -807,7 +781,6 @@ func (d *dataUsageCache) bucketsUsageInfo(buckets []BucketInfo) map[string]Bucke
flat := d.flatten(*e)
bui := BucketUsageInfo{
Size: uint64(flat.Size),
HotTierSize: uint64(max(flat.HotTierSize, 0)),
VersionsCount: flat.Versions,
ObjectsCount: flat.Objects,
DeleteMarkersCount: flat.DeleteMarkers,
@@ -1007,8 +980,8 @@ func (d *dataUsageCache) save(ctx context.Context, store objectIO, name string)
// Bumping the cache version will drop data from previous versions
// and write new data with the new version.
const (
dataUsageCacheVerCurrent = 9
dataUsageCacheVerV8 = 8
dataUsageCacheVerCurrent = 8
dataUsageCacheVerV9 = 9 // Retired access-tier cache; only adds the ignored "hts" entry key.
dataUsageCacheVerV7 = 7
dataUsageCacheVerV6 = 6
dataUsageCacheVerV5 = 5
@@ -1210,34 +1183,7 @@ func (d *dataUsageCache) deserialize(r io.Reader) error {
}
return nil
case dataUsageCacheVerV8:
// Zstd compressed.
dec, err := zstd.NewReader(r, zstd.WithDecoderConcurrency(2))
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer dec.Close()
dold := &dataUsageCacheV8{}
if err = dold.DecodeMsg(msgp.NewReader(dec)); err != nil {
return err
}
d.Info = dold.Info
d.Cache = make(map[string]dataUsageEntry, len(dold.Cache))
for k, v := range dold.Cache {
d.Cache[k] = dataUsageEntry{
Children: v.Children,
Size: v.Size,
Objects: v.Objects,
Versions: v.Versions,
DeleteMarkers: v.DeleteMarkers,
ObjSizes: v.ObjSizes,
ObjVersions: v.ObjVersions,
AllTierStats: v.AllTierStats,
Compacted: v.Compacted,
}
}
return nil
case dataUsageCacheVerCurrent:
case dataUsageCacheVerCurrent, dataUsageCacheVerV9:
// Zstd compressed.
dec, err := zstd.NewReader(r, zstd.WithDecoderConcurrency(2))
if err != nil {
+9 -605
View File
@@ -1591,145 +1591,6 @@ func (z *dataUsageCacheV7) Msgsize() (s int) {
return
}
// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable
func (z *dataUsageCacheV8) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, err = dc.ReadMapKeyPtr()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "Info":
err = z.Info.DecodeMsg(dc)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Info")
return
}
case "Cache":
var zb0002 uint32
zb0002, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Cache")
return
}
if z.Cache == nil {
z.Cache = make(map[string]dataUsageEntryV8, zb0002)
} else if len(z.Cache) > 0 {
clear(z.Cache)
}
for zb0002 > 0 {
zb0002--
var za0001 string
za0001, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Cache")
return
}
var za0002 dataUsageEntryV8
err = za0002.DecodeMsg(dc)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Cache", za0001)
return
}
z.Cache[za0001] = za0002
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
return
}
// UnmarshalMsg implements msgp.Unmarshaler
func (z *dataUsageCacheV8) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapKeyZC(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "Info":
bts, err = z.Info.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Info")
return
}
case "Cache":
var zb0002 uint32
zb0002, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Cache")
return
}
if z.Cache == nil {
z.Cache = make(map[string]dataUsageEntryV8, zb0002)
} else if len(z.Cache) > 0 {
clear(z.Cache)
}
for zb0002 > 0 {
var za0002 dataUsageEntryV8
zb0002--
var za0001 string
za0001, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Cache")
return
}
bts, err = za0002.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Cache", za0001)
return
}
z.Cache[za0001] = za0002
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
o = bts
return
}
// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *dataUsageCacheV8) Msgsize() (s int) {
s = 1 + 5 + z.Info.Msgsize() + 6 + msgp.MapHeaderSize
if z.Cache != nil {
for za0001, za0002 := range z.Cache {
_ = za0002
s += msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(za0001) + za0002.Msgsize()
}
}
return
}
// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable
func (z *dataUsageEntry) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
var field []byte
@@ -1762,12 +1623,6 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Size")
return
}
case "hts":
z.HotTierSize, err = dc.ReadInt64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "HotTierSize")
return
}
case "os":
z.Objects, err = dc.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
@@ -1946,12 +1801,12 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
// EncodeMsg implements msgp.Encodable
func (z *dataUsageEntry) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
// check for omitted fields
zb0001Len := uint32(10)
var zb0001Mask uint16 /* 10 bits */
zb0001Len := uint32(9)
var zb0001Mask uint16 /* 9 bits */
_ = zb0001Mask
if z.AllTierStats == nil {
zb0001Len--
zb0001Mask |= 0x100
zb0001Mask |= 0x80
}
// variable map header, size zb0001Len
err = en.Append(0x80 | uint8(zb0001Len))
@@ -1981,16 +1836,6 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Size")
return
}
// write "hts"
err = en.Append(0xa3, 0x68, 0x74, 0x73)
if err != nil {
return
}
err = en.WriteInt64(z.HotTierSize)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "HotTierSize")
return
}
// write "os"
err = en.Append(0xa2, 0x6f, 0x73)
if err != nil {
@@ -2055,7 +1900,7 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
return
}
}
if (zb0001Mask & 0x100) == 0 { // if not omitted
if (zb0001Mask & 0x80) == 0 { // if not omitted
// write "ats"
err = en.Append(0xa3, 0x61, 0x74, 0x73)
if err != nil {
@@ -2136,12 +1981,12 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) EncodeMsg(en *msgp.Writer) (err error) {
func (z *dataUsageEntry) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
o = msgp.Require(b, z.Msgsize())
// check for omitted fields
zb0001Len := uint32(10)
var zb0001Mask uint16 /* 10 bits */
zb0001Len := uint32(9)
var zb0001Mask uint16 /* 9 bits */
_ = zb0001Mask
if z.AllTierStats == nil {
zb0001Len--
zb0001Mask |= 0x100
zb0001Mask |= 0x80
}
// variable map header, size zb0001Len
o = append(o, 0x80|uint8(zb0001Len))
@@ -2158,9 +2003,6 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
// string "sz"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x73, 0x7a)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.Size)
// string "hts"
o = append(o, 0xa3, 0x68, 0x74, 0x73)
o = msgp.AppendInt64(o, z.HotTierSize)
// string "os"
o = append(o, 0xa2, 0x6f, 0x73)
o = msgp.AppendUint64(o, z.Objects)
@@ -2182,7 +2024,7 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) MarshalMsg(b []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
for za0002 := range z.ObjVersions {
o = msgp.AppendUint64(o, z.ObjVersions[za0002])
}
if (zb0001Mask & 0x100) == 0 { // if not omitted
if (zb0001Mask & 0x80) == 0 { // if not omitted
// string "ats"
o = append(o, 0xa3, 0x61, 0x74, 0x73)
if z.AllTierStats == nil {
@@ -2246,12 +2088,6 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Size")
return
}
case "hts":
z.HotTierSize, bts, err = msgp.ReadInt64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "HotTierSize")
return
}
case "os":
z.Objects, bts, err = msgp.ReadUint64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
@@ -2429,7 +2265,7 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntry) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *dataUsageEntry) Msgsize() (s int) {
s = 1 + 3 + z.Children.Msgsize() + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 4 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Uint64Size + 3 + msgp.Uint64Size + 4 + msgp.Uint64Size + 4 + msgp.ArrayHeaderSize + (dataUsageBucketLen * (msgp.Uint64Size)) + 3 + msgp.ArrayHeaderSize + (dataUsageVersionLen * (msgp.Uint64Size)) + 4
s = 1 + 3 + z.Children.Msgsize() + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Uint64Size + 3 + msgp.Uint64Size + 4 + msgp.Uint64Size + 4 + msgp.ArrayHeaderSize + (dataUsageBucketLen * (msgp.Uint64Size)) + 3 + msgp.ArrayHeaderSize + (dataUsageVersionLen * (msgp.Uint64Size)) + 4
if z.AllTierStats == nil {
s += msgp.NilSize
} else {
@@ -3422,438 +3258,6 @@ func (z *dataUsageEntryV7) Msgsize() (s int) {
return
}
// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable
func (z *dataUsageEntryV8) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
var zb0001Mask uint8 /* 1 bits */
_ = zb0001Mask
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, err = dc.ReadMapKeyPtr()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "ch":
err = z.Children.DecodeMsg(dc)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Children")
return
}
case "sz":
z.Size, err = dc.ReadInt64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Size")
return
}
case "os":
z.Objects, err = dc.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Objects")
return
}
case "vs":
z.Versions, err = dc.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Versions")
return
}
case "dms":
z.DeleteMarkers, err = dc.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "DeleteMarkers")
return
}
case "szs":
var zb0002 uint32
zb0002, err = dc.ReadArrayHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjSizes")
return
}
if zb0002 != uint32(dataUsageBucketLen) {
err = msgp.ArrayError{Wanted: uint32(dataUsageBucketLen), Got: zb0002}
return
}
for za0001 := range z.ObjSizes {
z.ObjSizes[za0001], err = dc.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjSizes", za0001)
return
}
}
case "vh":
var zb0003 uint32
zb0003, err = dc.ReadArrayHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjVersions")
return
}
if zb0003 != uint32(dataUsageVersionLen) {
err = msgp.ArrayError{Wanted: uint32(dataUsageVersionLen), Got: zb0003}
return
}
for za0002 := range z.ObjVersions {
z.ObjVersions[za0002], err = dc.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjVersions", za0002)
return
}
}
case "ats":
if dc.IsNil() {
err = dc.ReadNil()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats")
return
}
z.AllTierStats = nil
} else {
if z.AllTierStats == nil {
z.AllTierStats = new(allTierStats)
}
var zb0004 uint32
zb0004, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats")
return
}
for zb0004 > 0 {
zb0004--
field, err = dc.ReadMapKeyPtr()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats")
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "ts":
var zb0005 uint32
zb0005, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers")
return
}
if z.AllTierStats.Tiers == nil {
z.AllTierStats.Tiers = make(map[string]tierStats, zb0005)
} else if len(z.AllTierStats.Tiers) > 0 {
clear(z.AllTierStats.Tiers)
}
for zb0005 > 0 {
zb0005--
var za0003 string
za0003, err = dc.ReadString()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers")
return
}
var za0004 tierStats
var zb0006 uint32
zb0006, err = dc.ReadMapHeader()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003)
return
}
for zb0006 > 0 {
zb0006--
field, err = dc.ReadMapKeyPtr()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "ts":
za0004.TotalSize, err = dc.ReadUint64()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003, "TotalSize")
return
}
case "nv":
za0004.NumVersions, err = dc.ReadInt()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003, "NumVersions")
return
}
case "no":
za0004.NumObjects, err = dc.ReadInt()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003, "NumObjects")
return
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003)
return
}
}
}
z.AllTierStats.Tiers[za0003] = za0004
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats")
return
}
}
}
}
zb0001Mask |= 0x1
case "c":
z.Compacted, err = dc.ReadBool()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Compacted")
return
}
default:
err = dc.Skip()
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
// Clear omitted fields.
if (zb0001Mask & 0x1) == 0 {
z.AllTierStats = nil
}
return
}
// UnmarshalMsg implements msgp.Unmarshaler
func (z *dataUsageEntryV8) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
var field []byte
_ = field
var zb0001 uint32
zb0001, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
var zb0001Mask uint8 /* 1 bits */
_ = zb0001Mask
for zb0001 > 0 {
zb0001--
field, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapKeyZC(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "ch":
bts, err = z.Children.UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Children")
return
}
case "sz":
z.Size, bts, err = msgp.ReadInt64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Size")
return
}
case "os":
z.Objects, bts, err = msgp.ReadUint64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Objects")
return
}
case "vs":
z.Versions, bts, err = msgp.ReadUint64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Versions")
return
}
case "dms":
z.DeleteMarkers, bts, err = msgp.ReadUint64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "DeleteMarkers")
return
}
case "szs":
var zb0002 uint32
zb0002, bts, err = msgp.ReadArrayHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjSizes")
return
}
if zb0002 != uint32(dataUsageBucketLen) {
err = msgp.ArrayError{Wanted: uint32(dataUsageBucketLen), Got: zb0002}
return
}
for za0001 := range z.ObjSizes {
z.ObjSizes[za0001], bts, err = msgp.ReadUint64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjSizes", za0001)
return
}
}
case "vh":
var zb0003 uint32
zb0003, bts, err = msgp.ReadArrayHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjVersions")
return
}
if zb0003 != uint32(dataUsageVersionLen) {
err = msgp.ArrayError{Wanted: uint32(dataUsageVersionLen), Got: zb0003}
return
}
for za0002 := range z.ObjVersions {
z.ObjVersions[za0002], bts, err = msgp.ReadUint64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "ObjVersions", za0002)
return
}
}
case "ats":
if msgp.IsNil(bts) {
bts, err = msgp.ReadNilBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
return
}
z.AllTierStats = nil
} else {
if z.AllTierStats == nil {
z.AllTierStats = new(allTierStats)
}
var zb0004 uint32
zb0004, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats")
return
}
for zb0004 > 0 {
zb0004--
field, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapKeyZC(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats")
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "ts":
var zb0005 uint32
zb0005, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers")
return
}
if z.AllTierStats.Tiers == nil {
z.AllTierStats.Tiers = make(map[string]tierStats, zb0005)
} else if len(z.AllTierStats.Tiers) > 0 {
clear(z.AllTierStats.Tiers)
}
for zb0005 > 0 {
var za0004 tierStats
zb0005--
var za0003 string
za0003, bts, err = msgp.ReadStringBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers")
return
}
var zb0006 uint32
zb0006, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003)
return
}
for zb0006 > 0 {
zb0006--
field, bts, err = msgp.ReadMapKeyZC(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003)
return
}
switch msgp.UnsafeString(field) {
case "ts":
za0004.TotalSize, bts, err = msgp.ReadUint64Bytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003, "TotalSize")
return
}
case "nv":
za0004.NumVersions, bts, err = msgp.ReadIntBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003, "NumVersions")
return
}
case "no":
za0004.NumObjects, bts, err = msgp.ReadIntBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003, "NumObjects")
return
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats", "Tiers", za0003)
return
}
}
}
z.AllTierStats.Tiers[za0003] = za0004
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "AllTierStats")
return
}
}
}
}
zb0001Mask |= 0x1
case "c":
z.Compacted, bts, err = msgp.ReadBoolBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, "Compacted")
return
}
default:
bts, err = msgp.Skip(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return
}
}
}
// Clear omitted fields.
if (zb0001Mask & 0x1) == 0 {
z.AllTierStats = nil
}
o = bts
return
}
// Msgsize returns an upper bound estimate of the number of bytes occupied by the serialized message
func (z *dataUsageEntryV8) Msgsize() (s int) {
s = 1 + 3 + z.Children.Msgsize() + 3 + msgp.Int64Size + 3 + msgp.Uint64Size + 3 + msgp.Uint64Size + 4 + msgp.Uint64Size + 4 + msgp.ArrayHeaderSize + (dataUsageBucketLen * (msgp.Uint64Size)) + 3 + msgp.ArrayHeaderSize + (dataUsageVersionLen * (msgp.Uint64Size)) + 4
if z.AllTierStats == nil {
s += msgp.NilSize
} else {
s += 1 + 3 + msgp.MapHeaderSize
if z.AllTierStats.Tiers != nil {
for za0003, za0004 := range z.AllTierStats.Tiers {
_ = za0004
s += msgp.StringPrefixSize + len(za0003) + 1 + 3 + msgp.Uint64Size + 3 + msgp.IntSize + 3 + msgp.IntSize
}
}
}
s += 2 + msgp.BoolSize
return
}
// DecodeMsg implements msgp.Decodable
func (z *dataUsageHash) DecodeMsg(dc *msgp.Reader) (err error) {
{
+1 -6
View File
@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@ type BucketTargetUsageInfo struct {
// - total objects in a bucket
// - object size histogram per bucket
type BucketUsageInfo struct {
Size uint64 `json:"size"`
HotTierSize uint64 `json:"hotTierSize,omitempty"`
Size uint64 `json:"size"`
// Following five fields suffixed with V1 are here for backward compatibility
// Total Size for objects that have not yet been replicated
ReplicationPendingSizeV1 uint64 `json:"objectsPendingReplicationTotalSize"`
@@ -79,10 +78,6 @@ type DataUsageInfo struct {
// LastUpdate is the timestamp of when the data usage info was last updated.
// This does not indicate a full scan.
LastUpdate time.Time `json:"lastUpdate"`
// ScannerCycle changes only after a complete scanner pass. Background
// consumers use it to distinguish a partial cache update from a baseline
// that has visited every bucket and server pool.
ScannerCycle uint32 `json:"scannerCycle,omitempty"`
// Objects total count across all buckets
ObjectsTotalCount uint64 `json:"objectsCount"`
+1
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import (
// Tests create endpoints with ellipses and without.
func TestCreateServerEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
useStaticTestEndpoints(t)
testCases := []struct {
serverAddr string
args []string
+37
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
@@ -25,9 +26,42 @@ import (
"reflect"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/minio/dnscache"
)
type endpointTestResolver struct {
dnscache.DNSResolver
}
func (r endpointTestResolver) LookupHost(ctx context.Context, host string) ([]string, error) {
// These endpoint fixtures test locality and parsing, not public DNS.
for i, name := range []string{"example.org", "example.com", "example.net", "example.edu"} {
if host == name {
return []string{fmt.Sprintf("203.0.113.%d", i+1)}, nil
}
}
return r.DNSResolver.LookupHost(ctx, host)
}
func useTestEndpointDNS(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
previous := globalDNSCache
globalDNSCache = &dnscache.Resolver{Resolver: endpointTestResolver{net.DefaultResolver}}
t.Cleanup(func() { globalDNSCache = previous })
}
func useStaticTestEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
useTestEndpointDNS(t)
// These fixtures deliberately use localhost, including inside containers.
previous := orchestrated
orchestrated = false
t.Cleanup(func() { orchestrated = previous })
}
func TestNewEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
useTestEndpointDNS(t)
u2, _ := url.Parse("https://example.org/path")
u4, _ := url.Parse("http://192.168.253.200/path")
rootSlashFoo, _ := filepath.Abs("/foo")
@@ -130,6 +164,7 @@ func TestNewEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCreateEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
useStaticTestEndpoints(t)
tempGlobalMinioPort := globalMinioPort
defer func() {
globalMinioPort = tempGlobalMinioPort
@@ -353,6 +388,7 @@ func TestCreateEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
// So it means that if you have say localhost:9000 and localhost:9001 as endpointArgs then localhost:9001
// is considered a remote service from localhost:9000 perspective.
func TestGetLocalPeer(t *testing.T) {
useStaticTestEndpoints(t)
tempGlobalMinioPort := globalMinioPort
defer func() {
globalMinioPort = tempGlobalMinioPort
@@ -393,6 +429,7 @@ func TestGetLocalPeer(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGetRemotePeers(t *testing.T) {
useStaticTestEndpoints(t)
tempGlobalMinioPort := globalMinioPort
defer func() {
globalMinioPort = tempGlobalMinioPort

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